RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. vs.HON. JANSEN R.

RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners claiming that they are the heirs of Antonio Ching. Respondents Joseph and
Jaime are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes. The action seeks to declare the nullity
of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all
allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Whether the subject matter of the case is one of special proceedings or an ordinary civil action.
HELD:
The case is an ordinary civil action. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake
of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished
from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding
should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his
name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of
respondents' complaint and amended complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not
be threshed out in a special proceeding.

LUISA KHO MONTAER vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 174975 , January 20, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners, all Catholic, are the first family of the decedent Alejandro Montaer, Sr. The private respondents, a Muslim, widow of
the decedent, filed a complaint before the Sharia Court for the partition of the estate of Alejandro and the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decedent. The former moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
estate since Alejandro was a Roman Catholic. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. However, upon motion, the court
allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the laws of Muslim on the settlement of estate is applicable in this case.
HELD:
The Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has
jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court
determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court held that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special
proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 129242
January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadio ManalO died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children.
Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business. On November 26, 1992,

herein respondents, filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father,
Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. On the date of hearing, the
court declared all parties in default. The petitioners filed this petition seeking to annul the Resolution of the Court of
3
Appeals affirming the Orders of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner contended that there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family as
provided in Article 151 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 151 of the NCC pertaining to the absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the
same family is applicable in special proceeding.
HELD:
No. Art. 151 of the New Civil Code is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refer s to an
action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action
filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make
that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER

G.R. No. 157912
December 13, 2007
FACTS:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their
respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties. The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker moved for the dismissal of said money claim
against the estate on the grounds of failure to pay docket, failure to attach a certification against non-forum shopping and
petitioners failure to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally. On the other hand,
petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a
suppletory manner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rule in ordinary civil action is applicable in special proceeding.
HELD: Yes, but merely suppletory in character. Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. In the absence of special
provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose
an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable
or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for
money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry
Lee obtained a divorce decree. Subsequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis whom he had no children.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed

a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. She alleged that at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. The trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be
filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death. The term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

NAPOLEON D. NERI vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY

G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
FACTS:
Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, 2 from her first marriage with Gonzalo and 5 from her second marriage with
Enrique Neri. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a
total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte. Anunciacion died intestate. The heirs executed Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties,
and thereafter, conveying them to the late Spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000. In 1996, the children of Enrique filed a
complaint for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy assailing the validity of the sale for having been
sold within the prohibited period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of extra-judicial settlement of estate was valid.
HELD:
The Court held that in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy,
all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then
minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity. Only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have
effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy based on the provision that a person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to
sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.

In the matter of the estate of TELESFORO DE DIOS. TOMAS OSMEA, appellant.

G.R. No. L-7940
March 27, 1913
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, refusing to extend the time within which claims could be
presented to commissioners against the estate of Telesforo de Dios. The applicant is a merchant of much experience, a resident of
the municipality of Cebu, where he has lived and where the deceased, Telesforo de Dios, died, who was also a person well-known in
Cebu
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in refusing to extend the period for the presentation of claims against the estate of Telesforo
de Dios.
HELD:
No. The Court held that the appellant has not shown that he has a meritorious claim against the estate. There appears nothing in the
record demonstrating what the nature of the claim is, how it was contracted, or when. There is simply a naked allegation that
appellant has a claim. Also, the appellant, admitting full knowledge of the time within which he should have presented his claim and
the date on which the time for presentation expired, presents no sufficient explanation for failure to present the claim within that
period. His only excuse is that during the running of the period he was maintaining negotiations with one of the heirs for the
payment of the claim. Even if that were true, it furnishes no reason why the claim was not presented. Although the negotiations may
have been pending, the claim could have been presented nevertheless and, on payment thereof by the heir, further proceedings
could have been prevented.

PURA CARREON, ET AL vs. RUFO AGCAOILI and LOURDES SANTIAGO

G.R. No. L-11156
February 23, 1961
FACTS:
During the marriage, Celerina and Bonifacio acquired a parcel of land which is the subject of the controversy. When Bonifacio died,
Celerina represented herself as the sole heir of the property. Subsequently, she caused to obtain a new certificate of title in her own
name. She executed a mortgage with a bank which secured by the said parcel of land. The loan from the bank was paid, the
mortgage was released and the deed of absolute sale executed in his favor was registered. A new transfer certificate of title was
issued in the name of Rufo Agcaoili. After more than two years, the children of Celerina by her first marriage filed a complaint
against the spouses Agcaoili seeking to have the deed of sale executed by their mother declared as one of mortgage and to recover
one half pro-indiviso of the land described in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the buyer of the property after 2 years is in good faith
HELD:
Yes. There is no clear proof that when Rufo Agcaoili bought the land he knew of any flaw in the title of Celerina Dauag. The mere fact
that he was a townmate of Celerina is not sufficient basis to conclude that he knew that she had children by her first husband. It has
been shown that since 1920 Rufo Agcaoili has been an enlisted man in the Philippine constabulary and seldom come home to visit
his relatives. A man of such a situation cannot be expected to know the relatives and children of his vendor even if they are
townmates,. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear and sufficient evidence. Here every indication is that
Agcaoili bought the land in all good faith oblivious of the source of its acquisition.
The lien is effective only for a period of two years. From September 28, 1946, when a transfer certificate of title was issued to
Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two years had
elapsed. The Court sustained the lower court's opinion that thenceforth the right to have such lien cancelled became vested on
appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus oficio. And there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of appellee,
nor proof that he knew of any legal infirmity in the title of his vendor, we find no reason to apply the proposition that he is deemed
to be holding the land in trust for the children of Celerina Dauag.