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(22) Land Bank v CA and Jose Pascual

Facts:
Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three parcels of land located in Guttaran, Cagayan. Pursuant to
the Land Reform Program of the Government under PD 27 and EO 228, the Department of Agrarian Reform
placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer. After receiving notice of the decision of the PARAD
regarding the value of just compensation, private respondent accepted the valuation. However, when the
judgment became final and executory, petitioner LBP as the financing arm in the operation of PD 27 and EO
228 refused to pay thus forcing private respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution with the PARAD which the
latter issued on 24 December 1992. Still, petitioner LBP declined to comply with the order. Private respondent
filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by
the PARAD which the appellate court granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the LBP can refuse to pay the landowner of the value of just compensation
Held:
Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of the DAR, which bears the approval of the landowner, it
becomes its legal duty to finance the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner participated in the valuation
proceedings held in the office of the PARAD through its counsel, Atty. Eduard Javier. It did not appeal the
decision of PARAD which became final and executory. As a matter of fact, petitioner even stated in its Petition
that it is willing to pay the value determined by the PARAD provided that the farmer beneficiaries concur
thereto. These facts sufficiently prove that petitioner LBP agreed with the valuation of the land. The only thing
that hindered it from paying the amount was the non-concurrence of the farmer-beneficiary. But as we have
already stated, there is no need for such concurrence. Without such obstacle, petitioner can now be compelled to
perform its legal duty through the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

(24) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. The Court of Appeals and PRINCESS
EMME ATIK KIRAM (G.R. No. L-68303 January 15, 1988)
The case:
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals (CFI) in ordering the reconstitution of title in favor of private respondent.
Facts:

Properties in dispute are three divided lots altogether consisting of a total of 1,024
hectares of ricelands, the titles under the name of Sultan Jamalul Kiram, who died
in 1936. The private respondent, a niece of the late Sultan, now claims that the
original certificate of title and owners copy was destroyed due to a fire in Register
of Deeds of Sulu. She then goes to the CFI for reconstitution.

The CFI ruled for the respondent but the Republic filed a motion for dismissal, on
one of the ground that there was a lack of publication. The CFI granted said
restitution on the grounds that the certificate was published in the Official Gazette.

The Solicitor General appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court
of Appeals, which however affirmed in tot.

Issue:Whether or not the publication of the certificate in the Official Gazette complies
with the publication required by the proceedings after registration of the certificate.
Held: No. The notices of hearing were not posted on the main entrances of the provincial and municipal
halls of the locality in which the lands are located.
Rationale:

Section 13, of Republic Act No. 26 mentioned not only the publication in the Official Gazette but also,
required that (said notice of hearing) ...to be posted on the main of the municipality or city in which the
land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise.. , to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing.

A mode of publication is a jurisdictional requirement, the failure on the part of the applicant to comply
with it confers no jurisdiction upon the court. Neither is there any showing that the adjacent owners or
other interested parties were actually notified of the pending application

Republic Act No. 26 itself specifically calls upon the applicant to submit proof of that posting. 5 He
cannot rely on the presumption. In this case, fiction must yield to fact. Although the respondent
presented a certificate of service prepared by the sheriff, which embodying an order addressed to the
Station Commander of Panamao, Sulu, to post the proper notices and a certificate of publication in the
Official Gazette, it is not proof that the Station Commander had in fact complied with such an order.

Proclamation No. 1530 does not specifically name Sultan Kiram while Act No. 3430 does, The fact
therefore that Act No. 3430 grants title to the Sultan does not yield the presumption that Original
Certificate of Title No. P-133 refers to one and the same property.

For the purposes of the restitution, the two pieces of legislation earlier adverted to, Act No. 3430 and
Proclamation No. 1530, are not enough to support the petition for reconstitution. The private

respondent must have sufficient proof that her predecessor-in-interest had in fact availed himself of the
benefits of the land grant the twin statutes confer.

Wherefore, decision of the CFI is reversed and set aside. The Petition of Restitution
of the Title is dismissed.

(25) Case Digest on PHIL. VETERANS BANK V. CA


18 Jan. 2000
Facts:
Ps land was taken by DAR pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. P contended that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine
the just compensation for the taking of lands under CARP because such
jurisdiction is vested in the RTC.
Issue: Whether the DAR or RTC has jurisdiction
Held:
DAR has jurisdiction. There is nothing contradictory between the DARs
primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the RTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to the landowner. In
accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction
is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands
taken under CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the
courts.
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(28) Morta v. Occidental


GR No. 123417
10 June 1999
Pardo, J.

Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano
Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly gathering pili nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from
their respective land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants. Occidental claimed that
he was a tenant of the actual owner of the land, Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla
were not actually the owners of the land in question.
The trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla. Occidental, et al. appealed, contending that
the case was cognizable by the DAR Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). Thus, the RTC reversed
the lower court and ruled in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a tenancy-related
problem which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.

W/N the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB.


NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, the issue is clearly
outside DARABs jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. At any rate, whoever is declared to
be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancy-related for it still fails
to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina is the owner, then the
case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental
cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta.
Thus, for failure to comply with the requisites, the issue involved is not tenancy-related
cognizable by the DARAB.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
1. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

6. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Limited jurisdiction of DAR:
1. Adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
2. Resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and
3. Approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring, or readjustment of agricultural
lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

(29) DAR VS. CUENCA


FACTS
Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City
and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota City issued and
sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the landholding under the
compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No.
405. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and
Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405. Cuenca alleged that the implementation of
CARP in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the
implementation should have commenced and should have been completed between June 1988
to June 1992; that Executive Order No. 405 amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore,
it is unconstitutional considering that then President Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making
powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.
Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab
initio. The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist
from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination
of the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari
assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was
mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the
power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.

ISSUE
Whether the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court

RULING

Yes. A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs
prayed for refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of
EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the

allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following
averments. The main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not
the issue of compensation. Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the
DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the courts function of determining just
compensation. To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary
step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the
Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of
the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of
appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.

(30) Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos represented by his widow, Arsenia Garcia vda. de
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 109992 (March 7, 2000)

Facts:

The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the Municipal
Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public auction on September 20,
1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de
Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.

Private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period.
On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed as
DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from
gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless".

The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the gathering of the mango
fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992,
private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem
his land. The petition was dismissed.

Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a Motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that
"he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season".

On May 7, 1992 private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document,
Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of
Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.

The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending the resolution of the
ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time filed with the DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervenor's
deposited share. The Motion was granted and intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the
P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted tenant of the
land. The Court of Appeals affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the instant petition for review
on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question of
ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts?

Held:

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
SECTION 1.
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
(d)
Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the
subject property.

In the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:


For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the
parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held
that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters
involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems;
and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into
residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could
have brought this controversy under the ambit of agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition for
injunction in the first place.

The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main
petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the controversy between the parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on
which it can stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to order the
gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed
before it on the specific issue of ownership.

(32) LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONILA CELADA


FACTS:
Celada owns an agricultural land, 60% of which was identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Upon indorsement to it for field investigation and valuation, Land Bank valued the said land at
P299,569.61. DAR offered the same amount to Celada as just compensation. Celada, however, rejected the
offer. The matter was then referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for summary administrative
hearing on the determination of just compensation.
During the pendency of the DARAB case, Celada filed a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation, alleging that the current market value of her land was at least P2,129,085.00. In its answer,
Land Bank raised the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It contended that
Celada must first await the outcome of the DARAB case before taking any judicial recourse. Meanwhile, the
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank. Thereafter, the Special Agrarian
Court (SAC), where Celadas petition was filed, rendered judgment fixing the value of the land at
P354,847.50, finding that Celadas evidence showed that the neighboring lands of similar classification
were paid higher than what was quoted by Land Bank. It denied Land Banks affirmative defense. The
Court of Appeals dismissed Land Banks appeal.
Land Bank maintains that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over Celadas petition for judicial
determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the
DARAB. It also contends that the SAC erred in fixing the just compensation of the land based on the
valuation of neighboring lands instead of its actual land use.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for judicial determination of just
compensation pending administrative proceedings before the DARAB;
2.) Whether or not the SAC erred in fixing the just compensation of the land based on the valuation of
neighboring lands
HELD:

The petition is GRANTED.


SAC correctly assumed jurisdiction over determination of just compensation
The SAC did not err in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation
despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. As the Court held in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the RTC, sitting as a SAC, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. This original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decision. Although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting
as SACs, the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs.
It should be emphasized that the taking of property under the CARP is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
Thus, the SAC properly took cognizance of Celadas petition for determination of just compensation.
SAC erred in fixing just compensation based on valuation of neighboring lands
The SAC, however, erred in setting aside Land Banks valuation of the land on the sole basis of the higher
valuation given for neighboring properties. It did not apply the DAR valuation formula which considers
capitalized net income, comparable sales and market value per tax declaration as components of land
value.

(34) Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez


G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007)
Facts:

After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on November 16, 1993, of
respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in BarangayAgpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which respondent rejected.
Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just
compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.

On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering the LBP to pay
landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered with the total amount of
TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY
TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50).

A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel before the Special
Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon.

Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of
the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on
November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution on February 23, 2004.

LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution. On April 6,
2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the
CA. The CA, on September 28, 2004 dismissed the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the
pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC?

Held:

In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their
annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs
prayed for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD resolutions
should not be executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just compensation with the
SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora could come up with conflicting decisions. This is
precisely the evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping.

We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the
Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4,
2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.

In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's
decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore
that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after
its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had
already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.

(35) Case Digest: Chamber of Real Estate & Builders


Associations v. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 183409: June 18, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), Petitioner, v.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all private

agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled
agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15
June 1988. March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the following: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to
be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond the
effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized;
and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on
or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such
uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive
Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural uses or to another agricultural use.The AO was amended again in 2007 to include
provisions particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To
address the conversion to lands to non agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and
approval of land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is a slowdown of
housing projects because of such stoppage
ISSUES: Whether or not DARs AO entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses is unconstitutional
HELD: Yes.
POLITICAL LAW: Constitutionality of DARs A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses.
RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and not
classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. However, he
issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands reclassified from
agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June
1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or
otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No.
6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require
that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. It also
violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein that
reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the
DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.The said Section 2.19 of
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy
under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. There is
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under DAR AO No. 01-02,
as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively
prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More
so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all
other sectors of society.

(36) Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al.


G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land. By virtue of a Municipal
Ordinance, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. As part of their preparation for the
development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary
permits and appropriate government certifications.
However, the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and
directed the petitioners to cease and desist from further developments on the land.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. However, the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR
which has jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint.
When the case was brought to the SC, it was referred to the CA. However, the CA affirmed
the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the case.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of
conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to approve or disapprove


applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses, pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the reclassification or
conversion of agricultural lands.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint
for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program.

(37) LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD and JOSE R. CAGUIAT
G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation
for their agricultural lands, which were acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. The RTC
ordered Land Bank and DAR to pay respondents' land for P30 per square meters. Land Bank was not
able to file its motion for reconsideration on time because the motion filed by its counsel lacked a
notice of hearing. Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel is due to intense work-pressure and
constitutes excusable negligence, so the trial court should have heard the relief in accordance with Sec

1 of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Land Bank also argues that respondents failed to
exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just
compensation directly with the trial court because they should have first sought reconsideration of the
DAR's valuation of their properties.
Issues:
1. Whether or not counsel's failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence
entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment.
2. WON respondents should have sought reconsideration from DAR.
Held:
The petition is unmeritorious.Reasoning: Land Bank's argument that its counsel committed an
excusable negligence when he was not able to file the motion on time is untenable. Primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the
lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before
the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is,
after all, essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation
is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

(38) G.R. No. 170220

November 20, 2006

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA


SUNTAY TAEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioners, vs.LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee 2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of
agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285
hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the
land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972) 4 and Executive Order No. 228

(1987).5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54
which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2
containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under
the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the
same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of
just compensation.

ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the
expropriated properties at the time of payment.

HELD: Yes.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under
the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners. 27 The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet
received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the
failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is
important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.

(39) Samuel Estribillo, et al. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and Hacienda Maria, Inc.
G.R. No. 159674 (June 30, 2006)
Facts:

The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land
located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur. The parcels of land, the subject matters in this Petition,
were formerly part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing

that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful
cultivation thereof. HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent
No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land
with a total area of 527.8308 hectares. HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308
hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation
therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under said law.

The RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs The Decision was based on a 26 March
1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners' TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision. After the DARAB
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with their Petition for
Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the assailed Resolution:

The petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A.
Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the
other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration with Alternative Prayer with Leave
of Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his CoPetitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that
there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate
their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.

Issues:

Whether there was compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; the certification
against forum shopping?

Whether Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in
registration proceedings?

Held:

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of
multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other
tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals
and agencies would have to resolve the same issues.

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within
the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held
in Mendigorin v. Cabantog and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio that the certification of non-forum shopping
must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite
Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.

The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the
relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar, without
discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for
the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would
justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping,
such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are
as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless
would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate
of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the
indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act.

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after
granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to
petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the
order for the issuance of the patent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

(40) DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE


AND SPORTS (DECS).
G.R. No. 158228

March 23, 2004

FACTS: Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D which were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to
respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education). Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in
the name of respondent DECS .
Respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop
years, commencing from 1984-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for
another 10 agricultural crop years or until 2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several
others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition
for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of Escalante.
After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS,
stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a
conference with the farmer beneficiaries. The recommendation for coverage was approved by
DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the r, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the
Order of the Regional Director. Respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant
petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
HELD: No.
While respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income
derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in
the nearby locality, the court is inclined with the petitioners argument that the lands subject
hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and
exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income
derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the
coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption specifying those lands actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the
land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the
purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes."