G.R. No.

89785-98 June 25, 1990

7. Monina Posadas Senior Civil Engineer;

JAIME PONCE DE LEON, MERIAM DELOSTRICO, ORLANDO RAMIREZ,

REGALADO RENACIA, REYNALDO BABAO, MARY LOU MANANQUIL,
SESIPATRO MIER, MONINA POSADAS, LILIA RACHO, LEONARDO SALVA, and
DANILO ALTURA, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

8. Lilia Racho Property Custodian;

Rodolfo U. Jimenez Law Office for petitioner.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
These 14 cases involve irregular and fraudulent transactions in the Bais City Highway
Engineering District (BCHED), one of the fifteen (15) engineering districts in Central
Visayas, or Region VII. Similar cases from the same Region, already decided by the
Sandiganbayan, are: (1) the Danao City 1978 cases; (2) Tagbilaran City 1978 cases;
(3) Lapu-Lapu City 1978 cases; and (4) the Siquijor 1977 cases.
The petitioners are eleven (11) of twenty-eight (28) persons charged before the
Sandiganbayan with fourteen (14) counts of violations of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) 1 committed in connection with some
"ghost projects" in the Bais City Highway Engineering District (BCHED) in 1978.
The petitioners, except Jaime Ponce De Leon who is a private contractor, were
government employees at the time of the commission of the crime, holding positions
in the BCHED as follows:
1. Meriam Delostrico Accountant I;
2. Orlando Ramirez Senior Civil Engineer;
3. Regalado Renacia District Engineer;
4. Reynaldo Babao Maintenance Man;
5. Mary Lou Mananquil Civil Engineer;
6. Sesipatro Mier Administrative Officer;

9. Leonardo Salva Asst. Highway Engineer;

10. Danilo Altura Ground Man Gardener. (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
The information against them alleged that they conspired and connived with their codefendants to defraud the Government in amounts totalling P627,239.88, through the
falsification of fourteen (14) general vouchers, checks, and other documents
... making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of
Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement
ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letters of Advice of Allotment
to cover the purchase of construction materials for use in the
improvement and/or repair of roads within the District when in truth
and in fact, as all the accused well knew, the same were not true,
and correct; by making it appear in the voucher that funds were
available and that there-were approriate request[s] for allotments to
pay the aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for the said item was
made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a
corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning
bidder; that the roads construction materials were delivered,
inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged
supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact, as all the
accused know, all the foregoing were false and incorrect and
because of the foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused
were able to collect from the Bais City Highways Engineering
District the total amount of ... Philippine Currency, in payment of the
non-existing deliveries; that the aforesaid amount was not reflected
in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office showing
its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal
vouchers as a designed means to cover-up the fraud; and then the
accused, once in possession of the said amount, [did]
misappropriate, convert, and misapply the same to their personal
needs, causing injury, damage and prejudice to the Philippine
Government in the total amount of ... Philippine Currency.
(Emphasis supplied; pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
Together with Rolando Mangubat and Benjamin Camarra, 2 the Regional Accountant
and Supervising Civil Engineer, respectively, of the BCHED, the petitioners were
convicted of the charges against them and were uniformly sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan to suffer in each of the 14 cases an indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as maximum; each to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount stated in each of the fourteen (14)
informations (pp. 88-94, Rollo); and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of
the actions.
Of the twenty-eight (28) accused in the 14 cases, 12 were convicted and ten (10)
were acquitted, 3 namely: (1) Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director; (2) Angelina
Escano, Finance Officer: Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer; (4) Matilde Jabalde,
Supervising Accounting Clerk; (5) Josefina Luna, Accountant II; (6) Jose Sayson,
Budget Examiner, all of the Cebu City Regional Office; (7) Leonila Del Rosario, Chief
of Finance and Management Service; (8) Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant; (9)
Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant; and (10) Leonardo Tordecilla,
Supervising Accountant.
However, the Sandiganbayan's 75-page decision dated July 5, 1989 is silent on the
guilt or innocence of five (5) defendants, namely: (1) Assistant Regional Director Jose
Bagasao; (2) Accountant Edgardo Cruz; (3) Budget Officer II Agripino Pagdanganan;
(4) COA Auditor Cesar Pasculado; and (5) Auditing Examiner Tranquilino Sevilla.
The standard procedure for undertaking new highways projects or maintaining and
repairing existing ones, was described by Supervising Civil Engineer Benjamin
Camarra and District Engineer Regalado Renacia, whose testimonies are
summarized in the appealed decision as follows:
Among the fifteen (15) highway engineering districts which
comprised Region VII of the MPH [Ministry of Public Highways
(now Department of Public Works and Highways)], is the Bais City
Highway Engineering District (BCHED). It is headed by the City
Engineer of Bais City with its own auditing staff headed by the City
Auditor. Its jurisdiction encompasses the territorial limits of Bais
City, including the Bais-Kabangkalan Road and the Dumaguete
North Road, for which annual maintenance allotments are issued to
it and other districts by the MPH through the Regional Office in the
form of Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) which serve as
authority for the district office to incur obligations. These LAAs are
derived from Sub-Advice of Allotments (SAAs) which are issued to
all regional offices by the MPH based on Advices of Allotment (AAs)
issued by it by the Ministry of the Budget after the annual
government appropriations act or budget has been approved.
While AAs, SAAs and LAAs serve as authority to incur obligations
by the MPH, its regional offices and the latter's district offices, the

authority to make payments for said obligations incurred is derived

from Cash Disbursement Ceilings (CDCs), which are issued by the
Ministry of Budget to the MPH together with the AAs. The MPH, in
turn, issue Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (ACDC) to its
regional office, and the latter then issues the corresponding SubAdvice of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (SACDCS) to the different
engineering districts under it. All releases of funds by the MPH to its
regional offices are made at the outset of every quarter, based on
the programmed needs of the region's district offices, and said
releases made through LAAs and CDCs to each district are entered
in the appropriate logbooks or ledgers of the Regional Office,
principally in the Budget and Finance Division thereof.
In the case of the Bais CHED, disbursement of the quarterly
allotments for maintenance or other needs of the districts is
effected through the proper written request by the District Engineer
for the release of such funds, accompanied by the supporting
programs of work, directed to the Regional Director. Upon approval
of said request by the latter, an LAA is issued to the District
Engineer by the Regional Finance Officer, certified as to the
availability of funds by the Regional Accountant, and countersigned
by the Regional Director. Correspondingly, the requisite SACDC is
prepared by the Regional Finance Officer to be signed by him and
the Regional Director, after which they are duly recorded in a
logbook. Both the LAA and SACDC are then sent to the district
office and are carried and received by duly-authorized
representatives.
Implementation of the district's programs of work now go into the
requisition stage, wherein the proper Requisition for Supplies and
Equipment (RSE), needed for the prosecution of its projects and
embodied in the approved program of work, is prepared by the
requisitioning officer, certified as to the availability of funds by the
District Accountant, and approved by the District Engineer. The
Project Engineer also prepares a Request for Obligation of
Allotment (ROA) which the Accountant certifies as to availability of
funds. The RSE, together with a copy of the program of work, is
then transmitted to the Regional Office for the approval of the
Regional Director and thereafter returned to the district concerned
for prosecution of the project after compliance with bidding and
award procedures.
Based on the approved RSE, the district's Property Custodian or
Purchasing/Supply Officer, with the approval of the District

Engineer, sends out Request for Sealed Quotations to various

contractors or suppliers requesting them to submit, on or before a
date fixed therein, their quotations for the materials or supplies.
Notices thereof are likewise publicized through either newspaper
publications or postings in public places. Within the reglementary
period, the sealed bid forms are opened by the Committee on
Bidding and Award in the presence of representatives of the
District/City Auditor. The lowest price quotation or bid is determined
and the corresponding Abstract of Bids is prepared and signed by
the members of the committee, as well as the auditor's and district
engineer's representatives, after which the corresponding award is
made to the said lowest bidder, duly approved by the District
Engineer. A Purchase Order (PO) is thereafter prepared by the
Property Custodian, addressed to the winning bidder, certified as to
availability of funds by the Accountant and approved by the District
Engineer.

Clearance Certificate of the supplier-contractor. After the GV is

processed, pre-audited and approved, the papers are brought to
the Cashier for the preparation of the check or treasury warrant or
TCAA check, which is also pre-audited. The check is then released
to the supplier-contractor or his duly authorized representative who
issues the corresponding official receipt.
At the end of each calendar month, the District Accountant
prepares several reports, including the Report of Obligations
Incurred (ROI) and the Report of Checks Issued (RCI), which are
submitted to the Regional Office. At the Regional Budget and
Finance division, these reports, together with those coming from
other districts, are entered in the proper journals and, in the course
of ordinary accounting procedures, are entered in the General
Ledger. In turn, the entries in the General Ledger become the basis
for monthly Trial Balances (TBB) which are prepared cumulatively
by the Regional Accountant, recommended for approval by the
Regional Finance Officer and approved by the Regional Director,
which TBs are also submitted every month to the Central Office of
the MPH. At the end of the fiscal calendar year, the final Trial
Balance is prepared by the Regional Office and likewise submitted
to the MPH. (pp. 31-37, Rollo.)

Delivery is then effected by the winning bidder, in accordance with

the terms and conditions of the PO, which may include the time
required to start and terminate said deliveries and the places of
delivery. Inspection of deliveries are made at the delivery or project
sites by a representative of the Auditor's office upon receipt of a
verbal or written request for such inspection prepared by the
Property Custodian to the Auditor. The Auditor's representative
inspects the deliveries, signs the Delivery Receipts (DRs) and,
finally, the Report of Inspection (ROI), duly concurred in by the
Property Custodian. During said deliveries, samples of the
materials are also tested for their conformity with specifications and
the results of such tests are submitted to the District Engineer to be
attached to the payment vouchers, together with all other
supporting documents.

Upon the evidence presented at the trial, the Sandiganbayan found that:

After completion of deliveries, the corresponding General Voucher

(GV) for the payment of the supplies or materials delivered is
prepared, usually by someone at the district office. Said GV
contains on the face thereof five (5) certifications to be signed by
the proper officials, namely, the Property Custodian, the Project
Engineer, the District or City Engineer, the Accountant and the
District or City Auditor attesting and certifying to the correctness,
legality and propriety of the transaction covered by said GV.
Attached to said GV and required to be examined and verified by
the proper district officials and their subordinates are the requisite
supporting documents, such as, the RSE, ROA, Program of Work,
Detailed Estimates, Request for Sealed Quotations, Abstract of
Bids, PO, DRs, Request for Inspection, Test Reports and Tax

2. The "badges of fraud" proving the fake character of the three (3) LAAs and four (4)
SACDCS, which served as bases for the preparation and payment of the 14 GVs to
Ponce De Leon were:

1. Although the BCHED had received its allocation of P568,487.80 for 1978 for the
maintenance and repair of roads and bridges in that district the defendants caused
the disbursement of an additional sum of P627,239.88 through 14 fake general
vouchers paid to accused Jaime Ponce De Leon, for supposed deliveries from
January to April 1978 of materials for the Dumaguete City North Road (2-1/2 kms.)
and the Bais Kabankalan Road (4 kms.), utilizing three (3) fake LAAs and four (4)
SACDCs (pp. 60-61, Rollo). Per estimate of the Cental Office, the average cost of
maintenance was only P11,000 per kilometer of highway in 1978 (p. 57, Rollo) but
P627,239.88 was spent by the defendants in January to April 1978 to repair or
maintain 6- kms. of the Dumaguete City North Road and the Bais-Kabankalan
Road, which should have cost only P71,500 more or less.

(a) the improper charging of alleged prior year's (1977) obligation to

the 1978 LAAs and SACDCs which were irregularly issued.

(b) the improper charging likewise of the illegal disbursements to

"savings on equipment rentals,"
(c) the fake or doubtful LAAs were not numbered in sequence,
(d) there were no references to the mother SAA numbers which are
always cited in the regular or authentic LAAs,
(e) the fake LAAs were not recorded in the logbook maintained by
the Regional Office,
(f) the rubber stamps for the certification of availability of funds in
the fake LAAs were all signed by accused Rolando Mangubat,
Chief Accountant 1. Such certification in the regular LAAs were
usually signed by his assistant, Delia Preagido, and
(g) the authorized signatories of regular LAAs were either Finance
Officer Escano alone or jointly with Asst. Regional Director Jose
Bagasao, while the fake LAAs were signed by Mangubat and
Bagasao (pp. 64-65, Rollo).
3. No copies of the programs of work were presented during the investigation. The
programs of work for the two projects prepared by Mananquil (and checked and
approved by Ramirez and Renacia) were "antedated or manufactured" after, not
before, the issuance of the 14 GVs (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
4. To facilitate the defraudation of the Government, although the three (3) fake LAAs
were for amounts of P200,000, P250,000 and P200,000 each, and the SACDCs were
for P100,000, P450,000, P20,000 and P200,000 each (p. 68, Rollo) the RSES, POs
and GVs were split into amounts of less than P50,000 each so that they could be
processed, pre-audited, and approved by the accused BCHED resident auditor Jose
Veloso, instead of the COA Regional Auditor, as provided in COA Circular No. 76-41
dated July 30, 1976, in relation to COA Circular No. 16-16-A dated March 23, 1976,
clarifying COA Circular No. 76-A dated February 10, 1976 (p. 69, Rollo).
5. The materials for the two road projects were not delivered by the contractor, Ponce
De Leon. The documents supporting the GVs payable to De Leon were either
antedated or undated, and all were hastily and haphazardly prepared (pp. 70-71,
Rollo).
6. Ponce De Leon was not a gravel-and-sand extractor nor a supplier. His business
was registered as "Allied Auto Supply/Marketing" and "Allied Transport Services." In
1978, he had not paid any extraction fees and he did not own or lease any quarry, or

trucks for hauling gravel and sand. The delivery receipts (DRs) for the materials
supposedly delivered by him showed that only one truck was used to Make
simultaneous deliveries at the two project sites which were more than 60 kilometers
apart (pp. 72-73, Rollo), proving that the DRs were fictitious.
7. No maintenance engineers or foremen of the BCHED supervised and inspected
the two projects (p. 73, Rollo) which otherwise would have been done if there was
actual ongoing work in those projects.
8. The accused public officials, by the nature of their duties, would have known that
the documents (LAAs, SACDs, RSES, POs, and GVs) were fake by merely
scrutinizing them, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence, for the funding of the three
LAAs was irregular and the RSEs and GVs had been "split" into uniform amounts of
not more than P50,000 each.
9. Ponce De Leon knew fully well that his participation in the transactions was "only
make-believe or a farce;" but he wholeheartedly cooperated and conspired with his
co-accused to consummate their common plan to defraud the Government (p. 79,
Rollo). Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, which the petitioners violated, provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The elements of this offense are:
(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them;
(2) That said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions;

(3) That they cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private
party;

hasty and mass production and such ante-dated documents,

including programs of work, but also allowed their names, positions
and signatures to be used in completing the cycle which would lend
a semblance of legality or regularity to the questioned transactions
and illegal disbursements [of public funds to a fake contractorsupplier], thus causing undue injury to the Government in the total
amount of P627,230.99. ...

(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or

preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. (pp. 8283, Rollo).

... He also knew for a fact that the district had no prior year's
unliquidated obligations in the amount of P650,000.00, hence, any
and all LAAs with corresponding SACDCO would be questionable,
if not fake, spurious or irregular. He and accused Delostrico, the
district accountant, were fully aware of the standard operating
procedure in the release of quarterly allotments and should not
have accepted, much less, utilized the fake LAAs and SACDCA for
alleged "ghost projects" which were not supported by approved
programs of work and RSEs approved in the Regional Office. ...

As observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements are present in these 14

cases.
In the cases at bar, all the above-cited requisite elements are
present. When accused Bagasao and Mangubat, as Asst. Regional
Director and Regional Accountant, respectively, issued the fake
LAAs and corresponding SACDCs to the BCHED, knowing fully
well that the allotments and/or allocation thereunder were not
properly authorized by the Ministries of the Budget and the Public
Highways and neither have they been programmed for release in
accordance with standard operating procedure, they thus acted
with evident bad faith. Accused Renacia and Delostrico likewise
acted with evident bad faith in receiving and implementing the fake
LAAs and SACDCA since they should have known and noticed that
the allotments released thereunder were not for "regular
maintenance," especially so when the district had just received its
first quarter allocations for 1978; that they had not requested
formally for such extra allocations; that the LAAs and SACDCs
were fake or spurious on their faces and signed by unauthorized
officials, and that they had not prepared any program of work to
justify such extra allocations.
All the accused officials from the BCHED, namely, Renacia, Salva,
Camarra, Ramirez, Posadas and Mananquil, who were all
engineers, and their subordinates in the prosecution of projects in
the district, namely, Babao and Altura, together with those involved
in administrative, accounting and auditing functions, namely, Mier,
Delostrico, Racho, Pascualdo and Sevilla, likewise acted with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in participating in the
preparation, processing and approval of the GVs and supporting
documents, such as RSES. Requests for Obligation of Allotment
(ROAs), Abstracts of Bids, POs, Delivery Receipts (DRs), Summary
of Deliveries, Reports of Inspection (ROIS) and Checks in payment
of "ghost projects" to a fake or spurious contractor-supplier, Jaime
Ponce de Leon. They not only connived and confederated in the

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, Mangubat cannot escape or be absolved from liability in the
sordid mess. He initiated the entire scheme, together with accused
Asst. Regional Director Jose Bagasao, when they issued fake LAAs
and which he followed up by issuing fake SACDCA. He later tried to
cover-up the illegal and improper disbursement of public funds by
certifying to the correctness of the Journal Vouchers at the end of
the year through the utilization of "negative entries" which enabled
the region's financial records to reflect what he only wanted to
reflect, which is, the disbursements of funds thru regular LAAs and
SACDCs for 1978 but negating the amounts of the disbursements
thru the fake LAAs and SACDCS. (pp. 83-87, Rollo.)
The petitioners' attempt to denigrate the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Apollo Sayo and Victoria Quejada, members of the investigating team, is unavailing
for the principal evidence against the accused in these cases are documentary. The
existence of the documents and of their signatures therein, is not denied by them.
Their guilt of the crimes charged had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is dismissed. The appealed decision in SB
Crim. Cases Nos. 7201 to 7214 is affirmed in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

Criminal Cases Nos. 9200-9204. Except for the names of the individuals who were
allegedly favored by the petitioner and the dates when these favors were made, the
informations uniformly alleged:
That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan,
Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused AMOR D. DELOSO, a public officer being then the
Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, taking
advantage of his public and official position, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to
Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the
discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor
purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by
the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at
reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of
rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing
undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan. (Rollo, p. 30)
A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

The Office of the Solicitor General for public respondent.

The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R. Nos. 69963-67) to annul the
Sandiganbayan's resolutions denying the petitioner's motion to quash and motion for
reconsideration.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated February 10, 1989 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9200 to 9204 which
preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal
cases) pendente lite from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from
any office that he may be holding.
The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections
of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan
Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having
committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the
award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales
during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality
to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals.
The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was
dismissed. As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate
informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of Section
3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as

In a resolution dated July 28,1988, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
resolution became final and executory on October 17, 1988.
The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He
pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the
petitioner pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor D. Deloso is
suspended pendente lite from his position as Provincial Governor of
Zambales and from any other office that he may now be holding.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government for implementation and for him to

inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five (5)
days from receipt hereof. (Rollo, p. 94)
The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, the petitioner
filed the instant petition.
On February 17, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan
requesting that the execution and implementation of the February 10, 1989
suspension order be held in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the
petition. The motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask the Court for an
earlier setting of the trial of the cases which was denied in an order dated February
22, 1989.
In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the cases, the
Sandiganbayan said:
The Court notes that these cases have already been set for May
15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and 7, 1989 at 8:00 o'clock in
the morning and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. While the accused
claims that this period is ordinately far, the Court must also be
contend with its own calendar. It will be easy enough for this Court
to give the accused an earlier setting. However, such a setting will
be best a pretence since other cases have already been set
between now and May 15 where in many instances the accused
themselves are also under suspension by reason of the same
provision of law. Under the above circumstances, no other earlier
setting can be granted to the accused without making that setting
merely a sham since other cases which have been set earlier will
naturally have a right to expect priority. (Rollo, p. 135)
In view of this development, the petitioner filed an urgent supplemental application for
temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan, the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development,
and all those acting in their behalf from executing and implementing the February 10,
1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer and decide this petition on its
merits.
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13
of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act No. 3019).
This same issue was raised in the case of Layno v. Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536
[1985]). After considering the facts as well as the merits of the case, the Court ruled

that the petition need not be resolved through a ruling on the validity of the provision
on mandatory suspension. We instead, decided the case in relation to the principles
of due process and equal protection of the law.
Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition, we apply anew the
ruling in the Layno case and decide the instant petition in relation to the principles of
due process and equal protection without having to declare categorically whether or
not the suspension provision of Republic Act 3019 should be struck down as invalid.
We limit ourselves to ascertaining whether or not, under the circumstances of this
case, an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable.
As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a separate opinion the
mischief which would result if the Court allows the indefinite suspension of elective
local officials charged with violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that the penalty of
suspension is definitely much lower than that of removal and it
would be incongruous if we give to the penalty of suspension more
serious consequences than are attached to the penalty of removal.
Senator Padilla opted for the immediate restoration of the
respondent to his position once the favorable result of the election
is known.
Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there was an exchange
of views between Senator Ganzon and Senator Manglapus on the
Anti-Graft Law, the exchange was limited to the matter of the
commencement of the investigation of the charges, which,
according to Senator Ganzon, cannot be made within one year
prior to an election.
And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion above, I bewail the
apathy of the majority of the Court toward efforts to seek
enlightenment on legal issues of grave importance from the
deliberations of Congress upon the said issues. It is not quite
becoming of judicial magistrates to shunt aside a suggestion that
the interplay of legal provisions be carefully studied and analyzed.
In the deliberations of the Court on this case, I suggested that we
examine the possible delimiting effects of the provisions of the first
sentence of section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the provisions
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act insofar as the
suspension from office of an elective local official is concerned. In
no uncertain words did I focus the attention of the Court on the
serious ever-present possibility of harassment of an elective local

official taking the form of the filing of a valid information against him
under the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
after his exoneration in an administrative case involving the same
offense.
I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious delay in the
courts of justice which could effectively frustrate an elected or reelected local official from discharging the duties of his office for the
entire term of his office, and thus nullify the will of the people who
elected him. I likewise asked the Court to consider the situation
where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly and
is elected despite the fact that he is under suspension under the
authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and sought a definitive answer to the question. What then
would happen to the suspension meted out to him since it is the
National Assembly that determines whether he should assume and
continue in office?
All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by the
majority of the Court with the sweeping statement that the
provisions of the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative
cases. It is the ex cathedra attitude, this kind of slothful thinking,
that I find abhorrent and therefore deplore " (Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57
SCRA 163, 197-198 [1974])
Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January
18, 1988 local elections. The regular term of a governor is only 3 years although he
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992 by special provision of the Constitution.
(Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article XVIII, Constitution). He was, however, ordered
suspended from performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 by virtue of the criminal charges filed against
him. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner
may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated
sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on
the ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority.
Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified
becomes unreasonable thus raising a due process question. As we ruled in Layno,
Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, (supra):
Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del
Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this
information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan

according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would

have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such
municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October
26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are
entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be
proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally.
In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if
there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be
justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of
time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been
nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered
by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise
on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the
man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and
resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite
manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the
order of suspension should be lifted.
Moreover, in the earlier case of Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, (6 SCRA 1 [1962])
we ruled on the issue as to whether the preventive suspension beyond the maximum
period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic
Act 2260) is illegal and void. Paulino Garcia, the petitioner in the cited case was the
Chairman of the National Science Development Board appointed by the President of
the Philippines. He was charged with electioneering and dishonesty in office. Pending
investigation of the administrative charges against him, he was suspended by the
Executive Secretary by authority of the President. In view of his indefinite suspension,
he filed a petition praying in effect that the 60-day period prescribed in the Civil
Service Law for preventive suspension having already expired, he be reinstated in the
service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act. The respondents opposed the petition
on the ground that the petitioner was a presidential appointee and therefore not
covered by the 60-day preventive suspension limit under Section 35 of the then Civil
Service Act. The respondents maintained that the petitioner could be indefinitely
suspended. In ruling in favor of the petitioner, the Court stated:
To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the
President, facing administrative charges can be preventively
suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where
the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself
without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express

mandate of the Constitution (No officer or employee in the Civil

Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law. [Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines])
and the Civil Service Law (No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law and after due process). ... In the guise of a
preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he
could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly
established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution ... (at
pp. 8-9)
The question that now arises is whether or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the
suspension was ordered by no less than the President of the Philippines is applicable
to an elective official facing criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law and suspended
under Section 13, thereof.
The guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the application of the
ruling in the Garcia v. Executive Secretary. Thus, we explained in the Layno case, to
wit:
... If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in
character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is
therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic
limitation on the duration thereof; 'In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
suspension.' (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last
sentence. The first sentence reads as follows: 'Preventive
suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of
culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or
when the continuance in office of the respondent influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence'). It may be recalled that the principle against
indefinite suspension applies equally to national government
officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon.
Secretary (116 Phil. 348 [1962]). According to the opinion of Justice
Barrera: 'To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer
appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be
preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the
penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to
the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.'

(Ibid. 351-352) Further: 'In the guise of a preventive suspension, his

term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be
removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due
hearing, in violation of the Constitution.' (Ibid. 352) Clearly then, the
policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a
suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere
fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do
so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection
guarantee. (at p. 542)
The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an
unreasonable period of time applies with greater force to elective officials and
especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. The interests of the
sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the
heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court.
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the
highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an
indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire
term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder,
malversation of public finds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and
resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited
determination of his innocence or guilt.
The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period
can not be sanctioned. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective
public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety
(90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree,
which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of
this case.
The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as
amended by Batasan Pambansa Blg. 192 to him. He opines that the suspension
provision as amended which qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not apply
to him since he is now occupying the position of governor and not mayor, the position
wherein he was charged under the Anti-Graft Law.
This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v.
Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383 (1984), in this wise:
... Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended
because he is presently occupying a position different from that
under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision

clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act
3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage or execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Thus, by the use of the word office the same applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.
One last point. Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as
preventing the abuse of the prerogatives of the office, intimidation of witnesses, etc.,
become manifest, the respondent court is not bereft of remedies or sanctions. The
petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from
an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension imposed
on petitioner Amor D. Deloso by virtue of the February 10, 1989 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan should be limited to only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will
assume once again the functions of governor of Zambales, without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial of the pending cases against him in the Sandiganbayan. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A.
JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J.
GORDON, respondents.
Isagani M. Jungco, Valeriano S. Peralta, Miguel Famularcano, Jr. and Virgilio E.
Acierto for petitioners.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original
petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of

salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office . . . ." 2 Paragraph (d)
reads
(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis
supplied).
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic,
Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in
U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that theproviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 hereinabove quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional and statutory
provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public officer or position during his tenure," 3 because the City Mayor of Olongapo City
is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of
the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", 4since it was Congress
through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the
subject posts; 5 and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, which says:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense: . . . (g) Appointment of new employees, creation of
new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. During the
period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer
of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national
or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional,
temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except
upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not
grant the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to
be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that
may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing
provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent
need:Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be

given to the Commission within three days from the date of the
appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision
shall be null and void. (2) Any government official who promotes, or
gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any
government official or employee, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations . . . .
for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made
by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day
period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which
states, "Provided, however,That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions
in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication
and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public
office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an
executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, 6 ". . . . should be allowed to attend to
his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency . . . ."
Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an
executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents . . . ." 7

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination
to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most
beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the
appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the
LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for
no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since
the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought
to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke
a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut
difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple
offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the
government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g.,
the President as head of the economic and planning agency; 9 the Vice-President,
who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; 10 and, a member of Congress who
may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. 11
The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was not
accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It was purposely sought by the
drafters of the Constitution as shown in their deliberation, thus
MR. MONSOD. In other words, what then Commissioner is saying,
Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the prohibition is more strict with
respect to elective officials, because in the case of appointive
officials, there may be a law that will allow them to hold other
positions.
MR. FOZ. Yes, I suggest we make that difference, because in the
case of appointive officials, there will be certain situations where
the law should allow them to hold some other positions. 12

The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second
paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first
paragraph.
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor
of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, 13 where we stated that the prohibition against the holding of any
other office or employment by the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of
the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the
primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio
capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.
This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not
contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to
the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase
"shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been
the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at
least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been
used. 14
Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that
subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless
passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed,
the Senators would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had
they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio.
Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso was
stated, Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee just said
"the Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose the issue. It is a
legislative choice." 15 The Senator took a view that the constitutional proscription
against appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congress
attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the
President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view of Senator
Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be appointive, thus
nibbling in the bud the argument that they are ex officio.
The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by
respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality of the
challenged proviso since it is not put in issue in the present case. In the same vein,
the argument that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another
post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double
compensation 16 would be useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect the

constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example,
an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3, Art. VII, may
receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by
law.
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the
President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the
Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really
has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person
or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or
trust," 17 or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons
having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of
the same. 18 In his treatise, Philippine Political
Law, 19 Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the
selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise
the functions of a given office."
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily
exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J., 20 "the choice of a person to fill an
office constitutes the essence of his appointment,"21 and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds
that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise
of discretion." 22 In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
Court 23 we held:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified
among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
It is a prerogative of the appointing power . . . .
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves
an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing
appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a
fundamental component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext
of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as
to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own
choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be

met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of
appointment. 24
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a
presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A.
7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e.,
the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in
question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to
appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice,
is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer
during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the
appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act,
the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his
tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to
cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit
for appointment. The deliberation in the Constitutional Commission is enlightening:
MR. DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the
substitution of the word "term" with TENURE.
MR. FOZ. The effect of the proposed amendment is to make
possible for one to resign from his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, we should allow that prerogative.
MR. FOZ. Resign from his position to accept an executive position.
MR. DAVIDE. Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because
of, say, incapacity, he may leave the service, but if he is prohibited
from being appointed within the term for which he was elected, we
may be depriving the government of the needed expertise of an
individual. 25
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,

notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the
Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the
appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of
his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with
Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .
during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference between the two
provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts only after they have been appointed to another government office,
while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be
appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being
appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related
with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different where it is
expresslyprovided by law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to
another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from
accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala.
445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his
election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn
147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272,
232 p 388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons
holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office,
either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the
incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second
is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445)." 27
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the
position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the
public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under
color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or
because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of
some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect
being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or
pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21
Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)." 28

Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems, allowances
and other emoluments which may have been received by respondent Gordon
pursuant to his appointment may be retained by him.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., is on leave.

The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now evident, other matters
affecting the legality of the questioned proviso as well as the appointment of said
respondent made pursuant thereto need no longer be discussed.
In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen. Sotero Laurel
which he expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B. 1648, precursor of R.A. 7227,
when he articulated
. . . . (much) as we would like to have the present Mayor of
Olongapo City as the Chief Executive of this Authority that we are
creating; (much) as I, myself, would like to because I know the
capacity, integrity, industry and dedication of Mayor Gordon; (much)
as we would like to give him this terrific, burdensome and heavy
responsibility, we cannot do it because of the constitutional
prohibition which is very clear. It says: "No elective official shall be
appointed or designated to another position in any capacity." 29
For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain amidst the
strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves." 30 One of the
characteristics of the Constitution is permanence, i.e., "its capacity to resist capricious
or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate needs but only by passing fancies,
temporary passions or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or
personalities . . . . Such a Constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit
political expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change." 31
Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon has a choice. We have no choice.
WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states:
". . . Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of
this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent
Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by
him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority as
officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26882 April 5, 1978

ROSARIO VDA. DE LAIG, ROMEO, JOSE, NESTOR and BENITO, JR., all
surnamed LAIG, minors, assisted by Rosario Vda. de Laig, Their Guardian Ad
Litem, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN VERZO, PETRE GALERO, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF CAMARINES NORTE, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, AND THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,respondents.
Gelasio L. Dimaano for petitioners.
Pedro A. Venida for private respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents The Director of Lands, etc., et al.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in Civil Case No. 577
entitled "Rosario Vda. de Laig, et al. vs. Carmen Verzo, et al.," dismissing herein
petitioners' complaint for the reconveyance of a parcel of land with damages, and
declaring herein respondent Carmen Verzo as the lawful owner of the land in issue.
It appears that on March 27, 1939, one Petre Galero obtained rained from the Bureau
of Lands Homestead Patent No. 53-176 covering 219,949 square meters of land
located at Barrio Pinagtambangan, Labo, Camarines Norte, for which Original
Certificate of Title No. 1097 was issued in Galero's name.
On June 25, 1940, Galero sold the land to a certain Mario Escuta for P300.00. Escuta
in turn, sold the same land to Florencio Caramoan in December, 1942, Later,
however, Petre Galero, through proper court action, and with Atty. Benito K. Laig
the deceased husband of herein petitioner Rosario Vda. de Laig as counsel

recovered the land, the court having been convinced that its alienation violated
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which reads:
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five
years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be
valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds (Sec. 118, CA No. 141, as
amended by CA No. 456).
On June 1, 1948, a deed of sale was executed by and between Petre Galero as
vendor and Atty. Benito K. Laig as vendee, whereby the former sold to the latter the
land in question with its improvements, for P1,500.00 plus attorney's fees due Atty.
Laig for his legal services as counsel for Galero in the successful reconveyance case
(p. 87, rec.; People vs. Petre Galero, CA-G.R. No. 12043-R). This deed of sale was
executed in the house of Carmen Verzo and witnessed by one Claudio Muratalla and
Rosario Verzo Villarente (p. 87, back, rec., People vs. Petre Galero, supra), sister of
herein respondent Carmen Verzo, who was living with her in the same house at that
time.
Original Certificate of Title No. 1097 was delivered by Galero to Atty. Laig (Exh. J and
Annex B, p. 6, CA Brief for Petitioners, p. 137, back, rec.).
Unfortunately, vendee Atty. Benito K. Laig failed to solicit the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (then Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce), as required by Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended. It was
only after Atty. Laig's death in 1951 that his wife, herein petitioner Rosario, noticed the
deficiency.
On November 5, 1951, herein petitioner Vda. de Laig wrote the then Register of
Deeds of Camarines Norte, respondent Baldomero M. Lapak, stating that the
disputed parcel of land covered by original Certificate of Title No. 1097 in the same of
Petre Galero, had been sold to her late husband, requesting that she be informed of
any claim of ownership by other parties so that she could take the necessary steps,
and serving notice of her claim over the said property as surviving spouse of the late
Atty. Laig and as natural guardian of their children.
On November 12, 1951, Register of Deeds Lapak replied that Original Certificate of
Title No. 1097 was still intact and took note of her letter.
On March 29, 1952, petitioner Vda. de Laig filed with the Bureau of Lands an affidavit
together with copy of the deed of sale in her husband's favor. Said affidavit stated that
she wanted to have the ownership over the land transferred to her husband's name.

On August 14, 1952, the Bureau of Lands forwarded the said affidavit of Vda. de Laig,
together with the deed of sale, to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources with a recommendation that the said deed of sale be approved as the
same does not violate any pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act or the
corresponding rules and regulations thereunder promulgated. On the same day, the
Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thru then
Undersecretary Jose S. Camus, approved the deed of sale. And also on the same
day, the Office of the Director of Lands, thru Vicente Tordesillas, Chief of the
Publication Lands Division, addressed a letter to Atty. Benito Laig informing him of the
approval of the deed of sale executed by and between him and Petre Galero.
Meanwhile, however, on July 15, 1952, Petre Galero, with the assistance of Atty. Jose
L. Lapak, son of respondent Register of Deeds Baldomero M. Lapak sought in court
the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 1097, claiming that his
first duplicate of said OCT was lost during World War 11.
On July 19, 1952 or in a span of only four days - a second owner's duplicate copy
of OCT No. 1097 was issued by respondent Register of Deeds Baldomero M. Lapak
in favor of Petre Galero. And right on that same day, Galero executed in favor of
respondent Carmen Verzo a deed of sale of the land in issue for the sum of P600.00.
It was claimed that previously, the additional consideration of P500.00 in Japanese
war notes was received by Galero from Carmen Verzo, although this amount, or
anything to that effect, was not mentioned in the deed of sale executed by and
between them.
Upon being informed that the sale necessitates the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources before it could be registered in the Register of
Deeds, herein respondent Carmen Verzo, on July 30, 1952, addressed a letter to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, through the Director of Lands,
seeking the former's required approval Enclosed in the letter was a copy of the deed
of sale in Verzo's favor, and an affidavit that the land in point was sold to Verzo by
homestead grantee Petre Galero.
On August 30, 1952, Assistant Director of Lands Zoilo Castrillo forwarded Verzo's
papers to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and recommended that
the sale, not being violative of the pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act nor the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, be approved.
On September 12, 1952, Acting Secretary of Agriculture Jose S. Camus approved the
sale in favor of Carmen Verzo.

On September 27, 1952, the office of the Director of Lands notified Carmen Verzo of
such approval. Whereupon, on October 13, 1952, Verzo declared the land in her
name for taxation purposes, and since then, had been paying the realty taxes
thereon.

Verzo and the cancellation of the second owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of
Title No. 1097 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1055 by declaring the first OCT
No. 1097 valid and effective or in the alternative, by ordering Carmen Verzo to
reconvey the land in question to petitioners, plus P5,000.00 by way of damages.

On October 14, 1952, the deed of sale in Verzo's favor was registered, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1055, in lieu of OCT No. 1097, which was cancelled, was
issued in her name.

Sometime in 1958, Galero died while serving his sentence at the National
Penitentiary, and was, on November 11, 1958, substituted by his wife, Perpetua Dar,
as party defendant (p. 27, ROA; p. 114, rec.).

On January 26, 1953, petitioner Vda. de Laig, thru counsel, her brother Atty.
Dimaano, inquired from the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte if it was true that
OCT No. 1097 in favor of Galero had already been cancelled and a transfer certificate
of title had been issued in favor of another person. Respondent Register of Deeds
Lapak replied in the affirmative.

On February 25, 1953, the Director of Lands requested Petre Galero to explain within
30 days such double sale, and ordered the Provincial Land Officer in Daet,
Camarines Norte to investigate the matter and immediately submit findings thereon.

On November 21, 1961, the trial court, in a decision, dismissed the complaint and
declared that the land described in TCT No. 1055 to be rightfully owned by Carmen
Verzo. The lower court also found Baldomero M. Lapak, then the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Norte, guilty of negligence, but exempted him from any liability; found the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources likewise
guilty of negligence, but exempted them from any liability on the theory that they are
not responsible for the acts of their subordinates; held that the approval of two deeds
of sale in favor of two different vendees in a space of less than one month is but a
ministerial duty which exculpates the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from liability, and that plaintiffs-appellants slept on
their rights in not having the first deed of sale in favor of Atty. Laig registered in the
Registry of property, and therefore, have only themselves to blame for losing the land;
and exempted Galero from liability (pp. 88-97, ROA; pp. 119-124, rec.).

On March 12, 1953, in reply to the Director of Land's request, Petre Galero denied
having sold the land in issue to Atty. Benito K. Laig.

On April 12, 1962, petitioners appealed the decision of the lower court to the Court of
Appeals.

On March 15, 1953, the Bureau of Lands in Camarines Norte reported to the Director
of Lands that second vendee Carmen Verzo had already successfully obtained a
transfer certificate of title over the land in question, with the recommendation that the
heirs of the first vendee, Benito K. Laig, seek their remedy in court as the status of the
property at that stage does not anymore fall within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands.

On September 28, 1966 (p. 32, rec.), the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, thru
Justice Jesus Y. Perez, affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte.

In no time at all, petitioners called the attention of the Director of Lands to the
existence of two deeds of sale, one in favor of Atty. Benito Laig, and another in favor
of Carmen Verzo.

Petre Galero was charged in Criminal Case No. 533 before the Court of First Instance
of Camarines with estafa thru falsification of public documents in connection with the
sale in favor of Carmen Verzo of the land in point. Galero was convicted on October
29, 1953, which conviction was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Petre Galero (CA-G.R. No. 12043-R, December 2, 1954).
On April 13, 1954, petitioner Vda. de Laig, together with her minor children, filed the
present action, docketed as Civil Case No. 577 in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte against respondents Carmen Verzo, Petre Galero, the Director of
Lands, the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources praying for the annulment of the sale in favor of Carmen

The case unveils a couple of issues to resolve, to wit:

1. Who between petitioner Vda. de Laig and respondent Carmen Verzo should be
considered as the rightful owner of the land in question; and
2. Should the respondents register of deeds, Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, together with respondent Carmen Verzo, be held
liable for damages for approving the sale of one and the same piece of land in favor
of two different persons?
I

As in the present case of Rosario Carbonell vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
(L-29972, Jan. 26, 1976), the first issue calls for the application of Article 1544,
paragraph 2, of the New Civil Code regarding double sale.

2. One of the witnesses to the deed of sale executed by and between Atty. Laig and
Petre Galero was Rosario Verzo Villarente, Carmen Verzo's very own sister who was
at that time living with her in her house, where Atty. Laig then boarded.

The above-said provision reads:

Rosario Verzo Villarente, being in the household of her sister Carmen Verzo, must
have likewise informed the latter about the deed of sale executed by Petre in favor of
Atty. Laig which she signed as witness. A formal act, such as witnessing a deed of
sale, is not a common daily experience. Laymen, especially rural folk like Rosario
Verzo Villarente, who participate in the same, ordinarily regard the same as a
memorable event. It is not therefore unreasonable to assume that her significant role
as an instrumental witness to the deed of sale between Atty. Laig and Petre Galero
must have moved Rosario to confide to her sister Carmen the fact of her participation
therein.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the

person acquiring it who in good faith recorded it in the Register of
Property (emphasis supplied).
In the Carbonell case, supra, WE held that to be under the protective umbrella of
paragraph 2, Article 1544, of the New Civil Code, it is essential that the vendee of the
immovable must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale. In other words, good
faith must characterize the vendee's act of prior registration.

The records reveal that respondent Carmen Verzo was not in good faith when she
facilitated the registration of her deed of sale. The following indicia of bad faith
characterized NOT ONLY her act of registering her deed of sale, BUT ALSO her
purchase of the disputed realty:

3. Petre Galero was able to procure another copy of the duplicate of Original
Certificate of Title No. 1097 covering the disputed land through the aid of Atty. Jose
Lapak who is the son of the respondent register of deeds, Baldomero Lapak, under
clearly dubious circumstances. For one, it was done without observing the required
formalities of notice and hearing (Sec. 117, Act No. 496). Secondly, it was an over in a
record-setting period of ONLY four [41 days. Add to this the fact that respondent
register of deeds Baldomero Lapak issued said duplicate of OCT 1097 despite his
having received about eight months earlier and taken note on November 12, 1951 of
the letter of petitioner Rosario Vda. de Laig inquiring about the status of the title to the
questioned land which was purchased by her husband from Petre Galero; and the
process, indeed, reeks with an unpleasant scent. If Atty. Jose Lapak were not the son
of respondent Baldomero Lapak, the latter as register of deeds would not have
facilitated the issuance of the duplicate copy of the title with such "scandalous haste."
He should have informed his son, Atty. Lapak, and Petre Galero about the previous
inquiry of petitioner as early as November 5, 1951, to which he replied on November
12, 1951 that OCT No. 1097 was still intact.

1. At the time of the sale of the land in question by Petre Galero to Atty. Benito K. Laig
in 1948, the latter was a boarder of Carmen Verzo in her house. As a matter of fact,
Atty. Laig maintained his law office, and received his clients (among whom was Petre
Galero) therein [p. 81, t.s.n., session of Aug. 23, 1961 ].

Moreover, the expeditious disposal of the land in litigation by Petre Galero to Carmen
Verzo was done immediately after the death of Atty. Benito Laig, and during the time
that his wife Rosario Vda. de Laig, who was residing in faraway Manila, was seeking
all legal means to have the title over the property transferred to her name.

Atty. Benito K. Laig, as her boarder, must have mentioned to Carmen Verzo, his
landlady, the land sold to him by Galero. By the same token, Carmen Verzo must
have known such sale; because transactions of this sort in the rural areas do not
escape the knowledge of persons living under one roof with a party to the document,
more especially when there exists between such persons and party the peculiarly
intimate relationship of landlady and boarder in a small town.

Such bad faith on the part of respondent Carmen Verzo and Baldomero Lapak is
further underscored by the fact that Atty. Jose Lapak himself (a) was the notary public
before whom the deed of sale executed by and between Petre Galero and Carmen
Verzo was acknowledged, and (b) was the same lawyer who assisted Carmen Verzo
in writing the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, enclosing therewith an affidavit also sworn before said Atty. Lapak,
praying that the deed of sale be approved.

To this effect was Our ruling in a 1918 case that

The force and effect given by law to an inscription in a public record
presupposes the good faith of him who enters such inscription; and
rights created by statute, which are predicated upon an inscription
in a public registry, do not and cannot accrue under an inscription
'in bad faith,' to the benefit of the person who thus makes the
inscription (Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and
Williamson, No. 11658, Feb. 15, 1918, 37 Phil. 644, 649).

This conspiracy among Petre Galero, register of deeds Baldomero Lapak, his son
Atty. Jose Lapak, and Carmen Verzo, could not have been known to petitioner
Rosario Vda. de Laig, who was then as now, residing in Manila.
4. Carmen Verzo was familiar with the property in dispute and with the previous legal
battle over the same. In fact in her special defense (par. 2, p. 47, ROA), she stated
that she gave sums of money to Petre Galero to enable him to institute Civil Case No.
164-R-14 entitled "Petre Galero vs. Macario Escuta and Florendo Caramoan," for the
recovery of said parcel of land. Knowing that said case was for the reconveyance
from defendants therein of the land in issue and that Atty. Laig was the counsel of
Petre Galero, Carmen Verzo must have known likewise that a torrens title to the same
was existing and intact and the same was delivered by Petre to Atty. Laig as the
buyer of the land. And if she inquired from the wife of Atty. Laig, which was incumbent
upon her as she was aware of the antecedent circumstances, she would have been
told by petitioner Rosario Vda. de Laig that the owner's copy of the original certificate
of title was then in her possession Respondent Carmen Verzo could not pretend that
she believed that said owner's duplicate was lost during the war because Civil Case
No. 164-R-14 involving the land in point was instituted only AFTER the war and the
owner 's duplicate copy of the title was intact and returned to Petre after he won in
1948 the suit for reconveyance. She could have also asked about said title the first
buyer, Florencio Caramoan, who was ordered by the court to reconvey the land and
return the owner's duplicate of the to title.
5. Prior to the sale in her favor, Carmen Verzo knew that the disputed property
belongs to Atty. Laig, because whenever Atty. Laig was in Manila, Carmen Verzo
attended to said property and communicated with Atty. Laig in Manila about his share
of the harvest from the land (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., session of Aug. 4, 1964). How can
Carmen Verzo speak of Atty. Laig's share of the harvest without first knowing that the
land from where the crop was harvested was owned by Atty. Benito Laig? Bad faith
can be demonstrated, not ONLY by direct proof, but also by substantial evidence.
Bad faith is a state of mind indicated by acts and circumstances
and is provable by CIRCUMSTANTIAL ... evidence (Zumwalt v.
Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W. 2d 750, 754, 360 Mo. 362; Words and
Phrases Permanent Ed., Vol. 5, p. 261).
Logically, therefore, since, as has already been earlier shown, respondent Carmen
Verzo was not a purchaser in good faith, she could never have been a registrant in
good faith of the deed of sale of said land in her favor. Consequently, she cannot
claim the protection accorded to a registrant in good faith by paragraph 2, Article 1544
of the New Civil Code.

Finally, since there is no valid inscription to speak of in the present case, the
applicable provision of law is paragraph 3, Article 1544, New Civil Code (Carbonell vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, supra), which states:
Should there be no insciption, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the ab
thereat to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith (emphasis supplied).
In the present case, the fact of Atty. Benito Laig's having been the first possessor in
good faith of the property in issue was never disputed by respondent Carmen Verzo.
Moreover, the deed of sale in favor of the late Atty. Benito Laig was executed on June
1, 1948, over 4 years earlier than the deed of sale executed on July 19, 1952 in favor
of respondent Carmen Verzo.
It is Our view that the offices of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Director of Lands should be cleared of any liability. It is not difficult to see that
the reason why separate approvals concerning two separate sale of the same piece
of land were had was the fact that two sets of officials took charge of both requests.
But no malice can be gleaned from this fact. It should be borne in mind that both
officials daily attend to thousands upon thousands of papers. It is also possible that
their assistants failed to notice that two deeds of sale covered the same parcel of land
or failed to advise these two officials of such fact.
As heretofore indicated, the malicious participation of respondent register of deeds
Baldomero Lapak and his son Atty. Lapak is evident.
Knowing of the existence in his records of the original of OCT No. 1097, Baldomero
Lapak effected the issuance of the second duplicate of OCT No. 1097 to Petre Galero
in just four (4) days, dispensing with the requirements of notice and hearing to
interested parties. The law in this regard is Section 109 of Act No. 496, which reads:
If the duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a grantee, heir, devisee, assignee, or other person
applying for the entry of a new certificate to him ..., a suggestion
may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and
registered. The court (the Court of First Instance acting as land
registration court) may thereupon, upon the petition of the
registered owner or other person in interest, AFTER NOTICE AND
HEARING, direct the issue of a new duplicate certificate, which
shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of
the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to
like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be

regarded as the original duplicate for all the purposes of this Act
(Ocampo vs. Garcia, L-11260, April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 553).
For his malicious involvement, WE find Baldomero Lapak liable under the following
provision of the Land Registration Act:
Whoever fraudulently procures, or assists in fraudulently procuring
or is privy to the fraudulent procurement of any certificate of title or
owner's duplicate certificate, shall be fined not exceeding five
thousand dollars (ten thousand pesos) or imprisoned not exceeding
five years, or both, in the discretion of the court (Sec. 117, Act No.
496).
Baldomero Lapak likewise stands liable under Article 27 of the New Civil Code, which
states:

WE also find Atty. Jose L. Lapak liable under the abovequoted Section 117 of Act No.
496 (Land Registration Act), for which he should be, not only prosecuted but also,
disciplined as a member of the Bar.
Moreover, both Baldomero Lapak and his son Atty. Jose Lapak are likewise civilly
liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties
as public officer and as a member of the Bar (Art. 19, New Civil Code) or for wilfully or
negligently causing damage to another (Art. 20, New Civil Code), or for wilfully
causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
and/or public policy (Art. 21, New Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY REVERSED AND
I. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAMARINES NORTE IS HEREBY DIRECTED
(A) TO CANCEL TCT NO. T-1055; AND

Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public

servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
For in essence, his refusal to follow the directive of law (Act No. 496) was a conduct
injurious to the petitioner. Thus a chief of police is liable under Article 27 of the New
Civil Code for refusal to give assistance to the complainants which was his official
duty as an officer of the law (Amarro, et al. vs. Sumanggit, L-14986, July 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 707, 708-9). Similarly, a municipal mayor incurs the same liability for neglecting
to perform his official functions (Javellana vs. Tayo, L-18919, Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA
1042, 1051).

(B) TO ISSUE IN LIEU THEREOF A NEW TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN

FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE BENITO K. LAIG; AND
II. ALL THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN, EXCEPT THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ARE HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY PETITIONERS IN THE AMOUNT
OF TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS AS MORAL DAMAGES; THE SUM OF
FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND THE COSTS:
SO ORDERED.