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1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; tel: (202) 296-5633.
Keizai Koho Center. 1991. Japan, 1991: An
International Comparison. Tokyo: Keizai
Koho Center. P. A handy compendium of
statistics, many comparative, concerning
Japan's economy, society, and government.
English. Annual. Useful for background
for class lecture. To receive the publication
write to Keizai Koho Center (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs) 6-1,
Otemachi, 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
100, Japan.
Also handy is a booklet put out by the
same organization: Japan Information
Resources in the United States, 1990.
Ellis S. Krauss is
Professor of Political
sity of Pittsburgh. He
has conducted re-
search in Japan at
Tokyo, Kyoto, and
Keio universities.
published Japanese
Radicals Revisited (University of California
Press, 1974) as well as three co-edited books
on Japan, Political Opposition and Local
Politics in Japan (Princeton University Press,
1980; with Kurt Steiner and Scott Flanagan),
Conflict in Japan (University of Hawaii
Press, 1984; with Thomas Rohlen and
Central Points
Japan serves as an excellent case
of the anomaly of the economic
giant-political pygmy whose ability to
Asian neighbors.
June 1990).
Introduction
Japanese dependence on
American defense
guarantees sometimes
conflicts with Japan's
policy.
March
1992
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57
The Prime Minister also initiated discussions within the government about
legislation that would create a
"United Nations Peace Cooperation
Corps," a noncombat operations
group of some 2,000 members who
would play a support and relief role
for U.N. forces. A special session of
Japan's Diet debated the proposal in
October. Predictably the ruling Liberal Democratic Party met with stiff
resistance from the opposition parties, and outside parliament from
peace groups as well as from spokespersons of Asian nations which in
WWII had fallen victim to Japanese
imperialism. Lacking majority control in the upper house, plagued by
factional divisions within the LDP,
and facing public opinion polls
. . . Japan seems to
(September 1, 1990).
Japan's Foreign Ministry reacted
to American derision in kind, insist-
hopes of preempting the sort of criticism leveled at its policy the previous
tion had been dictated by Washington which also insisted that Tokyo
be divided equally between the multiforces and the frontline Arab states
58
PS:
Political
ously, this is not the "face" projected by Prime Minister Kaifu in the
Science
&
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Politics
of creating a "Greater East Asia CoJapanese sphere of conquest encompassed much of the eastern half of
China, all of Korea, Taiwan, the
March
that have passed since the Occupation, Japanese foreign policy elites,
1992
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59
Relations
democratization. Demilitarization
demands.
Arthur's rule was paternalistic, permitting little or no domestic opposition from the Japanese. In the 1950s,
Changing U.S.-Japan
131).
Another metaphor, especially
favored by Americans for reasons
that should be obvious, used to
PS:
Political
Science
&
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Politics
Japan's foreign policy fits the elitist democracy model since only in the
regard for public opinion as politically feasible. This does not mean that
in the Cold War, were only too willing to bear the burden of Japan's
security. Instead of wasting scarce
resources on the military, therefore,
Japan's leaders, principally Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-47,
1948-54), made the decision to
muster the nation's energies into
producing economic growth.
The political decision to foster economic growth, to forego a military
build-up, and to rely on U.S. security
guarantees constitutes the basic three
dimensions of the so-called "Yoshida
demilitarization in transforming
One such instance happened during the Gulf Crisis. As late as August
innovation.
March
1992
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61
the original 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. For Japan important revisions included the removal of a
policy.
unceasing public protest. For the
public the pacifist provision of the
true.
took the Speaker of the House captive; police were called to remove the
Socialists physically. The JSP thereafter boycotted Diet sessions. Outside
the Diet building, hundreds of thousands of students, workers, and
peace advocates demonstrated. Petitions opposing the Treaty garnered
13 million signatures; and most every
major newspaper scolded the Government for using authoritarian tactics in parliament. Ignoring them all,
Kishi used his LDP majority in the
Diet to ramrod ratification of the
PS.
Political
bluster.
Science
&
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Politics
affirmations by a succession of
Prime Ministers to abide by Article 9
of the Constitution. Even the so-
American pressure on
Japan to assume greater
coincided with a
ten worse. By 1972 Japan was running a $4 billion trade surplus with
economies.
don the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine. Instead of altering the basic
defense arrangement, Japan offers
March
1992
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63
1973.
PS:
Political
Science
&
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Politics
obvious truth.
disappoint them.
Early in his administration Nakasone engineered a partial reversal of
Japan's long-standing policy prohibiting the export of military technology by making the United States
dependence.
TABLE 1.
Amount Total
494
2,285
March
1992
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65
which may mean that implementation of the reforms will prove prob-
mercial advantage.
ble with the prospect of losing comAt roughly this juncture in the
PS:
evidence.
ensure that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the prime contractor and sym-
Political
Science
&
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Politics
"Japan has never asked for the stationing of troops. Let them (the
dictions.
in Asia.
Yet the "face" that Japan's foreign policy projects to many Asian
nations is of an untrustworthy,
TABLE 2.
March
1992
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67
TABLE 2 (continued).
Japan's Imports from-1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
b1985 ten countries, 1986-87 twelve countries. See p. 5. Source: Japan Tariff Association, The
Summary Report: Trade of Japan.
nations.
PS:
Political
Science
&
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Politics
Vietnam came only in 1973, following the Paris Peace Accords between
worthy, rapacious,
aggrandizing economic
machine that
March
billion.
Union, and its defense policy has traditionally assumed the Soviets to be
the principal enemy of Japan. Despite Soviet invitations for Japan to
invest, especially in exploiting
1992
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69
Southeast Asia, that it sought relations based on mutual trust, and further offered to play an overtly political mediator role of repairing rela-
350%. Despite the high level of economic support from Japan, some
ASEAN nations have complained
about tied aid, i.e., grants and loans
to be used for the purchase of
Japanese exports. Japan's ODA to
land is second only to Japan's investment in the United States and represents 53% of all foreign investment
in Thailand. Until 1987 Thailand was
FIGURE 1.
2.5
8.0
6.8
5.7
3.4
3.9
3.3
2.4
1.6
0.5
PS:
Indonesia China Philippines Thailand Bangladesh India Pakistan Burma Sri Lanka Malaysia
Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 June 1991).
Political
Science
&
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Politics
conflict.
March
1992
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71
future.
future."
foreign policy.
Of first importance is noting the
PS:
the kimono.
Future Directions of
Political
Science
&
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Politics
hope, and contribute whenever possible to making the world safe for
business.
Additional Readings
Frost, Ellen J. 1987. For Richer, For Poorer:
The New U.S.-Japan Relationship. New
York: The Council on Foreign Relations.
A well-written overview of the problems
tionship.
Commerce Department.
Pyle, Kenneth B. 1987. "In Pursuit of a
Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past
and the Future." Journal of Japanese
Studies 13:2: 243-70. An in-depth study of
former Prime Minister Nakasone's marginally successful attempt to overcome
Japan's typically reactive foreign policy.
Colby College. He is
March
1992
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73