Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs.

Mayfair
Theater, Inc.
Facts:
Carmelo & Bauermann own a parcel of land together with two-story

against Mayfair?
Ruling: The court ruled that there was no right of ownership transferred from
Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent to deliver the property to the buyer.

buildings located at Recto Avenue, Mla.

On June 1971, they entered into a contract of lease with Mayfair theater
for a period of 20 years, which the latter used a movie house known as

In the case, there was no right of ownership transferred from Carmelo to

Equatorial in view of a patent failure to deliver the property to the buyer.

Maxim theater.
2 year later, on 1969 Mayfair entered into a second contract of lease with
Carmelo for the lease of another portion of the property, which they used
again as a movie house named Marimar theater for a period of another

By a contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer

ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent. Ownership of the thing sold is a real
right,[ which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him in any of

20 years.
However, on July 30, 1978 -within age 20 year lease term- the subject
properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc,
Herein petitioner for the sum of P11,300,000 without their first being

the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an
agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
This right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. And
there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold is placed in the control

offered to Mayfair.
Thereafter, Carmelo could no longer be located so Mayfair deposited with
the clerck of court the sum of 11,300,00 less 847,000 as withholding tax,
of which the court issued a deed of reconveyance and in favor of
Carmelo and a deed of sale in favor of Mayfair. In result, the Registry if

and possession of the vendee.

From the peculiar facts of this case, it is clear that petitioner never took actual
control and possession of the property sold, in view of respondents timely
objection to the sale and the continued actual possession of the property.

Deeds of Manila cancelled Equatorials titles and issued new certificated

of titile in the name of Mayfair.

While the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as

On the other hand, representing itself as the owner of the subject

equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic

premises, Equatorial filed an action for the collection of sum of money

delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of the

against

vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

mayfair,

claiming

payment

of

rentals

or

reasonable

compensation for the defendants use of the subject premises after the
lease contracts had expired.
RTC ruled the it could not enjoy the fruits or rentals of the subject property
as the Deed of Absolute Sale between them and Carmelo is void as it is
inception did not happen.
Issue: WON petitioner can acquire the fruits or rentals of the subject property

In the case, Mayfairs opposition to the transfer of the property by way of sale to
Equatorial was a legally sufficient impediment that effectively prevented the
passing of the property into the latters hands.
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right
of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time
of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment
should belong to the owner of the property during that period. Not having been

the owner, Equatorial cannot be entitled to the civil fruits of ownership like
rentals of the thing sold.
Sulo sa Nayon, INC v Nayong Pilipino Foundation
Facts:

In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact,
as lessees, they recognize that the respondent is the owner of the land. What
petitioners insist is that because of the improvements, which are of substantial

Respondent, a government -owned and control corporation owner of the a

value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with the permission of

parcel of land in Pasay, Known as Nayong Pilipino Complex leased a portion of

respondent, they should be considered builders in good faith who have the right

its land for 21 years, renewable to 25 years to petitioner for the construction of a

to retain possession of the property until reimbursement by respondent.

Hotel bldg, to be known as Philippine village hotel.

The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable

Petitioner, on March 7, 1995 sent a letter to respondent with the intention of

improvements on the leased premises does not give the petitioners the

renewing the contact for another 25 years, which the respondent agreed to. The

right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder

new contract of lease is until year 2021.

in good faith.

However, on January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly

Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily "improve" the lessor

rentals despite respondents repeated demands. Hence, respondent filed a

out of its property. We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in

complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners.

good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448and
546 of the Civil Code. His rights are governed by Art. 1678 of the Civil Code.

MeTC of Pasay ruled in favor of the Respondent.

RTC, modified the ruling of MeTC and ruled that petitioners were builders in
good faith.
CA held that RTC erroneously applied the rules on accession as found on Arts.
448 and 556 of the CC
Issue: WON petitioner have acted in good faith in order for Art. 448 in relation to
Art.546 of the Civil Code may apply with respect to their rights over
improvements.
Ruling: No.
Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds,
plants, or sows on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and
not to lands where the only interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a
holder, such as a tenant.

PNB V. DE JESUS 411 SCRA 557

FACTS:

Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is

It would appear that on 10 June 1995,respondent filed a complaint against

petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, over the questioned property.

preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of
the building to instead remove it from the land. In order, however, that the builder
can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand
that a choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to prove good faith

In his complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired a parcel of land

on his part.

situated in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, he later found at that the northern

portion of the lot was being enriched upon by a building of petitioner.

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no

technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other

Despite two letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused

things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to

to vacate the area.

defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good

faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be

Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building
from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in
existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in
question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per
square meter which offer the latter claimed to have accepted.
The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent
of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of
the Philippines. He also contends that he is a builder in good faith.
TC as affirmed by CA ruled in favor of the respondent declaring him as the
rightful owner of the disputed lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not being a builder in good faith matters under article 448.
Ruling: A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule
accession.

that accords with the principle of

determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and

freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones
right, ignorance of a

superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach

another. One is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in
his title or made of acquisition ann flaw which invalidates it.
In the case at bar, petitioner was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to its
acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold to
it stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it.

Macasaet vs Macasaet

G.R. 154391 92

September 30, 2004

Facts:
1. Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and
Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of
respondents, and Teresita is his wife.
2. Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of
land, situated in Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease
agreement, their son and his wife occupied these lots in March 1992
and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction
business.
3. Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease
agreement. They claimed that their parents had invited them to
construct their residence and business on the subject lots. They added
that it was the policy of their parents to allot the the land owned as an
advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they
contended that the subject land had been allotted to Ismael as advance
inheritance. On the other hand, the the other subject land was allegedly
given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the
renovation of their parents house.
4. Respondent filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against
their children for failure to pay the agreed rental despite repeated
demands.
5. The MTCC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered the petitioner
to vacate the premises. It opined that the children had occupied the lots,
not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement but by tolerance of the
parents. As their stay was by mere tolerance, the children were
necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon
demand.
6. On appeal, the RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC. RTC allowed the
respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements
introduced by the children, after payment by indemnity provided for by
Article 448 in relation to Article 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
7. On an appeal by both parties to the CA which were consolidated, the CA
sustained the finding of the lower courts
Issues:
1. WON the children can be ejected
a. Based on the parents love reasons for gratuitously allowing the
children to use the lots, it can be safely concluded that the
agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children
benefitted from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory
condition existing between the parties occurs like a change of
ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved conflict or

animosity the agreement maybe deemed terminated. When

persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity
between the parents and the children, the purpose of the agreement
ceased. The children had any cause for continued possession of the
lots. Their right to use became untenable. It ceased upon their
receipt of the notice to vacate. And because they refused to heed
the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against them.
b. The children had no right to retain possession. The right of the
children to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested
only upon the latters demise. Rights of succession are transmitted
only from the moment of death of the decedent. Assuming that
there was an allotment of inheritance, ownership nonetheless
remained with the parents.
c. The childrens allegation that the indebtness of their parent to them
has been paid through dation cannot be given credence as there
were no sufficient proof of a settlement or contract of dation to settle
the alleged debt, and is inconsistent of the separate action by the
children to recover the same debt.
d. As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of
possession.
2. Rights of a Builder in Good faith
a. As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of
owner to everything that is incorporated or attached to the property.
Accession industrial building, planting and sowing on an
immovable is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code.
b. As the court found that the petitioners possession of the two lots
was not by mere tolerance, the applicable rule would be Article 448.
This article has been applied to cases wherein a builder had
constructed improvements with the consent of the owner.
c. In the case at bar, the respondents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by petitioners. Moreover, because the
petitioner occupied the lots upon their parents invitation, the latter
certainly knew and approved of the construction of the
improvements introduced thereon. Hence, petitioners are in good
faith when they built the structures on those lots.

Pleasantville Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land
In 1975, Respondent, Jardanico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo,
wherein subject Lot 9 was vacant at that time.

Reynate v CA
Facts:

Jardanico, secured the TCT in his name on the Register of Deeds of Bacolod
City, he later found out that Kee, made improvements on the subject lot and take
possession thereof.

During the tenancy, petitioner constructed a nipa hut where he and his family
lived and took care of nipa palms and planted on subject lands. They harvested
and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody
including Don Carlos himself.

Kee bought Lot 8 from CTTEI, the executive real estate agent of petitioner. It
appears however that when Octaviano, an employee of CTTEI assisted Kee and
its wife to inspect Lot, the land pointed out by Octaviano was Lot. 9. Jardanico,
confronted and demanded Kee to remove all its improvements and vacate Lot. 9
of which Kee refused to do so.
MTCC ruled that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract
between him and petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for
the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claim reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced on said lot.
On appeal, the CA ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith.

Petitioner Keynote was taken as tenant by Don Carlos, owner and father in law
of the private respondents, of a fish pond locate dat Bulacan.

When Don Carlos died, his heirs and petitioner entered into a written agreement,
whereby petitioner in consideration of the dum of 200,000,00 turned over the
fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Carlos.
Petitioner, surrendered the fishpond and two nipa huts to the heirs of Don
Carlos.
Thereafter, private respondents leased the fishpond to one, Dela Cruz.
However, petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him and took
care of the nipa palms he had planted therein.
Hence, private respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against the
petitioner.

Issue: WON Kee is a builder in good faith?

Ruling: Yes. Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what
he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not
Lot 8. Thus, Kees good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.

TC ruled in favor of the petitioner

RTC as affirmed by CA reversed the ruling od TC.
Ruling:
The court observed that the controversial premises is beyond the titled property
of the plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part
of the public domain.
On the other hand, the heirs based their claim of possession over lots 1 and 2
simply on the written agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter
surrendered his rights over the fishpond. There is nothing, however, on the
document that the tenant was giving other matters not mentioned in the
document. Neither was there any mention of the hut and nipa palms for such to
be included in the subsequent least to de la Cruz, a circumstance that gives the
impression that said hut and palms do not belong to the heirs.
Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation
and while it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of the
banks (Article 457), such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription.
In the present case, assuming that the heirs had acquired the alluvial deposit
(the lot in question), by accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a

period of 50 years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by

third persons.
Agustin v CA
Facts:
The Cagayan River separates the Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the
east in the province of Cagayan. Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo
Binuyag are among those who are occupying the western bank of the Cagayan
River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin.
From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank
including Agustins Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo
Binuyag.
In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed
its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of
respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side.
ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost upon sudden and abrupt
change of the course of the river?
HELD: NO.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1)
that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court
found: ". . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a
period of 49 years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other
side has become greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both
cases.
Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it
but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence
in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is
overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. The
private respondents ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon
the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or
1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said
accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river.
Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. "Art. 459.
Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its
bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the

land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it,
provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a
piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by
the current. (Emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, the sudden change of
course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a
portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate
by the current."
The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was
transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.

Celestial v Cachopero
Facts:
Cachopero filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) with the Bureau of
Lands covering a 415 sqm parcel of land located a Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotobato
and formerly part of Creek in Katiwanagan, midsayap.
He alleged that he had been occupying the land since Celestial filed a protest
against the MSA, saying that she has preferential right over the land subject
thereof since it is adjacent to, and is the only outlet from, her residential house.
After an ocular inspection by Bureau of Land, it was found out that that the land
was formerly part of the Salunayan Creek, but has dried up because of NIAs
construction of an irrigational canal.
Hence, Cahoperos application and her protest was denied because the local
department of public works and highways and the Municipal government may
need the land in future. However, Cachopero was allowed to stay on the lang
until such a time that the government needs the land for road expansion.
Celestial, filed an action for ejectment against her brother, but they later reached
a compromise.
Cachopero, filed a second MSA with the regional DENR for covering the same
property, but this time he had certification from the mayor and indorsement from
the district engineer that the land is no longer needed by the government and
that it is already suitable for residential purposes.
However, his application was dismissed and through the regional director agrees
that its residential land, he ordered for the sale of the land at a public auction
because of the conflicting interests of the parties.
Cachopero tried to seek relief from the LC, but it was denied. However, the CA
granted his petition for certiorari and ordered the DENR to process his MSA.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a claim of ownership over the land,
based on her alleged long-time adverse possession and her right of
accession
Ruling: No.
a) ADVERSE POSSESSION: A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess
or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the
sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the
Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain
which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has

dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

- Despite the fact that the municipal government later certified that said land
was alienable and disposable, the Court cited a case wherein it said, The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain.
b) ACCESSION: Celestial cannot rely on Article 370 of the Spanish Civil
Code and Art. 461 of the NCC. She claimed that at the time she bought it
from Basadre, the said portion already dried up so that almost one-half of a
house was already built, but she failed to allege when it really happened
which would determine the applicable provision in her case. This would be
helpful in determining the applicable law.
- Court explained that the rule in Art. 370 (The beds of rivers which remain
abandoned because the course of water has naturally changed belong to
the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lands.) has been
abandoned with the adoption of Art. 461. (See doctrine.) It
- Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present
Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner
or her predecessor-in-interest for the provision contemplates an abandoned
river bed due to natural change in the course of waters, but in her case, the
subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal.
- Both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the
course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it
is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course.

Morandarte v CA
FACTS:
Morandarte filed an application for free patent before the Bureau of
Lands, Dipolog City his application was approved by BOL, thereafter
Register of Deeds of Zambaoanga Del Norte issued the corresponding
OCT to Mrandarte.
Morandarte caused a subdivision survey of the lot, he and his wife
executed a REM over a parcel of their lot in favor of DBP, in
consideration for its loan.
More than 10 years after the issuance of OCT to Morandarte, the State
through Director of Lands filed a complaint for annulment of title and
reversion against Morandarte. They alleged that the subject land
includes portion of Miputak river which cannot be validly awards as it is
outside the commerce of man and beyond the authority of BIL to dispose
of, hence their title is void.
Morandarte contends that the Mipuatk river, changes its course brought
about by the fact that a portion of Miputak river was leased by the
Bureau of Fisheries to certain Realiza whose rights were subsequently
transferred to Lacaya. Moreover, they allege that inclusion of Miputak
river should not render the title void and only the portion of the property
covered by the Miputak river should be nullified but their title to the
remaining portion should be maintained.
RTC affirmed by CA: Morandartes title is void because it includes a
portion of the Miputak river. In additon, they sustained the rights of
Lacaya over a portion included in Morandartes title based on a Deed of
Transfer of Fishpond rights.
Ruling:

JAGUALING V. CA|EDUAVE, 194 SCRA 607

FACTS:Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents,
which later increased in size due to erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973
Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they
prevent squatters to come to the area
The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs.
Heirs of Antonio Factura which was the subject of judgment by compromise in
view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In the amicable settlement the
heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of
1,289 square meters more or less to Eduave.
Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that
they are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000
square meters more or less. According to them, they acquired the land by
acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They
presented tax declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove claim of
prescription.
Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in
question against Jagualing.
RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by
preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation
and that the land is a delta thus is part of public domain not susceptible of
appropriation.
CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and
subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on
Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true
owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the
premises and deliver possession of the land to private respondents.
ISSUE: W/N Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?
HELD: No.From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the
finding that the property of Eduave actually existed and was Identified prior to
the branching off or division of the river. The CA, therefore, properly applied
Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land

separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof

prior to such separation or isolation.
The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable
and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of
land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err in
applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private
respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which
corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.
It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This
preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land
located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in
the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact,
no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the
riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the
adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under
the torrens system must itself still be registered.
However Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the
required period and their possession cannot be considered in good faith since
by their admission they have recognized Eduaves ownership over the land.
Thus the land still belongs to Eduave.
Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin.
However such accretion may be lost to third parties thru prescription.

Office of City Mayor v Ebio

Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land located
in Paranaque city and covered by tax declaration in the name of Ebio.
Said land was an accretion of cut-cut creek.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added.

They assert that the original occupant of the land was their great grandfather,
and that their grandfather gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez.
EBio married Pedros sister and upon Pedros advice the couple established
their house on the subject lot.

The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the
alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.

Thereafter, Resolution No. 8 was passed by the Office of the Sangguinian Brgy.
Seeking assistance from the City Government of Paranaque for the construction
of an access road along cut-cut creek located in said Brgy, said land will run
traversing the lot occupied by the respondent. The city government, advised all
affected residents to vacate their area so respondents filed their opposition.

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No

matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.

Sometime in January 2003, respondents were surprised when several officials

of the brgy. proceeded to cut some coconut trees on their lot. They were asked
by the City Administrator to vacate the area, so in fear of being evicted they wen
to RTC and filed a preliminary writ of injunction.
Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is
classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its
banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. And
respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable party to the
action.
During the trial, respondents admitted that they have a pending application for
the issuance of a sales patent before the DENR. RTC denied their petition, on
the ground that they failed to established their right to the property since they did
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales
patent
has not yet been granted.
CA, reversed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: WON the subject land is part of the public domain?
RULING: The court mentioned Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters in relation
to Art. 457 of the Civil code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof,
belong to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land
which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
In the case at bar, the court ruled that the respondents deemed to have acquired
the property through prescription. Respondents application for sales patent,
however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as
their vested right over the subject property.
The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity
particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the
State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through
the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land.

Lucasan v PDIC

Facts:
Lucas and his wife (deceased) were the owners of a lots situated in Bacolod City
and which is covered by TCT.
PBC, extended a loan to Lucasan, with Bernares as a co-maker. Lucasan and
Bernares failed to pay the loan when it became due and demandable. As a
result, PBC filed a collection case against the two. RTC ordered that two pay
PBC, it also issued w writ of execution directing the sheriff to effect a levy on the
properties owned by Lucasan and see the same at public auction.
To cut the story short, Lucasan Lots were sold at public auction and were added
to PBC as the highest bidder. Thereafter, Lucasan wrote a letter to PDIC, PBCs
receiver and liquidator seeking the cancellation of the certificate of sale and
offering to pay PBCs claim against Lucasan.
Lucasan, as well as the mortgagee banks, PNB and RPB, did not redeem the
properties within the redemption period. Nevertheless, PBC did not file a petition
for consolidation of ownership.
Consequently, Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and RPB. Consequently, the
mortgagee banks executed their respective releases of mortgage, resulting in
the cancellation of the prior encumbrances in favor of PNB and RPB.
PDIC denied Lucasan request for cancellation.
So Lucasan filed a petition denominated as declaratory relief.
PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. It averred that
an action to quiet title under Section 1 of Rule 63 may only be brought when
there is a cloud on, or to prevent a cloud from being cast upon, the title to real
property. It asseverated that a cloud on the title is an outstanding instrument
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or
inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to
property.
RTC affirmed by CA: PDIC
ISSUE: WON Lucasan can avail the remedy of quieting of title?

RULING: NO.
To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its

prima

facie appearance of validity of legal efficacy.

Stated simply, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal title or at least an
equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or
proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. Lucasan
admitted that he failed to redeem the property during the redemption period, on
account of his ten limited financial situation. It was only 15 years later that he
manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost
whatever right ha had over the lots.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan cannot in any way operate to restore
whatever right he had over the subject properties. Such payment only
extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which
Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of
embargo and certification of sale.
Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition for consolidation
of ownership after the expiration of the redemption period. with the rule that the
expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to
redeem ans that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of
a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title
that is already vested in the purchaser.
Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest
over the subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for
quieting of title.

Lasquite v Victory Hills

Facts:
1971: Jose Manahan executed a Deed of Quitclaim or
Assignment of Rights in over a parcel of land in favor of
Conrado Lasquite.

by the subsequent grant of Free Patent to Lasquite and

Andrade.

Lasquite applied for a Free Patent over the lot. Pending the
approval of the application, he sold 1/2 of the land to
Juanito Andrade.
Upon the grant of the patent application, OCTs were issued
in their names.

1. No. To give OCT No. 380 probative value in court would

be to allow variance or an evasion or circumvention of the
requirement laid down in Section 105 of Act No. 2874. We
are thus warned that any title sourced from the flawed
OCT No. 380 could be void. On this basis, we are justified
to consider with great care any claims derived therefrom.

1983: Prescillas filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands to

question the grant of free patent in favor of Lasquite and
Andrade claiming that they have been in possession of the
lot since 1940.
Prescillas also instituted a case for reconveyance alleging
that Lasquite forged the signature of Jose Manahan in the
deed since Manahan died prior to its execution.
The Manahans filed complaint for annulment of title,
reconveyance and damages.
Claiming to be the owner of the lot (OCT 380) which was
allegedly registered in 1937 to to Jose Manahan by virtue
of Homestead Patent, Victory Hills filed a motion to
intervene.
RTC upheld the title of Lasquite and Andrade. It
disregarded OCT 380 and ruled that it lacked the signature
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce which is a
requirement for the patent's validity.
The CA reversed the RTC's ruling and declared victory Hills
as the Absolute owner of the lot.
Issues:
1. WON Victory Hills is entitled to reconveyance of the lot
since their Homestead Patent cannot be simply defeated

2. WON the claim of Victoria Hills had prescribed.

Held:

The established legal principle in actions for annulment or

reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should
establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but
by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to
be reconveyed is his. It is rather obvious from the
foregoing disquisition that respondent failed to dispense
such burden. Indeed, the records are replete with proof
that respondent declared the lots comprising Lot No. 3050
for taxation purposes only after it had instituted the
present case in court. This is not to say of course that tax
receipts are evidence of ownership, since they are not,
albeit they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner, for no one would ordinarily be paying taxes for a
property not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.
2. The action has not prescribed.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year
prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed
or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies
only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as
when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property
also remains in possession of the property, the

prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the

property does not run against him. In such a case, an
action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in
the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible.

Before the hearing of the case, or on July 20, 1993, petitioners and Macapagal
entered into a Compromise Agreement.2 Petitioners acknowledged therein his
ownership of the portions of the land consisting of 18,787 square meters
covered by OCT No. P-665. This agreement was approved by the trial court.

The action assumed the nature of a suit to quiet title;

hence, imprescriptible. However, in our view, respondent
Victory Hills has failed to show its entitlement to a
reconveyance of the land subject of the action.

RULING: No. As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet
title is not created by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an
interest in property.

Tandog vs Macapagal
Facts:
The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Antipolo where, the
Tandogs, represented by Efren Tandog claim that they have been in actual,
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land since time
immemorial. They trace their right from Casimiro Policarpio. He was survived by
his nephews and nieces, now deceased, except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She
and Casimiros grand nieces and grand nephews (herein petitioners) have
continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property,
they found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and
Marina Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners,
spouses Calderon used falsified documents to justify their possession, and for
his part, Renato Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent No.
045802-1165 which led to the issuance to him of Original Certificate of Title.
Because of these incidents, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Bracnh 73, Antipolo City a complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case
No. 92-2418.
Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners
allegations in their complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their
property in 1958 and, since then, have been in possession of the same. They
planted trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the corresponding
realty taxes. She does not know petitioners who are all strangers in the place.

ISSUE: W/N the action to Quiet title should prosper.

This rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis for
the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or
adverse possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.
While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a
cloud on their (petitioners) interest in the land, however, such allegation has not
been proved. The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to
justify their possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally
offered in evidence by petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents
which may have been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not
formally offered in evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be
given any evidentiary value.
Also, it is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable
title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.5
Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to
prove that Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-ininterest.