PublicServiceMotivationandperformanceincentives:aliterature

review
JerrettMyers1
June2008
Introduction
Thereisagrowingbodyofworkoninstitutions,incentivesandpublicsector
performance.Animportantaspectofthisfieldseekstounderstandhowto
structureincentivessothatemployeesarewellmotivatedtoperform
effectively(forexample,seeLeGrand2003).Theapplicationofvarious
reformssuchasperformancerelatedpaytogetherwithincreasing
dissatisfactionwithpublicservicesandtighteningbudgetconstraintsfacing
publicauthoritieshasstimulatednewdebateontheextenttowhichintrinsic
andextrinsicincentivescanmotivategoodperformance.TheQualityand
OutcomesFrameworkusedbytheGeneralMedicalServicesContract,the
StarRatingsusedtoevaluatetheperformanceofEnglishNHStrustsand
theComprehensivePerformanceAuditusedbycentralgovernmentto
measuretheperformanceoflocalauthoritiesareafewexamplesofrecent
policyinitiatives intheUKwhichseektoencouragebetterpublicsector
performancethroughavarietyofextrinsicincentivemechanisms.In
contrast,initiativesdesignedtoimproveperformancethroughtheuseof
2
nonfinancialandinformalincentivesarenotaswidelyreported.
Thisreviewfocusesontheintrinsic,nonfinancialconsiderationsfoundin
publicservice,commonlytermedpublicservicemotivation(PSM).Perry
andWise(1990:368)definethisas'anindividual'spredispositionto
respondtomotivesgroundedprimarilyoruniquelyinpublicinstitutions'.
Othercommonlyciteddefinitionsinclude:

themotivationalforcethatinducesindividualstoperform
meaningfulpublicservice(i.e.public,community,andsocial
service)(BrewerandSelden,1998:417)
ageneral,altruisticmotivationtoservetheinterestsofa
communityofpeople,astate,anationorhumankind(Raineyand
Steinbauer,1999:23)
thebelief,valuesandattitudesthatgobeyondselfinterestand
organizationalinterest,thatconcerntheinterestofalargerpolitical
entityandthatmotivateindividualstoactaccordinglywhenever
appropriate(Vandenabeele,2007:547)

Perry&Hondegem(2008:3)pointoutthatthemeaningofpublicservice
motivationvariesacrossdisciplinesandfields,butitsdefinitionhasa
commonfocusonmotivesandactioninthepublicdomainthatareintended
todogoodforothersandshapethewellbeingofsociety. Forexample,
teachersmaycareabouttheperformanceoftheirstudents,doctorsand
nursesabouttheirpatientshealthpoliceofficers maybeconcernedabout

1
2

JerrettMyersisResearchCoordinatoratOxfordPolicyInstitutejmyers@opi.org.uk
Thismaybebecausetheyhavealowerprofile,areconductedinformallyorareinfactless
common.
1

OxfordPolicyInstitute

thesafetyofacommunityandsocialworkersaboutthewelfareoftheir
clients.
Insomeanalyses,itistheorisedthatwhenanorganisationproducesoutput
thatanemployeedeemssociallyvaluable,theindividualmayobtaina
degreeofaddedutilitybycontributingtotheorganisationanditsobjectives.
Forexample,auniversitylecturermaybemotivatedbytheroleofher
institutionincontributingtosociety,itsregardfortrainingfuturegenerations
oritsabilitytoimprovetheemploymentandincomeprospectsofits
students. Asimilar,yetdistinctapproachemphasisestheimportanceofthe
specificactivitiesofatask.Forinstance,auniversitylecturermaygain
utilityfromconductingteachingandresearchthatcontributestothestateof
knowledgeonasubject.Thedistinctionbetweentheprimarybasisfor
publicservicemotivation,eitherfrommissionvalenceandmotivationor
taskactivity,highlightssomeofthecomplexityinthisconcept.Italso
suggestsavarietyofincentivesexistatdifferentlevelswithinorganisations
andunderscorestheimportanceofconnectingspecifictaskactivitiesto
broadermissionobjectives.
Respondingtoincentives
Afrequentlycitedinstrumentformodelingbehaviourarisingfromvaried
interestsisprincipalagenttheorywhichpositsthattheinterestsofthe
principal(s)(thepublic,governments,etc.)andthoseofagent(s)(service
providers,publicemployees,etc.)maydivergeandthatincentivesneedto
beusedtoaligntheseinterests.Classicaleconomictheorysuggeststhat
workersderiveutilityfromtheamountofincometheyreceiveforthe
performanceoftheirwork.Therefore,paymentthatislinkedto
performanceisexpectedtoinducetightlyalignedpreferencesbetween
principalandagentwhereascompensationthatisnotlinkeddirectlyto
performancecancreateincentivestoshirkresponsibilitiesand
underperform.However,thereisconsiderableevidencethatagentsgain
utilityfromnonmonetaryvaluesthroughbuildingrelationships(Windebank
2001),performinggoodworkthatisprofessionallyrewarded(Freidson
2001)orotherintrinsicconcerns(Kirton2001)suchastrust,altruismand
goodwillthatcanbeproducedthroughinteractionandexchange(Mahoney
1992).
AsBloor(2008)pointsoutinanarticleonproductivityinthemedicallabour
market,doctorsdonotrespondsimplytofinancialincentivesallkindsof
nonfinancialincentivesalsoaffectbehaviour,includingtrust,duty,altruism,
reputationwithinpeergroupsandcommunities,andmanyotherconcerns.
Thisisconsistentwithotherempiricalstudiescomparingpublicandprivate
sectorworkerreportsofrewardmotivation'thatsuggestpublicsector
workerstendtobemorehighlymotivatedbyintrinsicrewardssuchas
ideologicalgoalsratherthanextrinsicincentivessuchasfinancial
compensation(Rainey1982,Jabes&Zussman1989).
Frant(1996)observesthatbothhighpoweredincentives,accruingfrom
markettransactionsandlowpoweredincentives,typicallyfoundinthe
bureaucraticsettingcaneachproduceunintendedconsequences.Higher
poweredincentives maybeoverwhelming,resultinginagreatertendency
towardsdishonestbehaviour,whilelowerpoweredincentivesmaybe
underwhelming,resultinginapropensityforshirking.Similarly,Scott
2

OxfordPolicyInstitute

(2000)reviewsthedifferenteffectsthatGPpaymentsystemshaveon
professionalbehaviour.SalarybasedcontractsinwhichaGPispaida
fixedamountforservicecancreateincentivestoundertreatpatients
whereasafeeforservicearrangementwhereaGPispaidbasedonthe
volumeofservicesprovidedcancreateincentivestoovertreat,resultingin
supplierinduceddemand. Acapitationsystem,inwhichaGPispaid
basedonthenumberofpatientsenrolledinapracticecancreateincentives
toattractandcompeteforpatients.However,itmayalsocreateincentives
toattractlowcostpatients,commonlyreferredtoascreamskimming,as
wellasproducingincentivesforincreasingreferralsorprescriptionsinan
efforttominimiseworkload.
Godageretal(2007)lookatlevelsofcommunityserviceamongphysicians
inNorwaywitharemunerationrateestimatedat38%66%oftheequivalent
privatepracticerate. Theyfindthatdespitetheirlowerremunerations,
communityservicesareundertakenbyasignificantfractionofphysicians
beyondtheminimumrequiredamount(Godageretal,2007:30). The
willingnesstoperformagreateramountofcommunityservicethanthe
minimumrequiredmaybeevidenceofaconformitytocollectivityoriented
behaviour,atraitthatArrow(1963:951)suggesteddistinguishesthe
behaviourofphysiciansfromotherbusinessprofessionals.TheGodageret
alstudyalsofindsthatbothgrossincomeandgrossdebthadnegative
effectsonlevelsofcommunityservice,highlightingtheheterogeneityof
preferencesamongphysicians.
AsMurray(2008:8)pointsout,therelationshipsbetweenincentivesand
agentbehaviourarecomplexandmultifacetedthereisnoeasywayto
constructanincentivestructurethatwilldeliverhighqualitypublicservices
atleastcostthereisnoonesizefitsall. Althoughitmaynotbepossible
toguaranteeanoptimalsetofincentivesinallcircumstances,througha
clearerunderstandingofhowagentsrespondtovariousincentives,
policymakersareinamoreinformedpositiontostructurecontractsand
adjustmanagerialpracticesforimprovedperformance.
TheresultsofPublicServiceMotivation
Publicservicemotivation(PSM)isclaimedtopromoteprosocial
behaviourbyincreasingeffortto furtherthewellbeingofatargetgroup,
suchaspupils,patients,orsocialwelfareapplicants. Thisprosocial
behaviourisoftencharacterisedbyselfsacrifice,commitmenttothepublic
interestandcompassiontowardsothers.Examplesofsuchprosocial
behaviourcommonlycitedincludevarioustypesofethicalbehaviour,
workerswhodonatelabourbyworkinginexcessofcontractedhours,or
theprovisionofadditionalsupporttocoworkersthatisnotcoercedor
rewardedextrinsically.
EmpiricalworkintheUnitedStates,Canada,GermanyandtheUKhas
foundevidenceofthismotivationamongpublicservants(Perry1996,
Houston2000,Duxbury,Dyke&Lam1999,Vandenabeeleetal2006).
SubsequentworkhasestablishedthatemployeeswhopossessPSMhave
greaterjobsatisfaction,betterperformance(Grant2008),aremorelikelyto
lookforotherworkinsidegovernmentandmorelikelytobesupportiveof
reforms(Naff1999).Pandeyetal(2008)identifythatPSMiscorrelated
withorganisationalcitizenship,ineffectbeingmoreconsideratetoward
3

OxfordPolicyInstitute

theirfellowemployeesandmorelikelytohelptheirfellowemployeeswith
worktasks.Taylor(2008)findsadirectassociationbetweenPSMandjob
satisfactionandorganisationalcommitment.BesleyandGhatak(2005,
2007)pointtotheefficiencygainsfrommatchingagentsthatpossessPSM
withmissionorientedpublicandnonprofitorganisations.Inastudyon
personenvironmentfit,Steijn(2008)findsthatemployeeswithhigher
levelsofPSMaremorelikelytolookforworkinthepublicsector.
SourcesofPublicServiceMotivation
TwoprimarysourcesofPSMhavebeenidentifiedintheliterature.First,it
hasbeenreportedthatPSMisconstructedthroughindividualexperiences
includinglifeevents,socialisationfromfamilyinfluencesandeducationand
professionaltraining(Perry2000).IthasalsobeenreportedthatPSMis
cultivatedbyorganisationalculturethroughjobcharacteristics,
organisationalincentivesandtheworkenvironment(Camilleri2007,
MoynihanandPandey2007).Grant(2008)reportsastudythatexposed
callerssolicitingcharitabledonationsfromalumniforanAmerican
universitytoarecipientofthecharitabledonations.Therecipientprovided
afirsthanddescriptionofthebenefitsthataccruedfromtheworkthe
callerswereengagedin.Thisgroupofcallersdoubledthenumberof
weeklypledgesthattheyobtainedandincreasedtheamountofweekly
donationmoneyobtainedbymorethanfivefold,whereastherewasno
changeinthecontrolgroup.Thisresultsuggeststhatmanagerial
arrangementscaninfluencetheeffectsofPSM.Asleadership,policy
initiativesandmanagerialpracticescanbeusedtoinfluencebothindividual
valuesandthewaytasksarecarriedout,theseresultssuggestthat
authoritiescouldenhancelevelsofpublicservicemotivationamongagroup
orwithinanorganisation.
ThelinkbetweenPublicServiceMotivationandthechoicesof
entrantsintothelabourmarket
Employeesthatcareabouttheoutputsoftheorganisationaccruegreater
compensationfortheirefforts,thusraisingtheexpectedintensityofeffort.
Giventhattheprovisionofpublicservicescandependsignificantlyonthe
effortputforthbyemployees,therehasbeenconsiderableattention
devotedtothelinksbetweenPSMandmatchingemployeeswithpublic
serviceemployers.EmpiricalworkhasreportedthathighscoringPSM
typeswillchoosepublicratherthanprivatesectorwork(Steijn2008).This
findingistypicallybasedondatafrompublicemployeeswithhighlevelsof
PSMwhoreportthattheyaremorelikelytolookforapublicratherthan
privatesectorposition.Studiesexaminingthesechoicesareoftenrestricted
bytheavailabilityofdataanddonotdrilldownintomorerealistic
scenariossuchasthetradeoffsbetweenvariousoccupations. Asituation
thatmanyjobseekersencounteristhepossibilityofattainingamore
lucrativepositionatanorganisationwithfeweropportunitiestoengagein
prosocialbehaviour.ArehighscoringPSMtypeswillingtoforegowork
thathasapublicserviceorientationinreturnforahighersalary? Besley
andGhatak(2005)reportamodelthatconsiders(interalia)howthe
outsideoptionforworkersmayaffectthetypeandlevelofincentives
utilisedbyemployerstoattractandretainemployees.Withfullemployment
andariseintheprivatesectorwage,theirmodelpredictsthatthepublic
sectorwillneedtoconsiderschemesthat mimicprivatesector
4

OxfordPolicyInstitute

incentives(BesleyandGhatak,2005:629). Thearticlepointsoutthat
althoughNewPublicManagementreforms intheUKwerepopularduring
the1980s,widespreadinterestintheuseofmorehigherpowered
incentivesdidnotoccuruntilthe1990swhentherewasareturntofull
employmentandariseinprivatesectorwages. Thisoccurrencemaybe
attributedtothetendencyofworkerstomovefromonesectortoanotherin
searchofhigherpayoffs. This maymeanthatworkersarewillingtoforego
publicserviceorientedworkforhigherpay.However,itremainsunclear
whatvaluationhighscoringPSMtypesplaceonworkthathasapublic
serviceorientationandhowthisvaluationdiffersbyworkertype.
Resolvingthisissuewouldassistinunderstandingthestrengthofinformal
incentivessuchasPSMandhowitrelatestomorehigherpowered
incentivessuchasfinancialremuneration.
ProfilinghighscoringPublicServiceMotivationtypes
ResearchonPSMcitestheimportanceofavarietyofcharacteristics
includingaltruism,aninterestinprosocialbehaviour,andselfsacrifice.
Evidencesuggeststhatpublicsectoremployeesaremorelikelyto votein
elections(Garand,Parkhurst,andSeoud1991aWatson1997Wolfinger
andRosenstone1980citedinHouston2006),engagewithcivicgroups
(Brewer2003)andselfreportcharitabledonationsoftime,bloodand
moneythanprivatesectorcounterparts(Houston2006).However,existing
studiesonPSMmeasuretheconstructinrelativeisolationratherthan
relatinglevelsofPSMtootherpersonalorpsychologicalcharacteristics.
Thecriticalissuethatthesestudiesdonotreportiswhetherhighscoring
PSMtypeshaveparticularmeasurablecharacteristicsthatarestableover
time.Asaresult,itisunclearwhetherPSMcouldbeaccuratelymeasured
throughapsychometricprofilingtestsuchastheMotivation,Valuesand
PreferencesInventory.
Asthevaluesunderlyingmotivationstendtobestableovertime,this
meansthatit ispossiblewithareasonabledegreeofaccuracytopredict
thewayanindividualwithparticulartraitscanbeexpectedtoperformunder
certainconditions. IfarobustlinkbetweenthehighPSMtypeandacertain
psychometricprofilecouldbeestablisheditmightbepossibletofacilitate
bettermatchingbetweenhighPSMtypesandpublicserviceoriented
organisations.
TherelationshipbetweenPublicServiceMotivationandextrinsic
incentives
Thereisanongoingdebateaboutthewayfinancialincentivessuchas
performancerelatedpaycanaffectintrinsicmotivationssuchasPSM.
Theextensiveliteratureinbothpsychologyandeconomicsonthe
crowdingouteffectofvariousincentives,suggeststhatthereisatradeoff
betweenthesetwotypesofmotivations.OsterlohandFrey(2000)identify
alargenumberofscholarswhohavestudiedandfoundsupportforthis
phenomenon,whichmaybecausedbyatleastthreereasons. First,the
externalmotivationmayundermineselfdeterminationofthetaskbecause
theemployeefeelsthattheexternalpressureisthemainmotivator.Inthis
scenario,theemployeedoesnotfeelthattheactivitieswouldwarrantthe
intrinsicmotivationaswellastheextrinsicmotivation,therebyreducing
5

OxfordPolicyInstitute

onesintrinsicattachmenttotheactivity. Asimilarpointismadeby
Prenticeetal(2007:11)whopointout,itispossiblethatexternalfinancial
incentivescouldoverwhelmpublicservicemotivation,sinceitsuggeststo
theemployeethattheiremployerrecognisesnoassociationbetweenoutput
andeffortotherthanapure,marketrelationship. Second,theintroduction
ofacontractualrelationshipmayunderminetheoriginalrelationshipthat
theworkerfeltwiththeactivities.Whileintrinsicallyrewarding,the
employeemayfeelacertainloyaltyandemotionalattachmenttothe
activities,however,whenacontractualobligationisintroduced,itmay
underminethesebonds. Third,incasessuchaspayingforovertimework,
itmaybethatbycommodifyingthetask,theemployeehasamoredirect
measureoftheopportunitycostandwillthereforebemorelikelytoavoid
incurringthiscost.
Amorerecentdevelopmentonthistheorysuggeststhatwhenextrinsic
rewardsareperceivedassupportingratherthancontrolling,theywillcrowd
in,thatisincrease,intrinsicmotivations.Inastudyonthewayfinancial
remunerationaffectsresearchpublicationsinDenmark,Andersenand
Pallesen(2008)findevidenceinsupportofthistheory.Thisresultis
attributedtothebeliefthattheaffectedindividualviewsanadditional
(extrinsic)rewardasrecognitionofherintrinsicvalues.
Conclusion
Thereisconsiderableandgrowinginterestintheconceptofpublicservice
motivation,partlyasareactiontorecentpublicsectorreformsthatare
basedonincreasedmanagerialcontrolandfinancialincentivesandpartly
asmanyseesuchreformscontributingtoadeclinein`thepublic(ethic)
(Marquand,2004).Rebuildingpublicsectormotivationisviewedasaway
toimprovepublicservicequalityandvolumewithoutincurringthe
transaction/monitoringcostsassociatedwithhigherpoweredincentives
suchasperformancerelatedpay.Thisgrowingevidencebasehasbeen
bolsteredbymorethaneightypublicservicemotivationarticlesand
conferencepaperspublishedbetween1995and2007(Perry&Hondeghem
2008).
WhiletheoryandevidencesuggeststhatPSMcanplayakeyrolein
governingbehaviour,policyinitiativesdesignedtoimproveservicequality
andvolumesrelyingonotherformsofincentivesappeartobemore
prevalent.Ifrobustlinksbetweenmeasurablepsychologicaltraitsand
highscoringPSMtypescouldbeidentified,ourunderstandingofhow
extrinsicincentivesrelatetopublicservicemotivationimproved,clear
proxiesforpublicservicemotivationestablished,ormoredirectlinks
betweeninitiativesdesignedtoimprovepublicservicemotivationand
organisationalperformancecouldbedocumented,itmaycreateanew
spaceonpolicyagendasfortheconcept.Basedonthetrajectoryofcurrent
researchintopublicservicemotivation,someoftheseissuesmaybe
resolvedinthenottoodistantfuture.

OxfordPolicyInstitute

References

Andersen,LotteBghandPallesen,Thomas(2008)'"NotJustforthe
Money?"HowFinancialIncentivesAffecttheNumberofPublicationsat
DanishResearchInstitutions',InternationalPublicManagementJournal,
11:1,2847.
Arrow,K.J.,1963.UncertaintyandtheWelfareEconomicsofMedical
Care.TheAmericanEconomicReview53,941973.
Besley,T.andGhatak,M(2005)CompetitionandIncentiveswith
MotivatedAgents,AmericanEconomicReview,95(3):61636.
Besley,TandGhatak,MReformingPublicServiceDelivery(2007)Journal
ofAfricanEconomies200716:127156
Bloor,K.(2008)Pay'emorflay'em:improvingproductivityinthemedical
labourmarketConferencepaperforpresentationtoOPIconferenceon
`Institutions,incentivesandpublicsectorperformance'OPI18January
2008
Brewer,GeneA.2003.Buildingsocialcapital:Civicattitudesandbehavior
ofpublicservants.JournalofPublicAdministrationResearchandTheory
13:526.
Brewer,GeneA.ColemanSelden,Sally(1998)Whistleblowersinthe
FederalCivilService:NewEvidenceofthePublicServiceEthic. Journal
ofPublicAdministrationResearchandTheory8,3(July1998):413439.
Camilleri,E(2007)Antecedentsaffectingpublicservicemotivation
PersonnelReviewVol.36No.3,2007pp.356377.
Duxbury,L.,Dyke,L.,&Lam,N.(1999).Careerdevelopmentinthefederal
publicservice:Buildingaworldclassworkforce.Ottawa:TreasuryBoardof
CanadaSecretariat.Available http://www.tbs
sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/partners/workreport_e.asp
Frant,H.(1996)Highpoweredandlowpoweredincentivesinthepublic
sector,JournalofPublicAdministrationResearchandTheory,July,6,3,
36582.
Freidson,E2001Professionalism,theThirdLogic:OnthePracticeof
Knowledge.PolityPress.2001
Grant,AdamM.(2008)'EmployeeswithoutaCause:TheMotivational
EffectsofProsocialImpactinPublicService',InternationalPublic
ManagementJournal,11:1,4866
Houston,D(2006)WalkingtheWalkofPublicServiceMotivation:Public
EmployeesandCharitableGiftsofTime,Blood,andMoneyJournalof
publicadministrationresearchandtheoryJPART16:6786
Houston,D2000PublicServiceMotivation:AMultivariateTest.Journalof
PublicAdministrationResearchandTheory,Vol.10,No.4:713728(2000)
Godager,Geir,Iversen,Tor,Ma,AlbertChingTo,(2007)Servicemotives
andprofitincentivesamongphysiciansUniversityofOsloHealth
EconomicsResearchProgrammeWorkingPaper2007:4
Jabes,JakandZussman,David(1989)OrganizationalCultureinPublic
BureaucraciesInternationalReviewofAdministrativeSciences.198955:
95116
Kirton,D(2001)LoveandMoney:Payment,motivationandthefostering
task,ChildandFamilySocialWork,6,3,August:199208.
LeGrand,J(2003)Motivation,AgencyandPublicPolicy:OfKnightsand
Knaves,PawnsandQueensOxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Mahoney,J.T.,A.S.HuffandJ.O.Huff(1992)Towardsanewsocial
contracttheoryinorganizationscience,JournalofManagementInquiry,
December,1,4,15369
7

OxfordPolicyInstitute

Moynihan,DonaldP.andSanjayK.Pandey.2007.TheRoleof
OrganizationsinFosteringPublicServiceMotivation.PublicAdministration
Review67(1):4053.
Marquand,D(2004)DeclineofthePublic.TheHollowingOutof
Citizenship.PolityPress.
Murray,F(2008)'Organisationsarecakesnotcars':gettingthepublic
sectorincentivemixrightOxfordPolicyInstituteApril2008.Available
http://www.opi.org.uk/documents/Structuringincentivesinpublicorganisations
_Murray_April2008_000.pdf
Naff,K.C.andJ.Crum(1999)WorkingforAmerica,ReviewofPublic
Administration,Fall,19,4,517.
Osterloh,M&Frey,B2000,Motivation,KnowledgeTransfer,and
OrganizationalForms,OrganizationScience,Vol.11,No.5.(Sep.Oct.,
2000),pp.538550
Pandey,SanjayK.,Wright,BradleyE.andMoynihan,DonaldP.(2008)
'PublicServiceMotivationandInterpersonalCitizenshipBehaviorinPublic
Organizations:TestingaPreliminaryModel',InternationalPublic
ManagementJournal,11:1,89108.
Perry,JamesL.andHondeghem,Annie(2008)'BuildingTheoryand
EmpiricalEvidenceaboutPublicServiceMotivation',InternationalPublic
ManagementJournal,11:1,312
Perry,J1996MeasuringPublicServiceMotivation:AnAssessmentof
ConstructReliabilityandValidityJournalofPublicAdministrationResearch
andTheory,Vol.6,No.1:522(1996)
Perry,J.andWise,L.1990.Themotivationalbasesofpublicservice.
PublicAdministrationReview50:367373.
Prentice,G,Burgess,S,Propper,CPerformancepayinthepublicsector:a
reviewoftheissuesandevidenceOfficeofManpowerEconomics
November2007Available
http://www.ome.uk.com/downloads/Performance%20pay%20in%20the%20
Public%20Sector.%20A%20review%20of%20the%20issues%20and%20evi
dence.pdf
Rainey,H.G.andSteinbauer,P.1999.GallopingElephants:Developing
ElementsofaTheoryofEffectiveGovernmentOrganizations.Journalof
PublicAdministrationResearchandTheory9(1):132.
Rainey,H(1982)RewardPreferencesamongPublicandPrivate
Managers:InSearchoftheServiceEthicTheAmericanReviewofPublic
Administration.16:288302
Scott,Anthony(2000)Economicsofgeneralpractice,Chapter22
HandbookofHealthEconomicsEditedbyA.J.CulyerandJ.RNewhouse
Volume1,Part2,2000,Pages11751200PublishedbyElsevierB.V.
Steijn,Bram(2008)'PersonEnvironmentFitandPublicServiceMotivation',
InternationalPublicManagementJournal,11:1,1327
Taylor,Jeannette(2008)'OrganizationalInfluences,PublicService
MotivationandWorkOutcomes:AnAustralianStudy',InternationalPublic
ManagementJournal,11:1,6788
Vandenabeele,Wouter(2007)Towardapublicadministrationtheoryof
publicservicemotivation.PublicManagementReview,Dec2007,Vol.9
Issue4,p545556
Vandenabeele,WScheepers,SandHondeghem,A.(2006)PublicService
MotivationinanInternationalComparativePerspective:TheUKand
GermanyPublicPolicyandAdministrationVolume21No.1Spring2006
Williams,C&Windebank,J2001Beyondprofitmotivatedexchange:some
lessonsfromthestudyofpaidinformalworkEuropeanUrbanRegional
Studies8(1):4961.
8

OxfordPolicyInstitute