G.R. No.

L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of
the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the
inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which
took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that
year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the
moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief
board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22,
1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments,
together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila
dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned
allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the
petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine
Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte
de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts
were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are
still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons,
and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief
board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de
Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their
heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912,
by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due
trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent
in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the
cause. The defendant appealed and makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the
Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a donation subject to one

condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these
Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme
Government of Spain should not approve the action taken by the former government.
2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty
thousand dollars ($80,000) being at present the exclusive property of the appellant the
Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.
3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has
subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money
resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3,
1863, in these Island.
4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine
Legislature on January 30, 1912, is unconstitutional.
5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of
this suit brought by the Insular Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given to it by the
late Spanish Government of these Islands.
6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse
the Philippine Government in the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or
the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal
interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed
to inform the home Government in what manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue
of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake might
be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had
assumed toward the donors.
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883,
addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which reads:
Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.
Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila
informs your Excellency, First: That the funds which it has up to the present been able to
dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the sum of
one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after
tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit of the establishment, which would be

greatly injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third:
That your Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of
the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the national
subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That
in the public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board
over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said treasury by order of your general
Government, it having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it
had been held. fifth: That in the straightened circumstances of the moment, your
Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of that
sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of the central
relief board, there be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be
held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the
Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any reason, either
because of the failure of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by
your Excellency relative to the application to the needs of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of
the subscription intended to believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for
any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad obligates itself to return
any sums which it may have received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the
whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever bank
or banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry.
This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the present crisis and the
board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the
other officials who have take part in the transaction.
The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:
GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.
In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte
de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated that the funds which the said institution
counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account
remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which
reason it entreats the general Government that, in pursuance of its telegraphic advice to
H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad
$80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for
the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to
return this sum should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve the said proposal,
and for this purpose it will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it
stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled to suspend
operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient an institution; and in

view of the report upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and
considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much greater sum from the
source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general Government has
submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after
strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a
surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan
upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of
the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to
relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de
Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury; and
Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution
referred to would be frustrated, and that the great and laudable work of its establishment,
and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is not granted,
since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the evergrowing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and
Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind,
it might be said that at the present juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of
public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting from the late
calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such
poverty; and
Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein
contained, for the funds in question are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H>
M. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this general
Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in
conformity with the report of the Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as follows:
First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in
the public treasury of these Islands obtained from the national subscription opened by
reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its needs may
require, in installments of $20,000.
Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return,
within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government
does not approve this resolution.
Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other
work, proceed to prepare the necessary papers so that with the least possible delay the

payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de Piedad of
having to suspend its operations may be averted.
H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net
(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.
By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was
ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total sum available at the present time, taking into
consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your
general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants, whose names
were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been
established, as therein provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the
donations assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke them all within a
reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall identify themselves, without regard
to their financial status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein
mentioned have been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of
claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of the
Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the
relief board and your general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered
to the Monte de Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and
"in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the earthquake
be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply with the
provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of
this Finance order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a
report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that Department's report to
the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:
Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines)
Excellency. By Royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, it is provided that the
persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year
1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this
purpose, with observance of the rules specified in the said royal order, one of them being
that before making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to
money. These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were
turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general
needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable
institutions and another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On
January 30, last, your Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign
mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purposes
desired (that is, for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being
the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund

and which were expended in a different way from that intended by the donors) and this
Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the
Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of your
general Government of the date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said
funds, the (Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the period of
eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On this Intendencia's
demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the
provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would
be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself
to return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived,
inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund
should he collected, makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de
Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during which it
has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This Intendencia
also supposed that the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan,
inasmuch as, far from investing it in beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole
amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this
operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had
gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made
on receiving the sum, after repeated demands refused to return the money on the ground
that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order the
reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the
discharge of a sovereign command, the fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased
to order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it received from
the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not received as a loan, but as a donation,
this in the opinion of this Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order
which directed the apportionment of the amount of the subscription raised in the year
1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no
donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides,
no donation whatever could be made of funds derived from a private subscription raised
for a specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and the names of the
beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking only the mere
material act of the delivery, which has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected
reply made by the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the matter
of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in support thereof, this Intendencia
believes the intervention of your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order
No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg your
Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight
days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the
provisions of the said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that the
said pious establishment, during the last few days and after demand was made upon it,

has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on
deposit in the general deposit funds.
The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by
either the Philippine Government or the Spanish Government in regard to the $80,000 turned
over to the Monte de Piedad.
In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15,
1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883, $20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total
$80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public Treasury derived from the
subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable
loan, and without interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it
was closed by transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account
was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop of Manila, without interest,
thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The abovementioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of
these two account which on this date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr.
Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these institutions,
$95,000."
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information
concerning the status of the $80,000 and received the following reply:
MANILA, March 31, 1902.
To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.
SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information
from this office as to when and for what purpose the Spanish Government delivered to
the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened in
connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be
useful for the report which your office is called upon to furnish, I must state to your
department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have been consulted
for the purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a reimbursable
loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with their own
funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and June 2 of
the said year, 1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty
thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. (Signed) Emilio Moreta.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of
those Pious Institutions.

Manila, November 19, 1913

(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary
(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
Managing Director.
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place
between the Government of Spain and the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte
de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its
petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more
working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine
Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to
be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de
Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of
Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a
donation. The Governor-General, after reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this
general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance
which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may
remain as a surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan
upon the security of the credit of the institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection
can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be
made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly
bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M.
Government does not approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time the
word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000 appears in this resolution of the
Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did
tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest,
but that Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason that the
Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform the Madrid
Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the
sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general
Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of the
interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when considered in
connection with the report of the Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it was so
intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets forth in detail
the action taken in order to secure the return of the $80,000. The Department of Finance, acting
under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the
Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus
carried in its books until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada

Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account." Furthermore,
the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the
$80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest
doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as
a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal
brief that:
The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction
of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and
as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his
kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the
Philippines, of which said King and his deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines,
as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the latter, as a
result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high office and
tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the
national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a charitable
purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being needed for its original
purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof to
an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority, if not
in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when
it conferred upon him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very
closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government though Christian, was
not Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious
matters, and inveterately maintained a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and
civil powers.
In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express
provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did
not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the American
Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the
funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the
Spanish Government to take over such things would result in great inconvenience to the
American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for
the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it
cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a
Government like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government
or rather, the King of Spain, in this regard; and as the condition annexed to the donation

was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but became
impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these
Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the contract has been cleared thereof.
The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such
contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to the
Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity founded by the donations for the
earthquake sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first
proposition has already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second,
the record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose
the relief of the earthquake sufferers and for no other purpose. The money was turned over
to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the
money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including
the King of Spain and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the
disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official capacity, and the fact that they might have
belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such,
had nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the
Monte de Piedad (an institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the
charity in question had been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the
Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron,
respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not in their civil capacities, and such
functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the
right to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain
and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was completely separated
with the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The
donors were persons in Spain, the trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees, the
cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is
one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish
Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not being the owner of the fund it
could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it
certainly never has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the
Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even could Spain have
transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United
States, as a Government, have accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the
thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It follows further
that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who could

claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or
the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could
not, as counsel say, transfer the ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question
arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or
Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no
change of sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments were
something more than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact
status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force at the time there
transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875,
and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the
Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)
The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the
Spanish Government and which were remitted to the Philippine Government to be distributed
among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the
law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a
temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish
Government initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to
that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of the instructions, to exercise
supervision and control over the moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the donors
should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided
to its charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3
of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power upon the secretary of the interior of Spain,
and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some
other charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this
manner so long as they were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were contributed.
The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and totally or partially
change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the
charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the
donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and
to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for which they were contributed .The secretary
of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised these powers and
duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of
the Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their
governmental capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors. It will this be
seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the
fund.

It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the
$80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of
sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action
for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it
cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change.
While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war
between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898,
the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter
agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article,
Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public
highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belonged to the public
domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein,
it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign.
This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not
rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in
article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands
were ceded to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of
June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter
date. In Vilas vs. Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:
That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the
ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the
political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their
force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is
equally settled in the same public law that the great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the
new ruler.
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of
the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force
unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class
is clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of
the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate,
and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in
exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of
charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in
securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of
section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).

Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain
devolved upon he United States. In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval
in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said:
The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the
prerogative of the crown, and gave their Acts the same force and effect.
In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the
court in a charity case, said:
When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved
upon the people of the States. And this power still remains with them except so fact as
they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made
known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
Chancelor Kent says:
In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right
to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority
over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508,
note.)
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after
approving also the last quotations, said:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the
great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a
most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483,
497), wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in
the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts, idiots, insane persons, and persons
not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:
These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in
being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their
rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae.
They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative

department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice
and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other
cases whatever.
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party
in interest; that the Attorney-General had no power to institute the action; and that there must be
an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a whole, as distinguished from the
rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of
the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the
duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved the
following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge & C. C., 417):
Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it
devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the public that the crown should be entitled to
intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public generally, the
public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found
effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries,
10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by
this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this
Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action."
The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions.
The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They
parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original
sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no
doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be
impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to
recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to
again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which
the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being
given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific
purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public
use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the
Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to
maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the
prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in the
future.

As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act
No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that we have just held that the present Philippine
Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the
Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not,
as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the
owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board.
Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine
Legislature.
In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before
the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from the
Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the
obligations of the old city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different
corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the old
debt, said:
The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the
present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the
property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all
of its liabilities.
In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de
Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in
June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on
May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on
the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a)
because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b)
because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c) even if
the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in
fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.
The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000
in 1883 "to be held under the same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal
of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the royal order of December 3, 1892,
the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad in June, 1893, to return the $80,000.
The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a returnable loan until

January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31,
1902, the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question
was received as a reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January 30,
1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between
individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this
theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for
the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were
received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of
Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on
May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after March 31, 1902. (Sections 38
and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the
United States in U. S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125),
said:
It is settled beyond doubt or controversy upon the foundation of the great principle of
public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests
should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are
confided that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government,
is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its
intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14
Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs.
O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)
In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the
State. That no laches can be imputed to the King, and that no time can bar his rights, was
the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy, that
as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the
negligence of his officer and servants. The principle is applicable to all governments,
which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of
the interests and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the
statutes of a State prescribing periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not held
to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be
remedied are of such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a
State can only apply to persons and thing over which the State has jurisdiction, the United
States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.

In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:

In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not
as a general rule run against the sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But
the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that the state
must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in
competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit
in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.
In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing
and prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to
carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.
The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty
with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on
the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either
while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the owner of such coupons. (U. S.
vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the
beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for
trespass on the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs.
Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B., 397].)
These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in
the very nature of things, applicable to the Philippine Government.
Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question
the amount of the judgment nor do they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it
allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine currency.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:p

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds
of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the
certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for
the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and
beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9,
1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the
defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the
recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought
the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of
P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the
following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor
General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the
action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these
items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used
the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the
plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued
without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in
the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed,
nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was
dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us,
there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
1

involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of

land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent. We there said: .
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,

... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for
public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be
summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed
by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in
and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in
the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not

be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was
a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is
just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of
just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the
jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit
could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title
and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover
possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the
time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price
of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In
addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial
court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo
for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as
above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy
really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic
impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and
within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for
economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival
and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the
competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of
citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to

engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged
in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business
for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1
and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and
the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection
clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function
and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their

application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly
resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or
extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions
of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L.
ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824825.)
d. The due process clause.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is
by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and
wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted
to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has
been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative.
Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the
wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be
no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and
prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which
from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live
in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of
things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under
modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified
to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru
him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy
reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru
which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community.
He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little
gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store
with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He
has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out.
The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale
in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred
and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets
and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely
useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him.
In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent
control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it
is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law
is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not
an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control
virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and
the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail
trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets

Year and
Retailers
Nationality

No.Establishme
nts

Pesos

Gross Sales

Per cent
Distributi
on

Pesos

Per cent
Distributi
on

194
1:

194
7:

Filipino
..........

106,671 200,323,1
38

55.82 174,181,9
24

51.74

Chines
e .........
..

15,356 118,348,6
92

32.98 148,813,2
39

44.21

Others
............

1,646 40,187,09
0

11.20 13,630,23
9

4.05

Filipino
..........

111,107 208,658,9
46

65.05 279,583,3
33

57.03

Chines
e .........
..

13,774 106,156,2
18

33.56 205,701,1
34

41.96

Others
...........

354 8,761,260

.49 4,927,168

1.01

Filipino
..........

113,631 213,342,2
64

67.30 467,161,6
67

60.51

Chines
e .........
.

12,087 93,155,45
9

29.38 294,894,2
27

38.20

Others
..........

422 10,514,67
5

3.32 9,995,402

1.29

Filipino
..........

113,659 213,451,6
02

60.89 462,532,9
01

53.47

Chines
e .........
.

16,248 125,223,3
36

35.72 392,414,8
75

45.36

194 (Censu
8:
s)

194
9:

Others
..........

486 12,056,36
5

3.39 10,078,36
4

1.17

Filipino
.........

119,352 224,053,6
20

61.09 466,058,0
52

53.07

Chines
e .........
.

17,429 134,325,3
03

36.60 404,481,3
84

46.06

347 8,614,025

2.31 7,645,327

87

195
1:

Others
..........

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Year and Retailer's

Nationality

Item
Assets
(Pesos)

Gross
Sales
(Pesos)

1,878

1,633

1941:

Filipino ......................................
.......

Chinese .....................................
.........

7,707

9,691

Others .......................................
........

24,415

8,281

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,878

2,516

Chinese .....................................
......

7,707

14,934

Others .......................................
.......

24,749

13,919

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,878

4,111

Chinese .....................................
........

7,707

24,398

Others .......................................
.......

24,916

23,686

1947:

1948:

(Census)

1949:

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,878

4,069

Chinese .....................................
.........

7,707

24,152

Others .......................................
.......

24,807

20,737

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,877

3,905

Chinese .....................................
........

7,707

33,207

Others .......................................
........

24,824

22,033

1951:

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the

edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their
assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many
Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more
capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report,
pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the
Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents,
the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of
capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is
the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been
adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance
and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it
is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail
trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67
of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution
were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien
interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern
of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but
of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of
the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus
. . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation
not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic
subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th
ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution
No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and
a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of
Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance
and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to

alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved
by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as
the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in
the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose
an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer
does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for
its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it
from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and
free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests
of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the
mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to
the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has
had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous
hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods
and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No.
1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that
they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the
law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who
would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and
enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money
into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in
derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting
public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in
the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals;
what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods
and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the
alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution
is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The
alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is
for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of
stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of
that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him
from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the
earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt
the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's
economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient
and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function
of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the
welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they

are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the
trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to
prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and
as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare
that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities
we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co.
(1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection
clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the

Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a
valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat.,
I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance,
is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which
is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping
of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a
monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It
is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has
been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American
privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from
fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial
marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system
is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has
declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following
reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to
have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of
liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to
discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our
institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to
our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,
274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an

ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms)
to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it
could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the
right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said
that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and
loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker,
pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar
vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's
findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the
health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission,
92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters
and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further
added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry.
However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally
as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a
state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons
over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this
decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious,
or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of
public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the
United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of
books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the
main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be
no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud,
because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its
conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit
would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese
of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220
(1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of

laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power
granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the
administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial
hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as
hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens
do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom
they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in
so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the
land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions
and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of
the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without
the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it
is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our
fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign
born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental
environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of
the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without
plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations
against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,

when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination
to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940,
950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,
oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that
it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit
and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption
and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has
been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without

harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility
and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the
privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs
and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly
stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores
the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer
is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The
test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed
the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no
allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and
who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our
destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other
people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power
that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to
the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions
of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have
given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the
supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization
of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate
for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the
National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is
provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the
retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary
objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and
unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the

Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied
to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the
law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to
judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in
favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These
principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the
law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no
need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are
directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and
the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate"
does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in
page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors,
etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly

included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308,
quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint
and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While
word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason
why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection
with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State
vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the
title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more
general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains
other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which
would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the
principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been
appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions.
The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons
affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must
therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such
as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations
of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is

equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution,
are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes
upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title,
and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close.
Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed
in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the
Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the
Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule
does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a
provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the
due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not
infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of
which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have
not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not
violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the
Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did
engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They
assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows
aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or
forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is
not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the
existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The
prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes
first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such corporations is subject
to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation.1 But the
prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of which
is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of
the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and
partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien
engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their
property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and
partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a
deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of
the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their
business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to
reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the
alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The
stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The
goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of
effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law2 and that no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or
partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled
to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and
before the end of the term of the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by
the associations and partners and within six months after the death of their predecessor-ininterest.

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the
ownership of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain
constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and
prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands.4
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations
and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date
of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by
the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in
the retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are
invalid, for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the
Constitution.

MAXIMO CALALANG,
Petitioner
,
-versusG.R. No. 47800
December 2, 1940
A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LAUREL,
J.
:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as
a private citizen and as a taxpayer
of Manila, brought before this co
urt this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents,
A. D. Williams, as Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission; Vi
cente Fragante, as Director of
P
u
b
l
i
c
W
o
r
k
s
;
S

e
r
g
i
o
B
a
y
a
n
,
a
s
A
c
ting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez,
as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
c
h
a
n
r
o
ble
s
p
u
bli
s
h
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y

It is alleged in the petition that

the National Traffic Commission, in
its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director
of Public Works and to the Se
cretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street exten
ding from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:
30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from

1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and alon

g Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to
11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommend
ed to the Director of Public
Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 548 which authorizes said Di
rector of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Publ
ic Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads; that on
August 2, 1940, the Director of
Public Works, in his first indors
ement to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, recommend
ed to the latter the approval
of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-d
rawn vehicles be limited to the
portion thereof extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Azcarraga Street; that on
August 10, 1940, the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications,
in his second indorsement
addressed to the Director of

Public Works, approved the

recommendation of the latter that Ro
sario Street and Rizal Avenue be
closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and
during the hours as above indicated, fo
r a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Poli
ce of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted; that as
a consequence of such enforcement,
all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up pa
ssengers in the places abovementioned to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by
which the Director of Public Wo
rks, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Co
mmunications, is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for
the regulation and control of the
use of and traffic on national road
s and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue dele
gation of legislative power. This
contention is untenable. As was ob
served by this court in Rubi vs.
chanroblespublishingcompany

Provincial Board of Mindoro (39

Phil, 660, 700), The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in
the early Ohio case decided by
Judge Ranney, and since followed in
a multitude of cases, namely:
The true distinction therefore is be
tween the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involv
es a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursua
nce of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid object
ion can be made. (Cincinnati, W. &
Z. R. Co. vs. Commrs. Clinton Count
y, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wa
yman vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1)
may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments
or subordinate officials thereof,
to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead,
248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the necessity of the case.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
SECTION 1.
To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads
by acts of the National Assemb
chanroblespublishingcompany

ly or by executive orders of the

President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and contro
l the use of and traffic on such
roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval
of the President, may contai
n provisions controlling or
regulating the construction of buildings or other structures
within a reasonable distance fr
om along the national roads.
Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of
traffic by the Director of Public
Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon makes such action necessa
ry or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or fo
r a specified period, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
The above provisions of law do not
confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and th
e Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority th
erein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determin
e what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
chanroblespublishingcompany

Assembly in said Act, to wit, to

promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President
of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes
of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes
such action necessary or advisabl
e in the public convenience and
interest. The delegated power, if
at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law sha
ll be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law
is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine wh
en and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view
of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requiremen
ts of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government
official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the pr
oper occasion exists for executing
the law. But it cannot be said that th
e exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law. As was said in

Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): To

assert that a law is less than a law, be
cause it is made to depend on a
future event or act, is to rob the
Legislature of the power to act wisely
for the public welfare whenever a la
w is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to th
ings future and impossible to fully
know. The proper distinction
the court said was this: The
Legislature cannot delegate its powe
r to make the law; but it can
make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which
wise and useful legislation must
depend which cannot be known to
the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquir
y and determination outside of the
halls of legislation. (Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed.
294.)
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and
46077, promulgated June 12, 1939,
and in Pangasinan Transportation
vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated
June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion
to observe that the principle of
separation of powers has been made
to adapt itself to the complexities

of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain

limits, of the principle of subordi
nate legislation, not only in the
United States and England but in
practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administerin
g the laws, the rigidity of the
theory of separation of government
al powers has, to a large extent,
been relaxed by permitting the dele
gation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount
of discretion in administrative
and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also
in the promulgation of certain ru
les and regulations calculated to
promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents pu
rsuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion. Commo
nwealth Act No. 548 was passed
by the National Assembly in the
exercise of the paramount police
power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of
were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in
chanroblespublishingcompany

chanroblespublishingcompany

the interest and convenience of the

public. In enacting said law, ther
efore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of publ
ic convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve conge
stion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may inte
rfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and o
ccupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state (U.S.
vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the indivi
dual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a mise
ry, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because th
en society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slaver
y. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline,
so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greate

r authority is conferred upon the

government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of
liberty which resides in the people.
The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of
insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps
expanding as civilization advances.
As was said in the case of Dobbins
vs. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238;
49 L. ed. 169), the right to exerci
se the police power is a continuing
one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of po
pulation or other causes, become
a menace to the public health and we
lfare, and be required to yield to
the public good. And in People
vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was
observed that advancing civilizatio
n is bringing within the police
power of the state today things wh
ich were not thought of as being
within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the grow
th of public opinion, with an
increasing desire on the part of th
e masses and of the government to
look after and care for
the interests of the individuals of the state,
have brought within the police po
chanroblespublishingcompany

wer many questions for regulation

which formerly were not so considered.
The petitioner finally avers that th
e rules and regulations complained
of infringe upon the constitution
al precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all
the people. The promotion of social
justice, however, is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social
justice is neither communism, no
r despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of la
ws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the compet
ent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper econom
ic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exer
cise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
chanroblespublishingcompany

salus
populi est suprema lex
.
c
h
a
n
r
o
ble
s
p
u
bli
s
h
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y

Social justice, therefore, must be

founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence amon
g divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection th
at should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamen
tal and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfo
rt, and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about the greatest
good to the greatest number.
c
h
a
n
r
o
ble
s
p
u
bli
s
h
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING

, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed
for is hereby denied, with costs ag
ainst the petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-45459

March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of
Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of
the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are
blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations
are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though
the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be
prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ."

(Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with
reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged
act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be
violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The
statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice,
or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a
multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of
the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our
country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the
estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine
Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of
the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and
civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their
oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty,
not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence

for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of
Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves
and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively
to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1,
subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code).
Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results.
The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious
worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as
follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR
TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND
PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount
herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the
Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates
and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage
stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines
in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A.
The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ
prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps
in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth
P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by
any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on
page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was
"to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to
the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It
is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of
showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and

the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself
but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the
issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of
a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church,
was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government
should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less
religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken
by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere
incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain
inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by
indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious
intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development
nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very
serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we
have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act
No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made
use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-45081

July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the
respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the
first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as
follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province
of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner
as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the
most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the
following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS
DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO
PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no
se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y
confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8
aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph
6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o
antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging

(a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the
protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to
the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring
the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly
after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to
the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ
prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative
Department of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution,
whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies
submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the
Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not
availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be
respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution
and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress
of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of
article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the
fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date
as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential
to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law;
that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner
to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to
take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own
rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions,
created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not
an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section
226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on
March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests
against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing
December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission
on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by
said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was
an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a
writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to
limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral
Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution,
endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II
(should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the
Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent
Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case"
by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal
propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy.
However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading
the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty
to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing
justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of
jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its

own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example,
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that
this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that
a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but
as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system
of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of
good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied
in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is
not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing
must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . .
aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must
the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino
minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is
mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our

country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is
thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even
if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers
and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which
have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.
This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct
prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the
Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine
the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February
29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine
the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to
take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system
which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions
is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional
system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel
for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI
of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted
it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par.
5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution
of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par.
1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the
Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding
contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of
Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive
officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate
impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of
hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the
Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds,
three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided
over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall
preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees
to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction
of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each
from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from
the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to
the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the
Legislative Department, reads as follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases
contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of
the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as
proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in
favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on
Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further
changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral
legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as
follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on
the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of
the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should
like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the
member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to
be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no
question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral
Commission and there is nothing to be determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall
confirm also the election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the
House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the
rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for
purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body,
because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is
elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody
confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims
in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there,
unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral
Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was
declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in
question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by
certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly.
The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the
assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When
there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman
from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from
the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting
the election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns
and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections
are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase
"and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own
instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is
granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to
contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it
is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications
provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to
question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is
contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has
power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons,

Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the
draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
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Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion

apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice:
"The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"
parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de
los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la
enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como
sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision
Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas."
Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation
also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres
a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en
esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los
miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos,
sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que
tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
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The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the
power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by
reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The

Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus
maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert
the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections",
which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and nonpartisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57,
58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties
in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two
modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights
of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each
session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was
to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them,
and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and
their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with
their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or

disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of
the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the
house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges
and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in
order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be
present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote
if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to
the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of
commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might
be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his
government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham
election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this
system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly
prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in
questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the
evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring
in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of
their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest
among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in
favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the
principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is
well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are
ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management
of the very business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a
bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the
12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the
Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the
honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or
the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the
measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the
leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice
of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr.
Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an

essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the
most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the nonpartisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to
two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance
with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become
imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as
amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws
Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p.
787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house,
are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests
against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13,
1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in
the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art.
43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the
legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential
elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the
two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a
contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol.
19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members
elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of
the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision
of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately.
Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in
this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on
the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its
Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed
it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the
exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The

creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers
of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members
of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a
vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the
creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the
people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as
the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in
the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section
4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a
majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36
S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the
grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case
would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a
dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A
sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority
of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render
that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a

situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power
to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should
not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner
regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the
national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its
acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission
in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed
out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission
may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the
disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But
the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power
that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it,
as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and
each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must
be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however
illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the

intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on

November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in
section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does
appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved
a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the
record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the
six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively
designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of
limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National
Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such
cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter
entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have
been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
"the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by
the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of
fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a memberelect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No.
1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the
United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such
return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office

(Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25,
26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to
the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is
certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give
such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election,
or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c.
125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house
itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the
return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be
filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole
judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act
No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner
of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time
fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had
been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further
protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall
[Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus
[Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893).
The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be
deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine
all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that
power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of
contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do
directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory
of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only

constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate

constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of
the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain
the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the
Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of
the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of
Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of
filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses
of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive
the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as
a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the
present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is
an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am,
however, constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is
judicial in nature. (Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand,
the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative
in character. (M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U.
S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)
It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial.
Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any
clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a
contested election may be given, must be deemed to be included in the grant of legislative power
to the National Assembly.

The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in Article VI,
section 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the
United States provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its own members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has
assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given.
Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated prescribes:
Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of
Representatives of the United States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such
election shall have been determined by the officer or board of canvassers authorized by
law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the Member whose seat he designs
to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in such notice, shall specify
particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to
the effect that the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding this
provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as
follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe
the time and manner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and
shall fix the costs and expenses of contest which may be paid from their respective funds.
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a
body that would be above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests from the category of
political to that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission beyond the
reach of the law, but to insure the determination of such contests with the due process of law.
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
Article XV, section 2, of which provides that
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this Constitution.
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of
government, and to prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands
shall remain operative even after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all references in such laws to the government
or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the

government and corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent
not only with the spirit but the letter of the Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election
Law remains operative and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral Commission,
which, in so far as the power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the
Senate or the House of Representative under the former regime. It is important to observe in this
connection that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time and
manner in which notice of a contested election may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature
but in the Senate and House of Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to prescribe
the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of the Philippine Legislature
was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such contests.
Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to
prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National
Assembly is vested in the Electoral Commission, which is now the body clothed with power to
decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935,
could not have the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the
election of the petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to
adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with in which written contests
must be filed with the commission.
Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has
jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
petitioner Jose A. Angara.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades
"Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying
with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect
to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators
still manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial
movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive
Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of
carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and
provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that
henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.)
FERDINAND E.
MARCOS
Presid
ent
Republic of the
Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for
its presumed validity.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, * 3 which upheld the trial court, **
and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have
been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly
affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,"
final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance
by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the
need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the
task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of
the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power
then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since
the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a
phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more
fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the
Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in
the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make
it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal
straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion
in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no
farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting
Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed
against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for
themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John
made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the
two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or
the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster
described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which

proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach
of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience
or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need
for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the
loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing
may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the
general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The
police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18
By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond
the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even
so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper
but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No.
626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in
one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers
who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the
increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not
taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was
sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic
had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn
had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattlerustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that
the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of
the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or
by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct
relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited
doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven
years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,

Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of
the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps
so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there
is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was
fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
20

In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there

is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under
the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of
justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial
and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is
a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we
hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to
declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this
case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would
have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present
challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the
Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke
them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive
tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They
become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and
sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount
thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179271

April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),
Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295

April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH

ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS,
INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2
promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to
deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc,

acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided
by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals
(ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A
Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution
No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties,
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the partylist results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom
Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC]
have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating partylist seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60.
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections,
namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of
Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru
its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and
public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred
fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with
the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than
sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121)
votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i.

Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated

15,283,659

ii.

Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

1,337,032

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100%

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass
(Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte;
and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
Maximum Total Party-List Votes

102,430

16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand
four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus
COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a
formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the
required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list
ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION

VOTES
RECEIVED

BUHAY

1,163,218

BAYAN MUNA

972,730

CIBAC

760,260

GABRIELA

610,451

APEC

538,971

A TEACHER

476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

ALAGAD

423,076

BUTIL

405,052

10

COOP-NATCO

390,029

11

BATAS

386,361

12

ANAK PAWIS

376,036

13

ARC

338,194

14

ABONO

337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan

(BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF
REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the
Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore
entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other
election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers,
hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below,
the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong

Bayan Muna

Citizens Battle Against Corruption

Gabriela Womens Party

Association of Philippine Electric

Cooperatives

BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC

Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment

Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.

Akbayan! Citizens Action Party

AKBAYAN

Alagad

ALAGAD

Luzon Farmers Party

1
0

Cooperative-Natco Network Party

11 Anak Pawis
1
2

Alliance of Rural Concerns

1
3

Abono

A TEACHER

BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which
may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes
cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is
hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings
therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective
cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We
quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution
No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board
of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on
the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total
number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat
each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National
Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on
the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received
but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and
that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and
coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

977,476

CIBAC

755,964

GABRIELA

621,718

APEC

622,489

A TEACHER

492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

BUTIL

409,298

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

375,846

13

ABONO

340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest
number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it
the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list
system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an
additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as
expressed in Veterans, is:
Proportion of votes of first
party relative to total votes for
party-list system

Number of votes of first party

=
Total votes for party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it
to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received
by the first party

Additional seats

Equal to or at least 6%

Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%

One (1) additional seat

Less than 4%

No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
=

0.07248 or 7.2%

16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

Additional seats for

a concerned party

No. of votes of
concerned party
=

x
No. of votes of
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List

Percentage

Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA

1.65

CIBAC

1.28

No. of additional
seats allocated
to first party

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC

1.05

A TEACHER

0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD

0.71

BUTIL

0.69

COOP-NATCO

0.69

ANAKPAWIS

0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO

0.57

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election
Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws,
the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or
coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List

Additional Seats

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which
may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast
under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate
percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective
cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy
hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August
2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided
by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers
Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041
(PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should
be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the
same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative
seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every
2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance
with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by
each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list
election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under
the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION
OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25
June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of
their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941

and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by
Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the
Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No.
07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of
the NBC.11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC
proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat
under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12
Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC, the following
party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay

1.2

Bayan Muna

1.3

CIBAC

1.4

Gabriela

1.5

APEC

1.6

A Teacher

1.7

Akbayan

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic]

1.11

Anak Pawis

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono

1.14

AGAP

1.15

AMIN

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),

against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification
of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before
the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b)
of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their
petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional
seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the
"First Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b)
of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different
from those required under RA 7941;
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as
provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.
COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in
the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant
Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature,
involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation.17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the
term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the
allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.

xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The
House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available
to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not
deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats
available to legislative districts
x .20 =

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives

.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220
x .20 =

55

.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the
Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional
seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente
V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for
party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11
and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC
shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank
them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate
party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as
prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941
and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum
(2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall
have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups
under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes
corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all
the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast
for the party-list system.24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes,
and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded
under BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original
2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from
being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted
for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap,
but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only.
The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list
seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited
to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is
conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to
lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are
filled up.26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes garnered during the elections.27
Rank
1

Party
BUHAY

Votes
Rank
Garnered
1,169,234 48

Party
KALAHI

Votes
Garnered
88,868

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

49

APOI

79,386

CIBAC

755,686

50

BP

78,541

GABRIELA

621,171

51

AHONBAYAN

78,424

APEC

619,657

52

BIGKIS

77,327

A TEACHER

490,379

53

PMAP

75,200

AKBAYAN

466,112

54

AKAPIN

74,686

ALAGAD

423,149

55

PBA

71,544

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

56

GRECON

62,220

10

BUTIL

409,160

57

BTM

60,993

11

BATAS

385,810

58

A SMILE

58,717

12

ARC

374,288

59

NELFFI

57,872

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

60

AKSA

57,012

14

ABONO

339,990

61

BAGO

55,846

15

AMIN

338,185

62

BANDILA

54,751

16

AGAP

328,724

63

AHON

54,522

17

AN WARAY

321,503

64

ASAHAN MO

51,722

18

YACAP

310,889

65

AGBIAG!

50,837

19

FPJPM

300,923

66

SPI

50,478

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

67

BAHANDI

46,612

21

ABS

235,086

68

ADD

45,624

22

KAKUSA

228,999

69

AMANG

43,062

23

KABATAAN

228,637

70

ABAY PARAK

42,282

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

71

BABAE KA

36,512

25

ALIF

217,822

72

SB

34,835

26

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058

73

ASAP

34,098

27

AT

197,872

74

PEP

33,938

28

VFP

196,266

75

ABA ILONGGO

33,903

29

ANAD

188,521

76

VENDORS

33,691

30

BANAT

177,028

77

ADD-TRIBAL

32,896

31

ANG KASANGGA

170,531

78

ALMANA

32,255

32

BANTAY

169,801

79

AANGAT KA
PILIPINO

29,130

33

ABAKADA

166,747

80

AAPS

26,271

34

1-UTAK

164,980

81

HAPI

25,781

35

TUCP

162,647

82

AAWAS

22,946

36

COCOFED

155,920

83

SM

20,744

37

AGHAM

146,032

84

AG

16,916

38

ANAK

141,817

85

AGING PINOY

16,729

39

ABANSE! PINAY

130,356

86

APO

16,421

40

PM

119,054

87

BIYAYANG BUKID

16,241

41

AVE

110,769

88

ATS

14,161

42

SUARA

110,732

89

UMDJ

9,445

43

ASSALAM

110,440

90

BUKLOD FILIPINA

8,915

44

DIWA

107,021

91

LYPAD

8,471

45

ANC

99,636

92

AA-KASOSYO

8,406

46

SANLAKAS

97,375

93

KASAPI

6,221

47

ABC

90,058

TOTAL

15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over
the total votes for the party-list.28

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Votes Garnered
over Total Votes for
Party-List, in %

Guaranteed
Seat

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

APEC

619,657

3.88%

A TEACHER

490,379

3.07%

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

2.57%

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

11

BATAS29

385,810

2.42%

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

Total

17

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the twopercenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed
seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes." This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in
Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for
the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in
the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Ran
k

Party

Votes
Garnere
d over Guarantee
Votes
Total
d Seat
Garnere Votes for
(First
d
Party
Round)
List, in
(B)
%
(A)

Addition
al
Seats
(Second
Round)
(C)

(B)
plus
Applyin
(C), in
g the
whole
three
integer seat cap
s
(E)
(D)

BUHAY

1,169,23
4

7.33%

2.79

N.A.

BAYAN
MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

N.A.

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

N.A.

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

N.A.

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

N.A.

931

COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWI
S

370,261

2.32%

N.A.

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN 228,637

1.43%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

N.A.

26

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

N.A.

31

ANG
170,531
KASANGGA

1.07%

N.A.

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

N.A.

Tota
l

17

55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are
filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole
seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties
to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for
the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under
the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be
under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever
is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can
also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela
Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party,
it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa
political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I
see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so
that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to
many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus
for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties
can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge
both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter
in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with
them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where
labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there
has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the
Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party,
meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set
in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to
rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even
beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens
who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining
a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party,"
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that
major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to

represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee
"wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law.
It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he
or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation
of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5
of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of
party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to
the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those
who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats,
the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major
political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136781

October 6, 2000

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN,
and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

-- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His
Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786

October 6, 2000

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS,
respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795

October 6, 2000

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION

OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMAKATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER
INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU,
BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDPLABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce
and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does
it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws
-- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal
solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested
jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;2 and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution3
of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the
proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full
complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party
or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of
party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of

Representatives as regular members.4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through
the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/
Coalition

Number of
Votes Obtained

Percentage
Total Votes

Nominees

1. APEC

503,487

5.5%

Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

Leonardo Q. Montemayor

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

Diogenes S. Osabel

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.33%

Eduardo P. Pilapil

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.60%

Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.57%

Patricia M. Sarenas

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.54%

Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

Renato B. Magtubo

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the
Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation,
Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent
to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S.
Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to
Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed
that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on
August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care,
Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly
determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives."
Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these
elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the
party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second
Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include
those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of
names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as
party-list representatives, to wit:

1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP

24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a
set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives
Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be
given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It
apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for
APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it
abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group
of 38" private respondents.10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the
basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected
to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They

contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions
garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the
House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be
allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc
resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In
other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons
be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the
total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed
the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two
political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x
x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose
20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -with three commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution
of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party
(AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest
errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement
imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application,
holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this
Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.13 In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the
38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise
entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the
proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of
which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE
and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on
any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and
coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7
January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR
No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo
Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for
Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of
the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.
Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda
in amplification of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives
reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts

apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving
at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during
the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all
the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up
has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by
which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election

must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat
in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty
percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that
the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down
only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for partylist representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of
party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it
necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a partylist seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b)
of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as should have been the

Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies,
is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared
unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute
remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is
the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was
raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least
a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list
system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through
the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives,
as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving
at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different
sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of
the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes.
Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are
about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean
500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in

the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The
average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that
there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What
we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our
job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think
that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative
state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them.21 But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"22 to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way,
we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats
among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the
two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interestrepresentations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld
the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA
7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this
- is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively
referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their
respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or
guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two
percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the
three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the
votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.25 Translated in
figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats;
another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent
will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of
comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for
example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party
C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to
5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties
will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering
two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats
as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be
contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed
by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list
seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified
party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be
allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product
will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated
Total no. of votes of

No. of votes of
party concerned

No. of additional
seats of party
concerned
(Integer.decimal)

qualified parties
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending
order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the
distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party

Number of
Votes

Guaranteed
Seats

Additional

Extra
Seats

Total

1. APEC

503,487

5.73

2. ABA

321,646

3.66

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.55

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.47

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.90

6. AKO

239,042

2.72

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.71

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.68

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.64

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.45

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.21

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.16

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.12

3,429,338

13

32

Total

52

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those
obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of
facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total
of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
"proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models,
however. As ably pointed out by private respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is
filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German
law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned,

imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major
statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be
transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands
an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters
of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order
to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that
to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.
Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats
has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2)
the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a
fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not
necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting
percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional membership cannot
be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's
fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature.
Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme
Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given
by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore,
for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
=
Total votes for
party-list system

Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be
entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without

a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to
which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.1wphi1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to
one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional
seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of
the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would
contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party
received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the
first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion
to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
Additional seats
for concerned
party

Total No. of votes

for party-list system
=

x
No. of votes of
first party
Total No. of
for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party

Additional seats
for concerned
party

No. of votes of
concerned party
=

No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party

x
No. of votes of
first party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
No. of votes
of ABA

Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)

x
No. of vites of
first party (APEC)

No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)

321,646
=

.64 or 0 additional seat, since

rounding off is not to be applied

x1=
503,487

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as
follows:
Organization

Votes
Garnered

%age of
Total Votes

Initial
No.
of Seats

Additional
Seats

Total

1. APEC

503,487

5.50%

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.64

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

312,500 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.62

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.33%

304,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.61

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

255,184 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.51

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

239,042 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47

7. NCSFO

238,303

2.60%

238,303 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47

8. ABANSE!

235,548

2.57%

321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47

9. AKBAYAN!

232,376

2.54%

232,376 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.46

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

215,643 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

194,617 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.39

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

189,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.38

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.04%

186,388 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.37

PINAY

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be
zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers
and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in
the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum
of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party
may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself
has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant
parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with
the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the
twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however,
that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation,
no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict,"
then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat,

because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the
power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom
and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,30 cannot
simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse
is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by
the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution
prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of
three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional
representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a
total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not
be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated
the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already
popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our
tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not
despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve
as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and
vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve
as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular
democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,

perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of
full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting partylist representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203766

April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by
its President Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President
Michael Abas Kida, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO),
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL)
PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the partys Secretary
General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204002

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly
PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS),
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),
represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204126

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP),
formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA),
represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua Causing,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA,
LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr.,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER

EARTH (GREENFORCE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT
(AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND
FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General
Jose C. Policarpio, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro,

Dante Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA
CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein
by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL
PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART),
represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY,

HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their
capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394

ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC

HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and
Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT
AND WELFARE (PACYAW), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman,
Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING
FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE
COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC.
(ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their
respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204455

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M.
Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS),
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2
20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19
February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R.
No.

SPP No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC

Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng
Sining (ASIN)

- The "artists" sector is not

considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2

204455

12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers
Savings and
Loan
Association, Inc.
(Manila
Teachers)

- A non-stock savings and

loan association cannot be
considered marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not teachers by
profession.

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association of
Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists,
Inc. (ALA-EH)

- Failure to show that its

members belong to the
marginalized; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify.

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4

204435

12-057
(PLM)

1 Alliance
Advocating
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP)

- Failure of the nominees to

qualify: although registering
as a regional political party,
two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5

204367

12-104
(PL)

Akbay
Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.

- Failure of the group to show

that its nominees belong to
the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6

204370

12-011
(PP)

Ako An Bisaya
(AAB)

- Failure to represent a
marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7

204436

12-009
(PP),
12-165
(PLM)

Abyan Ilonggo
Party (AI)

- Failure to show that the

party represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8

204485

12-175

Alliance of

- Failure to establish that the

(PL)

Organizations,
Networks and Associations
of
the Philippines,
Inc. (ALONA)

group can represent 14

sectors; - The sectors of
homeowners
associations, entrepreneurs
and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
9

204139

12-127
(PL)

Alab ng
Mamamahayag
(ALAM)

- Failure to prove track

record as an organization;
- Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

1
0

204402

12-061
(PP)

Kalikasan Party-List
(KALIKASAN)

- The group reflects an

advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

11 204394

12-145

Association of

- Failure to prove

(PL)

Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent
and
Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

membership base and track

record;
- Failure to present activities
that sufficiently benefited its
intended constituency; and
- The nominees do not belong
to any of the sectors which
the group seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

1
2

204490

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa
Pinoy (PPP)

- Failure to show that the

group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives
of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21
and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R. No.

SPP
No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1

20381819

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol
Political Party
(AKB)

Retained registration and

accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2

203766

12-161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum,
Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

203981

12-187
(PLM)

Association for
Righteousness
Advocacy on
Leadership
(ARAL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to comply, and for
violation of election laws;
- The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

204002

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural Concerns
(ARC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United
Movement
Against Drugs
Foundation
(UNIMAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The sectors of drug
counsellors and lecturers,
veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to define the sector
it seeks to represent; and
- The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

204122

12-223
(PLM)

1 Guardians
Nationalist
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS)

Cancelled registration
- The party is a military
fraternity;
- The sector of community
volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

20426

12-257
(PLM)

Blessed
Federation of
Farmers and
Fishermen
International,
Inc. (A
BLESSED
Party-List)

Cancelled registration
- Three of the seven
nominees do not belong to
the sector of farmers and
fishermen, the sector sought
to be represented; and
- None of the nominees are
registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

9

203960

12-260

1st

Cancelled registration

(PLM)

Consumers
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc. (1-CARE)

- The sector of rural energy

consumers is not
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The partys track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

10 203922

12-201
(PLM)

Association of
Philippine
Electric
Cooperatives
(APEC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to represent a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 23 October 201229

11 204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo
Party-List Party
( AT )

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

12 203976

12-288
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural and
Agrarian
Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The interests of the peasant
and urban poor sectors that
the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;

- Failure to show that three of

the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231
13 204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na
Reporma Para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
(AGRI)

Cancelled registration
- The party ceased to exist for
more than a year immediately
after the May 2010 elections;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

14 203936

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido
Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

15 204126

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng
Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
(KAP)

Cancelled registration
- The Manifestation of Intent
and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the
party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to

the sector, or that they have

undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain at
Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

17 204141

12-229
(PLM)

The True
Marcos Loyalist
(for God,
Country and
People)
Association of
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to prove that two of
its nominees actually belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

18 204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino
Association for
Country Urban
Poor Youth
Advancement
and Welfare
( PA C YAW )

Cancelled registration
- Change of sector (from
urban poor youth to urban
poor) necessitates a new
application;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

19 204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda
Nationwide
Party (PASANG
MASDA)

Cancelled registration
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

20 203958

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng
mga Nakulong

Cancelled registration
- Failure to prove that

na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)

na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

21 204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing
Pinoy (AG)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

22 204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance for
Nationalism and
Democracy
(ANAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to represent an
identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its

Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
23 204239

12-060
(PLM)

Green Force for

the Environment
Sons and
Daughters of
Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is an advocacy
group and does not represent
the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

24 204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K
Association, Inc.
(FIRM 24-K)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

25 204341

12-269
(PLM)

Action League
of Indigenous
Masses (ALIM)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the partys
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

26 204358

12-204

Alliance of

Cancelled registration

(PLM)

Advocates in
Mining
Advancement
for National
Progress
(AAMA)

- The sector it represents is a

specifically defined group
which may not be allowed
registration under the party-list system;
and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

27 204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social
Movement for
Active Reform
and
Transparency
(SMART)

Cancelled registration
- The nominees are
disqualified from
representing the sectors that
the party represents;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

28 204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of
Bicolnon Party
(ABP)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

29 204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party
List (BAYANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

30 204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura
Natin Isulong
(AANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
partys nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

31 204125

12-292
(PLM)

Agapay ng
Indigenous
Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc.
(A-IPRA)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees are members of the
indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
are bona fide
members.

Resolution dated 7 November 201241

32 204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine
Coconut
Producers
Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is affiliated with
private and government
agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

33 204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang Lingkod
Party-List

Cancelled registration
- Failure to establish a track

(ABANG
LINGKOD)

record of continuously
representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

34 204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action
Brotherhood for Active
Dreamers, Inc.
(ABROAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation - Failure to show that the
party is actually able to
represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

35 204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng
mga Magsasaka
Para sa mga
Magsasaka
(BINHI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party receives
assistance from the
government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 28 November 201245

36 204356

12-136
(PLM)

Butil Farmers
Party (BUTIL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and

underrepresented; and
- The partys nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
37 204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st
Kabalikat ng
Bayan
Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan
(1st
KABAGIS)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Declaration of untruthful
statements;
- Failure to exist for at least
one year; and
- None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

38 204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United
Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

Cancelled accreditation
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The partys nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

39 204421,
204425

12-157
(PLM),
12-191
(PLM)

Coalition of
Senior Citizens
in the
Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)

Cancelled registration
- The party violated election
laws because its nominees
had a term-sharing
agreement.

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA,
COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK,
SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for

the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only
the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No.

SPP No.

Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

203981

12-187
(PLM)

Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

Leadership (ARAL)

204002

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

203922

12-201
(PLM)

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(APEC)

203960

12-260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(AKMA-PTM)

203958

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976

12-288
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(ANAD)

204125

12-292
(PLM)

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(1BRO-PGBI)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141

12-229
(PLM)

The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED)

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122

12-223
(PLM)

1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766

12-161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(UNIMAD)

204263

12-257
(PLM)

Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

204126

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

Magsasaka (KAP)

204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

LINGKOD)

204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

204239

12-060
(PLM)

Green Force for the Environment Sons and

Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

204341

12-269

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

(PLM)
204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

for National Progress (AAMA)

204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social Movement for Active Reform and

Transparency (SMART)

204356

12-136
(PLM)

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402

12-061 (PL)

Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394

12-145 (PL)

Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

204490

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455

12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435

12-057
(PLM)

1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(1AAAP)

204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

204421,

12-157

Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

204425

(PLM)
12-191
(PLM)

Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)

204436

12-009 (PP),
12-165
(PLM)

Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484

11-002

Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

MASDA)
The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners,
we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for
his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The
constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following
discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is
not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to
avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making
the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that
they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the
problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were
the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and
other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which

went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more
limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in
the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated
citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the
discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought
to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are
no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a
sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the
mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no
discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one
vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to
be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list.
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional
party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast
in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be
for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum
that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list
of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the
minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the
votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of
the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least
2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties
who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say,
there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets
only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So,
they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together,
form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same
time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will
get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have
the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat
on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially
the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of
party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather
than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even
have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can
be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for
the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under
the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must
they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever
is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and
can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela
Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party,
it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa
political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang
labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of
sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is
really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political
party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists
are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance
to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the
claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be
conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words,
COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties
in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to
sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang
Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view
that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to
further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral
contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern
when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise
that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This
proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list
system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative

the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for
selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by
which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace
themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three
consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only,
and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral
parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to
win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list
system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these nontraditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas
after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at
the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did
not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively
sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system
is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second,
the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the partylist system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens
who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c)
of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct
of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties
under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive
and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list
system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the
party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent
and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national
or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
"marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition
"marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However,
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political

constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special
interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No.
7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for
the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and
hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in
Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system,"
which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become
members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,"
the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,

organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even

interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented"
would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with
its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section
5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It
is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to
a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as
"wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding
in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "welldefined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors.
Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that
do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional
parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed
by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with
the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives. "However, the
requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong
Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it
expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even
through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political
parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly
limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate
in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political
parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of
the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a
voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
(in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such
sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to
participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x
x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further.
In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the
party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in sociopolitical engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have
committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized
under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in
the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then
prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in
accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to
the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal

advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations
must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have
been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution
has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for

determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list
elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this
purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-1123

March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta,
Antonio Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, and First Assistant Solicitor General
Reyes for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution
designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of
Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen representatives,
and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is
unnecessary to go into the facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the proper
understanding of the issues. For this purpose it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff senators

and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections
held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the
opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed
to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been
introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon
definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage
of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the
necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If
these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents
deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled
bill or resolution. There is some merit in the petitioners' contention that this is confusing
jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an enactment or
resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection, however, is purely
academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in
practice and in their operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are
synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal
coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a political question conclusively
binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions
has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S.,
431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too
well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments
of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695.
The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the
conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that
the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an

amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state
legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has
to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve
a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that
character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by
the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the
Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal
than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it
to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government;
because the measure derives all its vital force from the action of the people at the ballot
box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established form, to a free people,
the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for
the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments
in its exercise are in derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the
people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed
privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by
the instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and
Douglas, in Miller vs. Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and
ratification. From his forceful opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional
amendments. Final determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the
States has taken place "is conclusive upon the courts." In the exercise of that power,
Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether submission,
intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions
of a type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a
"political question" by the "political department" to which the Constitution has
committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an
amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that
ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a
proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the
judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion
in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the

exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of

amendments, we are unable to agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is
being followed between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that
judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time"
within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly authorized State
officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State
may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions,
are all consistent only with an intimate control over the amending process in the courts.
And this must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial
interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the
political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as
subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress.
There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the
Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die unless
ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only
Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article
5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has
the exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of whether as State whose
legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its
position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead
because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and
judicial branches of the government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the
amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has
been given by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is
"political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices
subscribed, arrives at the same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing
in court a point which not having been raised by the parties herein we will not decide his
reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of the legislative proceeding the
legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as
political, saying:
The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett,
258 U.S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise.
The historic source of this doctrine and the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs.
Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an action
for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to
vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no
cause of action because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes

thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition concerns political action, but it alleges
and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such
political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over
two hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1
Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by
this Court." "Private damage" is the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra,
and determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of which it is the
justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the conception that a voter's
franchise is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is
peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S.,
58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which there is no remedy outside the
law courts. "Although this matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an
injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston
vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge of this
injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2
Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intraparliamentary controversies to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies who are members, how and when they
should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different phases of legislative
activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted surely are matters that not
merely concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if
"political" has any connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670,
et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66
Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they matters of "private damage." They
pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the
legislative process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in
judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting
citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant that for
over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to purposes like
the present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the
functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should
therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political
jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and
popular government as conceived in the fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they
offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United States institutions after which ours
are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they
are the opinions which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To
make the point clear, it is necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a
statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the annotation on that case

in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the
controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of
Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a
resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amendment, and by three members of the House of
Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase in indorsement on the resolution
to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as not
passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from
signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering
it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was
proposed by Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a
resolution rejecting it and a copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United
States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying
the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty
against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in
favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior
rejection of the proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March
1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six
states and had been ratified only in five states, and that by reason of that rejection and the failure
of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition
on the merits. When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were
framed substantially in the following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to
have the judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the
right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it being the contention of the petitioners that "in the light
of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state
Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a
part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted
to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was
equally divided"; and third, the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and of the lapse
of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of
the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a
justiciable controversy, or a question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a
question upon which the Court is equally divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion
upon that point." On the third question, the Court reached the conclusion before referred to,
namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the

Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise
of its control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by
Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the questions whether an
amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject
to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the
grounds stated in the United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in
three groups. Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no
personality to bring the petition and that all the questions raised are political and non-justiciable
Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had
jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been granted and the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of
old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as
political and non-justiciable, passed by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor
to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction
of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one
hand and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the
question of jurisdiction; on the result to be reached, these two groups were divided. The
agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one hand, and the
Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that part of the
decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show
interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an
article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the
light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries" whether the proper procedure
for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal
of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices
"leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with
the four justices who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the
Court to decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out
that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court would seem under any circumstances
to bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a
justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind,
or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the conference and have him walk away
whole?" But speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue
could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case,
decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the judgment
below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying
down the rule of the case.

The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in
England. In the United States, "In point of numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally
pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have changed from their original
position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are not
clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition,
685, footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme
Court is on the side of those which favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069;
Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we
choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of
the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with
evident vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It
would be presumptuous on our part to pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already
been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our judgment and discretion, our labor is
reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion
of adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in
our opinion, almost decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American
Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the rule against going
behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent
department of the government, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must
lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is also one of
convenience, because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be
required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed
bills and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the legislature.
Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated as
exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an
act theretofore enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that
these is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be

certain that an act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined
by some court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between
the parties.
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract
these passages:
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few
things would be more mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule
contended for is that the Court should look at the journals of the Legislature to ascertain
whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the Secretary of State conforms in its
contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal
value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the
enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be
rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not only to the statutes now before the
Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been recently passed, but to laws
the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the acceptance of
this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have
before us some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . . . Can any
one deny that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals,
so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all written law will be shaken to its very
foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine,
to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is
scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be
at the mercy of all persons having access to these journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in
Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than
a quorum of each House may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon
the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the
consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and political power must of
necessity be confided to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in
them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others;
nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been
disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to
supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It
cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative
journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence considered a classic, and described by one who
himself is a noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and
having "put the matured nineteenth-century law in form to be used in a new era of growth"
unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in the soundness of the rule. The
distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i.e., the

impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on

legislative action, says:
(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged,
the Judiciary are bound to enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a
two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an act must be declared no law which in fact
was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a duty to determine
according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals may not
represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be
shown beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to
uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty
to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in
repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in upholding
an act based on improper votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is
to see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals.
Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as
provable by the testimony of members present is not allowable. If to support that it be
said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and impracticable, then it is answered
that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if
the duty to get at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at
any cost; and if it is merely a duty that is limited by policy and practical convenience,
then the argument changes into the second one above, namely, how far it is feasible to
push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of
view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus
inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on
some fallacious assumption whose defect is exposed only by carrying it to its logical
consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the fallacious motion that
every constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the Judiciary
and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is
certainly a large field of constitutional provision which does not come before the
Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial
remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a clause requiring
the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain
purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or
Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional
duty. A clearer illustration may be had by imagining the Constitution to require the
Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia whenever to the best of his belief
a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no
such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his
belief? Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a
certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare
the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its majority, did not
have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case

only after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one;
what is to be done?
These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying
and enforcing the Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists where the
Constitution enjoins duties which affect the motives and judgment of a particular
independent department of government, Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Such
duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to
perform them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an
act would not be treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the
Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up to and motivating the action
of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that department to obey or
disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature
as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator
not to vote until he has carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may
expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not to act finally until it has three times heard the
proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in the
former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the Judiciary in
the one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any
cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this
purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim
in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful,
and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect
credit upon the name of popular government. (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction,
citing the case of United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the
journal in that case to find out whether or not the contention of the appellant was right. We think
the petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by
the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those
were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the

Act was in existence or was placed before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had
been done, this Court would not have held the copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the
law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly stated that it "passed over the question" of
whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of
the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment
theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways
specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of
irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to
determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between
the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether
the senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary threefourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote for them,
because the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us.
A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question whether an
amendment to the existing constitution has been duly proposed in the manner required by such
constitution properly belongs to the judiciary. That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16C.J.S.,

437.) (See also 11 Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a different
view. (16 C.J.S., 437, notes 41 and 43.)
"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing
constitution is a judicial question." (McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392,
409; 119 N.W., 408.) (12 C.J., 880.)
"An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised
the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of
constitutional amendments. It has been judicially determined whether a proposed
amendment received the constitutional majority of votes. (Knight vs. Shelton, 134 Fed.,
423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W. 396; Green vs. State Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130;
47 P., 259; 95 Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722;
Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71
N.W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N.J.L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L.R.A., 251; State vs.
Foraker, 46 Oh. St., 677; 23 N.E., 491; 6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J., 880.)
As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state systems than to
the Federal theory of "grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that the members of our
Constitutional convention, composed mostly of lawyers, and even the members of the American
Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation, contemplated the adoption of
such constitutional practice in this portion of the world. Hence, my conclusion that in Philippine
polity, courts may and should take cognizance of the subject of this controversy.
B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Article XV),
the proposed amendment was not approved "by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives." They complain that certain Senators and some
members of the House of Representatives were not allowed to participate and were not
considered in determining the required three fourths vote.
The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting, assert that the persons
mentioned, for all practical purposed did not belong to the Congress of the Philippines on the day
the amendment was debated and approved.
Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people, for approval or
disapproval, the amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses,
etc."
Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its first section
provides that "the amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses,
adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-six, shall be submitted to the people,
for approval or disapproval, at a general election which shall be held on March eleven, nineteen
hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the Executive, declares in
the most solemn manner that the resolution proposing the amendment was duly carried.
Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether those petitioners who are members of the
Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not precluded from questioning its validity or
veracity, unless they assert and prove that in Congress they opposed its enactment. In default of a
contrary showing, it is not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress they endorsed-- or
at least are bound by the declarations of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private party is
estopped from challenging the constitutional efficacy of a law whose enactment he has procured
(see 16 C.J.S., 198 and 11 Am. Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be estopped from
impugning a statute he helped (presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the
remaining petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S.,
169.)
C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the instant
litigation may be solved by the application of other well-established principles founded mainly
on the traditional respect which one department of the Government entertains for the actions of
the others.
On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the applicability and
binding effect of section 313 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2210, which, in my
opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of Court. I likewise believe the soundness of the
doctrine expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a question admittedly within the domain of
the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill of resolution upon the judicial
authorities.
D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could plausibly fall
back on the time-honored rule that the courts may not go behind the legislative journals to
contradict their veracity. (United States vs. Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)
According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteenth (16) senators
approved the resolution against five (5), with no absences; whereas in the house sixty-eight (68)
congressmen voted "yes", eighteen(18) voted "no", one abstained from voting and one was
absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the total membership of twenty-one of the Senate
(16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the total membership of eighty-eight (88) of
the House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear that the measure was
upheld by the number of votes prescribed by the Constitution.
True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman to the effect
that the votes did not constitute the majority required by the Constitution. However, in the fact of
the incontestable arithmetical computation above shown, those protests must be attributed to
their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having then asserted that "there were absent
Senators or Congressmen who had not been taken into account. "Ford although we might have
judicial notice of the number of proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no better qualified
than the Legislature to determine the number of its actual membership at any given moment,
what with demises or demissions, remotions or suspensions.

HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting the same in so
far as they are not inconsistent with the applicable reasons supporting my concurring opinion in
Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). But I dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3,
ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the Senate and House of
Representatives had been counted "the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths of vote in either branch of Congress."
The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra, are,
first, that the questions therein raised were political in nature within the exclusive province of the
legislature, and, second, that the judiciary does not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is
to me evidence that the questions involved in the present proceeding are no less political than
those involved in that former Senate case. It is deemed unnecessary to dwell at more length upon
the grounds of my said concurring opinion.
The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion in the instant
proceeding is that the suspension of the said members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives being a political question, the judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere
with the determination thereof by the proper political department of the government, has perforce
to abide by said determination if it were to go any further in the consideration of the case. In
other words, any further discussion of the case in this Court will have to start from the premise
that said members have been suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and that we, being
powerless to interfere with the matter of said suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the
determination of said political branches of the government. As said by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases involving
the action of the political departments of the government, the judiciary is bound by such action."
(Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel vs. Chambers, 14
How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer
vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R.I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)
If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said members have been
thus suspended, there will be to my mind, absolutely no justification, ground nor reason for
counting them in the determination of whether or not the required three-fourths vote was
attained. Their case was entirely different from that of members who, not having been suspended
nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote upon the resolution. In the case of the latter, they
had, like all other members similarly situated, three alternatives, namely, to vote in favor of the
resolution, to vote against it, or to abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of course, their
votes had to be counted amount those supporting the resolution. If they voted against, of course,
their votes had to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from voting, there
would be sound justification for counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their
very abstention they impliedly but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the
resolution, for it is obvious that if they did, they would have voted in favor of it. On the other
hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose validity or legality we

are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In their case there would be
no way of determining which way their votes would have gone or whether or not they would
have abstained from voting. In this connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in
case they had not been suspended, I must go upon the assumption that while those suspended
members may belong to the political party which, as a party, was opposed to the resolution, still
they would have voted independently and following their individual convictions. In this
connection, it might not be amiss to mention that there were quite a number of minority members
of the legislature who voted for the resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said
suspended members, if they had not been suspended, would have voted against the resolution,
nor in favor of it either, nor that they would have abstained from voting. Why then should they
bed counted with the members who voted against the resolution or those who, having the right to
vote, abstained from doing so? Why should we count them as though we knew that they would
have voted against the resolution, or even that they would have abstained from voting? Soundly
construed, I submit that the Constitution does not, and could not, include suspended members in
the determination of the required three-fourths vote.
I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution that "The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .", advisedly used
the vital and all-important word "voting" therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the
members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all members not suspended or otherwise
disqualified, would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here even making a
concession in favor of the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain
from voting, may be counted among those not in favor of the measure. But what I cannot bring
myself to conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended to count suspended or
disqualified members as opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being
possible to know which way they would have voted or that they would have abstained from
voting that they would never have voted in favor of the measure. If I should ask why we
should not count such suspended or disqualified members among those in favor of the measure, I
am sure those who opine differently would answer, because we do not know that they would
have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask me why we should not count
them among those against the measure, I would answer that we do not know that they would
have voted against it or that they would have abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to
the conclusion the only one possible that such suspended or disqualified members should
not and cannot be counted due to that very impossibility of knowing which way they would have
voted or whether they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a sound and rational
construction of the constitutional precept.

PARAS, J.:
I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.
The last bastion of democracy is in danger.
Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance, and the banner
of the Constitution is silently and meekly hauled down from its pole to be offered as a booty to
the haughty standard bearers of a new brand of Farcism. In t he words of Cicero, "recedere de
statu suae dignitatis."
Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by those, throwing
overboard all ideals as burdensome and dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts to attain at all
costs individual survival, even in ignominy, could not stand the impact of initial defeats at the
hands of invading fearsome military hordes.
The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to determinate and indeterminate
ideological pressures. Very often man walks in the darkness of a blind alley obeying the pullings
and pushings of hidden and unhidden forces, or the arcane predeterminations of the genes of
human chromosomes. A rudderless ship floating in the middle of an ocean without any visible
shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the advent of the first typhoon. From early youth we begin
to hear and learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the guiding stars in our actions
and decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds dim or completely darken
those stars and then we have only to rely on our faith in their existence and on habit, becoming
unerring if long enough followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm and
cloudless nights. We are sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and
disagreements of our fellowmen. Let us not forget that the day shall come that we will be judged
on how are are judging. Posterity shall always have the final say. When the time solvent has
dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as to whether we have faced
our task fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude of our duties and have
chosen the most comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known whether did
keep burning the tripod fire in the temples of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity,
covered by the cold mist of historical oblivion; others will have their names as by words
repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general contempt; and still others will be
remembered with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the guard on accorded to all those
who remained faithful to the fundamental tenets of justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff
from the grain.
This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal has the sturdy
courage to keep its responsibility in proper high level. It will need the passing of decades and
perhaps centuries before a conclusive verdict is rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of
our fellow citizens and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred Scot decision of Chief Justice
Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil war, or whether in the heart of each future
Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory will be remembered with
gratefulness, because we have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief Justice
Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the rock bottom foundations which made of the

American Constitution the veritable supreme law of the land and established the role of the
tribunals as the ultimate keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will
be impartial and unbiased, exacting and pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one
condemned Dante wrote this lapidary line: "lasciate ogni speranza."
Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of stubborn refusal
to see reality or should be impaired by the polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no question that
at the time when the resolution in question, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was
adopted, the members of the Senate were 24 and the members of the House of Representatives
were 96, and that the 16 members of the Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by
undisputable mathematical computation, do not constituted three-fourths of the 24 members
thereof, and the 68 members of the House of Representatives who voted for the resolution, by
equally simple arithmetical operation, do not constitute three-fourths of the 96 members of the
said chamber. The official certifications made by the presiding officers of the two houses of
Congress to the effect that three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all
the members of the House of Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot
change the facts. Nothing in existence can. The certification, being a clear falsification of public
document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor and a fine not
to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts that is in conflict
with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some of them are
members of the Senate, others are members of the House of Representatives, and still others are
presidents of political parties, duly registered, with considerable following in all parts of the
Philippines.
The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the Commission on
Elections and the remaining three are respectively the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor
General and the Director of the Bureau of Printing.
Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16
in April 23, 1946, and that the House of Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on
April 23, 1946, minus 2d who resigned to assume other positions in the Government.
On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the Philippines a
resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto, which reads as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Philippines in joint session
assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House
voting separately. To propose, as they do hereby propose, the following amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto:
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight,
Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive
Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the
United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no
case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the
disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to
citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under
the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines."
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in an election at which it is submitted to the people for the ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68 Representatives voted in
favor and 18 against.
Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on March 11,
1947, for the purpose of submitting to the people the proposed amendment embodied in the
resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for said purpose.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because Congress may
not, by said act, submit to the people for approval or disapproval the proposed amendment to the
Constitution embodied in resolution Exhibit B inasmuch as, to comply with the express
provisions of Article XV of the Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, threefourths of the 24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18 Senators, 2 more than those
who actually voted for the resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98 members of the
House of Representatives should at least be 72 Representatives, or 4 more than those who
actually voted for the resolution.
Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from them
petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that the House of
Representatives is not composed of 98 members but of only 90. They admit that at the joint
session of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution 16 votes were
cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 68 and 5 in the Senate and 18 in the House
of Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act No. 73 and that
necessary steps to hold the plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said act is
unconstitutional, and byway of defense, allege that the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by
three-fourths of all the qualified members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately and, consequently, Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people

for approval or disapproval, fixing a date for a general election, and appropriating public funds
for said purpose, is valid and constitutional.
At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:
The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:
1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the majority
vote of the Commission on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in the election of April
23, 1946;
2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took part in
the election of the President of that body; but that before the senators-elect were sworn in
by the President of the Senate, a resolution was presented, and subsequently approved, to
defer the administration of oath and the seating of Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno,
and Jose E. Romero, pending the hearing and decision of the protest lodged against their
election;
3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their alleged oath of
office before notaries public, and not on the floor, and filed said oaths with the Secretary
of the Senate during the noon recess of the said date;
4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths of
office accomplished by them outside of the floor before a notary public and the Secretary
of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31, 1946, respectively; and that their
corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were paid on August 31, 1946;
5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno filed a copy
of Mr. Diokno's alleged oath of office dated May 25, 1946, with the Auditor of the Senate
on October 15,1946, and on said date his salary was paid corresponding to the period
from April 23 to October 15, 1946;
6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;
7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up to the
present time, the said Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not been allowed to sit and
take part in the deliberations of the Senate and to vote therein, not do their names appear
in the roll of the Senate;
8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of canvassers certified
as having been elected in the election held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight
representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose
Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and Luis Taruc for
Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental;

9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took part in the
election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives held on May 25, 1946;
10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn in by the
Speaker, Mr. Topacio Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a resolution to defer
the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc and Amado Yuson for Pampanga, Constancio
P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, Alejo Santos
and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental "pending the
hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their election," copy of the resolution
being attached to and made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;
11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal and
approved by the House, referred for study to a committee of seven, which up to the
present has not reported, as shown by the Congressional Record for the House of
Representatives;
12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not shown in on
the floor and have not been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the present time, nor have
they participated in any of the proceedings of the House of Representatives except during
the debate of the Escareal motion referred to in paragraph 11 hereof, nor cast any vote
therein since May 25, 1946, and their names do not appear in the roll of the members of
the House except as shown by the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives,
nor in the roll inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the
Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;
13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths of office
on the date set opposite their names, as follows:
Jose Cando
Vicente Gustilo
Constancio
Padilla
Alejo Santos
Luis M. Taruc
Amado M. Yuson
Jesus B. Lava
Alejandro
Simpauco

May 25, 1946

May 25, 1946
May 22, 1946
May 23, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the first four
who took their oaths before Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of the House;
14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the Secretary of the
House of Representatives;

15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term beginning
April 23, 1946, up to the present, with the exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and Jesus
Lava, to whom payment was suspended since August 16;
16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and were allowed to sit on September 30, 1946, the last
day of the Special Sessions;
17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the House,
Representatives Jose C. Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned before the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution was discussed and passed on September
18,1946;
18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was
made by the Secretary calling the roll of each house and the votes cast were as shown in
the attached certificate of the Secretary of the House of Representatives hereto attached,
marked Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof; and
19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of Representatives and the
alleged oaths of office are made a part of this Stipulation by reference thereto,
respondents reserving the right to question their materiality and admissibility.
Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.

For the petitioners:

For the respondents:

JOSE E. ROMERO
ANTONIO BARREDO

ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice

JOSE B.L. REYES

First Asst. Solicitor General

PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY
Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case is the first
question we have to consider.
No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's deliberation, we
should not evade deciding it and giving what in law and justice should be the answer.

To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the present
recourse of prohibition. If petitioners should lack that personality, such legal defect would not
certainly have failed to be noticed by respondents themselves.
Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have the
necessary legal personality to file the petition, and we do not see any reason why such
personality should be put in doubt.
Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the second, of
representatives; and the third, of presidents of four political parties.
All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of Senators Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are members of either of the two houses of Congress
and took part in the consideration of Resolution Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the
above three excepted senators were the ones who were excluded in the consideration of said
resolution and act and were not counted for purposes of determining the three-fourths
constitutional rule in the adoption of the resolution.
In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the necessary steps
for the holding of the general election on March 11, 1947, and that the carrying out of said acts
"constitute an attempt to enforce the resolution and act aforementioned in open violation of the
Constitution," is without or in excess of respondents' jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the
rights of the petitioners who are members of the Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure
and disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable injury to the taxpayers and the
citizens of the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those represented by them in
their capacities mentioned above."
There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or members of the
House of Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues involved in this case as members
of the Congress which adopted the resolution, in open violation of the Constitution, and passed
the act intended to make effective such unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress,
they are even duty bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution which, as
representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless they are to commit a flagrant betrayal
of public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see
to it that the fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled upon.
The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent large groups of
our population, perhaps nearly one-half of the latter, and the numerous persons they represent are
directly interested and will personally be affected by the question whether the Constitution
should be lightly taken and can easily be violated without any relief and whether it can be
amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of the Constitution itself.
As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and every one of the
citizens and inhabitants of this country. Whether our Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a
paramount law or just a mere scrap of paper, only good to be thrown into a waste basket, is a
matter of far-reaching importance to the security, property, personal freedom, life, honor, and

interests of the citizens. That vital question will necessarily affect the way of life of the whole
people and of its most unimportant unit. Each and every one of the individuals inhabiting this
land of ours shall have to make plans for the future depending on how the question is finally
decided. No one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.
Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present action; and
much more, those who are members of Congress have the legal duty to institute it, lest they
should betray the trust reposed in them by the electorate.
24 SENATORS
The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the members of
the Senate. According to petitioners there are 24 of them while according to respondents there
are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because,
according to them, "they are not duly qualified and sworn in members of the Senate."
This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation of facts
submitted by both parties.
No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may change the meanings and
effects of the words placed by respondents themselves in said seven paragraphs. No amount of
argument may delude anyone into believing that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not
senators notwithstanding their having been proclaimed as elected senators, their having taken
part in the election of the President of the Senate, their having taken their oaths of office, and
their receiving salaries as senators.
Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the undeveloped brains
of the pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred millennia ago, but it would be
unpardonably insulting o the human mind of the twentieth century.
Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as members of the
Senate, without taking into consideration whatever legal effects the Pendatun resolution may
have produced, a question upon which we have already elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs.
Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not suspended, they are senators anyway, and there is no
way of ignoring a fact so clear and simple as the presence of the sun at day time. Therefore,
counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the present Senate.
96 REPRESENTATIVES
The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to the effect that
the present House of Representatives is composed of 98 members and their own allegation to the
effect that at present "only 90 members have qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have taken
their seats as such."
Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the stipulation of
facts.

The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives Cando, Gustilo,
Padilla, Santos, Taruc, Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of the stipulation
of facts, are members of the House of Representatives.
The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are actual members
of the House of Representatives. We may even add that the conclusiveness about said eight
representatives is even greater than in the case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because
no resolution of suspension has ever been adopted by the House of Representatives against said
eight members, who are being deprived of the exercise of some of their official functions and
privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the Speaker.
That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where the insolence of
totalitarian rulers have replaced all constitutional guarantees and all concepts of decent
government, raises again a constitutional question: whether it is permissible for the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to exercise the arbitrary power of depriving representatives duly
elected by the people of their constitutional functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the
existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit its exercise unchecked is to make of
democracy a mockery.
The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught against the sovereignty
itself of the people, an onslaught which may cause the people sooner or later to take justice in
their own hands. No system of representative government may subsist if those elected by the
people may so easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of their constitutional functions.
From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last national election,
98 representatives were elected and at the time the resolution Exhibit B was adopted on
September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual members of the House, as two (Representatives
Zulueta and Ramos) has resigned.
Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution was adopted;
three-fourths of them should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only voted in favor of the
resolution, and if there were 96 representatives, three-fourths of them should certainly be more
than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is that, since not threefourths of the senators and representatives voting separately have voted in favor of the resolution
as required by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be no question that the resolution has not
been validly adopted.
We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement with the
majority opinion, have skipped the questions as to the actual membership of the Senate and
House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact that they are among the first important ones
squarely raised by the pleadings of both parties. If they had taken them into consideration, it
would seem clear that their sense of fairness will bring them to the same conclusion we now
arrived at, at least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of Representatives.
Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it
appears evident that the remedy sought for in the petition should be granted.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position concerning
the questions of the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it seems that
during the oral and in the written arguments they have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness
of the certification of authenticity made by the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of
Congress as their last redoubt.
The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than threefourths of all the members of each House voting separately, . . .."
Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be certified over
the signatures of the President of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Secretaries
of both Houses, respondents want us to accept blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to
accept unconditionally as a dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have shown,
appears to be a brazen official falsehood.
Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.
An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing overboard all
scruples, in the administration of justice, could accept as true what we know is not and then
perform our official functions upon that voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurb to be
entertained even for a moment. Anyone who keeps the minimum sense of justice will not fail to
feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage of justice which necessarily will result from the
suggestion.
But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to inquire behind the
false certification made by the presiding officers and the secretaries of the two Houses of
Congress.
Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the conclusiveness on
the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution."
To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of this opinion, as
Appendices A, B, and C,1 the memoranda presented by both petitioners and respondents, where
their attorneys appear to have amply and ably discussed the question. The perusal of the
memoranda will show petitioners' contentions to be standing on stronger ground and, therefore,
we generally agree with their arguments.
In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary," except "by express constitutional or statutory provision" to the contrary. Then

argues that "a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule'
out of respect to the political departments."
The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."
This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs. Avelino,
supra. We deem unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our opinion in said case,
where we have elaborated on the question.
Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary is "too well-established to need citation of authorities," they
recognize the difficulty "in determining what matters fall under the meaning of political
questions."
This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even as a good
doctrine. It is a general proposition made without a full comprehension of its scope and
consequences. No judicial discernment lies behind it.
The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of
political question" shows conclusively that the so-called doctrine has recklessly been advanced.
This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty
in determining what matters fall within the designation of political question. The majority itself
admits that the term "is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not
always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle
with the acts of the political department of the government."
Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a
school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of knowledge;
tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It is a synonym of principle, position, opinion, article, maxim,
rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to any speculative truth or working
principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to their acceptance. Therefore, to be
true, it should be expressed on simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of the
elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.
A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for developing
new propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of many problems. It is a groundwork for
the building of an intellectual system. It is the basis of a more or less complex legal structure. If
not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main columns of an architectonic
construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is supported by a thing whose existence
still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.
We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on the
unsettled meaning of political question. The general proposition that "political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary" is just one of the many numerous general pronouncements

made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide
hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.
It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the handful of
sand with which judicial ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness may solve a
problem or may act as a conjuration to drive away a danger or an evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make
it effective, as provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we
cannot agree with their conclusion that a litigation as to whether said article has been complied
with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive at this conclusion we
must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as
erroneous and false.
Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions relating to it,
therefore, betaken away from the courts? Then, what about the constitutional provision
conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide "all cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty or a law?"
COLEMAN versus MILLER
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625) is
invoked as the mainstay of the majority position.
No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and analysis of
the decision of the Supreme Court.
The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification by the State
legislature of a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution" and that "the decision by
Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State of the questions of whether an amendment has
been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State legislature," are
political questions and not justiciable.
At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no similarity or
analogy with the constitutional questions herein discussed. The questions as to the efficacy of the
ratification by the Senate of Kansas of the Child Labor amendment proposed by the United
States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the decision of said Congress, "in its control of the
Secretary of State," whether the amendment has been adopted "within a reasonable time from the
date of submission to the State legislature," either one of them does not raise a controversy of
violation of specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in the present case.
No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated because in
January, 1925, the Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a copy of the rejection having
been sent to the Secretary of State of the United States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution
ratifying the amendment was adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-20 division, the
Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote. Neither was there such mention of constitutional

violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time after submission of the
amendment to the State legislature.
No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the Lieutenant
Governor had cast his vote or because by the lapse of time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the
proposed amendment had allegedly lost its vitality.
It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy of ratification
by a State legislature of a proposed amendment, it was within the ultimate power of the United
States Congress to decide the question, in its decision rendered in the exercise of its
constitutional power, to control the action of the Secretary of State, and the promulgation of the
adoption of amendment could not be controlled by the courts.
Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in controversy in the
present case.
We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller,
according to the American Law Reports, show "interestingly divergent but confusing positions of
the justices," and are the subject of an amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled
"Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it happened that the nine-member United States Supreme
Court could not reach a decision on the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor of
Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number of justices was "equally divided."
How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs. Miller could be an
authority is beyond our comprehension.
GREEN versus WELLER
One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court in Green vs. Miller (32 Miss., 650), quoting one paragraph thereof.
Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed effect.
The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the submission to
the people of a proposal to amend the Constitution which should cause the free exercise of it to
be obstructed or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government, but in making
this pronouncement, it assumes that the submission is made "in a established form," adding that
the means provided for the exercise by the people of their sovereign right of changing the
fundamental law should receive such a construction as not to trample upon the exercise of their
right, and that the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed
privilege to the people of the state to change their Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the
instrument."
So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the majority position is
wrong because the Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the pronouncement, upon the
assumption that the submission to the people is made "in a established form" and "in the mode

prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in accordance with the provisions of the instrument, the
pronouncements would be the opposite if, as in the present case, the submission of the proposal
of amendment to the people is made through a process flagrantly violative of the Constitution,
aggravated by wanton falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of the
constitutional prerogatives of duly elected representatives of the people.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing" decision in Coleman vs.
Miller, is also invoked by the majority, but this other authority seems equally reluctant to offer its
helping hand to a helpless, desperate position.
The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution granted Congress
exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments."
Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power is granted by
our fundamental law to the Congress of the Philippines. Our Congress may propose amendments
or call a convention to make the proposal, but that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be
found any word, any grammatical sign, not even the faintest hint that in submitting the proposed
amendments to the people, Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the submission."
That submission must be provided by law, and no law may be enacted and come into effect by
the exclusive power of Congress. It needs the concurring action of the President of the
Philippines. And if the law happens to violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in
to nullify its effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its execution devolves upon the Executive
Department. As a matter of fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the
people the proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of the
Philippines may refuse to submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or insurrection
prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.
After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise not obtainable in
the Philippines, his conclusions cannot help the majority in anyway.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and "amusing" case of
Coleman vs. Miller is the next authority invoked by the majority, but the opinion does not offered
much help. The justice maintains that the proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are
matters that concern not merely political actions but are also of the very essence of political
action," and then advances the following argument: "To open the law-courts to such
controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies."
The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one of simple
distaste for the idea, but fails to give any sensible reason for the attitude. Ina totalitarian regime,
where decisions are rendered not in answer to the promptings of a sense of justice, but as

expressions of moods, caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attitude
could be taken as the law, but then it would be necessary to elevate him first to the category of a
fuehrer.
In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded on reason, but
never on passing unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.
We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views, which
in their judgment are in accord "with sound principles of political jurisprudence and represent
liberal and advanced thought on the workings of constitutional and popular government. "Our
regret is not for ourselves alone but for those who happen to accept as authority the unreasoned
and unexplained mental attitude of a judicial officer of a foreign country, praising it even with
the much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it represents the whimsical rule
of personal attitudes and not the rule of well-matured reason.
THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY
This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as Appendices A,
B, and C. Although we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion, we deem it convenient
to make a little analysis of what is stated in the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the
full approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts.
The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can we accept the
absolute verity of the presiding officers' certification that the resolution in question has been
adopted by three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives,
when as a matter of undisputable fact the certification is false? How can we accept a theory
which elevates a false-hood to the category of truth?
The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the English have
committed the nonsense of accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow suit? Why,
in the administration of justice, should our tribunals not think independently? Our temple of
justice is not presided by simians trained in the art of imitation but by human beings, and human
beings must act according to reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes
may happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be inconceivable for our courts to
commit such a blunder.
Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority states
that in the United States the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con on the theory,
although in petitioners' memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-date evidence to the
effect that there is a great majority for the rejection. But to our mind, mere numbers as to pro and
con seem to us immaterial in the decision as to whether the theory is or is not correct. Numbers
do not make reason nor justice.

The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-making body,
invoking to said effect the now obsolete section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2210.
Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the authority of laws
which have been repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the majority does not
support their contention. Section 313 alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the
procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any legislative body that may be
provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso that the existence of a copy of acts of said
commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof."
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of
Rule 123 show conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the rules effective since July 1,
1940, rejected the proviso as unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take
judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and section 41 provides what evidence can be used
to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules can a provision be found that would make
conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress
even if we know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our lawmaking body,
upon the very evidence used in support thereof, after a little analysis, has to banish as a midsummer night's dream.
50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150
In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50 American
Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked as reasons for the theory.
We will analyze the reasons adduced:
1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This must be the
strongest one, when it is first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require much discussion. Shall we
sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a social courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown
between different departments of the government? Has our sense of evaluation of spiritual values
become so perverted that we can make such a blunder in our choice? Since when have the social
or official amenities become of paramount value to the extent of overshadowing the principles of
truth and justice?
2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a very delicate power." This second reason is premised not on a
democratic attitude, but rather on a Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the
members of the majority are a king of emperos of Japan, to be worshipped but never to be
discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason should be relegated to where it belongs:
the archeological museum.

3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted evaluation of
human values. Is justice to be sacrificed for the sake of convenience?
4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated as
executed by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act
heretofore enforced had never become a law." This last reason personifies unreasonableness to
the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of the extent to which legal
stupidity may reach.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority, Wigmore on
Evidence. We will also analyzed the arguments relied upon.
1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the State." This
argument, as it appears quoted in the majority decision, is premised on the unreliability of
legislative journals, and it seems to depict a mind poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the
following: "We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be
apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too
much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative action would be at the mercy of
all persons having access to these journals. . . ."
The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American experience, which
seems not to be too flattering to our former metropolis.
Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes convinces us that
Wigmore's assumption does not obtain in the Philippines. It is true that in the pre-constitution
legislative enactments we have seen few instances in which there had been disagreement
between what has actually been passed, as shown by the journal, and the authenticated enrolled
bill. But the instances were so few to justify entertaining here the same fears entertained by
Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we fought to correct the evil in the
Constitutional Convention, where we were able to introduce the following revolutionary
provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall be printed
and copies thereof in their final from furnished each member at least three calendar days prior to
its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)
This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.
2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a
quorum of each House may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws upon the State in
defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution, Wigmore answers: "This perhaps cannot be
avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should

claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that
its high places have not been disgraced."
The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering, disgraceful,
or corrupt judicial officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding officers and members of the
legislature should be allowed to have their way unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and
balances established by the Constitution presupposes the possibility of error and corruption in
any department of government and the system is established to put a check on them.
When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the legislature is placed
at the bar of justice, the judiciary must not shrink from its duty. If there is corruption in the
judiciary, our laws provide the proper remedy. Even we, the members of the highest tribunal,
cannot with impunity commit "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other
high crimes" without being liable to be removed from office on impeachment, and we hope, if
there is such a case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate will do their duty in
accordance with Article IX of the Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example which
is given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES
The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a guarantee against
the adoption of amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities.
The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any change is to be
introduced in it, it must be in answer to a pressing public need so powerful as to sway the will of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. Said threefourth rule has been adopted by the Constitutional Convention, as all the other numerical rules,
with the purpose of avoiding any doubt that it must be complied with mathematical precision,
with the same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or expressible in arithmetical
figures.
Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, it means an exact number, not susceptible of any more or less.
All the members means that no single member should be excluded in the counting. It means not
excluding three Senators and eight Representatives as respondents want us to do in order not to
cause any inconvenience to the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress
who had the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had been complied within the
adoption of the resolution in question, when such a certification is as false as any falsehood can
be.
The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be
the death knell of constitutionalism in our country. If a constitutional provision can be so trifled
with, as has happened in the adoption of the resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith
with the vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its stead a whimsical government of
men.

The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate shall be
composed of 24 Senators (section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise
(section 5, Article VI); that each House may expel a member with the concurrence of two-third
of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall each be composed of
nine members, three Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislature members (section 11,
Article VI); that to overrun the veto of the President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House is necessary (section 20 [1], Article VI), and in certain cases the
concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20 [2],
Article VI); that Congress shall, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House, have the sole power to declare war (section 25, Article VI); that no treaty or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment by a vote of two-thirds of all its members (section 2, Article IX); and that
the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).
So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters not of
momentary but of momentous importance. Each and every one of them should be given effect
with religious scruple, not only because our loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but also
because by inserting them the Constitutional Convention had abided by the wise teachings of
experience.
By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional adoption of the
resolution in question to have their way is to set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the
supremacy of an empire of lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening Pandora's box of evils
and disasters.
The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the members of each House. From now on, by the simple expediency of certification by the
presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses that two-thirds had voted where a bare majority
had voted in fact, said majority may plunge our people into a maelstrome of war.
The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the House of Representatives. From now on, a mere plurality of one will be enough
to put impeachable high officials, including the President, on the carpet.
To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or
circumvented by not counting three actual Senators, as has been done in the resolution in
question, and thereby oust the President of the Philippines if he happens not to be in the good
graces of a senatorial majority.
Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to submit which to
the people high-handed means have been resorted to, there can be no question that it is of vital
importance to the people and it will affect future generations to unimaginable extent. The

Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that before such a momentous proposal could be
submitted to the people the three-fourth rule should be adhered to by Congress.
QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE
Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon all the forces of
liberalism to wage a crusade for human freedom. They should put on the armor of righteousness
and rally behind the banner for the vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied in the
Constitution and the high purposes of the Chapter of the United Nations." This, we said in our
dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-777. Concerning the judgment that the future may
pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same opinion we ventured that the
historian army, under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:
At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary and
retrogressive. When the victims of a constitutional violation, perpetrated by a group of
the highest officials of the government, came to if for redress, it adopted a hands-off
policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple with the situation and finding
refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely disappointing those who have pinned their
faith and hope in it as the first pillar of the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of
human fundamental rights. The issue of human freedom was disposed of by them most
discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on bail on appeal, in
flagrant violation of a constitutional guarantee and of one of the fundamental purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian may record that
the highest tribunal of the new Republic of the Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the
Philippine constitutional system, by refusing to do its duty in giving redress in a clear case of
violation of the fundamental law, to the great disappointment, despair and apallment of millions
of souls all over the world who are pinning their hopes on constitutionalism for the survival of
humanity.
The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the deliberations of the
several organs of the United Nations is predicated in the adoption of a single standard of laws,
compulsory within all jurisdictions of our planet. The ethology of all mankind must be shaped
under the pattern of that single legal standard. But the whole system is liable to crash if it is not
founded on the rock bed of the elemental principle that the majesty of the law must always be
held supreme.
To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing social organs,
moral attitudes and habits of thinking should undergo reforms and overhauling, and many fixed
traditional ideas should be discarded to be replaced with more progressive ones and
inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these ideas are the wrong ones which are used as
premises for the majority opinion in this case.
The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation and reform
should continuously be undertaken if death by stagnation is to be avoided. New truths must be

discovered and new ideas created. New formulas must be devised and invented, and those
outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be preserved, but those hampering the
progressive evolution of cultured should be stored in the museum of memory. The past and the
present are just stepping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the future.
Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had progressed by leaps and
bounds. Polonium and radium were discovered by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray,
and Rutherford the alpha, beta and gamma particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of
matter to become an under-microscopic planetarian system of neutrons, protons, and electrons.
Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are grown in
plain water, without any soil, but only with anions and cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste
matter, and from it is produced wood sugar, weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Interstellar space vacuum, almost absolute, is being achieved to serve ends that contribute to human
welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are harnessed to serve useful human purposes. The
aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic to produce vinegar for the asking. The
penicillum notatum and the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin and tyrothricin, two
wonder drugs that are saving many lives from formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful
insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that used to claim more than one million
victims a year in the world. The creation of synthetics had enriched the material treasures offered
to man by nature. Means of transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many
scientific dreams are fast becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is no
reason why the administration of justice should not progress onward, synchronized with the
rhythm of general human advancement towards a better future.
The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any qualm violated
Article XV of the Constitution and the majority of this Court, instead of granting the proper
relief provided by law, preferred to adopt the comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers,
creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more violations of the fundamental law. The final
results no one is in a position to foresee.
Our vote is for the granting of the petition.

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., disidente:

Por segunda vez en menos de un ao nos Ilaman a decidiry arbitrar sobre una violacion de la
Constitucion elcodigo fundamental de nuestro pais. A media dos del ao pasado se trataba del
recurso interpuesto ante esta misma Corte Suprema por tres Senadores1 que se quejaban dehaber
sido privados injusta y arbitrariamente de su derecho a sentarse en el Senado de Filipinas y a
particular y votar en sus deliberaciones, con grave infraccion y detrimento de la Constitucion que
ampara tal derecho. Ahora esos mismos Senadores acuden de nuevo a esta Corte para quejarse de
otra violacion de la Constitucion, pero estavez no vienen solos: les acompaan otros cinco
miembros del Senado, diecisiete miembros de la Camarra de Representantes y tres jefes de
aagrupaciones o partidos politicos Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth

Party. Jose O. Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de miembro del Senado y Presidente del
Partido Nacionalista. De modo que los recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8Senadores, 17
Representantes y 3 particulares.2 Tienenun comun denominador, a saber: que son todos
ciudadanos de Filipinas, y, ademas, contribuyentes y electores.
Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de Elecciones, el Tesorero de
Filipinas, el Auditor General y el Director del Buro de Imprenta.3
El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de prohibicion dirigigo a los
recurridos para que estos, sus agentes, empleados, subordinados y otras personas que actuen bajo
su superintendencia o en su nombre "se abstengan y desistan de dar los pasos tendentes haciala
celebracion de un plebiscito e eleccion general el 11 de Marzo, 1947, y de imprimir la resolucion
(sobre reformade los articulos 13. y 14. de la Constitucion), las balotas y otros papeles
necesarios en relacion con dicho plebiscito,y de desembolsar o de autorizar el expendio de
fondos publicos para dicho proposito."
Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesariopublicar integro a continuacion el texto de
la Resolucion conjunta que contiene la propuesta reforma a la Constitucion, resolucion que
constituye la materia u objeto de la consulta popular en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y
es la misma que en el lexico corriente de la prensa y del publico se conoce por resolucion sobre
paridad o igualdad de derecdhos constitucionales a favor de los americanos, esdecir, que concede
a estos iguales derechos que a los filipinosen la propiedad y cultivo de terrenos publicos, en la
explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales como bosques,minas, pesca y fuerza hidraulica, y en
la propiedad y operacion de utilidades publicas. He aqui su texto:
RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO BE APPENDED AS AN ORDINANCE THERETO.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session
assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House
voting separately, to propose, as they do hereby propose, the following amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto;
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article
Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive
Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the
United States on the Fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forth-six, pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no
case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the
disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to

citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under
the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporation or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in an election at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Adopted,

(Sgd.) JOSE AVELINO

President of the Senate

(Sgd.) EUGENIO PEREZ

Speaker of the House of Representatives

We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both Houses in joint
session assembled in the Hall of the House of Representatives on September 18, 1946.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO ZACARIAS

Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd.) NARCISO PIMENTEL

Secretary of the House of Representatives

Para comprobar la voluntad popular sobre la reforma constitucional propuesta el Congreso de

Filipinas ha aprobadola Ley No. 73 de la Republica que dispone y ordena la celebracion de un
plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de esteano, provee a la forma de celebrarlo y consigna el
presupuesto necesario para sufragar los gastos del mismo. Siuna mayoria de los electores votare
afirmativamente, la reformaquedara ratificada y estara en vigor por un periodo de 28 aos; en
caso contrario, quedara rechazada.
Los recurrentes alegan y sostiened que la resolucion conjuntade que se trate es ilegal y nula por
no haberse aprobadocon los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso, conforme a lo
provisto en el Articulo XV de la Constitucion, a saber:

SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all

the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
Se alega que cuando se considero y aprobo la citada Resolucion conjunta el Senado se componia
actualmente de 24 miembros, es decir, el numero exacto fijado en la Constitucion, y la Camara
de Representantes de 96 miembros, es decir, dos menos que el numero sealado en la
Constitucion, pues does dimitieron despues de las elecciones, uno para aceptar un cargo en el
ramo ejecutivo del gobierno y otro para aceptar un nombramiento en el servicio diplomatico. Sin
embargo, segun la demanda de los recurrentes, en el Senado solo se permitio votar a 21
miembros, excluyen dose de las deliberaciones y votacionfina l de la Resolucion a tres
miembros, a saber; los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero. De los referidos 21 miembros,
votaron a favor de la Resolucion 16 y en contra 5; asi que arguyen los recurrentes la
Resolucion no quedo aprobada, por parte del Senado, con el numero constitucionalde tres
cuartas-partes (3/4) de los miembros, elcual debia ser 18.
En la Camara de Representantes, segun los recurrentes, solo se permitio votar a 88 miembros,
excluyen dose de las deliberaciones y votacion final de la resolucion a 8 miembros, a saber:
Representantes Alejo Santos y Jesus B. Lava, de Bulacan; Reps. Jose Cando y Constancio P.
Padilla, de Nueva Ecija; Reps. Amado M. Yuson y Luis Taruc, de Pampanga; Rep. Alejandro
Simpauco, de Tarlac; y Rep. Vicente F. Gustilo, de Negros Occidental. De los referidos 88
miembros votaron a favor de la Resolucion solo 68; asi que arguyen los recurrentas la
Resolucion tampoco quedo aprobada, por parte de la Camara, con el numero constitucional de
tres cuartas-partes (3/4) partes de sus miembros, el cual debia ser 72, por lo menos, y no 68, aun
dando por descontados los dos miembros que despues de las elecciones aceptaron cargos en otros
ramosdel gobierno.
Siendo inconstitucional y nula la Resolucion basica deque se trata, consiguientemente los
recurrentes tachantambien de inconstitucional e invalida la referida Ley de la Republica No. 73
que convoca una eleccion general o plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de 1947 a fin de someter
alpueblo para su ratificacion o repudio la enmienda constitucional propuesta, y que consigna la
suma de P1,000,000 para los gastos en que se hubiere de incurrir con motivo dela celebracion de
dicho plebiscito, entre habilitacion deprecintos electorales, pago de dietas de los inspectores y
costo de la a impresion, publicacion, fijacion y distribucion gratuita de copias de la propuesta
enmienda en ingles, espaol y otros dialectos del pais.
Los recurridos, despues de admitir ciertas alegacioneses enciales de la demanda y negar otras,
plantean las siguientes defensas especiales:
Primera defensa especial: que una ley o resolucion impresa (enrolled Act or Resolution) de
ambas Camaras del Congreso, adverada o autenticada con las firmas de los Presidentes de dichas
Camaras, es prueba concluyente deque la misma fue aprobada por el Congreso; que, en virtud
del respeto que se debe a un ramo igual y coordinado del gobierno, no es permisible una

investigacion judicial desi la misma a fue o no aprobada debida y propiamente por el Congreso;
y que, por tanto, esta Corte Suprema carecede jurisdiccion para conocer y enjuiciar los puntos
suscitados por los recurrentes en relacion con la validez y constitucionalidad de la resolucion en
cuestion.
Empero si la primera defensa especial no fuese sostenida, los recurridos alegan, por via de
segunda defensa especial, que la resolucion controvertida fue aprobada a conlos votos de tres
cuartas-partes (3/4) de todos los miembros cualificados del Senado y de la Camara de
Representantes votando separadamente, en consonancia con el Articulo XV, apartado 1, de la
Constitucion, y que consiguientementela ley de la Republica No. 73 que ordena suplanteamiento
ante el pueblo para su ratificacion o desaprobacion, senala una fecha para la celebracion de
estaconsulta plebiscitaria y consigna fondos publicos para talfin, es valida y constitucional.
Consta en autos una estipulacion de hechos concertadaentre las partes, pero no se extracta aqui
para no alargar innecesariamente esta disidencia, pero se hara particular referencia a ella mas
adelante a medida que las exigenciasde la argumentacion lo demanden.
Es preciso hacer constar que los abogados de ambas parteshan hecho cumplida justicia a la
tremenda importancia del asunto haciendo extensos estudios y pacientes investigaciones de la
jurisprudencia pertinente, en particular la americana, teniendo en cuenta la influencia profunda y
decisiva de aquel pais en nuestras ideas politicas y constitucionales en virtud de la historica y
estrecha convivenciade casi medio siglo.
Es que la cosa no era para menos. Puede decirse, sinexageracion, que excepto en cuatro
momentos culminantes de su historia el primer grito de rebelion contra Espaa en Agosto de
1896, la ruptura de hostilidades contra Americaen Febrero de 1899, la aceptacion de la Ley de
Independencia en el plebiscito nacional de 1935, y la guerra contra el Japon en 1941 en
ningun momento, en los ultimos 60 aos, ha sido Ilamado el pueblo filipino a rendiruna decision
tan importante, de trascendencia e implicacionestan graves, tan tremendas, como la que tiene que
hacer en el plebiscito de 11 de Marzo proximo con motivode la Resolucion congresional
discutida en el presente asunto.
Es una de esas decisiones que hacen historia; que parabien o para mal sacuden los cimientos de
un pais tal quesi fuese un fenomeno cosmico; que determinan el curso desu existencia y deytinos
nacionales; que deciden, en una palabra, de la suerte de generaciones ya existentes y
degeneraciones que no han nacido todaviaa. Es una de esas decisiones que para hacerla los
pueblos deben hincarse humildemente de rodillas, de cara al cielo, pidiendo al Dios de los
pueblos y naciones la gracia de una salvadora inspiracion de Su infinita sabiduria . . ..
II
Para los efector de una amplia perspectiva historica quepermita destacar en toda su plenitud los
contornos de losformidables "issues" o puntos constitucionales debatidos en el presente asunto,
parece conveniente que repasemos, siquiera brevemente (en las notas marginales lo que no
cabeen el mismo texto de esta disidencia),4 los preceptos basicos de la Constitucion que se trate
de reformar conla Resolucion congresional de que tantas veces se ha hechomerito. Helos aqui:

ARTICLE XIII. CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
ARTICLE XIV. GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress
when the public interest so requires.
Como queda dicho, la reofrma propuesta es en el sentidode que, no obstante lo dispuesto en los
preceptos arribatranscritos, "durante la efectividad del Convencio Ejecutivo perfeccionado entre
el Presidente de Filipinas y el Presidente de los Estados Unidos el 4 de Julio de 1946, al tenorde
las disposiciones de la Ley del Commonwealth No. 733, pero que en ningun case se extendera
mas alla del 3 de Julio de 1974, la disposicion, explotacion, desar rollo y utilizacionde todos los
terrenos agricolas, forestales y minerales de dominio publico, de aguas, minerales, carbon,
petroleo y otros minerales petroliferos, de todas las fuerzasy fuentes de energia potencial, asi
como de otros recursos de Filipinas, y la operacion de utilidades publicas, si abiertos para
cualguier persona, quedan abiertos para los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y para todas las
formas de negocio y empresa de la propiedad o controladas, directao indirectamente, por ciudad
aos de los Estados Unidos, de la misma manera y bajo las mismas condiciones impuestasa los
ciudadanos de Filipinas o a las corporaciones o asociaciones de la propiedad o controladas por
ciudadanos de Filipinas (Resolucion conjunta del Congreso filipino, supra).
Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial pues, sobre ser historia contemporanea, se trata de las
labores y procesos deliberativos de la misma Asamblea Constituyente de quelos preceptos
capitales arriba transcritos constituyen la expresion acabada de toda la madurez de juicio, de toda

laprudencia y sabiduria de que eran capaces no solo los autores de la Constitucion y los
Delegados que la aprobaron, sino el pueblo filipino que la ratifico en el correspondiente
plebiscito nacional convocado al efecto. En pocas resoluciones ha habido tanta firmeza y tan
fuerte unanimidadentre nuestros partidos politicos y sus caudillos como enesa recia y
constructiva afirmacion de nacionalismo. Nadamejor, creo yo, que las siguientes palabras para
definir elespiritu, la filosofia que informa esas provisiones:
This provision of the Constitution has been criticized as establishing the outworn
Regalian doctrine which, it is suggested, may serve to retard the economic development
of the Philippines. The best encomium on this provision is probably the very criticism
launched against it. It is inconceivable that the Filipinos would liberalize the acquisition,
disposition and exploitation of our natural resources to the extent of permitting their
alienation or of depriving the people of this country of their heritage. The life of any
nation depends upon its patrimony and economic resources. Real freedom, if it is to be
lasting, must go hand in hand with economic security, if not economic prosperity. We are
at most usufructuaries of ourdomains and natural resources and have no power to alienate
them even if we should want to do so. They belong to the generations yet unborn and it
would be the height of folly to even think of opening the door for their untrammelled
disposition, exploitation, development or utilization to the detriment of the Filipinos
people. With our natural resources in the hands of foreigners what would be there left
except the idealism of living in a country supposedly free, but where freedom is, after all,
an empty dream? We would be living in a sumptuous palace that it not ours! We would be
beggars in our own homes, strangers in our own land!
Friendship and amity towards all nations are compatible with the protection of the
legitimate interests of the Filipino people. There is no antagonism or hostility towards
foreigners but sane nationalism and self-protection which every country of the world is
practising today in the interest of self-preservation. (The Three Powers of Government,
by Laurel, pp. 117-118.)
Los criticos de la enmienda constitucional propuesta pueden discutir libremente, como cumple a
los ciudadanos de un pais democratico, los meritos y demeritos de lamisma. Pueden combatirla
con toda clase de razones morales, politicas, economicas, financieras, internacionales, y hasta
de decencia y naturalmente defenderla tambiensus partidarios desde todos los angulos.
Podrian los opositoreshacer una minuciosa diseccion de su fraseologia yacaso hallar en sus
repliegues peligrosas implicaciones, posibles riesgos, como en ese par de adverbios "directa o
indirectamente", a cuyo socaire podrian acogerse corporacioneso asociaciones extranjeras
controladas solo indirectamente por ciudadanos americanos para concurrir en la explotacion de
nuestros terrenos publicos y recursos naturales, y en la operacion de utilidades publicas. Todo
estolo pueden hacer, y algo mas. Pero es obvio, elemental quesemejante discusion no compete a
esta Corte Suprema, sinoen todo caso a otros poderes constituidos.
Nosotros no estamos para determinar y enjuiciar labondad o maldad de la enmienda propuesta.
Lo unico quenos incumbe hacer, ya que la cuestion se halla propiamente planteada ante nosotros,
es resolver si la enmienda ha sido aprobada por el Congreso de acuerdo con el mandato expreso
de la Constitucion en materia de enmiendas; si losrequisitos que la Constitucion seala para

poder enmendarla requisitos que son mandatorios, categorica menteimperativos y

obligatorios se han cumplido o se han violado. Como se dijo bien en el asunto de Gray vs.
Childs ([1934], 156 So., 274, 279), ". . . No podemos decir queel estricto requerimiento relativo a
las enmiendas se puede renunciar a favor de una buena enmienda e invocar encontra de otra
mala. . . . No compete a los tribunales el determinar cuando una enmienda propuesta es sabia y
cuando no lo es. Los tribunales nada tienen que ver conla sabiduria de la politica. Pero es deber
de los tribunales, cuando se les pide que lo hagan, el determinar si o no el procedimiento
adoptado para la aprobacion de la enmiendaes el sealado por los terminos de la ley organica.
Todo lo que se lha dicho hasta aqui para poner de relievela filosofia de nuestra Constitucion en
materia de recursos naturales y utilidades publicas, se ha dicho no como expresion de un criterio
propio, sino tan solo para subrayar todala gravedad, toda la densidad del asunto, y prevenir
entodo caso los peligros de una rutinaria y complacienteliviandad. Como tambien se dijo en el
citado asunto deGray vs. Childs, "la enmienda de la ley organica del Estado o nacion no es una
cosa para ser tomada ligeramente, ni para ser hecha de lance o al azar. Es una cosa seria. Cuando
la enmienda es aprobada, viene a ser parte de laley fundamental del pais y puede significar el
bienestar omaldicion de las generaciones de la nacion donde se haceparte del codigo
fundamental."
Este pronunciamiento adquiere todo el valor y toda la resonancia de una consigna en el presente
caso en que lareforma propuesta afecta vitalisimamente al patrimonionacional del pueblo
filipino. No son los recursos naturalesy las utilidades publicas el tesoro de una nacion, labase
que sustenta su existencia, la espina dorsal de sueconomia? Por tanto, jamas se podra exagerar el
celo, la vigilancia que el pueblo y sus organos naturales ejercenpara que las salvaguardias
impuestas por la misma Constitucionen relacion con el proceso y tramitacion de todaenmienda
constitucional se cumplan y observen con el maximo rigor.
Aqui no caben excusas ni subterfugios. Ni siquiera cabeescudarse tras la doctrina de la
separacion de poderes quela mayoria de esta Corte invoca para justificar su inaccion, su
pasividad, su politica de "manos fuera", alegando que el presente asunto es coto vedado para nos
otros, algo quecae fuera de nuestra jurisdiccion, eso que en derecho politico y constitucional se
llama materia politica no-justiciable.
III
La mayoria rehusa asumir jurisdiccion sobre el presente caso porque dice que versa sobre una
cuestion politica, ylas cuestiones politicas caen fuera de la competencia de los tribunales de
justicia. Creo que esto es un error, dicho seacon todos los respetos debidos a mis ilustres
compaeros que sostienen tal opinion. Hay acaso algun documento mas politico que la
Constitucion? Si la opinion de lamayoria fuese valida y acertada, practicamente ninguna
violacion de la Constitucion podria ser enjuiciada por los tribunales, pues cual mas, cual menos,
casi todas las transgresionesconstitucionales, sobre todo las que comete elpoder legislativo o el
poder ejecutivo, tienen caracter politico. Bajo esa opinion la Constitucion seria una letramuerta,
un simple pedazo de papel: los poderes constituidos, los individuos que los componen, podrian
infringirim punemente la Constitucion sin que ningun arbitro constitucional pudiera intervenir
ordenadamente para restaurarla suprema majestad de la ley fundamental violada. Esclaro que

esto podria conducir facilmente al caos, a la anarquia, a la revolucion, dependiendo solo el

resultado de lamayor o menor docilidad del pueblo, del grado de elasticidad politica de las
masas. Y es claro que ninguno puedequerer este triste destino para nuestro pais.
Creo sinceramente que una mejor y mas correcta evaluacion de nuestro sistema de gobierno que
esta esencial mentecalcado en el americano, es que bajo la teoria relativa de las eparacion de
poderes, ningun poder es superior al pueblo cuya voluntad esta encarnada en la Constitucion. Los
poderes no son mas que agentes, mandatarios, servidores: el pueblo es el amo, el mandante, el
soberano. Y el pueblo ordena y manda por medio de la Constitucion esta es suvoz el verbo
hecho carne politica y social, el soplo vital quetraduce y transmuts su espiritu en postulados
esenciales deregulacion y gobierno.
Todo eso esta bien, no puede haber seria objecion a ello,dicen los sostenedores absolutistas de la
teoria de la sedparacion de poderes. Pero se pregunta: quien seala lavoluntad del pueblo tal
como esta plasmada en la Constitucion? ?Quien es el profeta que desciende del Sinai para revelar
las tablas de la ley? Quien ha de arbitrar en los conflictos constitucionales, o quien ha de decidir
los litigios propiamente planteados en que se ventilan una infraccion de la Constitucion? Hay un
peligroso vacio en nuestro mecanismo constitucional, o por el contrario, los resorteestan todos
bien situados, capaces de operar y funcionarade cuada y eficientemente? Esto es precisamente el
busilis, la cuestion batallona.
No puede haber duda en la contestacion a tales preguntas. Bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno el
poder judiciales el llamado a sealar, a interpretar la ley; y en los conflictoso transgresiones
constitucionales esta Corte Suprematiene la ultima palabra, le compete el arbitraje supremoy
final. Bajo nuestra mecanica constitucional, igual quebajo la americana, se da la aparente
paradoja de que la superior facultad, el supremo negocio de interpretar la voluntad del pueblo tal
como esta expresada mas o menos permanentemente en la Constitucion, no corresponde
propiamentea ninguno d e los poderes electivos, los que se renuevanperiodicamente, sino al
poder que si bien es denombramiento en su origen, tiene, sin embargo, sentido deperpetuidad,
quiero decir, es vitalicio en la complexion y funcion de los individuos que los componen el
poder judicial. La sabiduria peculiar, la originalidad del sistemaconsiste precisamente en eso: en
haber alojado el supremo arbitraje con relacion a los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales
en un poder del Estado al cual deliberadamentese le ha dotado de un clima psicologico y moral el
maspropicio posible a la objetividad y desasimiento de lasdisputas politicas y discordias civiles,
situandosele por encimade los vaivenes de la politica al uso y las veleida desde la suerte electora.
"Esto es lo que va implicto en la expresion supremacia judicial, que propiamente es la facultad
de revision judicial bajo la Constitucion" (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 171).
The very essence of the American conception of the separation of powers is its insistence
upon the inherent distinction between law-making and law-interpreting, and its
assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion which, when brought to bear upon the
Constitution, yields judicial review." (Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, p.
146.)
En el famoso asunto de Marbury vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados
Unidos, por boca de sugran Chief Justice John Marshall, en terminos inequivocos definio y

explico las facultades de la judicatura para poneren vigor la Constitucion como la suprema ley
del pais, y declaro que es terminantemente de la competencia y deberdel departamento judicial el
decidir cual es la ley querige.
The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same. Webster says: "The
Constitution being the supreme law, it follows of course, that every act of the Legislature
contrary to the law must be void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legislature
itself decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal and becomes only a moral
restraint for the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be
conformable to the Constitution, then the Constitution is advisory and accessory only, not
legally binding; because, if the construction of it rest wholly with them, their discretion,
in particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous constructions. Hence the courts of
law, necessarily, when the case arises, must decide upon the validity of particular acts."
Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 1,
2d edition, pp. 4, 5.)
En el citado asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral dijimos tambien lo siguiente:
. . . Y la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por artbitro final, frena a con
efectividad a los demas departament of en elejercicio de su facultad de determinar la ley,
y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la
Constitucion.
Esta doctrina reafirmo en el asunto de Planas contra Gil (67 Phil., 62), a saaber:
. . . As far as the judiciary is concerned, which it holds' neither the sword nor the purse' it
is by constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries,
and to the Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the
obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Section 2 [1], Art. VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the
other departments of the government and this result is one of the necessary corollaries of
the "system of checks and balances" of the government established.
No es que con esto el poder judicial assume un complejode superioridad sobre los otros poderes
del Estado, no. Setrate simplemente de que, dentro de las limitaciones de todacreacion humana,
alguien tiene que arbitrar y dirimir losconflictos y las transgresiones a gue puede dar lugar la
Constitucion, y se estima que el poder judicial, pro la razonde su ser y de sus funciones, es el
mas llamado a ser esearbitro. Se trate de una propia y graciosa inhibicion delos otros poderes en
virtud de una necesidad impuesta porunas teorias y practicas de gobiernio que han resistido la
prueba del tiempo y el choque con la realidad y la experiencia. En mi disidencia en el asunto de
Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192), hablando sobre este particular dijelo siguiente y lo reitero
ahora, a saber:
En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No sepuede discutir que los tres
poderes del Estado son iguales e independientesentre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior

al otro, mucho menos el poder judicial que entre los tres es el menos fuerte y elmas
precario en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se puede discutir que bajo la
Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una esferade accion propia y privativa, y dentro
de esa esfera un cumulode facultades que le pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro de
esaesfera y en el uso de esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discreciony ningun otro
poder puede controlar o revisar sus actos so pretexto de que alguien los cuestiona o tacha
de arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes o insensatos. Pero la insularidad, la separacion
llegasolo hasta aqui. Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente hasta nuestros
dias, el principio de la separacion de poderes hasufrido tremendos modificaciones y
limitaciones. El consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la
separacionde poderes queda condicionada por una mecanica constitucional lamecanica
de los frenos y cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the Constitution of the United States, tomo 3,
pags. 1619, 1620, 2. edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada poder es absoluto dentro de la
esfera quele asigna la Constitucion; alli el juego de sus facultades y funcionesno se puede
coartar. Pero cuando se sale y extravasa de esa esferainvadiendo otras esferas
constitucionales, ejerciendo facultades queno le pertenecen, la teoria de la separacion ya
no le ampara, la Constitucion que es superior a el le sale al encuentro, le restringe uy
leachica dentro de sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones anti-constitucionales. La
cuestion ahora a determinar es si bajo nuestrosistema de gobierno hay un mecanismo que
permite restablecer eljuego normal de la Constitucion cuando surgen estos desbarajustes,
estos conflictos que podriamos llamar de fronteras constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a
determinar si cuando surgen esos conflictos, un ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus
derechos, el mismo tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la Constitucion y las
leyes, y quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la cuestion basica,
cardinal en este asunto.
Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen son los tribunales de
justicia.
La mayoria no define en su decision lo que llama cuestion politica no-justiciable ni las maaterials
o casos que caen dentro de su significado. "The difficulty lies" dice la ponencia "in
determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not
susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as
to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government." Pero razonando por analogia cita un precedente, una
autoridad el caso de Coleman vs. Miller decidido no hace muchos aos por la Corte Suprema
Federal de los Estados Unidos. La mayoria cree que este es el caso mas semejante al que nos
ocupa. Creo que la mayoria padece error: el caso de Coleman contra Miller es precisamente un
buen argumento en favor del recurso.
Compendiado el caso es como sigue: En Junio, 1924, el Congreso de los Estados Unidos propuso
una reforma ala Constitucion, conocida por "Child Labor Amendment" (enmienda sobre el
trabajo infantil). En Enero, 1925, la Legislatura del Estado de Kansas adopto una resolucion
rechazandola enmienda y una copia certificada de la resolucionse envio al Secretario de Estado
de los Estados Unidos. En Enero, 1937, o sea 12 aos despues, una resolucion conocida como
"Resolucion Concurrente del Senado No. 3" se presento en el Senado del Estado de Kansas

pararatificar la propuesta enmienda. Habia 40 Senadores. Alconsiderarse la resolucion 20

Senadores votaron en favor y 20 Senadores en contra. El Teniente Gobernador, que era entonces
el Presidente del Senado en virtud de la Constitucion estatal, emitio su voto en favor de la
resolucion, rompiendo asi el empate. La resolucion fue posteriormente adoptada por la Camara
de Representantes de Kandas mediante una mayoria de los votos de sus miembros.
Fued entonces cuando se interpuso ante la Corte Suprema de Kansas un recurso de mandamus
por los 20 Senadores adversos a la resolucion y por otros 3 miembros de la Camarade
Representantes. El objeto del recurso era (a) compeler al Secretario del Senado a borrar el
endoso favorable de la resolucion y poner en su lugar las palabras "no ha sido aprobada"; (b)
recabar la expedicion de un interdicto contra los oficiales del Senado y Camara de
Representantes prohibiendo les que firmaran la resolucion y contra el Secretario de Estado de
Kansad prohibiendole que autentic aradicha resolucion y la entregara la Gobernador. La solicitud
cuestionaba el derecho del Teniente Gobernadora emitir su voto decisivo en el Senado. Tambien
se planteabaen la solicitud el hecho de que la resolucion habiasido rechazada originariamente y
se alegaba, ademas, quedurante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre Junio,1924, y Mayo,
1927, la enmienda habia sido rechazada porambas Camaras de las Legislaturas de 26 Estados y
solose habia ratificado en 5 Estados, y que por razon de dicho rechazamiento y por no haberse
ratificado dentro de untiempo razonable la enmienda habia perdido su validez y vitalidad.
La Corte Suprema de Kansas hallo que no habia ninguna disputa sobre los hechos, asumio
competencia sobre el casoy sostuvo que el Teniente Gobernador tenia derecho a emitirvoto
decisivo, que la proyectada enmienda conservabasu vitalidad original a pesar del tiempo
transcurrido, y quela resolucion, "habiendo sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes y por
el Senado, el acto de ratificacion dela propuesta enmienda por la Legislatura de Kansas erafinal y
complete." Consiguientemente el recurso de mandamus fue denegado.
Elevado el asunto en casacion para ante la Corte Suprema Federal, esta asumio jurisdiccion sobre
el caso, conla concurrencia y disidencia de algunos Magistrados que opinaban que el recurso
debia rechazarse de plano, sin masceremonias, por la razon, segun los disidentes, de que los
recurrentes no tenian personalidad ni derecho de accion para pedir la revision de la sentencia de
la Corte Supremade Kansas, y porque ademas se trataba de una cuestion puramente politica, por
tanto no-justiciable. Bajo la ponenciade su Presidente el Sr. Hughes, la Corte Suprema Federal
conocio del caso a fondo, discutiendo y resolviendo las cuestiones planteadas. He aqui sus
palabras: "Our authority to issue the writ of certiorari is challenged upon the ground that the
petitioners have no standing to seek to have the judgment of the state court reviewed and hence
itis urged that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.We are unable to accept that view." Esto
viene a ser comouna replica a las siguientes palabras de los disidentes: "It is the view of Mr.
Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself (Mr. Justice Frankfurter) that
the petitioners have no standing in the Court." Delo dicho resulta evidente que la Corte Federal
no adoptola actitud de "manos fuera" (hands off), sino que actuo positivamente sobre el caso,
encarandolo.
La decision consta de tres partes. La primera parte, que es bastante extensa, esta consagrada
enteramente adiscutir la cuestion de la jurisdiccion de la Corte. Ya hemosvisto que esta cuestion
se ha resuelto enteramente enfavor de la jurisdiction, en virtud de las razones luminosas que alli

se explanan y que no reproduzco por no ser necesario y para no alargar indebidamente esta
disidencia. La segunda parte es bien breve, apenas consta de dos parrafos. Se refiere a la
cuestion de si el voto del Teniente Gobernador, que rompio el empate, era o no valido. La Corte
nolo resuelve, por que dice que sus miembros se dividieron porigual sobre si era una cuestion
politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable. La tercera parte, tan extensa como la primera, esta dedicada a
estudiar y discutir las siguientes proposiciones :(a) Si habiendo sido rechazada originariamentela
enmienda, una ratificacion posterior podia validamente dejar sin efecto dicho rechazamiento y
tomarse como unaratificacion legal al tenor de la Constitucion; (b) si ellargo tiempo transcurrido
entre el rechazamiento y la ratificacion unos 13 aos no habia tenido el efecto de
darcaracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando estado juridico definitivo.
El analisis que hace el ilustrado ponente de las cuestiones planteadas es muy interesante y desde
luego acabado. Se estudian y comentan luminos amente los precedentes. Sobre la cuestion de si
el rechazamiento de unaenmienda propuesta impide que la misma sea ratificada posteriormente,
se puntualiza lo siguiente: que el articulo V de la Constitucion Federal sobre enmienda esta
fraseadoen terminos positivos, es decir, habla de ratificacion y node rechazamiento, y que por
tanto "el poder para ratificarlo confiera al Estado la Constitucion, y que, como poder ratificante,
continua y persiste, a pesar de un previo rechazamiento. "Luego la Corte dice, examinando los
precedentes, que el Congreso, en el ejercicio de su control sobrela promulgacion de las
enmiendas a la Constitucion, ha resuelto esta cuestion repetidas veces en el sentido indicado, esto
es, considerando inefectivo el previo rechazamientofrente a una positiva ratificacion; y la Corte
concluye que esta accion del Congreso es valida, constitucional; por consiguiente, los tribunales
no estan autorizados para revisarla. Es en este sentido, creo yo, como la Corte dice que se trate
de una cuestion politica no-justiciable, es decir una cuestion que cae dentro de la zona
constitucional exclusion del Congreso; por tanto, se trate deuna accion valida, constitucional.
Pero no hay nada enesa decision que diga, o permita inferir, que cuando el Congreso viola un
mandato expreso de la Constitucion, como en el caso que nos ocupa, los tribunales no pueden
intervenir, bajo el principio de la supremacia judicial entratandose de interpretar la Constitucion,
para resolver el conflicto o enjuiciar la transgresion, y conceder el remedio propiamente pedido.
En otras palabras, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller la Corte Suprema Federal hallo que el
Congreso, al declarar valida la ratificacion de la enmienda constitucional sobre trabajo infantil
(Child labor), no habia infringibo el articulo V de la Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, y la Corte lo
razona diciendo, con la vista delos precedentes, que el referido articulo V habla de ratificacion y
no de rechazamiento, y que, por tanto, "el poderpara ratificar continua y persiste a pesar de un
previo rechazamiento." De suerte que, en realidad de verdad, no escierto que la Corte Suprema
Federal declaro injusticiablela materia, pues que mejor prueba de justiciabilidad que ese dictum
categorico, positivo y terminante?
Sobre la proposicion de si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la ratificacion
unos 136 aos no habia tenido el efecto de dar caracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda,
causando estado juridico definitivo, la Corte Suprema Federal fallo que no, es decir,
declarovalida la ratificacion no obstante dicho lapso de tiempo, aduciendo razones muy atinadas,
entre ellas la de que las condiciones de caracter moral, medico, social y economico que
aconsejaban la prohibicion del trabajo infantil en las fabricas eran tan validas y existentes, si no
mas, cuandose sometio la enmienda por primera vez para su ratificacion como 13 aos despues.
Y luego la Corte cita autoridades y precedentes en apoyo de su conclusion, entre ellosel caso

tipico y decisivo de Dillon vs. Glass (256 U.S., 368; 65 Law.ed., 994; 41 Sup.Ct., 510). En este
caso la Cortedeclaro que el Congreso, al proponer una enmienda a la Constitucion, pueded fijar
un tiempo razonable para su ratificacion, y sostuvo la accion del Congreso al disponer enla
proyectada 18. Enmienda que la misma seria ineficaza menos que se ratificase dentro de siete
aos.
Ahora bien, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller ocurre todo lo contrario: el Congreso no habia
fijado ningun plazopara la ratificacion. En vista de esto, los recurrentes pretendian que la Corte
supliera la omision del Congreso declarandolo que era tiempo razonable, teniendo en cuentalos
precedentes judiciales y el precedente congresional de 7 aos ya sostenido en el caso citado de
Dillon contra Glass; y que desde luego el periodo de 13 aos era demasiado largo para ser
razonable. La Corte Suprema dijo que no, queno eran los tribunales los que debian fijar ese
tiempo razonable; que en esta cuestion entraban muchos factores denaturaleza varia y compleja
politicos, economicos y sociales que solo el Congreso estaba en condiciones de determinar
ya mediante la correspondiente legislacion como enel caso de la 18. Enmienda, ya en cada caso
concreto deratificacion al ejercer su control sobre la promulgacion de las enmiendas. Ahora bien,
pregunto: no es esto un dictum judicial? no es esto justiciar? no esta aqui la Corte Suprema
Federal sentandose en estrados y emitiendo judicialmente su opinion sobre una materia juridica y
constitucional sometida a su consideracion? En realidad, puede decirse que la unica cuestion que
la Corte ha dejado de resolver es la validez o nulidad del voto decisivo del Teniente Gobernador,
por la razon de que sobre este punto, segun se dice en la misma decision, la opinion del Tribunal
estaba igualmente dividida. Todas las demas cuestiones han sido enjuiciadas, resueltes, y esta
accion dela mayoria, asumiendo plena jurisdiccion sobre el caso y las materias en el discutidas,
es lo que ha motivado la disidencia de 4 Magistrados los Sres. Black, Roberts, Frankfurter y
Douglas. En efecto, estos disidentes no disimulansu desagrado al ver que la Corte asume en el
caso, siquier implicitamente, el poder de interpretacion judicial, y aunvan mas alla expresan
un notorio desencanto al ver que la Corte "trata el proceso enmendatorio provisto por la
Constitucion, como sujeto a interpretacion judicial en algunos respectos, y en otros sujeto a la
autoridad final del Congreso", y al ver tambien que en la decision "no hay desaprobacion de la
conclusion establecida en el asunto de Dillon contra Glass, de que la Constitucion requiere
tacitamente que una enmienda propiamente sometida debe darsepor muerta, a menos que se
ratifique dentro de un tiempo razonable." Es decir, los Magistrados disidentes esperaban que la
Corte revocase y abrogase lo hecho por ella en elcitado asunto de Dillo contra Glass en donde la
Corte, envez de abstenerse de conocer del caso por tratarse en el, segun los disidentes, de materia
politica no-justiciable, ejercio plena jurisdiccion sobre el mismo asumiendo supoder tradicional
de interpretar la Constitucion y declarando valida la lay del Congreso que fijaba un plazo de7
aos para la ratificacion de la 18. Enmienda. No puedo resistir a la tentacion de reproducir las
mismas palabrasde la disidencia: ellas, mejor que todo lo que yo pueda decir, demuestran de
modo inconcuso las irreconciliables diferencias de criterio entre la mayoria, representada porel
ilustre ponente Sr. Hughes, y los disidentes, pues mientraspor un lado el ponente justicia
decididamente el caso considerando, discutiendo y resolviendo todas las cuestionesplanteadas,
menos la cuestion del voto del Teniente Gobernador, citando profusamente autoridades y
precedentes, los disidentes, en su opinion, preconizan una actitudde absoluta abstencion, de
"manos fuera" (hands off), portratarse, segun ellos, de una materia politica no-justiciable que cae
exclusivamente bajo el control del Congreso. He aqui las palabras de los disidentes:

. . . To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a
power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of
Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is
being followed between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that
judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time"
within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly authorized State
officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State
may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions,
are all consistent only with an ultimate control over the amending process in the courts.
And this must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial
interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the
political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as
subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress.
There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Glass, that the
Constitution impliedly requires that a property submitted amendment must die unless
ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only
Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in article
5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has
the exclusive power to decide the political questions of whether a State whose legislature
has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and
whether in the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an
"unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial
branches of the government is made by article 5 which grants power over the amending
of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given
by the article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is "political" in
its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution and is
not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending process, subject to no
judicial review, the views of any court upon this process cannot be binding upon
Congress, and in so far as Dillon vs. Glass attempts judicially to imposed a limitation
upon the right of Congress to determine final adoption of an amendment, it should be
disapproved. . . . (Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A.L.R., 695, 708, 709.)
La distribucion de los votos con relacion a las cuestiones planteadas en el referido asundo de
Coleman vs. Miller esalgun tanto confusa, como han podido notar los mismos comentaristas; asi
que necesita de alguna explicacion. Escierto que no suscriben la ponencia mas que 3
Magistrados, a saber: el ponente Sr. Hughes y los Sres. Stone y Reed, pero en cuanto a la
jurisdiccion plena que la Corte asumio sobre el caso y la materia hay que aadir los votos de los
Sres. McReynolds y Butler. Estos dos ultimos no soloconcurrian implicitamente en la accion de
la Corte al enjuiciarel caso, sino que inclusive opinaban que debia concederse el recurso, esto es,

que debia anularse la ratificacion tardia de la Enmienda sobre Trabajo Infantil (Child Labor)
hecha por la Legislatura de Kansas. De modo queen cuanto al "issue" de la jurisdiccion, la
justiciabilidad del caso, la votacion era de 5 contra 4 por la jurisdiccion,la justiciabilidad, el
ponente Sr. Hughes, y los Magistrados Sres. Stone, Reed, McReynolds y Butler; por la actitud de
absoluta abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands off), los Magistrados Sres. Black, Frankfurter,
Roberts y Douglas.
Repito lo dicho mas arriba: el caso de Coleman vs. Miller, en vez de ser una autoridad a favor de
los recurridos, juntamente con el caso de Dillon vs. Glass constituyen precedentes decisivos en la
jurisprudencia federal americana a favor de los recurrentes.
V
Pero si la jurisprudencia federal milita en favor de latesis de que tenemos jurisdiccion para
enjuiciar y decidirel presente caso, en el ejercicio de nuestras supremas funciones como
interprete de la Constitucion bajo el principio firmemente establecido de la supremacia judicial
en asuntos propiamente planteados sobre conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, la
jurisprudencia de los Estados estodavia mas indubitable e inequivoca, mas terminante y decisiva.
La importancia de esto sube de punto si se tieneen cuenta que, mas que con el gobierno federal,
nuestra analogia, nuestros puntos de contacto en lo politico, constitucional y juridico es mas bien
con los diferentes Estados de la Union americana. Nuestro sistema de gobierna es unitario. Aqui
nuestras provincias no son Estados autonomos y semi-independientes como lo son los Estados
americanos. Asi que la cedula, la unidad politica mas semejante a la nuestra no es la federal, sino
la estatal. Por eso si bienes cierto que las constituciones de los Estados, como lanuestra, todas
estan fundamentalmente calcadas en el patron de la Constitucion federal, se vera que en
ciertosrasgos caracteristicos del sistema unitario nuestra Constitucionse aproxima evidentemente
mas a las de los Estados que a la federal. Esa semejanza es sobre todo notabilisimaen la parte que
se refiere al proceso enmendatorio de la Constitucion. Es que, en realidad, los Estados de la
Union americana, para todos los efectos de la vida interior, domestica, son practicamente
naciones independientes; asi que nuestra evolucion, nuestro transitode la condicion de
Commonwealth a la de Republicas oberana e independiente si bien nos distingue de ellos enel
derecho internacional, ninguna diferencia, sin embargo, ha operado en el campo constitucional,
ora en la parte dogmatica de la Constitucion, ora en la parte organica. Y la mejor prueba de esto
es que con la independencia nohemos tenido necesidad de cambiar de Constitucion: lamisma que
nos servia cuando eramos simple Commonwealth, es decir, cuando estabamos sujetos a la
soberania americana, es la misma que nos sirve hoy cuando ya somos Republic; y no cabe duda
de que nos serviria perfectamente bien si no la tuvieramos asendereada y malparada en nuestras
pecaadoras manos con repetidas violaciones, confrecuentes asaltos contra su integridad . . ..
Ahora bien; sin petulancia se puede retar a cualquieraa que seale un caso, un solo caso en la
jurisprudencia de los Estados de la Union americana en que los tribunales de justicia se hayan
negado a conocer y enjuiciaruna violacion constitucional semejante a la que nos ocupapor la
razon de que se trataba de una cuestion politica no-justiciable. No hay absolutamente ninguno;
por esoque los recurridos, a pesar de las pacientes y laboriosas investigaciones que denota su
habil y concienzudo alegato, no han podido citar ni un solo caso.

En cambio, los tomos de jurisprudencia de various Estados dan cuenta de casos indenticosd al
que nos ocupa y entodos ellos se ha declarado invariablemente que la violacion de la
Constitucion en lo que se refiere al precepto que regula el proceso de la enmiendas a la Ley
organica esuna cuestion judicial, y ninguna Corte Suprema de Estados e ha lavado jamas las
manos bajo la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Es mas: creo que in siquiera seha planteado
seriamente la objecion fundada en el argumentod e la injusticiabilidad.
Para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia no voy a citarmas que algunos casos los mas
conocidos y representativos, tomados de la jurisprudencia de algunos Estados, a saber: Florida,
Minnesota, Georgia e Indiana. De la Corte Suprema de Florida tenemos dos casos: el de
Crawford vs .Gilchrist y el de Gray vs. Childs.
En el asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist (64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 963l Ann. Cas., 1914B, 916), se
trataba de una accionde prohibicion interpuesta por el Gobernador del Estado, Albert W.
Gilchrist, contra el Secretario de Estado, H. Clay Crawford, para impedir que cierta propuesta
enmiendaa la Constitucion se publicara y se sometiera al electorado en un plebiscito para su
ratificacion o rechazamiento. Esdecir, lo mismo de que se trate en el case que tenemos
antenosotros. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la Camarade Representantes de Florida con
el voto necesario y constitucional de tres quintas (3/5), y fue enviada al Senado para su
concurrencia. El Senado tambien la aprobo conel voto de tres quintos, pero esta votacion fue
reconsiderada posteriormente. Asi estaba el asunto, pendiente de reconsideracion cuando se
clausuro la Legislatura. Despues, sin embargo, diose por aprobada la propuesta enmienday el
Secretario de Estado trato de dar los pasos parasu publicacion y ratificacion plebiscitaria. De ahi
la accionde interdicto prohibitorio, fundada en la alegacion de quela enmienda no habia sido
aprobada debidamente por la Legislatura de acuerdo con los metodos prescritos en la
Constitucion de Florida. Igual que en el presente casetambien hubo alli una batalla forense
colosal, con untremendo despliegue de habilidad y talento por cada lado. El ponente no se recata
en alabar el esfuerzo de las partesy dice: ". . . we think the parties to this litigationare to be
commended, both for taking the proceedings that have brought these unsual questions before the
court for determination and for the great ability with which their counsel have presented them to
this court."
Se lavo las manos la Corte Suprema de Florida declarandose incompetente para conocer del
asunto por la razonde que se trataba de una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable? De
ninguna manera. La Corte asumio resueltamente su responsabilidad y poder tradicional de
interpretarla Constitucion y fallo el asunto en su fondo, declarando que la cuestion era
propiamente judicial y que laenmienda constitucional propuesta no se habia aprobada
deconformidad con los requisitos establecidos por la Constitucionpara el proceso y tramitacion
de la enmiendas. Por tanto, se denego la peticion de supersedeas interpuestapor el recurrido para
enervar el recurso; es decir, al recurrentegano su inusitado e historico pleito. Y las esferas
politicas de Florida no se desorbitaron por esta decisivaderrota de la teoria de la separacion de
poderes. Vale la pena reproducir algunar de las doctrinas sentadas en elasunto, a saber:
Constitutional Law Power of Courts to Determine Validity of Action by Legislature in
Proposing Constitutional Amendment.

A determination of whether an amendment to the constitution has been validly proposed

and agreed to by the Legislature is to be had in a judicial forum where the constitution
provides no other means for such determination.
Injunction Subject of Relief Act of Secretary of State in Certifying Proposed
Amendments.
The act of the secretary of state in publishing and certifying to the country commissioners
proposed amendments to the constitution is in its nature ministerial, involving the
exercise of no discretion, and if the act is illegal it may be enjoined in appropriate
proceedings by proper parties, there being no other adequate remedy afforded by law.
Injunction Governor as Complainant, Secretary of State as Defendant.
The governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen, taxpayer, and elector, is a
proper complainant in proceedings brought to enjoin the secretary of state from
publishing at public expense and certifying proposed amendments to the constitution
upon the ground that such proposed amendments are invalid because they have not been
duly "agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each house" of the
legislature.
Amendments to Constitution Effect of Ignoring Mandatory Provisions of Constitution.
If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending the
constitution, it violates the right of all the people of the state to government regulated by
law.
Duty of Court to Enforce Constitution.
It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing
constitution.
Mandatory Provisions of Constitutions as to Manner of Amending Constitution.
The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of the constitution to
"be agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each house" of the legislature
is mandatory, and it clearly contemplates that such amendments shall be agreed to by the
deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the requisite number of the numbers of each house at
a regular session.
Construction of Constitution to Give Intended Effect Mandatory Character of
Provisions.
Every word of a state constitution should be given its intended meaning and effect, and
essential provisions of a constitution are to be regarded as being mandatory. (Crawford
vs. Gilchrist, Ann. Cas., 1914 B, pp. 916, 917.)

El asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist se decidio en 1912. Enm 1934 otro asunto constitucional
importante, el de Gray contra Childs, se decidio en virtud de la autoridad y sentencia dictada en
dicho asunto de Crawford.
En el caso citado de Gray contra Childs (156 So. Rep., 274; Fla.), tambien se trataba de una
demanda de prohibicion para impedir la publicacion de una propuesta enmienda constitucional
que iba a ser sometida al electorado de Florida para su ratificacion o rechazamiento en una
eleccion general o plebiscito fijado para Noviembre, 1934. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por
la Camara de Representantes con el voto de tres quintos (3/5), pero en el Senado hubo cierta
confusion acerca del texto finalmente aprobado. La Legislatura, antes de clausurarse aprobo
unafs resolucion conjunta autotizando a ciertos oficiales de las Camaras para que despues de la
clausura hiciesen ciertas correciones enlas actas y en el diario de sesiones a fin de formar la
verdaderahistoria de los procedimientos y compulsar el textode la enmienda tal como habia sido
aprobada. Se alegabaen la demanda que esto era ilegal y anticonstitucional. Eltribunal de circuito
estimo el recurso de prohibicion. Elevado el asunto en apelacion para ante la Corte Suprema del
Estado, la misma confirmo la sentencia apelada concediendo el interdicto prohibitorio. Hed aqui
los pronunciamientos de la Corte que parecen estereotipados para el caso que nos ocupa, a saber:
(4,5) Section 1 of article 17 of our Constitution provides the method by which the
Constitution may be amended. It requires that a proposed amendment shall be entered
upon the respective Journals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate with the
yeas and nays showing a three-fifths vote in favor of such amendment by each House.
The proposed amendment here under consideration nowhere appears upon the Journals of
the Senate, and therefore it is unnecessary for us to consider any other questions
presented or any authorities cited.
The amendment of the organic law of the state or nation is not a thing to be lightly
undertaken not to be accomplished in a haphazard manner. It is a serious thing. When an
amendment is adopted, it becomes a part of the fundamental law of the land, and it may
mean the weal or woe of the future generations of the state wherein it becomes a part of
the fundamental law. We cannot say that the strict requirements pertaining to amendments
may be waived in favor of a good amendment and invoked as against a bad amendment.
If the Constitution may be amended in one respect without the amendment being spread
upon the Journals of one of the respective House of the Legislature, then it may be
ameqnded in any other respect in the same manner. It is not for the courts to determine
what is a wise proposed amendment or what is an unwise one. With the wisdom of the
policy the courts have nothing to do. But it is the duty of the courts, when called upon so
to do, to determine whether or not the procedure attempted to be adopted is that which is
required by the terms of the organic law.
Finding that the organic law has not been complied with, as above pointed out, the decree
appealed from should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed on authority of the opinion and
judgment in the case of Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 953; Ann. Cas.,
1914B, 9156. (Gray vs. Childs, 156 Southern Reporter, pp. 274, 279.)

Note se que la clausula sobre enmiendas en la Constitucion de Florida es semejante a la nuestra,

a saber: (1) la propuesta enmienda tiene que ser aprobada por la Legislatura, en Florida con el
voto de tres quintos (3/5) de los miembros, en Filipinas con el voto de tres cuartos (3/4); (2) los
sies y los nos tienen que hacersesd constar en el diario de sesiones (Articulo VI, seccion 10,
inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1, Constitucion de Filipinas); (3) despues de aprobada la enmienda
por la Legislatura se somete al electorado en una eleccion o plebiscito, para su ratificacion
orechazamiento.
El procedimiento sobre enmiendas prescrito en la Constitucion federal americana es diferente, a
saber: el Congreso puede proponer la enmienda bien (1) mediante la aprobacion de dos tercios
(2/3) de sus miembros; bien (2) mediante una convencion que se convocara al efecto apeticion de
las Legislaturas de dos tercios (2/3) de los diferentes Estados. En cualquiera de ambos casos la
enmiendasera valida para todos los efectos y fines comoparte de la Constitucion siempre que
fuera ratificada porlas Legislaturas de tres cuartos (3/4) de los Estados, o porconvenciones de
tres cuartas-partes de los mismos, segun que uno u otro modo de ratificacion hubiera sido
propuestopor el Congreso.
Esta diferencia de procedimientos es la que, segun digomas arriba, me inclina a sostener que la
jurisprudencia constitucional propiamente aplicable a Filipinas es la jurisprudencia de los
Estados, puesto que es con estos con los cuales tenemos analogia o paridad constitucional en lo
que toca a la forma y manera como se puede reformar la Constitucion.
Seguire ahora citando mas casos.
Tenemos un caso de Minnesota, identico a los ya citados de Florida. En el asunto de In re
McConaughy (106 Minn., 392; 119 N.W., 408), tambin se suscito la cuestion de si una propuesta
enmienda constitucional habia sido aprobada de acuerdo con los requisitos sealados en la
Constitucion de Minnesota. Alli como aqui tambien hubo disputa sobre si esto era una cuestion
judicial o una cuestion politica no justiciable. La Corte Suprema deaquel Estado declaro sin
ambajes que era una cuestion judicial. He aqui sus palabras que no tienen desperdicio:
The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing
constitution is a judicial question. There can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial
opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether
the constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution, unless a
special tribunal has been created to determine the question; and even then many of the
courts hold that the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the organic law. There
is some authority for the view that when the constitution itself creates a special tribunal,
and confides to it the exclusive power to canvass votes and declare the results, and makes
the amendment a part of the constitution as a result of such declaration by proclamation
or otherwise, the action of such tribunal is final and conclusive. It may be conceded that
this is true when it clearly appears that such was the intention of the people when they
adopted the constitution. The right to provide a special tribunal is not open to question;
but it is very certain that the people of Minnesota have not done so, and this fact alone
eliminates such cases as Worman vs. Hagan, 78 Md., 152; 27 Atl., 616; 21 L. R. A., 716,

and Miles vs. Badford, 22 Md., 170; 85 Am. Dec., 643, as authorities against the
jurisdiction of the courts. (In re McConaughy, 106 Minn., 392; 119 N. W., 408.)
Tambien tenemos un caso de Georgia. En el asunto de Hammond vs. Clark (136 Ga., 313; 71
S.E., 479; 38 L.R.A.[N.S.], 77), se suscito igualmente una disputa sobre siuna enmienda habia
sido aprobada de acuerdo con los requisitos de la Constitucion era una cuestion judicial o no. La
Corte Suprema de aquel Estado declaro afirmativamente. He aqui su inequivoca
pronunciamiento:
Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that the proclamation of the governor declaring
that the amendment was adopted was conclusive, and that the courts could not inquire
into the question. To this contention we cannot assent. The constitution is the supreme
state law. It provides how it may be amended. It makes no provision for exclusive
determination by the governor as to whether an amendment has been made in the
constitutional method, and for the issuance by him of a binding proclamation to that
effect. Such a proclamation may be both useful and proper, in order to inform the people
whether or not a change has been made in the fundamental law; but the constitution did
not make it conclusive on that subject. When the constitution was submitted for
ratification as a whole, a provision was made for a proclamation of the result by the
governor. Const. art. 13, section 2, par. 2 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6613). But in reference
to amendment there is no such provision. Const. article 13, section 1, par. 1 (Civ. Code
1910, section 6610). In the absence of some other exclusive method of determination
provided by the constitution, the weight of authority is to the effect that whether an
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of the existing
constitution is a judicial question. (Hammond vs. Clark, 136 Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479;38
L.R.A. [N.S.], 77.)
Tambien tenemos el siguiente case de Indiana:
(1) In the beginning we are confronted with the contention on the part of appellees that
this court has no jurisdiction to determine the questions in issue here. In the case of
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind., 336, 391; 99 N.E., 1, 21 (Ann. Cas. 1915C, 200), this court,
after reviewing many decisions as to the power of the courts to determine similar
questions, sums up the whole matter as follows:
"Whether legislative action is void for want of power in that body, or because the
constitutional forms of conditions have not been followed or have been violated
(emphasis supplied) may become a judicial question, and upon the courts the inevasible
duty to determine it falls. And so the power resides in the courts, and they have, with
practical uniformity, exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal,
submission, or ratification of change in the organic law. Such is the rule in this state"
citing more than 40 decisions of this and other states.
(2) Appellees further contend that appellant has not made out a case entitling him to
equitable relief. The trial court found that the officers of the state, who were instructed
with the execution of the law, were about to expend more than $500,000 under the law, in

carrying out its provisions; indeed, it was suggested, in the course of the oral argument,
that the necessary expenditures would amount to more than $2,000,000. This court, in the
case of Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, involving the submission to the people of the
Constitution prepared by the Legislature, answered this same question contrary to the
contention of appellees. See pages 413 and 414 of that opinion. (186 Ind., 533; Bennett
vs. Jackson, North Eastern Reporter, Vol. 116, pp. 921, 922.)
Creo que la posicion de la jurisprudencia americana tanto federal como de Estado sobre este
punto, esto es, cuandoes judicial la cuestion y cuando no lo es, se halla bien definida en el tomo
12 del Corpus Juris, en la parte que llevael encabezamiento de "Constitutional Law" y bajo el
subepigrafe que dice: "Adoption of Constitution and Amendments" (12 Corpus Juris, 880, 881).
Es un compendiocuidados amente elaborado en que se da un extracto de la doctrina con las citas
sobre autoridades al pie. Reproducire el compendio, pero omitiendo las citas para no alargar
demasiado esta disidencia: el que desee comprobarlas no tienemas que consultar el tomo. En
realidad, leyendo este extracto se ve que parece un resumen del extenso analisis que llevo hecho
sobre la doctrina tanto federal como estatal. Su meollo es, a saber: la cuestion de si o no una
nueva constitucion se ha adoptado la tienen que decidir los departamentos politicos del gobierno;
pero la cuestion de si una enmienda a una constitucion existente ha sido debidamente propuesta,
adoptada y ratificada de acuerdo con los requisitos provistos por la Constitucion, para que
vengaa ser parte de la misma, es una cuestion que los tribunales de justicia tienen que
determinar y resolver, excepto cuandola materia ha sido referida por la Constitucion a un
tribunale special con poder para llegar una conclusion final. He aqui el sinopsis:
SEC. 382. b. Adoption of Constitution and Amendments. Whether or not a new
constitution has been adopted is a question to be decided by the political departments of
the government. But whether an amendment to the existing constitution has been duly
proposed, adopted, and ratified in the manner required by the constitution, as as to
become part thereof, is a question for the courts to determine, except where the matter
has been committed by the constitution to a special tribunal with power to make a
conclusive determination, as where the governor is vested with the sole right and duty of
ascertaining and declaring the result, in which case the courts have no jurisdiction to
revise his decision. But it must be made clearly to appear that the constitution has been
violated before the court is warranted in interfering. In any event, whether an entire
constitution is involved, or merely an amendment, the federal courts will not attempt to
pass on the legality of such constitution or amendment where its validity has been
recognized by the political departments of the state government, and acquiesced in by the
state judiciary. (12 C.J., pp. 880, 881.)
VI
Otra razon que aduce la mayoria para desestimar el recusro es que la copia impresa de la
resolucion en cuestionaparece certificada por los presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso;
que en esa certificacion consta que dicha resolucion fue debidamente aprobada por el Congreso
conlos votos de las tres quintas-partes (3/5) de sus miembros; que, por tanto, la debida
aprobacion de dicha resolucion nose puede cuestionar, es una prueba concluyente para todoel
mundo y para los tribunales de justicia particularmente. Este argumento se funda en la doctrina

inglesa llamada "enrolled act doctrine," cuya traduccion mas aproximada al espaol es "doctrina
de la ley impresa." Esto, por unlado.
Por otro lado, la representacion de los recurrentes arguye que lo que rige y prevaleced en esta
jurisdiccion noes la doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine," sino ladoctrina americana que se
conoce con el nombre de "journalentry doctrine," en virtud de la cual la prueba de siuna ley o
una resolucion ha sido debidamente aprobadapor el Congreso debe buscarse en el diario de
sesiones mismo del Congreso. Lo que diga el diario de sesiones esconcluyente y final.
Los recurrentes tienen la razon de su parte. Este punto legal ya se resolvio por esta Corte en la
causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons (34 Jur. Fil., 772), que ambaspartes discuten en sus
respectivos informes. Una de las defensas del acusado era que la Ley No. 2381 de la Legislatura
Filipina en virtud de la cual habia sido condenado era nula e ilegal porque so aprobo despues ya
del cierrede las sesiones especiales que tuvo lugar el 28 de Febrero de 1914, a las 12 de la noche;
es decir, que, en realidad de verdad, la aprobacion se efectuo el 1. de Marzo, puesla sesion sine
die del dia anterior se prolongo mediante una ficcion haciendose parar las manecillas del reloj a
las 12 en punto de la noche. Esta Corte, sin necesidad deninguna otra prueba, examino el diario
de sesiones correspondientea la referida fecha 28 de Febrero, y habiendo hallado que alli
constaba inequivocamente haberse aprobadola mencionada ley en tal fecha, fallo que esta
pruebaera final y concluyente para las partes, para los tribunales y para todo el mundo. La Corte
desatendio por completoel "enrolled act," la copia impresa de la ley, pues dijo, asaber: "Pasando
por alto la cuestion relativa as si la Ley Impresa (Ley No. 2381), que fue aprobada por
autorizacion legal, constituye prueba concluyente sobre la fecha desu aprobacion, investigaremos
si los Tribunales pueden consultar otras fuestes de informacion, ademas de los diarios de las
sesiones legislativas, para determinar la fecha enque se cerraron las sesiones de la Legislatura,
cuando talesdiarios son claros y explicitos." Y la Corte dijo que nohabia necesidad de consultar
otras fuestes, que el diario de sesiones era terminante, definitivo; y asi fallo la causaen contra del
apelante.
Y no era extrao que asi ocurriese: habia en la Corte una mayoria americana, familiarizada y
compenetrada naturalmente con la jurisprudencia pertinente de su pais Quede extrano habia, por
tanto, que aplicasen la doctrina americana, la doctrina del "journal entry," que es mas
democratica, mas republicana, en vez de la doctrina inglesa, el "enrolled act doctrine," que
despues de todo tiene ciertotinte monarquico, producto del caracter peculiar e influencia
tradicionalista de las instituciones inglesas? (Vease Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., 371; Del.)
Firman, como se sabe, la decision el ponente Sr. Trent, y los Magistrados Sres. Torres, Johnson,
Moreland y Araullo, sin mingun disidente.Y notese que cuando se promulgo esta sentencia
todavia estaba en vigor el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, tal como estaba
reformado por la Ley No. 2210. que entre otras cosas proveia lo siguiente: ". . . Entendiendose,
que en el caso de las Leyes de la Comisionde Filipinas o de la Legislatura Filipina, cuando
existeuna copia firmada por los Presidentes y los secretarios de dichos cuerpos, sera prueba
concluyente de las dispociones de la ley en cuestion y de la debida aprobacion delas mismas."
Que mejor prueba de la voluntad expresa, categorica, de hacer prevalecer la doctrina americana
sobrela doctrina inglesa? Lo mas comodo para esta Cortehubiera sido aplicar el citado articulo
313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil. No lo hizo, paso por alto sobreel mismo, yendo
directamente al diario de sesiones dela Legislatura, tomando conocimiento judicial del mismo. Si

aqui hay algun respeto a la regla del stare decisis, estaes una magnifica ocasion para demostrarlo.
Una regla bien establecida no ha de abrogarse asi como asi; sobretodo cuando de por medio anda
la Constitucion como enel presente caso en que se ha formulado ante nosotros la queja de que la
ley fundamental ha sido violada en unrespecto muy importante como es el capitulo sobre
enmiendas, y la queja no solo no es temeraria sino que se hallaapoyada en buenas y solidas
razones.
Mas todavia: cuando se establecio la doctrina en lacitada causa de los Estados Unidos contra
Pons (1916, Agosto 12) adoptando en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del "journal entry"
en lugar de la inglesa del "enrolled act," en nuestra Ley Organica que, por cierto, no era aun la
Ley Jones sino la Ley del Congreso de 1902, no habia ninguna disposicion que proveyera
mandatoriamente que en el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura sehiciesen constar los sies y los
nos en la votacion de cualquier proyecto de ley o resolucion, consignando especifica mentelos
nombres de los miembros que hayan votado enpro y en contra, ni tampoco habia ninguna
disposicione statutoria a dicho efecto. De modo que en aquella epoca el diario de sesiones de la
Legislatura carecia aun de las fuertes garantias de veracidad que ahora posee en virtud de esa
disposicion que hace obligatoria la constancia oconsignacion de los sies y nos, disposicion
incorporada enla Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica. (Vease Constitucion
de Filipinas, Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, incico 1; seccion 21, inciso 2.)
Sobre la derogacion del articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no puede haber duda.
Ese articulo, que equivale a una regla de prueba, no se ha incorporado enel Reglamento de los
Tribunales. No tratandose de una regla fundada en un principio general y unanimemente
establecido, sino de algo peculiar aislado, acerca del cuallas autoridades estan divididas, con una
mayoria de los Estados de la Union americana decididamente en contra, suno inclusion en el
Reglamento de los Tribunales tiene queconsiderarse necesariamente como una derogacion.
Indudablemente esta Corte, al no incluir dicho articulo en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, ha
querido derogarlo en vistade los resuelto en la citada causa de Estados Unidos contraPons y de la
novisima disposicion insertada en la Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica,
que exige la consignacion en el diario de sesiones de los sies y nos en cada votacion final de
proyecto de ley o resolucion conjunta, con especificacion de los nombres de los que hasvotado.
Resulta evidente de lo expuesto que ahora existen masrazones para reafirmar en esta jurisdiccion
la doctrina americana del "journal entry" o "constancia en el diario desesiones" (1) porque el
citado seccion 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil ya no rige con la vigencia del Reglamento
de los Tribunales; (2) porque esa disposicion denuestra Constitucion que hace obligatoria la
consignacion de los sies y nos en la votacion de cada bill o resolucion, con especificacion de los
nombres de los que hayan votado enfavor y en contra, hace del diario de sesiones la mejor
prueba sobre autenticidad de los actos legislativos y es, porconsiguiente, la ley sobre la materia
en este pais, con entera exclusion de la doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine."Las autoridades
americanas son contestes en que siempreque en un Estado de la Union Federal la
Constitucioncontiene una disposicion semejante a la nuestra sobre sies y nos la regla de prueba
no es la copia impresa de la leyo "enrolled act," sino el "journal entry" o constancia enel diario
de sesiones. (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra.)

Aqui se podria dar por terminada toda discusion sobre este punto si no fuera porque los abogados
de los recurridos arguyen fuertemente en favor de la doctrina de la copia impresa o "enrolled act
doctrine," y la mayoria de esta Corte acepta sus argumentos. Se cita, sobre todo, el asunto federal
de Field vs. Clark en apoyo de la doctrina.
He examinado la jurisprudencia americana sobre este particular con toda la diligencia de que he
sido capaz y he llegado a la conclusion de que nuestros predecesores enesta Corte merecen todo
encomio por su indubitable aciertoal adoptar en esta jurisdiccion, en la causa de los Estados
Unidos contra Pons, supra, la doctrina americana del "journal entry" o constancia en el diario de
sesiones legislativas. No cabe duda de que esta doctrina es mas democratica, mas liberal, y
tambien mas humana y mas concorde con la realidad. La doctrina inglesa del "enrolled act"
ocopia impresa de la ley esta basada en el derecho comun y se adopto en Inglaterra donde, como
se sabe, no hay constitucion escrita y la forma de gobierno es monarquica,y se adopto en un
tiempo en que el poder del Parlamento que era tambien el mas alto tribunal de justicia, era
absoluto y transcendente y las restricciones sobre el mismo eran muy ligeras. Por eso un tribunal
americano ha dicho: "Because such a rule obtains as to the Parliament of Great Britain, under a
monarchial form of government, that cannot be regarded as a very potent reason for its
application in this state, where the will of the sovereign power hasbeen declared in the organic
act." (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra, pag. 379; cito con frecuencia este asunto famoso de Delaware
porque es en el mismo donde he hallado una discusion mas acabada y comprensiva sobre ambas
doctrinas: la americana del "journal entry" y la inglesa del "enrolled act.")
Es indudable que el sesgo de la jurisprudencia americana hoy en dia es a favor de la doctrina del
"journal entry." Lo resuelto en el asunto federal de Field contra Clark, enque tanto enfasis ponen
los recurridos, no ha hecho mas que fortalecer ese giro, pues en dicho asunto va en vuelta
lainferencia de que cuando la Constitucion establece ciertos requisitos para la aprobacion de una
ley o resolucion, conla consignacion de los sies y nos y los nombres de los que han votado
afirmativa y negativamente, el diario de sesioneses el que rige y prevalece como modo e
instrumento de autenticacion. Por eso que en el asunto tipico y representativode Union Bank vs.
Commissioners of Oxford (199 N.C., 214; 25 S.E., 966; 34 L.R.A., 487), la Corte Supremade
North Carolina ha declarado lo siguiente.
According to the law it is well settled in nearly 100 well-adjudicated cases in the courts
of last resort in 30 states, and also by the Supreme Court of the United States, that when a
state Constitution prescribes such formalities in the enactment of laws as require a record
of the yeas and nays on the legislative journals, these journals are conclusive as against
not only a printed statute, published by authority of law, but also against a duly enrolled
act. The following is a list of the authorities, in number 93, sustaining this view either
directly or by very close analogy. . . . It is believed that no federal or state authority can
be found in conflict with them.
Decisions can be found, as, for instance, Carr. vs. Coke (116 N.C., 223; 22 S.E. 16; 28
L.R.A., 737; 47 Am. St. Rep., 801, supra, to the effect that, where the Constitution
contains no provision requiring entries on the journal of particular matters such, for
example, as calles of the yeas and nays on a measure in question the enrolled act
cannot, in such case, be impeached by the journals. That, however, is very different

proposition from the one involved here, and the distinction is adverted to in Field vs.
Clark, 143 U.S., 671 (12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p.
377.)

G.R. No. L-3820

July 18, 1950

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,

vs.

LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS,

Director of Prisons, respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Taada, and
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the
New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the
Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now,
therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further
order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such
discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate or to the said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be
briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of
P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt,
a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc.,
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The
second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-infact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the
alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine
Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for
P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation
Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the sum
of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June 21, 1944, together with
the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in
possession of the estate.

On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to
Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within
one year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that
failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment
of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the down
payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase price of said
estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14,
1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who
paid P10,000 down and promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of
P1,100,000 in ten successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which
to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid
the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust
Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress
Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February
5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial
demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the
Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period
of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of
Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress
Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the
Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate
sum of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31,
1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a
contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government
in 1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase
the Buenavista Estate because the occupation government had made tender of payment in
the amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to

vest title of Ownership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the
Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes
during the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single
centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed
of sale from the Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred
and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of the recission of the contract through which
Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five
members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether
the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal
was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may
deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public
hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses
or the production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee of any
bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to
assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its
functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and
recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses,
among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing
question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000
for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him
on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the
name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks
aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one
for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It
was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that
gave rise to the present case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the
disposition of funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were
being violated, and that all requisites had been complied with. Here also I acted in a
purely functional capacity of representative. I beg to be excused from making answer

which might later be used against me. I have been assured that it is my constitutional
right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this
Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my position.
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the
committee, interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten
statement, were legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own
statement, did not violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws
were violated, how is it that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps
you took to have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the questions,
saying that it would incriminate you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with
other people.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you
would be incriminated, or you would be incriminating somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money
that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for
any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the
petitioner, the latter testified as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29,
1949, is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did
you do with that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000
which you cashed on October 29, 1949?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was
a Filipino?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom
you delivered this big amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the
big amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this
big amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1- million paid to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.
The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver
these P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was
still here in the Philippines?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines
gave you the verbal instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving
these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that
certain person should receive these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain
person without receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I
meet him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?
Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the
two cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong estates?
Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949,
you knew already that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection
is Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this
P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times,
you never were able to find out what was his name?
Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of
course, we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't
know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know
their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person?
What is his complexion: light, dark or light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller.
He walks very straight, with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave
the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you
never came to know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.

On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read
to him the following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting
of contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation conducted by the
Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and
Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate
propounded to him the following interrogatories:
1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible
for you not to remember not only because of the big amount of money you gave to him
without receipt, but also by your own statements you knew him as early as 1946 when
General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of
money to him without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that
the questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his
constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that
written answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to
the latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the
name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not
remember his name. That was the reason then for refusing to reveal the name of the
person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name
of that person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be
self-incriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your former
claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and that your reason now for
your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer might be selfincriminating? In other words, the question is this: What is your real reason for refusing
to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not
remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the
accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is
very clear. It does not incriminate him.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee
on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of
May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as
requested. I cannot change anything in those statements that I made because they
represent the best that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with
the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you
gave during the investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you gave
the P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging because during the
investigation you told us: "I do not remember his name." But, now, you are now saying:
"My answer might incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first,
second, and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the
question. I beg to be excused from making any answer that might be incriminating in
nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not remembering the name of the person
has not been included, it is an oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you
remember or not the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you
say that your answer might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you
cannot answer the question; so how could your answer be self-incriminating? What do
you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to
answer those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no
means of knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without
communication with the outside. How could I answer the question? I have no knowledge
of legal procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.

The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does
not incriminate the witness.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be

excused from making further answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President
of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a public official you might render
yourself liable for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might
render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those statements
when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a
public official or a private individual ? We are giving you this chance to convince the
Senate that all these allegations of yours that your answers might incriminate you are
given by you honestly or you are just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the
information desired by the Senate.
The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and
explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it.
That is all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to
write such a letter, so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of
distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the
petitioner questions tending to elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to
whom he delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not
remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his
past activities dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently
as the post liberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view
thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information from
the witness, as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you
deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of
that person?

Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.

The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time
ago and, on the other hand, you remember events that occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby
the petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and
directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of
October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault
regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related
therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration
because it is the first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
was adopted. For the first time this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of
Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our
pronouncements here will set an important precedent for the future guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the
general principles of law which form the background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in
three independent but coordinate Departments Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The
legislative power is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the
Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision empowering either
of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that
whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of the
United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other
the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States
being reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people in the Philippines, the legislative
power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that the

Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United
States or any State Legislature. Our form of Government being patterned after the American
system the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and
practices we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting
analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S.,
135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the
power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude
the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L.
ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless
his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn
vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field
than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say
that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in
this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and
we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution
No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary
and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which Congress is the
constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by Congress to regulate or
even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has
recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any
other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those
attached to his own office, without ]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting
brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening directly or
indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a party, more
particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers who are
appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress
Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective
without previous congressional confirmation.2

We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of
his contention that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial
to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question
has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the
investigating committee has already rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as
to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to
force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit:
"In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion that
now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are
taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely
establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who
appeared and argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the
Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the investigation had not been
completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined
the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by
Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation,
more particularly to continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by
his committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved pending the
completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily all the measures that
Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may
be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other
words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed
or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action
and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information
to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited
from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is
limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or
investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of
that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the

question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of
the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of
Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with
a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the
contrary was intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of
McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed.,
1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully
may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged immateriality of the
information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative
body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention
to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the
issue under consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner
was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the
petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the
person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that
determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that
the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to
any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative
body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as
a result of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the
person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not
yet been approved by the lower house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn or
modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there
is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem necessary after
completing the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine
or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling
the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in
question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the
press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the
Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending
amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the
American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena
and asked, among others, the following questions:

Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities,
known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate
senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the
interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of
the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in that case was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to
answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The
resolution directed the committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is,
speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill
now before the Senate." What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when
ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures
might be defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers would
have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while
affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its
constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent
upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or
in law for such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution
No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible
for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its
constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On
the other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the
parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the
questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not
reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the
initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the
Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take the redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a
result of the transaction. As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of
public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the
constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79
S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)

The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner,
is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the
United States related to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay
Cook and Company had had an interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in
course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United States was
one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the
bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination and approval
or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United States, were
dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire
into the nature and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the
amount of property involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and the amount paid or
to be paid in said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers, and report to this
House." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out
that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one
in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's
settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other
creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held
that in undertaking the investigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit
of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another
branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly judicial." The principles
announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a "general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually possessed
is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and in
respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein
relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of this
power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the constitutional separation of government
powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that
the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not
within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the
subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the
Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There the
claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in
the pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial
power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after
the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken such
measures as may be within its competence to take to redress the wrong that may have been
committed against the people as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong
criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt
[1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We
quoted the following from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as
an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the

bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay
Cooke and Co., with the Government, acting through the House, attempting to override the
orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but
before Congress. That bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and
Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a
court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of "judicial
power"! The broader aspect of the investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay
Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the great
administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the
particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded for all
government deposits, that the facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of
other and greater maladministration, such considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor
had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the particular investigation and the powers
there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar in legislative
practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry,
place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the
legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the
court in Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be
achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for
abstract speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the
problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power.
Constitutionality depends upon such disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of
legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court
can predict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881.
The question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing,
as for contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who
had written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and
irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the committee in interfering with the
investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of
Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not
involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had implied power to
punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without
constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive
and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the
exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in that
case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present case. There the contempt
involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive
and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness to
answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and
jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has
implied power to punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is
applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's ) contention.

Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This
contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and
Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that
on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives while
the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was
then about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to attend the
sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which
Candido Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929,
Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by
confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not
complied with because the session of the House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on
November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was
subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, six justices
voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of
imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session of the
body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground
that the Philippine Legislature had no power to punish for contempt because it was a creature
merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of a Constitution adopted by the
people. Chief Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate opinions,
concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature had inherent power
to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could only
be executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive
pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following
passage in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to
exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that
imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the
two limitations which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is,
that the power even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to
imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the
body in which the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is
limited to the existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final
periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular

session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such
penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is
enforceable during the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be conceived
to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to its
preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was
committed.
If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the
legislative body exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must
perforce continue until the final adjournment and the election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice
Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the case before us, the members composing the
legislative body against which the contempt was committed have not yet completed their threeyear term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by
Justice Malcolm are obiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States for assault and battery
and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House, brought
before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and then discharged from custody.
The question as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The question there
was "whether the House of Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against
themselves, under any circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives
had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of
the defendant. In Marshall vs. Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the
power under the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a
vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such
contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court held that the House had no such power
because the writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not
endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon
that ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of
the petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it
appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of
five senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of
Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of
the investigation the committee caused to be served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M.
Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a
subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the
subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse for his
failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That
the President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or
his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring

the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such questions
pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro
tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order
of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a
writ of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the
ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its
power under the Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the
contentions of the witness was that the case ha become moot because the investigation was
ordered and the committee was appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on
March 4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to
the period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and
amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places as it
might deem advisable or necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can
continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session
without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting
them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the context shows that the reference
is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the
King. The rule may be the same with the House of Representatives whose members are
all elected for the period of a single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the
Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years
and so divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of
each Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies
may occur through death or resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may
continue its committees through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and,
after quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate,
however being a continuing body, gives authority to its committees during the recess after
the expiration of a Congress." So far as we are advised the select committee having this
investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has been
continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities have been suspended pending
the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be
continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and if, continued or revived, will have
all its original powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case
cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably
like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S.,
498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a
suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did
not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition
by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried
into effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was
interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think
a judgment should be rendered as was done in the case cited.

What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the
witness from custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose
members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third
become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as
vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all
elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second
Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December
30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first
session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in
May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it
could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the
end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative
functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any
proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative
body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say
that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish
for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The
Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we
have found it is within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed
because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation
during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the
performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the
obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he
shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body,
persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the
witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to
recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an
essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the
power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would
have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt

proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and
vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be
abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life.
But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper
bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this
Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he
would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 if that person be a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that
person be a private individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford
him safety. At first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were
violated, and that all requisites had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused
from making answers "which might later be used against me." A little later he explained that
although the transactions were legal he refused to answer questions concerning them "because it
violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on
my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction
without having to account for the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the
Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without securing any
receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance
with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain person had
nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases;
that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the P440,000 on October 29, 1949,
and that since then he had seen him again two or three times, the last time being in December,
1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5
feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the witness would not reveal the name of that person on these
pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't
remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of
that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the
bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily
implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a
person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is
punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur.,
sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that
Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling
against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said men when they were
arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1)
"Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are

sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman
of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions
are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was
again called and refused to answer the first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to
frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction
for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among other things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely
because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in
this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to
the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional
privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000
to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the
Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate
him. as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole
case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts
thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of
the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable
to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege
by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs.
1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E.
[2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to
decide that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty
as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state
has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under
the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming
constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his duties and obligations to the
Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific
obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and
imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that

the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The
wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain that
the laws under which he suffers were made for the security." Paraphrasing and applying that
pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the
fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is
restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with
costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The estates deal which gave the petitioner's examination by a committee of the Senate was one
that aroused popular indignation as few cases of graft and corruption have. The investigation was
greeted with spontaneous outburst of applause by an outraged citizenry, and the Senate was
rightly commended for making the lead in getting at the bottom of an infamous transaction.
All the more necessary it is that we should approach the consideration of this case with
circumspection, lest the influence of strong public passions should get the batter of our judgment.
It is trite to say that public sentiment fades into insignificance before a proper observance of
constitutional processes, the maintenance of the constitutional structure, and the protection of
individual rights. Only thus can a government of laws, the foundation stone of human liberty, be
strengthened and made secure for that very public.
It is with these thoughts in mind that, with sincere regret, I am constrained to dissent.
The power of the legislative bodies under the American system of government to punish for
contempt was at the beginning totally denied by some courts and students of constitutional law,
on the ground that this power is judicial in nature and belongs to the judiciary branch of the
government under the constitutional scheme. The point however is now settled in favor of the
existence of the power. This rule is based on the necessity for the attainment of the ends for
which legislative body is created. Nor can the legitimacy of the purpose of the investigation
which the Senate ordered in this case be disputed. As a corollary, it was likewise legitimate and
necessary for the committee to summon the petitioner with a command to produce his books and
documents, and to commit him to prison for his refusal or failure to obey the subpoena. And,
finally, there is no question that the arresting officers were fully justified in using necessary
bodily force to bring him before the bar of the Senate when he feigned illness and stalled for time
in the mistaken belief that after the closing of the then current session of Congress he could go
scot-free.

At the same time, there is also universal agreement that the power is not absolute. The
disagreement lies in the extent of the power, and such disagreement is to be found even between
decisions of the same court. Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat., No. 204, may be said to have taken
the most liberal view of the legislature's authority and Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
which partly overruled and qualified the former, the strictest. By the most liberal standard the
power is restricted "by considerations as to the nature of the inquiry, occasion, or action in
connection with which the contemptuous conduct has occurred." Punishment must be resorted to
for the efficient exercise of the legislative function. Even Anderson vs. Dunn speaks of the power
as "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."
Judged by any test, the question propounded to the witness does not, in my opinion, meet the
constitutional requirement. It is obvious, I think, that the query has nothing to do with any matter
within the cognizance of the Congress. There is, on the contrary, positive suggestion that the
question has no relation to the contemplated legislation. The statement of the committee in its
report that the information sought to be obtained would clear the names of the persons suspected
of having received the money, is, on the surface, the most or only plausible reason that can be
advanced. Assuming this to be the motive behind the question, yet little reflection will show that
the same is beyond the scope of legislative authority and prerogatives. It is outside the concern of
the Congress to protect the honor of particular citizens except that of its own members' as a
means of preserving respect and confidence in that body. Moreover, the purported good intention
must assume, if it is to materialize, that the persons under suspicion are really innocent; for if
they are not and the witness will tell the truth, the result will be to augment their disgrace rather
than vindicate their honor. This is all the more likely to happen because one of those persons, is
judged from the committee's findings, the most likely one, to say the least, who got the money.
If the process of deduction is pressed further, the reasonable conclusion seems to be that the
object of the question is, to mention only one, to prepare the way for a court action. The majority,
decision indirectly admits or insinuates this to be the case. It says, "It appearing that the
questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not
reasonable to expect the fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to
investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall
have determined who those parties are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take, to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a
result of the transaction." So here is an admission, implied if not express, that the Senate wants
the witness to give names because the fiscal or the courts will not initiate an action against
parties who should be prosecuted. It is needless to say that the institution of a criminal or civil
suit is a matter that devolves upon other departments of the government, alien to the duties of the
Congress to look after.
The Congress is at full liberty, of course, to make any investigation for the purpose of aiding the
fiscal or the courts, but this liberty does not carry with it the authority to imprison persons who
refuse to testify.
In the intricacy and complexity of an investigation it is often impossible to foretell before its
close what relation certain facts may bear on the final results, and experience has shown that
investigators and courts would do well to veer on the liberal side in the resolution of doubtful

questions. But the Senate is not now in the midst of an inquiry with the situation still in a fluid or
tentative state. Now the facts are no longer confused. The committee has finished its
investigation and submitted its final report and the Senate has approved a bill on the bases of the
facts found. All the pertinent facts having been gathered, as is to be inferred from that the report
and the nature of the Senate's action, every question, every fact, every bit of testimony has taken
a distinct meaning susceptible of concrete and definite evaluation; the task has been reduced to
the simple process of sifting the grain from the chaffs.
In the light of the committee's report and of the bill introduced and approved in the Senate, it
seems quite plain that the express naming of the recipient or recipients of the money is entirely
unessential to anything the Senate has a right or duty to do in premises. Names may be necessary
for the purpose of criminal prosecution, impeachment or civil suit. In such proceedings, identities
are essential. In some legislative investigations it is important to know the names of public
officials involved. But the particular disclosure sought of the petitioner here is immaterial to the
proposed law. It is enough for the Senate, for its own legitimate object, to learn how the
Department of Justice had in the purchase, and to have a moral conviction as to the identity of
the person who benefited thereby. The need for such legislation and translated into the bill
approved by the Senate is met by an insight into a broad outline of the deal. To paraphrase the
U.S. Supreme Court in Anderson vs. Dunn, although the passage was used in another connection,
legislation is a science of experiment and the relation between the legislator and the end does not
have to be so direct as to strike the eye of the former.
One of the proposed laws have prohibits brothers and near relatives of any president of the
Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly in transactions in which the Government is a
party. It is stated that this is subject to change depending on the answer Arnault may give. This
statement is wide open to challenge.
If Arnault should Antonio Quirino it must be admitted that the bill would not be altered. But let
us suppose that the witness will point to another man. Will the result be any different? Will the
Senate recall the bill? I can not perceive the slightest possibility of such eventuality. The pending
bill was framed on the assumption that Antonio Quirino was a party to the deal in question. As
has been said, the committee entertains a moral conviction that this brother of the President was
the recipient of a share of the proceeds of sale. No amount of assurance by Arnault to the
contrary would be believed for truth. And, I repeat, the proposed legislation does not need for its
justification legal evidence of Antonio Quirino's intervention in the transaction.
All this in the first place. In the second place, it is not to be assumed that the present bill is aimed
solely against Antonio Quirino whose relation to the Administration is but temporary. It is more
reasonable to presume that the proposed enactment is intended for all time and for all brothers of
future presidents, for in reality it is no more than an extension or enlargement of laws already
found in the statute book which guard against temptations to exploit official positions or
influence to the prejudice of public interests.
The disputed question is, in fact, not only irrelevant but moot. This is decisive of the irrelevancy
of this question. As has been noticed, the committee has submitted its final report and
recommendation, and a bill has been approved by the Senate calculated to prevent recurrence of

the anomalies exposed. For the purpose for which it was instituted the inquiry is over and the
committee's mission accomplished.
It is true that the committee continues to sit during the recess of Congress, but it is obvious from
all the circumstances that the sole and real object of the extension of the committee's sittings is to
receive the witness' answer in the event he capitulates. I am unable to see any new phase of the
deal which the Senate could legitimately wish to know, and the respondents and this Court have
not pointed out any. That the committee has not sat and nothing has been done so far except to
wait for Arnault's answer is a convincing manifestation of the above conclusion.
The order "to continue its investigation" contained in Senate Resolution No. 16 cannot disguise
the realities revealed by the Senate's actions already referred to and by the emphasis given to the
instruction "to continue its (committee's) examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000." The instruction 'to continue the investigation' is not
entitled to the blind presumption that it embraces matters other than the revelation by the witness
of the name of the person who got the money. Jurisdiction to deprive a citizen of liberty outside
the usual process is not acquired by innuendoes or vague assertions of the facts on which
jurisdiction is made to depend. If the judgment of the court of law of limited jurisdiction does not
enjoy the presumption of legality, much less can the presumption of regularity be invoked for a
resolution of a deliberative body whose power to inflict punishment upon private citizens is
wholly derived by implication and vehemently contested by some judges. At any rate, "the
stronger presumption of innocence attends accused at the trial", "and it is incumbent" upon the
respondents "to show that the question pertains to some matter under investigation." (Sinclair vs.
U. S., 73 L. ed., 693.) This rule stems from the fact that the power is in derogation of the
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, which presupposes " a trial in which the rights of the parties shall be decided by a
tribunal appointed by law, which tribunal is to governed by rules of law previously established."
Powers so dangerous to the liberty of a citizen can not be allowed except where the pertinence is
clear. A Judge who abuses such power may be impeached and he acts at all times under the sense
of this accountability and responsibility. His victims may be reached by the pardoning power.
But if the Congress be allowed this unbounded jurisdiction of discretion, there is no redress, The
Congress may dispoil of a citizen's life, liberty or property and there is no power on earth to stop
its hand. There is, there can be, no such unlimited power in any department of the government of
the Republic. (Loan Association vs. Topeka, 20 Wall, Nos. 662, 663; Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill No.
N.Y. 140.)
The above rule and discussion apply with equal force to the instruction to the committee in the
original resolution, "to determine the parties responsible for the deal." It goes without saying that
the congress cannot authorize a committee to do what it itself cannot do. In other words, the`
Senate could not insist on the disclosure of Arnault's accomplice in the present state of the
investigation if the Senate were conducting the inquiry itself instead of through a committee.
Our attention is called to the fact that "in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the
Congress of the Philippines alone, and therefore that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider
range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States or any state legislature." From

this premise the inference is drawn that " the field of inquiry into it (Philippine Congress) may
enter is also wider."
This argument overlooks the important fact that congressional or legislative committees both
here and in the Unived States, do not embark upon fishing expeditions in search of information
which by chance may be useful to legislation. Inquiries entrusted to congressional committee,
whether here or in the United States, are necessarily for specific objects within the competence
of the Congress to look into. I do not believe any reason, rule or principle could be found which
would sustain the theory that just because the United States Congress or a state legislature could
legislate on, say, only ten subjects and the Philippine Congress on twenty, the latter's power to
commit to prison for contempt is proportionately as great as that of the former. In the
consideration of the legality of an imprisonment for the contempt by each House, the power is
gauged not be the greater or lesser number of subject matters that fall within its sphere of action,
but by the answer to the question, has it jurisdiction over the matter under investigation? Bearing
this distinction in mind, it is apparent that the power of a legislature to punish for contempt can
be no greater nor less than that of any other. Were it possible for the Philippine Senate and the
United States Senate to undertake an investigation of exactly identical anomalies in their
respective departments of justice, could it be asserted with any support of logic that one Senate
has a wider authority to imprison for contempt in such investigation simply because it has a
"wider range of legislative field?"
It is said that the Senate bill has not been acted upon by the lower house and that even if it should
pass in that chamber it would still have the President's veto to hurdle. It has been expressly stated
at the oral argument, and there is insinuation in this Court's decision, that the revelation of the
name or names of the person or persons who received the money may help in convincing the
House of Representatives or the President of the wisdom of the pending measure. Entirely apart
from the discussion that the House of Representatives and the Chief Executive have their own
idea of what they need to guide them in the discharge of their respective duties, and they have the
facilities of their own for obtaining the requisite data.
There is another objection, more fundamental, to the Senate invoking the interest or convenience
of the other House or the President as ground of jurisdiction. The House of Representatives and
the President are absolutely independent of the Senate, in the conduct of legislative and
administrative inquiries, and the power of each House to imprison for contempt does not go
beyond the necessity for its own self-preservation or for making its express powers effective.
Each House exercises this power to protect or accomplish its own authority and not that of the
other House or the President. Each House and the President are supposed to take care of their
respective affairs. The two Houses and the Chief Executive act separately although the
concurrence of the three is required in the passage of legislation and of both Houses in the
approval of resolutions. As the U.S. Supreme Court in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, said, "No general
power of inflicting punishment by the Congress (as distinct from a House is found in the
Constitution." "An act of Congress it said which proposed to adjudge a man guilty of a
crime and inflict the punishment, will be considered by all thinking men to be unauthorized by
the Constitution."

Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra, it is said can not be relied on in this case as a precedent because,
so it is also said, "the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or
partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here it is not
disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable
expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the Jurisdiction of the
Senate." Yet the remarks of Judge Land is which are quoted in the majority decision point out
that the inquiry "was a normal and customary part of the legislative process." Moreover,
Kilbourn vs. Thompson is important, not for the matter it treated but for the principles it
enunciated.
It is also said that Kilbourn vs. Thompson did not meet with universal approval as Judge Land is'
article above mentioned shows. The jurist who delivered the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice
Miller, was one of the "giants" who have ever sat on the Supreme Federal Bench, venerated and
eminent for the width and depth of his learning. Subsequent decisions, as far as I have been able
to ascertain, have not rejected or criticized but have followed it, and it still stands as a landmark
in this branch of constitutional law.
If we can lean on private opinions and magazine articles for comfort, the petitioner can cite one
by a legal scholar and author no less reknown and respected than Judge Land is. I refer to Judge
Wigmore who, referring to an investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice said in an article
published in 19 (1925) Illinois Law Review, 452:
The senatorial debauch of investigations poking into political garbage cans and
dragging the sewers of political intrigue filled the winter of 1923-24 with a stench
which has not yet passed away. Instead of employing the constitutional, manly, fair
procedure of impeachment, the Senate flung self-respect and fairness to the winds. As a
prosecutor, the Senate presented a spectacle which cannot even be dignified by a
comparison with the persecutive scoldings of Coke and Scroggs and Jeffreys, but fell
rather in popular estimate to the level of professional searchers of the municipal
dunghills.
It is far from my thought to subscribe to this vituperation as applied to our Senate. Certainly, this
august body said not only do the right thing but is entitled to the lasting gratitude of the people
for taking the courageous stand it did in probing into an anomaly that robbed a depleted treasury
of a huge amount. I have tried to make it clear that my disagreement with the majority lies not in
the propriety or constitutionality of the investigation but in the pertinence to that investigation of
a single question. The investigation, as had been said, was legal and commendable. My objection
is that the Senate having started within the bounds of its authority, has, in entire good faith,
overstepped those bounds and trespassed on a territory reserved to other branches of the
government, when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless,
impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot.
Thus understood, this humble opinion does not conflict with the views of Judge Land is and all
other advocates of wide latitude for congressional investigations. All are agreed, and the majority
accept the proposition, that there is a limit to the legislative power to punish for contempt. The

limit is set in Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge Land is approved "the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed."

G.R. No. 169777*

April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his

capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro

Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q.

PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA,
LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III,
RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of
the Philippines, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169659

April 20, 2006

BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO,
Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep.
TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND
GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by
ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169660

April 20, 2006

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP
Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169667

April 20, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.

x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169834

April 20, 2006

PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 171246

April 20, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE

AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL
P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V.
GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early
history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may
keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for
vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S.
Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished."1
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself
to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005.
They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under
review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the

Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression
of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government
that contravenes its mandates.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia,
the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral
Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R.
Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and
Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the
following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005
entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator
Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping
Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1,
2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria
Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security
to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the
Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by
Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the
Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of
Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its

postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal
attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters."
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the
postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the
Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation."
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are
unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and
arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of
the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on
the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the
separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to
the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public

Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and
the public officers covered by this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this
executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security
should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R.
No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials
enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of
powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita
a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department
invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the
same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have
not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled
date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon,
Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per
instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP]
is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written
approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP
officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through,
with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary
Ermita, citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following
government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro
Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief
State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez,
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding,
DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase
II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority
Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes
sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for
certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
464.

In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members
Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino,
Courage, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties
(CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all
claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues
they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being
unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to
impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons.
Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from
fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its
right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that
E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Courage alleges
that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their
submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL
alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to
information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a
citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his
petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition
of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and
work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an
organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to
institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared
null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be
ordered to cease from implementing it.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in
the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material
injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly
interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals
information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and

prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464
because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress,
particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be
resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen.
Senga for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping
scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8,
2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance
from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will attend
once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of those invited appeared, the hearing
on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and
the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under
the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several
Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and
December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA
Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director
Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management18 having
invoked E.O. 464.
In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and
Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and
Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21 communicated
their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O.
464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to
attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.
On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional
right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.
All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents
from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive
issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in

implementing E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the
Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art.
VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an
actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties
were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda.
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective
memoranda, paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its
face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four
instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.22
Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7,
2006, while those in G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on
March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file
memorandum27 was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it
would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest,
prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.29
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 2130
Art. VI, Sec. 2231
Art. VI, Sec. 132
Art. XI, Sec. 133
Art. III, Sec. 734
Art. III, Sec. 435
Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36
Art. II, Sec. 2837
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated
memorandum38 on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.

The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is
in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39
Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy
where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be
omitted.
Standing
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659,
169660 and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials
of the executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the
Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees
to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain
that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege
of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no
mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees
which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.
As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and
underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have

standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest
falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact."40
Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a
taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending
power.41
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a
personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual
members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and
Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a
proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.44
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public
decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not
disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to
assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to
sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.47
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan
Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis),
and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the
absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its
committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being
sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as
members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained
three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to
participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list
system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.48

As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions,
passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of
citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its
lawyer members,50 invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern,
asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the
effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of the balance of power
among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.52
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the
transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved
in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the
lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.54
The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of
the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that
E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized
interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form
traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political
party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
Actual Case or Controversy
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials
invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the
NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President
Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56
These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured

the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with
regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents
claim that the instruction not to attend without the Presidents consent was based on its role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the
President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that
such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or
prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of
an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require
either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in
order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials
invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for
any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be
sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality
of E.O. 464.
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress,
deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question
of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the
general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in
order.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Underscoring supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except
that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein
the Batasang Pambansa and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58
a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of
inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a
leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his
refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the
Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to punish Arnault for contempt,
this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with
the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those
which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in
Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure
of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the
most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the
right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not
properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such
inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to
avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of
legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power
of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or
Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the
persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be
exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse
of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the
rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such
instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to
forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power
of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term
figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular
clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light
of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public."65
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims
of varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since
presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds
of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either
judicial or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that
its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the
informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68
Tribes comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to
resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled
early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state
secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government
informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending
investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding
the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the
executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where
such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities
involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and
diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive
domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank
expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.70
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it
would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
given procedural setting.71
The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974.
In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege against a
subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents
relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the Presidents
general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court
held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S.
Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a
Presidents powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling
that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of
criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the
issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73
Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with
President Washingtons refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of
Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year
as Nixon, recognized the Presidents privilege over his conversations against a congressional
subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,
the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the
interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the
President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte
v. Vasquez.77 Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It
quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences,

like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which
we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein
petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to
information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information
which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in
name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens demands for information.
In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding
that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The same case held that
closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information
does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of
powers,"82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and
diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from
the right to information.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United
States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1

Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences
between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section
3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department
heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in
marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State
or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22
of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis
Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question
Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear
before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this
regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa as the
Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa one of the most
competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in
congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but
if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact
that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate
[when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited

or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation
or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their
presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was
originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the
proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the
question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee
on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour
from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the
provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the
deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now
go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the
Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour.
I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we
reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in
terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its
own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put
Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the

members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of
Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now
become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and
Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different
functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour.
Commissioner Davides only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be
placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identical functions of Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners alone. From the above-quoted exchange,
Commissioner Maambongs committee the Committee on Style shared the view that the two
provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand,
was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His
views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and
the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,85
corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision
for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers
mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that
Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable
to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability
of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the
National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national
policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot
be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only
as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is
lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during
the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of
separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this
jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department
heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in
light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to
executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As
Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is
that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of
departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation
between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the
congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the
Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The
absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country,
comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the
Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to
perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive
information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power
devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon
information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by
a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the
Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Justice.
Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the
absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the
provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it
constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head

to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,
and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated
in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the
National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given
the title of Section 2 "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" , it is evident
that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is
intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed
above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories
of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be
read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in
the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court
shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is
"covered by the executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement
effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that
the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office,
authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in
possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then
becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in the legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that
the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without
mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is
being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive
privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate
President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It
reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the
Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m.,
please be informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of
Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public
Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And
For Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President.
(Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent
from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter
assumes that the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be
covered by the order means that a determination has been made, by the designated head of office
or the President, that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive
privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the
same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not
secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the
standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermitas letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch,
either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a
determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of
writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim
of privilege has been made by the executive.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege
may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in
the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internaldeliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open
by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it
sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the
ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied
claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated
by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by
Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g.,
whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the
privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is
being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive,
but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information
between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination.
Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be
classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not
seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information
that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information,

must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual
personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances
are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.93 These, in substance, were the same
criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v.
Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure
impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs needs to
determine whether to override any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied)
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97
On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing
operation. In stating its objection to claimants interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing
more, that the disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that
non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government has not shown nor even alleged that
those who evaluated claimants product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in
this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon
which the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this
Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimants products was a
matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge
sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide
precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:

A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description
of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their
confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of
disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has
little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An
improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a
claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the
claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and
reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the
Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside
scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v.
U.S:102
We think the Courts decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly
relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that if (petitioner) had legitimate
reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of
Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state
(his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given
the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate
steps to obtain the records. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or
remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to
make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers
before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect.103 A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he
would incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It
is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly
appears to the court that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim,
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege
is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an

explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding
of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power
of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding
only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege.
It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be
construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged
unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the
Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the
President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines
that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of
the executive branch,105 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege is
thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption
from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to
the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in
the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b),
is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in
his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time
to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.
This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If,
after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes
the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before
Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of
the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by
Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for
implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change
the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive
officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information
pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in
claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative
power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right

to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds
Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of
inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same
is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do
not directly apply to people in general, Taada v. Tuvera states:
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may

question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the
challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464
has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is,
therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this
Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For
[w]hat republican theory did accomplishwas to reverse the old presumption in favor of
secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor
of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power
of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order
No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1
and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200238

November 20, 2012

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBANK) and PASCUAL M. GARCIA III, as

representative of Philippine Savings Bank and in his personal capacity, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT, consisting of the senators of the republic of the
philippines acting as senator judges, namely: JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JINGGOY
EJERCITO ESTRADA, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO,
EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JOKER P. ARROYO, PIA S. CAYETANO, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, TEOFISTO GUINGONA III, GREGORIO B.
HONASAN II, PANFILO M. LACSON, MANUEL M. LAPID, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., SERGIO R. OSMENA III, FRANCIS "KIKO"
PANGILINAN, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, RALPH G. RECTO, RAMON REVILLA,
JR., ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, MANNY VILLAR; and THE HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE PROSECUTION PANEL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Petitioners Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Pascual M. Garcia III, as President of
PSBank, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullity and set aside the
Resolution1 of respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, sitting as an Impeachment
Court, which granted the prosecution's requests for subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum2 to
PSBank and/or its representatives requiring them to testify and produce before the Impeachment
Court documents relative to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to belong to then
Suprerpe Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
On November 5, 2012, and during the pendency of this petition, petitioners filed a Motion with
Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition3 averring that subsequent events have overtaken the
petition and that, with the termination of the impeachment proceedings against former Chief
Justice Corona, they are no longer faced with the dilemma of either violating Republic Act No.
6426 (RA 6426) or being held in contempt of court for refusing to disclose the details of the
subject foreign currency deposits.

It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become moot and academic
because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of. The judgment will not serve
any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be
enforced.4 In Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,5 the Court ruled:
It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There
is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. (Citations omitted)
Indeed, the main issue of whether the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily when it issued the
assailed subpoena to obtain information concerning the subject foreign currency deposits
notwithstanding the confidentiality of such deposits under RA 6426 has been overtaken by
events. The supervening conviction of Chief Justice Corona on May 29, 2012, as well as his
execution of a waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or
foreign currency, has rendered the present petition moot and academic.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to abstain from passing upon the
merits of this case where legal relief is no longer needed nor called for.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 9, 2012 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202242

July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP.
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the filing of this case. The issue has constantly
been nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional challenge.
As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in the process of
selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court cannot delay the
resolution of the issue a day longer. Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is not an
option.
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one
(1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from
each house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? These are the
pivotal questions to be resolved in this original action for prohibition and injunction.
Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the annals of history bear witness to the
fact that the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive
prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of
American origins, both the Malolos Constitution1 and the 1935 Constitution2 had vested the
power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the
deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to
ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.3

Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973 Constitution,4 the
appointment of judges and justices was no longer subject to the scrutiny of another body. It was
absolute, except that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political
pressure and partisan activities,5 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are
provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall
keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for
the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.6 Perhaps in order to give
equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and
the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only
one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.7 Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each.8 At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero

and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition,9 setting forth the following
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
I
Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that
the JBC shall have only one representative from Congress.
II
The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on a JBC
composed of only seven (7) members.
III
Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed of the one member
from the Senate and one member from the House of Representatives, they could have
easily said so as they did in the other provisions of the Constitution.
IV
The composition of the JBC providing for three ex-officio members is purposely
designed for a balanced representation of each of the three branches of the government.
V
One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right (not even right) to
sit in the said constitutional body and perform the duties and functions of a member
thereof.
VI
The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and
unconstitutional.10
On July 9, 2012, the JBC filed its Comment.11 It, however, abstained from recommending on
how this constitutional issue should be disposed in gracious deference to the wisdom of the
Court. Nonetheless, the JBC was more than generous enough to offer the insights of various
personalities previously connected with it.12
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as
members of the JBC in their Comment13 filed on July 12, 2012. According to them, the crux of

the controversy is the phrase "a representative of Congress."14 Reverting to the basics, they cite
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution15 to determine the meaning of the term
"Congress." It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of "Congress," such that the absence of either divests
the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. In simplistic terms, the
House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not Congress.16 Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in
the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from Congress," it should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.17
Tracing the subject provisions history, the respondents claim that when the JBC was established,
the Framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating "a
representative of the National Assembly" to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to
aptly jive with the change to bicameralism, the legislative system finally adopted by the
Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. According to respondents, if the Commissioners
were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral
one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in
the JBC.18
The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, the respondents urge the Court
to look beyond the letter of the disputed provision because the literal adherence to its language
would produce absurdity and incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress.19 In other words,
placing either of the respondents in the JBC will effectively deprive a house of Congress of its
representation. In the same vein, the electorate represented by Members of Congress will lose
their only opportunity to participate in the nomination process for the members of the Judiciary,
effectively diminishing the republican nature of the government.20
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render the latters purpose nugatory. While they admit that the
purpose in creating the JBC was to insulate appointments to the Judiciary from political
influence, they likewise cautioned the Court that this constitutional vision did not intend to
entirely preclude political factor in said appointments. Therefore, no evil should be perceived in
the current set-up of the JBC because two (2) members coming from Congress, whose
membership to certain political parties is irrelevant, does not necessarily amplify political
partisanship in the JBC. In fact, the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely
provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees.21
The Issues
In resolving the procedural and substantive issues arising from the petition, as well as the myriad
of counter-arguments proffered by the respondents, the Court synthesized them into two:

(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit
of the 1987 Constitution.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its Comment, the JBC submits that petitioner is clothed with locus standi to file the petition,
as a citizen and taxpayer, who has been nominated to the position of Chief Justice.22
For the respondents, however, petitioner has no "real interest" in questioning the constitutionality
of the JBCs current composition.23 As outlined in jurisprudence, it is well-settled that for locus
standi to lie, petitioner must exhibit that he has been denied, or is about to be denied, of a
personal right or privilege to which he is entitled. Here, petitioner failed to manifest his
acceptance of his recommendation to the position of Chief Justice, thereby divesting him of a
substantial interest in the controversy. Without his name in the official list of applicants for the
post, the respondents claim that there is no personal stake on the part of petitioner that would
justify his outcry of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the mere allegation that this case is of
transcendental importance does not excuse the waiver of the rule on locus standi, because, in the
first place, the case lacks the requisites therefor. The respondents also question petitioners
belated filing of the petition.24 Being aware that the current composition of the JBC has been in
practice since 1994, petitioners silence for eighteen (18) years show that the constitutional issue
being raised before the Court does not comply with the "earliest possible opportunity"
requirement.
Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first ascertain the
nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations therein and the character of the relief sought, the Court views the petition as
essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.25
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in
the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the
very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for
declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.26
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to
the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After
all, the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending
two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.

The Courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution,
is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.27 Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal
branch of government is put in issue.
Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict of rights
and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,28 the
Court summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from jurisprudence. There, it was held that
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers,
there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there
must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.29
In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes
his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the
government are spent for lawful purposes. According to petitioner, "since the JBC derives
financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner
possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBCs proceedings are not
tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution."30
Notably, petitioner takes pains in enumerating past actions that he had brought before the Court
where his legal standing was sustained. Although this inventory is unnecessary to establish locus
standi because obviously, not every case before the Court exhibits similar issues and facts, the
Court recognizes the petitioners right to sue in this case. Clearly, petitioner has the legal
standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of this
controversy.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
"personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all
over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The
Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional process
be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this
question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of
transcendental importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all
citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the
opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant
in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of
a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.31 The allegations of constitutional
violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the
government. The allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from
the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues
raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of
the magistrates in our judicial system.
The Composition of the JBC
Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an understanding of the composition of the
JBC as stated in the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It reads:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places
the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular
members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the
crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC

composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and "a
representative of Congress."
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of
Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what
the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.33 Verba legis non est
recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.34
The raison d tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained;35 and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of
law to prevail. 36
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated.37 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter.38 The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.39 In short, every meaning to be
given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute
since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and
its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word "Congress" used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the
Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum,40 "from the enumeration of the

membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only."41
Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.42 Not any
of these instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of the
subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic
aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about the appointments of members of the
Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints them.
If there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointment. In this proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of
a board composed of seven members called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the
President will still appoint the member of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees
of this Council.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints
four of them who are regular members.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. CONCEPCION. The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan politics.43
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. RODRIGO. If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as
the provision in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council,
this will be a diminution of the appointing power of the highest magistrate of the land, of the
President of the Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be
limited by a group of seven people who are not elected by the people but only appointed.

Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our constitutional
provisions on appointments. The members of the Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the
government. Even a municipal judge cannot be appointed by the President except upon
recommendation or nomination of the three names by this Committee of seven people,
commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and the Commission on Civil
Serviceeven ambassadors, generals of the Army will not come under this restriction. Why are
we going to segregate the Judiciary from the rest of our government in the appointment of highranking officials?
Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the honor of our
President without being effective at all because this Council will be under the influence of the
President. Four out of seven are appointees of the President and they can be reappointed when
their term ends. Therefore, they would be kowtow the President. A fifth member is the Minister
of Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member represents the Legislature. In all
probability, the controlling part in the legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this
representative form the National Assembly is also under the influence of the President. And may
I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that event the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is an appointee of
the President. So it is futile he will be influence anyway by the President.44 [Emphases supplied]
At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC
for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the
JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then
be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created.
While it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it
is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting
deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word "Congress" in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.
Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress,
the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.45 On
this score, the Court cites the insightful analysis of another member of the Court and JBC
consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.46 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the
JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major
elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government while the regular members are
composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of

government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three exofficio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
xxx

xxx

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers
under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial
branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch of in the matter of
its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent
powers requires the Senate and House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies
in furtherance of Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and,
in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no
such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal
branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign
the same weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding
aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the
Court finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Courts conclusion that
"Congress," in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident
that the definition of "Congress" as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government
- to legislate.47 In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of
each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers such as, inter
alia, the power of appropriation,48 the declaration of an existence of a state of war,49 canvassing
of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,50 and impeachment.51 In the exercise of
these powers, the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the roles which a
particular house plays, regardless of whether the two houses consummate an official act by
voting jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization
of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each
house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen
consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of government.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the
term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of
oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with

firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the coequal branches of government.
Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in
response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of
the Judiciary.52 To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that,
in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active
role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as
one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, "negate the principle of equality among
the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution."53
To quote one former Secretary of Justice:
The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative and the other sectors represented
in the JBC must be corrected especially when considered vis--vis the avowed purpose for its
creation, i.e., to insulate the appointments in the Judiciary against political influence. By
allowing both houses of Congress to have a representative in the JBC and by giving each
representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as compared to the other members of the
JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted influence in the appointment of judges.54 [Emphasis
supplied]
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2)
of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing
Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the
Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be
countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of
situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the
people who run it.55 Hence, any act of the government or of a public official or employee which
is contrary to the Constitution is illegal, null and void.
As to the effect of the Courts finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional,
it bears mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all.56 This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,57 the Court
explained:

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play.1wphi1 It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that
the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden
on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Considering the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds
that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all
its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine as to
who should remain as the sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a matter beyond the
province of the Court and is best left to the determination of Congress.
Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and the
House of Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is not in a position
to stamp its imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the
Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of this
constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power
and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct, by
reading into the law what is not written therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16887

November 17, 1920

MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, petitioner,

vs.
ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and the PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
RIZAL, composed of ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGSALIN and CATALINO S.
CRUZ, respondents.
Gregorio Perfecto for petitioner.

MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these
proceedings in mandamus to have the provincial governor and the provincial board of the
Province of Rizal temporarily restrained from going ahead with investigation of the charges filed
against him pending resolution of the case, and to have an order issue directed to the provincial
governor commanding him to return the petitioner to his position as municipal president of
Pasay. The members of the provincial board have interposed a demurrer based on the ground that
this court has no right to keep them from complying with the provisions of the law. The
provincial governor has filed an answer to the petition, in which he alleges as a special defense
that numerous complaints have been received by him against the conduct of Miguel R. Cornejo,
municipal president of Pasay; that these complaints were investigated by him; that he came to the
conclusion that agreeable to the powers conferred upon provincial governors, the municipal
president should be temporarily suspended, and that an investigation is now being conducted by
the provincial board.
Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much eloquence, that his client has been deprived of an
office, to which he was elected by popular vote, without having an opportunity to be heard in his
own defense. The respondents reply that all that the provincial governor and the provincial board
have done in this case is to comply with the requirements of the law which they are sworn to

enforce. Obviously, therefore, we should first have before us the applicable provisions of the
Philippine law bearing on the subject of suspension of public officers.
Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal officers," Article IV of Chapter 57 of
the Administrative Code, provides:
The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in
office. for minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe
punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus
effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten
days.
Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges are preferred by
a provincial governor against a municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next
meeting, regular or special, furnish a copy of said charges to the accused official, with a
notification of the time and place of hearing thereon; and at the time and place appointed,
the board shall proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity of said charges, giving
the accused official full opportunity to be heard. The hearing shall occur as soon as may
be practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not later than fifteen days from
the date the accused is furnished a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official
shall, on sufficient grounds, request an extension of time to prepare his defense.
Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall
adjudge that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall
adjudge that the accused has been guilty of misconduct which would be sufficiently
punished by reprimand, or further reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to
deliver such reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if
previously suspended, shall be reinstated.
If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe discipline, it shall
without unnecessary delay forward to the Chief of the Executive Bureau certified copies
of the record in the case, including the charges, the evidence, and the findings of the
board, to which shall be added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official
ought to be suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and in such
case the board may exercise its discretion to reinstate the official, if already suspended, or
to suspend him or continue his suspension pending final action.
The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident thereto shall be
given preference over the current and routine business of the board.
Action by Chief of Executive Bureau. Upon receiving the papers in any such
proceeding the Chief of the Executive Bureau shall review the case without unnecessary

delay and shall make such order for the reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further
suspension of the official, as the facts shall warrant. Disciplinary suspension made upon
order of the chief of the Executive Bureau shall be without pay and in duration shall not
exceed two months. No final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended
by the Department Head and approved by the Governor-General.
With the foregoing legal provisions in mind, certain aspects of the case can be disposed of
without difficulty. Thus it cannot be seriously contended that the courts should interfere with an
orderly investigation which is about to be conducted by the provincial board. Nor can there be
any doubt as to the meaning of the law. A very minute and extensive procedure is provided by
the Legislature for central and provincial supervision of municipal officers. The provincial
governor, in receiving and investigating complaints against such officers, may take three courses.
For a minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; but if the maladministration in office is
more serious he may temporarily suspend the officer, and thereafter may file written charges
against the officer with the provincial board. The procedure followed before the provincial board
and later on appeal to the Chief of the Executive Bureau, while interesting, does not concern us.
The important fact is that the law, in permitting a provincial governor temporarily to suspend a
municipal officer, makes no mention of a formal hearing of the charges.
In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the provincial governor, all that he can do before the
presentation of formal charges is either to reprimand the officer or to suspend him temporarily
from office. In the latter case the provincial governor's action is not a finality. The law is
especially careful to guard the rights of officer charged with maladministration in office. But the
point is made that, notwithstanding the provisions of the law and notwithstanding long official
practice, the temporary suspension of a municipal officer, without an opportunity to be heared in
his own defense, is in contravention of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights concerning
due process of law.
So much has been written on the subject of due process of law that is would be futile to enter into
its intricate mazes. It is self-evident, however, that, in ordinary cases, to condemn without a
hearing violates the due process of law clause of the American Constitution and of the Philippine
Bill of Rights. It is for this reason that we can well understand the logic of those who cling to this
through and to whom a contemplated violation of the Constitution is most repugnant. It is but
fair, in ordinary cases, that a public official should not be removed or suspended without notice,
charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. But not permitting our judgment to be unduly
swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight, and recalling again that the courts have
ordinarily to give effect to legislative purposes, it is further only fair to mention certain
exceptions to the due process of law rule, which would seem to include the instant case.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not
with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law,
has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by
means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely
executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a
day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles. (Weimer vs. bunbury [1874], 30 Mich., 201;

Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856], 18 How., 272 followed in Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco [1910], 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell {1914], 27 Phil., 354; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus
[1915], 31 Phil., 218 and other Philippine cases). In certain proceedings, therefore, of an
administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice
and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Examples of special or summary proceedings
affecting the life, liberty or property of the individual without any hearing can easily be recalled.
Among these are the arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of property
in tax cases; the granting of preliminary injunction ex parte; and the suspension of officers or
employees by the Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau pending an investigation. (See
Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12 C.J., 1224; Administrative Code, sec. 694.)
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary
to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public
office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due proces of law, but is
a public trust or agency. In the case of Taylor vs. Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere
agencies or trust, and not property as such." The basic idea of government in the Philippine
Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being
mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary
or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions
of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents.
Coming now to the more specific consideration of the issue in this case, we turn to the article by
Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, generally considered the leading authority in the United States on the
subject of Administration Law, in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, and find the rules
as to suspension of public officers laid down very concisely as follows: "Power to suspend may
be exercised without notice to the person suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by Professor
Goodnow to support his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. Attorney-General vs. Johnson
([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here held by the Supreme Court of Florida that the
governor could, under section 15 of the executive article of the Constitution, suspend an officer
for neglect of duty in office without giving previous notice to the officer of the charge made
against him.
A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be found in 22 Ruling Case Law, pp. 564,
565. On the subject of suspension of public officers it is heared said:
The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for
the time being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice
and hearing are not prerequisite to suspension unless required by statute and therefore
suspension without such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due
process of law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal
protection of the laws because the evidence against the officer is not produced and he is
not given an opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses.lawph!
l.net

The case to support the first sentence in the above enunciation of the rule is State vs. Megaarden
(85 Minn., 41), which in turn is predicated on State vs. Peterson ([1892], 50 Minn., 239). In a
discussion of the subject more general than specific, it was said:
The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively requires the suspension,
pending his trial, of a public officer, especially a custodian of public funds, charged
with malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. Suspension does not remove the officer, but
merely prevents him, for the time being, from performing the functions of his office; and
from the very necessities of the case must precede a trial or hearing. Such temporary
suspension without previous hearing is fully in accordance with the analogies of the law.
It is a constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of his liberty or property
except by due process of law, which includes notice and a hearing, yet it was never
claimed that in criminal procedure a person could not be arrested and deprived of his
liberty until a trial could reasonably be had, or that in civil actions ex parte and temporary
injunctions might not be issued and retained in proper case, until a trial could be had, and
the rights of the parties determined. We have no doubt, therefore, of the authority of the
legislature to vest the governor with power to temporarily suspend a county treasurer
pending the investigation of the charges against him, of official misconduct.
The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as authority for their second sentence is that of
Griner vs. Thomas ([1907], 101 Texas, 36; 16 Ann. Cas., 944). The holding of the court here was
that it is within the power of the legislature to authorize the temporary suspension of a public
officer during the pendency of valid proceedings to remove such officer and as an incident to
such proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the constitution has given power to remove such
officer only for cause and after a hearing. Notice and hearing are not preprequisites to the
suspension of a public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing.
The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from the United States Supreme Court. (Wilson
vs. North Carolina [1897], 169 U.S, 586.) An examination of the decision, however, shows that
while it tends to substantiate the rule, the facts are not exactly on all fours with those before us.
Without, therefore, stopping to set forth the facts, only the following from the body of the
decisioned be noted, viz.:
In speaking of the statute and the purpose of this particular provision the Supreme Court
of the State said: "The duty of suspension was imposed upon the Governor from the
highest motives of public policy to prevent the danger to the public interests which might
arise from leaving such great powers and responsibilities in the hands of men legally
disqualified. To leave them in full charge of their office until the next biennial session of
the legislature, or pending litigation which might be continued for year, would destroy the
very object of the law. As the Governor was, therefore, by the very and spirit of the law,
required to act and act promptly, necessarily upon his own findings of fact, we are
compelled to hold that such official action was, under the circumstances, due process of
law. Even if it were proper, the Governor would have no power to direct an issue like a
chancellor."

The highest court of the State has held that this statue was not a violation of the
constitution of the State; that the hearing before the Governor was sufficient; that the
office was substantially an administrative one, although the commission was designed by
a statute subsequent to that which created it, a court of record; that the officer taking
office under the statute was bound to take it on the terms provided for therein; that he was
lawfully suspended from office; and that he was not entitled to a trial by jury upon the
hearing of this case in the trial court. As a result the court held that the defendant had not
been deprived of his property without due process of law, nor had he been denied the
equal protection of the laws.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right guaranteed to him
by the Federal Constitution, by reason of the proceedings before the Governor under the
statute above mentioned, and resulting in his suspension from office.
The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the State. It was taken
under a valid statute creating a state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court
has held. What kind and how much of a hearing the officer should have before
suspension by the Governor was a matter for the state legislature to determine, having
regard to the constitution of the State. (There can also be cited as supporting authority
State ex rel. Wendling vs. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners [1915], 159 Wis., 295;
Sumpter vs. State {1906], 81 Ark., 60; Gray vs. McLendon [1901], 134 Ga., 224; State
vs. Police Commissioners, 16 Mo. App., 947; Preston vs. City of Chicago [1910], 246
III., 26; and People vs. Draper [1910], 124 N.Y.S., 758, where it was held that the
legislature has the right to authorize an officer to remove an appointive or elective officer
without notice or hearing.)
Certain intimations have been made that under the procedure prescribed by the law an injustice
might be done municipal officers. Such suppositions are not unusual even as to cases before the
courts, but in this as in all other instances, the presumption always is that the law will be
followed and that the investigation and the hearing will be impartial. In the language of Justice
Trent in Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the presumption is just as
conclusive in favor of executive action, as to its correctness and justness, as it is in favor of
judicial action." We entertain no doubt that the provincial governor, fully conscious of the trust
reposed in him by the law, will act only in cases where strong reasons exist for exercising the
power of suspension and upon a high consideration of his duty.
The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might unduly delay the hearing is also without much
force. The same might be said of any administrative officer, or in fact of any judicial officer. The
presumption, again, is that every officer will do his duty promptly, and if he does not, certainly a
remedy can be found to make him do so. Not only this, but the law before us expedites the
proceedings by fixing a short period of ten days within which the provincial governor must lay
the charges before the provincial board, which must be heard by the latter body within fifteen
days. Of more compelling force is the suggestion from the other side that the public interest
might suffer detriment by postponing the temporary suspension until after the hearing.

Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the provisions of section 2188 of the
Administrative Code are clear and that they do not offend the due process of law clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the law without fear or favor.
Petition denied with costs. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

This is an original action for the writ of mandamus to require the respondents to reinstate the
petitioner to his office as president of the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal.
The facts upon which the petition is based are not in dispute. They are not only admitted by the
demurrer of the respondent Andres Gabriel buy were expressly admitted by him in open court.
They are:
(1) That the petitioner was duly elected by the people of the municipality of Pasay as president
for the period of three years from the 16th day of October, 1919;
(2) That the petitioner was suspended from said office on the 13th day of September, 1920, by
the respondent Andres Gabriel, without notice, without a hearing, and without an opportunity to
present any proof whatsoever in his defense.
The facts having been admitted, we have only a question of law to decide, to wit: Is the governor
of a province authorized under the law to suspend a municipal president from his office, to which
he has been legally elected for a period fixed by the law, without notice, without a hearing and
without an opportunity to present proof in his defense?
Section 3 (first paragraph) of the Jones Law provides "that no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law."
Section 2188 of Act No. 2711 provides:

SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal officers. The
provincial governor shall receive the investigate complaints against municipal officers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in office. For
minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment
seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the
official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written
charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten days.
It will be noted that while section 2188 provides for a suspension, it makes no provision for the
procedure in such cases. In the absence of a procedure prescribed by the statute, we are of the
opinion that the procedure marked by the Constitution (Jones Law) must be followed, to wit:
That no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. "Due
process of law" has been defined many, many times, and simply means that before a man can be
deprived of his life, liberty or property, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself.
The right to hold, occupy and exercise an office is as much as species of property within the
protection of the law, as any other thing capable of possession; and, to wrongfully deprive one of
it or unjustly withhold it, is an injury which the law can redress in as ample a manner as any
other wrong. And that right is regarded as a right within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which says: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall nay State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
(Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714; Dent vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S., 114, 124; Huling vs. Kaw,
etc. Ry. Co., 130 U.S., 559; Scott vs. Neal, 154 U.S., 34; New Orleans Waterworks vs. New
Orleans, 164 U.S., 471; Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U. S., 78, 110; Haddock vs. Haddock, 201
U.S., 562, 567, Michigan Trust Co. vs. Ferry, 175 fed., 667; Bunton vs. Lyford, 37 N.H., 512 [75
Am. Dec., 144]; Foster vs. Kansas, 112 U.S., 201.)
The power to remove an officer who has been duly elected for a specified period can be
exercised only, and for just cause, after the officer has had an opportunity for defense.
In the absence of express power, given in express words, the presumption must be, in view of the
provisions of the Jones Law above quoted, that the legislature intended that every officer duly
elected for a fixed period should be entitled to hold his office until the expiration of such period,
unless removed therefrom for cause, after a fair and impartial investigation in which he has been
given an opportunity to defend himself. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corporations, sec. 250; Fields vs.
Commonwealth, 32 Pa., 478; Stadler vs. Detroit, 13 Mich., 346; State vs. Bryce, 7 Ohio St., 2;
Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 93; Hobokan vs. Gear, 27 H.J.L., 265; Dullan vs. Wilson, 53 Mich., 392;
People vs. Therrien, 80 Mich., 187; Robbinson vs. Miner, 68 Mich., 549.)
It seems to me that if the hero of the Filipino people, Jose Rizal, could read the decision of the
majority of this court and thereby learn that one of the citizens of the Philippine Islands has been
deprived of his property and rights, without a hearing, he would turn over in his grave and, with
a wailing cry, exclaim: "A social cancer of a new type is again in my beloved land!"

The question presented is not a new one. It has been discussed since long before the English
people, in mass, met upon the fields of Runnymede and demanded and obtained from an
unwilling king the Magna Charta, which has constituted the chief stone in the political edifice of
all the civilized nations since that time (years 1215). In creating the constitution for the Filipino
people, the United States Government expressly provided that no person, no Filipino, no citizen
of the Philippine Islands, shall be deprived of his life or property without "due process of law."
The question has been presented to the courts many, many times, and without exception the said
provision of the constitution has been sustained, except where the same constitution contains
other provisions authorizing the suspension of officers without a hearing. In the Philippine
Islands there is no authority in the constitution (the Jones Law) authorizing or justifying the
statute in question. Not only is such a statute not authorized but it is absolutely prohibited by the
provisions of the Jones Law quoted above. The Jones Law provides that no law shall be enacted,
etc.
In a discussion of the subject before us we must bear in mind the distinction between an
appointive and an elected officer. There are a few cases which hold that in case of an appointive
officer, where the appointment is at the pleasure of the appointing power, his suspension or
removal is exercisable at the mere discretion of the appointing power. (State vs. St. Louis, 90
Mo., 19; Field vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. St., 478; State vs. Johnson, 18 L. R. A., 410.)
Where a person is appointed to an office and is a mere employee, whose position does not have
the dignity of an office, and, by virtue of his appointment, may be removed or suspended at the
will of the appointing power, then, of course, the rule is different. Such persons are not officers
but mere employees. (Thorpp vs. Langdon, 40 Mich., 673; People vs. McDill, 15 Mich., 182;
Portman vs. State Board, etc. 50 Mich., 258; Attorney-General vs. Cain, 84 Mich., 223.)
On the other hand the authorities are practically unanimous, where the appointment or election is
made for a definite term and the removal is to be for cause, that the power of removal or
suspension cannot be exercised without due notice and hearing. (Mechem on Public Officers,
sec. 454; Dullan vs. Wilson, 53 Mich., 392 [51 Am. Rep., 128]; Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 99; King
vs. Gaskin, 8 Term Rep., 209; Ramshay's Case, Ad. & E. [N.S.], 190; Williams vs. Bagot, 3 B. &
C., 786; Queen vs. Archbishop, 1 Ell. & El., 545; Page vs. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. [Ky.], 672;
Willard's Appeal, 4 R. I., 601; Field vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa., St., 478; State vs. Bryce, 7 Ohio,
82; Foster vs. Kansas, 112 U. S., 201; Kenard vs. Louisiana, 92 U.S., 480.)
The constitution and laws of the Philippine Islands having created the office of president of the
different municipalities and having fixed definitely the tenure of said office, the legislature, by
virtue of the provisions of the Jones Law, is prohibited from enacting any law which would
justify any individual in the state in removing him from office without first presenting charges
against him and giving him an opportunity to be heard. (Removal of Public Officer, 25 Am. Law
Rev., 201; State vs. Commonwealth, 3 Metcalf [Ky.], 237; Page vs. Hardin [supra]; Brown vs.
Grover, 6 Bush [Ky.], 1; Commonwealth vs. Gamble, 62 Pa., 342; State vs. Draper, 50 Mo., 353;
State vs. Thoman, 10 Kansas, 191; State vs. McMeely, 24 La. Ann., 19; Cooley, Const. Lim., 6th
ed., p. 78; People vs. Draper, 15 N.Y., 532; State vs. Williams, 5 Wis., 308; State vs. Baker, 38
Wis., 71; State vs. Hewitt, 16 L. R. A., 413.)

In the case of State vs. Hewitt (16 L. R. A., 413) the attorney-general of the State of South
Dakota admitted in open court "that it is true, as contended by the relator, that the preponderance
of authorities is against the removal of the officer for cause, whose term of office is fixed by law,
without formal charges and a hearing thereon on timely notice."
Mr. Justice Bailey of the English Court, in the case of Williams vs. Bagot (3 Barn and C., 785),
said: "It is contrary to common sense of justice that any party could be deprived of his rights and
be concluded unheard."
Every officer in the Philippine Government who has been legally elected for a fixed period has a
right to be heard under the provisions of the Jones Law before he can be deprived of his rights.
He has a right to be heard and to explain.
In the absence of express constitutional authority, the Philippine Legislature is prohibited from
enacting a law by which any officer elected by the people for a definite period may be suspended
or removed from his office without first having been given an opportunity to be heard and to
present whatever defense he may have. (Jones Law, sec. 3; Dullan vs. Wilson, 51 Mich., 128;
Hallgreen vs. Campbell, 82 Mich., 255; Jacques vs. Little, 51 Kansas, 300.)
In the case of Dullan vs. Wilson (53 Mich., 392) the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan,
with whom Mr. Justice Cooley agreed, said: "We have examined carefully the authorities cited
upon the brief of the learned counsel for relator in support of the position that no notice is
required to be given, and that the action of the Executive is final and conclusive. It is sufficient to
say, without commenting specially upon them, that the reasoning of those cases does not
commend itself to our judgment. They appear to us to be opposed, not only to the decided weight
of authority, but also to the fundamental principles of justice."
In the case of Hallgreen vs. Campbell (82 Mich., 255), the Supreme Court of the State of
Michigan said: "We have not found any case where an officer who is appointed for a fixed term
has been held to be removable except for cause, and, wherever cause must be assigned for the
removal of the officer, he is entitled to notice and a chance to defend himself."
In the case of Han vs. Boston (142 Mass., 90) it was held that no power to remove or suspend an
officer could be exercised until after notice and an opportunity by the official in question to be
heard in his own defense.
In the case of State vs. St. Louis (90 Mo., 19) the Supreme Court said: "When the removal is not
discretionary, but must be for a cause, . . . and nothing is said as to the procedure, a specification
of the charges, notice, and an opportunity to be heard are essential."
Mr. Dillon, in his valuable work on Municipal Corporations (sec. 250) says: "Where the right of
removal or suspension is confined to specific causes, such power cannot be exercised until there
have been formulated charges against the officer, notice thereof, and an opportunity for defense."
(Biggs vs. McBride, 17 Ore., 640; State vs. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St., 98.)

In the case of State vs. Hastings (16 L. R. A., 791, 797) the Supreme Court of Nebraska, after
citing and commenting not only upon the cases cited above but also upon other cases, said: "It
seems plain to us that the doctrine of these cases is in accord with the weight of authority and is
supported by the soundest reasons."
It is true that a few cases can be found which hold that an officer may be suspended under a
statute, without notice and without a hearing. But it is believed that an examinations of each of
such cases will show that such statues are authorized by the constitution of the particular state.
(Grines vs. District Judge, 101 Tex., 36 Poe vs. State, 72 Tex., 625, State vs. Johnson, 18 L. R. A.,
410.)
All that has been said above relates only to the petition for mandamus against the respondent the
provincial governor of Rizal. I am fully convinced that a great preponderance of the
jurisprudence upon the question which I have here discussed shows clearly that the petitioner
herein was suspended in a manner not authorized by law, and that the writ of mandamus prayed
for should be issued, directing the reinstatement of the petitioner.
With reference to the respondent provincial board, the record shows that it was not a party to the
acts complained of in the petition in the present case. The petition, therefore, as against the
provincial board should be denied.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
Section 2188 of the Administrative Code which empowers the provincial governor to investigate
complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty, corruption or other form of
maladministration in office does not, as may be seen from the text itself of said section, empower
the provincial governor to suspend the officer against whom the complaint may be presented
pending the investigation. There is even no word whatever in said section from which such
power may be inferred.
The suspension of the officer against whom the complaint may have been presented (when he is
not a municipal treasurer) may, according to said section, be ordered by the provincial governor
when written charges are submitted by the latter to the provincial board after the investigation
has been made, if he thinks it desirable to impose a more severe punishment, or if, in his opinion,
the charge is one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question; and, in this case, that is,
when the suspension is effected after the investigation is held, such written charge against said
official must be presented by the governor to the provincial board within the period of ten days.
Therefore, it is clear and evident, according to the text of said section, that during the
investigation that the provincial governor may hold, in view of a charge presented against a
municipal officer, the latter cannot be suspended from his office for the simple reason that such
investigation may end in a reprimand of the officer, which is the only punishment that the
provincial governor may impose in such case upon the municipal officer, and the law does not
empower the governor to order said suspension at that time, except only when a complaint is
presented against the municipal officer to the provincial board.

If, as has been said, the investigation which the provincial governor may hold against a
municipal officer may end either in the imposition of a punishment, such as a reprimand of the
officer or in a complaint against the municipal officer which the provincial governor may submit
to the provincial board, in the latter case suspending said municipal officer from that time,
that is, from the time the complaint is made and submitted to the board within the period of ten
days, a period determined and fixed, which the law grants for said purposes, it is evident that
the municipal officer should be notified of the complaint and therefore should be heard in said
investigation; otherwise, in holding the investigation without the presence of the officer against
whom the complaint may have been presented, and, in holding, at most, a summary trial against
him without first hearing him or giving him an opportunity to defend himself, the reprimand
imposed upon him as the result of the investigation in the first case to which said article 2188
refers, would be a penalty imposed upon the officer without due process of law.
If this is true, it is also true that the officer subjected to investigation should be notified of the
complaint and should be heard in said investigation for, if such investigation should end in a
charge which the provincial governor may consider proper to present against him to the
provincial board, such investigation would be the basis of the charge against the officer and the
provincial board should take cognizance of such investigation in the corresponding proceeding.
If the most vulgar criminal is notified of the complaint presented against him before a justice of
the peace and is heard in the preliminary investigation which this judicial officer must hold
before the corresponding information is filed by the fiscal in a court of first instance, and if in
that investigation he is given the opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty as well as to defend
himself in order that the justice of peace holding the investigation may consider the merits of the
complaint and the result thereof, so that he may determine whether or not reasonable motives
exist for him to believe that the accused is guilty and also to determine, as a consequence,
whether sufficient motives exist to present against the accused the corresponding information in
the Court of First Instance these being facts which the fiscal in turn should consider before
filing the corresponding information it is unreasonable, unjust and illegal that, in a
preliminary investigation such as that held by the provincial governor in the second case referred
to in section 2188 by virtue of the complaint presented to him against a municipal officer, such
municipal officer should not be notified of the complaint or head or given the opportunity to
defend himself in order that the provincial governor may duly determine whether it is proper to
impose upon said officer a more severe punishment or whether the abuse or neglect of duty
imputed to him is among those that affect the official integrity of said officer.
When a complaint charging the commission of a delito (felony) is laid before a
magistrate, the accused is entitled as of right to a preliminary investigation as to
"probable cause" before being committed to stand trial for the crime charged therein.
(U.S. vs. M'Govern, 6 Phil., 621)
When a preliminary examination, under the provisions of General Orders, No. 58, is
conducted by a judge or by a justice of the peace in this jurisdiction, either within or
without the city of Manila, the accused has a right to be present and to be heard by
himself and by counsel and to present witnesses in his behalf. . . . . (U. S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.)

The object of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an

accused person is placed upon trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from
useless and expensive prosecutions. (U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.)
The doctrine established by this court in the cases above mentioned, and in many others that
need not be cited, is applicable also to the case where an investigation is held, according to said
section 2188 of the Administrative Code, by the provincial governor by virtue of a complaint
presented against a municipal officer, because without an investigation held in legal form, that is,
by hearing the person accused of a crime in a judicial complaint or the municipal officer accused
in a complaint presented to the provincial governor, and giving him the opportunity to defend
himself, the information against the accused in the first case, can not be filed in the Court of First
Instance and, in the second case, the complaint against the municipal officer, which may result in
his discharge, can not be presented to the provincial board; and as the right to be present at the
investigation, and be heard by himself or through an attorney and present witnesses in his favor,
which are what constitute due process of law, is an essential right of the accused in either case,
then, if in the investigation by the provincial governor of Rizal, of the complaint received by him
against Miguel Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay, and referred to in his answer, said
governor, without previously notifying the accused municipal president of said charges, held a
preliminary investigation in his absence, without hearing him and without giving him an
opportunity to defend himself, the complaint against said municipal officer filed by said
provincial governor or Rizal with the provincial board is without foundation and is illegal for
want of due proces of law in said investigation. Therefore, the administrative proceeding
instituted against said municipal officer by virtue of that complaint is for that reason affected
with a radical vice and it is evident that the provincial governor has not acted in accordance with
the clear and conclusive provisions of the section of the Administrative Code already cited and
that he has acted in excess of his powers, not only in ordering the suspension of the municipal
president, petitioner herein, but also in presenting to the provincial board, as a result of said
investigation, the complaint against him. Hence the proceeding instituted before said provincial
board by virtue of said complaint, is illegal and void.
For the reasons above stated, in dissenting from the respectable opinion of the majority, I am of
the opinion that the petition presented by Miguel Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay, against
Andres Gabriel, provincial governor of Rizal as well as against the provincial board of Rizal,
composed of Andres Gabriel, Pedro Magsalin, and Catalino S. Cruz, is well taken, and the
respondents should be, as they not are, ordered to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionerin-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZONABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-inintervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionerin-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionersin-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionerin-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO
SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,
AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,
ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III,
ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO,
RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIOCUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,

GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,

BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionerin-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionerin-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG,

RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO
SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH,
EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ,
HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE,
WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA,
EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR,
petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionerin-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C.
DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS,
ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,

MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE
COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
[CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and
seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches
of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one
such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject
of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence
to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive

or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the

discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are
to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily,
salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least onethird of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between
these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW

RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR AGAINST INITIATION

OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed
by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or resolution of

Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed Initiated.
In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint
of impeachment or a citizen files
a verified complaint that is

impeachment filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of

the House.

endorsed by a Member of the

House through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case
may be, is sufficient in substance,
or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of
the said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period
of one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in
the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5)
of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging
that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens,
taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their
petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to
conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that
he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez
v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that
the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the
legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul
M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal
interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their

petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be
protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray
that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate
and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors
and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the
Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections
16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the
Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.
Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III
of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition
for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing
Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the
issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an

official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the
unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of
the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that
as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but
alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the
Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays
in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays
in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the
resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.

Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was
put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it
was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug
offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28,
2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at
10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this
Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties
and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C.
De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin
the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under
the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments
on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M.
Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute
itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as
the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R.
No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated
Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World
War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3,
2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant
petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold
and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to
determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P.
Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their

delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty

however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for
the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred
upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for
a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme
law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United
States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral
component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in

turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of
the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are
mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief
Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role
of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of
habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did

not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a

Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 39
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame
Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in
Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential
application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try"
impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v.
United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different
fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and
balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would
create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in
cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole
power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to

impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case
of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a
duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise
of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment
of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of
the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in
point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the

legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such memberelect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like
almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction

could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not
have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury.
Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court
had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases
involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural
matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the wellentrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to
distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an

action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as

broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of
the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the
personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of
their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit;
and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege
to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there
is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation
that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial
of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court
to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners
additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive
determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is
totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not

being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise
the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to
join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene,
alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.
and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He
alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine
the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues
relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he
asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected
to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice
to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only
then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and
enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature.
Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent
need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this
Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment
Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The
dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief
Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional
infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second

impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of
Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither
the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness
on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term
"political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government."
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason,
this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political
questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even
in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a
political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion,
when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review
and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that
the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature
holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all,
reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x

And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense
at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with
it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of
the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of
the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am
not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So
that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our
main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in
their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The
1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22
had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to
that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was
our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished

what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish
for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President
around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite
which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which
prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern.
The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on
which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous
by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt
the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held
from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were
not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the
Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the
motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already
in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored
the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded
to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been
ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void.
The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question
and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast
majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme
Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in
their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members
of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case.

This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up.
There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly
justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There
are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a
decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as
a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is
bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further
clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power
is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused
its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not
a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme
Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question
doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away
with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this
Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly
political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would
have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under
the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and
non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political
questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.
These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review
is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment,
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission
on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground
upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this
Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of
the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome
of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the
second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling
for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim
to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c)
a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault
on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of
this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general,
which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already
been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows
then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining
the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the
afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not
filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for
said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and
for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely
endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should
have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who
signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the
scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling
considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions
would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but
the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of
the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute
the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the
Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of
the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec.

1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it
has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office,
the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him]
to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in
[his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in
the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the SenatorsMembers thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all
of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the
Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought,
leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no
less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly
and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests
or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them,
is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of
his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It
affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which
it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power
of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be

disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal
or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from
different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of
judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor
Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded
as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences.
Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently,
failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were
not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the preexisting constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the
martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of
the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the
branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence,
chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in
People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect
and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
(1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to
file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
"initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as
amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI
(3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to
commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with

Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments
of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading
to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco
and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of
the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated
but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened
earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of
the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its
records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings
starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment
by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that
the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples
in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It
is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So,
on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules
of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but
the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee
or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143
(Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting
the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of

the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2),
Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas,
who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used
in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object
in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a
vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the
present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning
of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people,
both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it
and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or

resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the SecretaryGeneral of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing
Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices
who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this
Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former
members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles
that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present
only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief
Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records
of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear
and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee,
or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least onethird of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of
Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly
behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the
determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S.
Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in
the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules
of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power
if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view
the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules
of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to
that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence
of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk
may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for
a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It
is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by
the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US

Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this

enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches
of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not
do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our
trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of

government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the
view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157
(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third
parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that
this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that
"the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more.
It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different
from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes
the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic
flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to
be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought
bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position
or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against
the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and
chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired
military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state
of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any
kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference
was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of
all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in
fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only
the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to

bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is
that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations
or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is
the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by
the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of
the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by
this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted
to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found
answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the
use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193459

February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN
PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, COCHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS
(NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and
prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in
accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao
(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint1 against petitioner, upon the endorsement of
Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.2
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap,
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to
House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.3 who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.4
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo
Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint5 against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List
Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan,
Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.6 On even date, the House of Representatives
provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress.
By letter still of even date,7 the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to
Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,8 also directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the
Committee on Rules,9 instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for
Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to
include the two complaints in the Order of Business,10 which was complied with by their
inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives
simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.11
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints
sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same
time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010
Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for
prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the
complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of
public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints,
which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient
in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public
respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on
September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.13
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner
filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day
or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo
ante order14 and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court
subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second
complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective
Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court
granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Under an Advisory15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12,
2010, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing
by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.
The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that
public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking
cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is
discretionary in nature,16 and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary
investigation.17
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.18 The argument
that impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this
wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a
duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While

the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment
of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
xxxx
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review.
In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether
his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the

Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat

another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.19 (citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction20 of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."21
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the
special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it wellwithin its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that
could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from
the Court.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but
simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.22
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial
review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since
petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the
proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the
present petition23 on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the
sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of ripeness.24 The question of
ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the
challenged conduct.25 In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the
validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode
of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints
presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have
acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of
one year.
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue whether public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two
assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due
process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the
Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep.
Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo
Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against
Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way
that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being
hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.26
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So
GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein.
Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He
alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. 28
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely
presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints.29
Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to
compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges
that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another
case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law
under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:

He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that
mean that your client will be deprived of due process of law?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman,
which goes with the element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of
him.
JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in
this case there were objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there
was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a
constitutional crisis.
JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it
mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found
liable for violation of a law[?]

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with
that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the
right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot
come from an impartial adjudicator.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the
two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that
it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.lawphi1
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however.
So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice31 holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be
instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be
anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and
constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of
work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance
of not just one but five state prosecutors.32 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form
and substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in
fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the
filing of an answer.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance
before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and
related irregularities?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is
only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint
may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how is not your action premature,
Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is
(interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure
at the Committee-level, particularly Section 534 which denotes that petitioners initial
participation in the impeachment proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer starts after
the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the
Committee refused to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of
sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the
Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules.35
The claim fails.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an
exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the
discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to
effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum
constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear
in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint
or resolution,"36 and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee."37
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This
requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing."38 In the discharge of its constitutional duty,
the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional
requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis
her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
This the Court cannot do.
Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.]"39
Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised,
upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of
defense.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or,
more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public
respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter
published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with
that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.40
Citing Taada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent
ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section
3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in
any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation."42
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations43 which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is
intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI
of Constitution.
Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of
announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency
law or regulation to become known or obligatory.44 (emphasis supplied)
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference
in their usage.

The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times.45 A number of those instances
involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the
case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has
invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of
judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk
of court for filing and publication."46
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to
"promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates" in the presidential and vice
presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14,
2010 national elections on May 25, 2010,47 it did not require the publication thereof for its
effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on
different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in
one case,48 the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to
make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be
generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the
general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.49
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former
should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of
Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that
the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no
position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for
Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to
do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that
where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them,

before the courts may intervene.50 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so
as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri.
Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the English language to
appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a
categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is
that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987
Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v.
Tuvera.51 Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor
had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either
a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the
House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because,
for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for
impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for
impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose
that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid
harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read
as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other procedural
requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.52 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing.
Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment
mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than nonself-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings
taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant
self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment
complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House
would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending
the completion of the publication requirement.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is
aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on
Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in
keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In
other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed
purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely
aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may
be given retroactive application to pending actions. "It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws."54 In the present case,
petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of
witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.55
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null
and void in its entirety. Rather,
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and
void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even
availed of and invoked certain provisions57 of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7,
2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus
finds no violation of the due process clause.
The one-year bar rule
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th
Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint
may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit
that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral
to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation
ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially
maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment
complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco58 states that the term "initiate" means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.59 The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint
which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The
initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified
impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action"60 which
contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas
and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating
includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third61 of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.62 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings Sections 1663 and 1764 of Rule V thereof "clearly
contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term initiate a meaning different
from filing and referral."65
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the
Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambongs statements66 that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.
Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was
all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the
Houses action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.
Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical about this,"67 for certain exchanges
in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following
exchanges.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment
proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate
proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the
membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is
required.
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a
report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the
members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an
ordinary Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a
very liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem
where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or
whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the
Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified
complaint, are some of the questions we would like to be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can
be overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and
that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x68 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to
convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of
Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are
charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.69 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong
delivered on at least two occasions:
[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record
my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor.
The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the
Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that
the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and
it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves
or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with
me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with
me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal,
but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.70 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3
(3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the
exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase
WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word
"by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of
the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with
the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.71 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and
Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral
to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco
cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.72 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was
considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of
initiation because "something prior to that had already been done,"73 apparently citing Bernas
discussion.
The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee
report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step,
absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the
verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to
the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is
impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint"74 to
denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory
construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.75
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is
the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an
impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone,
however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle
wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the
candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is
kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the
first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an
exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective
complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate
the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be
the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after
diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later
from filing an impeachment complaint.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its
laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without
seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed
out "worms" in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within
the ultra-limited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants,
injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always
unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted
from directly participating in the impeachment process.
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of
Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same
impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already
initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a
second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment
complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of
the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment
complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has
been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment
trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas disquisition76 in Francisco, a proceeding which
"takes place not in the Senate but in the House"77 precedes the bringing of an impeachment case
to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is
within the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives.78 Conscious of the legal
import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide
to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed
by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private
individual, should own up to its processes.
The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of the House Secretary
General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment
complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker
alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the
House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set
its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against
the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional
complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided
without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.79 Moreover,
it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee
may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral.80
With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a
subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and
further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer
has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest
it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment
proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is
afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within
which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding

deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may
be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter."
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly
"belated" referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the
said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only
four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day
session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte
directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well
within the said 10-day session period.81
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is
filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people
as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and
frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an
impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an
impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of
the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await,
at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of
initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of
all the members of the House.82 To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.83 To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the
Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.84
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in
the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case
involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the
Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding
against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to
accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine,
which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way,
then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The
Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite
way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same
decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case

was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment
today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my
breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent
must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
administration of justice in the courts.85
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers
the series of steps that follow."86
Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the
unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day
period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings
until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution
for impeachment or the overriding87 of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent),
or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),88 or the
Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the
recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod
the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too
loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment
proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that
concurred with the Francisco ruling.89 Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar
is two-fold: "to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its
principal task [of] legislation," with main reference to the records of the Constitutional
Commission, that reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public
officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the
legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time.
And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the
legislature will do nothing else but that.90 (underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of
time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only
one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official
functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not
to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in
Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the
constitutional provision.

Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of
multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session
days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral.
As pointed out during the oral arguments91 by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the
framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The
requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint,
endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these
must be met before bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an
impeachable officer.
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of
a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the
number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and
for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a
complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.
To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad
publicity are enough oppression.
Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources
runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the
Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself,
which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the
quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers,
the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges
entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with
the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated
on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by
the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should
be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a
vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole
import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.
Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules,
Section 16 of which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court
shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."

Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective
rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts
or rejects two procedural devices.
First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the
Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one
offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner,
the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her
with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that
public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing
her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment
process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official
functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report
within the deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment
complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be
defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the
grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor
also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a
political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the
complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment
complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions92 outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure
that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if
Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since
impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to hold
any public office even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner
concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the
Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of
the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the
House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of
that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution
allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an
article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment."94 It,
therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation,
petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her
within one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its
chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to
consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the
sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will
decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioners
petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated."96
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation,
the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature,
conjectural or anticipatory.97
Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints
were deemed consolidated,98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners
theory obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already
brushed aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and
September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September
14, 2010 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104768

July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of
the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its
Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its
evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG
to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to

conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of
this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth
of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board
issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City.
The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all
covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC,
PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her
use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine
Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the
mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of
Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth
Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car
went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of
income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he
being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth
Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no
visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There
was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit
assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money
would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and
analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of
P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for illgotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried
for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property."3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
("RA No. 1379") 4 against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an
Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the
PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth
Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security
Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from

legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found
reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim
to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in
Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house
of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a
clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed
ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her
house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November
1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of
preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The
court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge
the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state
when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the
subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in
court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.
Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence
already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired
the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly
because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its
preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further
evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the
complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The
Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that
private respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it
had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however,
warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court
held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military
officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former
President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered
returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has
primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as
the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection
herewith.

SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint
Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same
issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was
conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against
him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND
THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR
RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND
PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF
THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS
TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN

LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.

SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra,
are clearly not applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037
was cured and/or waived by respondents with the filing of their respective
answers with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they
were filed after commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the
petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE
OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE
EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and
cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under
RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to
make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be
taken based on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs
power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific
responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of
EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG.
Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG
could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a
subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders
directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President
Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated
within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to

recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black
on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association
with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative,
and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General19 does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes
of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas
was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close
association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos
acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us.
Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that
the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to
RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its

jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly
a subordinate of the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this
contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following
recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried
for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property."20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its
amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and
limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that
the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a
"subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas
allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other
legitimate income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association
with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not
contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with
former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent
Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal.
The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same
and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act
Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the illgotten wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests
jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need
to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family,

relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is
clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the
PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2
and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises
and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority and influence, connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said
ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling
under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman
and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of
unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the
Solicitor General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the
Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings
involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the
absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos.
The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority
by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and

its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended
Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should
have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must
also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be
taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government
be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the
forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as
well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in
the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to
it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President,
PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and
prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the
pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which
explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990.
Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the
proceeding.30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is
vested by law and not by the parties to an action.31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct
the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary
investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the
forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth
under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion
of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner
has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended
Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989.
Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion
sought "to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with
being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this
case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the
inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents
and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the
presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task
in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage,
when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a
situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a
five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff
Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary
investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36
The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March
1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the
court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date
set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-

Amended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for
years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended
Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to
complete the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than
sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked
petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a ReAmended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners
evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case
against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the
raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the
seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team
seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition;
one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and
by the will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends
that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents
did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance
of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over
of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces
up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2)
whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration")
remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at
least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as

that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new
order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly
known as the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an
existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right
of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional
methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people
of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter
any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government
which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of
the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then
in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by
mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government,43
petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom
Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the
Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of
sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the
previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing
of assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that
the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration
orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in
defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues
that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner
Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument.
On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results
and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal
shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special
protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due
process, hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios,
fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not
an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me
elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization
and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian
protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is
tragic when we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee
report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the
convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee
report is asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of
disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin
to think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that
is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a
Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it
becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and
seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the
search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom
price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there
is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the
highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow
strong, only if it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price
that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of
Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If
Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo
argument that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law.
If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of

Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to
the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with
what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell,
Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake." I ask the
Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section
8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the
test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is
a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the
present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that
"[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court
has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations
under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say

that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos
as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.
The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law
that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside
from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some
jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in
said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason
why they also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money
and other jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron",

and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were
containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained
money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized
this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along
also the money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will
bring that because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your
Honor.49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby
armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your
Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for
search warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons
were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how
many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office
who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum
Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for
instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also
these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these
were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search
warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attach cases.1wphi1 These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols
or other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be
money. So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they
will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team,
like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its
own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team
exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,53 and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However,
we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor.
We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding
the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.