People of the Philippines vs Johnny Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554

Facts:
To conceal her pregnancy from her parents, complainant Helen Camillion, 22 years old, single, left
for Cagayan de Oro sometime in February 4, 1992 to be a helper. She quit her employment on July
19, 1992, and moved into a rented a room in the house of Mrs. Flora Sinatao, a "hilot" and the
mother of herein appellant. On August 01, 1992, Helen gave birth with the assistance of Mrs.
Sinatao, in the said room. On August 05, 1992, about 12:00 midnight of the same day, she was
awakened from her sleep, surprised to find appellant already lying beside her. Frightened by
appellant's presence, she screamed for help, but appellant, brandishing a knife, ordered her to stop
shouting. While she was gripped with fear, appellant removed his pants and brief. He then removed
complainant's duster leaving her naked. While in bed, appellant began to kiss her and then, through
force and intimidation, succeeded having carnal knowledge with her. The following morning,
appellant padlocked the room's door, left the place, and an hour later, he returned to rape her again.
Complainant claimed that she was repeatedly raped until August 16, 1992. In the morning of August
17, 1992, complainant discovered that the padlock of her room was left unlocked. She then went out
of the room then proceeded to the house of Josephine, her friend, located 30 meters away from Mrs.
Sinatao's house. However, at around 10:00 o'clock of the same morning, appellant arrived at
Josephine's house. He mauled and forced complainant to return to her rented room where the
beating continued. Hours later, appellant was arrested by the police upon the complaint of his sisterin-law for mauling her son with a piece of wood. Despite appellant's arrest and with her room left
unlocked, complainant did not leave until 6:30 in the evening of the same day upon the assistance of
a barangay tanod who went to fetch her. She was brought to the police station where she executed
an affidavit. The next day, she was brought to the Provincial hospital for examination of her injuries.
The defense, on the other hand, disputed that Mrs. Flora Sinatao, mother of the appellant, 76 years
old and a former midwife ("hilot"), narrated that she met the complainant for the first time on March
1992, Mrs. Sinatao gave the complainant a massage, as requested, on which occasion she found a
fetus in complainant's womb. Complainant wanted to have the fetus aborted but Mrs. Sinatao
prevailed upon her not to do it. In April and May 1992, complainant returned for consultation. She
was informed of her expected date of delivery to be around the last week of July or the first week of
August. On July, complainant went back to Mrs. Sinatao and rented one of the rooms of her house to
make sure that she will be attended to by a midwife during her delivery. On August 01, 1992, she
gave birth with Mrs. Sinatao assisting and providing the necessary medicine. Lorna Malinaon,
appellant's common law wife, testified that she went to Mrs. Sinatao's house on August 11, 1992, at
11:00 o'clock in the evening to look for appellant. Inspecting the rooms in Mrs. Sinatao's house, she
found complainant's room. Peeping through a hole in the door she saw the appellant and the
complainant lying in bed. She waited outside for the appellant to come out which the appellant did.
Moved by anger, she slapped and scratched appellant then confronted the complainant pointing her
fingers at the latter while asking for an explanation. Complainant simply remarked that there was
nothing bad. Johnny Sinatao, the accused, when called to the witness stand testified that
complainant was her live-in partner. He denied the charge of rape leveled against him, but admitted
that he mauled the complainant on August 17, 1992, due to jealousy. Gina Cocon, the defense's last
witness, 23 years old, married, and a housekeeper, lives in a neighboring room adjacent to
complainant's room. She noticed that the complainant and the appellant were living together lovingly
and solicitously for two weeks. On August 17, 1992, she saw complainant pull out her clothes to
transfer to another place on which occasion the appellant mauled her. She also averred that Merly

Paharon, their neighbor who lives in a room opposite complainant's room, was always present from
August 1, 1992 to August 18, 1992.
Held:
Rape is truly an abominable crime, nevertheless, there must be moral certainty of its having been, in
fact, committed to warrant a conviction therefor. And to determine this, the Court is guided by three (3)
settled principles in reviewing the evidence, to wit: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it
is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
defense
Complainant asserts sexual abuse through violence and intimidation, but strangely, she did not offer
any resistance when assaulted, an unlikely impulse for a woman confronted with such an affront on
her honor. The manner of her supposed rape is odd for it appears that it was punctiliously made.
Complainant failed to recount where the supposed knife was pointed or placed while appellant was
busy undressing or while complainant was being molested. Neither did complainant give details of
how the succeeding rapes took place but simply alleged that she was repeatedly raped during the
succeeding days. Such reaction is highly unnatural for a woman who went through such harrowing
ordeals. Complainant, quite strangely, appeared nonchalant to the appellant's sexual advances, if
she was indeed raped. Complainant, though allegedly detained, was not even completely isolated as
to prevent her from seeking immediate help. The structure of complainant's room (single board
walling) and its location in a populated area gave her every opportunity to cry for help. And yet, she
did not exert any determined effort to attract the attention of others. As to be reasonably expected, a
ravished woman would instinctively call for help or at best flee from her lecherous captor to safer
grounds when opportunities present themselves. It is evident from the foregoing that complainant's
inculpatory statements were at odds with human experience, especially for an unwilling adult victim
which she portrayed herself to be and wanted the Court to believe.
It is a settled rule that in a criminal case, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused
must be duly taken into account. Accusation, it must be stressed, is not synonymous with guilt. The
cardinal rule being that the conviction of an accused must rely on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence, a requirement miserably lacking in this case as the version given by the complainant is
intrinsically weak and improbable. While it is true that denial could not stand vis-a-vis a positive
testimony, this, however, presupposes that the testimony is credible in itself, an instance absent in
the case at bar. Evidence to be believed, We reiterate, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. This is essential to overthrow the
constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. The guilt of the appellant must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Without passing this exacting standard, appellant's conviction cannot stand.
Otherwise, if all that matters in the prosecution for the crime of rape is a positive testimony, then every
accusation would inevitably result to conviction even if the testimony is riddled with material
inconsistencies and contradictions.
Moreover, the Court finds the evidence for the defense not only satisfactory but also exculpatory.
Appellant's assertion that he did not rape the complainant is worthy of credence as it has been
sufficiently established that appellant and the complainant had an amorous relationship. This was
confirmed by the defense witnesses. And notwithstanding the relationship of some of these
witnesses to the appellant, such circumstance does not ipso facto render their testimony biased and
less worthy of full faith and credence, for the Court has consistently held that the relationship of a

witness to a party does not, by itself, impair the credibility of the witness. Besides, a witness unrelated
to the accused in the person of Gina Cocon, complainant's own neighbor, testified that indeed an
amorous relationship existed between the complainant and appellant, albeit it was severed when
appellant mauled the complainant. Absent any showing that Gina Cocon is ill motivated, her testimony
has to be accorded full faith and credence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant
Johnny Sinatao is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of rape.