**NDI16 Starter Set Climate

Coop Aff **

1AC

Potential Plans
The United States federal government should substantially
increase its climate cooperation with the Peoples Republic of
China
The United States federal government should substantially
increase its technical dialogue on climate change with the
Peoples Republic of China
The United States federal government should substantially
increase its cooperation on emissions standards and
comparison, emissions trading systems, and renewable
technology financing with the Peoples Republic of China

1AC Warming Advantage

ADVANTAGE () IS CLIMATE CHANGE:
Global climate action is locked in a pattern of distrust and
shallow cooperation---incremental, bilateral progress is the
only way to build the trust necessary for global cooperation
David Roberts 16, writer on energy and climate change for Vox, formerly of
Grist, citing Robert Keohane and David Victor, The argument for incrementalism in
international climate negotiations, 5/26/16,
http://www.vox.com/2016/5/26/11766252/international-climate-incrementalism
[Table omitted]
a binding
global treaty just isn't in the cards, and the quest to achieve it is standing in the way
of more small-scale, concrete steps. The clearest articulation I've seen of the latter school of thought was
But most people (some more grudgingly and despairingly than others) are coming around to the realization that

just published in Nature Climate Change by Robert Keohane of Princeton and David Victor of UC San Diego, in a paper entitled
"Cooperation and discord in global climate policy." It's part of a larger package of papers on "the role of society in energy
transitions," which is an overdue focus for academic attention. There's tons of great stuff in it, but it's all behind a paywall, which is
really a damn shame. So I'll just briefly summarize the Keohane-Victor argument. The structure of climate change resists collective

Climate change is a global commons problem. The costs of action are

localized, but the benefits accrue globally , over long time periods. A safe climate is a public
good, and "public goods are typically underprovided in the absence of a governing authority," write Keohane and Victor, "because
action

each actor has an incentive to free-ride to gain a beneficial climate while failing to pay its share." Because of this malign

it has proven extremely difficult to achieve the deep cooperation that will be
required to solve the problem. To get beyond shallow coordination requires more trust,
reciprocity, and international governing authority than currently exists . Coordination is
incentive structure,

easy, cooperation is hard Keohane and Victor's analysis turns on a distinction between coordination and cooperation. They explain
the distinction this way: Collaboration can take many forms along a continuum from coordination to cooperation. In situations of
coordination, agreements are self-enforcing, that is, once an agreement has been made, the parties do not have incentives to defect
from it. For instance, once everyone in the United States understands that Americans drive on the right-hand side of the road, no
rational driver has an incentive to drive on the left, and vice versa for drivers in the United Kingdom.

Cooperation, by

contrast, is not self-enforcing. In the famous game of Prisoners Dilemma, for instance, each player has an incentive to
confess, implicating his partner in crime in return for a lighter sentence. The deep coordination needed between states to provide

Moving from coordination to cooperation requires

relationships of trust and institutions that can counter this incentive to free-ride , through
rewards or punishments. And for a global public good like climate mitigation, the problem is
particularly severe, since there are dozens of big emitters, which all have strong domestic incentives to free-ride. Success
is only possible with near-universal cooperation, and there is, as yet, no central authority for global
governance. (The UNFCCC itself has virtually no power to sanction or reward its members.) Keohane and Victor offer this
public goods has a similar structure.

simple matrix to divide international agreements into four types, based on two variables. One is whether the level of agreement is
self-reinforcing (coordination) or not (cooperation). The other is the level of "joint gains" that could potentially be achieved through
agreements. Here's a chart: They run through examples of international agreements that fit in all four boxes. For our purposes, the

international climate action has long been stuck in the lower left box because
collaboration is relatively shallow, only a modest amount of joint gains are being achieved. Last year's
US-China climate accord and the Paris agreement are good examples; both amount
to codifying their respective members' national interests. There's little to
push countries beyond their immediate interests, so the joint gains (in terms of climate
mitigation) remain far lower than what's possible . International climate change agreements need to be lifted to
the upper-left box. As an example of international collaboration that has made that ascent ,
Keohane and Victor cite trade. More open trade began with smaller, bi- and multi-lateral
problem is that

agreements to lower or remove the worst, costliest tariffs, actions clearly in participating countries' interests. As
countries worked together and developed reciprocal relationships, they built up the trust needed to create
institutions like the WTO, which provided a level of central governance that enabled greater cooperation and
greater joint gains. In other words, it was not enough merely to agree on the abstract desirability
of more trade. There was a long, deliberate process of ratcheting up, building
trust, and forming institutions.

US-China cooperation is key to develop metrics for comparing

policy implementation in different contexts---thats key to
make the Paris agreement enforceable and resolve concerns of
unfairness
Joseph Aldy 16, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of
Government, Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States:
Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy, February 2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf
[INDC = Intended Nationally-Determined Contribution]
INDCs describe what a country intends to do to combat global climate change post2020, including controlling GHG emissions, building climate-resilience, mobilizing financial resources, facilitating technology
development and transfer, as well as enhancing institutional capacity for mitigation and adaptation, based on a countrys own
assessment of its domestic political and socioeconomic conditionsand its own capabilities and opportunities for mitigation and

Because there were only a few suggestions from COP decision 1/ CP.2025 on the form or
content of INDCs, the INDCs submitted to date vary widely in terms of scope, strategies,
timeframes,26 and types of mitigation goals. The United States and the European Union, among others,
adaptation.

have adopted absolute, economy-wide emissions-reduction targets relative to a particular base year. Some countries have
established target years by which their CO2 or broader GHG emissions will peak, including China (2030), Singapore (2030), and
South Africa (2025). A number of countries intend to reduce their emissions relative to a forecast business-as-usual level for the year
2030, such as Argentina, Indonesia, and Mexico. Another set of countries plans to reduce emission intensity, measured as the ratio
of CO2 emissions to GDP, including Chile, China, and India. While assessment of other effort (e.g., for adaptation) is also needed,

it

is particularly important to ensure the comparability of countries mitigation

efforts. The ability to assess mitigation ambitionand compare it across different
countriesis important for addressing equity and ambition concerns in the
context of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Procedures for comparing effort
could also facilitateand indeed, make possible enhancing clarification, transparency, and
understanding of the INDCs. Comparison could facilitate linkage between and among the highly heterogeneous
mitigation policies stated or implied in various INDCs, which could include both market-based policies and non-market regulatory
approaches. Such procedures could even allow countries to link various non-market regulatory approaches. Finally, enabling
countries to compare post-2020 mitigation targets and assess progress toward post-2020 mitigation commitments could help
provide the basis for an equitable collaborative process through which individual parties increase their climate-change mitigation
obligations over time.27

It is difficult to compare highly heterogeneous mitigation

commitments. Table 2 shows the 2020 and post-2020 (Paris regime) mitigation targets adopted by the European Union
(E.U.), the United States (U.S.), and Chinaas well as the E.U.s Kyoto Protocol commitments. As indicated in the table, the E.U.
and U.S. commitments include economy-wide, quantified emissions-reduction
targets. China prefers to calculate emissions reductions against a projected, business-asusual (BAU) emissions trajectorythat is against a forecast of Chinas GHG emissions in the absence of any new mitigation
polices. Chinas 2020 and post-2020 mitigation goals are expressed in terms of a reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per
unit of GDP), and Chinas INDC states that total CO2 emissions will peak by 2030. In addition to these goals, Chinas INDC includes

Despite such
disparities, techniques may be availableor possible to constructfor comparing disparate
mitigation systemsfor example, an emissions trading (cap-and-trade) system in one country and a performance
an increase in forest volume and in the share of non-fossil fuels in the countrys overall energy mix.28

Current research suggests four principles for evaluating possible metrics for
comparing heterogeneous mitigation effort. First, an ideal metric should be comprehensive , capturing the
entire effort undertaken by a country to achieve its mitigation commitment. Second, a metric should focus on
observableand preferably quantifiablecharacteristics of effort. Third, individual countries or
stakeholders should be able to reproduce a metric given (a) the inputs used by analysts, and
(b) available public information . Finally, given the global nature of climate change, a metric should be
universal, constructible by and applicable to as broad a set of countries as possible .
standard in another.32

Candidates are emission-related metrics (the historical norm), abatement cost, and carbon- or energy-price metrics. Each has its
advantages, disadvantages, and appropriate potential applications in a system of voluntary, heterogeneous mitigation targets. The
first set of metrics concerns emissions or other emissions-related physical measures. Emissions-based metrics have several
advantages. First, they are directly linked to the environmental outcome of concernin this case mitigating climate change by
reducing the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. Emission levels are often known (though capacity to measure emissions
varies from country to country) and are therefore not subject to major disputes. On the other hand, it has been difficult to form an
international consensus about the specific form of an emissions-based metric, since different choices with respect to base year,
transient versus accumulated emissions, or absolute versus per capita or intensity-based emissions would give different countries
an advantage. As such, the process of comparisonor specific methods or metricscould be politically sensitive in individual
countries, especially in the context of multilateral processes. Moreover, absolute emissions can be affected by economic booms
and recessions independent of mitigation effortsin these situations, projected emissions relative to a BAU scenario may provide a
better indicator of country-level effort. However, emissions relative to forecast values are not directly measurable, and BAU
projections can bring a great deal of uncertainty. Comparison among individual countries mitigation efforts based on emission
related metrics may also encounter technical difficulties, such as different timeframes, types of GHGs, coverage of sectors, and
accounting methodologies adopted by individual countries. A second set of possible metrics, drawn from research though not yet
put into practice,33 would focus on GHG prices. Prices could be explicit, as in the case of cap-and-trade systems or carbon taxes, or
prices could be implicit, as in the shadow prices in a non-market regulatory system for reducing CO2 emissions. Price-based metrics
could also focus on net energy prices or changes in energy prices over time. One advantage of such metrics is that market prices
are observable, and in countries that adopt cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes, the explicit carbon price offers a relatively
direct measure of the level of mitigation effort being undertaken by a country or region. Carbon prices are also a direct measure of
the strength of incentives for long-term investment in mitigation and the deployment of low-carbon technologies. However, pricebased metrics also have important downsides. Volatile exchange rates can make it difficult to compare across countries and a pricebased approach cannot easily capture the level of effort associated with non-price policies, such as fuel standards. A third set of
potential metricsagain not yet implemented in the context of the UNFCCC processinvolves the costs of mitigation. Such metrics
could focus on an absolute measure of costs incurred to mitigate GHG emissions, or on costs incurred relative to GDP. Mitigation
costs can be estimated by modeling the effect of actual policies, or by analyses that attempt to identify the least-cost option for
achieving a certain emissions objective. The cost of implementing a given policy closely reflects the level of effort associated with
that policy, which is an advantage of cost-based metrics. But an important drawback of these metrics is that mitigation costs are not
directly observable and must be estimated using economic modeling. Moreover, if the cost of a policy is taken as an indicator of
effort, the use of a cost-based metric could have the effect of rewarding costly but ineffective policies. In that case, estimating costs
for both actual policies and the theoretical least-cost approach could help identify opportunities for improving on existing policies.

There is no single metric that satisfies all four design principles for an ideal metric
(i.e., comprehensiveness, reproducibility, universality, and that the metric is based on observable data). Individual
countries preference for specific metrics that reflect their own interests whether
emissions-related, which have been implemented extensively in practice, or other proposed approaches may result in a
lack of consensus among national governments that are members of the UNFCCC .
Some governments have such significantly divergent ideas on equitable effort sharing as to make official efforts to compare and
assess mitigation effort in the INDCs under the UNFCCC regime infeasible. Therefore, academics could provide useful and
informative advice by developing a suite of metrics to assess and compare the mitigation efforts of different countries to facilitate
mutual understanding and encourage increased ambition, taking into account the transition of emission trajectories, historical
responsibility, cumulative emissions, national circumstances and capacity, and other factors. This is analogous to the approach
commonly taken to evaluate the macroeconomic health of an economy, in which a set of metrics, such as GDP, unemployment rate,
inflation rate, and interest rates may be considered. Similarly, using a suite of metrics rather than a single metric will better

Beyond cooperating
to develop metrics that can be used to compare country-level climate mitigation
efforts, China and the United States can work together to develop rigorous,
transparent, and systematic mechanisms for collecting and analyzing data and monitoring policy
implementation (Aldy 2014). Transparent mechanisms for evaluating policy
implementation can speed the learning process among different countries by identifying best
characterize the overall level of mitigation effort associated with a diverse set of climate policies.

practices and common mitigation challenges. Such mechanisms may also be helpful in assessing collective mitigation efforts and
evaluating the aggregate cost and efficacy of those efforts. The participation of potentially neutral third parties, such as
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and academic researchers can support the gathering of accurate
information, when desired by UNFCCC member governments. Experience with past non-climate agreements suggests that
delegating responsibility for information collection and dissemination to such institutions can lower the costs of implementing an
international agreement and enhance countries technical and policy-making capacities. Analysis generated by such organizations
could improve transparency and help provide a scientific basis for the review process under the Paris Agreementhelping build a

basis for conversations and facilitated dialogues between governments interested in learning about policies and outcomes in other
countries. In particular, other existing international agreements and organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the
World Trade Organization, the Montreal Protocol, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), may offer experience and lessons in connection with collecting and processing
data to help establish and operate a transparency system under the Paris Agreement. Some international organizations, such as

China and
the United States could cooperate to identify the best approaches to building a
transparent regime for review and assessment of progress under the Paris Agreement
conducted by national governments and perhaps supported by third-party organizations. The two countries will each
bring strengths to bear on this important set of issues , yielding an outcome that will
advance efforts to address climate change under the new Paris regime.
CITES, formally rely on nongovernmental organizations to review national reports and monitor implementation.

Cooperation is also vital to develop and link emissions trading

schemes---that creates a cascade effect and resolves equity
concerns
Joseph Aldy 16, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of
Government, Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States:
Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy, February 2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf
[ETS = Emissions Trading Scheme]
One approach to bilateral collaboration is to mutually review the lessons learned
from emissions trading in both countries and in other parts of the world, as a guide to further
developing domestic ETSs. Among the important lessons that might usefully be studied:
Interaction of various policies (in the same or overlapping jurisdictions) that reduce GHG emissions
either directly or indirectlymay be problematic for ETS performance . One example is Californias Low
Carbon Fuel Standard in the presence of the California ETS. If such complementary policies affect emitters with obligations under
the ETS, they provide no additional environmental benefit (allowances will simply be re-allocated by the market), they depress
allowance prices (by reducing demand), drive up aggregate abatement costs (by introducing abatement-cost heterogeneity), and

Policy
regarding offsets must be considered carefully . Offsets can reduce compliance costs, but limiting their
can constrain technological innovation in the longer term, as a result of depressed prices (Goulder and Stavins, 2011).

geographic origin so that emissions reduction occurs only within the ETS jurisdiction makes little sense with regard to climate
change, which is a global commons problem. On the other hand, co-benefitsespecially from reduced use of coal for generating
electricityare indeed geographically specific. There are other issues to be considered with offsets, as well, beyond the scope of this

the narrower the geographic and

sectoral coverage of an ETS, the more leakage there will be, where leakage refers to the
paperincluding inherent verification problems in offset systems. In general,

migration of emitters outside the jurisdiction to seek lower production costs. (With regard to electricity markets, such migration may
be virtual, as injurisdiction utilities purchase potentially lower-cost power from outside the jurisdiction.)22. Upstream

systems with broad geographic coverage will experience relatively less leakage . An
advantage that emissions trading systems have over carbon tax systems is that the initial allocation of allowances may be used to
secure political support for the system and otherwise enhance equity (because allowances have cash value). This can be
accomplished without adversely affecting the environmental performance of the system, because the manner in which allowances
are initially allocated will not typically affect the incentives facing firms with mitigation obligations (Hahn and Stavins, 2011); these
incentives depend on marginal abatement costs, which are not affected by the initial allocation of allowances. Finally, leakage and
competitiveness concerns may be addressed in an emissions trading system by distributing free allowances in proportion to firms
output or production (a so-called updating, output-based allocation system, used in the California ETS, as noted above).

Exchanging insights into these and other lessons is a major way that China and the United
States can continue to cooperate with regard to the development of emissions trading .
As a next step in identifying opportunities for cooperation, it is useful to examine how the political and economic
context in China and the United States differs. A first significant difference lies in the policy-making processes in
the two countries. In the United States, the political parties have polarized perspectives on climate change, and carbon markets
have emerged principally in the more liberal states, in the absence of a national framework. National climate policy can be affected
by the results of presidential and congressional elections. In contrast, in China, consensus on policy making is reached at different
levels of government. Once consensus is built, political will can be translated into policies that are then implemented by ministries
and various levels of governments. Since the development of a national carbon emissions trading market was included in the Twelfth

Five Year Plan, which is Chinas highest-level national plan and one that the Chinese government takes seriously, stakeholders can

China and
the United States offer different socioeconomic contexts for the implementation of
climate policy. Compared to the United States, which has achieved a relatively homogeneous state of economic
development, different regions of China are at very different stages of economic
development. While the coastal provinces increasingly face a problem of excess production capacity, the inland provinces
have reasonable confidence that the central government will launch its national ETS in the coming years. Second,

are still in the process of industrialization and rapid urbanization. Thus, a national cap-and-trade scheme for China will largely be
shaped by centrallocal interactions in the allocation of emission allowances to different provinces, taking into consideration the
uneven social and economic development status of these provinces. How to avoid leakage and balance economic growth and
emissions reductions in the less developed provinces presents a major challenge in the design of national ETS for China.

Third,

the U.S. economy is a mature market economy with comprehensive rules,

regulations, and mechanisms for resolving conflicts. In contrast, China has a market economy with many features
remaining from the central planning era. A number of these features could create challenges for a national ETS, which relies on wellfunctioning market mechanisms. As an example, researchers have pointed to potential problems associated with Chinas highly
regulated electricity market. Regulated electricity prices could mean the cost of carbon emissions in electricity production will not be
passed through to electricity consumers in a timely manner. However, in 2015 the government announced a plan to deepen
electricity-system reform that would introduce competition and allow market-based electricity-price setting in non-public sectors.
How to make a market-based solution work in an environment with many non-market features remains an important question for

substantial opportunities for China

U.S. cooperation exist at both the micro and macro levels. China has strong
political will and the ability to quickly put that will into action, but lacks experience, institutional
capacity, and research and technical support from academia. The United States can help
China overcome these deficits by collaborating on the design of a national trading
system, including detailed rules to handle issues such as allowance allocation, entry and exit from the ETS, price
ceilings and floors, and allowance banking and borrowing. China also needs to improve its market
environment at the macro level and reform policies that prevent market mechanisms from
functioning as intended. Close communication between scholars in the two countries can also help China build its research
capacity in a field that has been unfamiliar to many Chinese academics until recently. Other forms of collaboration
for example, to accelerate the transfer of low-carbon technologies and expertise can help
scholars and policy makers. Given their similarities and differences,

Chinese enterprises comply with new climate policies. (There has been considerable collaboration between the two countries on

quick action by China

to launch regional and national ETS programs can help motivate the United States
to initiate more cap-and-trade systems and speed progress toward a more
comprehensive national approach to climate mitigation. There has already been considerable
energy-technology innovation in the past; see bibliography at the end of this paper.) Meanwhile,

collaboration between the state of California and the various Chinese jurisdictions that are implementing the pilot ETSs discussed in
the previous section, as well as some interaction between the national NDRC and California.23 This collaboration has been useful,

there are a number of similarities between the ETSs in China and the U nited
States. The programs in both countries have shaped initial carbon markets and
achieved certain policy goals, but are also imperfect in some respects. In both countries, issues have
given that

emerged with respect to specific design features and impacts (e.g., in terms of leakage, competitiveness, and barriers to linkage).

an important area for longer-term ChinaU.S. cooperation is direct linkage

establishing trading connections between different national and sub-national
policy systems that allow emission reduction efforts to be recognized and
redistributed across systems. Linkage brings several potential benefits. It can reduce abatement costs across linked
Finally,
that is,

regions by allowing regions with higher abatement costs to take advantage of abatement opportunities in regions with lower costs.
By expanding the geographic scope of an emissions trading system, linkage can also effectively reduce the influence of local market
power in carbon markets and mitigate price volatility. Finallyby creating opportunities for regions with lower-cost abatement
opportunities to benefit from investment from higher-cost regions linkage

can advance the goal of

distributional equity, as exemplified by the UNFCCCs principle of common but differentiated responsibilities,
without sacrificing cost-effectiveness. However, effective linkage also requires
coordination on a number of key issues, such as the definition of key terms and standards and procedures for
emissions accounting.24

Cooperation on emissions trading spills over and enables more

dramatic emissions reductions
Jeff Swartz 16, International Policy Director, International Emissions Trading
Association, Chinas National Emissions Trading System: Implications for Carbon
Markets and Trade, March 2016,
http://www.ieta.org/resources/China/Chinas_National_ETS_Implications_for_Carbon_
Markets_and_Trade_ICTSD_March2016_Jeff_Swartz.pdf
the overall UNFCCC negotiating process was widely ridiculed as
being too slow or hindered by obstructionist countries who did not want to advance global
climate policy. In some aspects, these issues have hampered the functionality and ambition
of a global carbon market to date. David Victor has argued that the overall lack of global progress on
Ahead of COP 21 in Paris,

climate change to date is in large part due to the difficulties in bargaining between a very large number of countries
at the UNFCCC. He contends that diplomatic club

arrangements of a small number of countries

addressing specific climate policy issues would be more effective than the big tent of
countries status quo.29 Climate clubs are a particular type of cooperation arrangements whereby groups of
countries agree to work together on a specific issue by following the clubs rules in exchange for exclusive
membership benefits; meaning benefits that would only accrue to club members. The notion of exclusivity is
important to incentivise compliance among members and create interest in joining the club among non-members.

This concept can contribute to scaling up ambition and action at the global
level, and potentially manifest into future carbon market clubs . Climate clubs could
be formed around a range of different issues. Given the proliferation of carbon
markets and the gains from cooperation, this is a particularly promising area.
A carbon market club could work outside yet in parallel to the UNFCCC by enabling countries
that are operating ETSs to exclusively recognise other countries emission reduction
units and harmonising standards on accounting and MRV. In theory, it would be easier to
put into practice than the international emissions trading provisions and flexibility mechanisms from the Kyoto
Protocol as it would be an easier negotiation amongst a willing coalition of countries. It would likely emerge
amongst wealthier countries or OECD member countries first, rather than a mix of countries as would be the case in
a global carbon market established under the UNFCCC. A carbon market club could potentially emerge as a result
of a specific provision in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which recognises countries ability to engage in
cooperative approaches involving internationally transferred mitigation outcomes. Some countries might interpret
this provision as endorsing or allowing them to develop bilateral or plurilateral carbon markets outside the UNFCCC
process. Those markets will need to report back into the UNFCCC process for purposes of compliance with the
Agreement and the five-yearly stocktake process. This could be interesting for some ambitious countries who
perceive the UNFCCC negotiating process as too slow and/or having a monopoly on the governance of carbon
markets. There is a perceived danger, however, that many developing countries would likely be left out of initial
club arrangements and would thus not able to partake in the clubs benefits. This could potentially undermine
broader multilateral climate policy efforts at the UNFCCC and weaken the ultimate goals of OECD countries climate
diplomacy. In order to deal with this challenge, non-members of the clubs could for example be given observer
status, which would not only increase transparency, but could also pave the way for them to eventually join the
club.30 One

of the most anticipated gains from club participation would be greater

cost-effectiveness in meeting various national emission reduction targets.
The cost savings could lead to greater ambition amongst club member countries
to reduce emissions, for example by scrapping free allocations, increasing the schemes coverage, and
tightening caps. This increased ambition is likely the most important global benefit ,
especially in light of the more ambitious 1.5 degrees Celsius goal established by the Paris Agreement. A carbon
market club would need to produce common market infrastructure such as registries,
accounting rules, and offset protocols, and could provide club members with intrinsic benefits
in the form of exclusive trading of emissions units, increased liquidity, price stability, and policy support from other
club members. Technical issues such as MRV, unit tracking, and so on should be worked out amongst club members
in a transparent and open working group. Moreover,

members of the carbon market club could

gain political and reputational benefits from joining a club with higher ambition and
more robust trading architecture rather than simply following a unilateral carbon market approach.
This could help overcome political restraints that large emerging economies may have about
joining the club. Criteria for joining a carbon market club might include the type of emissions cap countries impose,
the long-term emissions reduction goal of a countrys policy, and/or the level of financial and political commitment
a member would bring to the club. Chinas participation in a club would yield both positive and potentially negative
impacts which the paper will address in Chapter 5.

Action now solves warming---stabilizing climate change below

2 degrees allows management of its impacts and prevents its
catastrophic consequences
Laura Segafredo 15, manager of the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project,
former senior economist at the ClimateWorks Foundation, Six Tough Questions
About Climate Change, 11/30/15, http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2015/11/30/sixtough-questions-about-climate-change/
There is still time and room for limiting climate change within the 2C limit that
scientists consider relatively safe, and that countries endorsed in Copenhagen and Cancun. But clearly
the window is closing quickly. I think that the most important message is that we need
to start really, really soon, putting the world on a trajectory of stabilizing and
reducing emissions. The temperature change has a direct relationship with the
cumulative amount of emissions that are in the atmosphere, so the more we keep emitting at
the pace that we are emitting today, the more steeply we will have to go on a downward trajectory and the more
expensive it will be.
Today we are already experiencing an average change in global temperature of .8. With the cumulative amount of
emissions that we are going to emit into the atmosphere over the next years, we will easily reach 1.5 without even
trying to change that trajectory.

Two degrees might still be doable, but it requires significant political will and fast
action. And even 2 is a significant amount of warming for the planet, and will have consequences in
terms of sea level rise, ecosystem changes, possible extinctions of species, displacements of people, diseases,

and more. But if we can contain global

warming within those 2, we can manage those effects. I think thats really the message of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reportsthats why the 2 limit was chosen, in a sense. Its a
level of warming where we can manage the risks and the consequences.
Anything beyond that would be much, much worse.
agriculture productivity changes, health related effects

Warming causes extinction---triggers tipping points and

positive feedbacks which make the planet uninhabitable
Naomi Klein 14, award-winning journalist, syndicated columnist, former Miliband
Fellow at the London School of Economics, member of the board of directors of
350.org, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, pp. 12-14
In a 2012 report, the World Bank laid out the gamble implied by that target. As

global warming
approaches and exceeds 2-degrees Celsius, there is a risk of triggering nonlinear
tipping elements. Examples include the disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet leading to
more rapid sea-level rise, or large-scale Amazon dieback drastically affecting ecosystems,
rivers, agriculture, energy production, and livelihoods . This would further add to 21st-century
global warming and impact entire continents. In other words, once we allow temperatures to climb past a certain
point, where the mercury stops is not in our control. But the bigger problemand the reason Copenhagen caused

such great despairis that because governments did not agree to binding targets, they are free to pretty much
ignore their commitments. Which is precisely what is happening. Indeed, emissions are rising so rapidly that unless
something radical changes within our economic structure, 2 degrees now looks like a utopian dream. And its not
just environmentalists who are raising the alarm. The World Bank also warned when it released its report that
were

on track to a 4-C warmer world [by centurys end] marked by extreme heat
waves, declining global food stocks, loss of ecosystems and biodiversity, and
life-threatening sea level rise. And the report cautioned that, there is also no certainty
that adaptation to a 4-C world is possible. Kevin Anderson, former director (now deputy
director) of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, which has quickly established itself as one of the U.Ks premier
climate research institutions, is even blunter; he says

4 degrees Celsius warming7.2 degrees Fahrenheit

is incompatible with an organized, equitable, and civilized global community . We

dont know exactly what a 4 degree Celsius world would look like, but even the best-case scenario is likely to be

Four degrees of warming could raise global sea levels by 1 or possibly even
2 meters by 2100 (and would lock in at least a few additional meters over future centuries). This would
calamitous.

drown some island nations such as the Maldives and Tuvalu, and inundate many coastal areas from Ecuador and
Brazil to the Netherlands to much of California and the northeastern United States as well as huge swaths of South
and Southeast Asia. Major cities likely in jeopardy include Boston, New York, greater Los Angeles, Vancouver,

brutal heat waves that can kill tens of

thousands of people, even in wealthy countries, would become entirely unremarkable
summer events on every continent but Antarctica. The heat would also cause staple
crops to suffer dramatic yield losses across the globe (it is possible that Indian wheat and
U.S. could plummet by as much as 60 percent), this at a time when demand will be surging due to
population growth and a growing demand for meat . And since crops will be facing not just heat
stress but also extreme events such as wide-ranging droughts, flooding, or pest outbreaks, the losses could
easily turn out to be more severe than the models have predicted . When you add
ruinous hurricanes, raging wildfires, fisheries collapses, widespread disruptions to
water supplies, extinctions, and globe-trotting diseases to the mix, it indeed
becomes difficult to imagine that a peaceful, ordered society could be sustained (that
London, Mumbai, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Meanwhile,

is, where such a thing exists in the first place). And keep in mind that these are the optimistic scenarios in which
warming is more or less stabilized at 4 degrees Celsius and does not trigger tipping points beyond which runaway
warming would occur. Based on the latest modeling, it is becoming safer to assume that

4 degrees could

bring about a number of extremely dangerous feedback loops an Arctic that is regularly
ice-free in September, for instance, or, according to one recent study, global vegetation that is too
saturated to act as a reliable sink, leading to more carbon being emitted rather than stored. Once
this happens, any hope of predicting impacts pretty much goes out the window. And this process may be starting
sooner than anyone predicted. In May 2014, NASA and the University of California, Irvine scientists revealed that
glacier melt in a section of West Antarctica roughly the size of France now appears unstoppable. This likely spells
down for the entire West Antarctic ice sheet, which according to lead study author Eric Rignot comes with a sea
level rise between three and five metres. Such an event will displace millions of people worldwide. The
disintegration, however, could unfold over centuries and there is still time for emission reductions to slow down the

plenty of
mainstream analysts think that on our current emissions trajectory, we are headed for even
more than 4 degrees of warming. In 2011, the usually staid International Energy Agency (IEA) issued
a report predicting that we are actually on track for 6 degrees Celsius10.8 degrees Fahrenheit
of warming. And as the IEAs chief economist put it: Everybody, even the school children, knows that this will
have catastrophic implications for all of us. (The evidence indicates that 6 degrees of
warming is likely to set in motion several major tipping points not only slower ones such as
the aforementioned breakdown of the West Antarctic ice sheet, but possibly more abrupt ones, like massive
releases of methane from Arctic permafrost.) The accounting giant PricewaterhouseCoopers as also
process and prevent the worst.

Much more frightening than any of this is the fact that

published a report warning businesses that we are headed for 4-C , or even 6-C of warming. These various
projections are the equivalent of every alarm in your house going off simultaneously. And then every alarm on your
street going off as well, one by one by one. They mean, quite simply, that

climate change has become

an existential crisis for the human species. The only historical precedent for a crisis of this
depth and scale was the Cold War fear that we were headed toward nuclear holocaust, which would have made
much of the planet uninhabitable. But that was (and remains) a threat; a slim possibility, should geopolitics spiral
out of control. The vast majority of nuclear scientists never told us that we were almost certainly going to put our
civilization in peril if we kept going about our daily lives as usual, doing exactly what we were already going, which
is what climate scientists have been telling us for years. As the Ohio State University climatologist Lonnie G.
Thompson, a world-renowned specialist on glacier melt, explained in 2010, Climatologists, like other
scientists, tend to be a stolid group. We are not given to theatrical rantings about falling
skies. Most of us are far more comfortable in our laboratories or gathering data in the field than we are giving
interviews to journalists or speaking before Congressional committees. When then are climatologists speaking out

all of us are now convinced that

global warming poses a clear and present danger to civilization.
about the dangers of global warming? The answer is that virtually

1AC Relations Advantage

ADVANTAGE () IS RELATIONS:
US-China competition is increasing, but options exist to
improve relations and limit suspicion---cooperation is key
Dingding Chen 16, assistant professor of Government and Public Administration
at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute,
Cooperation Is the Only Way Ahead for US-China Relations, 3/10/16,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/cooperation-is-the-only-way-ahead-for-us-chinarelations/
Indeed, Nius new essay sheds some light on U.S.-China relations from a Chinese perspective. It is particularly

both countries are increasingly suspicious of each others intentions

in East Asia and beyond. The United States is suspicious of a rising China that tries to
push U.S. influence out of Asia and, in the process, becomes a regional hegemon. China, on the other
hand, suspects that the United States wants to block its rise for fear of losing its hegemonic status
in world politics. Such a deep level of distrust was already evident as early as 2012, when
timely given that

Chinas Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal in the United States co-wrote a report on strategic distrust between the
two powers. Unfortunately, tensions between the two powers have only increased due to disputes in cybersecurity,
the South China Sea issue, and trade competition.

the best term to characterize U.S.-China relations is

competitive interdependence, meaning that the two countries are competing in Asia, but also are
Niu, however, believes that

constrained by their economically interdependent relationship. Furthermore, he points out that the deterioration of
U.S.-China relations in the last few years should not be blamed on the U.S. side alone, as some in China would
suggest. Many favor a U.S. conspiracy theory, but such a view is not only intellectually lazy, but also unsupported
by empirical facts. The U.S. side certainly has its own share of the blame, but perhaps more important is what has
changed within China.
That change, according to Niu, is more fundamental to explaining Chinas new foreign policy approach. Questions
that we should be asking ourselves include: 1) Is Chinas central foreign policy changing? 2) How does Chinas
leadership define the nature of U.S.-China relations? 3) Is Chinese public opinion moving to the left? All these
questions are very important if our goal is to stabilize and improve U.S.-China relations in the future. Unfortunately
again, we have not seen many good-quality studies addressing these questions in either the Chinese and English
academic literatures.

Niu also puts emphasis on the strategic nature of a cooperative U.S.-China

relationship. This is especially important because Niu is referring to long term strategy. This refutes the view
that a cooperative U.S.-China relationship is only for purpose of convenience, paving the way for China to replace
the United States in the future.
Undoubtedly, Nius views in China will be hotly debated. Some might disagree with him on the issue of U.S.
intentions and others might agree with him on the changes occurring within China. Either way, it is fortunate that
we have prominent scholars like Niu Jun in China who remind us, again, from a historical perspective, that

a good

and stable relationship between the United States and China benefits both
tremendously. This is very important as the two major powers head into a new era of
competition in East Asia. The key for the U.S.-China relationship going forward will
be to let interdependence put constraints on their competition in a healthy
way.

Expanding cooperation on climate issues is key to the entire

relationship---outweighs other issues and specifically spills
over to deescalate security competition
Melanie Hart 14, Director for China Policy at the Center for American Progress,
Expanding the Frontier of U.S.-China Strategic Cooperation Will Require New
Thinking on Both Sides of the Pacific, 11/10/14,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/11/10/100852/expan
ding-the-frontier-of-u-s-china-strategic-cooperation-will-require-new-thinking-onboth-sides-of-the-pacific/
in U.S.-China relations, it is actions rather than words that
can turn the tide. The United States should look for opportunities to actively engage
China in international decision making in low-risk way, and China should look for opportunities to
As with all fundamental problems

actively demonstrate that it will use those new opportunities responsibly. The eight U.S. and eight Chinese essays in
the three Center for American Progress conference reports offer multiple ideas for both sides to consider.

Cooperation on energy and climate issues serves a critical role that goes far beyond
the energy and climate space Even in private discussions at the track II level, the energy and
climate track has become the undisputed anchor for the bilateral relationship.
That anchor should be protected against future political shifts in either nation. On issues regarding
security in the Asia-Pacific and U.S. versus Chinese perceptions of global order, the October
conference discussions sometimes became rather heated. Even when discussing these issues in
a private group and among friends, U.S. and Chinese observers have fundamentally different views. In contrast,
on energy and climate change, the divides are primarily technical in nature. To be sure,
global climate negotiations can be very heated, but at a bilateral level, U.S.-China commonalities seem
to outweigh U.S.-China differences in this space. Even more importantly, U.S. and Chinese leaders have
been able to leverage those common interests to make real progress on pressing challenges. In the past two years,
U.S. and Chinese leaders have signed new agreements and launched new projects on issues ranging from smart

progress on energy and

climate change serves as an invaluable anchor for a relationship that also covers
issue areas where the two nations have less common ground . In the October dialogue,
many heated discussions on security issues ended with someone commenting, Well, at least
we have energy and climate. That comment alone was often enough to shift the
groups mindset from frustration to cooperation, because the breathtaking progress the
United States and China have already achieved in the energy and climate space serves as proof that
as deep as the differences may be, the United States and China can eventually overcome
them.
grid technology to the reduction of hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs. The steady

Scenario one is security competition:

US-China security relations are nearing a tipping point--expanding cooperation is key to prevent a downward spiral
into war in the East and South China Seas
David M. Lampton 15, Director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and Chair of the Asia Foundation,
transcript of Dr. Lamptons speech titled: A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is
Upon Us as given at the conference Chinas Reform: Opportunities and
Challenges, May 2015, http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-inu-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/

Today, soon after May 4th and in the context of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, the question is whether or not America and
China can, again, find such vision and leadership in todays far different circumstances. My purpose in the frank remarks to follow is
not to depress or offend, but rather to motivate all of us to push events in a better, more mutually beneficial direction. My spirit is at
one with Minister Lis exhortation that we amplify what we have in common. For eight U.S. and five
Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuitybroadly speaking, constructive
engagement. This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required
time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But, none of these challenges ever destroyed overall

in both our nations that we each had fundamental, shared interests

requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains .
assessments

Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives in either society to rethink
fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to live with the hegemon, as one respected Chinese professor put it, and
Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After the 9/11 attacks on America, China was
seen as non-threatening, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the War on Terror. In a reflective moment after the 9/11
attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns HopkinsSAIS in which he said, We have seen the
enemy, and it is not China. In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests that

The positive balance between hope

and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have
changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our
respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization. We are
witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive
U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American
policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American primacy.
subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights.

In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to Chinas achieving its rightful international role
and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the
narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous
American thinking, in the following terms: In

Beijings eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to Chinas

rise American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and
sabotage its political leadership. The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive
about Beijing: Beijings long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese
sphere of influence spanning the region.[1] Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and
global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative
narratives have grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong,
developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and
Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its
foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and black hands unsettles most outside

If developments continue along the current

trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional,
accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less
observers, not least Americans. What is happening?

cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished.
What can be done?

Stabilizing South China Sea naval arms races prevents nuclear

war
Polina Tikhonova 15, Russia expert at ValueWalk, citing Zhang Baohui, Prof @
Political Science and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies @ Lingnan, US
Faces Nuclear War Threat Over South China Sea Chinese Professor, 11/28,
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-nuclear-war-south-china-sea/
China is willing to start a nuclear war with the United States over the South China
Sea, according to a Chinese professor. Beijings rhetoric after an incident with a U.S. warship
sailed to the South China Sea suggests that Chinese decision-makers could resort to
more concrete and forceful measures to counter the U.S. Navy, according to Zhang
Baohui, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific
Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. If so, a face-off between the two navies

becomes inevitable. Even worse, the face-off may trigger an escalation towards
military conflicts, the professor wrote in a piece for RSIS Commentary. But, according to Baohui, the
U.S. military is oblivious to this scenario, since Washington decision-makers think
Americas conventional military superiority discourages China from responding to
such provocations in the South China Sea militarily . However, this U.S.
expectation is flawed, as China is a major nuclear power, the professor wrote.
When cornered, nuclear-armed states can threaten asymmetric escalation to
deter an adversary from harming its key interests, he added. Baohui then refers to the military
parade in Beijing that took place on Sept. 3 and revealed that Chinas new generation of tactical missiles such as
the DF-26 are capable of being armed with nuclear warheads. Moreover, according to the latest reports, Chinas
air-launched long-range cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. U.S. could provoke nuclear war

the disputed islands

present Chinas strategic interests, which is why this kind of asymmetry in
stakes would certainly give Beijing an advantage in the balance of resolve
over Washington, according to the professor. And if the South China Sea situation escalates and starts
with China And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in the South China Sea,

spiraling into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face a choice of either backing
down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and the worlds largest military force with a strength of approximately
2.285 million personnel. Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs, either in reputation or human

it would be unwise for the U.S. to further provoke

China in the disputed area, since Chinas willingness to defend its interests,
reputation and deterrence credibility could easily escalate the conflict into a
military confrontation that would ultimately harm U.S. interests, according to the
professor. China will join Russia in nuclear war with NATO With NATO member state Turkey downing a Russian
lives, for the U.S., Baohui wrote. So

jet in its airspace, there is already a high risk of military confrontation in the world. And with China being so close
and allied with Russia, Beijing decision-makers could see the incident with the Russian warplane as an opportunity
to avenge the West for the South China Sea provocations.

Unchecked East China Sea conflict goes nuclear

Robert Ayson 14, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University; and
Desmond Ball, Emeritus Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at
the Australian National University; November 2014, Escalation in North Asia: A
Strategic Challenge for Australia, http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG
%20%2318%20Web.pdf
There is no guarantee that China and Japan will be able to keep their bilateral military
interactions in the East China Sea below the threshold of armed violence, even if it is their
continuing preferences to do so. This event would not necessarily ruin Asias long record for the avoidance of major
interstate wars. The downing of a plane or the sinking of a coastguard vessel would not automatically spell the

Asias relative peace has induced a tendency to assume

that war of almost any sort is largely unthinkable because it would be so costly,
including for economic reasons. It is important to question any prevailing assumptions
that this logic will remain robust in a serious Sino-Japanese crisis which could well be just
beginning of a catastrophic conflict. But

around the corner.

There may also be a corresponding assumption that Japan would not be the first to use force because of longstanding constitutional and moral restraints. Again this should be questioned. Some years back, when the
transformation of the Japanese Coastguard (JCG) was already becoming evident, Richard Samuels observed that in
contrast to the Maritime Self Defense Force (which is denied authority to fire on enemy ships unless fired on first)
the JCG is now allowed by law to initiate armed conflict under conditions that are vaguely defined and easily
justifiable in retrospect. Local commanders are now authorised to use force under the conditions of justifiable
defense and during an emergency. 2 M. Taylor Fravel has argued that China tends to restrict its use of force in
territorial disputes to situations when its claim is weak.3 But this limitation is of little comfort whenever the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is seen as one of those weaker claims.

Should minor hostilities eventuate, either accidentally or by design, a good deal would then depend on the political

nationalist sentiment
in both countries would likely put both governments in a difficult position, even if
restraint was their preferred option. The paucity of ongoing political contact
between China and Japan at the highest level (in contrast to Sino-US relations under Xi and
Obama) might make an agreement on restraint harder to agree, as would the absence of the
temperature of the Sino-Japanese relationship. In the event of any public coverage,

maritime communications mechanism that the two countries are currently discussing. There is little sign that SinoJapanese strategic relations constitute what Coral Bell once called an adverse partnership which the Cold War
superpowers had already begun to develop by the time they found themselves in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The
absence of a similar mutually chastening experience is probably one reason

todays North Asia lacks a

consciousness between the dominant powers , that they have solid common interests as well as
sharp conflicting interests.4
Something Small May Escalate Very Quickly

Japan and
China are locked in one of Asias closest approximations to a zero-sum-game over status
and prestige. An ascendant China is bad for Japans status and a more vital Japan is a direct challenge to
Chinas aspirations. These dynamics play out in their East China Sea contest. And even if an
improved political environment in North Asia can be reached with more amicable Japan-China relations, perverse
military-technical incentives for the rapid escalation of conflict could still be
viciously destabilising in the event of even a minor outbreak of violence .
Whatever the evolving atmospherics of the Xi-Abe relationship, it is difficult to avoid the view that

Perhaps the most pernicious of these escalatory dynamics is the duality of Chinas strategic predicament. On the
one hand Chinas growing assertiveness in the East China Sea is a sign of greater national confidence that the
Peoples Republic now has the power to revise the regional conditions that it has hitherto had to put up with. On the

Chinas growing military presence in Asias maritime theatres is the visible tip of a
military iceberg characterised by severe vulnerabilities in C4SIR Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and inexperience in
operating effectively beyond the first island chain. If Beijing thought for some reason,
rightly or wrongly, that a more significant use of force against the PLA by Japan was
imminent, the pressures to preempt by way of Chinas own escalation would
be very significant. If Japans knowledge of Chinas military weaknesses were accompanied by a Chinese
other hand,

underestimation of Japans surveillance power, any hint of Chinese breakout could be a very hazardous moment in
their strategic relationship. In an excellent study, Avery Goldstein has pointed to the real dangers of crisis instability
between the China and the United States.5 But more scholarly and official attention needs to be directed to crisis
instability problems between China and Japan.
Of course it cannot be expected that any such escalating Sino-Japanese conflict will necessarily remain between the

The United States, Japans alliance guarantor, will likely face some very early decision
points about whether to enter the fray. In some senses at least, a degree of American
involvement seems almost automatic. There are intimate links between Japans and Americas
two of them.

armed forces and C4SIR systems in North Asia, including their cooperation in underwater Sound Surveillance

It is difficult to imagine Washington having anything less than a

front seat in the evolving violent drama. This raises the costs of Chinas escalation
in a way that might first be thought to generate great caution in Beijing; for the
Systems (SOSUS) facilities.6

disablement of Japanese systems is also likely to impinge on Americas military eyes and ears in Asia.
China would need to think twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of

But knowing the resources that Japans ally could bring to bear, China could in
face incentives to escalate very quickly against Japan before America made
that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was unlikely to come
direct US military involvement.
fact

good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,

the deterrence of Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least some speculation that China might
exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7
Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of an already
serious crisis, Chinas leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to face some additional
escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be
among the very first targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at
least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has available over which
it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American
involvement may, through Chinas preemptive moves, become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more
specific: China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR systems including Americas satellite
capabilities.
A Nuclear Exchange is Also Possible

the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and Japan to
a much more serious and damaging triangular conflict with United States participation
suddenly seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine Chinas early resort to antisatellite attacks, its exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile capabilities to
target Americas aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for
In this sequence,

military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is it implausible to envision devastating American and
Japanese attacks against Chinas C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep
this escalating exchange in the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that might be

strategic and material factors which suggest that nuclear escalation is

less unlikely than some might wish to presume.
used). But there are

An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of
intimidation. That would immediately require Americas closest attention. Nuclear weapons remain for China the

China may want to use its nuclear

weapons early if it feels that its ability to retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface
here to make this hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks separate tactical
and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese) conventional attacks
great equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets,

designed to degrade Chinas control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijings confidence in its ability to
retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear
option, it has to use it early rather than as a last resort. The second is that, because of basing arrangements,

China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of
its land based nuclear missiles and sea based nuclear systems. This is also a perverse
incentive to nuclear escalation.

Scenario two is global governance:

Climate change is a key opportunity for the US and China to
signal rapprochement, and signals an ability to cooperate
across diverse political systems, which is necessary to prevent
a host of existential threats
Orville Schell 15, Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at
the Asia Society and former dean of the University of California, Berkeleys Graduate
School of Journalism, How China and U.S. Became Unlikely Partners on Climate,
10/6/15,
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/how_china_and_us_became_unlikely_partners_on_clima
te/2917/
even as U.S.-China relations continued to unravel, the two leaders met again in
Washington last month. Once again climate change was the issue that brought them
Then,

together to reaffirm their shared conviction that climate change is one of the greatest threats
facing humanity and that their two countries have a critical role to play in addressing it. Both leaders
promised to move ahead decisively to implement domestic climate policies , to
strengthen bilateral coordination and cooperation, and to promote sustainable development and the transition to
green, low-carbon, and climate-resilient economies.
China agreed to match the U.S. by pledging $3.1 billion to help developing countries meet the climate change
challenge and then went the U.S. one better: It promised to expand its seven experimental carbon markets into a
nationwide cap-and-trade carbon emissions trading system.

The U.S.-China relationship turned out to be an unexpected vessel into which despairing
climate change activists could place their hopes. But climate change also proved to be an
unexpected providence for the increasingly fraught U.S.-China relationship.
Regularly touted as the most important bilateral relationship in the world today, Beijings relations with
Washington had been unraveling under of a host of issues caused by Chinas new assertiveness
colliding with Americas pivot to Asia and Xi Jinpings new assertiveness abroad and uncompromising

authoritarianism at home. But now it suddenly seems to have some new lift under
its wings. And heading into the international climate conference in Paris this December, people in other nations
also feel encouraged by this new Sino-U.S. rapprochement.

Despite the fact that the U.S. is plagued by a Congress filled with climate deniers and that the Chinese
Communist Party increasingly views the U.S. as out to covertly overthrow its one-partysystem government, the two nations nonetheless managed to come together . And as
worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the U.S. are the essential keystones of any global
climate change solution arch, so their finally finding this common ground gives modest reason for optimism.

there still sits one extremely

divisive problem that few want to recognize, because almost no one knows what to do about it, and it
effects our bilateral ability not just to tackle climate change, but the myriad of
other pressing problems from pandemics and nuclear proliferation to terrorism
and humanitarian crises that afflict our world: The United States and the People's Republic of
China have fundamentally irreconcilable political systems and antagonistic value systems. We
Unfortunately, like the proverbial elephant in the middle of the room,

are a liberal democracy and they are a Leninist one-party state, and nobody quite knows how to factor an equation
that includes democracy and autocracy. Yet, to collaborate, we are compelled to pretend this elephant isnt in the
room.
The U.S. system of governance derives, of course, from a liberal democratic model stressing constitutionalism,
multi-party electoral politics, rule of law, strong governmental checks and balances, and elaborate protections of
the rights of the individual, a system purposefully adopted by our founding fathers as a bulwark against
monarchical tyrannies. Our value system is drawn from the same wellspring of enlightenment ideals and stresses
personal liberty, freedom, and the sanctity of the individual.
Chinas one-party, Communist system, adopted from the Soviet Union during its darkest Stalinist period, is based on
the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and the Marxist notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that
prescribe a strong, hierarchal, uni-party political system organized around discipline, orthodoxy, and unity.
These fundamental contradictions make the U.S. and China unlikely partners for any kind of partnership, and yet

here we are in a world that begs our collaboration for the sake of planetary survival .
The idea that two countries with such different political histories, values, and
systems could ever cooperate grew out of two previous historic diplomatic
breakthroughs. The first came in 1972 when Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger visited Beijing to recast U.S.China relations with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai as a hedge against the U.S.S.R., The second came in 1979 when
Deng Xiaoping visited Washington to reestablish full diplomatic relations with President Jimmy Carter. Out of this
rapprochement and Dengs ambitious new program of reform and opening up, a presumption unfolded that China
was, at last, beginning to join the Wests notion of history as heading ineluctably (a la Hegel) toward a more open
and democratic horizon. Americans hoped that if we just helped it along with a little more free marketization and

cultural exchange, slowly Chinas political system would evolve and its values would change to become more like
ours. It was a nave dream that we sometimes allowed ourselves to dream, if sometimes to doubt. It did, however,
provide grounds for both countries to begin many kinds of constructive collaboration.
Unfortunately, this phase of collaboration ended in the bloodshed of 1989 when leaders in Beijing became alarmed
at the way their dabbling in political reform almost landed the Chinese Communist Party on the ash heap of history.
The result was an almost complete halt in further democratization.
Nonetheless, over the ensuing decades, through growing trade the two countries did manage to reknit the U.S.China relationship back together well enough for both sides to begin imagining that, with more time, economic
liberalization, educational exchange, civil society interaction, etc., China might yet evolve into a responsible
stakeholder, as then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick hopefully put it.
But since Xi Jinpings investiture as Communist Party general secretary and president in 2013, he has made it
abundantly clear that China is definitely not headed in any direction that is convergent with the West. President Bill
Clinton once scolded his Chinese predecessor for being on the wrong side of history. Xi has made it emphatically
clear that his China was on what he viewed as the right side of history, and one with distinctly Chinese
characteristics. What is more, he seems to be suggesting that China had now also come up with its own viable
model of development, one that might be described as Leninist capitalism. But if this model is Chinas new
historical endgame, the U.S.-China bilateral becomes deprived of any semblance of converging long-term political

Instead of sharing the presumption of an even vaguely common political

horizon, the two countries now find themselves traveling in diverging historical
directions.
game plans.

climate change has come to the rescue! By reminding both

sides that we exist in a common context and that there will be no solution to climate
change or many other global problems without close collaboration between the U.S. and
China, the two countries have been given an incipient new common purpose. Whether it
But, mirabile dictum,

will guide these two large, powerful, and often reckless nations into a new collective direction is now the question.
Without such a compact, there is literally no hope of remedying climate change.
Although the two countries still disagree on many things, when President Obama welcomed Xi Jinping to the White
House last month with a 21-gun salute on the South Lawn and a state dinner, the two not only took another
important step toward such a remedy, but created new momentum that will help at international climate talks in
Paris in December.
Such Sino-U.S. cooperation is a beguiling dream that is at last edging toward possibility. But, because of the static
created by our very different political and values systems, it is still a somewhat nave dream. Nonetheless, one can

the new sense of a perceived common threat one that is actually even more
compelling than the menace of the Soviet Union back in the 1970s will now be enough to change not
only the U.S.-China relationship, but the whole global climate change equation.
only hope that

Cooperation with politically diverse great powers like China is

vital to global stability and a norm-based international order--the US cant afford to only cooperate with liberal democracies
Charles Kupchan 11, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University
and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, June
2011, The false promise of unipolarity: constraints on the exercise of American
power, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 165-173
These examples aside, Brooks and Wohlforth also fail to address another important pathway through which

norms and rules constrain the exercise of US power . They focus exclusively on the costs to
the United States of its own failure to comply with the institutions and rules that Washington took the lead in

in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that began

and amid the ongoing ascent of China, India, Brazil, and other rising
states, change in ordering norms may well be driven by the preferences and
crafting after the close of World War II. But
in 2008

policies of emerging powers, not by those of the United States. Moreover, the impressive
economic performance and political staying power of regimes that practice nondemocratic brands of capitalismsuch as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabiacall
into question the durability of the normative order erected during Americas
watch. Well before emerging powers catch up with Americas material resources,
they will be challenging the normative commitment to open markets and liberal
democracy that has defined the Western order.
The substantive gap between the norms of the Western order and those that
inform the domestic and foreign policies of rising powers has not gone unnoticed
(Kupchan and Mount 2009). Nonetheless, many scholars have offered an illusory response: that the United
States and its democratic allies should dedicate the twilight hours of their primacy to universalizing Western
norms. According to G John Ikenberry (2008, 37, 25), the United States global position may be weakening, but
the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century.

The West should sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible to ensure that the
world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes. Such confidence in
the universality of the Western order is, however, based on wishful thinking
about the likely trajectory of ascending powers, which throughout history have
sought to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advantage their own
interests. Presuming that rising states will readily embrace Western norms is not
only unrealistic, but also dangerous, promising to alienate emerging

powers that will be pivotal to global stability in the years ahead (Gat 2007).
Brooks and Wohlforth do not address this issuepresumably because they believe that US preponderance is so
durable that they need not concern themselves with the normative orientations of rising powers. But facts on

China is, as of 2010, the worlds second largest economy,

holds massive amounts of US debt, and is strengthening its economic and
strategic presence in many quarters of the globe; the G-8 has given way to the G-20; the
prime minister of democratic India has called for new global rules of the game
the ground suggest otherwise.

and the reform and revitalization of international institutions (Mahbubane 2008, 235); the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have increased the voting weight of developing countries; and the United
Nations Security Council is coming under growing pressure to enlarge the voices of emerging powers.

All of

these developments come at the expense of the influence and normative

preferences of the United States and its Western allies. By the numbers, Brooks and Wohlforth
are correct that unipolarity persists. But rising powers are already challenging
the pecking order and guiding norms of the international system. If the next
international system is to be characterized by norm-governed order rather
than competitive anarchy, the West will have to make room for the
competing visions of rising powers. A new order will have to be based on
great-power consensus and toleration of political diversity rather than the
normative hegemony of the West.

U.S. relative power will inevitably decline with the rise of new
powers---failing to embrace political pluralism destroys the
effectiveness of liberal order, causes a violent transition and
great-power war
Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, Preserving U.S.
National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct, online:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-USNational-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11
The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term
threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical
focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a
strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the
Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional
hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic,
its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict that argument.

With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order,

the United States should adopt a grand strategy of investment, building legitimacy
and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a
liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant
imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of enlargement,2 investment supports a
world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles , however, it differs in
that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances,
etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations.
Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion
similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: (i) (providing)
significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to)
protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.4 China has already solidified its
control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central
Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5
Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He
contends that China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the
champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic
power in East Asia.6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase
its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western
civilization.

The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one
should compare the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth

the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War
threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and
democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence , while initially
limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately
leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing
world order.
century.7 Furthermore,
ultimately

A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in

institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism .
The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted
globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support
these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately
undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon.
The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that
threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that
the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one core nation's involvement in a conflict between another
core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10

the United
States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the
problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal
catalysts of future global conflicts.11
threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately,

Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the
question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on
other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study
titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN)
charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more
importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States
has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global
legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate.
Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids
the precepts of the previous administration: preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,14 which have
resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the
United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the
Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation
must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military
unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy.
Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John
Ikenberry, argues that the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance,
the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.15 American foreign policy has
misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted
principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie
Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists
support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .16 and reject military primacy in favor of
supporting a rules-based system of order.
Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional
powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or swing civilizations, in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These
states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign
policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18
Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade
together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their
arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and

while globalization is creating a new international order, differences

between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors
and lead to conflict.20
argues that

Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe the basic rules and principles of a liberal
international order, which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that
China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it.
China's leaders want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,21 from
which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion.

Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national
security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American
leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced
by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat

the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin
building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its
interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.
now,

Solvency

Solvency---Paris Implementation
US-China cooperation is key to expand and implement the
Paris Agreement
Joseph Aldy 16, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of
Government, Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States:
Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy, February 2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf
Given that China and the United States are the worlds two largest GHG emitters; the
momentum that already exists with respect to bilateral cooperation on climate change and clean
energy technologies;11 and the completion of the Paris Agreement at COP-21it is important to
explore opportunities for and challenges to furthering this cooperation. Among other reasons,
much work remains to be done to elaborate the Paris Agreement over the next five years
to specify rules, procedures, and guidelines for the various elements of the accord. China-U.S.
collaboration will continue to be very important during this preparatory phase.
More generallybeyond the UNFCCC processit is important to explore how ChinaU.S. cooperation can
facilitate multilateral cooperation in global efforts to address climate change.
In this discussion paper, we address three areas for potential cooperationor expansion of current cooperation: 1)
the design and implementation of emissions trading (cap-and-trade) systems; 2) standards and procedures for

standards and procedures

could help advance the effectiveness and equity of the Paris Agreement as it is elaboratedby
making possible more accurate comparison of effort. They could also promote the use of
domestic market mechanisms and the crediting of these toward INDCs, as well as linkage
among ETSs and among heterogeneous policy systems (Bodansky, et al. 2014; Metcalf and Weisbach
accounting for emissions and for measuring progress in achieving INDCs. Such

2012); 3) The intersection of trade and climate policyhow China-U.S. trade might be affected by domestic policies
and international agreements (bilateral and multilateral) to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and how China and
the United States can collaborate to magnify possible trade benefits and reduce possible trade risks of the
movement toward low-carbon societies.

Solvency---Green Tech
Cooperation on green tariffs and IPR massively expands clean
technology
Joseph Aldy 16, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of
Government, Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States:
Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy, February 2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf
China and the United States have a
substantial mutual incentive to engage in bilateral cooperation. Fruitful areas for
such cooperation include cutting tariffs on environmental goods, such as wind turbines,
solar panels, and solar water heaters, relaxation of the export ban on low carbon
technologies, and coordinating policies for the protection of intellectual property rights
related to environmental products. Successful bilateral cooperation in these areas can
help both countries gain better access to the technologies and products needed for costeffective climate mitigation, and accelerate the process of innovation and diffusion
for green technologies. The prospects for such expanded bilateral cooperation have been given impetus
Thirdly, since each is such an important trade partner to the other,

by the 2014 and 2015 joint announcements by China and the United States.

Bilateral cooperation can also inform future efforts to integrate climate policies and
frameworks with other plurilateral or regional frameworks that address trade and economic
development. For instance, China-United States cooperation can facilitate efforts underway
within the International Maritime Organization to address international governance issues
involving both climate change and trade, such as international maritime shipping emissions of black carbon and
methane. Further, Chinas new status as an Observer in the Arctic Council will create yet more opportunities for
Chinese-US cooperation on the climate and trade issues on that organizations agenda.

Solvency---Emissions Trading Cooperation

Cooperation with China on emissions trading sends and
international signal and builds global cooperation on emissions
trading
Jeff Swartz 16, International Policy Director, International Emissions Trading
Association, Chinas National Emissions Trading System: Implications for Carbon
Markets and Trade, March 2016,
http://www.ieta.org/resources/China/Chinas_National_ETS_Implications_for_Carbon_
Markets_and_Trade_ICTSD_March2016_Jeff_Swartz.pdf
Chinas ETS pilots and its commitment to a national ETS has sent a political signal that
has the potential to create a dynamic towards an increasing uptake of ETSs , which, in
turn, could enhance cooperation on carbon pricing through linkages and the
development of a plurilateral carbon market club. Whether or not China would link its ETS or join such a club
will become clear over time, although the national ETS is only likely to move from free allocation to auctioning. Before this policy
change takes place, it will be difficult to envisage any other ETS linking with Chinas as there will likely be little demand for extra
allowances during the free allocation period given that the NDRC is expected to generously issue allowances to operators during the
first or second phases of the ETS, and it is rather unlikely that China would increase its carbon intensity reduction target before
2020. Chinas non-participation in a plurilateral carbon market would not, however, stop other countries from forming one. Several
INDCs Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland, or South Korea, amongst others have firmly stated that they need access to
international market mechanisms in order to achieve their respective emission reduction targets. These countries are the likely
candidates for creating a plurilateral carbon market, or a club, and they will do so regardless of policy outcomes from China.
Moreover, 18 countries led by New Zealand and including Canada, the US, Australia, Korea, and Japan, signed a ministerial
declaration on carbon markets at COP 21.53 This declaration features a pledge by countries to work together to quickly develop
standards and guidelines for international market mechanisms to support the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. The countries who
signed up to this declaration would be the likely candidates to form a plurilateral carbon market club and to develop standards and
norms for carbon market cooperation in the future. These countries may decide that in order for them to fulfil the targets they set

it is easier to agree on provisions for accounting, offset use, and

allowance transfers outside of the UNFCCC process rather than within it. They
could, for example, agree on mutual rules for international carbon trading which could
then feed into the UNFCCC process on similar rules under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
out in their respective INDCs,

Considering the nature of the countries who signed up to the Declaration they are mostly members of the OECD and have export-

rules and standards they would set for international carbon markets in a
plurilateral trading club might be of a higher calibre than what could be established under
the UNFCCC with over 190 countries as part of the multilateral decisionmaking process.
driven economies the

Moreover, the US and Canada, as signatories of this declaration, would bring real-world experience to the discussion from their
cross-border carbon trading cooperation between California and Qubec. China was not one of the declarations signatories, and
does not seem to be posturing to the wider group of countries with carbon markets that intends to lead on carbon market
cooperation in the pre-2020 period. However, Chinas policy officials responsible for the implementation of the national ETS have
expressed an interest in potential linkage with South Korea over recent months.54 China did not take a vocal lead on the
development of Article 6 at COP 21, and instead used its pavilion within the COP grounds to highlight the experiences and
challenges from its ETS pilots and what is to come next under the national ETS. It is quite clear from the set-up of Chinas ETS that
the government wants to perfect emissions trading in China before looking abroad for any type of cooperation. China should weigh
cautiously joining any plurilateral trading club until it has undergone at least one compliance phase and all aspects of its ETS have
been properly tested and evaluated by its ETS regulator. It is difficult to foresee whether China would be a net seller or buyer in a
carbon trading club, but its intensity target will be a factor in any scenario in which China participates. If Chinese firms subject to an
intensity target buy less expensive units from an international club, it could lead to a scenario where production costs are then less
expensive in China and unnecessary production increases in China would occur. Cheaper units from a club could be used for
compliance by firms in China and, therefore, it would cost them less to comply with the overall target and emissions may actually
grow. This would undermine the effectiveness of reducing emissions through the ETS. If firms from China sell Chinese-issued units
into a club, there could be unforeseen variations in the level of Chinese units made available depending on the level of economic
activity in China at any given time. This could lead to a club whereby its members with absolute caps are subject to a higher degree
of price volatility compared to their domestic systems. A carbon market club would need a fungible trading unit in order to function
effectively. However, if it was to allow Chinas intensity based ETS to participate, it might have to impose trading restrictions on the
number of units that could be imported into or exported from the club by China, or establish an exchange-rate mechanism

China might explore linking

first with one of its strongest trading partners or joining a smaller regional club
where it also has well-established economic and trading ties. This could reduce
specifically for China or other members with intensity-based targets. With that in mind,

the risks that may emerge when Chinese firms were to be market price makers or
price takers. Any potential ETS linkage by China would first require that its carbon market is designed in a way so that it can
be harmonised with other systems in the future. The EU has invested in both the Chinese and Korean ETSs through EuropeAid
projects that aim to ensure lessons learned from the EU ETS are applied in both systems.55 This project, along with policy officials in
China and Korea steadfastly ensuring that their systems are designed so they are linking ready in the future, could go a long way
to ensuring a future carbon market club does emerge.

Cap-and-trade cooperation specifically spills up to enable more

effective global emissions trading
Joseph Aldy 16, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of
Government, Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States:
Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy, February 2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf
This paper has identified three specific areas of international climate policy, namely market-based mechanisms,
comparison of efforts, and trade policy and climate policy interactions, where China and the United States can

Cooperation on market-based climate policies, particularly capand-trade, is important, not only because market-based approaches offer the most costeffective approach to mitigating GHG emissions, but also because emissions trading
systems make it possible to address equity concerns by adjusting the level of the
emissions cap and the allocation of emission allowances .
deepen their cooperation.

A logical focus for ChinaU.S. cooperation with respect to market-based

mechanisms is capacity building. A functioning cap-and-trade system requires
properly designed government and market institutions. At a micro level, the United States
and China can exchange experience and expertise on topics such as allowance allocation,
price ceilings and floors, allowance banking and borrowing, and other detailed emissions trading rules.
At a macro level, both China and the United States confront challenges to implementing cap-and-trade systems in
the United States because of political polarization and in China because of features of the regulated electricity

Cooperation and communication can help

both countries overcome these barriers, while also advancing theoretical and empirical
market and the power of state-owned enterprises.

understanding of cap-and-trade and other market-based approaches.

Cooperation on standards and procedures for comparing mitigation efforts can strengthen the
technical basis for other aspects of ChinaU.S. cooperation , particularly in the area of capand-trade systems, and facilitate the linkage of homogeneous or heterogeneous climate
policies. Cooperation in this area can also increase transparency and consistency
in climate negotiations, improve trust among parties, and advance efforts to track collective
progress toward achieving global mitigation targets.

AT: Say No---General Climate Action

Reject neg evidence---China obviously cares about reducing
emissions
Scott V. Valentine 11, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Towards the SinoAmerican Trade Organization for the Prevention of Climate Change (STOP-CC),
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 4, Number 4, Winter 2011, Oxford
Journals,
Chinas leadership is aware of the notoriety that China is ascending to in this regard.
Domestically, it has adopted ambitious policies to reduce GHG emissions.39 A
prominent example is an aggressive system of taxation designed to encourage
consumers to purchase more fuel-efficient cars.40 China also boasts the highest growth rate of installed
renewable energy capacity.41 The government realizes that current levels of environmental
degradation jeopardize Chinas capacity for long-term growth.42 Furthermore, public
pressure to adopt more sustainable development policies is clearly evident.43 In the
past 10 years alone, environmental disasters have purportedly affected 8% of Chinas
population.44 Owing to Chinas large coastal population, a projected 50 million or more people will be affected
by escalating consequences of climate change, exacting an economic loss estimated at US$260 billion. As Chinas
Assistant Foreign Minister highlighted in 2007, China has one-fifth of the worlds population. It means that for all of

the Chinese
government takes this issue seriously.45 In short, accusations that China is not
interested in playing a role in climate change mitigation are misguided.46
the people affected by climate change, more than one-fifth of them will be Chinese. That is why

AT: Say No---Cooperation

China says yes---strong economic and environmental benefits
Junjie Zhang 15, Associate Professor of Environmental Economics in the School of
Global Policy and Strategy at University of California, San Diego, What Would New
Breakthroughs on Climate Change Mean for the U.S.-China Relationship? 9/16/15,
https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-would-new-breakthroughs-climatechange-mean-us-china-relationship
U.S.-China climate collaboration is aligned with the self interests of both
countries. On the U.S. side, the Obama Administration is pushing the unprecedented regulation of
coal-fired power plants. This initiative is perhaps the last opportunity for President Obama to craft his
climate change abatement legacy. In order to gain domestic support, it is instrumental to leverage the
climate actions of other major emitters. Since China accounts for over a quarter of global carbon
emissions, working with China is crucial for the U.S. to achieve its climate target.
The

for China, the incentive for climate mitigation is not only from international
pressures but also due to its own need to reduce energy consumption and
improve air quality. As a middle-income country, climate change is not a top priority for the Chinese
government. However, since energy security and environmental pollution are closely
related to carbon emissions, these co-benefits convince China to engage in
increasingly aggressive mitigation efforts. By collaborating with the U.S., China can
learn from the U.S. experience how to grow the economy while curbing climate and air pollutants.
As

The US and China both say yes

Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
The USA and China share a high degree of ideological common ground in
regard to climate change mitigation policy. Both nations appear focused on a no regret
climate change strategy that focuses on initiatives to reduce GHG emissions while
simultaneously providing economic benefits.100 There is, therefore, reason to believe that a
bilateral relationship between the two nations could both facilitate opportunities and
avoid contentious rifts over burden-sharing. It may be possible to alter the current superficial
friendship through efforts to exploit the economic opportunities inherent in climate change mitigation
programmes.101
Without a doubt, there are areas in which American and Chinese firms are locked in fierce competition and where
political and economic arguments to avoid cooperation inevitably arise. Competition in a global economy is

there are also instances in international collaboration of initiatives

that feature synergies. In fact, the possibility of collaboration has been acknowledged
even among competing firmsthe term coopetition having been coined to describe such a
unavoidable. However,

scenario. This is particularly true in regard to collaborations between firms from developing and developed nations,
where corporate strengths tend to differ greatly.102

China says yes---other parts of US-China relations dont

negatively influence climate cooperation
Li 15 Li Shuo, Senior Climate & Energy Policy Officer for Greenpeace East Asia,
What Would New Breakthroughs on Climate Change Mean for the U.S.-China
Relationship? 9/16/15, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-would-newbreakthroughs-climate-change-mean-us-china-relationship
Last
Novembers joint statement on climate change elevated the issue to a new height
and gave the world a positive surprise . The agreement was important in two regards. First, ahead of
the United Nations timeline, the two biggest emitters gave the world a preview of their
intended post-2020 climate actions. China, for the first time, indicated its intention to peak its
President Xi Jinpings state visit will no doubt be an important date on any climate watchers calendar.

emissions. Second, a new formulation of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) was agreed upon by
adding in the language of in light of different national circumstances. This exact language was introduced into the
subsequent U.N. decision in Lima. This effectively cleared the biggest stumbling block for the negotiation in the run
up to Paris.
However, the upcoming climate statement will likely not be as significant as last years, partly because the biggest
cards are already on the table. However, this does not mean there will be any shortage of horse-trading or
important political signals. Despite the new guidance on CBDR, negotiators are still struggling with how to interpret

the The
Xi-Obama meeting is a good opportunity to align the two countries on some of
these issues, to reassure each other about the delivery of their targets with
enhanced domestic policies and new bilateral initiatives . The final outcome of these talks is
it in different aspects of the future global climate regime, and other issues such as climate finance. Thus,

expected to further guide the U.N. talks.

the climate change discussion is relatively immune to the overall

complicated bilateral atmosphere is also worth mentioning. Over the past two years, the two
sides have dedicated considerable political attention in making climate cooperation
a success. The pace, approach, and politics of each sides domestic climate policy is bound to
the others in an unprecedented way. With this in mind, strategists on the two sides should already be
The fact that

thinking about how to carry the valuable progress not only to Paris but through Paris, into the Post-Obama
period, and also into other important bilateral discussions which have not seen as much progress.

AT: Say No---Air Pollution

China says yes to climate cooperation, specifically to reduce air
pollution
Alvin Lin 15, Climate and Energy Policy Director, China Program, Natural
Resources Defense Council, with Barbara Finamore, Senior Attorney and Asia
Director, China Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, Paris Climate
Agreement Explained: Why we can trust China to meet its climate commitments
under the Paris Agreement, 12/12/15, https://www.nrdc.org/experts/alvin-lin/parisclimate-agreement-explained-why-we-can-trust-china-meet-its-climate
Some in the US who are opposed to taking action on climate change will criticize any agreement
coming out Paris as as being unimplementable or weak, arguing that the US should not take actions to reduce
its greenhouse gas emissions when other big emitters such as China can't be trusted to do the same. That
argument is a cynical one aimed at delaying the inevitable transition of our societies from fossil fuels to clean
energy. Here's why

it isn't true:

Addressing climate change will help China to clean up its air. Severe air pollution
has plagued large swathes of the country in the last several years, as power plants and factories
powered by coal and millions of cars on the roads have brought choking pollution to its skies. At the beginning of
the second week of the negotiations, after a week in which air pollution reached "beyond index" levels
unimaginable in the United States, Beijing issued its first ever red alert for air pollution, taking half the cars off the

There is broad recognition that China

needs to reduce its coal consumption in order to both clean up its air and reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions, since coal accounts for 50-60% of its fine particulate matter and 80% of its
roads and shutting down schools to try to clean up the air.

CO2 energy-related CO2 emissions. Similar air pollution levels have not been seen in the United States since the
1960s and 1970s, an era which saw the passage of the Clean Air Act and tough new fuel and tailpipe standards to
clean up the choking smog in cities like Los Angeles. Just as the US cleaned up its air in response to the demands of

China is also self-motivated to cap its fossil fuel consumption and switch
to cleaner energy in order to clean up its air and to ensure that the government is
living up to citizens' expectations.
its citizens,

China is already meeting and exceeding its existing climate and clean energy
targets. China is on track to meet and exceed its existing 2020 target to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45%
from 2005 levels. This is because its coal use fell by 2.9% in 2014 and nearly 5% so far this year, as its investments
in clean energy begin to replace its long-term reliance on coal. The fall in China's coal consumption means that

China's CO2 emissions were level in 2014 and are predicted to fall by 3.9% this
year, the main factor in causing global CO2 emissions to stall or even fall this year. China has now
installed more wind and solar power than any country in the world, and will install as
much new solar power this year as currently installed across the entire United States. In fact, Chinese investments
in renewable energy topped $83 billion in 2014, more than double that of the United States, and it plans to increase
wind and solar energy to 200 GW and 100 GW respectively by 2020, further increasing its lead as a renewables
superpower. Doing so will both help to clean up China's air and re-direct its economy toward a more sustainable
pathway, while also spurring jobs and innovation.

China is building a strong energy and GHG emissions measurement, reporting and
verification system. China has established a mandatory GHG reporting system for industrial enterprises to
measure and report their greenhouse gas emissions in 24 key industries. As it prepares to establish a national
carbon trading system in 2017, it will be requiring enterprises to report their emissions and to have them verified by
third party verification companies. Ensuring strong MRV will be important for China to ensure the success of its
carbon trading system, and in fact China is seeking to learn how to improve its emissions tracking through close
cooperation with counterparts in California and the EPA.

China has also been improving its energy

statistics reporting, releasing updated coal consumption statistics for the period 2000 to 2013 which, while

they were an increase compared to previously reported figures, also show that China is working hard to make its
energy statistics as accurate as possible.

As part of its war on pollution, China has

implemented a much tougher Environmental Protection Law , with stronger penalties, official
China is strengthening environmental enforcement.

performance assessments, public interest lawsuits and pollution data monitoring to enforce pollution standards.

These powerful new tools are a game changer and give the government much
greater authority to regulate and punish polluters , and they reflect the government's recognition
that providing clean air and water to its citizens requires strict compliance with environmental regulations.
China is investing $3.1 billion of its own money to help developing countries address climate change. China's is
investing $3.1 billion to help developing countries tackle climate change through its South-South Cooperation Fund.

These efforts demonstrate China's recognition of the seriousness of climate

change and a willingness to do its part to help the most vulnerable countries adapt to the effects of climate
change and build more resilient, low carbon communities.

climate naysayers in the United States have used the specter of a

rapidly developing China to argue for inaction. The time for making such
arguments has now passed, as China and other developing countries forge ahead in reducing their
For too long,

emissions and investing in clean energy in order to clean up their own environment and build the foundation for a
sustainable and healthy future for their people.

Warming Advantage

1AC Oceans Impact Scenario

Warming harms the oceans in particular, which collapses ocean
biodiversity and results in positive feedbacks---but action now
can stave off the worst impacts
Cheryl Katz 15, San Francisco Bay Area-based science writer covering energy,
environmental health, and climate change, How Long Can Oceans Continue to
Absorb Earths Excess Heat? 3/30/15,
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/how_long_can_oceans_continue_to_absorb_earths_exce
ss_heat/2860/
uptake mechanisms like subsurface heat burial in the tropical
Pacific and vertical heat transfer to the ocean depths could already be declining .
Recent weather trends suggest that

And so this is why 2014 is now the warmest year on record, said Trenberth. In other words, the heat is no longer
going deep into the ocean. The wind patterns have changed, the surface of the Pacific Ocean has warmed up. And
that has consequences.

One of the major consequences is higher sea levels . Thermal expansion water swells as it
heats accounts for a substantial portion of rising seas, so warmer oceans mean even worse news
for already threatened islands and coasts.
The effects on sea circulation patterns and weather are complex and difficult to tease out from natural variation,
requiring long-term observation. But mounting evidence points to a variety of likely impacts. Among them:

Rapidly warming Arctic waters could worsen summer heat waves in Europe and
North America by lowering the temperature differential that drives mid-latitude circulation. And a recent rash
of unusually intense cyclones may be linked to changes in the tropical Pacific.

As for marine life, ocean heating already presents multiple, intensifying

dangers. Warmer water holds less oxygen and other gases. On top of that, warming increases ocean
stratification, which blocks the movement of oxygen-rich surface waters to lower
depths. The resulting low-oxygen zones are now spreading, and climate models predict
they could be 50 percent larger by the end of this century . Not only are the zones
inhospitable to most sea creatures, they squeeze critical upper ocean habitat as they
enlarge, said Sarah Moffitt, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California, Davis Bodega Marine
Laboratory.
So you are losing this substantial habitat footprint for oxygen-respiring organisms, she said. We are seeing
signals of oxygen loss in every ocean basin in the global ocean.
A recent study by Moffitt and colleagues of seafloor sediments from the end of the last Ice Age, around 10,000 to

Pacific Ocean ecosystems from the Arctic to Chile

extensively and abruptly lost oxygen when the planet warmed through
deglaciation, she said. The findings offer a glimpse of what may lie ahead. It shows us that in a carbonrich, warm future, ocean systems have the capacity to change in a way that has no
analogue in todays world, Moffitt said.
17,000 years ago, revealed that

A further concern is that temperature increases could diminish the oceans vital role as a carbon sink. Absorbing
CO2 from the atmosphere is another way oceans mitigate greenhouse gas impacts, although marine waters are
growing increasingly acidic as a result. Currently, up to nearly half of humanitys carbon dioxide output ends up
dissolved in seawater, with most landing in the Southern Hemisphere oceans, where wind-driven eddies bury it

warm waters also hold less CO2. And those cyclical winds likely will someday decrease. The
outcome of rising ocean temperatures and decreasing winds would be faster ocean
deeply. But

CO2 saturation and far more heat-trapping gas entering the atmosphere a
scenario potentially akin to the massive ocean carbon release that helped end the last Ice Age.

Theres still time to turn things around, scientists say.

We

have the technology today to make a positive impact on climate, and all we
lack is the political will, said John Abraham, a thermal sciences professor at the University of St.
Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota. But he and others worry that by covering up the effects of our long fossil fuel
bender, oceans are keeping us from realizing just how off-kilter the earths climate system has become.

Collapse of ocean biodiversity causes global extinction

Callum Roberts 15, professor of marine conservation at the University of York,
Our seas are being degraded, fish are dying but humanity is threatened too,
9/19/15, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/20/fish-are-dying-buthuman-life-is-threatened-too
When life is brought low, there are unwanted and unanticipated knock-on
effects. Predators like tuna, sharks, porpoises and whales are not mere embellishments, nice to
have but not critical if lost. They once regulated the abundance of their prey and weeded
out diseased and parasite-laden creatures before populations became seriously affected. They
were important in cycling nutrients through ocean ecosystems, shuttling them
from the depths to the surface where sunshine and plants could turn them into the energy that feeds all
life in the sea. Seabed life, those waving fields of invertebrates swept aside by trawls, captured
carbon and sequestered it into the sediments. They kept the water clean, boosting
photosynthesis, and removed pathogens and pollutants we put in the sea.
if you are wondering whether it matters that life in the sea has gone down, the
answer is yes. In the long term, it is a matter of life and death to all of us. The
oceans are vast. Once we thought they were too big to suffer anything other than minor damage at our
hands. We know that is no longer true. Human influence reaches every part of the ocean,
from the distant high seas to the deepest abyss. What we are just beginning to understand is that
they are too big for us to let them fail. The oceans have colossal importance
in keeping our planet habitable. If they fail, so do we.
So

Exts---Harmonization/Comparison Key
Lack of a common metric for comparison collapses all global
climate cooperation
Ron Israel 15, Chair, Citizens 2015 Campaign for a Global Climate Agreement,
Baseline Year Markers for a Global Climate Agreement, August 2011,
http://www.theglobalcitizensinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/15-08-26Baseline-Year.pdf
Each countrys Paris Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) pledge is made relative
to a baseline year. This baseline serves as the foundation from which relevant data
is calculated. It is imperative that all countries use the same, standard baseline
year to make comparison between pledges possible. It is difficult, if not impossible, to compare
pledge emission reduction targets if different baseline years are used because of the
many varying factors that are used to calculate pledge baselines and emission reduction targets.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommends that countries use 1990 as the standard
baseline year. This 1990 baseline is derived from the most recent 30-year normal climate period as calculated by
the World Meteorological Organization. Moreover, the 1990 baseline has been used in a large number of high

pledges made using a 1990 baseline have many scientific

comparison points and are known to be reliable and accurate .
impact climate studies. As a result,

many countries are using alternative baseline years in their pledges to

serve their own needs. Alternative baseline years include: 2005, 2013, and a business-as-usual model.
Countries use these alternative baseline years to make their pledged emission
reduction targets appear more robust than they actually are. For example, a 25%
Unfortunately,

emission reduction target relative to a 2005 baseline year equals only a 13% emission reduction relative to 1990
baseline year. As mentioned above, the plethora of alternative baselines also prevents accurate comparison
between pledges.

The chaos that results from the use of different baselines is unacceptable. Countries
must use a common baseline in order to maximize transparency and ensure that robust, comparable pledges are
made. The standard baseline year should be the IPCC recommended year, 1990, since it has been used in

The use of a standard baseline year is integral to the

production of a meaningful climate agreement at the United Nations sponsored
significant, relevant scientific studies.

Conference of the Parties 21 in Paris later this year.

Exts---Sends Signal/Spillover
The plan builds momentum and spills over to other countries
Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
There are also significant global benefits associated with a positive bilateral
commitment by China and the USA to collaborate on green economic development
issues. First, climate change is but one concern when taking into account the growing impact of economic
activities on our global ecosystems.109 Establishing a basis for positive cooperation now will enable these two
major economies to advance towards improving the sustainability of their respective production and consumption

the animosity between the USA and China as exhibited in UNFCCC

climate change negotiations exposes the roots of escalating competition between
the two nations for global political and economic supremacy.110 As the world experienced between the early
1960s and the late 1980s, contests of power between superpowers tend to produce more
negative externalities than positive developments. Collaborating on GHG reduction
represents an opportunity for these two superpowers to mitigate a digressive power
contest.111 Thirdly, many of the other nations that have ratified the KP exhibit a lacklustre approach to climate
change negotiations, in part because the standoff between the USA and China discourages
other nations from taking leadership. Fourthly and perhaps of most importance, a
collaborative relationship between these two nations could provide both with the necessary
processes. Secondly,

assurances that short-term sacrifices will result in substantive long-term progress towards climate change

could consequently encourage both nations to commit voluntarily to emission

reduction targets that would otherwise be unachievable through multilateral negotiations.
mitigation; it

Challenges will undoubtedly arise in facilitating a ChinaUS agreement to collaborate on GHG mitigation initiatives.
Both nations face sizeable domestic political obstacles to arriving at such an agreementthe USA in terms of
political deadlock and China in terms of cascading policy to the provinces.112 There are net benefits, however, to a
collaboration of this kind.113 Mutual economic benefits are to be gained from commercial joint ventures in the
areas of vehicle production,114 transport fuel development,115 energy efficiency technologies,116 clean coal
technology,117 coal-bed methane capture,118 and iron smelting technology.119 There are also opportunities for
collaborative research in green innovation, CC&S, built-environment technology, and alternative energy R&D (wind,
solar PV, solar thermal, etc.).

this agreement could also act as the

catalyst necessary to inspire other strategic pairings, for example between Germany and
India or Japan and Brazil. As Zhang emphasises, in order to encourage developing countries to
do more to combat climate change, developed countries should focus on carrots
(not sticks).120 The appeal of encouraging strategic pairings between developed and developing nations lies in
the competition it engenders among such national pairings. Stimulating competition in this way may
inspire enhanced innovation and lower market prices for new technology, in the
In addition to benefiting the American and Chinese economies,

same way as heightened competition between firms gives rise to greater innovation and consumer surplus.

Exts---US-China Key
US-China cooperation is key---theyre the only roadblocks to
success on climate
Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
Despite all current efforts to abate GHG emissions, results are insufficient . Dimitrov
succinctly summarises the challenge as advanced by the IPCC, To avoid the most catastrophic impacts and limit
temperature rise to below 2C, advanced economies would need to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 2540
percent by 2020, and global emissions need to be reduced 5080 percent by 2050.89 Given the analysis put

it appears that the UNFCCC process will continue to plod towards

establishing follow-on emission reduction targets, which will likely fall short of the
requisite aggregate GHG emission reductions necessary to avert the worst
consequences of climate change. It also appears that in the interim, a number of polycentric
initiatives will continue to foster action and encourage greater (albeit insufficient)
progress. Therefore, it is necessary to consider what could be done to facilitate further achievement of the
forward in this article,

requisite deep GHG emission reductions.

the
USA and China need to contribute more proactively to the GHG emission reduction
process. These two nations are the worlds two largest aggregate GHG emitters, responsible for over 40% of total
global emissions.90 It is widely recognised that without rigorous contributions from these two
nations, anything the rest of the world does to mitigate GHG emissions will be an insufficient
On reflecting upon what is missing, one issue possessing preeminent importance and exigency stands out;

prescription to solve the problem.91

the USA and China have been two of the most recalcitrant nations in
international climate change negotiations.92 Certain analysts have even suggested that for these
Unfortunately,

two nations, international climate change negotiations are less about climate than about asserting themselves as
dominant global forces.93 As Afionis concluded in regard to COP15, negotiations between the USA and China were
largely about making sure they were not seen to be stepping too far ahead of each other.94 This political jousting
has both discouraged proactive commitments from the two nations and undermined the leadership role that the EU
has attempted to provide in global climate change negotiations.95

Exts---Warming Bad
Warming is real, anthropogenic, and threatens extinction --prefer new evidence that represents consensus
Richard Schiffman 13, environmental writer @ The Atlantic citing the Fifth
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, What Leading Scientists Want You to
Know About Today's Frightening Climate Report, 9/27/13, The Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/09/leading-scientists-weigh-inon-the-mother-of-all-climate-reports/280045/
The polar icecaps are melting faster than we thought they would; seas are rising
faster than we thought they would; extreme weather events are increasing. Have a nice
day! Thats a less than scientifically rigorous summary of the findings of the Fifth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report released this morning in Stockholm. Appearing exhausted after a nearly two sleepless days fine-tuning
the language of the report, co-chair Thomas Stocker called climate change the greatest
challenge of our time," adding that each of the last three decades has been
successively warmer than the past, and that this trend is likely to continue into
the foreseeable future. Pledging further action to cut carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, "This
isnt a run of the mill report to be dumped in a filing cabinet. This isnt a political document produced by
politicians... Its science." And that science needs to be communicated to the public, loudly and clearly. I canvassed leading climate
researchers for their take on the findings of the vastly influential IPCC report. What headline would they put on the news? What do they hope people hear

Mann, the Director of the Earth Systems Science

Center at Penn State (a former IPCC author himself) suggested: "Jury In: Climate Change Real,
Caused by Us, and a Threat We Must Deal With." Ted Scambos, a glaciologist and head scientist of the
National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) based in Boulder would lead with: "IPCC 2013, Similar Forecasts, Better Certainty." While the report,
which is issued every six to seven years, offers no radically new or alarming news, Scambos told me, it puts an exclamation point
on what we already know, and refines our evolving understanding of global
warming. The IPCC, the indisputable rock star of UN documents, serves as the basis for global climate negotiations, like the ones that
took place in Kyoto, Rio, and, more recently, Copenhagen. (The next big international climate meeting is scheduled for 2015 in Paris.) It is also arguably
the most elaborately vetted and exhaustively researched scientific paper in
existence. Founded in 1988 by the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization, the IPCC represents the
distilled wisdom of over 600 climate researchers in 32 countries on changes in the Earths
about this report? When I asked him for his headline, Michael

atmosphere, ice and seas. It endeavors to answer the late New York mayor Ed Kochs famous question How am I doing? for all of us. The answer, which

It is now 95 percent likely

that human spewed heat-trapping gases rather than natural variability are the
main cause of climate change, according to todays report. In 2007 the IPCCs confidence level was 90 percent, and in 2001 it
was 66 percent, and just over 50 percent in 1995. Whats more, things are getting worse more quickly than
almost anyone thought would happen a few years back. If you look at the early IPCC predictions back
wont surprise anyone who has been following the climate change story, is not very well at all.

from 1990 and what has taken place since, climate change is proceeding faster than we expected, Mann told me by email. Mann helped develop the
famous hockey-stick graph, which Al Gore used in his film An Inconvenient Truth to dramatize the sharp rise in temperatures in recent times. Mann

Given the current trajectory, we're on track for ice-free

summer conditions in the Arctic in a matter of a decade or two ... There is a similar story with the
cites the decline of Arctic sea ice to explain :

continental ice sheets, which are losing ice and contributing to sea level rise at a faster rate than the [earlier IPCC] models had predicted. But there
is a lot that we still dont understand. Reuters noted in a sneak preview of IPCC draft which was leaked in August that, while the broad global trends are
clear, climate scientists were finding it harder than expected to predict the impact in specific regions in coming decades. From year to year, the worlds

hotspots are not consistent, but move erratically around the globe. The same has been true of heat waves,
mega-storms and catastrophic floods, like the recent ones that ravaged the Colorado Front Range. There is broad agreement that
climate change is increasing the severity of extreme weather events, but were not yet able to

It is like watching a pot boil, Danish astrophysicist and climate scientist Peter
Thejll told me. We understand why it boils but cannot predict where the next bubble will be. There is also
uncertainty about an apparent slowdown over the last decade in the rate of air temperature increase. While some critics claim that
global warming has stalled, others point out that, when rising ocean temperatures are
factored in, the Earth is actually gaining heat faster than previously
anticipated. Temperatures measured over the short term are just one parameter, said Dr Tim
Barnett of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in an interview. There are far more critical things going on; the
acidification of the ocean is happening a lot faster than anybody thought that it
would, its sucking up more CO2, plankton, the basic food chain of the planet,
are dying, its such a hugely important signal . Why arent people using that as a measure of what is going on?
Barnett thinks that recent increases in volcanic activity , which spews smog-forming aerosols into the air that deflect solar radiation
and cool the atmosphere, might help account for the temporary slowing of global temperature
rise. But he says we shouldnt let short term fluctuations cause us to lose sight of the big picture. The dispute over temperatures underscores just
predict where and when these will show up.

how formidable the IPCCs task of modeling the complexity of climate change is. Issued in three parts (the next two installments are due out in the spring),
the full version of the IPCC will end up several times the length of Leo Tolstoys epic War and Peace. Yet every last word of the U.N. document needs to be

I do not know of any other area of any complexity and importance at all
where there is unanimous agreement... and the statements so strong, Mike
signed off on by all of the nations on earth.

MacCracken, Chief Scientist for Climate Change Programs, Climate Institute in Washington, D.C. told me in an email. What IPCC has achieved is
remarkable (and why it merited the Nobel Peace Prize granted in 2007). Not surprisingly,

the IPCCs conclusions tend to be

conservative by design, Ken Caldeira, an atmospheric scientist with the Carnegie Institutions Department of Global Ecology told
me: The IPCC is not supposed to represent the controversial forefront of climate
science. It is supposed to represents what nearly all scientists agree on, and it does
that quite effectively. Nevertheless, even these understated findings are inevitably controversial. Roger Pielke Jr., the Director of the
Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Colorado, Boulder suggested a headline that focuses on the cat fight that todays
report is sure to revive: "Fresh Red Meat Offered Up in the Climate Debate, Activists and Skeptics Continue Fighting Over It." Pielke should know. A critic of
Al Gore, who has called his own detractors "climate McCarthyists," Pielke has been a lightning rod for the political controversy which continues to swirl
around the question of global warming, and what, if anything, we should do about it. The publics skepticism of climate change took a dive after
Hurricane Sandy. Fifty-four percent of Americans are now saying that the effects of global warming have already begun. But 41 percent surveyed in the
same Gallup poll believe news about global warming is generally exaggerated, and there is a smaller but highly passionate minority that continues to

For most climate experts, however, the battle is long over at least
when it comes to the science. What remains in dispute is not whether climate change is happening, but how fast things are going
believe the whole thing is a hoax.

to get worse. There are some possibilities that are deliberately left out of the IPCC projections, because we simply dont have enough data yet to model

The scary elephant in the

closet is terrestrial and oceanic methane release triggered by warming. The IPCC projections dont include the possibility
them. Jason Box, a visiting scholar at the Byrd Polar Research Center told me in an email interview that:

some scientists say likelihood that huge quantities of methane (a greenhouse gas thirty times as potent as CO2) will eventually be released from

the threshhold when humans lose control

of potential management of the problem, may be sooner than expected. Box, whose work
has been instrumental in documenting the rapid deterioration of the Greenland ice sheet, also believes that the latest IPCC
predictions (of a maximum just under three foot ocean rise by the end of the century) may turn out to be wildly
optimistic, if the Greenland ice sheet breaks up. We are heading into uncharted territory he said. We
are creating a different climate than the Earth has ever seen. The head of the IPCC,
Rajendra Pachauri, speaks for the scientific consensus when he says that time is fast running out to avoid the
catastrophic collapse of the natural systems on which human life depends. What
he recently told a group of climate scientist could be the most chilling headline of all for the U.N. report: "We have five minutes
before midnight."
thawing permafrost and undersea methane hydrate reserves. Box said that

It's the only existential threat

Deibel 7 Terry L, Professor of IR @ National War College, Foreign Affairs Strategy:
Logic for American Statecraft, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today
there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which,
though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the
Finally,

stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the
gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near
certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in
refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming
is occurring. In legitimate scientific circles, writes Elizabeth Kolbert, it is
virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the
fundamentals of global warming. Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this
sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century; climate change could literally
alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria; glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than
expected, andworldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago; rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most

Earths
warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5
million illnesses each year as disease spreads; widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidadkilled broad swaths of corals due to a 2-degree rise in sea
destructive hurricanes; NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second;

temperatures. The world is slowly disintegrating, concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. They call it climate changebut we just call it breaking
up. From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at
about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric
CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and

we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2

degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals,
species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the
Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of
rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolinas outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village.
how serious the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show,

Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow.
Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26

the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on

positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface
percent of GDP. But

temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-

humankinds continuing
enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette
with the earths climate and humanitys life support system. At worst, says physics
professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, were just going to burn everything
up; were going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will
collapse. During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet
Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War eras
equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better
supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers from terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat
not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but
potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.
increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that

Warming does cause extinction---destroys oceans and bioD

Sify 10 Sify News, Sydney newspaper citing Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Professor at
University of Queensland and Director of the Global Change Institute, and John
Bruno, Associate Professor of Marine Science at UNC, Could unbridled climate
changes lead to human extinction?, http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridledclimate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction-news-international-kgtrOhdaahc.html
'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems'
emerged from a synthesis of recent research on the world's oceans, carried out by
two of the world's leading marine scientists. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor
at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden,
unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans,
including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is further evidence that
The findings of the comprehensive report:

we are well on the way to the next great extinction event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have
enormous implications for mankind, particularly if the trend continues. The earth's ocean, which
produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated
carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the
earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which
humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added. The 'fundamental and

changes to marine life identified in the report include rapidly warming and acidifying
oceans, changes in water circulation and expansion of dead zones within the ocean depths.
These are driving major changes in marine ecosystems: less abundant coral reefs, sea grasses and mangroves
(important fish nurseries); fewer, smaller fish; a breakdown in food chains; changes in the distribution of marine
life; and more frequent diseases and pests among marine organisms. Study co-author John F Bruno, associate
professor in marine science at The University of North Carolina, says greenhouse gas emissions are
modifying many physical and geochemical aspects of the planet's oceans, in ways 'unprecedented
comprehensive'

in nearly a million years'. 'This is causing fundamental and comprehensive changes to the way marine ecosystems function,' Bruno
warned, according to a GCI release. These findings were published in Science

ETS Solves 2 Degrees

Carbon market cooperation stops a 2-degree temperature
rise---its critical to enable counties to rapidly cut emissions
and meet their Paris pledges
Alex Hanafi 15, Senior Manager of Multilateral Climate Strategy at the
Environmental Defense Fund and a Senior Attorney in EDF's International Climate
Program, How carbon markets are driving deeper, faster pollution cuts in Paris
climate pledges, 11/25/15, http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2015/11/25/howcarbon-markets-are-driving-deeper-faster-pollution-cuts-in-paris-climate-pledges/
With only a few days before nations meet in Paris to negotiate an inclusive post-2020 structure for global climate

the world
will be entering a new paradigm of climate action , in which all nations play a role in the collective
cooperation under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), we already know that

fight against climate change. We also know that while the emissions reductions pledged for 2025 or 2030 by over

aggressive additional action well beyond

2030 will be necessary to meet the internationally agreed goal of limiting global average
atmospheric warming to no more than 2 degrees Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. That
goal is the upper limit agreed by the international community, at a level that scientists believe
would likely avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Because the Paris pledges
170 countries over the course of this year are significant,

mark only the beginning of a new era of climate cooperation, it is imperative that an effective international climate
agreement promotes greater and greater ambition as it matures. A successful Paris agreement can thus set the

countries have
started identifying effective tools that can be used to accelerate ambition over time ,
stage for the world to turn the corner on global emissions. Even before they arrive in Paris,

so that the UNFCCCs objective to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system can

Many countries have stated they can and will do more, if they have access to
bilateral, regional, or international carbon markets also known as emissions trading or capand-trade. As shown in the map above, among the more than 170 countries that have
submitted their carbon-cutting plans (known as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, or
INDCs) to the UNFCCC, more than half have either stated their intention to use
international carbon markets to tackle carbon pollution, or are already employing them
domestically, at the national or subnational level. (For more detail, see the UNFCCC's synthesis report on the
be met.

aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined contributions [PDF] and IETA's INDC tracker.) Mexico is a
great example of how markets can drive greater ambition and deeper reductions. Mexicos INDC indicates carbon
markets can play an important role in reducing Mexicos carbon pollution well below its current planned cuts of 22%
below business as usual (BAU) levels by 2030. In fact, Mexico states that international carbon markets are
require[d] to meet its conditional emissions target, i.e. a 36% reduction below BAU of greenhouse gas emissions

Mexico says that the availability of

international carbon markets would allow it to cut its emissions 60% more than its
unconditional goal. If all nations or even just major economies with the capacity to administer robust
by 2030. Think about what that difference means:

emissions trading systems increased their ambition by 60%, we would collectively be much closer to limiting

carbon markets catalyze an

increase in mitigation ambition, particularly by developed countries. Indeed, the
advantages of a collaborative model for cost-effective emissions reductions
informed the design of the Kyoto Protocols emissions trading system , which is credited
warming to no more than 2 degrees Celsius. Countries agree that

with spurring developed countries to adopt deeper emissions reductions than they would have in the absence of
these carbon market tools. How emissions trading works to reduce pollution Just how do emissions trading

By channeling capital and entrepreneurial

effort into finding the fastest and cheapest ways to cut emissions, a price on
carbon drives deeper reductions. While cap-and-trade is not the only way of pricing carbon, it is a
systems allow countries to be more ambitious?

natural candidate, combining the economic appeal of a carbon price with the environmental guarantee of an
emission cap. Evidence from actual emissions trading markets including the EU Emissions
Trading System, the California cap-and-trade program, the U.S. Regional GHG Initiative (RGGI), and the U.S. sulfur

shows that these programs are cutting pollution at lower cost and
in less time than initially expected. Growing experience with emissions trading and the cross-border
dioxide trading system

sharing of lessons learned that allows development of more effective domestic policies over time means that

momentum is building on carbon markets around the world, at the international, national,
and subnational level.

As the vast majority of countries head to Paris with concrete plans to reduce their

coordination among jurisdictions with carbon markets will be

increasingly crucial to maximize cost-effectiveness and environmental integrity
which in turn will give jurisdictions the confidence to catalyze a faster transition to a
prosperous low-carbon economy.
pollution,

Chinese Emissions Sufficient

Chinese emissions are sufficient to cause extinction
John Copeland Nagle 11, the John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law
School, Spring 2011, How Much Should China Pollute?, Vermont Journal of
Environmental Law, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 591
Third, the rest of the world suffers because of the inability of China and the United States to agree on a method for
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Even if the rest of the world were to reach such an agreement, the failure
to include China and the United States would doom the project from the start. Together, China and the United

Left unchecked,
China's emissions alone could result in many of the harms associated with climate
change. [FN20] That is why many observers believe that [t]he decisions taken in Beijing, more
than anywhere else, [will] determine whether humanity thrive[s] or perishe[s].
States account for forty-one percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. [FN19]

AT: Too Late

Action now staves off the worst impacts of warming---an
iterative process of improvement after Paris is sufficient to
save the planet
Rebecca Leber 15, politics and environment writer for the New Republic, citing
climate scientist Gavin Schmidt, The Plan to Save the World, 10/27/15,
https://newrepublic.com/article/123223/plan-save-world
By certain measures, its already too late. Politicians, climatologists, and environmental activists
have long rallied around 2 degrees Celsius of warming as a decisive point, after which we can no longer stave off
disaster. Today, however, were already at 0.9 degrees of warming above preindustrial averages, and

were on

track to blow past 2 degrees by the middle of the century and well over 4 degrees by the end of it. At the
rate were going, just limiting global warming to 2 degrees is a pipe dream. That doesnt mean the
planet is doomed, however. We can still prevent the most devastating effects of
climate change if we take action now. The 2-degree target isnt a hard and fast cut-off, says NASA
climate scientist Gavin Schmidt. Instead, its more like a speed limit. The faster youre going around
that curve, the more dangerous it is going to be , he told me. We may end up scraping
the guardrail on our way around the mountain bend, but its still possible to keep the car on the
road. At a basic level, in order to ensure our survival, we need to end our reliance on fossil fuels
as quickly as possible. Jennifer Morgan, global director of the climate program at the World Resources
Institute, said that in order for the Paris talks to be counted as a success, they must at least agree on this central
point: Theres just one direction of emissions, and that is going down. Charting that course is what world leaders
must do this fall when they meet for two weeks in Paris for the twenty-first United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change. Past international attempts have failed to reach a consensus on even that basic point. But we
know that if we do nothing, we risk calamity for the most vulnerable people in the world. And we know
with the same clarity what needs to happen in Paris in order for the world to avert the worst-possible scenarios of
global warming. Paris is not shaping up to be a repeat of Kyoto in 1997 or Copenhagen in 2009 or other
conferences that resulted in little more than artificial promises. The long history of failed efforts to address climate
change on the international stage has left many environmentalists disillusioned and skeptical that progress can be

2015 will
represent a real turning point, the moment we finally got serious about saving the
planet. To succeed, the Paris conference must produce an agreement in which industrialized nations pledge to
made. For decades weve waited for some grand wake-up call. But there is reason to believe that

cut carbon emissions significantly by 2030. It should also lay out a longer-term roadmap to midcentury, when
developing nations will hopefully make similar leaps. Given current political realities, any agreement forged in Paris
wont be a binding treaty. Yet even a nonbinding agreement will be a positive outcome if it
requires nations to be transparent about their progress and sets up a system for financing the costs associated with

Paris must be viewed as the beginning of a

long process of reviews and revisions. Countries should agree to return to the table every few
adapting to climate change. More importantly, though,

years with new plans that are more ambitious than whatever they commit to in Paris this fall. This isnt an excuse to
kick the can down the road, as we have done for far too long, but an acknowledgment that

climate change

can be solved only in a series of steps, not one fell swoop. Paris is that starting point.
Indeed, officials acknowledge that meeting the 2-degree limit is all but impossible. The proposals currently on the
table do not take us to 2 degrees, the U.N.s Christiana Figueres, the chair of the Paris talks, told The New Yorker
in August. Environmental groups have expressed their displeasure that Paris is already, by that measure, an empty
promise. Ben Schreiber, climate and energy program director of the U.S. branch of Friends of the Earth, criticized
world leaders for failing to take the steps necessary to reach the 2-degree goal. Paris is not taking us down a

limiting warming to
2 degrees in a single conference shouldnt be the only criteria for success . Robert
pathway for a just climate agreement, he said. But a new consensus is emerging that

Stavins, director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, sees 2 degrees as an aspirational target thats
really not achievable. If we remain wedded to that goal, he said, we risk falling into despair and apathy. The most
ambitious target that can be isnt necessarily the best one that can be done. It is the most realistic one, Stavins

said. Paris

is incredibly important in that it shaves off 1 degree Celsius, said

Andrew Jones, the co-director of Climate Interactive, an MIT-affiliated climate policy group. It is a much
better world, and it sets off the framework for ratcheting up ambitions in the
future.

Its not too late---warming impacts are linear---action now can

prevent the worst impacts
Brad Plumer 14, senior editor at Vox, former energy and environment reporter
for the Washington Post, Why it's still not "game over" for global warming, 6/6/14,
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/6/5786318/it-doesnt-make-sense-to-say-weve-failed-atglobal-warming
Climate change isn't an issue with a single
point of "success" or a single point of "failure ." What we're facing are (literally) degrees of
change. The world will get hotter as we load more greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere. And the higher the temperatures, the greater the risks for human
civilization. A 2C rise in global average temperatures would be disruptive. A 4C rise would be much more disruptive. And 6C
rise would be far, far more drastic still. At no point here does it make sense to say that we've
"failed" once and for all, or that it's (to use Ezra's phrase) "game over." Things can
always get worse. And it's still very unclear where we'll end up on that spectrum .
But the underlying premise of the article is a little ill-defined.

We're likely to miss the 2C goal but the story doesn't end there Ezra's jumping-off point was a long piece I wrote about the
world's likely failure to stay below the agreed-on 2C temperature limit. That's a goal that the international community has set for
itself: We shouldn't let global average temperatures rise more than 2C (or 3.6F) above pre-industrial levels. Go past that, and we
step outside the conditions under which human civilization developed. It's true that the world is very likely to go past the 2C mark

the 2C limit also isn't some magical line between

"success" and "failure." It's an artificial boundary that happened to become the
focal point for policy discussions. The world isn't entirely safe if we stay below it, nor entirely
doomed if we go above it. Indeed, plenty of people would have considered even 2C of warming a "failure" it will likely mean
for the reasons I reported on here. But

that low-lying island nations like Tuvalu get swallowed up by the rising seas, as well as extensive damage to coral reefs and the

the disruptions
caused by global warming are likely to increase as temperatures keep rising . And the
communities that depend on them as the oceans warm. This isn't semantic quibbling. The key point is that

damage is expected to increase non-linearly. Here are a few mainstream forecasts from economists who have tried to model that
damage: Different models have different estimates for how costly global warming will be. But everyone agrees on the general point

risks and damages keep piling up as the world gets hotter . So if the world can't prevent 2C of
it's still a good idea to try and avoid 3C of warming. If we can't avoid 3C
of warming, it's still a good idea to avoid 4C. And so on. Climate policy experts don't like to put things

warming,

this way, since it increases the odds that the world might get lulled into complacency and postpone cutting emissions, letting
temperatures rise higher and higher. (The World Bank, for one, has argued that "4C warming simply must not be allowed to occur"
because there's no guarantee that humanity can adapt.) That's understandable. Setting hard boundaries and framing things
in terms of success and failure is a much more intuitive way to think about the issue. (I've been guilty of this sort of talk myself.)
But it doesn't really make sense to declare "game over" at any point . One place to see that is
with that recent news that six of West Antarctica's key glaciers appear to be in a state of irreversible decline and will eventually
collapse into the ocean in the coming centuries. Yes, it's probably too late to keep that ice sheet intact. In that sense, we've failed.

by increasing or decreasing emissions, humanity can still influence how

rapidly that ice melts in the centuries ahead and hence, how much time coastal
cities have to adapt to rising sea levels. And that's a far more relevant question.
But

AT: Paris Solves---General

Paris was just the start---further cooperation is key
Carol Gribnau 15, Green Society Programme Director, Hivos, The Paris Climate
Agreement offers hope; now lets get to work, 12/15/15,
https://www.hivos.org/news/paris-climate-agreement-offers-hope-now-lets-get-work
Now that all the solemn words have been pronounced, we must put that positive
energy into action. As we have seen in the past, inaction is often the main problem, and in
order to remain well below an increase of 2 degrees Celsius, action is needed now. Rich countries in
particular must act decisively to reduce their own emissions and leave fossil fuels where
they are: in the ground. In the Netherlands for example, that means no more coal. At the same time, the
agreement asks for a firm commitment towards low-income countries to enable them to
adapt to the impacts of climate change (adaptation) and focus on climate-neutral development, including the use

The means providing financial resources and sharing

knowledge and expertise.
of renewable energy.

the agreement is not convincing on these points. The national climate

plans that countries submitted prior to the summit still wander dangerously close to a temperature
rise of 3 degrees Celsius. So there still remains an enormous gap to bridge, and this
However,

requires a solid pricing of carbon and an immediate end to subsidies for fossil fuels.
Financial support for developing countries is laid down in the agreement as a formalisation of what had been agreed
in Copenhagen in 2009: developed nations will provide $100 billion in climate finance annually to developing
countries by 2020 to help them combat climate change and foster greener economies. However, experience shows
that industrialised nations use their development budget for climate funding, while at the same time allowing their
own companies to implement climate adaptation projects. This is how they soften the financial consequences of

poor countries often bear the costs of climate

adaptation and climate-related disasters such as floods and droughts while they could be using their
resources to get a head start at re-shaping their growing economies in a sustainable manner. Therefore, there is
still much to be gained in terms of climate-neutral, innovative solutions that
likewise offer clear opportunities for business investments .
the commitments they have made. As a result,

The coming years will be critical for

putting this agreement, which represents a real turnaround for the entire world, actually into
practice. The commitment nations made to evaluate their climate plans and emissions targets every five years,
The proof of the pudding is in the eating, as the English say.

and adjust them if necessary to meet the long-term temperature goal, represents in Hivos opinion a big stick to
keep the agreement on track.

AT: Paris Solves---Market Cooperation

Paris didnt solve---market mechanisms are still underdeveloped
Charlotte Streck 16, co-founder and director of Climate Focus, serves as an
advisor to numerous governments and non-profit organizations, private companies,
and foundations on legal aspects of climate policy, international negotiations, policy
development and implementation, The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning, Journal
for European Environmental and Planning Law, Volume 13, 2016, pp. 3-29,
http://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/The%20Paris%20Agreement%20A
%20New%20Beginning.pdf
Flexible mechanisms and carbon markets first pioneered by the Kyoto Protocol with the dual
purpose of assisting developing countries with achieving sustainable development and helping developed countries

have long been elements of the international climate

finance architecture. The High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, established in 2010 by
to comply with their mitigation targets22

the un Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, calculated that with an international carbon price of USD 2025 raised in
developed countries, around USD 30 billion annually could be leveraged for developing countries in addition to

UNFCCC Parties
have been struggling to reach common ground regarding the design of future
market approaches, their scope, and their function.24 For years, the discussions centred on what
private investment flows of USD 100200 billion in gross private capital.23 Conversely,

was referred to as New Market Mechanisms (NMM) on the one hand, and the Framework for Various Approaches
(FVA) on the other. The NMM was mostly conceived as a hands-on, centralized and top-down outfit, while the FVA
referred to a looser concept identified as an international tool to secure robust accounting for cross border
mitigation outcomes. Both concepts foresaw the issuance, or acceptance, of units to track emission reductions and,
within limits, offset a Partys mitigation obligations.

Negotiations on market mechanisms remained vague however, suffering from

conceptual differences. Several countries, in particular developed countries, envisioned the NMM as a
means to target whole economic sectors or broad segments of the economy and to see target countries commit to
own contributions when setting the baseline or reference level.25 Others, in particular

a number of

emerging countries, wished to retain a project-based approach, inspired by Kyotos Clean

Development Mechanism (CDM) with no targets enshrined for developing countries.26 In that sense, the

much of the discussions

were overshadowed by questions on the ethical value of carbon trading, seen against the
background of environmental justice,27 on the one hand, and the unresolved matter of carbon
trading in the context of emission reductions from deforestation (REDD+), on the other
discussions were no more than a continuation of the discussion on CBDRC. Finally,

hand.

Relations Advantage

Exts---Relations Declining
Relations arent high---significant possible flashpoints still
exist
Travis Tanner 16, President at The US-China Strong Foundation, U.S.-China
Relations in Strategic Domains, April 2016,
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_USChina_April2016.pdf
The U.S.-China relationship is becoming increasingly complex and interdependent, and
leaders in Beijing and Washington are struggling to establish a common
foundation on which to expand and deepen bilateral relations . While both sides seem to
agree on the general need to cooperate and manage competition, the details of how to move the
relationship forward remain unclear, particularly in areas where progress has already been difficult to
achieve. The international stakes of how the two nations work together and collaborate are monumental. Given that
the global challenges facing the world today cannot be resolved without both the United States and China,
calculations in the cyber, maritime, nuclear, and space domains are increasingly consequential and carry
implications for other nations. Military-to-military (mil-mil) and people-to-people (P2P) interactions also have the
potential to influence outcomes across a range of these and other key policy areas.
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and Peking Universitys Institute for China-U.S. People-to-People
Exchange partnered on a project to produce an examination of the challenges to establishing greater trust and
cooperation in U.S.-China relations in strategic domains and bilateral exchanges. The projectU.S.-China Relations
in Strategic Domainsassembled a study team of leading experts from China and the United States to develop a
conceptual foundation for U.S.-China relations. Employing an innovative approach to represent both U.S. and
Chinese perspectives, the members of the study team jointly examined opportunities for collaboration by
identifying areas of divergence and convergence across four strategic domains and two modes of bilateral
exchange. The project also enlisted two groups of senior advisorscomposed of top scholars and current and
former senior officialswho provided guidance and direction to the project and feedback to members of the study
team.
The study team interacted and held discussions through seminars in Beijing and Honolulu, as well as through teleand video conferences. The resulting essays published in this NBR Special Report assess the U.S.-China relationship
in the maritime, nuclear, cyberspace, and space domains as well as through the lens of P2P and mil-mil exchanges.
The project team sought to go beyond the rhetoric of cooperation to examine side by side U.S. and Chinese
interests in each strategic domain and bilateral mode of exchange. Each essay identifies areas of convergence and

The central challenge in

improving strategic stability between the United States and China is finding ways to
enhance collaboration and mitigate sources of tension. The project aims to help
recommends cooperative initiatives and mechanisms to manage tensions.

policymakers and strategists identify the terms and conditions through which the two sides can better understand
one another, avoid conflict, and facilitate cooperation.

the U.S.-China relationship is stronger than it has ever been but also faces an increasing
number of sources of tension and disagreement. Taiwan, North Korea, and territorial
disputes between China and several U.S. allies in the East and South China Seas all
present significant potential flashpoints. In addition, general strategic mistrust
plagues the relationship and carries the potential, along with several other factors, to
quickly exacerbate tensions and bring about a harmful deterioration of the
relationship or even conflict.
Today,

Even the economic domain, which has traditionally served as a linchpin for the relationship, is no
longer as rock-solid as it has been in the past . The U.S. and Chinese economies are inextricably
linked, and economic success or failure for one generally equates to benefits or harm for the other. The prospect of
a maturing and slowing Chinese economy, volatility in the Chinese stock market, and depreciation of the yuan all
carry negative implications for the United States and the global economy. Similarly,

U.S. measures to

restrain Chinese efforts to assume a leadership role in Asia and globally do not bode well
for the bilateral relationship. Notably, 2014 was the first year in recent decades when the
majority of both societies viewed the other side negatively.

Exts---Plan Spills Over

The plan spills over---climate cooperation sends a positive
signal that improves all other aspects of bilateral cooperation
Junjie Zhang 15, Associate Professor of Environmental Economics in the School of
Global Policy and Strategy at University of California, San Diego, What Would New
Breakthroughs on Climate Change Mean for the U.S.-China Relationship? 9/16/15,
https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-would-new-breakthroughs-climatechange-mean-us-china-relationship
climate change has become an important
topic in all the recent meetings between the presidents. The bilateral climate collaboration
started from an area that has the least impact on the economy. During the Sunnylands Summit in 2013, two
countries agreed to limit the production and consumption of climate-damaging hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs). The climate diplomacy then achieved a landmark success during the 2014
APEC meeting in Beijing, when China promised to peak its carbon emissions by 2030. The
momentum of the U.S.-China climate collaboration continues . In the highly anticipated State
The U.S. and China have made solid progress as

Visit in late September, presidents Obama and Xi are likely to focus on more detailed action plans, probably
promoting sub-national level climate collaboration.

Climate change is one of the few areas that the U.S. and China can achieve
successful collaboration. As the rivalry between two countries has intensified in recent
years, mutually beneficial climate collaboration can be an important step stone to
improve bilateral relationship. By working together to reduce climate pollutants,
both countries not only contribute to the protection of global climate but also send a positive signal
to build a healthy U.S.-China relationship.

An iterative process of cooperation improves trust and overall

relations
Aspen Institute 16 Track II Dialogue on Energy, Climate, and Sustainable
Development: Enhancing Bilateral Cooperation between China and the U.S.,
Session 2: Climate Diplomacy, Cooperation, and Broader Issues of International
Relations, 6/2/16,
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/ee/2.%20U.S.
%20Climate%20Diplomacy.FINAL__0.pdf
The broader US-China diplomatic
relationship is mired by divergent diplomatic and economic interests, often leading both
actors to approach disclosure of key metrics with caution. Yet the disclosure required to address the
common threat of climate change, and fully realize the potential of the Paris agreement, can be the
focal point from which trust is earned through an iterative process and thereby
benefiting the broader diplomatic relationship. There are numerous well known hard and
Explore the soft and hard co-benefits of cooperative climate action.

measurable co-benefits of climate action. These include the clean air and health benefits of GHG reduction, the
technology and development benefits of innovation in low carbon technology, the development of capacity in
development and use of data sets, including MRV standards, and others. The U.S. and China could commit to a
series of workshops on such topics to build peer learning groups that span areas that have been previously
separate but which have potentially common or overlapping research agendas.1 As these workshops develop their
analysis, it may be possible to envision how

diplomacy could make progress through action

achieving co-benefits that would be less likely if the issues and benefits are not
considered together.

Exts---SCS Conflict Coming

SCS conflict is coming---China is growing more assertive
David Barno 6/14, Retired Lt. Gen., Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the
School of International Service at American University and a Nonresident Senior
Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council, A Guide to Stepping It
Up in the South China Sea, 6/14/16, http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/a-guide-tostepping-it-up-in-the-south-china-sea/
The South China Sea has become one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the
world as China continues to aggressively expand its influence and capabilities there.
One year ago, we proposed several ways in which the United States could try to deter further Chinese

tensions in the region have only

risen since then. The Chinese have only accelerated their bellicose behavior, and nothing
encroachments. But, as the recent Shangri-La Dialogue demonstrated,

the United States has done has seemed to have any effect. The United States and its partners now have no choice
but to consider a wider range of more assertive responses.
We are not seeking a conflict with China, nor do we advocate a war. We do not believe that China is an inevitable

Chinese actions in the South

China Sea, if left unopposed, will give it de facto dominance of an area that is a vital
strategic interest to the United States. More direct U.S. actions would involve significant risks
adversary of the United States. But we are increasingly concerned that

but so would failing to act, and those risks are far less appreciated.

the South China Sea matter? It is one of the worlds most important shipping
lanes, transited by about one-third of global commercial goods each year. It lies atop at least seven billion barrels
of oil and an estimated 900 million cubic feet of natural gas. Conflicting claims to these important
waters abound. These involve several U.S. allies and friends and will likely be exacerbated by the pending
Why does

outcome of an international court case between China and the Philippines. Chinese efforts to establish sovereign
claims over these key international waters not only threaten unimpeded access to global shipping lanes and U.S.
partners in the region, but also set a dangerous global precedent. Beijings forceful efforts are intended to establish
regional hegemony by creating a zone of near seas over which it can claim sole control.

Chinese actions have grown bolder. They have completed land

reclamation efforts at the three largest outposts in the South China Sea and are now
focusing on developing infrastructure. Each one already has an airfield with a 9,800-foot runway,
During the past year,

which is long enough to land most military aircraft. They have also landed a military jet on Fiery Cross Reef and

these
capabilities provide forward-positioned power projection platforms for Chinese
fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft . Aircraft from these bases could easily reach and
deployed advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels. Taken together,

possibly enforce Chinese claims out to the so-called nine-dash line that borders the easternmost rim of the
South China Sea. Chinese Navy ships and maritime militia can also use these outposts as refueling and provisioning
stops that extend their sea presence across this vast expanse. U.S. aircraft carriers are at best transient visitors in

no other country in the region can project and sustain the air
and naval presence in the South China Sea that these fixed bases now offer .
these same waters, and

The United States has responded to this continued expansion with ever stronger warnings and actions. Most
notably, the United States conducted its first freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea in
October 2015, when a U.S. destroyer sailed within 12 miles of Subi Reef to demonstrate that the United States
rejects any Chinese maritime claims emanating from its artificial islands. At least two other FONOPs have been
conducted since then, and the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, has stated that future FONOPs
will increase in number, scope, and complexity.

Chinese confrontational actions are nevertheless continuing and even

escalating. In recent months, for example, Chinese fighter jets have flown dangerously
Yet

close to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in both the South and East China Seas, violating an
agreement that the United States and China signed last year on safe conduct in the air. And
the Chinese government recently announced that it is considering establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) over the South China Sea as a further signal of its security claims to this key region.

Exts---ECS Impact
Senkaku disputes escalate and cause extinction---high
tensions now
Adam P. Liff 15, Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana
Universitys School of Global and International Studies, Postdoctoral Fellow in the
Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and Associate in Research at
Harvard Universitys Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and Reischauer Institute of
Japanese Studies, and Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in the Strategic
Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College and an Associate in Research at
Harvard Universitys Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Crowding the Waters,
March 23, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143285/adam-p-liff-andandrew-s-erickson/crowding-the-waters?cid=rss-rss_xml-crowding_the_waters000000
Since September 2012, the de facto dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over islands in the
East China Sea has become unprecedentedly unstable. China is conducting
more military and paramilitary operations in the surrounding waters and airspace
than ever, and Japan is scrambling more fighter jets than at any time since record-keeping
began in 1958. By 2014, Chinese Major General Zhu Chenghu said, the slightest carelessness could
spark an unintended conflict between the worlds second- and third-largest economies. A military
conflict between China and Japan would have catastrophic consequences
and would almost certainly involve the U.S. military. After a chilly, abbreviated November 2014 summit
between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinpingthe first ever meeting between the two leaders

top-level political dialogue, although no longer frozen,

remains on thin ice. More important, in the East China Sea things didnt get much better.
Chinese government ships continue to enter Japans de facto territorial waters . For its
part, Tokyo shows no signs of backing down, scrambling fighters daily to intercept approaching
Chinese planes. Meanwhile, public opinion polls record Sino-Japanese acrimony at unprecedented
highs. While neither side wants a conflict, in this volatile reality of increasingly crowded
waters and airspace, the risk that a miscalculation or accident could
escalate into a major crisis is far too high for comfort. Indeed, the reality is
sobering: institutional deficiencies undermine each governments ability to rapidly
and effectively coordinate internally in the event of a crisis . Worse yet, despite seven
years of negotiations, Tokyo and Beijing have failed to formally agree tomuch less
implement reliablyany bilateral crisis management mechanism. In short, the ability of
China or Japan to prevent a low-level incident from escalating to a fullblown crisis is questionable. To ameliorate the risk of an avoidable catastrophe in the East China Sea, then,
political relations have begun to thaw. But

true statesmanship must be matched with expeditious institutional reforms on both sides. While the likelihood of any single

the drastic increase of encounters increases overall

risk significantly. It isnt as if China and Japan want to go to war over a few islands. In 2007, both governments pledged to
encounter escalating to a military conflict is low,

turn the East China Sea into a Sea of Peace, Cooperation, and Friendship. Prior to the downturn in relations in September 2012,
they had also held high-level maritime consultations and bilateral talks on a maritime communication mechanism. New rounds were
held this past January. March 19 marked the first bilateral security dialogue in four years, wherein Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister
Liu Jianchao and Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Shinsuke Sugiyama discussed implementation of a hot line between defense

While talk is good, and certainly not cheap, no

timetable for implementation of any concrete crisis management mechanisms has
been set. Yet realities in the air and waters surrounding the islands remain volatile
and demand immediate and substantive progress on firebreaks to contain escalation
authorities to avoid unintended clashes in the air and at sea.

in the event of an incident. Diplomatic cooperation and robust, depoliticized communication mechanisms are
vital and needed urgently.

U.S. gets drawn into East China Sea conflict

Nick Beams 15, former national secretary of the Australians Socialist Equality
Party, US and Japan tighten military ties in stepped up war drive against China,
April 29, World Socialist Web Site,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/04/29/usja-a29.html
The agreement was formalised ahead of tomorrows address by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to a joint session of the US
Congressthe first ever such address by the head of a Japanese government. The significance of the visit and the agreement for US
objectives was highlighted by the fact that Obama spent most of Tuesday closeted in talks with Abe ahead of the congressional
address.

The agreement allows for greater co-operation between US and Japanese armed forces and increases the
likelihood of direct American military intervention should Japan and China come
into armed conflict over disputed territory in the East China Sea.
It is in line with last years reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution by the Abe
government which extends the conception of self-defence to include joint military
action with its allies, particularly the US, should it come under attack.
The reinterpretation was the outcome of a concerted push by the United States for Japan to scrap any constitutional restrictions on

Washington is accelerating its drive to integrate its allies in the AsiaPacific region into its operations directed against China as part of the pivot to Asia
of which Japan and Australia form two key foundations.
its military activity.

It also dovetailed with the aims of the right-wing nationalist Abe government to remove the shackles on Japanese military action
under the so-called pacifist clause of the post-war constitution. Immediately following last years reinterpretation, Abe delivered
an address to the Australian parliament in which he laid out the perspective an increased global role for Japan.
No direct mention of China was made in the statements accompanying the signing of the Washington agreement but there is no
doubt it was the target.
A senior US defence official was reported as saying it was a big deal and a very important moment in the US-Japan alliance
before going on to cite an increasing threat from Chinas ally North Korea. For the US, the North Korean threat is a convenient
cover for its military measures directed against China.

Establishing a potential trigger for war, the agreement specifically confirmed

an earlier US commitment to side with Japan, if necessary by military means, in its
conflict with China over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islets in the East China Sea. The
dispute over the uninhabited rocky outcrops, which has been on-going for several
decades, escalated in 2012 when the Japanese government nationalised them in a
clear provocation against China.
Secretary of State John Kerry made clear the US regards them as under Japanese
control. Calling the new defence ties an historic transition, Kerry said: Washingtons commitment to
Japans security remains ironclad and covers all territories under Japans
administration, including the Senkaku Islands.

Exts---Global Governance Impacts

Cooperative great-power relations across regime type create a
global check on conflict---enables the U.S to effectively isolate
any state that threatens regional or global security---means
they cant win an impact
Charles Kupchan 9, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University
and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam Mount, doctoral
candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Spring 2009,
The Autonomy Rule, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, online:
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf
Employing these minimal and consistent standards for inclusion would not only
increase the number of stakeholders in the international system, but also
allow for a clear delineation of those states that do not deserve the rights of
good standing. Washington would be able to take a resolute and principled
stand against the few remaining predatory regimessuch as Sudan, North Korea,
Myanmar, and Zimbabwethat evince no apparent concern for the welfare of their citizens and expose them to
brutality, famine, illiteracy, and systematic repression. The United States would also be able to isolate any
state or non-state actor whose breach of international norms endangers regional or
global security. Moreover, having affirmed the rights of all responsible states,
Washington would be more likely to enjoy the backing of many of the worlds
statesdemocracies and non-democracies alikein confronting such
predators. With membership in the community of nations well-defined, a great-power consensus
might well emerge on how best to deal with predatory states , making
humanitarian and preventive intervention a more realistic prospect . Honoring the
Autonomy Rule would therefore legitimate a new and more inclusive order while delegitimating and isolating the worlds most dangerous actors .
Far from representing an abandonment of American ideals, this approach draws
heavily on the foundational principles of Americas own experience to shape the
parameters of a new international order. John Gaddis, a Yale historian, agrees that the United States should focus on
eradicating tyranny rather than spreading democracy, observing that the objective of
ending tyrannyis as deeply rooted in American history as it is possible to imagine . . . Spreading democracy
suggests knowing the answer to how people should live their lives . Ending
tyranny suggests freeing them to find their own answers. Moreover, as citizens in a
pluralist society, Americans have a tradition of valuing the preservation of intellectual,
cultural, racial, and religious difference. Celebrating pluralism not only ensures that the
uniqueness of the individual will be valued; such tolerance also produces a vibrant society capable of
bringing multiple perspectives to bear on common problems.
These principles are equally applicable to international politics: There can be no
good justification for the United States to celebrate pluralism at home but fail to
do so abroad. Just as pluralism and tolerance help resolve some of the most difficult challenges of domestic
governance, they should do the same for matters of international politics. As long as other countries adhere to the Autonomy
Rule, the United States should respect their political preferences as a matter of national discretion and a reflection of the
diversity that is intrinsic to political life.

Cooperation with a plurality of governance models prevents

great power war---failing to bolster pluralist cooperation
causes unstable multipolarity, kills U.S. leadership, and
prevents global solutions to terrorism, prolif, warming, energy
security, water, and the economy
Charles Kupchan 12, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University
and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, No One's World: The
West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, Kindle edition (no page
numbers)
Although Western hegemony is in its waning days, it still provides a significant level of
global stability. Teamwork between the United States and the EU continues to represent the world's most important
partnership. The EU's aggregate wealth rivals America's, and the U.S. economy will remain number one into the next decade.
The American military will maintain its primacy well beyond the next decade, and Washington's diplomatic clout will be second
to none for the foreseeable future.

the stability afforded by Western predominance will slip away in step

with its material and ideological primacy. Accordingly, the West must work with
emerging powers to take advantage of the current window of opportunity to
map out the rules that will govern the next world . Otherwise, multipolarity
coupled with ideological dissensus will ensure balance-of-power
competition and unfettered jockeying for power, position, and prestige. It is far
preferable to arrive at a new rules-based order by design rather than head
toward a new anarchy by default.
Nonetheless,

The goal should be to forge a consensus among major states about the
foundational principles of the next world. The West will have to be ready for
compromise; the rules must be acceptable to powers that adhere to very
different conceptions of what constitutes a just and acceptable order. The
political diversity that will characterize the next world suggests that aiming low
and crafting a rules-based order that endures is wiser than aiming high and
coming away empty-handed. What follows is a sketch of what the rules of the next order might look likea
set of principles on which the West and the rising rest may well be able to find common ground.
Defining Legitimacy

the West has propagated a conception of order that equates

political legitimacy with liberal democracy. If a new rules-based order is to
emerge, the West will have to embrace political diversity rather than
insist that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government. To be sure,
Under American leadership,

nondemocracies currently have their say in global institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the G-20. But
even as the West does business with autocracies in these and other settings, it also delegitimates them in word and action.
The United States leads the charge on this front. In his second inaugural address, George W. Bush stated that, "America's vital
interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture." Although of different political stripes, Barack Obama told
the UN General Assembly in 2010 that "experience shows us that history is on the side of liberty; that the strongest foundation
for human progress lies in open economies, open societies, and open governments. To put it simply, democracy, more than any
other form of government, delivers for our citizens."- Obama also made clear his commitment to democracy promotion in
outlining the U.S. response to the Arab Spring:
The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the
freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders.... Our support
for these principles is not a secondary interest... it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported
by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal.2

Europe generally shares this outlook. Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief, declared in 2010 that, "democracy, human
rights, security, governance and sustainable development are intrinsically linked. Democratic principles have their roots in

elites in the West "have

operated on the ideological conviction that liberal democracy is the only
legitimate form of government and that other forms of government are not
only illegitimate but transitory.''
universal norms and values."- Such statements affirm Robert Kagan's observation that

This stance is morally compelling and consistent with values deeply held among the Atlantic democracies. But the equation of
legitimacy with democracy undermines the West's influence among emerging powers. Even countries like Brazil and India, both of
which are stable democracies, tend to view the West's obsession with democracy promotion as little more than uninvited meddling
in the affairs of others. The backlash is of course considerably harsher in autocracies such as China and Russia, which regularly warn
the United States and the EU to stay out of the domestic affairs of other countries. In Putin's words, "We are all perfectly aware of
the realities of domestic political life. I do not think it is really necessary to explain anything to anybody. We are not going to
interfere in domestic politics, just as we do not think that they should prevent practical relations ... from developing. Domestic
politics are domestic politics."
For the West to speak out against political repression and overt violations of the rule of law is not only warranted but obligatory.

to predicate constructive relations with rising powers on their readiness to

embrace a Western notion of legitimacy is another matter altogether. Senator John McCain is off
course in insisting that "It is the democracies of the world that will provide the pillars upon which we can and must build an
enduring peace." On the contrary, only if the West works cooperatively with all regimes
willing to reciprocatedemocracies and nondemocracies alikewill it be able
to build an enduring peace. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate
change, energy security, water and food security, financial crisisthese
challenges are global in nature and can be effectively addressed only in
partnership with a wide array of countries.
But

It makes little sense for the West to denigrate and ostracize regimes whose
cooperation it needs to fashion a secure new order; the stakes are too high.
Western countries only harm their own interests when they label as illegitimate
governments that are not liberal democracies. Recognizing the next world's
inevitable political diversity and thereby consolidating cooperation with
rising powers of diverse regime type is far more sensible than insisting on the
universality of Western conceptions of legitimacyand alienating potential
partners. The West and rising rest must arrive at a new, more inclusive, notion of
legitimacy if they are to agree on an ideological foundation for the next world .

-- Terrorisms extinction
Toon et al 7 Owen B. Toon, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and
Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, Atmospheric effects and
societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual
nuclear terrorism, online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-19732007.pdf
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the worlds great urban
centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At
the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such
small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart
of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range
can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and
casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the
arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with

substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control

sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear
explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons
with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the
Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air
burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan
area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and
radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana
suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe
would most likely have severe national and international economic
consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks
because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where
business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue
nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an
organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by
such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once
predicted for a full-scale nuclear counterforce exchange in a
superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated
by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to
significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did
not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical,
social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have
been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and
Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present
scenarios and physical outcomes.

-- Prolifs extinction
Martin Hellman 2008, Prof Emeritus of Engineering @ Stanford, Defusing the
Nuclear Threat: A Necessary First Step, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/statement.php
Nuclear deterrence has worked for over fifty years, while attempts at nuclear disarmament have borne very
limited fruit. The success of deterrence combined with the failure of disarmament has fostered the belief that,
repulsive as nuclear deterrence might be, it is the only strategy we can depend on for the indefinite future.

Given the horrific consequences of even a single failure , the real question is
whether deterrence will work until it is no longer needed . Anything less is a
modern day version of Neville Chamberlains infamous 1938 statement promising Peace in
our time, implicitly leaving the problem and likely destruction to our childrens
generation. And, as occurred to Chamberlains Britain, devastation could come much sooner than
anticipated. The danger increases with each new entrant into the nuclear weapons
club and more new members, including terrorist groups, are likely in the near future. Given that the
survival of humanity is at stake , it is surprising that risk analysis studies of nuclear deterrence
are incomplete. A number of studies have estimated the cost of a failure, with estimates ranging
from megadeaths for a limited exchange or terrorist act, through possible human extinction for a fullscale nuclear war. But there is a lack of studies of an equally important component of the risk, namely the
failure rate of deterrence.

-- Unchecked warming causes extinction---scientific consensus

Don Flournoy 12, PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the
University College @ Ohio University, Former Associate Dean @ State University of
New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project Manager for University/Industry
Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Currently Professor of Telecommunications
@ Scripps College of Communications @ Ohio University, Citing Feng Hsu, PhD
NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center, January 2012, "Solar Power
Satellites," in Springer Briefs in Space Development, p.10-11
In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at
Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of
space and Earth, writes, The evidence of global warming is alarming, noting the
potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and
troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring
and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received
first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues,
including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research
with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no
doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious
problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are
due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are
two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific
evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2
concentrations in Earths atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of
global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the
worlds scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential
catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this
problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse
gases into Earths biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a
technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence
that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy
addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. This,
he writes, is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate
change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is
simply too high for us to take any chances (Hsu 2010 )

-- Energy shocks cause great power nuke war

Islam Yasin Qasem 7, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and
Social Sciences at the University of Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in
International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, The Coming Warfare of Oil
Shortage, online:
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o
.htm
Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will
not hesitate to unleash their economic and military power to ensure secure
access to oil resources, triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. And

while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military
power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already
nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons. In an anarchic world with
many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in
downward spiral, the chances of using nuclear weapons in pursues of
national interests are high.

Cooperation across regime type creates effective regional

security architectures---causes a global backstop against
conflict escalation
Charles Kupchan 12, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University
and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, No One's World: The
West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, Kindle edition (no page
numbers)
Enhancing the efficacy of international institutions will also require the
devolution of greater responsibility and capability to regional actors.
Deliberations at the global level are certainly required to set broad policies as
well as coordinate responses to crises. But global governance has its limits; as
the UN and G-20 have made clear, reaching consensus and taking effective
action do not come easily.
The diffusion of global power ultimately means the diffusion of
international responsibilityfrom the Atlantic community of democracies to
a broad array of states in good standing in all quarters of the globe. A new
distribution of power necessitates a new distribution of responsibility, and
effectively tackling many of today's challenges requires broad cooperation
across region and regime type. Proposals that envisage the world-wide
extension of Western institutionssuch as a global NATO or a League of
Democraciesare destined to fall woefully short. Important rising powers
would be excluded and Western democracies have little appetite for such an
expansion of commitments.
Instead, Western institutions should serve as a model, not a substitute, for
regional governance elsewhere. In the same way that NATO and the European
Union helped bring security and prosperity to the Atlantic community, similar
institutions can do the same in other areas. Regional devolution makes sense for
a number of reasons. Countries closest to a crisis are those most likely to take
effective action, if only for reasons of proximity. And with the West likely to be
more focused on its own problems in the coming years, tapping the potential of
other states increases the likelihood of timely diplomatic and military
initiatives. Finally, the West's intervention beyond the Atlantic zone always
invites resistance and resentment. In contrast, action by local states is more
likely to enjoy support and legitimacy within the region in question.
The devolution of authority to regional bodies has already been occurring, aided
by the evolving capacities for governance and engagement at the regional level.
The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the defense union taking shape in South America (UNASUR)as these
and other regional organizations mature, they have considerable potential to
assume greater responsibility for their respective regions.

Air Pollution Advantage/Add-On

Top Level Internal Link

US-China climate cooperation is vital to reduce Chinese
emissions of non-CO2 GHG emissions---thats key to reduce air
pollution and avoid crop collapse in China
Barbara A. Finnemore 15, Senior Attorney and Asia Director at the Natural
Resources Defense Council, What Would New Breakthroughs on Climate Change
Mean for the U.S.-China Relationship? 9/16/15,
https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-would-new-breakthroughs-climatechange-mean-us-china-relationship
[SLCP = Short-Lived Climate Pollutant]
In their joint climate agreement last November, Presidents Xi and Obama made major progress, both in committing

Xis imminent trip to

the U.S. presents another vital opportunity for the worlds two largest greenhouse gas (GHG)
emitters to show climate leadership in the run-up to Paris.
to reduce CO2 emissions and in advancing the international climate negotiations. President

One area of potential cooperation that would be ripe for a major announcement is mitigation of
non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), such as black
carbon, methane, nitrous oxides and HFCs, not only warm the atmosphere but are also linked
with the severe air pollution affecting China.
According to an expert Chinese and international team that has been meeting in Beijing under the auspices of the
China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), recent scientific

the fast implementation of some key SLCP measures in

specific sectors can have significant benefits by reducing the rate and degree of
warming in the nearterm (i.e. over the next few decades), providing substantial health
benefits by lowering PM2.5 and ground-level ozone concentrations, and avoiding significant losses
in the yields of many important crops in China. Action in China will not only
benefit environmental conditions and development in China, but will also provide
assessments have identified that

global climate benefits, including in the Arctic, and air quality benefits in neighboring countries and over the
northern hemisphere.
China is taking major steps to control air pollution through regulation of SO2 and NOX emissions, including under its
recently amended Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law. These measures are a top priority and essential to
reduce human health impacts. Yet these pollutants also have a cooling effect on the climate, so unless these
emission reductions are accompanied by a reduction in short-lived climate pollutants, they would lead to
accelerated near-term warming in China and globally. The SLCP approach is the only way to reduce the near-term
warming and counteract this effect, making an SLCP strategy especially crucial for China.

China is already taking some actions to reduce SLCPs, through both domestic policies and
international programs, including reducing its production and consumption of the ozone
depleting substance HCFC-22 under the umbrella of the Montreal Protocol; supporting the
continued destruction of the super-GHG HFC-23, which is a byproduct of HCFC-22 production; and
promoting climate-friendly refrigerants to replace high-global warming potential HFC refrigerants. Further U.S.China cooperation could help identify gaps in SCLP implementation and promote
earlier and deeper implementation of key measures that would address global
warming and air pollution in the most effective way. This would include measures to reduce methane
emissions in the oil and gas, waste and agriculture sectors; cooperation on policies and standards for phasing down
consumption of HFCs and replacing them with climate-friendly refrigerants; and measures to reduce black carbon
from a variety of sources, including diesel engines in on-road and non-road vehicles and vessels, residential use of

coal and solid biomass fuels, inefficient coal combustion in small-scale industry, and the open burning of agriculture
waste.

Exts---Internal Link
Climate action solves their air pollution
Alvin Lin 15, Climate and Energy Policy Director, China Program, Natural
Resources Defense Council, with Barbara Finamore, Senior Attorney and Asia
Director, China Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, Paris Climate
Agreement Explained: Why we can trust China to meet its climate commitments
under the Paris Agreement, 12/12/15, https://www.nrdc.org/experts/alvin-lin/parisclimate-agreement-explained-why-we-can-trust-china-meet-its-climate
Addressing climate change will help China to clean up its air. Severe air pollution
has plagued large swathes of the country in the last several years, as power plants and factories
powered by coal and millions of cars on the roads have brought choking pollution to its skies. At the beginning of
the second week of the negotiations, after a week in which air pollution reached "beyond index" levels

Beijing issued its first ever red alert for air pollution , taking
half the cars off the roads and shutting down schools to try to clean up the air. There is broad
recognition that China needs to reduce its coal consumption in order to both clean up
its air and reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, since coal accounts for 50-60% of its fine
unimaginable in the United States,

particulate matter and 80% of its CO2 energy-related CO2 emissions. Similar air pollution levels have not been seen
in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, an era which saw the passage of the Clean Air Act and tough new
fuel and tailpipe standards to clean up the choking smog in cities like Los Angeles. Just as the US cleaned up its air

China is also self-motivated to cap its fossil fuel

consumption and switch to clean er energy in order to clean up its air and to ensure
in response to the demands of its citizens,

that the government is living up to citizens' expectations.

Short-lived climate pollutants are key---controlling their

emission solves air pollution and crop yields
Jiming Hao 15, Council Member with the China Council for International
Cooperation on Environment and Development, Professor, School of Environment,
Tsinghua University, Coordinated Actions for Addressing Climate Change and Air
Pollution, November 2015,
http://www.cciced.net/encciced/policyresearch/report/201511/P0201511175745243
03949.pdf
[SLCP = Short-Lived Climate Pollutant]
Air pollution is a major issue in China, with very large impacts on human health,
agriculture, quality of life and economic development. Studies have estimated that PM2.5 pollution
causes millions of premature deaths globally from outdoor and indoor exposure to PM2.5 pollution. The PM2.5
pollution causes increased incidence of strokes, heart disease, lung cancer and respiratory infections which leads to
people dying earlier than they would in the absence of PM2.5 pollution (i.e. the premature mortality). In addition, a
much larger number of people are being affected by non-lethal, yet significant health impacts including increased

controlling
air pollution is undoubtedly a top priority for China in the coming years.
incidence of asthma, increased hospital visits, low birth weight, and lost work and school days. Thus,

An SLCP strategy can mitigate air pollution impacts in several important ways. First of all, SLCP
strategies address some of the major sources of incomplete combustion, reducing a large part of the emissions that
lead to the PM2.5 concentrations causing the damage to health, and so can deliver substantial reductions in health
impacts. Secondly,

SLCP strategies can reduce impacts of tropospheric ozone on crop

yields, forest growth and human health, which is an important area for air pollution control. Last and perhaps
most importantly, an SLCP strategy is an important way to address near-term climate warming, which will be further
enhanced by the planned rapid removal of sulphur and NOx from the atmosphere.

Sulphur and NOx are being controlled in China under the air pollution law to prevent human health impacts, which
is a top priority and very necessary. High levels of sulphur in the atmosphere, however, cool the planet. Thus the
SO2 and NOX emission reductions on their own would lead to accelerated near-term warming in China and globally.
The SLCP approach is the most effective way to reduce the near-term warming and counteract this effect, making
the SLCP strategy especially crucial for China.

reducing the sulphur content in their fuels is a widely

used strategy for mitigating air quality and health impacts of NRMS emissions. Thus,
In the case of the non-road mobile sources,

reducing the sulphur in fuels will also lead to regional near-term warming, and therefore must be offset through an
SLCP strategy, which includes further BC controls on NRMS sources. In light of the projected reduction in SO2,

there is an urgent need to accelerate the control of SLCPs, like BC, from the shipping
and port sectors and other non-road machinery to offset the climate impacts of
reduced SO2 emissions. Lower sulphur content in fuels is necessary for the deployment of advanced
control technology, which emphasize the need to coordinate SLCP, air quality and climate strategies.

CCP Scenario
Pollution causes mass protests and threatens CCP legitimacy
Eleanor Albert 16, Online Writer and Editor for the Council on Foreign Relations,
Chinas Environmental Crisis, 1/18/16, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinasenvironmental-crisis/p12608
Environmental damage has cost China dearly, but the greatest collateral damage for
the ruling Communist Party has likely been growing social unrest. Demonstrations have
proliferated as citizens gain awareness of the health threats and means of organized protest
(often using social media). In 2013, Chen Jiping, former leading member of the partys Committee of Political and

environmental issues are a major reason for mass incidents

in Chinaunofficial gatherings of one hundred or more that range from peaceful protest to rioting.
Legislative Affairs said that

Environmental protests in rural and urban areas alikesuch as those in Guangdong, Shanghai, Ningbo, and
Kunmingare increasing in frequency. The number of abrupt environmental incidents, including protests, in 2013
rose to 712 cases, a 31 percent uptick from the previous year.

one of the most important changes in Chinas environmental

protest movement has been a shift, beginning in the late 2000s, from predominantly rural-based
protests to urban-based movements. The issue has worried the top leadership,
which views the unrest as a threat to the partys legitimacy. Air pollution in
China has turned into a major social problem and its migitation has become a crucial political
CFRs Economy points out that

challenge for the countrys political leadership, write Center for Strategic and International Studiess Jane Nakano
and Hong Yang. Yet the government has responded to public outcries: Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared a war
on pollution in March 2014; in May of the same year the government strengthened the countrys Environmental
Protection Law for the first time in twenty-five years. Such moves reflect a changing understanding within China
about the relationship between economic development and societal wellbeing, Economy and Levi write.

The Internet has played a crucial role in allowing citizens to spread information
about the environment, , placing additional political pressure on the
government. In March 2015 Under the Dome, a TED Talk-style documentary on Chinas air pollution went
viral, attracting hundreds of thousands of views before Internet censors blocked access, and in 2013 the discovery
of thousands of dead pigs in the Huangpu river also spread rapidly online. However, experts say the jury is still out
on the current government will implement meaningful reforms, which has shown more resolve in cracking down on
public dissent than implementing environmental measures.

Chinese pollution causes CCP collapse and lashout

Yee & Storey 2 Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at
the Hong Kong Baptist University; and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at
Deakin University, 2002, The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, p. 5
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of
political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil
war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all
of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability.
Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the
increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of
natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid
industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central
government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil
war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring
countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would

no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A

fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear
weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.2
From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its
neighbours and the world.

CCP Impact---Nationalism/Territory
Reduced legitimacy causes the CCP to embrace nationalism--that causes existing territorial disputes to escalate to armed
conflict
Tyler McKnight 13, M.A. student in International Relations at the University of
San Diego, B.A. in Political Science from Villanova University, Regime Legitimacy
and the CCP, Fall 2013,
http://www.sandiego.edu/cas/documents/polisci/TylerMcKnightPaper.pdf
the most reasonable and likely path the CCP will pursue to shore up its
legitimacy is by embracing nationalism. There is a lot for the Chinese to be proud of these days.
Perhaps

They are a country that has risen from the ashes of the Cultural Revolution to become the second largest economy
in the world. Most of the people of China no longer live a life of subsistence, but one of material wealth. Many
Chinese can now afford things that were once considered luxury items such as televisions and cars. China has firmly
established itself as an economic power. China is now not only economically strong, but also politically and militarily
strong on the international stage. After many years of subjugation, exploitation, and humiliation at the hands of
foreign powers China is now a strong nation. China is powerful enough now to defend its borders against any
potential threat. Increasingly, China is also able to flex its muscles beyond its own borders and territorial waters as
exemplified by Chinas recent establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed

Chinas ability to project power is quickly

catching up with potential rivals such as Japan and the United States. The use of nationalism to
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.

support regime legitimacy is not a new concept for the CCP. Since the late 1970s the CCP have been cultivating
nationalism as a way to compensate for the weaknesses of communist ideology. After the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution and the sanxin weiji (three spiritual crises) the CCP started using nationalism as a way to establish a
hegemonic order of political values and as a way to rally popular support behind a less popular regime and its
policies by creating a sense of community. The CCP double downed on using nationalism as a way to unite the
country and reinforce its legitimacy after the Tiananmen Square protests in the spring of 1989. Nationalism was
viewed as a way to counter Western liberal ideas and calls for democracy. As the CCP did after the protest of 1989
and continues to do today, the party continues to sell itself as the protector of the Chinese people against foreign
aggression. If the CCP were to allow weakness, disunity, and disorder at home it would open a Pandoras box. Such
chaos would weaken China and give foreign aggressors the chance to reassert themselves. With Chinas history of
foreign exploitation, such an argument can carry a lot of weight in China. China is once again a strong country and

If
the CCP were to strongly embrace and stoke nationalism, it would be hard
to contain it. If the CCP were to define itself as the guardians of Chinese nationalism it would have to
work hard to ensure it appeases the concerns of nationalist. China continues to have a
number of festering territory disputes with its neighbors: the continued de facto
independence of Taiwan, its border with India, and the Senkaku /Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea
to name a few. With its history of foreign exploitation, China is acutely sensitive to any territory dispute. The CCP
would have a very hard time maintaining its nationalist credentials if it were to
allow other countries to assert control over any of the disputed areas. The Chinese leaders
it does not want to fall back into a role of subjugation.xxiii The problem with nationalism is it is a fickle beast.

ran into this problem in the late 1990s when there was a distinct rise in nationalism in China. The authors of the

nationalist book The China That Can Say No were openly critical of the Chinese government for taking a
endorsed taking action to
annex Taiwan at any cost and open confrontation with Japan and the United States.
popular

stance they viewed as too soft towards the United States and Japan. They

A move such as this would at best be risky considering China was, and still is, dependent on Japan and the United
States to ensure its continued economic growth.xxiv As a result of Chinas history of humiliation and the CCPs

China is more likely than other countries to use

strong-arm tactics or force to assert itself. Such moves are a double-edged sword for the
CCP. They could help the CCP to maintain its credentials as the guardians of the Chinese
people, but this would be at the expense of hurting its standing in the international community, or worse,
need to strengthen its nationalist credentials,

sending China on path towards armed conflict. When military units of

opposing countries are in close proximity to each other and tensions run high, it can be
very difficult to prevent acts of aggression from spilling over into armed conflict.
Posturing on one side can be viewed as an imminent intent to attack on the other.
China will have to balance a fine line to ensure their actions are not viewed as too soft at home or overly aggressive
by the international community. If the CCP relies heavily on nationalism to strengthen its legitimacy and it is viewed
too soft at home, it will hurt the staying power of the regime.

its neighbors, it could face

If China is viewed as too aggressive by

reduced foreign investment, sanctions, or worse, armed conflict. All of

which would also hurt the economic growth of China and as a result damage the legitimacy of the regime.

CCP Impact---China-India
McKnight says nationalism causes China-India war---goes
nuclear
Rory Medcalf 12, Director-International Security Program at the Lowy Institute
for International Policy, with FIONA CUNNINGHAM, The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear
Weapons in China-India Relations
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Cunningham_and_Medcalf
%2C_The_dangers_of_denial_web.pdf
The nuclear dynamic between China and India the worlds two most populous
states armed with the worlds most dangerous weapons has long been a strangely cold
issue in international affairs: underexplored and underestimated. It is often assumed
they have a stable relationship involving mutual deterrence that would function in a
crisis and that this benign situation will endure .1 But as their power and interests
expand, such assumptions will need to be re-examined. It is striking that, despite
their commonalities of restrained nuclear postures and disarmament rhetoric, China and
India have failed to achieve reassurance and cooperation on nuclear issues. This is
an unpropitious starting point for a relationship that is becoming more competitive . 2
The more troubling conceivable futures for Sino-Indian nuclear relations are marked
by questions about the effectiveness of deterrence and a lack of preparation
for crisis management. In any case, the implications of nuclear competition between
China and India extend beyond the possibilities remote but not to be dismissed of military
confrontation, the exchange of nuclear threats or nuclear use. This dynamic is
creating new uncertainties in relations between the two powers, as well as their relations
with the United States and Pakistan. It is also obstructing global arms control and disarmament efforts. In this Lowy
Institute Analysis, we assess Sino- Indian nuclear dynamics including by examining the two countries' nuclear
capabilities and postures, drivers of security tensions and potential flashpoints. We conclude by suggesting
measures to restrain this nascent nuclear competition. Strategic tensions Competition, coexistence and asymmetry

Mistrust is an enduring feature of relations between India and China, and has
worsened in the past five years. Certainly some substantial elements of cooperation have simultaneously grown
and persisted, resulting in what might be termed competitive coexistence rather than full- blown rivalry.* China has
become India's largest trading partner, though economic competition could deepen as manufacturing expands in

India and China have parallel interests in some global forums,

but this has not led to patterns of sustained cooperation,
trust or mutual respect.
India. As huge developing nations,
such as on climate change,

Reduced legitimacy causes the CCP to embrace nationalism--that causes Indo-China border conflict
J. Michael Cole 14, The Diplomat, "Where Would Beijing Use External
Distractions?", July 10, thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-externaldistractions/
Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external
distractions to tap into a restive populations nationalist sentiment and thereby
release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in
power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through
retributive democracy that is, elections have used this device to ensure their survival during periods
of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and

go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened

economic growth,
by
domestic instability? Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and
rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture

In past
decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a
disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against
external opponents, namely Japan and the United States. While serving as a convenient outlet,
domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as
far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was
a function both of Chinas focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors)
and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the
worlds second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of
double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military. Those impressive
achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly
approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding
respect, which if denied can and should be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to
attribute Chinas recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the
emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a
component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese
expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional
forum in Hanoi in 2010, There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries. This newfound
assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of
serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially
destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and
external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled.

sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public
discontent with his bungled economic policies.

For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking

it must not result in failure or military

attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor),

defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic
crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-

The greater the

domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take , given that the scope and, above
taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions:

all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater. With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios
would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime

The intensifying crackdown on critics of the

CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship all point to
growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood,
soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility.

which Beijing could use for external distraction. 1. South China Sea The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes
with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of
Chinas indivisible territory and therefore a core interest, are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some incident, timed to counter unrest
back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has both the
numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have
skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood

Jammu
and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh Although Beijing claims that it is ready for a
settlement of its longstanding territorial disputes with India, the areas remain ripe
for the re-ignition of conflict. New Delhi accuses China of occupying 38,000 square kilometers in
Jammu and Kashmir, and Beijing lays claim to more than 90,000 square kilometers of territory inside
the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. A few factors militate against the suitability of those territories for an external distraction, chief
of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijings interests. 2.

among them the difficult access in winter, and the strength of the Indian military, which would pose a greater risk to PLA troops than those of Vietnam or

memories of Chinas routing of the Indian

military in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 could embolden Beijing. Though challenging,
the PLA would be expected to prevail in a limited conflict with Indian forces, and
the Philippines in the previous scenario. Nevertheless,

China would have taken on a greater regional power than Vietnam or the Philippines, with
everything that this entails in terms of political benefits back home .

That goes nuclear

David Brewster 15, Visiting Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific, specializes in South
Asian and Indian Ocean strategic affairs; Senior Maritime Security Fellow at the
Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai, and a Fellow with the Australia India
Institute, 3/31/15, The Coming Nuclearization of the Indian Ocean,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/03/31/the_coming_nuclearization_of_
the_indian_ocean_107834.html
While the world focuses on the dangers that a nuclear-armed Iran could present in the
Middle East, a potentially more dangerous and unstable nuclear proliferation is
occurring in the Indian Ocean .
In the coming years India, Pakistan, and perhaps China will likely deploy a significant number of
nuclear weapons at sea in the Indian Ocean. This could further destabilize already unstable
nuclear relationships, creating a real risk of a sea-based exchange of nuclear
weapons.
Observers have long seen India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry as the most unstable in the world, and South Asia as the
most likely location of nuclear conflict. This is not just academic speculation. Foreign diplomats have been
evacuated from Islamabad on several occasions from fears of an impending nuclear exchange with India.
India has a no first use (NFU) nuclear-weapons policy of sorts, although it is increasingly subject to caveats and
exceptions. But Islamabad refuses to adopt an NFU policy and indeed has announced a long list of actions that it
claims would justify a nuclear response against India. Pakistan is also busy miniaturizing its nuclear weapons for
tactical use, thus reducing the threshold for Pakistani nuclear action.
Importantly, Pakistan sees its nuclear arsenal not only as a deterrent but also as an enabler, providing an umbrella
under which it can sponsor sub-conventional attacks against India. In the face of terrorist attacks such as those in
Mumbai in 2008, Delhi has found its options constrained by concerns about a possible Pakistani nuclear response.
But few are confident that India's restraint can be maintained in the face of another serious cross-border attack that
is proved to have been sponsored by Pakistan.
Both India and Pakistan are now in the process of moving their nuclear weapons capabilities into the maritime
realm.
India is the furthest down this track, having launched its first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine INS Arihant in 2009 (expected to be commissioned this year); it is also in the process of building two
more so-called SSBNs. Further, India is developing nuclear-tipped Dhanush short range ballistic missiles for
deployment on offshore patrol vessels. India has leased a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine and has plans to
construct up to six more SSNs (unlike SSBNs, SSNs are not armed with nuclear ballistic missiles). Pakistan is
following India's lead, having recently established a Naval Strategic Force Command Headquarters with the
declared intention of developing a sea-based deterrent. This may involve nuclear-armed conventional submarines
supplied by China, rather than SSBNs.
Some nuclear weapons states have created a nuclear triad in order to have an assured second strike capability.
While such an assured capability can help stabilize a nuclear relationship, according to a recent Carnegie report,
taking the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic into the maritime realm may in fact create greater instability.
One issue is an ambiguous mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities at sea, including the deployment of nuclear
missiles on Pakistani conventional submarines and on Indian missile boats. Uncertainty over whether a platform is
carrying nuclear weapons creates a risk of an inadvertent but highly escalatory attack on an opponent's nuclear
capability. Another concern is that maritime nuclear capabilities could lower Pakistan's already low nuclear
threshold. Islamabad may be tempted to conduct a demonstration nuclear attack at sea, believing it will not be
escalated on land. A further problem is Pakistan's reported propensity to delegate nuclear authority to field
commanders, which could create considerable risks if submarine communications are interrupted.

China is also a major player in the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean . China's role in
creating a nuclear-armed Pakistan is a big factor in the distrust that characterizes the India-China security
relationship. In the 1980s, China supplied Pakistan with weapon plans along with fissile material, and facilitated the
supply of missile technology. Any further moves by China to develop Pakistan's maritime nuclear capability will only
cement India's threat perceptions about China.

The India-China nuclear relationship is itself relatively unstable and is now also
moving into the Indian Ocean. This is because India's land-based nuclear deterrent currently suffers from
considerable geographical and technological disadvantages compared with China. China is able to deploy
its nuclear missiles in sparsely populated territory close to India's border, providing
it with nuclear missile coverage of the entire subcontinent . In comparison, India fields much
shorter range missiles that can barely reach major population centers in eastern China.

This gives India good reason to establish an assured second strike capability on
SSBNs that could potentially be forward deployed into the western Pacific. Alternatively, India may deploy its
SSBNs in a well-protected bastion in the Bay of Bengal, although this may require further development of Indian
missile technology.

There have been increasing detections of Chinese SSNs in the Indian Ocean in recent
years, including the deployment of a Chinese SSN to the western Indian Ocean between last December and
February, nominally as part of its anti-piracy deployment. According to Indian sources, these deployments are part

Beijing has less reason

to deploy its SSBNs in the Indian Ocean ; instead, they will likely be primarily
deployed in the western Pacific, targeted at the US . This could create its own risks: the detection
of hydrographic profiling' of the region and will likely increase in frequency. But

of an unusual transit of a Chinese SSBN into the Indian Ocean or an Indian SSBN into the Pacific could be seen as an
escalation at times of tension.
The US also has a potentially significant role in facilitating nuclear stability in the Indian Ocean. In the 1980s,
Washington helped construct India's only facility for communications with submerged nuclear submarines and the
US might again support India's maritime nuclear capabilities. It might even be in Washington's interests to help
Pakistan. The establishment of reliable communications links with Pakistan's nuclear-armed submarines could, for
example, be critical in stabilizing the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic.

Despite concerns about superpower competition in the Indian Ocean during the
latter half of the Cold War, there was relatively little nuclear competition in that
theatre. The three-party nuclear rivalry we will soon see in the Indian Ocean is likely
to be more unstable, and potentially far more dangerous.

CCP Impact---Lashout Helper

Only our offense---no chance of CCP collapse, but theyll do
whatever it takes to guarantee continued control
Timothy Heath 15, Senior Defense and International Analyst at the RAND
Corporation, No, Chinas Not About to Collapse,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-chinas-not-about-to-collapse/
The CCPs liabilities are well known. These include an antiquated political identity, cumbersome
ideology, and widespread disenchantment with Marxism among the public (and among more than a few party
members). CCP-led government has failed to provide adequate services, ensure rule of law, and has long tolerated
corruption, malfeasance, and widening inequality. Many of these vulnerabilities have persisted for years, and some

The partys advantages are less often discussed, but these bear
reviewing if one is to evaluate the viability of CCP rule. One of the most overlooked, but
important, assets is a lack of any credible alternative. The partys repressive politics prevent the
formation of potential candidates, so the alternative to CCP rule for now is anarchy. For a
country still traumatized by its historic experience with national breakdown, this grants
the party no small advantage. To truly imperil its authority, the CCP would need to
behave in so damaging a manner as to make the certainty of political chaos
and economic collapse preferable to the continuation of CCP rule. A party that attempted to
have worsened over time.

return to extreme Mao-era policies such as the catastrophic Great Leap Forward could perhaps meet that threshold.
But despite the numerous superficial comparisons in Western media, little about the current administration policy
agenda resembles classic Maoism. The second major political advantage lies in improvements to the partys
effectiveness in recent years. In a major paradigm shift, the CCP redefined itself as a governing party whose
primary responsibility rests in addressing the myriad economic, political, cultural, ecological, and social welfare
demands of the people. It has carried out ideological and political reforms to improve its competence and
effectiveness accordingly. The Xi administration has refined, but upheld, the focus on increasing the nations
standard of living and realizing national revitalization, objectives embodied in the vision of the Chinese dream.
Although the party has rightly come in for criticism for moving slowly and inadequately on these issues, the policy
agenda nevertheless appears to resonate with the majority of Chinese citizens. Independent polls consistently show
that the party has in recent years enjoyed surprisingly strong public support. When weighing the partys political
liabilities against its assets, therefore, the

evidence suggests that the CCP faces little danger

of imminent collapse. Improvements to its cohesion, competence, and responsiveness, combined with a
policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese and the lack of a compelling alternative outweigh the persistent

The partys overall political stability throughout the 2000s, despite

massive political unrest generated by breakneck economic growth, underscores this point.
The Insecure CCP If the party does indeed a measure of political support and security, why
does it behave in so insecure a manner? This is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of CCP
political liabilities.

behavior today and a major driver of speculation about the possibilities of political exhaustion and collapse. There
is no question that China is experiencing tumult of a degree unusual even for a country habituated to pervasive

Amid the unrelenting anti-corruption drive, officials throughout the country appear
to be operating in an atmosphere of pervasive fear and distrust . The intensifying political
discontent.

crackdown against critics, liberal thinkers, and supposedly pernicious, malignant Western influences evoke the
paranoid witch-hunts of the Mao era. The oppressive atmosphere and political insecurity (not to mention choking
pollution and problems such as toxic water and food) have motivated an astonishing number of Chinas elite to seek

While it is tempting to read such behavior as symptomatic of a

desperate regime fending off the inevitable, there are reasons to doubt such an
interpretation. For one, signs of systemic breakdown are hard to find. There is little
a way out of the country.

evidence of the open political warfare that has typified previous periods of political weakness and disarray. For now,
at least, the central leadership appears united behind Xis policy agenda. The economy continues to grow, with PRC

Government policy and

operations continue without the kinds of abnormal interruptions or breakdowns that one would
expect of a nation in serious crisis. A more plausible reading is that Chinas leadership is
officials anticipating an annual rate at a slowing, but still healthy, 7 percent.

determined to do whatever it takes to achieve national development and establish the

conditions for long-term rule. The CCP aims to do this primarily by undertaking political reforms to
improve the effectiveness and competence of government administration and by overseeing the sustained growth
that can enable a steady increase in the standard of living. These objectives are so important to the partys longterm survival that the Xi administration has shown a willingness to crush whomever gets in the way, regardless of
political party affiliation.

Economy Scenario
Air pollution makes economic growth in China impossible
Daniel K. Gardner 14, Dwight W. Morrow Professor of History and East Asian
Studies at Smith College, Chinas Off-the-Chart Air Pollution: Why It Matters (and
Not Only to the Chinese) - Part One, 1/14/14,
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=394
The economic costs of air pollution are immense. A number of studies have attempted to
calculate the cost of Chinas air pollution as a percentage of the countrys GDP, but the figures they arrive at range
widelyIve seen 2.5% to 10%depending to a large degree on what metric researchers use and whether they
take into account both short-term and long-term health outcomes. Some studies also factor in material or nonhealth impacts in addition to health impacts.

Polluted air significantly raises morbidity and mortality rates, as the MIT and the Global
Burden of Disease studies indicate. These higher rates, in turn, translate into higher medical
costs and an increase in missed working days (i.e., lower productivity). Additionally, polluted
air results in resource depletion: soil acidification from acid rain reduces the
amount of Chinas arable land, lowering crop productivity; mercury emitted by coal combustion enters
the water systems, contaminating water and affecting fish, rice, vegetables, and fruits; and airborne pollutants kill

Polluted air also takes aim at building structures, hastening their

deterioration. Indeed, many worry about the effect that airborne chemicals will have on the countrys precious
off trees and forests.

historical monuments.

There are indirect economic effects of the sooty air to consider as well. For instance,
as Shanghai revs up efforts to attract foreign businesses to the new Shanghai Free Trade Zone,
there is worry that Chinas, and now Shanghais, reputation for unhealthy air may be a
deterrent. Then theres tourism. Foreign visitors to China were down in 2013 by 5% in the country as a whole
and by a full 10.3% in Beijing. Media-drenched events like the January 2013 airpocalypse have likely played a
sizable role here.

Chinese Food/Econ Impact

Chinese food collapse collapses the Chinese economy
Carlson 12 (Benjamin, Writer at the Global Post, US Agricultural Exports to China Become Costly in Times of
Drought, July,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48349453/US_Agricultural_Exports_to_China_Become_Costly_in_Times_of_Drought)

With the worst dry spell in 50 years threatening to kill corn and soybean crops across a
wide swath of the Midwest, driving food prices to record highs, Chinese officials are
bracing for a shock that could complicate plans to revive the economy this year.
China imported $20 billion worth of soybeans, corn, cotton and hides from US
farmers, surpassing Canada for the first time.
In 2011,

China is particularly dependent on soybeans, which have become a crucial feed

crop for the countrys massive pig farms. As more Chinese can afford to eat meat more regularly, pork
consumption has skyrocketed. More than half of the worlds pork is now produced and consumed within China.

Corn imports are also important, with China purchasing more from the US than any country but Japan.
Next year, it is expected to buy 5 million tons of American corn.
But analysts dont expect the prices to come down anytime soon. A bullish run on soybean futures drove up the
cost to $16.92 per bushel for November delivery, beating the previous all-time high of $16.37 set during the global
food crisis of 2008.

this constrains Beijing's ability to fix its economy. If rising food prices boost
inflation, the government would have less room to increase the money supply and
fuel growth a key concern given that the economy has been slowing all year.
All

Already, analysts are predicting that ordinary Chinese could feel some sticker shock when they go
to the butcher. Zhang Zhiwei at Nomura says that the sharp rise of global agricultural prices will likely push up
pork prices in China, according to the Financial Times.

Chinese economic collapse causes world war three

Plate 3 (Tom, Professor of Communications UCLA, Straights Times, 6-28, Lexis)
imagine a China disintegrating - on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency
because the economy (against all predictions)
suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees
would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't
handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look
to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia - once occupied by
Japan - into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and
Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style. That's
why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth - the very direction
But

prompting, much less outright military invasion -

the White House now seems to prefer.

Pollution will cause 750 thousand deaths annually, and

collapses water supply.
Economy 13 (Elizabeth, The Diplomat, Chinas Water Pollution Crisis,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/forget-air-pollution-chinas-has-a-water-problem/)

Chinese and western media have been all atwitter over the shocking
levels of air pollution in Beijing and a number of other Chinese cities . But it really
In recent weeks,

shouldnt be all that shocking. After all, in 2007, the World Bank and Chinas own State Environmental Protection

as many as 750,000 people

die prematurely in China annually from respiratory disease related to air pollution.
Administration (now the Ministry of Environmental Protection) found that that

And more recently, Greenpeace Beijing reported that in 2011 in four major cities, more than 8,000 people died
prematurely as a result of just one pollutant, PM 2.5. Anyone who spends any time in Beijing knows that the city has
not yet found a way to tackle the myriad sources of air pollution from construction to cars to coal.

As frightening as the countrys smog-filled skies might be, the countrys water
pollution is easily as alarming. According to one 2012 report, up to 40 percent of
Chinas rivers were seriously polluted and 20 percent were so polluted their water
quality was rated too toxic even to come into contact with. Part of the explanation may rest
in the estimated 10,000 petrochemical plants along the Yangtze and 4000 along the
Yellow Rivers. (And the Yellow and Yangtze are not even the most polluted of Chinas seven major rivers.) On
top of whatever polluted wastewater might be leaching or simply dumped into
Chinas rivers from these factories, the Ministry of Supervision reports that there are almost 1,700
water pollution accidents annually. The total cost in terms of human life: 60,000 premature
deaths annually.
While the macro picture is concerning, even more worrying is that individual Chinese dont know whether their
water is safe to drink or not. A Chinese newspaper, the Southern Weekly, recently featured an interview with a
married couple, both of whom are water experts in Beijing (available in English here). They stated that they hadnt

water quality deteriorate

significantly over just the past few years, even while state officials claim that more
drunk from the tap in twenty years, and have watched the

than 80 percent of water leaving treatment facilities met government standards in 2011.

AT: Air Pollution Down

The status quo doesnt solve---Chinese air quality is still
disastrous
Matt Sheehan 16, China correspondent for the Huffington Post, How China Is
(Surprise!) Winning Its War On Air Pollution, 1/7/16,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-air-pollution2014_us_568e592ce4b0a2b6fb6ecb73
even with those improvements, the air in Beijing and much of eastern China remained
extremely toxic. Studies have linked air pollution to shrinking life expectancy and over a million deaths each
year. Beijings average pollution levels in 2015 still put it well in the unhealthy
range and far above international standards for acceptable air quality.
But

The decline in average levels also proved unable to prevent extreme pollution
events airpocalypses that smothered the capital during November and December. Those
haze events prompted Beijing authorities to issue their first-ever pollution red alert this
year. Data from the United States Embassy in Beijing shows 2015 experiencing the worst November-December
since measurements began in 2008.

2015s roller coaster quality the best summer and worst winter on record has prompted
further questions over what led to soaring pollution levels in November and December. Anders Hove,
associate director of research at the Paulson Institute, says that part of the blame can be placed on
coal-fired winter heating. While crackdowns on polluting steel or cement factories may have accounted for
blue skies during the summer, officials cant simply close down facilities that provided heating to residential areas
in Chinas frigid north.
Lauri Myllyvirta, an air pollution expert with Greenpeace, pins the blame instead on particularly bad weather
patterns.

Daily variation in Beijing pollution levels is heavily dependent on weather

conditions. Low winds from the south carry in toxic air masses from Chinas
industrial rust belt, while high winds from the north can clear out putrid skies in a matter of hours. During
this past November and December, Beijing saw double the number of days with smog-forming weather conditions
stagnant air and high humidity compared with 2014, Myllyvirta says.

Air pollution is increasing in central and western China---their

cards only assume the East
Zheping Huang 16, reporter covering China for Quartz, Masters in journalism
from the University of Hong Kong, China is reducing air pollution in its big cities
by making it worse in its smaller ones, 4/20/16, http://qz.com/665572/china-isreducing-air-pollution-in-its-big-cities-by-making-it-worse-in-its-smaller-ones/
China announced a plan to curb air pollution in the notoriously smoggy
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, home to many old factories. Last year it even closed factories near the new
In 2013,

Disneyland in Shanghai, hoping for more cheerful skies around the park.

Such measures have begun to work, but with one caveat: They have not been much
applied to the central and western provinces, where pollution levels have
actually increased.

In the first quarter of this year, levels of PM2.5the smallest, most dangerous air pollution particlesfell by an
average of 8.8% from a year ago in 362 cities, according to a Greenpeace study released today (April 20). Beijing
and Shanghai saw average PM2.5 levels fall 27% and 12%, respectively.

Of the 91 cities with rising average PM2.5 levels, 69 were in central and western parts of
the country. And those 69 witnessed an average jump of 20% in PM2.5 levels.
The five cities with the highest levels of PM2.5 are all located in the autonomous region
Xinjiang, a predominantly Muslim area in the nations far west. Xinjiang also recorded the worst
air quality in the first quarter among all the 31 Chinese provinces, with a 46% rise of
average PM2.5 concentration year-over-year. Expanded industrial activity, particularly around the capital Urumqi, is
partly responsible for the surge, Greenpeace explains.

Air quality in central and western China is likely to deteriorate further due to
increased investment in coal-fired power plants in these regions. Last year 75% of
Chinas new permits for such plants, with a total capacity of 128 gigawatts, were for locations
in central and western regions , according to Greenpeace.
The findings show that the governments measures to curb air pollution in eastern Chinas key regions work, said
Greenpeace climate and energy campaigner Dong Liansai in a statement. But now is not the time to selectively
implement these

policies. They must be introduced across the country to ensure clean air for all.

Pollution is extremely severe in China---kills their economy and

crop yields
Constance Gustke 16, New York-based journalist, Pollution crisis is choking the
Chinese economy, 2/11/16, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/11/pollution-crisis-ischoking-the-chinese-economy.html
For Ting Li, life in Beijing means navigating through sticky gray smog. To avoid harmful
pollution particles, she must carry a mask and check the air quality every day. The thick, heavy air has been so bad
that Li sent her son who suffers from the infamous Beijing cough, caused by breathing harmful pollutants to
live outside Beijing, where air quality is better.
"Even

with air purifiers in homes, pollution exceeds the norm," said Li, who is a chief
representative for the Rocky Mountain Institute in China. " It's severe and really scary. We can't go
outside much."
nearly 300 cities in China that badly failed air-quality
standard measurements in 2015, according to data collected by Greenpeace. And the effects are
devastating: More than 1.6 million people per year die in China from breathing toxic
air. To fight back, China's leaders have been waging a tough war on pollution by rolling out new technologies,
Beijing isn't alone, though. It's one of

capping coal use and using more renewable energy, such as solar and wind.
"It's too early to tell if the war on pollution is working ," said Elizabeth Economy, director for Asia
studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "But the intention is there. Top leadership has made a commitment to
address the problem for the first time in decades." She estimates that visible results won't be seen for three to five
years.

Air pollution is clearly very costly, though, to its $11-trillion-plus economy. It dings China's GDP
about 6.5 percent annually, according to RAND Corp. estimates. Those costs are mainly
driven by lost productivity, since factories are shut down on bad air days to avoid the dangerous health
effects of breathing the dense, toxic air.
"Sick days and hospital visits all take a toll on the urban economy, " said Anders Hove,
associate director of research at the Paulson Institute. High levels of pollution are linked to serious chronic illnesses,

like heart disease and lung cancer, which are costly to treat. And air pollution also affects tourism and outdoor
recreation, he added.

China's crops are damaged, too, said Hove. Some 20 percent of China's soil is
contaminated. And the country's largest rice-growing province, Hunan, has soil that's laced with heavy metals
from factories. This pollution taints the country's food supply, according to reports.

Fragmentation DA Answers

2AC Non-Unique
Non-unique---climate governance is highly fragmented now
Emilie Becault 16, Project Manager, Leuven Centre for Global Governance
Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium, The Global Governance System for Climate Finance:
Towards Greater Institutional Integrity? April 2016,
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp-171180/wp173-becault-marx.pdf
substantial disagreements over the meaning and/or applicability of UNFCCC principles for
have been conducive to the development of a diversely populated
architecture (Pickering et al. 2013). As demonstrated by several mapping studies, climate financial
flows to developing countries are currently mobilized, channeled, and delivered
through a myriad of organizational entities . These include for instance, global donor funds set by UN
These

climate finance

agencies like the UNFCCC, the World Bank (WB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)
(e.g., the global Environment Fund, the Green Climate fund); Global donor funds managed by the EU institutions
such as the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund; Regional recipient funds managed by regional
development banks, bilateral financial institutions (BFIs) and national development banks (NDBs); and national

A
substantial share of public climate finance to developing countries is also flowing
via bilateral channels such as development cooperation agencies and bilateral
development banks. To facilitate the distinction between climate finance and development aid, some
recipient funds managed by bilateral financial institutions (BFIs) and National Development Banks (NDBs).18

developed countries and most notably the UK, Germany and Japan, have in recent years established their own
climate-specific funds. Noteworthy as well, are financial flows provided by private
who range from single actors to multinational corporations, international investors initiatives, and their

actors ,

Carbon finance has also become an important mechanism of climate financing

with the proliferation in the past few years, of a wide range of private, public, and hybrid
carbon funds. Finally, since the mid-2000s, an increasing number of innovative transnational and regional
intermediaries.

public-private partnerships, gathering stakeholders from different sectors (e.g., public, private, non-profit), have
been established for the purpose of scaling up private climate-related investments in developed and developing
countries.
A detailed description of all of the various organizations and actors more or less directly implicated in the
mobilization and deployment of climate finance to developing countries is understandably, beyond the scope of this

the rapid proliferation of institutions, actors, and mechanisms ,

maps out into a governance architecture that
is highly fragmented vertically, between different layers of societal organizations
(e.g. national, supranational, regional) and spatial scopes (e.g. bilateral, multilateral, transnational), but also,
and increasingly, horizontally between different groups of actors and policy sectors. In this regard, the global
architecture for climate finance, can be described, following Abbotts (2012) useful analysis of the
transnational regime for climate change, as loosely polycentric, a term pioneered by Elinor Ostrom to
chapter. Suffices to say is that

involved in international climate financing ultimately

qualify multileveled and multi-actor governance systems involving a multiplicity of relatively autonomous governing
units, formal or informal, operating at different levels, scales and policy fields (Ostrom 2010). The attributes of
autonomy and formal independence are often crucial to differentiate polycentric systems from mere verticallymulti-levelled hierarchies where a central organizing unit often plays a leading steering role. Determining how the
climate finance architecture fares in terms of polycentricity would require understandably a more in-depth empirical
analysis with a close focus on the degree of interactions between the various key organizational components of the

the lack of a strongly

centralized coordinating mechanism coupled with the diversity of values and
interests of key parties have been key drivers for the development of a weakly
system. At this phase of the discussion however, we can say that both

polycentric governance architecture for climate finance, a macro-structural feature which as we

will see below presents substantial disadvantages for questions of institutional integrity.19

1AR Non-Unique
Theres no overall normative framework for action, especially
on climate finance
Emilie Becault 16, Project Manager, Leuven Centre for Global Governance
Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium, The Global Governance System for Climate Finance:
Towards Greater Institutional Integrity? April 2016,
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp-171180/wp173-becault-marx.pdf
climate finance has thus far been characterized
by extensive normative contestation over its publicly proclaimed principles and
values, and relatedly, by a highly fragmented governance architecture
characterized by a myriad of loosely coordinated institutions and mechanisms. In
Our analysis reveals that at the systemic level,

regard to its geographical scope, in turn, climate finance has been insufficiently targeting those countries or
communities that are most in need of financial support, especially for adaptation measures. Taken together, it
seems that these three features of the broader organizational context for climate finance tend to be indicative and
conducive of the difficulty of achieving greater institutional integrity at the micro-institutional level and in regard to
all sequential phases of climate finance support to developing countries (e.g. mobilization,
administration/governance, and delivery).22 Three main issues stand out in this respect.
The first has to do with the lack of strong normative guidance which in the context of a large and highly diversified
institutional environment can work to hinder rather than facilitate the move toward greater policy coherence and
institutional consistency among and across the variety of institutions that compose the system. As mentioned

the persistence of deep disagreements between developed and developing

countries over the meaning and/or normative force of some key principles of climate finance has thus
far, prevented, or if not, significantly delayed the development of an overarching
normative framework for tracking and monitoring climate financial flows as well as for safeguarding the
above,

legitimacy and effectiveness of the use of funds for concrete mitigation and adaptation measures. Conversely, one

developed countries and other

contributing actors have so far been able to exercise considerable discretion in
choosing how to mobilize, count, administer and deliver their funds. All in all, it seems that
major implication of the lack of a strong normative framework is that

without strongly agreed and institutionalized guiding norms and principles as well as enforcement mechanisms, the
global governance system for climate finance ultimately runs the risk of evolving into an incoherent governance
complex involving incompatible and mutually harmful rules and institutions.

2AC UNFCCC Fails

The UN process fails---its too complex and divided
Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
The debate over how to quantify the common but differentiated responsibilitiesthe
commonly agreed tenet underlying the UNFCCC framework15has not dissipated. Twenty
years later, member states are still deeply divided over the scale of further Annex I nation
commitments, the timing and scale of Annex II nation commitments, the pace at which global
emission reductions should be encouraged, and the methods and responsibility for
financing such reductions.16
Certain researchers have over-simplified the UNFCCC regime by describing it as a contest between two campsone
camp comprising developed nations that support a single global, legally binding treaty incorporating commitments
from both developed and developing nations; the other comprising developing nations that wish to see parallel
negotiations directed at (i) solidifying commitments from Annex I nations, and (ii) identifying feasible methods to
support developing nation participation.17 The second group essentially supports the two-track process
represented by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol
(AWG-KP) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC (AWG-LCA).

The situation, however, is far more complex than the two camp perspective suggests .
For example, there are within the developing nation cohort , nations that demand an
additional grace period prior to committing to reduction targets, nations that prefer a voluntary system,
and nations that prefer commitments based on alternative benchmarks such as
improved energy efficiency or emissions per capita. Furthermore, there is widespread intra-cohort
disagreement over the magnitude of reduction commitments that developing nations should undertake.18
Many researchers would agree that these different perspectives on what represents a fair and just contribution to
mitigating this global common problem inhibit climate change negotiations.19 Ekholm et al.20 have recently
demonstrated how five different perspectives on equity (egalitarian, sovereign, horizontal, vertical, and equal
responsibility) can justify targets based on emissions per capita, future emissions, emissions per GDP, reduction
targets based on historical emissions, or reduction targets based on ability to pay. Lange et al.21 similarly apply
different equity principles, such as the egalitarian principle, the sovereignty principle, the polluter pays principle,

application of these different perspectives on

equity undermines consensus in emission reduction target-setting.
and the ability to pay principle, to demonstrate how

ideological differences are amplified by incomplete scientific and economic

understanding of the consequences associated with amplified levels of GHG
concentrations in our atmosphere . Incomplete knowledge influences the exigency with which nations
These

view problem resolution.22 It also makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of current and future
commitments.23 Under such circumstances, facts

tend to reflect ideologies.24

1AR UNFCCC Fails

The UN climate process is structurally flawed---requiring
unanimous consensus derails its effectiveness
Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
[Edited for language]
In addition to the ideological polarisation that retards [limits] the UNFCCC negotiation
process, numbers of notable structural flaws associated with the KP also undermine its
effectiveness. This section reviews some of the more prominent weaknesses. They include: lack of emission reduction
commitments by the USA and China, complications caused by too many cooks in the kitchen, the Kyoto
Protocol`s consensus rule, timorous emission reduction targets, the unenforceable nature of national
commitments, the failings of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and the lack
of effective monitoring capability. Each topic will be addressed in sequence. The greatest failing of the KP by far
is that the USA and China have made no GHG emission reduction commitments. These two countries are currently responsible for
more than 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions. If the two nations were to commit to emission reduction targets, the KP could
be lauded for including commitments from nations that collectively contribute over 80% of global GHG emissions. Without reduction
commitments from the USA and China, the KP is doomed to have only minor impact.25 Unfortunately, these two nations remain
largely imprisoned by old fault lines and appear unwilling to undertake any significant emission reduction commitments without the
other party taking action first.26 China has repeatedly expressed resistance to accepting any cap on its aggregate GHG emissions
due to concerns that such commitments might impede economic growth.27 The USA has actually passed legislation echoing these
concernsthe Byrd-Hagel Resolution.28 Another prominent KP flaw relates to one of its more laudable featuresinclusiveness. On
one hand, as mentioned earlier, all 193 nations have equal say in what is decided. This is particularly commendable in regard to the
42-member Alliance of Island States (AOIS) that collectively contribute virtually nil to climate change but whose existence is actually

The problem with inclusiveness is that the negotiation

process becomes congested and agreements become less likely . Consider, for instance,
the COP15 conference in Copenhagen. Described as the largest summit in the history of international diplomacy,30 it was
attended by 10 500 delegates representing 190 states, more than 120 heads of
state and government, 13 500 observers from civil society, and 3000 journalists .31 In
such large-scale negotiations, each national team employs disparate skills and tactics while
attempting to accomplish disparate objectives . The task of achieving consensus is
consequently gargantuan. Simply put, too many cooks have spoiled the Kyoto broth. Critics of the KP would
jeopardised by sea-level rise.29

point out that member nations that are highly dependent on fossil fuel resource revenues, such as Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, would
not be expected to play a helpful role in supporting technological transition. As Victor cautions, the

effectiveness of an
international agreement is limited by the commitment level of the agreements
least interested party.32 Furthermore, as greater commitments over shorter time horizons become necessary to
mitigate climate change, the financial stakes amplify, heightening reluctance to endorse binding commitments.33 KP negotiations
have been further impeded by weaker nations banding together to exert more coercive force on the negotiation process,
exacerbating the challenge.34 Overall, there is compelling evidence that the 193 nations will be hard-pressed to reach consensual
agreement, given such disparate national interests. As a testament to what can be achieved when the number of parties to a
negotiated settlement is reduced, the Friends of the Chair that initiated the Copenhagen Accord consisted of around 20 countries,
including the USA, Brazil, India, and Chinaall of which possess competing national interests.35

According to the

UNFCCC guidelines, all nations are given one vote and all nations must endorse a given proposal before it can be
adopted. In other words, even one opposing nation can derail a desirable initiative.36 Needless to
say, the consensus rule has been disastrous in terms of negotiation efficiency
and effectiveness with hostage-taking and rent-seeking demands becoming
regular fixtures at COP events.37 To highlight just how obtrusive this structural flaw has been, Dimitrov describes
how the failure to ratify the Copenhagen Accord came down to opposition from eight minor nations: Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Tuvalu,
Sudan, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.38 It is hence understandable why many delegates departed from Copenhagen with

deflated spirits. As Christoff summarised, Copenhagen may mark the end of the democratic moment in global [climate] diplomacy.
Oligarchic formations like the self-appointed G-20 will be the space for securing a consensus among the more powerful countries.39

Enforcing compliance with the UN climate process is

impossible
Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
[CDM = Clean Development Mechanism]
the UNFCCC declares that it is among the most comprehensive and
rigorous systems of compliance for a multilateral environmental agreement and, on paper, it is hard to
In praise of the KP,

refute this claim. Under the terms of the KP, Annex I nations that fail to meet their GHG emission reduction
commitments will be required to make up the difference plus an additional 30% in the next commitment period.
Moreover, the offending nation will also be prevented from making transfers under the KP flexible mechanisms.44
These conditions arguably represent significant incentives for Annex I nations to live up to their commitments.

The trouble is, Annex I nations are all sovereign nations . Although the UNFCCC can
attempt to enforce compliance through the International Court of Justice or through national courts, if a
nation determines that it cannot meet its GHG emission reduction commitments, attempts to enforce
compliance will in many cases be fruitless.45 Perhaps the most notorious example involves
Canada, which has publicly stated that it has no intention of honouring its round one
commitment.
This false veil of enforceability has led some critics to go as far as to argue that in the absence of an external
authority to impose enforceable rules, no nation (developed or developing) will voluntarily change behaviour to
reduce energy use and GHG emissions.46 As DeCanio observes, altruism

is not a notable feature of

international relations.47
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a flagstone in the construction of a system
wherein developed nations support the technological transition necessary to help
reduce GHG emissions in developing nations . The promise of the CDM was that it would
simultaneously provide developed nations with a supplemental avenue for cost-effectively reducing domestic GHG
emissions while supporting technological transition in developing nations.48

The reality falls far short of

the promise.
The flaws in the CDM have been widely acknowledged. Uncertainties as to the future of the KP have encouraged the
development of projects that exhibit front-heavy revenue flows such as methane flaring, which do little to enhance
national capacity. Delays in the project approval process that range from months to years increase the risk of

the CDM has spawned appalling examples of gaming

the system.49 For example, Sovacool and Brown have reported that more than half of the projects
accredited by the United Nations involved HFC-23 destruction ,50 and that HFC-23 creation
investing in CDM projects. Furthermore,

and destruction was becoming a more profitable business model than that of creating saleable HFC-23 for industrial

overall volume still

represents but a drop in the bucket of total carbon emitted.51
uses. Although carbon-trading activity has significantly accelerated in recent years,

the monitoring of actual GHG emission

reduction is delegated to national authorities that have economic incentives to
distort reports if performance falls short of emission reduction commitments. As Vogler further
cautions, there is limited scope for direct central monitoring of GHG sources and sinks
by, for example, earth observation satellites.52 When inadequate oversight is combined with the
One final structural flaw associated with the KP is that

fact that maintaining a national GHG emission inventory is fraught with

measurement complications, one can be excused for viewing national emission reduction reports
with a degree of scepticism.

Ideological polarization makes multilateral cooperation

impossible
Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
[KP = Kyoto Protocol]
The combination of ideological polarisation and the numerous structural
failings associated with the KP has produced an international climate change negotiation
climate fraught with petty bickering and obstructionist behaviour. Disagreements
have been amplified due to ongoing scientific uncertainty as to the potential consequences of climate change,
which prevents accurate economic and ecological cost analyses. This has been exacerbated by

the IPCC

controversy that has destabilised public confidence in expert judgment .53

climate politics have intensified.54 Fossil fuel special-interest
groups have persistently muddied public understanding of climate change by financing
In parallel to this scenario,

campaigns designed to foster scepticism of scientific analyses related to it.55 Meanwhile, technological initiatives
such as the promotion of Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CC&S) technologies have emerged as methods to
prolong reliance on existing technology and avoid costly technological transitions.56 In short, one could argue that

the pressure needed for

an exigent response has become lost in political turmoil.
despite ongoing evidence that climate change is progressing at an alarming rate,

the KP process has actually weakened the international spirit of

cooperation by entrenching differences of opinion over the common but
differentiated responsibility principle and fostering alliances of nations that disrupt the core
Certain critics contend that

negotiation process by their pursuit of secondary initiatives aimed at enhancing self-interest.57,58 When the COP15
in Copenhagen ended without a binding set of second round GHG emission reduction targets, any vestige of
optimism in the existing process was seemingly eradicated.59 There are consequently understandable grounds for
pessimism as to whether or not these ideologically ensconced parties will be able to cultivate the common ground
necessary to produce a new effective climate treaty, as envisaged in Durban.
Another concern that has intensified as the UNFCCC process has progressed is that of the financial capacity of
nations to expedite the technological transition necessary to avert the worst consequences attributed to climate

The scale of investment necessary to transform energy systems alone has

been estimated in the tens of trillions of US dollars.60 Therefore, the financial pledges
made in Copenhagen (US$30 billion annually between 2010 and 2012 rising to US$100 billion by 2020) and
re-affirmed in Durban and Doha represent but a drop in the bucket in terms of requisite
financing.61
change.

There is increasing concern that key nations such as China and India cannot adopt sufficient GHG emission
reduction policies due to financial constraints.62 Meanwhile, the current global economic downturn has significantly
reduced the financial capacity of developed nations to facilitate domestic GHG emission reduction and to support
such efforts in developing nations. Amid this dire backdrop lurks an understanding that the hard work is still to
come. As Macintosh explains, Many of the most cost-efficient measures have by now been implemented;

Building consensus on what a fair

distribution of these costs will look like against the backdrop of the economic and
financial crisis may well prove much more difficult than making the first steps back in the
year 2000.63
nevertheless, further GHG emission reductions will be necessary.

2AC Incrementalism Link Turn

Multilateral treaty-based forums like the UN are useless on
climate---smaller-scale cooperation is key to build trust and
make those institutions workable over the long term
David Roberts 16, writer on energy and climate change for Vox, formerly of
Grist, citing Robert Keohane and David Victor, The argument for incrementalism in
international climate negotiations, 5/26/16,
http://www.vox.com/2016/5/26/11766252/international-climate-incrementalism
Climate campaigners have long been fixated on securing a big agreement on final ends,
with the unspoken assumption that once a binding agreement is in place, the means
will simply emerge. But it doesn't work that way: It is tempting to imagine that once general
agreement has been reached on the nature of the climate change problem for example, agreement that warming should be
stopped at 1.5 or 2 C, as was visibly codified in Paris appropriate institutions will emerge and that optimal mitigation strategies

optimal
institutions often dont emerge, even when there are large potential gains to be
had. That last sentence is particularly noteworthy. Without those institutions and practices in place, and the trust that
undergirds them, national leaders have immense incentive to make big, flowery
promises but do the minimal amount required of them "organized hypocrisy," a
discovered by economic analysis will somehow follow suit. One of the central insights from political science is that

too-frequent state of affairs in international relations. So how to do that ratcheting work, laying the foundation for greater
ambition? Carbon reductions can serve a wide range of interests It would be nice to think that all 194 countries involved in the
UNFCCC are motivated by the public good of a safer climate, but that would be rather nave. In fact, arguably only two of the big

Stitching together a stronger web of

international collaboration will require a nuanced understanding of what various
nations need and are capable of contributing. Interests are a vexed subject for researchers, since countries are
emitters, the US and the EU, are thus motivated (and them only partially).

rarely frank about their true interests, but in the climate space, we're in luck. The Paris climate accord set aside the dream of a
binding treaty and instead moved to a new structure, in which countries submitted their own voluntary Intended National
Determined Contributions (INDCs). Thus far there have been 160 submissions, involving 187 countries, representing around 98

INDCs are voluntary, they represent a decent (if not perfect)

approximation of the interests and capabilities of the countries involved . Keohane and
percent of global population. Because

Victor identify five: 1) Create the global public good of reduced climate change. As mentioned, only the EU and some regions of
the US (California) are plausibly motivated by this; for most countries, other interests drive participation. 2) Create local or national
public goods that happen to address, as well, the global public good of climate change. There are tons of carbon mitigation efforts

China is powerfully motivated to reduce smog

and other air pollutants, which are nearing crippling levels; in doing so, it will also secure
climate benefits (usually). 3) Generate competitive economic benefits, such as the creation of new industries solar,
that also bring immediate local benefits. For instance,

wind, batteries. This is a two-edged sword. The pursuit of competitive economic advantage can induce countries to invest in clean
energy industries, but it can also lead them to dig in to protect powerful fossil fuel interests. 4) Bargain for side payments, such as
requests for money to help pay the cost of controlling emissions and adapting to climate change. This is a somewhat
uncomfortable topic among climate campaigners, but the fact is that many poor or developing countries see climate negotiations
primarily as a way of securing financial assistance from the developed world. (As they will suffer most from climate change, for

There are benefits to

leading on an issue of international importance. Perhaps more significantly, it looks bad to
be a laggard when everyone else is participating. It is hoped that this these "soft power" dynamics will
help the Paris accord succeed. Given this range of interests, Keohane and Victor write, "institutions such as the
UNFCCC that require near-universal consensus are likely to make only modest
progress. Even states that would conditionally be willing to do more are unlikely to
offer ambitious policies, insofar as such policies would make sense for them only in the context of an ambitious
agreement in which all major polluters participated." A wicked problem, diverse interests, and a
negotiating framework that requires unanimity that's a recipe for lowestcommon-denominator agreements. Demanding maximum ambition and
which they are least responsible, they are entitled to redress.) 5) Create reputational benefits.

unanimity at the same time is a recipe for frustration. "The fundamental logic of global
public goods makes it difficult for countries to create deep cooperation quickly,"
Keohane and Victor write. The only alternative is to create it slowly, piece by piece.

1AR Incrementalism Link Turn

Incremental, bilateral cooperation is the only way forward on
climate policy---its key to build trust and make future
progress possible
David Roberts 16, writer on energy and climate change for Vox, formerly of
Grist, citing Robert Keohane and David Victor, The argument for incrementalism in
international climate negotiations, 5/26/16,
http://www.vox.com/2016/5/26/11766252/international-climate-incrementalism
incremental cooperation might take, including Victor's long-time hobby horse,
small groups of countries working together on climate strategies that
offer mutual benefit, boosting one another's fortitude and ambition. There are also
They discuss a few forms that such
"climate clubs,"

joint research programs, shared commitments on energy or deforestation, and various other bits of bricolage. Keohane and Victor

States should cooperate where cooperation is possible, often on

the basis of voluntary groupings; coordinate on issues where cooperation is too difficult or where universal
participation is desirable; and probe experimentally to seek to expand the boundaries of
feasible cooperation. As no single path is likely to be globally effective on its own, a multiplicity of actions should be
summarize the strategy this way:

taken. This is already how things seem to be evolving. In addition to China, the US has signed bilateral agreements or released joint
statements on climate efforts with Brazil, India, Vietnam, and the Nordic countries. Each of those agreements is tailored to its
participants, emphasizing areas of mutual benefit. And "subnational actors" (e.g., states and cities) are taking action as well;

Approaching cooperation from the

bottom up makes for diffuse and frustratingly slow progress, but it makes for progress. The alternative
hasn't. This kind of talk makes many climate activists apoplectic. It sounds like surrender, or fatalism. Unlike a binding
California hosts the first "Subnational-Clean Energy Ministerial" in June.

agreement with a clear target, it sounds fuzzy and uncertain, terrifying characteristics for a strategy intended to save the world. And
in a decentralized framework, it's difficult to see how to secure climate justice for poor and low-lying nations (something the paper

the choice is not between grand

ambition and incremental steps. There is no way to go straight to grand ambition.
The choice is spinning our wheels or getting underway . "Proceeding by small steps
to build confidence and generate patterns of reciprocity is not a timid,
second-best strategy," they write. "Instead, it is essential." Right now, nations have varying preferences and interests,
there is no global authority, and trust is low. It's premature to try to jam everyone into a single
grand bargain. Instead, "supporters of effective climate policy must figure out how to
operate effectively in a polycentric global system." I once wrote a post about the perpetual search
doesn't spend enough time on). But if Keohane and Victor are right,

for Archimedes' lever, that one strategy or policy that is powerful enough to tackle climate change on its own. The long quest for a

it will be a million little

struggles. There won't be one big final treaty, there will be an evolving skein of bilateral and
multilateral agreements. The journey of a thousand miles doesn't begin with a thousand-mile leap. It
begins with steps.
binding global climate treaty is a version of that hope. But it won't be one big struggle,

2AC Market Cooperation Link Turn

Paris alone was insufficient---cooperation on carbon markets
provides the impetus for future cuts necessary to solve
warming
Alex Hanafi 16, Senior Manager of Multilateral Climate Strategy at the
Environmental Defense Fund and a Senior Attorney in EDF's International Climate
Program, How a Coalition of Carbon Markets Can Complement the Paris Agreement
and Accelerate Deep Reductions in Climate Pollution, 5/19/16,
http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2016/05/19/how-a-coalition-of-carbon-markets-cancomplement-the-paris-agreement-and-accelerate-deep-reductions-in-climatepollution/
As countries gather here in Bonn, Germany to begin the work of translating the historic Paris Agreement into action,

individual countries carbon-cutting pledges must be

strengthened in the coming years to deliver the ambitious long term goal agreed in Paris: keep
warming well below 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), and achieve global net
zero emissions before 2100. The Paris Agreement provides several market- and transparencyrelated tools that can help spur the international cooperation necessary to achieve its
long term goal, including provisions that facilitate high-integrity, bottom-up
linkages of domestic carbon markets to cut carbon pollution. These linkages (described in
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as cooperative approaches) promise to reduce costs, and unlock
the finance needed to drive deeper global emissions reductions. The agreement on
cooperative approaches in Paris reflects the widespread recognition among nations that carbon markets,
accompanied by a clear, comprehensive transparency framework, will help drive the deep emissions
reductions needed to prevent the most severe impacts of climate change. With the urgency
there is widespread recognition that

of climate action clear, the key challenge now becomes: how can we accelerate the international cooperation
needed to solve the Paris equation? One concrete step, drawing on the cooperative approaches provisions of the
Paris Agreement, would be to establish a coalition of carbon market jurisdictions to catalyze the development and
increase the ambition of domestic carbon markets. Much as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
helped broaden participation and ambition in trade, a voluntary coalition of carbon market jurisdictions (CCM) could
expand the scope and maximize the cost-effectiveness of ambitious climate action around the globe. Why
coordinate on carbon markets?

As carbon markets continue to expand, coordination among

jurisdictions using or considering carbon markets especially on the rules and standards needed to ensure
environmental integrity and maximize cost-effectiveness will give governments and the private
sector the confidence to go faster and farther in reducing their climate-warming
pollution. Although the Paris Agreement provides a framework for international cooperation on carbon markets,
it is ultimately up to countries to work together to agree the detailed rules
necessary for international carbon markets to drive emissions down and investment up. The good
news is that groups of countries can make substantial, early progress, ultimately
informing and complementing the longer-term UNFCCC process.

1AR Market Cooperation Link Turn

Short-term bilateral cooperation sets the stage for future
multilateral efforts---the plan allows more effective UN
guidance in the future
Alex Hanafi 16, Senior Manager of Multilateral Climate Strategy at the
Environmental Defense Fund and a Senior Attorney in EDF's International Climate
Program, How a Coalition of Carbon Markets Can Complement the Paris Agreement
and Accelerate Deep Reductions in Climate Pollution, 5/19/16,
http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2016/05/19/how-a-coalition-of-carbon-markets-cancomplement-the-paris-agreement-and-accelerate-deep-reductions-in-climatepollution/
Minilateral

efforts can stimulate faster, deeper emissions cuts and strengthen

international cooperation Rapid and early emissions cuts are the single most important
determinant of whether the global community is likely to meet the Paris Agreements
goal to limit warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit). And delaying
necessary action to reduce global warming pollution dramatically increases costs to the global economy. For both
the climate and our economies, not all emissions reductions are the same: the earlier, the better. Thats why it is

cooperative emissions trading

between countries can continue and expand while multilateral accounting
guidelines are developed. Transactions will need to be consistent with any multilateral guidance
so important that Article 6 of the Paris Agreement affirmed that

developed by Parties to the Paris Agreement over the coming years particularly to ensure that the same emission

A minilateral
coalition of carbon markets could complement efforts under the UNFCCC by
fostering agreement on detailed standards for the accounting, transparency, and
environmental integrity of internationally transferred emissions units. These nuts and
reductions are not claimed toward more than one mitigation pledge (double counted).

bolts standards, which will help avoid errors in tallying up total emissions and traded units, form the bedrock of

Early agreement would give countries the confidence to

move forward quickly in implementing their Paris pledges and a basis for increasing
their ambition over time. Practically speaking, future UNFCCC guidance on cooperative
approaches will likely be influenced by working examples of international emissions
trading, making the success of a carbon markets coalition an important precedent for
broader cooperation on markets in the UNFCCC. This process could mirror recent progress on standards
high-integrity emissions trading.

for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+), where technical advances made by countries
in the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility contributed to greater progress in the UNFCCC. Whats next? In Paris, a
diverse group of 18 developed and developing countries led by New Zealand announced that they will work quickly
together to develop standards and guidelines to ensure the environmental integrity of international market

another similar coalition could set the bar for market-based climate
by developing robust accounting and transparency standards for
environmental and market integrity. Coordinated leadership by forward-looking jurisdictions would
mechanisms. This group or
action

help ensure that the growth of international emissions trading is accompanied by enhanced ambition and real,

these same guidelines

could support the establishment of a common trading framework among a
coalition of carbon market jurisdictions . A framework might include mutual recognition of emission
permanent, additional, and verifiable emissions reductions. Over a longer period,

units, harmonized approaches to verifying emissions reductions and generating offset credits, and a shared trading
infrastructure, which together could ensure environmental integrity and encourage more countries, states, and
provinces to cap and price carbon. Paris began a new, more ambitious chapter in the history of climate action, but
much of the chapter is yet to be written. Were in the race of our lives to finish the work of protecting future
generations and building prosperous low-carbon economies .

A coalition of carbon markets can help

deliver on the promise of the Paris Agreement and catalyze the deep global
emissions reductions that climate science demands .

Small-scale linkage creates larger climate agreement in the

future
Daniel Bodansky 14, Foundation Professor of Law, ASU Sandra Day OConnor
College of Law, expert on international environmental policy, Facilitating Linkage of
Heterogeneous Regional, National, and Sub-National Climate Policies Through a
Future International Agreement, November 2014,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-ieta-linkage-paper-nov-2014.pdf
linkage
could help create a pathway to a more robust long-term international climate
policy architecture. In the short term, there will probably be several regional sets
of directly linked systems, with some indirect linkage through the CDM or other offset/sectoral crediting
programs. This short-term arrangement may transition toward a system with a greater
number of direct links. In the same way that the GATT transitioned into the WTO, a bottom-up
system of links between national-level climate programs could, in principle, provide the basic
institutional framework for a broader agreement (Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Ranson and
By helping to build an institutional framework of coordination among different GHG mitigation systems,

Stavins, 2013b).22

Linkage could help support a future climate agreement in another way: by providing incentives for
nations to adopt market-based climate policies. Major developed countries with capand-trade systems may be expected to attempt to use offset programs as both a
carrot and a stick to stimulate mitigation action in counties without an emissions cap. The
best example of this may be the EU ETS policy toward CDM offsets from developing countries. Whereas the EU ETS
allowed regulated entities to use CDM credits originating in any developing country between 2008 and 2012,
beginning in 2013 new CDM credits are only allowed for projects originating in Least Developed Countries (the 48
poorest countries, as defined by the United Nations), thus excluding projects in China and India, among other
countries (European Commission, 2011b). This policy shift is deliberate; according to EU documents: [w]hile
initially the use of international credits was allowed for cost-effective compliance, this has been complemented with
the objective of actively using the leverage the EU possesses as the by far most important source of demand for
international credits (European Commission, 2011b, 1).

linkage could support a future climate agreement in the short run by

facilitating learning and sharing of ideas about how to implement market based
mechanisms, by reducing the administrative costs of meeting nationally determined
contributions, and by contributing to a sense of momentum that helps build
political support at the national level.
Finally,

2AC No Internal Link

A polycentric system doesnt collapse global climate
governance---its a critical backstop
Scott V. Valentine 13, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and
School of Energy and Environment, City University of Hong Kong, Enhancing
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts through Sino-American Collaboration, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Volume 6, Number 2, Summer 2013, Oxford Journals
a polycentric approach, such diversity sires a host of
compelling benefits. Polycentric initiatives reduce the risk associated with the
failure of any specific initiative. Even if the UNFCCC process were to collapse
entirely, some level of progress towards climate change mitigation would be ensured
thanks to the presence of other initiatives.82 Polycentric initiatives also tend to be more
effective in generating results because they can be customised to appeal to stakeholders
with disparate needs.83 Moreover, because polycentric initiatives enlist participation from a greater
In spite of the inefficiencies blamed on

diversity of stakeholders, they are inherently more innovative.84

problems such as climate

changewhich influence all levels of societycan only be effectively addressed through
initiatives implemented at various scales.85 This embodies the matching principle in
international law that contends that problems involving multiple levels (e.g. global, national, regional,
and small scales) should involve contributions at each of these levels .86 Numerous experts
Perhaps of most salience in support of a polycentric approach is evidence that

support the contention that both bottom-up and top-down approaches to climate change mitigation are necessary
in order to ensure that top-level goals translate to local action, and vice versa.87
Tompkins and Amundsen succinctly summarise this perspective in regard to

the UNFCCC process:

The Convention plays a role in shaping the discourse of climate change and in generating national level responses

is not adequate to inspire national action to resolve the problems of

climate change. There is scope for many additional initiatives, through collaboration, trade or
aid, and through bilateral agreements.88
but perhaps it

1AR No Internal Link

Starting with a fragmented system is net better for climate
governance
Emilie Becault 16, Project Manager, Leuven Centre for Global Governance
Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium, The Global Governance System for Climate Finance:
Towards Greater Institutional Integrity? April 2016,
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp-171180/wp173-becault-marx.pdf
the implications of institutional fragmentation for the
geographical and/or thematic allocation of climate finance. As Keohane and Victor (2011) explain it in their
analysis of the regime complex for climate change politics, fragmented governance architectures
have for sure, several advantages over the more traditional modes of governance
based on centralized/integrated top-down structures, chief among them being their greater
adaptability and flexibility over time. In addition, bottom-up forms of international
cooperation, are, quite logically, expected to be more attuned to the interests, concerns, or
values of local communities. These advantages however are no guarantee of effective policy outcomes at
A third and final issue touches upon

least at the systemic level. The climate finance landscape, in its unequal geographical and thematic allocation of
funds, aptly illustrates how highly fragmented structures of governance often run the risks of failing to produce
meaningful results or policy outcomes. Of particular concern here are the costly inefficiencies generally associated
with the presence of overlapping set of institutions with no, to little history of intra-organizational cooperation or
competition. More importantly, institutional fragmentation, when poorly coordinated, tends also to facilitate
negative outcomes including non-compliance, forum shifting, and exit from legally demanding institutional settings.

No Tradeoff
No tradeoff between the UN and lower-level processes
Fariborz Zelli 11, Associate Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Lund
University, and academic advisor to the Earth System Governance International
Project Office, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance and its
Consequences across Scales: The Case of REDD, August 2011,
http://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/04b56fa4-81f1-4f42-9865-be0b0ad88f7a.pdf
global climate governance has become increasingly
polycentric (Ostrom 2010). However, while it is important to acknowledge the multiplicity
of sites of climate governance, the previous section has also made clear that the UNFCCC
process has not all of a sudden ceased to play a central role in the entire
climate governance complex. These nearly parallel processes have spurred a heated
debate. Some authors have made strong pleas in favour of the UNFCCC process (e.g. Depledge and Yamin 2009;
So far, we have shown that

Hare et al. 2010), whereas others have emphasized that this overburdened process will block any progress and that
it would be wise to pin our hopes on decentralized approaches (e.g. Victor et al. 2005; Prins and Rayner 2007;
Rayner 2010).

Geoengineering CP Answers

2AC Unintended Consequences

The counterplan causes a laundry list of unintended
consequences---collapses the global environment
Zoe Carpenter 15, associate Washington editor for the Nation, Scientists: We
Cannot Geoengineer Our Way Out of the Climate Crisis, 2/10/15,
https://www.thenation.com/article/scientists-we-cannot-geoengineer-our-way-outclimate-crisis/
That question was held up for scrutiny on Tuesday by the National Academy of Sciences, which released a study
(funded, in part, by the CIA) of two ideas for staving off the worst effects of climate change via technological
manipulation of the climate: to remove carbon-dioxide from the atmosphere and sequester it elsewhere, or to
reflect sunlight away from the planet by whats known as albedo modification, la Mount Pinatubo. The unequivocal
message from the committee was that

the world cannot expect to geoengineer its way out of

the climate crisis.

There is no silver bullet here. We cannot continue to release carbon dioxide and
hope to clean it up later, said committee chair and Science Editor-in-Chief Marcia McNutt at a press
briefing in Washington. The climate doesnt go backwards. It goes different. And we
dont even understand where that different state ends up , said another member of the panel.
In preparing and discussing the report, its authors declined to use the term geoengineering, opting instead for
climate intervention. McNutt explained, Wefelt that engineering implied a level of control that is illusory.
Current carbon-capture and storage methods would take decades to achieve moderate results and be costprohibitive, according to the report. These carbon-removal strategies include land management and reforestation;
ocean iron fertilization; and sucking carbon dioxide from the air, which is difficult to do because its much more
diffuse in ambient air than, say, in a smokestack at a power plant. According to the committee, large-scale
deployment of these techniques would cost just as much if not more than transitioning to clean-energy sources.
Still, given the political barriers to emissions reductions, and the scale of reductions needed, the committee said it
was almost inevitable that some carbon-capture technology would be required to avoid some of the worst effects
of warming. As such, the concluded, more research and development is warranted.

Albedo modification presents a more troubling case. It would be irrational and

irresponsible to pursue those techniques without reducing emissions, the committee
wrote. Not only do they fail to address the root cause of climate change. They also pose a number of
known risks, including ozone loss and changes to rainfall, and could disrupt the
climate in other, less clear ways. There is significant potential for unanticipated,
unmanageable, and regrettable consequences in multiple human dimensions from albedo modification
including political, social, legal, economic, and ethical dimensions, the report reads.

1AR Unintended Consequences

Causes a laundry list of environmental crises---allows ocean
acidification, and causes catch-up warming and resource
conflicts
Erik van Sebille 15, Research Fellow and Lecturer in Oceanography, UNSW
Australia, Climate hacking would be easy that doesnt mean we should do it,
1/4/15, http://theconversation.com/climate-hacking-would-be-easy-that-doesntmean-we-should-do-it-35200
pumping ash into the sky to dim the Sun? Perhaps predictably, its
is likely to create new problems of its own.

If it is so easy, why arent we already

because this climate solution

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has completely rejected solar radiation
management not because it is too hard, but because there is no guarantee that the
consequences will be benign.
There are three major problems that make this form of geoengineering so dangerous that, hopefully, it will never be
used.

it does not address the root cause of climate change. It only addresses one of the
while failing to deal with related issues such as ocean
acidification. This is because our carbon dioxide emissions will continue to build up in
the atmosphere and dissolve in the oceans , making seawater more acidic and making it harder for
First,

symptoms: global warming,

species like corals and oysters to form their skeletons.

The second problem is also related to the continued build-up of atmospheric carbon dioxide.

If, at some point

in the future, we stop pumping ash into the skies, the ash will rapidly wash out from the atmosphere in a
few years. Yet with atmospheric carbon dioxide levels even higher than before, Earth will experience
rapid catch-up warming. According to the IPCC, this could be as much as 2C per
decade roughly 10 times the current rate. This would be very troubling, given that many species,
including in places such as Sydney, are already struggling to adapt to the current pace of change.

pumping dust into our skies will almost certainly change the weather. In particular,
it is likely to alter the amount of rainfall from country to country. Some will become drier,
Third,

others wetter, with a range of grave impacts on many types of agriculture. It is not yet clear how individual

unpredictable water and food supplies can provoke

regional conflict and even war.
countries will be affected, but we know that

2AC Moral Hazard

Sulfate aerosol use creates a moral hazard---diverts resources
from warming mitigation and collapses efforts to solve
warming
Albert C. Lin 13, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law,
Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard? Ecology Law Quarterly 40:673-712,
2013, https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/lin/files/ELQ.MoralHazard.pdf
geoengineering might ameliorate some of
climate changes most severe impacts, experts generally agree that it is no substitute for
mitigation and adaptation.22 At best, geoengineering would offer only a partial response to climate
How exactly might geoengineering pose a moral hazard? Although

change: ocean fertilization can absorb no more than a fraction of the GHGs contributing to climate change, and

SRM cannot address into perpetuity all the effects associated with higher atmospheric
GHG concentrations. Moreover, geoengineering involves grave uncertainties and potential hazards.23
Indeed, even geoengineerings strongest supporters in the scientific community agree that mitigation
remains essential whether geoengineering efforts proceed .24 At the same time, attention to
geoengineering is increasing and support for geoengineering research is building. The moral hazard concern is that

research and development in geoengineering may undermine public and political

support for mitigation and adaptation, notwithstanding geoengineerings
limitations.26 Put differently, geoengineering could be inaccurately perceived as a
comprehensive insurance policy against climate change. This misperception could create
various incentives that would exacerbate the problems that geoengineering is intended to
ameliorate. Individuals might curb voluntary efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Fossil
fuel consumption and other GHG-generating behaviors might even increase out of a
misguided belief that climate change no longer poses a threat. Societies might
divert resources away from mitigation toward geoengineering schemes that
ultimately prove futile or unworkable. Finally, political and financial support for mitigation and adaptation policies
might decline.

Moral hazard concerns have most often surrounded the more drastic

geoengineering techniques, such as ocean fertilization and stratospheric aerosol deployment.28

Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, this Article uses the term geoengineering to refer to these techniques and
assesses the moral hazard they might present. Part II of this Article considers climate adaptation as a case study
that suggests how public attitudes towards geoengineering might develop. Part III explains the concept of moral
hazard as developed by the insurance industry and economists, and surveys empirical evidence of moral hazard in

risk compensation, which is

also pertinent in analyzing how the public and policymakers might respond to
geoengineering. Part IV examines moral hazard and risk compensation in the specific context of
a variety of other contexts. In addition, Part III introduces the related concept of

geoengineering policy. Acknowledging that direct and reliable empirical evidence in this area will be hard to come

biases and other

psychological mechanisms that are likely to affect perceptions of geoengineering risk.
Part VI concludes that the moral hazard of geoengineering should be taken seriously , and
by, the Article turns to indirect means of analyzing the issue. Part V discusses

Part VII reflects on implications for future geoengineering policy.

1AR Moral Hazard

Geoengineering plays into the narrative of a quick and easy
technical fix to warming---diverts attention from mitigation
Albert C. Lin 13, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law,
Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard? Ecology Law Quarterly 40:673-712,
2013, https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/lin/files/ELQ.MoralHazard.pdf
For purposes of analyzing public perceptions of geoengineering, the public may fall into two camps according to
their underlying views on climate change: believers and skeptics. Persons in both groups are subject to heuristics
and biases that foster overconfidence in geoengineerings efficacy and underweighting of geoengineerings

climate change skeptics are especially

likely to experience moral hazard with respect to geoengineering . This prediction may
risks.208 Cultural cognition theory suggests, moreover, that

appear counterintuitive at first, as there is presumably no need for climate change policy measures
geoengineering or otherwiseif climate change is not a problem to begin with. But as cultural cognition theory

the policy options offered in response to a risk can substantially alter public
perceptions of that risk. Specifically, for climate change skeptics who have resisted climate mitigation,
geoengineering offers a policy option more consonant with culturally conservative
values. Supporting evidence exists in studies examining the influence of cultural values on perceptions of another
predicts,

controversial technology, nuclear power. Persons with individualistic and hierarchical orientations (hierarchical
individualists) tend to be the strongest supporters of nuclear power, whereas persons with more communitarian
and egalitarian orientations tend to be its strongest opponents.210 Not surprisingly, the former group also tends to
be relatively skeptical of global warming. When nuclear power is framed as a possible solution to global warming,
however, hierarchical individualists have been found to be more open to evidence of global warming.211 For these

geoengineering could have an appeal similar to that of nuclear energy. 212 By

illustrating how technology might solve problems faced by humanity,
geoengineering could serve as an affirmation of human initiative, capitalism,
and scientific progress. The possibility that one might simultaneously deny climate change and
persons,

advocate geoengineering is not merely theoretical. The Cato Institute has derided concern over global warming as a
scare while framing opposition to geoengineering as opposition to economic growth.214 Views expressed by
scholars associated with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think-tank, provide a further
illustration. The AEI has financed attacks on climate change science and sponsored programs
critical of international efforts to combat climate change and other environmental problems.215 At the same time,

AEI scholars also have expressed strong support for geoengineering research and
deployment. Testifying before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Lee Lane, co-director of AEIs
geoengineering project, characterized stratospheric aerosols and other similarly speculative SRM techniques as
very likely to be a feasible and effective means of cooling the planet.216 Advocating that SRM be viewed no
differently than any other policy tool for responding to climate change, Lane blithely suggested that SRM may have
more upside potential than does any other climate policy option.217 Samuel Thernstrom, the other co-director of
AEIs geoengineering project, more recently cautioned that [g]eoengineering should be seen as a complement to
mitigation and adaptation, not an alternative, and deemed it implausible that any national leader would argue
that geoengineering offers a safe alternative to emissions reductionsor that the American people would go along
with the idea.218 Nonetheless, Thernstrom touted geoengineering for its unique ability to overcome the inertia in
the climate system and provide a degree of rapid cooling, if necessary, and advocated immediate research on
geoengineering.219 The knowledge thereby gained, he contended, would be relatively cheap and potentially

the
proponents of these views make little mention of geoengineerings drawbacks . They
priceless, while continued ignorance of this field would be reckless . . . . Perhaps unsurprisingly,

also gloss over the tremendous difficulties of developing effective geoengineering techniques and determining
whether they would actually work. Deployment of any serious geoengineering project is estimated to be decades
away, even if research efforts were accelerated immediately and even if such efforts ultimately proved

geoengineering offers no magic bullet. Efforts to frame

geoengineering as a necessary choice under desperate circumstances
nevertheless may exacerbate the moral hazard effect. Proponents of geoengineering research
successful.221 Simply put,

have described geoengineering as the only human response that can fend off rapid and high-consequence climate
impacts.222 Such

statements shift attention away from mitigation by play[ing] on

the fears of the public and advocat[ing] technological quick-fixes rather than
reasonable debate about instituting difficult changes to our resource-based and extractive mode of
existence. The ease with which geoengineering supporters sometimes make their arguments underscores the

it is susceptible to
framing as a magic bullet against climate change, geoengineering may prove attractive
not only to persons whose cultural values align with geoengineering, but also to the
broader American public. Studies find that Americans strongly support GHG emission reductions, yet tend
potentially widespread psychological and political appeal of geoengineering. Because

to oppose specific policies that would discourage fossil fuel consumption.224 Interpreting this apparent

public opinion on climate change is in

a wishful thinking stage of opinion formation, in which they hope the problem can be
solved by someone else (government, industry, etc.), without changes in their own
priorities, decision making or behavior.225 Geoengineering, in hinting at a cheap
and easy resolutionor at least postponementof our climate reckoning, plays directly into
this wishful thinking. Even if politicians recognize the problems associated with geoengineering, they face
little incentive to dispel any illusions the public may hold. Rather than make difficult choices that
impose costs on the electorate, it will be easier for elected officials to point to a
technological fix that may one day arrive, obviating the need for sacrifice or a
departure from business as usual.226 By suggesting additional potential options for responding to
climate change, geoengineering reduces the political pressure for near-term mitigation
and provides opponents of mitigation with a new rationale for further delay.227 In
contradiction, the author of one such study suggests that American

the end, people might want so much to believe that geoengineering will work that they may allow politicians and
interested parties to convince them that it will work, regardless of evidence to the contrary.

Not Feasible
The counterplan isnt feasible---there are far more technical
issues in the real world than in models
Piers Forster 15, professor of physical climate change at the School of Earth and
Environment at the University of Leeds, Not enough time for geoengineering to
work? 2/2/15, http://thebulletin.org/not-enough-time-geoengineering-work7963
So could geoengineering be a quick fix? We have been researching the feasibility of such technologies
as part of Britains Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals project, which spans engineering and the
physical and social sciences. We examined two carbon capture technologies and six solar technologies in as much
detail as possible, and identified two main stumbling blocks. The first issue has to do with the deployment time
necessary to introduce a technology at scale, and the second with how long we would need to commit to
geoengineering to make a difference.

None of the proposed technologies really exist on anything other than

paper. This raises serious concerns as to whether any of them could be developed
and deployed at scale within the next few decades. We investigated one technology first proposed around
Rocky rollouts.

15 years ago in which sea-salt particles would be sprayed into clouds from ocean-going ships to increase the low
clouds reflectivity. We chose this technique as a test case because some of the proposed engineering details are in
the public domain, so we could use them to improve the realism of our simulations.

only certain clouds

were susceptible to spraying at certain times of day; many of the sea-salt particles
coagulated and rained out before they reached the cloud; and the particle plume
generated by the moving ship had a tendency to sink rather than rise to cloud level (due to
Our simulations found three issues that reduced the efficacy of the spraying mechanism:

the evaporation of water from the generation of sea-salt). No doubt many of these obstacles would be
surmountable, but development and testing take time.
International governance and legal obstacles will also slow any attempts at implementation. Even a carbon-capture
technology like tree planting, which already exists and is benign on a small scale, becomes problematic when

all of the
solar technologies we simulated led to side effects, particularly in the form of changing rainfall
patterns. The side effects were uncertain, crossed national borders, and often occurred
on the other side of the Earth from the deployment location . The possibility of a rogue state
deployed on a large scale, requiring that competition for land and resources be taken into account. And

conducting unilateral geoengineering aside, people and governments would have to develop international legal
protocols to manage the process of deployment before any technologies could be put in place.
Watching and waiting. We also found that with current observation capabilities and the inherent variability of the

it would take at least a decade of careful observations to determine

the impact and side effects of geoengineering. Climate is defined as the average weather.
climate system,

Floods and droughts happen even without any manmade interference, so weather needs to be averaged over at
least a decade to determine the climate. A similar 10-year average would be needed to see what effect
geoengineering was having on weather statistics.

There would be further complications. The effectiveness of geoengineering deployment could be

affected by the weather. For example, we studied injecting sulfate aerosols into the
stratosphere to reflect sunlight before it hits the Earth. But the winds in the stratosphere may
blow differently than expected and produce abnormal distributions of sulphate
aerosol in the stratosphere. Similarly, the technology that would have ships injecting sea-salt particles
into the air to brighten marine clouds would need a strategy to cope with varying patterns of
cloudiness. Careful collection of statistics to measure the effects these technologies were having on climate,
and their effectiveness, would require time. Unfortunately, time may not be on the side of the would-be
geoengineers: Imagine that soon after injecting particles into the stratosphere, a country experienced

unprecedented flooding. The engineers would be unable to say whether the technology was to blame or not. This
uncertainty could easily lead to paranoia as to what effects geoengineering was having, even if it was blameless.
It is hard to predict how much geoengineering could cool the climate over a given time frame due to a lack of
sufficient information on the proposed technologies. However, we were able to roughly gauge the maximum

marine cloud brightening and

cirrus cloud thinning may not be able to cool the planet by much more than 1 degree
Celsius globally. A slightly greater cooling may be achieved by injecting sulfur dioxide
potential of several radiation management technologies. We found that

into the stratosphere. Other schemes we investigated had very large local effects on either temperature or rainfall,

any possible cooling needs to

be put in context with the expected 1 degree Celsius of additional warming over the
next 20 to 30 years from continued emissions of greenhouse gases . Unless we reduce greenhouse
making them less attractive as global cooling mechanisms. Moreover,

gases in the atmosphere, rising temperatures could at best only be delayed for a short while.

it
wouldnt be possible to simply switch it off. For it to continue to be effective in a world of rising
emissions, the scale of its deployment would need to grow commensurately . Suddenly
stopping would then become a problem, as very rapid warming would result. Rapid
We need to remember, too, that even if geoengineering appeared to be effective in all the ways we hoped,

warming is damaging to many biological ecosystems which do not have time to adapt. By setting off down the
geoengineering path, we would be committing future generations to the technology.

Doesnt Cancel Out CO2

Sulfate aerosols cant cancel out CO2---they have
fundamentally different effects on the climate
Kelly E. McCusker 12, PhD candidate, atmospheric science, University of
Washington, The climate response to stratospheric sulfate injections and
implications for addressing climate emergencies, 2012 was last year cited,
http://www.atmos.washington.edu/~bitz/McCusker_emerg_submit_twocol.pdf
The combination of imposed forcings is not necessarily, a priori, expected to result in
stabilized climate on a regional scale for three reasons. First, stratospheric sulfate forcing, such as
is prescribed in our experiments, does not have the same properties as a forcing from
increased carbon dioxide because the former primarily acts on shortwave radiation and
the latter primarily on longwave radiation. Thus, due to lack of sunlight, the efficacy of sulfate aerosols
in the polar regions may be diminished. Second, studies have shown that modifications to shortwave
versus longwave radiation affect temperature and precipitation differently
(Allen and Ingram 2002; Bala et al. 2008). A perfect cancellation of surface temperature by solar radiation
management necessarily excludes perfect cancellation of precipitation, because of the differing energetic

the spatial distribution of stratospheric sulfate

aerosol versus carbon dioxide is not identical, with carbon dioxide being well-mixed
in the troposphere, and a sulfate layer limited to the lower stratosphere . The latter effect, we
properties of the radiative forcings. Third,

will show, has profound implications for the response of the climate - and especially for the effectiveness of
geoengineering to avoid the two polar emergencies we consider here. Even if the negating effect of a sulfate layer

there is also some question as to just how feasible it is to tune to the correct
amount of sulfate in the real world, where timescales of adjustment are spatially
varying and large natural variability will obscure the response of the earth system
to changes in forcing.
was perfect,

Topicality Answers

2AC AT: T-Conditional

We meet---the aff involves an offer of cooperation to China that
they have to accept, which means it includes reciprocal action
by them
Counterinterpretation---engagement is the unconditional
provision of incentives it excludes coercive strategies
Johnston and Ross, 5 - professor of political science at Harvard AND professor of
political science at Boston College (Alastair and Robert, Engaging China: The
Management of an Emerging Power, p. xv)
The volume's comprehensive approach to studying engagement means that the contributors have vastly different

To encourage a common dialogue among the contributors and to

facilitate the generation of a common understanding of engagement with cross-national
research agendas.

applications, the contributors have worked within a common definition of engagement. For the purpose of this
volume,

engagement is defined as follows:

The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a

rising major power's behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are
consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order.
In this approach, amelioration of the rising power's behavior does not include efforts to hinder the accretion of
relative power. This is better understood as "containment". We have neither defined nor limited the methods of
amelioration, preferring that individual authors characterize the methods used by the respective countries and/or
multilateral institutions. "Non-coercive methods" include such strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests,
transformation of preferences, and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints.

In contrast to containment,
engagement seeks neither to limit, constrain, or delay increases in the target
country's power nor prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power. Rather, it
seeks to "socialize" the rising power by encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order. Our
definition of engagement specifically excludes coercive policies.
The contributors clearly differentiate engagement from containment.

Prefer our interpretation:

Aff ground---conditional affs require the aff to defend far too
much and there are only good solvency advocates for a few of
them---unconditional affs are key to allow the aff to innovate
and find new areas of cooperation to more effectively develop
the topic
Limits---their interpretation actually explodes limits since any
unconditional proposal can be conditioned on any condition--means it multiplies the number of affs by a huge number, but
decreases the quality of those affs
Prefer reasonability---competing interpretations create a moral
hazard which causes the neg to arbitrarily go for T to limit out
the aff, instead of making debates better

Exts---Aff Ground
Our interpretation is key to aff ground---the best literature
about United States China policy is based around specific,
unconditional policy proposals, and forcing the aff to be
conditional artificially expands the scope of what the aff has to
defend---that makes it impossible to innovate over the course
of the year and develop new angles on the topic, because the
aff would always be forced to read one or two conditional affs
Aff ground outweighs neg ground---it sets the terms for the
debate and is a prerequisite to any meaningful clash---the neg
will always be able to come up with something to say, which
means its more important to prioritize the most effective
subject for debate

Exts---Engagement = Unconditional
Engagement is structural linkage, not tactical linkage means
it must be unconditional
Mastanduno, 12 professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael,
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases edited by Steve Smith, p. 217)

Positive economic statecraft can be defined as the provision or promise of economic

benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. It is important to
distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified
economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the
target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots' or
'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and
others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement, involves an
effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of
political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be
unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in
target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic
engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable
changes in target behaviour.
Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic.
Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state
calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be
sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing
policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the USA offered
sizeable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange
for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to
accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic
policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and japan offered economic
inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the
OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to ensure that they would receive access
to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the USA offered to increase sales of
coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the
Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed.
Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most
clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1980 [1
9451). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic
benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state.
Over time, internationaIist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the
sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy
of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman
demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to
inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part
of its weaker central European neighbours during the inter-war period.

Engagement is distinct from conditionality

Smith 5 Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the
European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005
(Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?, Global
Europe: New Terms of Engagement, May, Available Online at
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/24863/ichaptersection_singledocume
nt/273de787-0ede-4c7e-a001-94d09f793f1b/en/03_Conditionality.pdf, Accessed 0725-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. Engagement is a foreign policy strategy of building close

ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another
state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic
practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal
ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and
encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously
labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of oxygen: economic activity
leads to positive political consequences.19
Conditionality, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation,
of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the
fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. Positive conditionality
entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; negative
conditionality involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the
state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of
asphyxiation).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no
strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of
looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in
another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

2AC AT: T-Contacts

We meet---the aff is a diplomatic contact related to climate
policy, and it likely would involve discussion over climate
financing and renewable energy investment, also making it an
economic policy
Counter-interpretation---engagement is deliberative dialogue
between two states
Lederach 12 John Paul Lederach, Professor of International Peacebuilding at
the University of Notre Dame and Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Colorado,
From Isolation to Engagement: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism, Peace
Policy, 1-25, http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2012/01/25/from-isolation-to-engagementstrategies-for-countering-violent-extremism/
The U.S. governments list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations is a central part of a counter-terrorism strategy based
on the isolation of individuals and groups who espouse violence defined as terrorism. This strategy makes it illegal
to provide material support to those individuals and groups, which increasingly is interpreted to prohibit any contact
or consultation with groups on the list.

Peacebuilding, on the other hand, proposes a strategy of engagement.

Engagement requires contact and deliberative dialogue , inclusive of all
views. It develops processes that focus on accurately understanding the sources of violence and addressing them
through a range of nonviolent change strategies.

Prefer our interpretation:

Aff ground---their interpretation arbitrarily limits engagement
to a random list, which constrains the aff and prevents
innovation over the course of the year
Topic coherence---diplomacy doesnt just happen through
official state visits, but rather lower-level contacts and Track II
dialogue---only allowing those kinds of affs gives a clear
picture of US policy towards China
Prefer reasonability---competing interpretations create a moral
hazard which causes the neg to arbitrarily go for T to limit out
the aff, instead of making debates better

Exts---Aff Ground
Our interpretation is key to aff ground---Resnick artificially
constrains the options available to the aff and limits the topic
to a couple arbitrary set of policies---that makes it impossible
for the aff to explore new types of engagement and come up
with new mechanisms over the course of the year
Aff ground outweighs neg ground---it sets the terms for the
debate and is a prerequisite to any meaningful clash---the neg
will always be able to come up with something to say, which
means its more important to prioritize the most effective
subject for debate

Exts---Topic Coherence
Our interpretation is key to topic coherence---their
understanding of diplomacy is outdated and incoherent
because modern diplomacy occurs through low-level,
bureaucratic connections at all levels of government, not just
when the president visits another country. Including lowerlevel diplomacy and technical discussion is necessary to
effectively debate China policy.
This outweighs their limits claims---limits for the sake of limits
are useless because the subject of debate is what gives it
value and shapes our future understanding of China---only our
interpretation makes this topic valuable and effective

Exts---Engagement = Dialogue
Engagement must contain dialogue---that contrasts with
isolation
Capie 2 David H. Capie, and Paul M. Evans, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 118
engagement is sometimes used in a slightly narrower sense to describe the
political relationship between specific states. Here there are two distinctive usages: first,
engagement can be described as a kind of loosely defined informal association or
relationship. The example that has received the most attention in the literature on Asia-Pacific security is that
of the United States' engagement of China. In this sense, engagement connotes a relationship
of dialogue and involvement, and is often contrasted with "containment" or
"isolation".'3 Joseph Nye has said "the attitude that 'engagement' implies is important." He claims the United
Second,

States' decision to engage China "means that [it] has rejected the argument that conflict is inevitable"." A related
use of engagement is to describe formal state policies or strategies. For example, the Clinton administration's
"Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" and policy of "Comprehensive Engagement" with China. Different parts
of the government often take very differing attitudes to engagement. Robert Sutter notes that under the George VV.
Bush administration, there has been "an institutional gap between the Department of Defense and other US
departments as far as interaction and engagement with China is concerned".'5

**CLIMATE COOPERATION NEG**

Fragmentation DA

1NC

1NC Fragmentation DA
Paris set the stage for a new climate regime---multilateral
cooperation is key
ACT Alliance 15 coalition of European development agencies, focusing on
climate change, food security, and the EUs development policy, Paris Climate
Agreement: a good but insufficient step forward, 2015, http://actalliance.eu/newspost/paris-climate-agreement-a-good-but-insufficient-step-forward/
There is a deal! This might sound very weak to cheer but it was by no means sure that all countries, and in
particular the current biggest emitters, would agree to a deal until the very last day of the negotiations. Every
politician, negotiator and other advocacy expert had still in mind the failure of the nightmarish conference held in
Copenhagen in 2009. But reality had changed with more and more people around the globe aware of the threat of

Renewable and energy-efficient solutions are now

considered viable alternatives, and nearly all sectors of our societies, from companies, to churches, to
local public authorities have started acting voluntarily without regulatory pressure. Politicians, who are often
influenced by corporate interests could not ignore the critical mass of people and other
stakeholders. Additionally to these determining factors, the French presidency of this COP21
acted wisely to ensure an inclusive and party-driven process where all countries felt
at ease to negotiate. In these diplomatic environments, delicate attention is key to find the
best possible compromise without leaving anyone behind.
climate change and eager to act.

The Paris agreement to tackle climate change is universal in that it is applicable to all
countries. It creates a new international climate regime, moving from the Kyoto Protocol
which targeted only historical emitters and applied a top-down approach. Even most countries have not contributed
to the great threat to human life which climate change is, but now all countries not just the greatest historical
emitters must play their part; the remaining space in the atmosphere for greenhouse gases (also called carbon
budget) is now too little to continue emissions if we want to prevent dangerous climate-induced impacts and
irreversible consequences. The need to act is so high and urgent that no one on this earth can continue or wish
living the fossil-fuel based and a Western consumerist lifestyle. And developing economies must avoid repeating the
ecological mistakes of the historical emitters.

In Paris, countries adopted two long term goals . One temperature goal to limit
global warming to less than 2C, and striving for 1.5C. A difference of 0.5C is significant and
Concretely.

exceeding a 1.5C increase could for many countries mean their land or part of it becoming inhabitable before the
end of this century. And a second goal of net zero emissions by the second half of this century, between 2050 and

a mechanism was agreed upon whereby from 2020

onwards every five years, all countries will present their strategies for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Five years is short enough to ensure governments will act as often they are
2100. To achieve these two long term goals,

caught by short-term solutions coinciding with elections cycles. Language in the agreement allows developing
countries to continue increasing their emissions but at a lower level than business-as-usual, depending also on the
support they will receive from rich countries.

The adaptation section is perhaps one of the best outcomes with the creation of a
qualitative goal to review the actions undertaken and the needs of improving resilience
of the poorest and most vulnerable countries, in combination with the 5-year mitigation cycle. The agreement
acknowledges the strong link to mitigation action as the main solution to reduce the need to
adapt to climate change. Several fundamental rights are also explicitly mentioned in order
to ensure adaptation actions are shaped to the specificities of each countries , to be
gender-responsive and to take into consideration vulnerable and indigenous communities.

Bilateral US-China climate cooperation undermines the

multilateral climate process---specifically alienates India and
the EU, and undermines climate financing
Joanna Lewis 11, assistant professor of science, technology and international
affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and
Multilateral Relationship, 2011,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The%20State
%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf
The tendency of the United States to deal directly with or in small groups of
countries, rather than via the UN process, has led to a discussion of a new global
group being formed: the G2, consisting of the United States and China. Since the United States is seen
as the leader of today, and China as the leader of tomorrow, many believe such a grouping is well suited.
President Obama has called the relationship between the United States and China as important as any bilateral

From a U.S. perspective, it could be much

simpler to work out a deal on climate change with China directly, and in doing so could
relationship in the world (White House, 2009a).

ensure that it is on the same page with its major global trading partner and the worlds largest emitter. There are
many commonalities in dealing with climate change that the United States and China face, as discussed previously,
that lend to fruitful opportunities for collaboration. In addition, direct bilateral agreements eliminate some of the
concerns about trust and transparency that emerge in larger groupings.

One key problem with the G2 approach, however, is Chinas aversion to the idea. As
one Chinese scholar stated recently, a Pax Chimericana would invite international
hostility, be impossible for China to sustain politically , undermine the United
Nations and contradict its governments commitment to multilateralism (Jian, 2009;
Gillespie, 2009). While the U.S.-China relationship is symbiotic, it is asymmetrical, as China is an unevenly
developed state. The G2 approach to climate change in particular conflicts with Chinas aversion to being singled
out as a major emitter.

many in the EU have expressed concern

with being left out of such discussions, particularly as they relate to climate change,
fearing that the United States and China will negotiate their own climate agreement
and leave the rest of the world behind. The United States and EU are also aware that too much
focus on China risks alienating other Asian states, including India. China is also a
China is not the only country opposed to the G2 concept;

constructive participant in the ASEAN networks that have served to enhance Asian autonomy from the United

The majority of the developing world is also averse to a G2

approach to climate change, recognizing that the success of an international climate
regime that includes financing for mitigation and adaptation will require the
active engagement of the United States and China.
States (Gillespie, 2009).

Multilateral cooperation under UN is the only way to organize

effective responses to climate change---no other forum or
organization is legitimate or effective
Howard Bamsey 15, Adjunct Professor in the Regulatory Institutions Network at
the Australian National University, former director of the Green Growth Institute,
with Kath Rowley, General Manager, Reviews at the Climate Change Authority,
Australia and Climate Change Negotiations: At the Table, or on the Menu? 3/25/15,
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-and-climate-change-negotiations

The UNFCCC may be central to the global response to climate change but it does
not enjoy a good press. It is widely seen as a talk-fest, and a polarised one at that. Progress is
certainly slow, as is inevitable for any group of 195 where all decisions require consensus. It suffers from other
failings as well; but the fact is the UNFCCC negotiations shape national and global
climate action and associated economic activity through both formal and informal channels. Climate
discussions in other forums come and go, but the UNFCCC has proven resilient, and
remains the only universal forum for negotiating the rules. It thus retains a unique
legitimacy.[15]
the
conventional view of national sovereignty is always respected . No country can be compelled
That is not to say it dictates national obligations. To be clear: the negotiations are an activity of the UN, so

to do anything. Given that decisions are made only by consensus, countries have scope to prevent decisions they
object to strongly. Ultimately, any country can choose not to become a party to an agreement as the United
States (and, originally, Australia) did with the Kyoto Protocol and any party can later withdraw if it chooses as
Canada did from the Protocol in 2011.

the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol boast almost universal membership (the
Being party to either agreement entails
legal obligations, primarily about reducing emissions of greenhouse gases within the country concerned, and
reporting on the actions taken.[17] These obligations are not specific as to the particular policies and
measures to be adopted, but they form part of a broader and interconnected global regime
that is, slowly but inexorably, having an impact on the economic activities that are the source
of emissions.
Still,

Convention has 195 member states; the Protocol 191).[16]

In giving operational effect to legal provisions of the two treaties, parties make formal decisions. Decisions are not
legally binding in themselves, but can, over time, construct a quasi-legal understanding. Looking back, a series of

incremental moves can be seen to establish a general accepted standard that guides
actions by individual countries and other actors .[18]
In recent years, the emphasis on legal obligations has been progressively overtaken by the demands of
universalism. In the Kyoto Protocol, legal form that is, an agreement in the form of a Protocol containing legally
binding targets was determined in 1996, before any decision on what the targets themselves would be.[19]
Targets applied to a select list of developed countries only. The move to universal action began in Bali in 2007;
following the Copenhagen meeting in 2009, over 90 developed and developing countries pledged action to reduce
their emissions. As the Paris meeting approaches, decisions on targets will precede decisions on legal form. All
countries have been invited to put forward their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs, in negotiation
parlance) well before the meeting convenes. Many will be expressed as absolute emissions targets (as in the Kyoto
Protocol) but some will not, and some will include additional actions such as support for other countries efforts.
Many developing and some developed countries have insisted that their commitments be recorded as voluntary as
the quid pro quo for making them. This reflects the same concern Australia has long expressed: that differences in
national circumstances mean commitments should be different in scope, nature, and degree.[20] As a result, while
Paris may yet deliver an outcome with legal force,[21] it is highly unlikely that the national mitigation targets
themselves will be legally binding. Australias initial insistence at Lima that the Paris outcome had to be legally
binding was probably just a misstep, underlining how remote Australian ministers had been from the negotiations to
that point. (Some observers suspect though that it was an attempt by the Government to set the bar for Paris so
high that Australia could label the meeting a failure and withdraw even further.)[22]

many countries are concerned with maintaining

the capacity to evaluate what national commitments mean in terms of emissions,
and to monitor implementation. The UNFCCCs central reporting and review
framework will therefore remain crucial, and it will be important for Australia to be able to influence
Regardless of the legal form of the Paris outcome,

the design of those mechanisms in detail.[23]

informal channels of influence operate too . The negotiations are,

the global locus of debate on climate change. At the Lima COP in

Beyond the formal process,

to a large extent,

2014, for example, about 180 official side-events were held.[24] These were sponsored by some
of the thousands attending the COP who do not represent governments but speak for intergovernmental,
environment, civil society and business organisations, academic institutions, and other groups of varying influence

the COP is a marketplace for the

intense exchange of ideas and opinions among delegates and observers . Connections
in their communities. While not all follow the negotiations in detail,

are made and, over time, strands of different ideas intertwine, mature, and emerge into practice. Collaboration can,
and of course does, occur outside the COPs, but

the COP and to a lesser extent, the few weeks of

is the annual point of convergence and the

intersessional negotiations throughout the year

deadline for next steps.

Uniqueness

2NC Uniqueness
The Paris Agreement set a precedent for multilateral climate
cooperation in the future---it created a new climate regime
with provisions for future review and integrated every country
into the cooperation process---thats 1NC ACT Alliance
Paris changed the game---multilateral cooperation is
succeeding now and will be enhanced in the future
Charlotte Streck 16, co-founder and director of Climate Focus, serves as an
advisor to numerous governments and non-profit organizations, private companies,
and foundations on legal aspects of climate policy, international negotiations, policy
development and implementation, The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning, Journal
for European Environmental and Planning Law, Volume 13, 2016, pp. 3-29,
http://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/The%20Paris%20Agreement%20A
%20New%20Beginning.pdf
the Paris Agreement is a milestone in international climate politics
and brings years of near deadlock negotiations to a conclusion. The Agreement
creates a global process of engagement, follow-up, regular stock-take exercises
and cooperative action. On the one hand, it represents a step forward, overcoming the
many divisions that had marked the Kyoto area: between developed and developing countries,
The adoption of

between industrialized nations inside the Protocol and those outside, and between those supportive of market
mechanisms and those that vehemently opposed them. On the other hand, individual country contributions fall
short of the overall climate goal, and the risk is that the Paris Agreement remains a shell without sufficient action
and support. It thus remains to be seen whether the Paris Agreement is the right framework through which to
address the collective action problem of climate change.
1 Introduction
On 12 December 2015, 196 Parties to the un Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the
Paris Agreement (PA), a new legally-binding framework for an internationally coordinated effort to tackle climate

The Agreement comes 23 years after the signing of the UNFCCC, represents the
culmination of six years of international climate change negotiations under the
auspices of the UNFCCC, and was reached under intense international pressure to
avoid a repeat failure of the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009. Diplomacy, this time around,
worked smoothly. The French government hosting the Paris negotiations with Minister of Foreign
Affairs Laurent Fabius acting as President of the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (cop 21) has been
widely complemented for skilfully navigating through the two-week marathon and for
change.

securing a diplomatic success. Behind the scenes, Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC pulled

concerted action
helped broker the deal. On the way to Paris, the joint announcement1 of the U.S. and China the worlds
the strings to bring reluctant government officials in line. At the level of the Parties,

biggest polluters in 2014 to commit to national mitigation targets, and the G7 Declaration of Elmau,2 carefully
orchestrated by the German government, to aim for a decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of
the century, provided important milestones. During the Paris conference, the emergence of the High-AmbitionCoalition3 was instrumental in consolidating the text for its ultimate adoption.

Obviously Paris wasnt perfect and global cooperation is hard,

but the momentum is on our side
IRO 16 International Relations Online, run by the School of International Service
at American University, Why COP21 Was a Milestone for International Collaboration

and Global Climate Change, 3/22/16, https://ironline.american.edu/blog/WhyCOP21-Was-a-Milestone/

The 2015 Paris Climate Conference was a success. Attendance grew to
For the first time in
history, all nations agreed to actions and investments that aim to limit the global
temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The action plan agreed to at
COP21 strengthens the collective ability of nations to deal with and address the impacts of
climate change for the next decade.
By any measure,

50,000 participants, including 25,000 official delegates from around the world.

global cooperation to secure a future safe

from climate change took a dramatic new turn here in Paris, U.N. Secretary-General Ban
When historians look back on this day, they will say that

Ki-moon said while reflecting on the significance of the international collaboration exhibited at COP21.

the focus is on implementation. To reach the ambitious

developed countries agreed to mobilize finances and increase
support for poorer countries to achieve their respective reduction targets. Between now and when the
Now, in the months following the agreement,
and important goal,

agreement takes effect in 2020, countries will work to define a clear path forward.
Public discussions of the agreement are surfacing, both with resounding praise as well as skepticism. Krishneil
Narayan, coordinator of the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, which represents countries vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change, commented on the agreement, saying, Rapid action to address climate change is a
matter of survival for my Pacific people and as such, how can we accept any compromises? The Paris Agreement

Paris was never meant to be the last step. It was meant

to be a progressive step in identifying new common grounds to address climate
change together collectively through a new, universal agreement.
did not reflect all we asked for but

Another first for COP21 is a climate agreement that applies to all countries, including
large developing countries with large emissions totals like India and China. Xie Zhenhua, Chinas chief negotiator,
was quoted by the Environment News Service, saying, China congratulates warmly the adoption of the Paris

The agreement is not perfect but that does not prevent us from marching
forward. While we wait to see how the agreement is put into action, what is clear is that COP21 marks a
significant step forward. The Paris Agreement allows each delegation and [country] to go back home
Agreement.

with their heads held high, said Laurent Fabius, president of COP21. Our collective effort is worth more than the
sum of our individual effort. Our responsibility to history is immense.

Link

2NC Link Overview

Bilateral US-China climate cooperation collapses the
multilateral climate process---three warrants:
1. Exclusivity---the plan sends the signal of the two largest
emitters negotiating a deal behind closed doors that
excludes everyone else---that specifically angers the EU
and India, who want a seat at the table and would reject
any process that began with exclusive US-China
negotations---thats Lewis
2. Global negotiations---the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change is the only organization with the ability to
successfully negotiate and coordinate global climate
action---bilateral US-China negotiations undermine
confidence in that negotiation process, which leads to
fragmented and purely local climate action---thats Lewis
and Bamsey
3. Climate financing---money and resources need to be
transferred to developing countries to pay for climate
mitigation, but only multilateral cooperation under the UN
can effectively coordinate that process---the plan causes
smaller developing countries to lose faith in the climate
financing process, which is central to their ability to act
on climate change---thats Lewis

2NC Inequity Link

The plan sends the signal of inequity by showing developing
countries that the US and China will go behind their backs
John Ashton 3, former Special Representative for Climate Change at the UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with Xueman Wang, Senior Carbon Finance
Specialist, The World Bank, Sustainable Development Network, Equity and Climate:
In Principle and Practice, 2003 was last date cited,
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/EquityandClimate.pdf
Equity relates not only to the substance of an agreement but also the process by
which it is reached. There is no surer way to push an agreement out of reach than
for a group of parties to conclude that the negotiating process is biased against them .
Trade negotiations broke down in Seattle partly because developing countries saw the
real deals being done behind closed doors among small groups of countries (the
so-called green room process). In the climate negotiations, the disastrous meeting in The Hague in 2000 of the
Sixth Conference of Parties (COP6) collapsed partly because developing countries would not accept as a fait
accompli any last-minute agreement between the European Union and the United States.16
The Kyoto Protocol itself illustrates the importance of a fair process. There were no agreed criteria
for assigning obligations. Some commitments were imposed by muscular chairmanship or gaveled through without

Developing countries were on that occasion pressed into

accepting a deal made in their absence among their industrialized partners,
fuelling their suspicions ever since about faits accomplis. The Kyoto Protocol might not
have been agreed without such methods; but it has been fragile in part because of them. As the process
becomes more demanding on more countries, it will become ever more important
for all to feel that their voice in it will be heard.
reaction from exhausted negotiators.

This imperative derives, in a sense, from the equity dimension of entitlements: all who believe they have interests
at stake in any aspect of the negotiation are entitled to equal access to the process. And there should be room for

The negotiationand, hence, its outcome stand a better chance of

being accepted as fair if the process is transparent and open to all parties.
any party to press its concerns.

In a negotiation with 168 parties clustered into disparate groups, each incorporating a range of conflicting interests,
it is a challenge to establish these conditions. There will always be tension between the need to create the time
pressure without which parties cannot be brought to compromise and the desire of each party to be allowed enough

Any deal reached behind closed doors between some parties

without consulting others will always be vulnerable, even if it only touches directly on the
time to assess its interests.

interests of the parties in the room. Yet in any large negotiation the core political deals are always struck informally
between those with most at stake. Those willing to take on commitments resent vetoes from those not being asked
to do so. It can be destabilizing to demand, as some often do, that no deal is acceptable without parallel progress
on all issues, so that emissions cuts offered by industrialized countries become contingent upon specific kinds of

transparency and inclusion can only work if all parties

show sensitivity to each others process concerns and nurture a sense of
responsibility to the process as a whole.
resource transfer, however desirable. So

2NC Distortion Link

Individual or bilateral action distorts the market for green tech
and makes global action impossible
Benjamin K. Sovacool 9, director of the Danish Center for Energy Technology at
the Department of Business Technology and Development and a professor of social
sciences at Aarhus University, Scaling the policy response to climate change,
Policy and Society, Volume 27, Issue 4, March 2009, pp. 317-328
Addressing global problems such as climate change in a decentralized system also leaves individual actors to
negotiate solutions among themselves. Yet negotiation alone may be ineffective , since parties
emitting more greenhouse gases do not fully suffer the costs of pollution and have no incentive to remedy the
situation. Sources emitting less greenhouse gases have little bargaining power, and litigation is time-consuming and
rife with risk and uncertainty. Polluters can simply move to other places that do not have restrictive policies,

A polyglot of local climate change policies allows

stakeholders to manipulate the existing market to their advantage, using regulatory
creating significant leakage.

loopholes to emit greenhouse gases wherever regulators are the most lax.
Three examples from the United States are most telling. Weiner (2007) estimated that RGGI has experienced
leakage rates as high as sixty to ninety percent due to coal-generated electricity being imported into RGGI states.
Power plants in adjacent states to ones in RGGI have actually increased their output to sell into the higher-priced
RGGI electricity markets. Similarly, further south, LS Power (a New Jersey-based company) has proposed building a
1200 MW coal plant in Early County, Georgia, to export electricity to Florida because the plant likely would not have
been approved in either New Jersey or Florida. The investing corporation resides in a RGGI state with strong
environmental regulations, and the intended consumers reside in a state with a growing commitment to green
energy and climate change mitigation. The plant would be located in Georgia because political leaders there
routinely express skepticism that human actions are impacting the climate. It is estimated that the plant would
increase the amount of carbon dioxide released by electricity generation in Georgia by 13 percent alone (Gayer &
Kerr, 2007). Finally, PacifiCorp, an electric utility serving customers in the Pacific Northwest, has repeatedly
attempted to build coal-fired power plants in Wyoming and Utah, states without mandatory greenhouse gas
reduction targets, but not in Oregon (which has mandated a stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions by 2010) and
Washington (which has mandated 1990 levels by 2020).

localized climate action in lieu of

global policy sends distorted price signals. By lowering demand for carbon-intense
products, local standards reduce the regional (and even global) price for carbon-intensive
fuels. But in doing so, they provide further incentives for nearby actors without
climate change mandates to do nothing because of lowered prices. Reduced
prices, in turn, encourage over-consumption in areas without carbon regulation ,
decrease the incentive to enact energy efficiency and conservation measures , and
In addition to the relatively straightforward phenomenon of leakage,

discourage the adoption of alternative fuels for vehicles and renewable energy technologies (Sovacool & Barkenbus,
2007).

If Mr. Green purchases a smaller, more fuel

efficient, and less luxurious automobile than Mrs. Brown, his actions mean less consumption, less pollution,
and lower gasoline prices for everyone. Yet Mr. Green's sacrifice makes it less likely Mrs. Brown
will see the need to change her habits, not more, since she enjoys the positive benefits
of Mr. Green's action along with everybody else ( Schipper, 1975). This is potentially the most
serious drawback to local action towards climate change: as one group of countries reduces
emissions, the overall cost of producing greenhouse gas intensive goods and services
within this group will rise relative to other producing states. A comparative
advantage in the manufacturing of greenhouse gas intensive goods will therefore
shift to nonparticipating countries. Such market distortions could be significant (Barrett & Stavins,
Think about an analogy at a much smaller scale.

2003).

2NC Legitimacy Link

Exclusive climate change negotiations are disastrous for the
overall regime---they have zero legitimacy and distort the
perceived costs of climate change
Jeffrey Scott McGee 11, Senior Lecturer, Program Convenor of Master of Laws,
School of Law, University of Newcastle, Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging
Discourse within International Climate Change Governance? PORTAL Journal of
Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011, SSRN
The exclusive minilateralism discourse is in direct contestation with cosmopolitan
democratic version of liberal multilateralism. First, the very significant reduction in franchise
advocated by the exclusive minilateral discourse (from all countries concerned with climate
change to only the key emitters and/or economically power states) is obviously at odds with the
expansion of democratic representation23 in international institutions that lies at the heart
of cosmopolitan democratic project (Held 2006: 170 172). The exclusive minilateralism discourse is
therefore vulnerable to attack on the basis of its lack of legitimacy and failure to adhere to
cosmopolitan democratic ideal of all inclusiveness (Held 2006: 171). Second, the exclusive minilateralism
discourse openly excludes civil society, particularly ENGOs, from participation in meetings of the
inner sanctum of decision-making on international climate change policy . This conflicts
with cosmopolitan democratic theory that promotes the voice of non-state actors as means of representing the
aggregated interests of individuals and as an agent to monitor the accountability of states (Held 2006: 171). Third,
the exclusive minilateralism discourse is also difficult to reconcile with cosmopolitan democratic ideal of enhancing
the transparency and accountability of intergovernmental organisations (Held 2006: 172). In sum, the cosmopolitan
democrat should be significantly concerned at the strengthening of the exclusive minilateralism discourse.
The exclusive minilateralism discourse also has potential negative effects upon the level of discursive democracy in
international climate governance. Dryzek indicates that in assessing a deliberative system it is important to
consider the connections between the public spaces of social movements, media outlets, internet, public hearings
and other popular sites of communication and the empowered spaces of formal collective decision making bodies
such as the UNFCCC COP meetings (Dryzek 2010: 10). He suggests that effective deliberative systems have
mechanisms by which public spaces can adequately transmit information and influence to the empowered space
and thereby hold the decision makers in the empowered space to account (Dryzek 2010: 10). The Copenhagen COP
15 meeting demonstrated a flowering of the public spaces of international climate governance with intense media
coverage of the meeting and a record number of NGO representatives registered to attend (Fisher 2010: 13). There
were several large protest marches by ENGOs and climate justice movements during the two weeks of COP 15
demanding a fair, binding and ambitious treaty from the state representatives in the empowered space of the
meeting halls and back rooms of the Bella Centre (McGregor 2011: 2; Fisher 2010: 1415). However, despite the
vibrancy of the public space surrounding the COP15 meeting, within the empowered space of the Bella Centre,
there was a strong feeling from ENGOs of marginalisation and reduced ability to participate and effectively lobby
state representatives (McGregor 2011: 34, Fisher 2010: 1). T he

minilateral approach of reducing

negotiations to small groups of key states appears to have a significant negative
impact upon the flows of influence and accountability between the public space
and the empowered space of the formal negotiations. Discursive democracy is thus weakened if a
flourishing public space is unable to transmit its discursive influence into the empowered space of international
climate governance and hold actors in that space accountable for their decisions.

strengthening of the exclusive minilateralism discourse and prevalence of

exclusive minilateral institutions in international climate change governance carries
significant risk that economically powerful states will seek a subtle redefinition
of the problem of human induced climate change and limit the range of
acceptable policy options to those serving their immediate economic interests . The
Further, a continued

non- UN minilateral climate forums discussed above have either explicitly or implicitly supported a rise in
greenhouse emissions to 2050 that on the science of the IPCC will deliver in excess of a three degree average

surface temperature increase above preindustrial levels (McGee & Taplin 2006: 183; McGee & Taplin 2009: 222
227). The country pledges made to the Copenhagen Accord and modelling done in support of the APP both tacitly
accept a rise in surface temperature of this magnitude.24 The key nations involved in these agreements have thus
already affected a subtle shift in intersubjective understanding on what level of ambition might realistically be
expected in global emission reduction and hence what global ambition should be on the level of acceptable climate

If the level of ambition of greenhouse gas mitigation arising from minilateral

forums remains low there is a significant risk that the subsequent world of three degree
plus warming will not be one that is friendly to either cosmopolitan or discursive conceptions of
change.

democracy in international climate governance.25

Procedural legitimacy is a prerequisite to the entire climate

process---backdoor negotiations between two parties collapses
it---Copenhagen proves
Simon Schunz 11, Postdoctoral research fellow and senior member, Leuven
Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven, The Democratic
Legitimacy of the Contemporary Global Climate Governance Architecture,
September 2011,
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp7180/wp75.pdf
In the absence of effective
coercion or inducements mechanisms in global politics, legitimacy is what matters
most (Bernstein 2011: 20): solving the collective action problem of climate change necessitates
designing policy solutions that can effectively deal with the problem posed, while being
accepted by those they are addressed to. To be acceptable, the process of designing these solutions
Responding to the climate challenge at the global level is, however, intricate.

requires the close involvement of those affected (i) by climate change and (ii) by the rules imposed to combat its
driving forces (mitigation) and consequences (adaptation). In essence, this paper parts from the assumption that

any global political solution to the problem of climate change, if it is to viably exist at all, needs
to be democratically legitimate in substantial and procedural terms.2
When it comes to the democratic legitimacy of contemporary global climate politics, a critical analysis of the
political and policy practices and the academic debates reveals, however, quite divergent appreciations. A first
observation is that although the rise to power of emerging economies like China and India resulted in a proliferation
and diversification of governance I in the field (with the creation of, e.g., the Major Economies Forum, the G-8+5 or

the United Nations (UN) regime, which has developed

since the early 1990s around the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its
the G-20), most assessments focus essentially on

1997 Kyoto Protocol. A second observation is that, within this UN framework, we can now talk about the so-called
Cancun paradox: the processes and outcomes of global climate politics that had been considered insufficient and
illegitimate in Copenhagen had suddenly become acceptable, even promising, and relegitimized one year later in
Cancun (Audet/Bonin 2010, see also quote in chapeau of the paper).
Indeed, after two years of intense post-2012 reform debates within the UN regime,

the 2009 climate

summit in Copenhagen had nourished hopes for a breakthrough in the multilateral negotiations, but
ended in the minimum common denominator outcome embodied in the Copenhagen
Accord. This led observers and participants in the negotiation process to diagnose a legitimacy crisis for
international climate politics (Bckstrand 2010: 1, Mller 2010). The roots of this crisis were seen in problems of
effectiveness, i.e. the observed incapacity of the UN-based multilateral regime of delivering any sustainable
solutions to the problem of climate change, despite the investment of immense diplomatic resources (e.g. Vihma

critics also pointed to the non-respect of the principle of inclusiveness

and of procedures of UN multilateralism when texts were negotiated in exclusive
circles among key states during the summit (e.g. Mller 2010). This was most visible during the
final days of the talks when the physical access of civil society representatives to the
conference premises was limited and negotiations moved into a Friends of the Chair setting of about
2011). Yet,

25 countries3 , excluding the bulk of the 195 parties to the UNFCCC.

The choice to negotiate in a

closed setting was heavily criticized by a small group of parties (Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua,
Tuvalu), and led to a stand-off in the final plenary, in which the Copenhagen Accord was only taken note of by the
conference of the parties (COP) (ENB 2009).

Internal Link

2NC India Internal Link

India is key to global climate negotiations---theyre a critical
deal-maker
Katharina Michaelowa 11, Center for Comparative and International Studies,
University of Zurich, India in the international climate negotiations: from traditional
nay-sayer to dynamic broker, 2011, https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/specialinterest/gess/cis/cisdam/Research/Working_Papers/WP_2011/2011_WP70_Michaelowa.pdf
India managed to play a dominant role as its Chinese partners
were ill prepared for the last minute discussions between heads of state . According to
Conrad (2011, p. 7) the knowledgeable Chinese experts had already left the negotiation table
when the relevant part of the negotiation actually started . The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
And even within BASIC,

had come only for ceremonial reasons and was insulated from the ongoing debates in order to shield him against

India in turn,
negotiated actively and quite successfully at this stage and was largely recognized
as having contributed significantly to the Copenhagen Accord that reflected many of its core
any negative effect a failure of the negotiations could have on his personal reputation.

positions although it failed to bring about legally binding commitments by Annex I countries for the period post
2012. In the international media reporting on the Copenhagen failure, the porcupine role was largely attributed to

Ramesh
strongly contributed to this perception and actively
presented India as a deal maker rather than a deal breaker (The Hindu 2009a). Already
China (Conrad 2011), rather than to India. Indias dynamic Minister of Environment and Forestry, Jairam
(in office from May 2009 to July 2011)

before Copenhagen, he realized the need for maximal flexibility during the last few days of the negotiations, and
prevented the Indian parliament from defining parts of the Indian position as non-negotiable. After Copenhagen,
Ramesh took the bold step of publishing a new emissions inventory of India for the year 2007 without being
required to do so by the UNFCCC (Ministry of Environment and Forests 2010), a step which China has avoided so far.
And one year later Ramesh surprised some of his own negotiators when, at the plenary of COP 16 in Cancn, he
stated that all countries must agree to a legally binding commitment under an appropriate legal form thereby
breaking with a long-standing paradigm of Indian international climate policy (Hindustan Times 2010).

the most recent period confirms a trend towards a mixed strategy, which
appears to have strengthened after COP 8 in Delhi. The traditional defensive and strictly distributive
Overall,

Indian negotiation strategy lost more and more ground to selected integrative and increasingly proactive elements.

the active participation of India became crucial to move the climate

regime forward. In line with Mohan (2003) we thus observe a tendency for the transformation from
In fact,

porcupine to tiger, but with a major strategic shift taking place only in the mid-2000s. As opposed to trade

some of this flexibility also extends to Indias attitude towards its major
coalition partners in G77 and BASIC. Despite the relevance of these coalitions, building sub-coalitions and
negotiations,

proceeding with unilateral proposals without awaiting the consent of the group has not been considered a taboo by
Indian climate negotiators in recent years.
In the literature on climate policy,

the shift towards a more proactive and flexible strategy is

also noted elsewhere (Vihma 2011, Shukla and Dhar 2011), and appears even in the title of certain articles:
From Obstructionist to leading player: transforming Indias international image (Mathur and Varughese 2009).

2NC EU Internal Link

The EU is key---theyre central to the global climate coalition
Radostina Primova 16, Director, Climate and Sustainable Development
Programme, Heinrich Boell Foundation, The Paris agreement: what does it mean for
the EUs domestic energy policy and external climate strategies? 1/26/16,
https://eu.boell.org/en/2016/01/26/paris-agreement-what-does-it-mean-eusdomestic-energy-policy-and-external-climate-1
EU climate diplomacy has been building up over the past years to create a
momentum for COP21, in order to reinforce trust among its strategic partners and forge
new alliances, in particular through the G20 and G8 fora.
One of the strengths of EU climate diplomacy during COP21 was indeed its bridgebuilding role in bringing together a broad coalition of more than 100 countries that
shaped major elements of the agreement and paved the way to the notion of a 1.5 degree Celsius
target. This coalition with the countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) during the

it was significantly
strengthened through the backing of the US, Mexico, Norway, Columbia, Gambia
and Brazil that joined forces with the EU, the island countries and the least developed countries for a
broader climate alliance.
negotiations was a novelty in the EUs alliance-building strategy. Furthermore,

Europe also insisted on incorporating the five-year review cycle in the agreement, as
well as setting up a robust transparency framework. Thus, it shaped to a great extent
the monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms in the agreement.

2NC Climate Finance Internal Link

Effective climate financing is key to withstand the effects of
climate change
Neil Bhatiya 15, Fellow at the Century Foundation, The Green Climate Fund:
Finding a Role for Peacebuilding Priorities, 6/19/15,
https://tcf.org/content/report/the-green-climate-fund-finding-a-role-forpeacebuilding-priorities/
In the wake of the September 2014 United Nations climate summit, which brought together
representatives from more than one hundred countries to build global ambition to fight climate change, there
has been a flurry of diplomatic activity dedicated to that end. One important step
taken was that developed nations finally began to make good on their promise to
endow the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a multilateral mechanism through which they would
aid developing nations in climate change mitigation and adaptation.1
As the main vehicle for developing nations to access financing to meet the
multiple challenges of climate change, including transitioning to greener energy
systems and building resilience against extreme weather, the GCF is an essential
component of the global climate effort. Without it, Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
will not be able to bear the upfront costs of combating and responding to environmental
change and will continue to rely on enviromentally harmful fossil fuels. Critical at this point is not only
guaranteeing that the GCF receives adequate funding, but also that it is programmatically aligned to
best leverage the use of its resources.

Fragmentation Bad---Legitimacy
Fragmentation collapses global climate negotiations---the UN
is the only organization seen as legitimate on climate issues
Robert Falkner 15, International Relations Department and Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and
Political Science, International negotiations: Towards minilateralism, Nature
Climate Change, Volume 5, 2015, pp. 805-806
Just as the number of climate actors and initiatives has increased, so has the risk of
fragmentation in global climate governance. In their analysis of 922 responses
from the International Negotiations Survey, carried out at two consecutive COPs in 2013 and 2014, Hjerpe and

point to a widely diverging range of opinion with regard to the ever more
complex field of climate initiatives2.
Nasiritousi

there is no frontrunner that could claim to have

widespread support and legitimacy outside the UNFCCC. While the G20 is mentioned by 14%
of the respondents, the MEF and the Montreal Protocol are only noted by 5% and 4% respectively. Other forums
receive even less support. Most government officials favour UN-style
multilateralism, while non-governmental organizations generally focus more on domestic and nonIt is clear from their findings that

traditional initiatives involving non-state actors. Minilateral forums are of particular interest to officials from
European and North American governments, but find few supporters in other regions of the world.

research2 offers a valuable glimpse into the minds of climate

negotiators and observers at a critical time in the international process . Whatever the
Hjerpe and Nasiritousi's

outcome of the Paris climate summit, the search for novel governance mechanisms is likely to intensify. As the

none of the emerging

minilateral forums has gathered any significant recognition and support among
practitioners to offer a legitimate alternative to the multilateral approach . Of course,
authors note, the UNFCCC is no longer the only show in town, but

whether minilateralism can ever hope to provide a more realistic answer to the global climate problem is a question
that requires further investigation and goes beyond the scope of their study (see ref. 3).

Fragmentation Bad---Time
A bottom-up approach is rearranging deck chairs on the
Titanic---there is no time to build an entirely new regime---the
UN process is key
John Schellnhuber 7, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Kyoto: no
time to rearrange deckchairs on the Titanic, Nature, Volume 450, November 2007,
p. 346
Prins and Rayner boldly propagate a "bottom-up 'social learning' "
approach to climate policy that aspires to "put public investment in energy R&D on a wartime footing". I
Yes, in the sense that

agree with the importance of both elements to twenty-first century climate protection, but doubt whether there is a

Fine-scale measures and movements towards sustainability ,

as well as technological and institutional innovation strategies, are needed to
decarbonize our industrial metabolism and to force policy-makers to face the challenges ahead.
solid causal chain linking them.

Fancy phrases such as "the silver buckshot" may help to sell the case.

Time is crucial, however. It is unlikely that a bottom-up, multi-option approach alone

will be able to mobilize war-level climate-protection efforts by all the major emitters
(including Russia, China and India) within the one or two decades left to avert an
unmanageable planetary crisis. Without a 'global deal' designed for effectiveness,
efficiency and fairness and providing a framework to accommodate every nation there will be neither
sufficient pressure nor appropriate orientation towards the climate solutions we
desperately need. The bottom-up and top-down approaches are complementary and must be pursued interactively.

Kyoto is simply a miserable precursor of the global regime intended to deliver genuine
climate stablization and was never expected to be more. "Ditching" it now would render all
the agonies involved completely meaningless after the event, denying the entire
process of policy evolution the slightest chance to succeed. So, instead of rearranging the
deckchairs on the Titanic through social learning, let us ditch pusillanimity.

Fragmentation Bad---Patchwork
Fragmentation causes a patchwork---makes development of
climate policies and green technology impossible
Benjamin K. Sovacool 9, director of the Danish Center for Energy Technology at
the Department of Business Technology and Development and a professor of social
sciences at Aarhus University, Scaling the policy response to climate change,
Policy and Society, Volume 27, Issue 4, March 2009, pp. 317-328
Advocates of international action argue almost the exact opposite to the local/state enthusiasts: they respond that

global standards offer uniformity. Standardization can engender a more efficient

regulatory regime than a multiplicity of state and local standards, which tend to heighten barriers to
interstate trade. Uniformity helps provide manufacturers and industry with consistent
and predictable statutes. A single national currency, for example, is cheaper to use than scores of
separate local currencies, and a uniform gauge for railway tracks makes more sense than a collection of competing

simple, clear, and precise climate change policy would minimize many of the
transaction costs that arise with localized action.
standards. A

Consider the current case of American climate policy. Policy variations and fragmentations exist across countries,

International corporations today are operating in a

patchwork of markets, some with strong carbon constraints and others without any carbon regulations.
regions, states, and localities.

Within the United States, ten northeastern states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) are currently participating in RGGI, which will reduce
emissions of carbon dioxide from power plants by 10 percent in 2019, but more than half of the U.S. states do not

This mosaic of divergent policies is particularly

challenging to entrepreneurs who are striving to develop national markets.
even have greenhouse gas reduction goals.

For example, developers of distributed generation projects (such as solar photovoltaic and cogeneration power
plants) face highly variable standards for connecting to the electric grid and can take advantage of net metering
laws in some states, but the specific rules about qualifying facilities vary (Brown, Chandler, Lapsa, & Sovacool,

Considering the commercialization and deployment of technology in

novel technologies
face unique systems barriers that incumbent technologies no longer suffer because :
the dominant technologies already benefit from mature and well understood
regulatory systems (Unruh, 2000). When new technologies are getting ready for commercialization,
developers need to know how the technology will be treated by the law. Having uniform codes and
standards in place before technologies come to the marketplace can reduce
business risk. Compelling examples of this need for uniform codes and standards are hydrogen-based
2008, pp. 5960).

terms of knowledge imbedded in linked systems and subsystems, it is not surprising that

products and systems and carbon capture and sequestration systems, where safety standards, worker certifications
and other regulations are in early stages of development with numerous uncertainties including scale of
implementation and enforcement (Brown, Chandler, Lapsa, & Sovacool, 2008; Brown, Southworth, & Sarznyski
2008).

Fragmentation Bad---Data/Information
Fragmented action makes data collection and comparison
impossible---causes bad climate decisions
Benjamin K. Sovacool 9, director of the Danish Center for Energy Technology at
the Department of Business Technology and Development and a professor of social
sciences at Aarhus University, Scaling the policy response to climate change,
Policy and Society, Volume 27, Issue 4, March 2009, pp. 317-328
Absent international
action, independent regulators can duplicate each other or engage in timeconsuming and complex negotiations to divide labor and resources.
Decentralization generally weakens technical capacities such as data collection and
research and development requiring large-scale scientific instruments. It makes little sense to have every
A second, related advantage to global action concerns economies of scale.

state, city or town measure the level, size, and type of carbon dioxide emissions, track the carbon intensity of fuels,
determine their health effects, identify safe level of emissions, and design cost-effective policy responses. In highly
technical areas such as energy, agriculture, and the environment, although individual communities may benefit
from better information, none has an incentive to provide it on their ownand none has an incentive to research

Global
information collection can create a unified set of indicators, making up for
disparities in the competencies of local environmental programs (Sovacool, 2008).
Without accurate information collected using standardized protocols, consumers,
producers, and policymakers will find it difficult to make efficient land use, travel, and
the infrastructure decisions. Andersson and Ostrom (2008) even comment that localization can
lead to stagnation and inefficiency when communities become isolated from each other and lack
the situation in other states unless they are directly suffering from the effects of trans-boundary pollution.

the information necessary to promote optimal environmental policy.

AT: Bilateralism Spills Up

US-China cooperation doesnt spill up---empirically denied
Joanna Lewis 11, assistant professor of science, technology and international
affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and
Multilateral Relationship, 2011,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The%20State
%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf
Even a successful foundation of bilateral agreements between the United States
and China appeared to have had little bearing on the discussions in Copenhageneven the
bilateral discussionswhen 192 other countries were in the building. As a result, the
discussions that President Obama held with Premier Wen in Copenhagen were far less
positive than those he had a few weeks earlier with President Hu in Beijing. This reality
illustrates the limits of bilateral discussions in moving the multilateral climate
debate.

Copenhagen proves---prior US-China cooperation had zero

global effect
Jennifer S. Oh 12, Assistant Professor, International Studies, Ewha Womens
University, PhD, Politics, Princeton University, Business Interests and USChina
Relations on Climate Change, Pacific Focus, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (April 2012), 3661
An agreement between the USA and China was crucial for the successful conclusion of the Copenhagen summit.
The developed countries position on emission reduction targets was contingent on the US acceptance of emission
targets. The US decision, in turn was contingent on securing international monitoring over Chinas emission reports.
Moreover, as the de facto leader of the G-77 developing countries, Chinas position had a critical impact on the

The outcome of the Copenhagen summit largely depended

on successful negotiations between the USA and China at the exclusion of most of
its 190-plus members.
position of developing countries.

Yet, negotiations between the USA and China proved to be quite difficult and quickly turned
acrimonious.15 PremierWens refusal to attend high-level meetings with President Obama and other major
world leaders demonstrates the tense relationship between the USA and China. Instead of attending the impromptu

Wen held a
separate meeting with Indian, Brazilian, and South African leaders . President Obama and
meetings of 20 or so world leaders conducted by President Obama and US officials, Premier

Secretary of State Clinton had to walk uninvited into this secret meeting to engage directly with Premier Wen. And
much to the resentment of developing countries, it was in this unplanned meeting that the central terms of the
Copenhagen Accord were agreed upon.16
The final version of the Copenhagen Accord was essentially an international agreement to limit GHG emissions
without any binding commitments or obligations to reduce GHG emissions to a specified target by a set date. One
major achievement lay in the fact that Brazil, China, India and South Africa the four biggest GHG emitters among
the developing countries agreed to set up voluntary targets for GHG emissions. These countries agreed to some
measure of international verification of the voluntary targets, although no concrete measures were agreed upon.17
The Copenhagen Accord also provided provisions for financial support to developing countries that were threatened

the lack of binding agreements, concrete verification procedures,

and enforcement authority raise doubts as to whether the Copenhagen Accord can
substantially lead to changes in the worlds climate policies and practices . The problem
by climate change. Yet,

of enforcement and compliance continue to plague the effectiveness of the UNFCCC.

Improved bilateral relations between the USA and China on climate change
obviously did not carry over to the Copenhagen summit. Even prior to the Copenhagen
summit, US Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern remarked that bilateral engagements between
the USA and China did not achieve any breakthroughs over core issues that
were to be discussed at Copenhagen negotiations.18 The USAs and Chinas agendas and
strategies on climate change and clean energy clearly shifted once the focus moved
beyond technology sharing and development to the setting of emission targets, monitoring of domestic
compliance and funding commitments. It is important to note that none of these three issues was seriously
addressed during the numerous bilateral engagements between the USAand China. A large factor behind changed

new issues that directly

challenged the political interests of both governments.
USChina relations at the Copenhagen summit lies in the introduction of

No spill-up---business interests prevent bilateral cooperation

from carrying over
Jennifer S. Oh 12, Assistant Professor, International Studies, Ewha Womens
University, PhD, Politics, Princeton University, Business Interests and USChina
Relations on Climate Change, Pacific Focus, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (April 2012), 3661
How do you
explain the contrast between active USChina collaboration on climate change at
the bilateral level and hostile USChina relations during multilateral climate
negotiations? This article argues that domestic politics, in particular business interests, largely
explain the variation in USChina relations at the bilateral and multilateral levels . Due
to the fragmented and decentralized structure of the climate policy community in both countries, business
interests wield a disproportionately large influence over US and Chinese climate
politics. Bilateral cooperative efforts on climate change mitigate business opposition by targeting government
The main objective of this article is to assess the nature of USChina relations on climate change.

funding, support and policies to create incentives for private sectors in the USA and China to participate in clean
energy and climate projects. In contrast,

targeted benefits to private sectors are much more

difficult in multilateral forums, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), where the aim is to provide broader communal benefits in the form of a cleaner environment. The
USA and China face greater possibilities of strong domestic business opposition in
multilateral forms, undermining cooperative efforts on climate change. One
caveat to this argument is that business interests in the USA and China are quite distinct given the strong degree of
overlap between government (both central and local) and business interests in China.
An area that receives less attention in this article is the broader political calculations and rivalry between China and
the USA. While this is an obviously important aspect of ChinaUS relations, the paper strictly looks at domestic
political interests for the following reasons. The research question specifically seeks to understand the active

bilateral collaboration between China and the USA in climate change projects . Such
collaboration has emerged despite political rivalry between the two countries . Similar
reasoning applies to China and the USAs standoff at multilateral climate negotiations. Regardless of
state-level calculations, strong domestic opposition prevents China and the USA
from embracing ambitious climate agreements in the UNFCCC meetings. However, political
calculations are not completely ignored. Later discussions of recent trade disputes between the USA and China over
clean energy industries are reflective of the precarious relationship between the two countries.

Impact

Turns Global Governance

It turns the affs global governance impact---global
multilateralism is comparatively more effective at creating
cooperation across political diversity than bilateral deals
Lars Engberg-Pedersen 11, Senior Researcher, Global Transformations,
Danish Institute for International Studies, Climate change negotiations and their
implications for international development cooperation, March 2011,
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/Partners/ResearchOrg/Research-studies/Climate%20change%20negotiations%20and%20their
%20implications%20for%20international%20development%20cooperation
%202011.pdf
Climate change negotiations hold the potential of substantially changing the
relations between developed and developing countries . If a breakthrough occurs
with the adoption of a global deal on climate change and the emergence of a global governance
with developing countries having a say, international development cooperation is likely to
change thoroughly. One may expect that it is either changed to accommodate the more equal
relationship between developed and developing countries in climate change or dismantled because neither

This is all the

more likely if the global deal includes internationally mobilised resources (e.g.,
through taxes, levies or auctioning of emission allowances) for adaptation and mitigation in
developing countries. In that case, the financing of development cooperation may also change.
developing countries, nor tax payers in developed countries wish to pursue the cooperation.

Currently, the likelihood of a global deal on climate change appears small. An incremental process of separate

If such a process is characterised by sector-based

agreements, initiatives outside the UNFCCC framework, bilateral funds, and an
increasing role of multilateral banks, the implications for development cooperation may be
much less dramatic. However, a global deal cannot be ruled out if a climate change induced
agreements seems more probable.

natural disaster should hit countries that are major actors in the negotiations. Historically, significant institutional
change has taken place during or immediately after major crises, and climate change has precisely the ability to
produce such crises.

Geoengineering CP

1NC

1NC Counterplan
The United States federal government should propose and
advocate a geoengineering protocol under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, prioritizing
research into and deployment of an injection of 250,000 metric
tons of sulfur dioxide particles into the stratosphere per year.
Sulfate aerosol geoengineering solves warming
David Rotman 13, editor of MIT Technology Review, A Cheap and Easy Plan to
Stop Global Warming, 2/8/13,
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/511016/a-cheap-and-easy-plan-tostop-global-warming/
[SRM = Solar Radiation Management]
Customize several Gulfstream business jets with military engines and with
equipment to produce and disperse fine droplets of sulfuric acid . Fly the jets up around 20
Here is the plan.

kilometerssignificantly higher than the cruising altitude for a commercial jetliner but still well within their range. At that altitude in
the tropics, the aircraft are in the lower stratosphere. The planes spray the sulfuric acid, carefully controlling the rate of its release.

The sulfur combines with water vapor to form sulfate aerosols , fine particles less than a
micrometer in diameter. These get swept upward by natural wind patterns and are dispersed
over the globe, including the poles. Once spread across the stratosphere, the aerosols will reflect
about 1 percent of the sunlight hitting Earth back into space. Increasing what scientists call
the planets albedo, or reflective power, will partially offset the warming effects caused
by rising levels of greenhouse gases. The author of this so-called geoengineering scheme, David Keith,
doesnt want to implement it anytime soon, if ever. Much more research is needed to determine whether injecting sulfur into the
stratosphere would have dangerous consequences such as disrupting precipitation patterns or further eating away the ozone layer
that protects us from damaging ultraviolet radiation. Even thornier, in some ways, are the ethical and governance issues that
surround geoengineeringquestions about who should be allowed to do what and when. Still, Keith, a professor of applied physics at

it could be a cheap
and easy way to head off some of the worst effects of climate change. According to Keiths
Harvard University and a leading expert on energy technology, has done enough analysis to suspect

calculations, if operations were begun in 2020, it would take 25,000 metric tons of sulfuric acid to cut global warming in half after

Once under way, the injection of sulfuric acid would proceed continuously . By
2040, 11 or so jets delivering roughly 250,000 metric tons of it each year, at an annual
cost of $700 million, would be required to compensate for the increased warming
caused by rising levels of carbon dioxide . By 2070, he estimates, the program would need to be injecting a
one year.

bit more than a million tons per year using a fleet of a hundred aircraft. One of the startling things about Keiths proposal is just

A few grams of it in the stratosphere will offset the warming

caused by a ton of carbon dioxide, according to his estimate. And even the amount that would be needed by
how little sulfur would be required.

2070 is dwarfed by the roughly 50 million metric tons of sulfur emitted by the burning of fossil fuels every year. Most of that
pollution stays in the lower atmosphere, and the sulfur molecules are washed out in a matter of days. In contrast, sulfate particles
remain in the stratosphere for a few years, making them more effective at reflecting sunlight.

The idea of using

sulfate aerosols to offset climate warming is not new . Crude versions of the concept have been around
at least since a Russian climate scientist named Mikhail Budkyo proposed the idea in the mid-1970s, and more refined descriptions
of how it might work have been discussed for decades. These days the idea of using sulfur particles to counteract warmingoften
known as solar radiation management, or SRMis the subject of hundreds of papers in academic journals by scientists who use

Keith, who has published on geoengineering

since the early 1990s, has emerged as a leading figure in the field because of his aggressive
public advocacy for more research on the technologyand his willingness to talk unflinchingly about how it might work. Add to
that his impeccable academic credentials last year Harvard lured him away from the University of Calgary
with a joint appointment in the school of engineering and the Kennedy School of Government and Keith is one of the
computer models to try to predict its consequences. But

worlds most influential voices on solar geoengineering . He is one of the few who
have done detailed engineering studies and logistical calculations on just
how SRM might be carried out. And if he and his collaborator James Anderson, a prominent atmospheric chemist at
Harvard, gain public funding, they plan to conduct some of the first field experiments to assess the risks of the technique. Leaning
forward from the edge of his chair in a small, sparse Harvard office on an unusually warm day this winter, he explains his urgency.
Whether or not greenhouse-gas emissions are cut sharplyand there is little evidence that such reductions are comingthere is a
realistic chance that [solar geoengineering] technologies could actually reduce climate risk significantly, and we would be negligent
if we didnt look at that, he says. Im not saying it will work, and Im not saying we should do it. But it would be reckless not to
begin serious research on it, he adds. The sooner we find out whether it works or not, the better. The overriding reason why

the
warming caused by atmospheric carbon dioxide buildup is for all practical purposes
irreversible, because the climate change is directly related to the total cumulative emissions. Even if we halt
carbon dioxide emissions entirely, the elevated concentrations of the gas in the
atmosphere will persist for decades. And according to recent studies, the warming itself will
continue largely unabated for at least 1,000 years . If we find in, say, 2030 or 2040 that climate change
Keith and other scientists are exploring solar geoengineering is simple and well documented, though often overlooked:

has become intolerable, cutting emissions alone wont solve the problem. Thats the key insight, says Keith. While he strongly

he says that if the climate dice roll against us, that wont be
only thing that we think might actually help [reverse the warming] in our
lifetime is in fact geoengineering.
supports cutting carbon dioxide emissions as rapidly as possible,
enough: The

The counterplan also creates a multilateral process for

geoengineering, which is key to effective and safe use of
sulfate aerosol technology
Michael C. Branson 14, J.D. Candidate, May 2014 Santa Clara University School
of Law, A Green Herring: How Current Ocean Fertilization Regulation Distracts from
Geoengineering Research, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 163 (2014),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2771&context=lawreview
For geoengineering techniques to be considered as a viable option, substantially more
scientific knowledge is needed to determine whether they work .219 Based on current
research, it is impossible to determine whether the implementation of geoengineering techniques outweigh their
risks. Unfortunately, the tone set by Parties to the CBD and the LC/LP discourages all ocean fertilization projects,
including those with scientific value. While both the CBD and LC/LP recognize the need for increased scientific
knowledge on geoengineering techniques, the instruments have no intention to promote the growth of this
knowledge. By placing harsh requirements on those who follow the legal framework without providing any

Private actors like Russ George

seize upon this lack of scientific progress as justification for its radical
action: if the international scientific community refuses to take ocean fertilization seriously, the future of the
planet requires financially capable actors to intervene and conduct research themselves. If legitimate
research teams conduct fewer legitimate scientific experiments, unilateral
experiments could become the only means to collect data . Even projects which opponents
incentives, the Assessment Framework discourages scientific progress.

claim are entirely focused on profit attempt to collect scientific data to legitimize their practice. Unfortunately, for-

Creating an
international framework that supports scientific research would help eliminate
uncertainty and allow for better risk assessment. Providing a structure for
increasing scientific knowledge on ocean fertilization experiments, and all geoengineering
methods, would eliminate the justification for unilateral actors to push forward with
their geoengineering agenda. Increased understanding of geoengineering options
would further decrease the risk of countries independently implementing
geoengineering projects that have been scientifically proven to be ineffective . Not
profit experiments are likely to be ill-equipped compared to scientific experiments.

projects that pursue scientific understanding

and weigh the environmental impacts should be rewarded under a geoengineering
protocol. The protocol should not automatically ban commercial experiments if those experiments pursue these
same goals in a responsible manner. Including commercial experiments within the protocol will
allow these experiments to contribute to the climate change community, rather than
force them to fight against international currents. Funds should be dedicated to furthering
research rather than castigating experiments and then arguing not enough is known to consider geoengineering.
only should barriers to scientific research be reduced,

This funding should be in addition to, rather than a reduction from, current scientific grants on climate change

The best means

to remove this uncertainty is to pursue scientific experiments vigorously today .
Conclusive results from these experiments can take several years, so it is imperative the international
community act now before the climate change reversal becomes dependent on these technologies. The
UNFCCC is the proper instrument to provide funding and a forum for scientific
geoengineering experiments because it already collaborates with a highly respected
research. Uncertainty about geoengineering and ocean fertilization remains a real concern.

scientific body and because more nations are party to the convention. The UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the scientific body

the IPCC does not conduct any experiments,228 it is
the best-equipped scientific body to determine the efficacy of geoengineering
experiments. Working Group I of the IPCC recently released a report that included a paragraph about the lack
of knowledge sufficient to make conclusions about whether geoengineering methods would be effective. A
geoengineering protocol under the UNFCCC could create a controlled system for
necessary scientific research, and could direct the funds to the most effective
experiments based on the recommendations of the IPCC .
already works in collaboration with

that seeks to better understand climate change.227 While

2NC Solvency

2NC Overview
The counterplan immediately solves warming---injecting
sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere scatters sunlight and
reduces the amount of radiation reaching the Earths
atmosphere, which reduces the greenhouse effect and offsets
the effect of CO2---thats 1NC Rotman
The counterplan also develops a multilateral governance
structure for geoengineering---advocating a protocol under the
United Nations allows global debate over geoengineering and
responsible use of sulfate aerosol technologies---that allows
more effective, long-term climate management---thats
Branson
Solvency is not a yes/no question, but rather a sliding scale--the counterplan doesnt need to perfectly offset CO2s effect
on the climate, but it certainly does reduce some of the worst
effects of warming and buy time for management and
adaptation

2NC Sulfate Aerosol Solvency

The counterplan literally stops global warming, but developing
governance mechanisms is key
David Keith 13, Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics for the Paulson School
of Engineering and Applied Sciences and Professor of Public Policy for the Harvard
Kennedy School at Harvard University, A Case for Climate Engineering, 2013, Adobe
Digital Editions, pp. 7-8
It is possible to cool the planet by injecting reflective particles of sulfuric acid
into the upper atmosphere where they would scatter a tiny fraction of incoming sunlight
back to space, creating a thin sunshade for the ground beneath. To say that its possible understates the
case: it is cheap and technically easy. The specialized aircraft and dispersal systems required to
get started could be deployed in a few years for the price of a Hollywood blockbuster.
I dont advocate such a quick-and-dirty start to climate engineering, nor do I expect any such sudden action, but

the underlying science is sound and the technological developments are real. This
single technology could increase the productivity of ecosystems across the planet
and stop global warming; it could increase crop yields, particularly those in the hottest
and poorest parts of the world. It is hyperbolic but not inaccurate to call it a cheap tool that could
green the world.
Solar geoengineering is a set of emerging technologies to manipulate the climate. These technologies could
partially counteract climate change caused by the gradual accumulation of carbon dioxide. Deliberately adding one
pollutant to temporarily counter another is a brutally ugly technical fix, yet that is the essence of the suggestion
that sulfur be injected into the stratosphere to limit the damage caused by the carbon weve pumped into the air.

Solar geoengineering is an extraordinarily powerful tool. But it is also dangerous. It entails

novel environmental risks. And, like climate change itself, its effects are unequal, so even if it makes many farmers
better off, others will be worse off. It is so cheap that almost any nation could afford to alter the earths climate, a
fact that may accelerate the shifting balance of global power, raising security concerns that could, in the worst
case, lead to war. If misused, geoengineering could drive extraordinarily rapid climate change, imperiling global

stable control of geoengineering may require new forms of

global governance and may prove as disruptive to the political order of the 21st century as nuclear
food supply. In the long run,
weapons were for the 20th.

2NC Multilateralism Solvency

Massive momentum for a geoengineering agreement now---the
counterplan capitalizes on this
Aaron Strong 11, Assistant Professor holding joint appointments with Urban and
Regional Planning and with the Environmental Policy Program at the Public Policy
Center, Toward an International Geoengineering Agreement: The Promises (and
Pitfalls) of Negotiating a Convention on Global Climate Interventions, 2011, Papers
on International Environmental Negotiation, Volume 18: The Next Generation of
Environmental Agreements, http://pon.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/images/posts/Toward_an_International_Geoengineering_Agreement
_vol18_2011.pdf
The Nagoya Decision has squarely framed the issue of geoengineering and put it in the spotlight. It has
highlighted the necessity for a more fully developed operational definition of
geoengineering, and has confirmed a multi-convention trend toward a model
that allows for a continuation of scientific research that has gone through a process
of environmental assessment, while prohibiting any large-scale implementation of geoengineering
actions. In the meantime, there has been increased discussion of the issue of
geoengineering governance within civil society as well as on the subject of further
geoengineering research. In March 2010, scientific and academic experts on the subject convened for the
Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies. The report from this conference was
released in November 2010; it provides five principles for further research into climate intervention technologies: 1.
Climate engineering research should be aimed at promoting the collective benefit of humankind and the
environment. 2. Governments must clarify responsibilities for, arid, when necessary, create new mechanisms for
the governance and oversight of large-scale climate engineering research activities. 3. Climate-engineering
research should he conducted openly and cooperatively, preferably within a framework that has broad international
support. 4. Iterative, independent technical assessments of research progress will be required to inform the public
and policymakers. 5. Public participation and consultation in research planning and oversight, assessments, and
development of decision-making mechanisms and processes must be provided. (Asilomar Report, 2010) Also in

an international conference was held in Missoula, MT, to discuss the ethics of

solar radiation management, highlighting the fact that the discussion has left the confines
of science and policy discussion, and entered a new phase of broader societal
debate. This new phase is reflected in the increased attention to the governance gap
in the literature on the subject . Calls for a global governance regime on
geoengineering have now been coming from scientists (Asilomar), from
environmental advocacy groups (ETC Group report, personal communication), and
numerous academic observers. The Convention on Biological Diversity has opened the door to a
2010,

treatment of all forms of geoengineering, but has not settled the issue, either in terms of definition, or in terms of

both the need and the opportunity

are present for a concerted international effort to define a global governance
regime for geoengineering in order to fill this gap. This paper seeks to fill the
governance gap by proposing a potential Convention on Global Climate
Interventions (CGCJ), which would build upon the recent science, analysis, decisions, and interlocution on the
subject. The time for such a convention is ripe . The Convention on Global Climate Interventions The
ultimate governance structure. Under these circumstances,

following is a proposal for a new convention on geoengineering. Because issues related to geoengineering proposals
fall under the remit of many current multilateral agreements, this proposal is advanced without prejudice to the

through the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change as a Protocol (because of the relatedness
question of the forum in which it might be negotiated. For example, this could be done

of the objective ci this convention) or between United Nations member states in the context of a conference

The proposed
convention is an attempt to elaborate both on the current state of the discussion of
geoengineering governance and the current state of geoengineering governance
within the UN system. As such, the convention includes elements inspired by the CBD moratorium, the
specifically convened for this purpose (which is the form in which it is presented here.)

London Conventions procedures for an environmental impact assessment framework for small-scale scientific
research proposals, elements of the UNFCCC, and principles for public participation, principles for governance, and
coordinated approval procedures that have been put forward in the recent literature on the subject (For example.
Lim, 2009, who proposes a new set of serial decisions under the UNFCCC). The convention takes as a fundamental

Regardless of
ones position vis--vis geoengineering implementation, there is nearly universal
recognition that some form of elaboration of governance is required, and the intent here
given the need for further elaboration of a global governance regime for geoengineering.

is to frame what taking the next step forward in geoengineering governance might look like.

US leadership is key
William R. Moomaw 13, Professor of International Environmental Policy at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, founding Director of the
Center for International Environment and Resource Policy, the Tufts Climate
Initiative and co-founder of the Global Development and Environment Institute,
Can the International Treaty System Address Climate Change? The Fletcher Forum
of World Affairs 37:1, Winter 2013, http://www.fletcherforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Moomaw_37-1.pdf
The United States played a central role in negotiating both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol, but it has been unwilling to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and take on its binding commitments. While the
United States was supportive during the negotiations for the framework treaty which had
no binding commitments and gained unanimous support for ratification in 1992 its attitude changed
dramatically during negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, under which the United States would
have been required to implement modest emissions reductions. During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the United
States insisted on a market-based mechanism for emissions trading among developed countries (Annex B in the
Protocol). This allowed countries that could easily reduce their emissions to sell their surplus reductions to
countries that had more difficulty meeting their targets, which American negotiators argued would create a more

The United States argued and won the debate to

change Brazils proposed Clean Development Fund to assist developing countries in
reducing emissions into a Clean Development Mechanism. Instead of being funded through
cost-effective system for meeting overall goals.

penalties assessed when countries failed to meet targets, the Clean Development Mechanism requires developed
countries to pay for projects in developing countries in order to receive credit. The United States supported joint
implementation, whereby developed countries could work together to reduce emissions. The European Union
applies this principle in its emissions bubble, which allows poorer European countries to increase their emissions
as long as EU-wide emissions decrease by the prescribed eight percent below 1990 levels during the first
commitment period from 2008 to 2012. Despite these compromises, the United States still was not able to raise
political support for the Kyoto Protocol at home. In July 1997, following a year of intense lobbying by U.S. auto and
fossil fuel companies through the Global Climate Coalition, the U.S. States Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel
resolution, which stipulated that the United States could not ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless China and India had the
same reduction obligations within the same time period. !is resolution passed 95-0. In doing so, it flew in the face of
the UNFCCCs treaty obligations that called for common but differentiated responsibilities among nations with the
greatest financial capacity to respond to climate change. For developed countries such as the United States, these
responsibilities meant leading the way in reducing emissions. Yet, until 2006, the United States was the worlds
largest emitter of heat-trapping gases and it remains the largest historical cumulative emitter. China is now the
largest annual emitter, but its per capita emissions remain only about one-half those of the United States. For a
short time, U.S. political commitment looked promising. The Clinton administration was determined to act on
climate change; as negotiations on the Protocol lagged, Vice President Al Gore flew to Kyoto and agreed that the
United States supported the original intent of the treaty. Then, President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol, but
the treaty never made it through the Senate ratification process. Moreover, in 2000, George W. Bush campaigned
for president favoring action on climate change. Yet, after he defeated Al Gore, President Bush unsigned the Kyoto
Protocol claiming to undo President Clintons commitmenta somewhat dubious process in international law. The

one aspect of the UNFCCC that has been followed without exception is the annual Conference of the Parties

Although the
United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, it still manages to affect its
implementation by other nations. For example, at the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP 13) in
hosted by a different country each year and named for the city in which the meeting is held.

Bali in 2007, the United States hindered formation of a post-Kyoto regime by refusing to accept the emerging

As a major
international power and large emitter of carbon dioxide, it is difficult for the
international community to ignore the United States, even when it has no official role in the Kyoto
process. However, a dramatic intervention by the ambassador from Papua New Guinea shamed the
consensus to retain the common but differentiated responsibility language of the original Protocol.

American representatives into agreeing not to impede the consensus and allowed the process to move forward. He

called for U.S. leadership, but stated that if it was not forthcoming to get out of the way.

Answers

AT: Geoengineering Fails

It can be ramped up slowly and doesnt cause catastrophic
impacts
David Rotman 13, editor of MIT Technology Review, A Cheap and Easy Plan to
Stop Global Warming, 2/8/13,
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/511016/a-cheap-and-easy-plan-tostop-global-warming/
[SRM = Solar Radiation Management]
For very brief spells, Keith sometimes lapses into animated annoyance with SRM critics. A moment later, however, he is calmly and
logically countering the criticism with responses he has developed after years of thinking and writing about geoengineering. He

sulfur injection could be rationally ended a century or less

after its begun; while the underlying climate changes it was masking would return, the rate of change
affecting ecosystems and humans would have been slowed and managed. The idea
that initiating SRM would commit us to continuing it indefinitely is just not true , he
sketches a graph showing that, in fact,

states with characteristic self-confidence. Even many of the strongest advocates of SRM research say the technology would be a
nearly unthinkable last resort for a desperate world facing climate changes so destructive that the risks would be worth taking.
Keith, however, has a far less apocalyptic vision. If weve actually found something that could substantially reduce the risk of

thats nothing to be upset about, he says.

something to celebrate. In fact, he says framing the case for geoengineering as a last
resort in a climate emergency is a bit of a rhetorical trick : it leaves undefined what a climate
climate change over the next century and save a lot of lives,
Its

emergency is, and there is no simple definition. The approach Keith proposes is at once more deliberate and far more radical:
In my view, we should begin real research now, and if it bears out that [SRM] could meaningfully reduce climate risks without too
many risks of its ownwhich may or may not turn out to be truethen we should actually begin doing this relatively soon, but with

the technology could be ready to be deployed as early as 2020 (or, more

and would involve levels of stratospheric sulfur practically within
normal ranges for the first decade. The process could be monitored and evaluated, and because the amounts of
sulfur injected into the stratosphere would be relatively small, the chances of a big problem are pretty
close to zero. It is often assumed that SRM would be turned on with a big switch ,
says Keith. But theres no reason you cant ramp it up. And that ability to turn on the
system slowly and with minimal risk is behind his willingness to take
geoengineering seriously, he says: If it was a one-time decision, I would be much more skeptical about doing it. It
a very slow ramp. He believes
realistically, 2030)

would be very hard to persuade me that it was sensible. Given the possibility of a more deliberate approach, I lean pretty strongly,
I got to say, to doing it.

AT: Technically Impossible

The technology exists and management is feasible
David Keith 13, Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics for the Paulson School
of Engineering and Applied Sciences and Professor of Public Policy for the Harvard
Kennedy School at Harvard University, A Case for Climate Engineering, 2013, Adobe
Digital Editions, pp. 14-15
Suppose the goal was to cut the rate of global warming in
half starting in 2020 by putting sulfuric acid into the stratosphere . If combined with serious
efforts to cut emissions, this isin my opiniona plausible scenario for managing the human
and ecological risks of climate change in a world without politics. It is doable in the narrow technocratic
sense that a well-managed program could likely be ready to start by 2020 if given a
How might geoengineering work?

provisional go-ahead today and a total budget of roughly a billion dollars.

This scenario is a tool with which we may explore the possible. It is not a prediction or plan. There are a handful of
plausible geoengineering technologies and a host of ways they might be used including some that are immensely
destructive. As a newly emerging and divisive idea, geoengineering will add to the confusion of climate politics.
Though I hope to persuade you that its a good idea in the sense that it might be approved and swiftly implemented
in some ideal global democracy, the chance of starting this scenario by 2020 seems slight. We lack the social tools
to make sound collective decisions about planetary management. I will explore the politics that may shape realworld outcomes later in this book.

the sulfuric acid needs to be in tiny watery droplets about a thousand times
it needs to be put into the stratosphere about 20
kilometers above the earths surface. Once there, the droplets will scatter sunlight back
into space reducing the amount of sunlight reaching the ground. This slight shading effect tends to cool the
To be effective,

smaller than the width of a human hair and

planet, partially offsetting the warming effect of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. Water droplets would do
a fine job scattering sunlightany cloud does thisbut they just dont live long enough in the dry air of the
stratosphere. The reason for using sulfuric acid is simply to keep the droplets from evaporating. Once formed the
acid droplets remain in the stratosphere for about a year before falling into the lower atmosphere, so they must be
continuously replenished.
As carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphereand accumulate they will until
humanity cut its emissions to nearly zerothe amount of sulfur needed to offset their warming grows year by year.
After the first year of operation, the project would need to inject about 25 thousand tons per year of sulfur in order
to offset half of that years growth in warming due to that years accumulation of greenhouse gases. The next year
one would need to use 50 thousand tons to provide enough cooling to offset the half the warming from two years

In 2030, after a decade of operation the

injection rate would need to be 250 thousand tons per year .4
growth in the atmospheres stock of greenhouse gases.

It is not technically difficult to get sulfates into the stratosphere.

The hardware to do

the
required aircraft and dispersal technology could be engineered and built within
a few years by many aerospace companies or governments . The technical
challenge is not the sulfur dispersal hardware but rather the development of the science and observing
tools to monitor the effectiveness and side-effects of a sulfate geoengineering program, but
here too there are many tools that could be applied quickly.
this does not exist today, but it is nevertheless fair to say that the capability exists today in the sense that

Injection of sulfates might be accomplished using Gulfstream business jets retrofitted

with off-the-shelf low-bypass jet engines to allow them to fly at altitudes over sixty thousand feed along with the

Only one or two aircraft would be

needed to start the program, and after a decade it would take about ten aircraft to lift the required 250
hardware required to generate and disperse the sulfuric acid.

thousand tons each year at an annual cost of about 700 million dollars. It would then make sense to convert to

purpose-built aircraft with longer wings better suited to high-altitude flight; this change would cut costs roughly in
half and might allow global distribution of sulfate from two airfields.5
In 2070, after a half century of operation, the program would need to be injecting a bit more than a million tons per
year using a fleet of a hundred aircraft, though by that time it might make sense to have switched from sulfuric acid
to an engineered particle with fewer environmental impacts. Sulfates in the stratosphere are certainly not the best

there would be ample time to

develop alternatives before the problems with sulfates are likely to become too
severe.
possible technology, but under the slow ramp scenario describe here

You may find this scenario intriguing or crazy, but

its hard to argue that its technically

infeasible. The necessary hardware could be ready by 2020 and even after a half century the direct cost of the
program would be less than one percent of what we now spend on clean energy development.

AT: Moral Hazard

Moral hazard requires them to win other solvency arguments--if its true that the counterplan does reduce warming, then
theres no impact to people avoiding emissions reductions
David Keith 13, Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics for the Paulson School
of Engineering and Applied Sciences and Professor of Public Policy for the Harvard
Kennedy School at Harvard University, A Case for Climate Engineering, 2013, Adobe
Digital Editions, p. 60
The expectation that people will adjust their behavior does not provide an
argument against introducing risk reducing technologies; it simply means that risk will be reduced
less than one would predict using a calculation that ignored the behavioral change. It would be perverse
in the extreme to argue that risk compensation justifies withholding condoms or
seatbelts. Similarly for geoengineering: all else equal, I expect a world where geoengineering is tested and
available will be one that spends less on reducing emissions than a world where geoengineering was known to be
impossible. Frank discussion of risk compensation is rare. I have served on several high-profile committees that
aimed to articulate formal consensus views about geoengineering. Each worked hard to reassure its audience that
research on geoengineering should not in any way divert attention from cutting emissions. The Bipartisan Policy
Centers report said This task force strongly believes that climate remediation technologies are no substitute for
controlling risk through climate mitigation; and, Message number one of the Solar Radiation Management
Governance Initiative was that Nothing now known about SRM provides justification for reducing efforts to mitigate
climate change through reduced GHG emissions, or efforts to adapt to its effects.48 I view these statements as (at
best) confused. Why? They are no doubt motivated by a well-intentioned conviction that humanity is doing far too

the fact that we

ought to be cutting emissions so that we pass on less carbon-climate risk to our
grandkids does not justify assertions that it would be wrong for humanity to alter its
behavior if geoengineering does provide a meaningful reduction in climate risk. The
little to cut emissions in the face of the climate threat, a conviction I share unequivocally. But

objective at the very root of mainstream climate policy is to improve human welfare by balancing the costs of
reducing emissions against the damages from climate change. While I am personally unpersuaded by this utilitarian
framing, it is a centerpiece of climate policy analysis. If you accept the utilitarian view, then you are committed to

if climate risk is reduced then policy should reflect that change

by slowing emissions cuts. The math is simple and unavoidable: less risk means less
resources expended to insure against the risk. This is just as true were god to
speak from the clouds (from where else would she speak on this topic?) announcing that she
has reduced the climates sensitivity to carbon dioxide, as it is if mere mortals were to achieve
accept the consequence that

an imperfect and partial version of the same effect by injecting aerosols in the stratosphere.

AT: UNFCCC Fails at Geoengineering

FCCC adaptive governance solves gridlock and develops norms
Albert C. Lin 9, Professor of Law at the UC Davis School of Law, Balancing the
Risks: Managing Technology and Dangerous Climate Change, Issues in Legal
Scholarship 8(3), 2009
What does all of this mean in terms of agreements and institutions for geoengineering governance? First, notwithstanding the

geoengineering should be addressed within

the structure of the existing FCCC.101 The FCCC identifies as one of its principles that parties should
FCCCs general orientation towards emission reductions,

protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind,102 a premise that encompasses

the FCCC has already established a forum the Conference of the

and has at its disposal technical bodies, such as the IPCC and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice, that can facilitate research, peer review, discussion, and
development of consensus in this area.103 Given the potential substitutability of geoengineering projects
geoengineering governance. Moreover,
Parties

for emissions reductions, it makes no sense to develop an entirely separate international regime to address geoengineering.

it is critical that geoengineering be addressed explicitly by the Conference of

the Parties, and that it be addressed soon. Failing to address geoengineering research needs as well as potential
Second,

geoengineering deployment heightens the risk that events will unfold in ways that are less than desirable. One possibility is that
there will be underinvestment in the public good of geoengineering research. Such research is critical to determining whether
geoengineering can provide a viable option emergency or otherwise for combating climate change without endangering human
health, the environment, or global security.105 Even if the international community ultimately decides to ban geoengineering
completely or to bar the use of geoengineering projects as a source of carbon offsets, research likely would prove valuable in
facilitating detection and monitoring of covert geoengineering projects.106 Another possibility, at the other extreme, is that

inattention to geoengineering will allow unilateral geoengineering schemes to

proceed without international oversight or consideration of global ramifications .107 In
addition to countering these risks, addressing governance issues while geoengineering is in its infant stages minimizes the influence
that an established industry or other constituency with vested interests in geoengineering might have on governance structures and
decisions. Third, the Conference of the Parties should confront the risk that geoengineering or similar climate modification
techniques could be used as weapons. Here, the Conference can look to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), which bans environmental modification for military or hostile
purposes.109 Unlike the FCCC, ENMOD does not command universal assent. Although most of the worlds major powers have
ratified the treaty, only 73 countries are parties to it.110 More importantly, ENMOD is limited in scope: on its face, it prohibits only
the intentional use of environmental modification techniques by one party against another.111 It apparently does not govern attacks
by a party state on a non-party state, it does not authorize affirmative steps to block use of environmental modification techniques
by non-states, and it lacks provisions for penalizing parties that violate its terms. Notwithstanding these flaws, the provisions of
ENMOD offer a sound starting point for geoengineering governance. The prospects for achieving consensus on a ban on the use of
geoengineering for military or hostile purposes are probably more favorable than on other aspects of geoengineering. Efforts in this
area should of course address the weaknesses of ENMOD, particularly with respect to verification and enforcement mechanisms, as
well as the potential use of geoengineering techniques by rogue states or rogue actors. Although it is unclear at this time whether
such techniques could be targeted effectively against other countries, securing a ban on the hostile use of geoengineering

parties will have to think

creatively to develop mechanisms for making collective decisions on
geoengineering and for managing the risk of unilateral geoengineering . That is, even if
ultimately may require mutual promises to defend other parties against such use. Fourth,

agreement can be reached to ban geoengineering as a weapon, the risk remains that one country or a small group of countries
might be desperate enough to undertake a geoengineering project unilaterally, disregarding the potential harmful impacts on
others. Consensusbased decision making, the predominant model for cooperative international action on environmental matters, is
not well-suited for responding promptly to such a scenario. Nor is consensus formation likely for climate change issues more
generally, given the disparity of interests among states, the high costs of responding to climate change, and the need for rapid
adjustments as scientific knowledge changes.114 An obvious alternative to a consensus model of decisionmaking would be to
adopt nonconsensus processes such as rules providing for passage of measures by a supermajority.115 Nonconsensus
arrangements, however, are rarely found in international environmental law because countries are often reluctant to yield
autonomous control over economic activity and resource use.116 Objections to nonconsensus decisionmaking are also rooted in
legitimacy concerns: in contrast to treaty commitments, whose legitimacy rests on explicit consent, obligations adopted through
nonconsensus processes must be justified by some other theory. There are nevertheless several examples of treaties that provide
for the adoption of amendments binding on all parties to those treaties via nonconsensus processes. The legitimacy of these
amendments rests on a theory of general consent i.e., that signatories have consented to an ongoing system of governance.118
Countries have tended to be more open to these nonconsensus arrangements where technical matters are at issue or where the
range of possible amendments is limited in nature.119 Although the FCCC does not presently authorize amendments to be adopted
in this manner,120 several international environmental agreements do provide for nonconsensus decisionmaking. How might the
parties to the FCCC incorporate within the architecture of the FCCC a nonconsensus process to deal with geoengineering? Of course,

the FCCC a framework convention contemplates the subsequent development of specific

protocols to address substantive details, such as those pertaining to

geoengineering.122 One possibility would be to develop a protocol that treats
geoengineering governance as a series of adaptive management decisions, rather
than as a single binary choice to be made once and for all.123 Geoengineering governance, in other words,
would involve adaptive governance, in which decisionmaking structures would be put in
place to foster adaptive management.124 Breaking up the geoengineering issue into
smaller incremental decisions may make nonconsensus processes more palatable
while facilitating adaptive decisionmaking. Ideally, an adaptive governance approach
would promote learning, conceive of policy choices as an integral part of the
learning process, and protect the resilience of the Earths climate system by seeking to
avoid decisions that foreclose future options. A critical initial question would involve the baseline from which geoengineering
governance decisions would be made. Given the widespread unease and uncertainty associated with geoengineering proposals, the
international community should begin with a default presumption against the implementation of any geoengineering project. Such a
presumption is also warranted by the difficulty of reversing course after a geoengineering project has already been operating for
many years: suddenly stopping a long-running aerosol release program, for instance, would almost surely cause a rapid warming
that both human and nonhuman populations would struggle to adjust to.126 Notwithstanding any presumption against
geoengineering deployment, an adaptive governance approach counsels in favor of revisiting that presumption at regular intervals.

Regularly revisiting the issue offers several advantages . First, this would allow the
parties to take account of updated information regarding climate change and its
impacts, the success (or lack thereof) of efforts to reduce emissions, and geoengineering risks and
refinements.127 Review of the issue must be sufficiently frequent to allow the parties to respond to climate surprises128
unexpectedly rapid or large climate changes that are not accounted for in most climate models, which tend to assume relatively

a schedule to periodically reconsider the

issue reduces the stakes involved in each vote, thereby ameliorating the tendency
for parties to assume entrenched positions that make agreement more difficult and increasing the likelihood
that parties will be willing to agree to a nonconsensus decisionmaking process.129 Third, repeated consideration of
geoengineering can foster a continuing international dialogue on the matter.
Such a dialogue essentially would serve as ongoing negotiations that can lead to
the building of coalitions or the formation of consensus on an issue .130 In addition,
consistent views or decisions with regard to the conditions under which geoengineering may be deployed can also
promote the formation of norms and even customary international law to govern the
smooth increases in GHG concentrations and temperature. Second,

conduct of nations and institutions with respect to geoengineering.131

International approaches solve---the FCCC is key

David A. Wirth 13, Professor of Law and Director of International Studies, Boston
College Law School, Engineering the Climate: Geoengineering as a Challenge to
International Governance, 40 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 413 (2013),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2106&context=ealr
climate engineering proposals can
be at least partially characterized according to well-established principles of
international law. Several multilateral treaties cover subject matter that could be interpreted to address either climate
management strategies or the effects of geoengineering interventions, leading to the inference that those agreements
might serve as vehicles for coordinated international efforts in this area . A number of
Although seemingly novel from the perspective of both intent and design,

modest efforts have already been under-taken to address iron fertilization proposals. A. Climate Engineering in the International
Legal System From a legal perspective, geoengineering proposals can be divided into a number of categories. First, the effects of
all climate engineering interventions can be expectedand, indeed, are intendedto be global in scope. Because the principal
greenhouse gases (GHGs) are well-mixed, meaning evenly distributed over the planet, emissions anywhere on Earth affect

interventions in the climate system, whether exacerbating the

affect all
states,63 the principal subjects of international law. The climate, moreover, can plausibly be
characterized from a legal point of view as a global commons , like the high seas or Antarctica,
everyone, everywhere. More particularly,

problem (as in the form of increased emissions of GHGs) or beneficial (as in the form of emissions reductions)

beyond the reach of national jurisdiction.64 From this perspective, no one state would have the authority to govern in the legal
space occupied by the climate. And, of course, no single state has the practical capacity to alter the climate in a manner that affects
only itself. Because emissions of GHGs originate from all over the planet, no one state has the ability unilaterally to determine the

climate policy
necessarily involves issues of commons management, at a magnitude and urgency rarely if ever
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, and hence the integrity of the global climate. Consequently,

before encountered.6 While all geoengineering interventions will necessarily have global effects, at least in theory one could divide
proposals into two categories: those that could be expected to have only beneficial effects, and those that might also have adverse
consequences. Proposals that fall into the latter category would benefit from policies that encourage or require investigation and
identification of harmful effects that may not be ini-tially apparent in advance of deploying those proposals.66 This might include
further laboratory investigations, or perhaps limited field trials. In practice, however, it may be difficult or impossible to anticipate
unintended negative consequences either qualitatively or quantitatively. The structure of the international legal system suggests a
second line of cleavage based on an attribute other than the effect of a particular intervention: whether a proposed action occurs
within national jurisdiction. International law includes in this category actions taken within a states territorial sea and those
undertaken aboard vessels flying a states flag outside that states area of exclusive jurisdiction.67 Based on the established
structure of the international legal system, this category of activities could be regulated only by the state within whose jurisdiction
the intervention takes place.68 For example, a carbon capture and storage initiative69 might be undertaken within a single states
territory, with the byproduct permanently stored in that states land mass or territorial sea. In such a situation, the activity
concerned would fall within the sovereign jurisdiction of the state in which the undertaking occurs, and would be subject to the
exercise of the police power and regulatory control only of that state, whose government by definition has a monopoly on the
exercise of governmental authority within its territory. That said, actions taking place within a national jurisdiction may also be
constrained by international legal obligations, such as a customary duty to refrain from transboundary pollution, expectations of
decision-making based on precaution,71 or obligations undertaken in bilateral or multilateral treaties addressing environmental
pollution.72 Additionally, it may be difficult to determine whether a particular actionsuch as one undertaken in the upper
atmospherefalls within the acting states national jurisdiction. But because geoengineering actions are certain to have global
effects whether or not they occur within a single states jurisdiction, one might consider all climate engineering proposals to be
governed by the corpus of international environmental law, a considerable portion of which addresses extraterritorial effects of
domestic actions. A second class of actions defined by territorial location is composed of interventions whose physical location lies
beyond national jurisdiction, such as on the high seas or in outer space. In contrast to an activity that takes place within a states
territory, many actions occurring in areas outside national jurisdiction lie beyond the reach of law, as by definition no state has the
legal authority to regulate there.74 These extraterritorial actions are constrained, if at all, only in national custom and agreements
that neither encompass all transboundary activity nor necessarily bind every state.75 Some proposals, such as the suggestion for
sending orbiting reflectors into space, necessarily occur beyond national jurisdiction in areas of the globalor, in the case of outer
space, the celestialcommons.76 In many other areas related to climate management, however, there may be grey or uncertain
areas. For example, although a geoengineering intervention may involve delivery of a physical agent into the oceans on the high
seas, chances are that a readily identifiable state will have jurisdiction over the vessel from which such an action is initiated.77
Alternatively, ocean fertilization might take place in coastal waters subject to a states exclusive jurisdiction, but quite obviously the
nutrients involved would likely, if not inevitably, drift into and across international waters. B. Multilateral Initiatives Related to

On a truly global issue such as climate change, multilateral fora tend to play a
predominant role. International institutions, and particularly multilateral organizations, are settings
in which a great deal of law is made and non-binding good practice
standards are established. Despite the variety of settings and policy instruments available in the multilateral
Climate Engineering

system to coordinate and harmonize states actions on the national and international levels, relatively little by way of concrete

A number of existing instruments might

provide legal authority for action on geoengineering, either by encouraging or constraining proposals
measures have been adopted with respect to climate engineering.

for such interventions in the ecosystem. Several of the more obvious are identified below, although the list is not intended to be
exhaustive. The small number of concrete but modest efforts actually addressed to geoengineering, chiefly ocean fertilization, are

The United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (FCCC), to which almost every United Nations (U.N.) Member State is party, establishes a
global architecture for coordinating national and international efforts to deal with
many aspects of the climate change problem.79 The FCCC addresses efforts that include most notably
then analyzed. 1. Potential Instruments and Settings for Addressing Geoengineering

mitigation (emissions reductions) and adaptation (responses to climate change that has already occurred or is inevitable).80 As

that agreement is a natural starting place for considering geoengineering

techniques.
such,

UNFCCC solves
Michael C. Branson 14, J.D. Candidate, May 2014 Santa Clara University School
of Law, A Green Herring: How Current Ocean Fertilization Regulation Distracts from
Geoengineering Research, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 163 (2014),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2771&context=lawreview

Ocean fertilization, like any geoengineering method, poses real and unknown risks to our
planet. But so does inaction on climate change. The CBD and LC/LP decisions include boiler plate language
concluding that research into ocean fertilization must be pursued, but also limit channels through which to conduct
beneficial research.
The goal of the CBD and the LC/LP to prevent damage caused by hazardous dumping is honorable. But, in reality,
the efforts fail to comprehensively protect against fringe experiments like that of Russ George. Instead, the CBD ban
on ocean fertilization and the LC/LP Assessment Framework significantly slow the pace of legitimate research and
distract from a serious discussion about the risks and benefits of ocean fertilization and geoengineering methods in
combatting climate change.

A geoengineering treaty or protocol offers the best route for such a discussion. The
UNFCCC is particularly equipped to tackle the problem because it includes nearly
every country in the world. A geoengineering treaty would allow for a wide
ranging discussion about whether geoengineering proposals outweigh the risk they
impose. Further, such a treaty would allow for discussion about all methods of
geoengineering, which would allow States to work together in determining which
geoengineering techniques should be the most rigorously pursued , and which are too
dangerous to pursue. Similarly, in the preliminary research stages, States could determine how to
allocate resources to research most economically. Until nations sit down for real
discussions to support risk assessments of ocean fertilization experiments, rogue environmentalists
will likely continue to act as a distraction using the lack of international progress as
a rationale for their actions.

AT: This is Nuts

The last time people said the counterplan was crazy, they did
the research and found out that it would work
Jeremy Schulman 15, senior project manager for Climate Desk, Mother Jones,
We Could Stop Global Warming With This FixBut It's Probably a Terrible Idea,
3/27/15, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/03/geoengineeringcaldeira-climate-change
Caldeira set out to disprove the "ludicrous" idea that we could
reverse global warming by filling the sky with chemicals that would partially block the sun. A few
Back in the late 1990s, Ken

years earlier, Mount Pinatubo had erupted in the Philippines, sending tiny sulfate particlesknown as aerosolsinto
the stratosphere, where they reflected sunlight back into space and temporarily cooled the planet. Some scientists
believed that an artificial version of this process could be used to cancel out the warming effect of greenhouse
gases.
"Our

original goal was to show that it was a crazy idea and wouldn't work," says Caldeira, who
But when Caldeira and a
colleague ran a model to test out this geoengineering scenario, they were shocked by what they
found. "Much to our surprise, it worked really well," he recalls. "Our results indicate that
geoengineering schemes could markedly diminish regional and seasonal climate
change from increased atmospheric CO2," they wrote in a 2000 paper.
at the time was a climate scientist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

You might think that the volume of aerosols needed to increase the Earth's reflectivity (known as albedo) enough to
halt global climate change would be enormous. But speaking to Kishore Hari on this week's Inquiring Minds podcast,
Caldeira explains that "if

you had just one firehose-worth of material constantly spraying

into the stratosphere, that would be enough to offset all of the global warming
anticipated for the rest of this century."

Topicality

Contacts

1NC T-Contacts
Interpretation:
Engagement is the establishment of contacts---that means
economic engagement is trade and aid, and diplomatic
engagement is official diplomatic interaction
Resnick 1 Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University,
Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, Defining
Engagement, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco
Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the
scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott
Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the
international order through promoting "increased trade and financial
transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of
economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of
the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and
cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework
pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.
(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential
effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.
Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating
its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek
merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that
"[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus
containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need
to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a
comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any
verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes,
I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political
behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and
enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e.
diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the
specific forms that such contacts might include:
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS
Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations
Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes
Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government
officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa
MILITARY CONTACTS
Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and viceversa

Arms transfers
Military aid and cooperation
Military exchange and training programs
Confidence and security-building measures
Intelligence sharing
ECONOMIC CONTACTS
Trade agreements and promotion
Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

Violation:
The affirmative isnt an official diplomatic interaction, trade, or
foreign aid---its technical cooperation on environmental issues
Vote negative:
First is limits---including any form of connection between the
US and China blows the lid off the topic and makes any random
interaction topical---only setting a clear categorical limit on
the topic allows negative engagement and clash over welldefined policy proposals
Second is precision---Resnick is the only author with intent to
define describing the topic wording---any other definition is
arbitrary and lets the aff move the goalposts to include
entirely separate literature bases

2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that engagement means the
establishment of contacts---our Resnick evidence says that
means economic engagement is trade promotion, trade
agreements, and foreign aid, and diplomatic engagement is
official diplomatic interaction like diplomatic recognition or
summit meetings
The affirmative does not meet this---the affirmative is technical
cooperation on climate policy---their Aldy evidence describes
the most likely results of the plan as sharing expertise on
emissions trading systems and developing standards for
comparing emissions reductions, which are low-level
interactions that would take place between scientists and
bureaucrats, not official diplomatic visits or economic ties.
Using these categorical definitions of engagement is critical to
any meaningful definition of the topic---Resnick is the only
author seeking to define and limit the scope of the term
engagement, which is otherwise defined in ad hoc,
contextual ways. Our definition is grounded in the literature
and sets a clear boundary around the affs allowed in the topic.
Reject broad definitions of engagement---theyre so vague that
it hinders effective policy analysis and makes any positive
action topical
Resnick 1 Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan,
Journal of International Affairs, Defining Engagement v54, n2, political science
complete)
DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO BROADLY
A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the
tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For
instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive
and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be
considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited
volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of
non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his
work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15)

Haass
and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends
to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16)
Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard

As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in

the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action,

deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only
reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm
of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive
sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be
analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.

2NC Limits Impact

Our interpretation is key to limits---their interpretation makes
any ongoing interaction between China and the US topical,
which puts zero conceptual limit on the topic and means the
neg has to be ready for literally any proposal for any type of
cooperation that one person came up with. For example, they
could read affs to:
Talk to China about rare earth elements
Send one or two diplomats to placate unrest in Western China
Discuss where Chinese nuclear missile silos are
Negotiate rights for natural gas under the South China Sea

All of these affs just pick one potential area for cooperation
and do something tiny in it, without considering the effect of
US engagement on the grand strategies of the US and China--only our interpretation allows debate over the fundamental
questions of US-China relations and the structurally important
ways that we might cooperate

2NC Precision Impact

Our definition is key to precision---Resnick is a professor of
political science, using scholarly research to set a clear limit
around the definition of engagement---other definitions just
consider as anything positive toward another country, while
our evidence considers the unique economic and diplomatic
conditions that make up an engagement policy.
Precision is vital for quality debates broad definitions of
engagement as positive inducement create conceptual
confusion and unlimits the topic
Resnik 1 Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan,
Journal of International Affairs, Defining Engagement v54, n2, political science
complete)

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in

practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are

vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory
regimes. The quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the persistent inability of
the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous
conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the
conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use
the discourse of statecraft. Currently,

this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially
appeasement, isolation and containment.

few terms have been as frequently or as

engagement.(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as

In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy,

confusingly invoked as

that of
the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted
the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea
and Vietnam.

the word
engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has
"become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually
means."(n2) The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3)
Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that

1.

2.

3.

4.

A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American
internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed
that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign
engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."(n4)
A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous
concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush
administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the
dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."(n5)
A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration
announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on
improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed
by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear
reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons
program.(n7)
A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this
notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held
hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a
policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's

5.

human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one
of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our
differences."(n9)
A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in
a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each
of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and
emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments
of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to
advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10)

scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to

conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical
errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively
that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions ; (3) defining
Unfortunately,

engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.

2NC Environmental Violation

Environmental cooperation is explicitly not economic
Rose, 8 Professor of International Trade and Economic Analysis and Policy in the
Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, NBER research
associate and CEPR research fellow (Andrew, NON-ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE: THE CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES April,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13988.pdf)
Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions.
Some interactions are strictly economic; for instance, countries engage in
international trade of goods, services, capital, and labor. But many are not
economic, at least not in any narrow sense. For instance, the United States seeks to
promote human rights and democracy, deter nuclear proliferation, stop the spread
of narcotics, and so forth. Accordingly America, like other countries, participates in a
number of international institutions to further its foreign policy objectives; it has
joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we concentrate on the
interesting and understudied case of international environmental
arrangements (IEAs). We ask whether participation in such non-economic
partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The answer, in both
theory and practice, is positive.

Exts---Economic Definitions
The plan is an economic inducement engagement requires
trade promotion
Celik, 11 masters student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and
Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies
http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagementpolicies)
Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are
significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans
on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et
al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and
target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction
over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual
gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from
carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow
goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her
to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not
want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely;
sender works deliberately to improve the target countries Gdp, trade potential,
export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important
goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has
the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender
state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.
(Kroll,1993)

Trade promotion is export financing and assistance

USDA 13-United States Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General [Effectiveness of FAS Recent
Efforts to Implement Measurable Strategies Aligned to the Departments Trade Promotion and Policy Goals
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-0001-22.pdf]

FAS helps U.S. food and agricultural exporters take full advantage of market opportunities

through trade

Trade promotion refers to activities that provide exporters with

intelligence, credit financing, and assistance in their efforts to raise awareness and
approval of their products overseas. FAS promotion activities include a partnership with
promotion and trade policy.

approximately 75 agricultural industry groups to develop and maintain markets and export credit guarantee
programs, which encourage foreign buyers to purchase U.S. agricultural goods. FAS largest trade promotion
program is the Market Access Program. The purpose of the program is to create economic growth in rural America
and the overall U.S. economy by funding consumer promotions, market research, and technical assistance. FAS
received $58.5 million in appropriated funds to administer trade promotion activities in FY 2012.

Foreign aid is transfer of goods and services still raises the

question of economic
Encyclopedia Britannica No Date

[foreign aid
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/213344/foreign-aid]

foreign aid, the international transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country
or international organization for the benefit of the recipient country or its
population. Aid can be economic, military, or emergency humanitarian (e.g., aid
given following natural disasters).

Exts---Diplomatic Definitions
Diplomatic engagement is limited to presidential visits and
State Department diplomatic actions
Derrick, 98 - LIEUTENANT COLONEL, US Army (Robert, ENGAGEMENT: THE
NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE? http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695

Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs. Financial incentives are an

effective engagement tool since countries usually interact with the US when money
is involved. Whether it is obtaining funding for a national program; acquiring
materiel, food or medicine; or maintaining Most Favored Nation Status, financial
aide has always been a preferred way for the US to affect the behavior of others.
Diplomatic engagement ranges from recognition of sovereign states and foreign
governments, to presidential visits, to all aspects of the embassy itself. The mere
existence of an embassy is an engagement tool. Through official diplomatic
ceremonies, informal meetings, and embassy employees living among the locals,
the Department of State's presence is engagement in and of itself.

Theres a distinct diplomatic engagement budget and it

exclusively refers to State Department public diplomacy and
embassy programs
State Department, 15 - Released by the Bureau of Budget and Planning and the
Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (Department of State Evaluation Policy
1/29, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/evaluation/2015/236970.htm
Specific Programs: In addition to its routine activities, the Department undertakes
programs to achieve specific objectives. These programs, broadly defined to include
projects, activities, and efforts, are time-bound and have separate resources
budgeted for them. They fall under two categories: foreign assistance and
diplomatic engagement. Foreign assistance programs are designed to achieve a
wide range of objectives such as preventing conflict and stabilizing war-torn
societies, rehabilitating refugees and internally displaced persons, supporting
human rights and gender equality, and combating hunger, HIV/AIDS, and
environmental degradation. Diplomatic engagement programs are designed for
engaging other governments and global partners through a variety of efforts, such
as public diplomacy; promoting economic and business relations; staffing bureaus,
posts, and consulates to engage host country governments and international
organizations; providing American citizens services; and providing grants to foreign
countries to generate goodwill and friendship.

A budget-based definition creates a clear bright-line

Pitkin, 16 - Director, Bureau of Budget and Planning, U.S Department of State
(Douglas, Congressional Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management,

International Operations and Bilateral International Development, 3/1,

http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030116_Pitkin_Testimony1.pdf
As the Director of the State Department Bureau for Budget and Planning, I am here
today to discuss our request for our people; diplomatic and embassy security
programs; public diplomacy efforts; treaty based contributions to United Nations
peacekeeping efforts and international organizations, and our global management
platform, otherwise known as the Diplomatic Engagement portion of the
Departments budget. The Diplomatic Engagement budget is about 32% of the total
State/USAID request, with foreign assistance rounding out the remaining 68 %. The
FY 2017 request for this portion of the budget totals $16.1 billion, an increase of
$560 million over the FY 2016 level.

AT: Aff Ground

Our interpretation allows enough aff ground to be innovative,
but still preserves negative engagement---the aff can read
plenty of different mechanisms under the categories that
Resnick describes, for example:
High-level diplomatic dialogue between Obama and Xi
Promotion of Chinese membership in the TPP and other institutions
Negotiation over trade disputes and intellectual property rights
Expansion of development aid to rural China

Depth is better than breadth---there may be fewer affs in a

numerical sense under our interpretation, but they allow the
neg to clash with the aff much more effectively, which
promotes better and more valuable debate. Placing a bound on
the topic also forces the aff to innovate vertically rather than
horizontally, which still promotes in-depth debate and allows
the aff to come up with new mchanisms.
Our interpretation allows sufficient aff flexibility
Bayne 7 Sir Nicholas Bayne, Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit of the
London School of Economics, and Stephen Woolcock, Lecturer in International
Relations at The London School of Economics, The New Economic Diplomacy:
Decision-making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, p. 4
Economic diplomacy is best defined not by its instruments but by the economic
issues that provide its content. We follow the same categories as used by Odell in
determining the scope of economic negotiation: 'policies relating to production,
movement or exchange of goods, services, investments (including official
development assistance), money, information and their regulation (Odell 2000. 11). This
is a very wide range of issues. A single volume could not cover them all and, of necessity, this book is
selective. It concentrates on the central issues of trade, finance, energy and the global environment. These are
topics of high political profile, which arouse strong popular concern and bring out well the interplay between
different actors in economic diplomacy

AT: Reasonability
Theyre not reasonable---that was above
Limits DA---they force us to prep for the sum of all reasonable
interpretations which is unmanageable
Reasonability causes judge intervention since it requires
arbitrary gut check about how bad is bad enough instead
which topic you prefer
Competing interpretations causes a race to the top where both
sides need a defensible interp---predictability arguments solve
their offense because the aff can beat arbitrary interps

Quid Pro Quo, Clarice

1NC T-Conditional
Interpretation:
Affirmatives must involve an explicit quid-pro-quo---diplomatic
and economic engagement is the offer of positive inducements
in exchange for specific concessions
Hall, 14 Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University
(Ian, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, p. 3-4)
This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case, their uses, and their limits. It

the growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy
that employs "positive inducements'' to influence the behavior of states.8 It acknowledges
follows

that various, different engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we can

positive
inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular quid pro quos from the
target state.9 An investment might be canvassed, a trade deal promised, or a weapons
system provided in return for a specific concession. With the second type of strategy,
distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first type of strategy,

inducements are offered merely to catalyze something bigger, perhaps even involving the wholesale transformation
of a target society.10 In this kind of engagement, many different incentives might be laid out for many different
constituencies, from educational opportunities for emerging leaders to new terms of trade for the economic elite.
The objects of engagement can include changing specific policies of the target state or transforming the wider
political, economic, or social order of a target society. Both of these objectives could be pursued with coercive
strategies employing either compellence or deterrenceor indeed with a mixture of both engagement and
coercion." But much recent research has argued that the evidence for the efficacy of both compellence and
deterrence in changing target state policies is inconclusive.12 Both military and economic sanctions have been
shown to have mixed results, and many scholars argue that coercion rarely works." By contrast, there is some
considerable evidence that engagement strategies can both elicit discrete quid pro quos from states and generate
wider political and social change within them that might in the medium to long term lead to changed behavior at
home or in international relations.14 Moreover, it is clear that engagement is both more commonly utilized than
often recognized by scholars of international relations and that it is generally considered more politically accepted
to politicians and publics in both engaging states and in the states they seek to engage.15

Engagement strategies take different forms depending on their objectives. They can emphasize
diplomacy, aiming at the improvement of formal, state-to- state contacts , and be led
by professional diplomats, special envoys, or politicians . Alternatively, they can
emphasize military ties, utilizing military-to- military dialogues, exchanges, and
training to build trust, convey strategic intentions, or simply foster greater openness in the target states defense
establishment.16 They can be primarily economic in approach, using trade, investment, and
technology transfer to engender change in the target society and perhaps to generate greater
economic interdependence, constraining a target state's foreign policy choices.17 Finally, they can seek to
create channels for people-to-people contact through state-driven public diplomacy, business
forums and research networks, aid and development assistance , and so on.

Violation:
The affirmative is a one-sided offer of cooperation---it does not
require reciprocal action by China
Vote negative:
First is limits---allowing unilateral action means any tiny
proposal to do anything with China becomes topical---requiring
a QPQ forces the aff to be large and salient enough to actually
change Chinas behavior.
Second is topic coherence---an engagement topic requires the
affirmative to change Chinas behavior in some way, rather
than simply unilaterally offering something---thats the only
way to access debates about Chinas grand strategy and
internal politics

2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that the affirmative must require some
reciprocal action from China in return for the affs
cooperation---policies must be explicitly linked to quid-pro-pro
actions in order to qualify as engagement---thats Hall
The affirmative doesnt meet this---they are a unilateral offer
of engagement to China, without a reciprocal action in
return---even if the aff implicitly involves some reciprocity with
China, our Hall evidence says engagement strategies must be
explicitly linked to separate QPQ actions
Prefer definitions that define engagement as a strategic
interaction it means it has to be linked to a behavior change.
Thats vital to distinguish it from everyday diplomacy which
unlimits the topic and destroys ground
Cha, 2k Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Victor, Engaging North Korea Credibly,
Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 13655)

Engagement is a process of strategic interaction designed to elicit cooperation from

an opposing state. Its means are generally non-coercive and non-punitive, seeking
neither to undercut an adversary nor to pressure it into submission. The strategy
also differs from capitulation as it does not entail simply deferring to the opponents
desires, but seeks some form of accommodation. However, engagement is more
than everyday diplomacy. It is a discrete type of security response to a
threatening power, actively seeking to transform the relationship into a nonadversarial one and to change the threatening states behaviour and goals in the
process.3 Arguably, containment could be described in a similar way. Moreover,
engagement is not credible to the opponent without some semblance of strength on
the part of the engager. The primary difference, however, is that engagement does
not explicitly leverage the threat of conflict or punishment to exact cooperation.

2NC Limits Impact

Our interpretation is key to limits---allowing the aff to be
unconditional allows any tiny action that somehow interacts
with China, without any discussion of changing Chinas
behavior writ large. For example, the aff could:
Change US immigration policy toward China
Send one or two diplomats to talk about the South China Sea or internal protests
Negotiate over one trade dispute
Slightly expand discussion on Taiwan policy
Discuss classified nuclear policy

Our interpretation both limits the literature available to the aff

and forces the aff to be large enough that it can actually
change Chinas behavior---both of those things ensure that the
negative can effectively engage with the aff

Exts---Engagement = QPQ
Engagement is the act of using political and economic contacts
as a strategy to create long-term patterns of cooperation its
distinct from pure diplomacy because it requires a bargain to
be struck. The aff is appeasement because its a unilateral,
one-time concession
Dueck, 6 - Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in George Mason Universitys
School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs (Strategies for Managing
Rogue States, Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223241,
doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.01.004
The term rogue state, which has come into wide usage only over the past decade, has more to do with American
political culture than with international law.1 Nevertheless, it does capture certain undeniable international realities,
namely, the continuing existence of numerous authoritarian states that support terrorism, seek weapons of mass
destruction, and harbor revisionist foreign policy ambitions. Loosening this definition a bit, we can see that rogue
states are really nothing new. Over the past century, Western democracies have been faced with a series of

democracies
have always had five basic strategic alternatives in relation to such adversaries:
appeasement, engagement, containment, rollback, and non-entanglement .
challenges from autocratic, revisionist, and adversarial states of varying scope and size. The

Appeasement
The strategy of appeasement, while seemingly discredited after 1938, has recently attracted surprising and
favorable attention from scholars of international relations.2 Part of the problem surrounding the term has been a

appeasement is not synonymous with diplomatic

refers only to those cases where one country
attempts to alter or satiate the aggressive intentions of another through unilateral
political, economic, and/or military concessions.3
failure to agree on its meaning. Properly speaking,
negotiations or diplomatic concessions, but

It is sometimes argued that appeasement can work under certain circumstances, and that Neville Chamberlain's

drawbacks of
appeasement, however, are inherent. They lie in the fact that concrete concessions are
made by one side only, while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions from
hostile to benign. With this strategy, there is nothing to stop the appeased state from
pocketing its gains and moving on to the next aggression.5 Britain's rapprochement with the United States in
performance at Munich in 1938 was simply a case of appeasement badly handled.4 The

the 1890s is often described as a successful case of appeasement.6 Skillful British diplomacy indeed played a part
in significantly improving relations between the two over the course of that decade, but that case does not deserve
the term. The United States was not particularly hostile to Great Britain in the first place, and no vital conflicts of
interest existed between the two powers. The Anglo-American rapprochement was more the result than the cause
of that commonality of interests.7 In sum, appeasementstrictly definedis a strategy best avoided. Realistic
bargaining or negotiations involving mutual compromise and presumably fixed intentions is another matter entirely,
however, and should not be confused with appeasement.
Engagement

Engagement, a popular concept in recent years, actually has several possible meanings and is used
in a number of different ways. It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or commercial
activism internationally;8 (2) the simple fact of ongoing political or economic contact with
an existing counterpart or adversary; (3) using such political or economic contact as a
strategy in itself, in the hopes that this contact will create patterns of cooperation,
integration, and interdependence with a rogue state;9 (4) a strategy under which
international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements ,

or (5) the very act of diplomacy, negotiating, or

bargaining, regardless of its content. Only the third definition, focusing on integration through contact,
is analytically useful. The first is too vague to be of much use; the second is a condition
rather than a strategy; the fourth is more accurately captured by dtente; and as to the last
definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words diplomacy ,
alongside continued rivalry or competition;10

negotiating, or bargaining when they have served very well up to now. 11

Engagement as a strategy of integration through contact rests upon liberal assumptions regarding international
affairs. Specifically, it typically assumes that increased economic interdependence, membership in international
organizations, and transnational contact between civil societies will combine to shape adversarial regimes in a more
democratic and peaceful direction.12 In the 1970s, Western analysts viewed America's dtente with the Soviet
Union as this sort of strategy, and the collapse of the ussr is in fact frequently attributed in large part to the
subversive influence of increased contact with the West. But Western trade, technology, and recognition in the
second half of the Cold War did as much to prop up as to undermine the Soviet bloc.13 Western policies toward
various rogue states (and toward China) over the last twenty years have often been predicated on the assumption
that increased political and economic contact with the outside world will undermine these regimes. Yet there is
remarkably little evidence that integration through contact has ever actually worked in managing existing
international adversaries.
The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy team, with which dtente is most closely linked, did not see it primarily as a
strategy of integration, but rather as a strategy of disciplined rivalry alongside expanded areas of cooperation.14 In
other words, they held to the more traditional definition, in which tensions were reduced while continued
competition with one's adversary was considered inevitable. In this very limited sense, the Soviet-American dtente
of the early 1970s was indeed a positive achievement, in that the risks of war were reduced for both sides. Only
when liberals came to view dtente as having more ambitious, overarching goalsas restraining Soviet expansion
through a web of interdependencedid it have to be considered a failure.

Observers often
call for the United States to engage rogue states such as North Korea or Iran when what
they seem to mean is negotiate. Obviously one cannot speak of negotiations in the
abstract: it all depends on the precise bargain that is on offer. Yet this is exactly
what observers so often do when they urge the United States to try diplomacy
without regard to the particular terms that are actually available from the other
side. If a rogue state is willing to come to an agreement, however limited, that advances American interests, then
Engagement as integration, engagement as dtentewhat about engagement as diplomacy?

diplomatic efforts should be embraced. If not, then we ought to recognize that diplomacy is not an end in itself.

Diplomatic engagement requires seeking a behavioral change

through mutual concessions
Takeyh, 9 - senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations (Ray, The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement Boston Globe, 10/7,
http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomaticengagement/p20362
As the Obama administration charts its foreign policy, there is increasing unease about its lack of achievements. The Iraq war
lingers, Afghanistan continues to be mired in its endless cycle of tribal disarray and Islamist resurgence, Guantanamo remains open.
Still, Obama has introduced important changes in both the style and substance of US diplomacy. An honest dialogue with the
international community has at times led the president to acknowledge our own culpabilities and shortcomings. Even more dramatic

Obama's willingness to reach out to America's adversaries and seek

negotiated solutions to some of the world's thorniest problems. It is Obama's declared engagement policy that
has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of
has been

appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed, "When France chides you for appeasement, you know you're
scraping bottom." Acknowledgement of America's misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated
as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns
America's offers of a greater opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George Soros and the CIA are
instigating a velvet revolution in their country. Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach

Such views miscast the essence of

diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted
to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace.

the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek
adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path
nation. However,

toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and
proliferation. Should these regimes fail to grasp the opportunities before them, then Washington has a better chance of assembling
a durable international coalition to isolate and pressure them. One of the problems with a unilateralist Bush administration that
prided itself on disparaging diplomatic outreach was that it often made America the issue and gave many states an excuse for
passivity. The Obama administration's expansive diplomatic vision has deprived fence-sitters of such justifications. An administration
that has reached out to North Korea, communicated its sincere desire for better ties to Iran, and dispatched high-level emissaries to
Syria cannot be accused of diplomatic indifference. The administration's approach has already yielded results in one of the most
intractable global problems: Iran's nuclear imbroglio. The Bush team's years of harsh rhetoric and threats of military retribution
failed to adjust Iran's nuclear ambitions in any tangible manner. A country that had no measurable nuclear infrastructure before
Bush's inaugural made tremendous strides during his tenure. Unable to gain Iranian capitulation or international cooperation, the
Bush administration was left plaintively witnessing Iran's accelerating nuclear time clock. In a dramatic twist of events, the Obama
administration's offer of direct diplomacy has altered the landscape and yielded an unprecedented international consensus that has
put the recalcitrant theocracy on the defensive. Iran's mounting nuclear infractions and its enveloping isolation caused it to
recalibrate its position and open its latest nuclear facility to inspection and potentially ship out its stock of low-enriched uranium for
processing in Russia. Deprived of such fuel, Iran would not have the necessary resources to quickly assemble a bomb. In a short
amount of time, the administration has succeeded in putting important barriers to Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. The United
States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its national power. The tumultuous Bush years have demonstrated
the limitations of military force. Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions and
acceptance of less than ideal outcomes. Moreover, as the United States charts its course, there is nothing wrong with acknowledging
past errors. Instead of clinging to its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the judgment of
other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.

AT: Aff Ground

No aff ground impact---our interpretation still allows many
economic and diplomatic conditional affs, while allowing
negative engagement. For example, the aff could condition
engagement on:
Human rights or democratic reforms
Cooperation in the East or South China Seas
Air pollution action
Trade cooperation or intellectual property rights

Depth is better than breadth---there may be fewer conditional

affs in terms of number, but they allow a rich debate over the
types of incentives that should be used, the value of coercion
versus positive engagement, and the intricacies of Chinas
motivations regarding the US---the topic is totally useless
without those debates

AT: Reasonability
Theyre not reasonable---that was above
Limits DA---they force us to prep for the sum of all reasonable
interpretations which is unmanageable
Reasonability causes judge intervention since it requires
arbitrary gut check about how bad is bad enough instead
which topic you prefer
Competing interpretations causes a race to the top where both
sides need a defensible interp---predictability arguments solve
their offense because the aff can beat arbitrary interps

Case Answers

Solvency

1NC China Says No

China says no---zero chance they take action on warming
Patricia Adams 15, economist and the executive director of Probe International, a
Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement
since the 1980s, founder of the World Rainforest Movement and the International
Rivers Network, The Truth about China: Why Beijing will resist demands for
abatement, 2015, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-aboutChina.pdf
Chinas Communist Party faces intense domestic pressure to develop its
economy in order to raise its standard of living. Under normal circumstances, China could
accomplish this goal by increasing its use of fossil fuels . It also faces intense domestic pressure
to eliminate air pollution, which in many cities has become a major public health threat. Ordinarily, it could
accomplish this goal by burning those same fossil fuels efficiently and cleanly, as does the West.
But Chinas goals are complicated by intense international pressure to curb its use of fossil fuels in order to lower its

Curtailing its use of fossil fuels would slow economic growth and,
contrary to popular belief, compromise Chinas desire to reduce air pollution. The goals of economic
growth and blue skies reinforce each other but conflict with the goal of reducing
carbon dioxide emissions.
carbon dioxide emissions.

The economic advance of developed countries has been marked by increases in

fossil-fuel use. The developed world chiefly the United States and European countries now
insists that China adopt a different, unproven path to economic development by
curtailing fossil-fuel use. Not only has no country since the Industrial Revolution ever become developed by

even those developed countries that have set explicit carbon

dioxide reduction targets for themselves have generally been unable to meet these while
growing their economies.
eschewing fossil fuels, but

While the Wests per capita carbon dioxide emissions changed little in the decades preceding the great recession of
20072009,1 its per-capita emissions of NOx and SOx pollutants declined markedly (see Figure 1). The developed
countries tackled their air-pollution problems without cutting fossil fuels. Using abatement technologies, the
developed world found economic growth and improved air quality compatible objectives. But despite decades of

no technology has been found that decouples fossil-fuel use and carbon dioxide
emissions on anything other than a small scale, at very high cost . The West is now
asking China to accomplish something no Western economy has been able to
do to maintain high rates of economic growth while simultaneously cutting carbon
dioxide emissions.
effort,

Many governments in the West falsely claim that, as a by-product of reducing carbon dioxide, Chinas air quality will
also be improved. As this paper will show, Chinese and Western governments must understand that an aggressive
policy geared towards reducing conventional air contaminants in China would likely undermine efforts to reduce
Chinas carbon dioxide emissions, and vice versa. Yet it is in the political interests of all concerned to perpetuate the
myth that the goal of reducing air pollution complements the goal of reducing carbon dioxide.

China has made no binding commitment

to curb carbon dioxide emissions, and that a meaningful curb is unlikely to
occur without a painful reduction in its economic growth . This was true before the dramatic
setbacks seen in Chinas economy this past summer and it re-mains so now, when the Chinese leadership
is focussed above all else on an economic recovery . Yet it is in the political interests
of both camps to perpetuate the pretence that China has as a priority a reduction
Chinese and Western observers also must understand that

in carbon dioxide emissions, as appeared to be the case on 11 November 2014, when the presidents of
the United States and China announced their shared intention to produce a global agreement at the UN Climate
Conference in Paris in December 2015.2
The worlds two largest carbon dioxide emitters, who for decades had battled over who was responsible for the
planets warming and who should stop it, seemed to have called a truce. But the contradiction between what the

Friendly rhetoric can never do more than

paper over this underlying contradiction.
West wants and what China needs belies that truce.

It is of course conceivable that China could dramatically reduce its carbon dioxide emissions should its economy
experience a protracted contraction. For the purpose of this analysis, we will assume that the Chinese economy
becomes stable and that the Chinese Communist Partys paramount concern is the pursuit of economic
development, upon which the continuation of its rule depends. Under these assumptions, it follows directly that

China will not be reducing its carbon dioxide emissions.

2NC China Says No---General

China says no---the CCP is totally committed to raising
economic growth and living standards for its citizens, which
require extensive fossil fuel use. Theyve never made a binding
commitment to reduce emissions, and current agreements are
just rhetoric they use for political purposes---thats Adams.
Domestic concerns outweigh international ones
Patricia Adams 15, economist and the executive director of Probe International, a
Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement
since the 1980s, founder of the World Rainforest Movement and the International
Rivers Network, The Truth about China: Why Beijing will resist demands for
abatement, 2015, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-aboutChina.pdf
The Communist Party of China is highly sensitive to domestic pressure, which
has the potential to threaten its existence. It is much less concerned about
international pressure. Because of the irrelevance of global carbon dioxide levels to
most Chinese citizens,30 Chinas leadership has had few qualms in fending off
international pressure to contain its emissions at successive UN climate change meetings. Its
diplomatic position has been dictated by its understanding of its needs: China is
a developing country that must increase its per-capita energy use in order to lift its citizens
out of poverty.

China just doesnt listen to the US on climate

Joshua W. Busby 10, assistant professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the
University of Texas, Austin, where he is also the Crook Distinguished Scholar at the
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security Law and a fellow with the RGK
Center for Philanthropy and Community Service, China and Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Engagement, November 2010,
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-BusbyChinaClimateChangeFinal.pdf
American officials periodically adopted a hectoring tone
with the Chinese. As one Chinese academic told me, some American officials talked at them
like they were pontificating on CNN. The Chinese found this to be an immediate turnoff. As Deborah Seligsohn of the World Resources Institute notes, The Chinese scratch their heads. They
know they live in tiny apartments, turn off all lights, wear three layers of clothing indoors in the winter,
and only run the air conditioner on the hottest days . Then these Americans come to
town on jets, blast the air conditioning, and lecture them about their energy use
During U.S. visits to China in 2009,

(quoted in Hachigian 2009). In the absence of U.S. domestic legislation, this approach is likely to be
counterproductive. As Elizabeth Economy said in her April 2010 testimony to the U.S.-China Economic Security
Review Commission, [The
country)

United States] has no credibility in pushing China (or any other

to forge a new path if it, itself, is not already well down that road (Economy 2010).

the United States deftly tied its pledges of climate finance for the
developing world to Chinas willingness to compromise on MRV. This drove a wedge
between China and the developing world, which saw China as blocking access to adaptation and
At Copenhagen,

mitigation assistance (see Hirsch 2010). While clever, the effort to cast the Chinese as the villains of Copenhagen

Diplomatic dust-ups between

the United States and China perhaps play well to respective publics but deflect from real
progress. In meetings leading up to Cancun, U.S. officials should resist the temptation to lecture China.
ultimately gets us no closer to addressing the problem (Miliband 2009).

That obviously means the plan doesnt solve, but it also

collapses the global climate regime
Patricia Adams 15, economist and the executive director of Probe International, a
Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement
since the 1980s, founder of the World Rainforest Movement and the International
Rivers Network, The Truth about China: Why Beijing will resist demands for
abatement, 2015, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-aboutChina.pdf
The annual global climate summits that began in 1995 in Berlin have, in recent years, seen
irreconcilable demands by rich and poor countries followed by high-pressure
overtime negotiations, ending in agreement to meet at a later date. Throughout it all, China has
steadfastly stuck to its guns: it would not be swayed from its path of fossil-fuel-fired
development. That remained true at the 2014 Conference of the Parties in Lima and it will remain true in
Paris when a new treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol will be negotiated.
China, as the worlds
largest greenhouse gas emitter, is indispensable to the negotiations. Without
Chinas participation, the global climate apparatus would collapse. A charitable
All parties in Paris will ultimately have no choice but to accept this line because

view of the reason that Western countries will capitulate to Chinas demands is that they fear countries would
otherwise soon take to exploiting the atmosphere in a Garret-Hardin-style Tragedy of the Commons. A less
charitable view is that the Western governments need to save face for domestic political purposes: if the talks
unambiguously fail, they will need to explain to their citizenry how they could be walking away from a threat they
had
claimed was existential.

2NC China Says No---US Domestic Politics

China says no---they think US domestic politics will blow up
any climate cooperation
Joshua W. Busby 10, assistant professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the
University of Texas, Austin, where he is also the Crook Distinguished Scholar at the
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security Law and a fellow with the RGK
Center for Philanthropy and Community Service, China and Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Engagement, November 2010,
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-BusbyChinaClimateChangeFinal.pdf
U.S. actions probably are
largely ancillary to what China is prepared to do on its own. Although China is increasingly
worried about the effects of climate change, the United States wants Chinese cooperation on
climate change more than the Chinese do. At the same time, the Chinese are
skeptical of the credibility of U.S. commitments. Given the transparency of the U.S. legislative
process, China is well aware of U.S. difficulties in passing domestic climate legislation .
Neither view adequately captures the current situation. The reality is that

Moreover, China cooperated with the United States on a pilot carbon sequestration project called FutureGen during
the George W. Bush administration, only to see it cancelled.34
Where Europe wants a multinational treaty to address climate change, the United States wants to flesh out a

China is
committed to the asymmetry of the UNFCCC process and the Kyoto Protocol in
particular, which distinguishes between the legal obligations of developed and developing countries, with little
plurilateral process to ensure commitments made at Copenhagen are kept and accounted for.

flexibility in allowing countries to graduate from one category to another.35 China, meanwhile, is prepared to spend
money on projects with limited oversight infrastructure in place to monitor progress.36 While this attitude might
result in wasted money, ill-conceived projects, and difficulty evaluating progress, China prefers immediate action to

this undercurrent
of mistrust about shared interests and perspectives figures into any discussion
of available and desirable policies to address climate change.
grandiose mid-century commitments that may or may not be kept. Though oversimplified,

This section discusses what those policies might be, the U.S. role in engaging China on climate change, the venues
best suited to achieve progress, and ways to empower private actors to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The Least of Things: Move Forward on Technology Agreements
Minimally, the United States should move forward on the suite of technology agreements reached during President
Obamas November 2009 visit to Beijing. During the visit, the United States and China concluded a series of
bilateral technology agreements, including the creation of a Clean Energy Research Center, an Electric Vehicles
Initiative, an Energy Efficiency Action Plan, a Renewable Energy Partnership, a 21st Century Coal effort, a Shale Gas
Initiative, and an Energy Cooperation Program (U.S. Department of Energy 2009; The White House 2009). This suite
of initiatives sounds impressive and reminiscent of the kinds of technical projects pursued through the Asia Pacific
Partnership (APP). However, it requires follow-through and implementation, the first steps of which have only
recently been announced. Even if all initiatives are launched, we should have realistic expectations of what they are
likely to yield. Not much money backs the effort. The Clean Energy Research Center, for example, was to have a
$150 million budget from both public and private sources over five years. In March 2010, Secretary of Energy
Steven Chu announced public funding totaling $37.5 million over five years to U.S. research institutions (Friedman
2010; Sandalow 2010). In contrast, China is estimated to have set aside more than $200 billion for green energy
projects in its domestic stimulus spending for 2009 and 2010.37 In July 2010, it announced plans to spend as much
as $738 billion on clean energy by 2020 (Bloomberg News 2010b).
Funding is not the only problem affecting the technology agreement; because of its largely government-togovernment nature, it may not be sufficiently scaleable, nimble, or swift to deliver the kinds of emissions savings
that are ultimately needed. Perhaps technology cooperation will yield breakthroughs on carbon sequestration and
other areas to radically transform the playing field, but we should be modest in our aspirations for these initiatives.

These programs are potentially most useful as signals to domestic and global audiences that the two countries are

Perceived obstructionism by the other

can undermine each countrys willingness to do more on its own. Leading up to
Copenhagen, the Obama administration wanted and needed to convey to members of
Congress that it was working together with China to address the problem. As a result of the
trying to work together and be good international citizens.

rancor at Copenhagen, the United States avoided been perceived as a climate laggardbut at the expense of

While the Obama administrations efforts to pass

comprehensive climate legislation in 2010 suffered for reasons unrelated to China, the image
of Chinese opposition allows U.S. opponents of action to revive the arguments
they have used with success since 1997. To move its domestic legislative agenda on climate change in
conveying an image of joint cooperation.

the 112th Congress, the Obama administration will likely need to return to a narrative that emphasizes Chinas
willingness to act, either in concert with the United States or as an economic competitor.

Domestic climate legislation is a prerequisite

Joshua W. Busby 10, assistant professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the
University of Texas, Austin, where he is also the Crook Distinguished Scholar at the
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security Law and a fellow with the RGK
Center for Philanthropy and Community Service, China and Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Engagement, November 2010,
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-BusbyChinaClimateChangeFinal.pdf
U.S. influence on Chinas policy is limited, as I discuss
China has been reluctant to enact firmer
targets because it is skeptical that the United States will act. The single most
important step that the United States can take to persuade the Chinese to pursue or
extend the upper bound of its current target is to pass domestic climate
legislation of its own. While the domestic cleavages within China over its emissionsintensity target remain somewhat unclear, U.S. action would simultaneously bolster the claims of
Can the United States influence this target?

in more detail below on border tax adjustments. However,

Chinese actors willing to support more ambitious action and pressure opponents to concede ground.

2NC China Says No---Bilateralism

China doesnt want bilateral cooperation---they want
multilateralism
Joshua W. Busby 10, assistant professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the
University of Texas, Austin, where he is also the Crook Distinguished Scholar at the
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security Law and a fellow with the RGK
Center for Philanthropy and Community Service, China and Climate Change: A
Strategy for U.S. Engagement, November 2010,
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-BusbyChinaClimateChangeFinal.pdf
G2 bilateral dialogues like the S&ED are potentially attractive; indeed, these led to the U.S. China
suite of technology agreements finalized during President Obamas November 2009 visit to China. However,
China tends to prefer larger venues where there is some strength in numbers.
Moreover, China does not want the issue of climate change to be perceived as a twocountry problem, which would elevate the degree of scrutiny and expectations for global leadership on its
part. In any case, prosaic bureaucratic infighting on the U.S. side between the DOE and Department of Treasury
may undercut the S&ED as a productive venue.46 A meeting of the S&ED was held in Beijing in late May 2010. With
Copenhagen over and U.S. climate legislation still held up in the Senate, this meeting had less of a climate focus
than in the previous year, though it was followed by three forums on energy efficiency, renewables, and biofuels
(Seligsohn 2010b).

No single venue needs to or will likely become the locus of decisionmaking. The cast of
characters may vary depending on a given dimension of the problem . For example,
actions to reduce emissions from deforestation could involve a different set of actors than those seeking to
coordinate actions and investments on carbon sequestration. Victor (2007, 150) calls this the variable geometry
of participation.

No Solvency---Emissions Reductions Impossible

Its structurally impossible for China to design an effective
warming policy
Patricia Adams 15, economist and the executive director of Probe International, a
Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement
since the 1980s, founder of the World Rainforest Movement and the International
Rivers Network, The Truth about China: Why Beijing will resist demands for
abatement, 2015, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-aboutChina.pdf
China has made grand promises about rebalancing its economy to be energy-lite ,
en route to reaching its stated goals of capping carbon dioxide emissions and meeting 20% of its energy needs with
non-fossil fuels by 2030. Many not only believe that these goals are achievable, they believe that in China, a
dictatorship ruled by fiat, the goals are more easily achievable than in a messy democracy that must pander to

Chinas Communist Party dictatorship and

top-down economy would be a hindrance rather than a help in meeting these goals,
different interest groups. This belief is mistaken.

even assuming China ever expected to meet them.

Chinas stated goals are nothing but daunting. According to Scientific American:

China will have to build as much wind, solar, nuclear and hydropower in the next 10
years as it has built coal-fired power plants in the last 10 years as much as 1,000
gigawatts worth of alternatives to coal, also including natural gas, whether pipelined from Russia or
fracked out of the countrys own shale deposits. And even if that dream is realized, an International Energy Agency

such a build out, though possible, is not sufficient to slow rising coal
consumption unless Chinas economic or electricity use growth also slow
significantly.77
analysis76 suggests

According to the US-based Breakthrough Institute, a think tank focused on development and the environment,

because its economy will continue to grow a deep transformation of the present
fossil energy economy is not on the horizon in China.78 Breakthrough agrees with others
that Chinas target of meeting 20% of its energy needs from non-fossil sources
merely represents a continuation of current trends and policies and reflects
the naturally slow pace of energy transitions .79
a decarbonised future look expensive to the Chinese leadership but, given its history, it also
looks impossible to implement.80 Despite having immense power over the economy and its citizens,
the Chinese government knows that it lacks the legal and governmental structures to
implement its major reform plans. In the language of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the
country lacks the soft technologies among them cultural and institutional values such
as property rights needed to complement the more easily obtainable hard technologies.81
The countrys centralised rule creates perverse incentives that undermine economic efficiency82 and the
corrupt, party-controlled judicial system makes environmental protection
impossible. According to a 2014 study by Wai-Hang Yee et al. from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
Not only must

when adherence to the rule of law as a governance principle is an exception rather than the rule and the law is not
highly regarded as a legitimate source of authority, formal regulations fail to serve as a useful guide for the

The leadership
is reduced to rhetoric and issuing blunt measures , such as token crackdowns on polluters. Even
regulatees, who may not believe the regulators intend on enforcing the formal regulations.83

when a clean technology exists, it may not be used. As Xu Yuan at Princetons Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs details, sulfur dioxide scrubbers are installed at a large proportion of Chinese coal power plants

 a larger proportion than in the US but they often run only during inspections by government officials; otherwise
they tend to be turned off to save operating costs.84

Chinas central government is good at announcing targets to reduce emissions and

even installing controls sometimes but incapable of enforcing them.85 For years Chinas leaders
have promised to clean up the air and for years inspectors have been bribed to ignore infractions .
Local officials who are charged with carrying out central government environmental diktats often cannot
comply, being ill-equipped to meet the ever-growing list of environmental challenges central officials set for
them.86 Sometimes they simply dont want to. Instead, they welcome polluters, often job-creating
state-owned enterprises who will set up shop in their communities, bringing bribes, taxes, and revenue from fines
with them.87 Air quality understandably worsens.

Warming Advantage

1NC Warming Advantage

The Paris Agreement solves the internal link---it allows
comparison and resolves concerns of inequality
Baker & McKenzie 16 international law firm, worked closely with parties at
COP 21, The Paris Agreement: Putting the first universal climate change treaty in
context, January 2016,
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Environmental/ar_global_cl
imatechangetreaty_jan16.pdf
An important issue negotiated in the COP was the ability for Parties to compare
progress to achieve NDCs in a consistent and transparent manner. To that end, the Paris
Agreement includes a transparency framework that will be established by a future COP
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (to be known as the CMA), which allows the Parties the
ability to track progress towards the well-below 2C target, drawing on some of the existing UNFCCC mechanisms

Future CMA guidance will be developed to ensure

measurement promotes environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy , completeness,
comparability, and consistency and avoids double counting. The framework should include Parties providing a
(e.g. international assessments).

national inventory report on emissions and sources using IPCC-accepted methodology and information necessary to
track progress on NDCs.
4 Differentiation Between Developed and Developing Parties
Although the Paris Agreement calls for all countries to make ambitious emission reduction pledges and a

the Agreement differentiates between the

obligations of developed and developing country governments with respect to
achieving such pledges.
transparency framework to monitor such pledges,

The Agreement states that developed countries should have absolute economy-wide targets; whereas developing

the
Agreement compels developed countries to include whole of economy targets ,
whereas developing countries can scale up to such targets. Despite this, the Paris Agreement
countries should "move over time" towards economy-wide reductions or limitation targets. In other words,

takes a softer approach to differentiation between developing and developed countries to reflect changes in some
countries' economic situation since the adoption of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. The Agreement takes a selfdifferentiation approach. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC, where countries are annexed in

the Paris Agreement does not cross reference these previous annexes
does it define the terms "developed" and "developing ", allowing countries to self
assess where they fit on the developed/developing spectrum and thus intending that the
agreement have greater longevity than previous climate agreements.
developed/developing categories,
nor

Linkage of emissions trading systems fails---laundry list of

obstacles to effective implementation
Daniel Bodansky 14, Foundation Professor of Law, ASU Sandra Day OConnor
College of Law, expert on international environmental policy, Facilitating Linkage of
Heterogeneous Regional, National, and Sub-National Climate Policies Through a
Future International Agreement, November 2014,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-ieta-linkage-paper-nov-2014.pdf
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-ieta-linkage-paper-nov-2014.pdf
2.4 Challenges of Linkage

The advantages of linkage are real, but linkage also

these challenges are economic, others are political.

brings with it a number of challenges. Some of

2.4.1 Economics

linkage has the potential to improve the costeffectiveness of a pair of linked policies only if there is sufficient environmental integrity in
both systems with respect to their monitoring, reporting, and verification
requirements (Ranson and Stavins, 2013a). If one jurisdiction in a linked pair or large set of linked jurisdictions
First, it is important to recognize that

lacks the capacity or motivation to track emissions and emission allowances accurately (and/or the capacity or

loopholes will be exploited throughout

the system, damaging the cost-effectiveness of the full set of linked policies. This
can create significant barriers to linkage between nations with different levels of environmental and
motivation to measure and verify offset credits), these

financial 8 FACILITATING LINKAGE OF HETEROGENEOUS REGIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUB-NATIONAL CLIMATE

POLICIES THROUGH A FUTURE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT management (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).7 On the
other hand, linkage could encourage the development of stronger systems: a desire to link between two countries
or regions might induce the party with the weaker system to improve the environmental integrity of its system in
order to persuade the other party to link.

Linkage itself can undermine environmental integrity. For example, linkage can
result in double counting if transfers between countries are not properly accounted
for and if, as a result, the same emissions reduction is counted towards compliance in
more than one national system.
Strategic behavior could also produce adverse economic consequences in a set of
linked systems. In a game-theoretic analysis of two countries setting their emissions caps (and thereby, their
reduction targets), Helm (2003) examines the incentives of two countries that wish to link but assign different
values to emissions reductions. Suppose that Country A adopts an ambitious emissions cap that leads to high
allowance prices, reflecting the high value it places on emissions reductions. Country B may assign a lower value to
its emissions reductions, and thus sets a domestic cap on emissions that produces a lower domestic allowance price

If Country B anticipates linking with Country A, it may have an incentive

to loosen its domestic cap even more, so that the post-linkage emissions price
more closely reflects its domestic benefits from emissions reductions . This can lead
to disparities in ambition that could complicate efforts to link.8 However, multilateral linkage
than Country A.

would reduce the power of one jurisdiction to influence the international price by adjusting its own cap.

The Paris agreement is structurally unable to affect the

climate, which means the plan cant make it any better
WSJ 15, Wall Street Journal editorial board, Well Always Have the Illusions of
Paris, 12/1/15, http://www.wsj.com/articles/well-always-have-the-illusions-of-paris1449015377
China (the No. 1 emitter) and India (No. 3) wont undermine
their economic growth or stop eradicating desperate poverty to assuage Western neuralgia.
World-wide, some 1.3 billion people still live without electricity . So the negotiators simply
The problem is that countries like

gave up the pretense of trying to agree to a legally binding agreement.

countries will volunteer their own random carbon emissions-reduction targets

with no global goals. There are no
consequences for failing to comply or even common standards for measuring improvement. In echtInstead,

and the actions they may or may not take to meet them,

United Nations idiom, these pledges are called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, or INDCs.

The Chinese INDC says carbon emissions will peak sometime before 2030, maybe, unless they dont. And even this
vague aspiration was determined before the Communist Party revealed that

China burned 17% more

coal per year than it formerly disclosed.

But no INDC exposes the Paris farce better than Americas. Mr. Obama promises that the U.S. will reduce CO2
emissions by 26% to 28% from 2005 levels by 2025. According to the Environmental Protection Agencys
greenhouse gas inventory, that would be some 1.8 billion fewer tons of CO2-equivalent in a decade. Yet the U.S.
INDC outlines only about a billion tons, 45% short of the goal.

the reductions the Administration has identified touch everything from

coal-fired power plants to landfill management to efficiency standards for home
appliances. Mr. Obama doesnt lack ambition so much as legal authority; most of these unilateral rules
are being challenged in the courts. Yet his green diplomats still cant explain how the
U.S. will meet the targets they are selling in Paris.
Keep in mind that

Not that Mr. Obamas plan wont damage U.S. jobs and living standards. Energy-intensive industries like
manufacturing, chemicals, cement and pulp and paper will be particular victims and may decamp for overseas. The
President is trading away the competitive advantage of cheap U.S. natural gas for a bag of anticarbon promises.

nothing that emerges from Paris will have a discernible effect on world
temperatures. Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology studied the INDCs that
have been released so far and concluded that temperatures in 2100 will rise 3.7 degrees
Celsius if they are followed to the letter. Then again, these are the same scientific models that
Moreover,

predicted much higher temperatures than weve had.

Most
developing-world INDCs are conditioned on an enormous wealth transfer . To try to
The other big item on the Paris agenda is the one that these confabs always come down tocash.

resuscitate talks in 2009, Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State pledged a $100 billion public-private fund that would
flow to poorer nations for climate mitigation. But the poor countries have wised up and are now demanding much
more for climate justice.

Catastrophic warming inevitable even if all emissions are cut

Anthony Chavez 13, Associate Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law,
Northern Kentucky University, A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: The
Geoengineering Branch, Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment 5.1, 9/1/13, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1078&context=jece
[Graphs omitted]
Even if we eliminate the anthropogenic sources27 of global warming immediately
and completely, the global temperature will continue to rise for decades before
it stabilizes.28 Several factors will cause this continued rise.29 First, carbon dioxide (CO2), which remains
in the atmosphere for centuries, will continue to trap heat.30 Second, the thermal inertia of the
Earths oceans means that they absorb heat and radiate it gradually, for hundreds of
years.31 Second, feedbacks increase the rate of global warming. First, although natural processes, such as
photosynthesis and absorption by ocean waters, remove some of the anthropogenic CO2 that is released into the
atmosphere, these processes cannot remove all such CO2, meaning that CO2 will continue to accumulate
in the atmosphere.33 Moreover, natural processes become less successful at removing CO2 as emissions
increase,34 and climate change itself suppresses carbon absorption by both land and ocean processes. Second,

because of the thermal inertia of the Earths oceans, the global temperature will
continue to rise, even if carbon emissions were to cease.36 Thus, the warming currently
experienced is only about sixty percent of the warming that would be expected at the atmospheres current level of
CO2 concentration.37 For this reason,

were society to stop emitting all carbon today, the

planets temperature would not immediately return to pre-industrial levels or even stabilize.38
Actually, the temperature would continue to increase for a few decades ,39 and only then
remain at that new level for at least one thousand years. Third, not only will global warming continue for several

the rate of warming will increase due to carbon-cycle feedback cycles

that accelerate warming.41 Indeed, models suggest that feedbacks will more than double
the direct effect of increasing CO2 levels without feedbacks .42 For example, feedbacks
are accelerating the rate at which the Arctic ice cap melts.43 As the global temperature has
decades, but

warmed, less snow has fallen on the Arctic ice cap.44 Because snow reflects approximately eighty-five percent of
the sunlight that it receives,45 snow acts as sunscreen for ice. The decline in snowfall has exposed ice to sunlight,
which increases melting.46 As the melting increases, the planetary surface albedo47 decreases, thus prompting
greater melting.48 Ocean waters absorb almost ten times more solar radiation than does sea ice, thereby

Additional feedbacks will accelerate the rate at which the

atmosphere warms.51 Such feedbacks include, among others, the increase of water vapor,52
the weakening of carbon sinks,53 and the impairment of terrestrial hydrology and its
increasing temperatures.

impact on vegetation.54 C. Mitigation Alone Is Unlikely to Avert Significant Climate Change For several reasons,

mitigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent significant climate change.

First, international agreements to reduce emissions have had limited success , and are
unlikely to be successful in the future.55 Second, implementation of alternative energy
technologies is unlikely to take effect soon enough to avert significant temperature increases.56
Finally, scientists now believe that initial targets for acceptable warming were too lenient, necessitating a stronger
response to climate change than previously anticipated.57 To avoid catastrophic climate change,

international agreements have set goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions .58 The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)59 set an overall framework for
intergovernmental efforts to address climate change.60 In 1997, the parties to the UNFCCC developed the Kyoto
Protocol,61 which committed industrialized nations to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2012.62
These countries committed themselves to collective reductions averaging more than five percent from 1990

emissions have continued their upward trajectory .64 As of

collective emissions had dropped only 1.4% below their 1990 emissions .65 At
the same time, emissions from the non-industrialized countries had increased by
100.6% over 1990 levels, so that combined global emissions had increased by 34.7% since 1990.66 As
emissions levels.63 Unfortunately,
2007, their

discussed below in Part IV, similar efforts are likely to be unsuccessful in the future. Second, even if nations decide

structural aspects of the energy industry , which generates one-quarter of

will require decades to convert a significant portion of the
industry to clean technologies.68 Although society adopts certain technologies with lightning rapidity,69
to reduce CO2 emissions,

global greenhouse gases,67

conversion to new energy technologies occurs much more slowly.70 Indeed, two laws of energy technology

the energy industry requires several decades to adopt and

implement new technologies.71 On average, energy technologies have required thirty
years to advance from being technically available to reaching materiality .72 This pattern
development dictate that

was consistent across all technologies, including nuclear power, natural gas, biofuels, wind, and solar photovoltaic.
Figure 274 below illustrates that several energy technologies grew during the last century in accordance with these
laws: Adoption of new technologies in the energy field requires significant time because of several inherent
characteristics of the power industry. First, historical patterns show that the industry needs almost a full decade to
build and test new technologies: three years to build a demonstration plant, one year to commence operations, and

massive amounts of
capital must be invested to alter significantly the mix of energy sources ,76 amounts
that dwarf the scale of the industry .77 Third, once a technology reaches materiality, growth rates
two to five years to identify problems and reach satisfactory operability.75 Second,

flatten (see Figure 3).78 This growth trend results in part from the nature of energy infrastructure. Power plants
have average lives of twenty-five to fifty years, though some have operational lives of up to 100 years.79
Consequently, only two to four percent of existing sources require replacement in a given year.80 Besides replacing

conversion to renewable energy systems will often require other

developments, such as land acquisitions, different transmission methods, enabling
technologies, market systems, and other changes, which may not yet be
foreseeable. Royal Dutch Shell projected that renewable sources of energy could reach materiality by 2030,
power plants,

sooner than others have forecast.82 Royal Dutch Shell further projected that by 2050 total energy demand would
be one-third lower than a business-as-usual scenario.83 Even if these projections are correct, CO2 concentrations

current emissions
targets, but scientists now believe that even these targets are not stringent enough.85 Despite
mitigation efforts during the past three decades, atmospheric CO2 concentrations have risen
steadily.86 Figure 387 presents the atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1980 During this period,
would not stabilize until they reached 550 ppm.84 Not only are we unlikely to meet

atmospheric CO2 increased from 338.7 ppm to 393.8 ppm, a rise of 16.3%.88 Atmospheric CO2 increased every

Since 2002, annual CO2

concentrations have increased on average by 2 ppm per year .91 Thus, not only are targets
year.89 Furthermore, the annual increase in CO2 is actually rising.90

in international agreements too difficult to achieve,92 they may also be too lenient.93 The following example
illustrates the obstacles that prevent abatement of atmospheric levels of CO2. At the 2010 UN Climate Change
Summit in Cancun, the delegates agreed to limit warming to a global mean temperature increase of two degrees
Celsius,94 which requires an atmospheric content of 450 ppm of CO2. 95 To achieve this target, global emissions
immediately need to begin declining by more than one percent per year,96 in contrast to the annual global
increase.97 Small delays in emissions cuts, moreover, necessitate much larger reductions in future emissions.98

Delay causes the atmospheric CO2 to peak higher and later, thus necessitating
much sharper cuts to attain the same level.99 For this reason, stabilization at 450 ppm
appears to be virtually impossible even if aggressive mitigation were to
begin today. Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult to achieve,101 these
targets may also be too lenient.102 Scientists have set a rise of two degrees Celsius as a target to avert
catastrophic consequences. Recent analyses, however, suggest that this rise would be too high.104
Comparison to prehistoric records indicate that the current level of CO2 (approximately 394 ppm) is
already too high to maintain current planetary conditions.105 Indeed, current analyses
suggest that 2 C warming may cause significant sea-level rises, storms, floods,
droughts, and heat waves.106 Maintaining climate conditions comparable to those of the Holocene Era,
during which civilization developed, requires reducing the atmospheric CO2 level to 350 ppm.10

No impact to warming---new data proves

Matt Ridley 13, Ph.D. in Zoology from Oxford, worked for the Economist for nine
years as science editor, Washington correspondent and American editor, fellow of
the Royal Society of Literature and of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and a
foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 9/17/13,
Dialing Back the Alarm on Climate Change,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873245490045790675324857
12464?mod=trending_now_1&mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com
%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887324549004579067532485712464.html%3Fmod
%3Dtrending_now_1
Later this month, a long-awaited event that last happened in 2007 will recur. Like a returning comet, it will be taken to portend ominous happenings. I

the

IPCC) "fifth assessment report

refer to
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (
," part of which will be published on
Sept. 27. There have already been leaks from this 31-page document, which summarizes 1,914 pages of scientific discussion, but thanks to a senior
climate scientist, I have had a glimpse of the key prediction at the heart of the document. The big news is that, for the first time since these reports

dials back the alarm . It states that the temperature rise we can
expect as a result of man-made emissions of carbon dioxide is lower than the IPCC thought in
2007 . Admittedly, the change is small, and because of changing definitions, it is not easy to compare the two reports, but retreat it is. It is
started coming out in 1990, the new one

significant because it points to the very real possibility that, over the next several generations, the overall effect of climate change will be positive for

equilibrium climate sensitivity" (ECS)eventual warming

induced by a doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which takes hundreds of years to occur is "extremely likely" to be
above 1 degree Celsius (1.8 degrees Fahrenheit), "likely" to be above 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.4 degrees Fahrenheit)
and "very likely" to be below 6 degrees Celsius (10.8 Fahrenheit). In 2007, the IPPC said it was "likely" to be above
humankind and the planet. Specifically, the draft report says that "

2 degrees Celsius and "very likely" to be above 1.5 degrees, with no upper limit. Since "extremely" and "very" have specific and different statistical
meanings here, comparison is difficult. Still,

the downward movement since 2007 is clear, especially at the bottom

A more immediately
relevant measure of likely warming has also come down: "transient climate
response" (TCR)the actual temperature change expected from a doubling of carbon
dioxide about 70 years from now, without the delayed effects that come in the next century. The new report will say that
this change is "likely" to be 1 to 2.5 degrees Celsius and " extremely unlikely" to be
greater than 3 degrees . This again is lower than when last estimated in 2007 ("very likely" warming of 1 to 3 degrees Celsius, based on
models, or 1 to 3.5 degrees, based on observational studies). Most experts believe that warming of less than 2
degrees C elsius from preindustrial levels will result in no net economic and ecological damage .
Therefore, the new report is effectively saying (based on the middle of the range of the IPCC's emissions scenarios) that there is a better
than 50-50 chance that by 2083, the benefits of climate change will still outweigh
the harm. Warming of up to 1.2 degrees Celsius over the next 70 years (0.8 degrees have already occurred), most of which is predicted to
of the "likely" range. The most probable value (3 degrees Celsius last time) is for some reason not stated this time.

happen in cold areas in winter and at night, would extend the range of farming further north, improve crop yields, slightly increase rainfall (especially in

Increased carbon dioxide

levels also have caused and will continue to cause an increase in the growth rates of
crops and the greening of the Earthbecause plants grow faster and need less water when carbon dioxide concentrations
are higher. Up to two degrees of warming , these benefits will generally outweigh the
harmful effects, such as more extreme weather or rising sea levels, which even the IPCC concedes will be only about 1 to 3 feet during this
period. Yet these latest IPCC estimates of climate sensitivity may still be too high. They
don't adequately reflect the latest rash of published papers estimating "equilibrium
climate sensitivity" and "transient climate response" on the basis of observations,
most of which are pointing to an even milder warming . This was already apparent last year
with two papersby scientists at the University of Illinois and Oslo University in Norway finding
a lower ECS than assumed by the models . Since then, three new papers conclude that ECS
is well below the range assumed in the models . The most significant of these, published
in Nature Geoscience by a team including 14 lead authors of the forthcoming IPCC
scientific report , concluded that "the most likely value of equilibrium climate sensitivity
based on the energy budget of the most recent decade is 2 .0 degrees Celsius ." Two
recent papers (one in the Journal of the American Meteorological Society, the other in the journal Earth System Dynamics) estimate that
TCR is probably around 1.65 degrees Celsius. That's uncannily close to the estimate of 1.67 degrees reached in 1938 by Guy
arid areas), enhance forest growth and cut winter deaths (which far exceed summer deaths in most places).

Callendar, a British engineer and pioneer student of the greenhouse effect. A Canadian mathematician and blogger named Steve McIntyre has pointed out
that Callendar's model does a better job of forecasting the temperature of the world between 1938 and now than do modern models that "hindcast" the
same data. The significance of this is that Callendar assumed that carbon dioxide acts alone, whereas the modern models all assume that its effect is
amplified by water vapor. There is not much doubt about the amount of warming that carbon dioxide can cause. There is much more doubt about whether
net amplification by water vapor happens in practice or is offset by precipitation and a cooling effect of clouds. Since the last IPCC report in 2007, much

It is now more than 15 years since global average temperature rose

significantly. Indeed, the IPCC chairman Rajendra Pachauri has conceded that the "pause" already may have lasted for 17 years, depending on
which data set you look at. A recent study in Nature Climate Change by Francis Zwiers and
colleagues of the University of Victoria, British Columbia, found that models have
overestimated warming by 100% over the past 20 years . Explaining this failure is
now a cottage industry in climate science . At first, it was hoped that an underestimate of sulfate pollution from industry
has changed.

(which can cool the air by reflecting heat back into space) might explain the pause, but the science has gone the other wayreducing its estimate of

a favorite explanation is that the heat is hiding in the deep ocean. Yet the
data to support this thesis come from ocean buoys and deal in hundredths of a
degree of temperature change, with a measurement error far larger than that . Moreover,
ocean heat uptake has been slowing over the past eight years . The most plausible
explanation of the pause is simply that climate sensitivity was overestimated in the models
because of faulty assumptions about net amplification through water-vapor
feedback. This will be a topic of heated debate at the political session to rewrite the report in Stockholm, starting on Sept. 23, at which issues other
sulfate cooling. Now

than the actual science of climate change will be at stake.

Sustained economic growth will vastly outpace warming--ensures even poor countries can adapt easily
Indur M. Goklany 11, science and technology policy analyst and Assistant
Director of Programs, Science and Technology Policy for the United States
Department of the Interior; was associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change off and on for 20 years as an author, expert reviewer and U.S.
delegate, December 2011, Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and
others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming, online:
http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf
It is frequently asserted that climate change could have devastating consequences for
poor countries. Indeed, this assertion is used by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
and other organizations as one of the primary justifications for imposing restrictions on human emissions of
greenhouse gases.
But there is an internal contradiction in the IPCCs own claims. Indeed, the same highly influential report from the
IPCC claims both that poor countries will fare terribly and that they will be much better off than they are today. So,
which is it?

the IPCC assesses impacts. The process

begins with various scenarios of future emissions. These scenarios are themselves
predicated on certain assumptions about the rate of economic growth and related
technological change.
The apparent contradiction arises because of inconsistencies in the way

Under the IPCCs highest growth scenario, by 2100 GDP per capita in poor countries
will be double the U.S.s 2006 level, even taking into account any negative
impact of climate change. (By 2200, it will be triple.) Yet that very same scenario is
also the one that leads to the greatest rise in temperatureand is the one that has
been used to justify all sorts of scare stories about the impact of climate change on the poor.

Under this highest growth scenario (known as A1FI), the poor will logically have adopted,
adapted and innovated all manner of new technololgies, making them far better
able to adapt to the future climate. But these improvements in adaptive
capacity are virtually ignored by most global warming impact assessments.
Consequently, the IPCCs impacts assessments systematically overestimate the
negative impact of global warming, while underestimating the positive impact.

2NC SQ Solves---Paris
The Paris agreement also solves transparency and monitoring
Charlotte Streck 16, co-founder and director of Climate Focus, serves as an
advisor to numerous governments and non-profit organizations, private companies,
and foundations on legal aspects of climate policy, international negotiations, policy
development and implementation, The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning, Journal
for European Environmental and Planning Law, Volume 13, 2016, pp. 3-29,
http://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/The%20Paris%20Agreement%20A
%20New%20Beginning.pdf
With its focus on voluntary contributions the PA depends on a mechanism that allows individual Parties and the COP
to assess whether Parties are on track to meeting the overall objective of the Agreement. Only if there is

The
Agreement therefore foresees a process that evaluates the progress of individual
Parties in meeting their NDCs, and another mechanism that looks at the overall
accumulated progress in avoiding dangerous climate change.
transparent tracking of progress will it be possible to adjust and sufficiently strengthen the ambition of NDCs.

Article 13 establishes an enhanced transparency framework for action and support

that will provide a clear understanding of mitigation action and available climate finance. Parties will have to collect
and make available information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its NDC and keep
track of their emissions in national inventory reports. In terms of support, developed Parties shall provide
information on financial, technology transfer and capacity building support provided to developing Parties.
Developing Parties shall provide information on support needed and received.
The way in which progress in achieving NDCs could be verified was deeply contested in Paris with a majority of
countries arguing in favour of an independent review of country actions. A number of larger developing countries

The compromise consists in a technical

expert group which will review information provided. Information submitted by
countries will undergo a technical expert review (Art. 13.11). The experts will check the
were sceptical or rejected outright third-party overview.

consistency of information provided and identify areas of improvement. The transparency framework hence
contains elements of a third party review while being facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive [in] manner,

The fact that the new transparency framework will

for the first time review the emissions of all Parties can be considered a
significant step towards improving data and increasing transparency around national
respectful of national sovereignty (Art. 13.3).

and global emissions and mitigation actions.

the COP will take stock of the implementation

of the Agreement every five years (Art. 14.2). The first stocktaking is scheduled for 2023. Before that,
the supporting COP decision also mandates a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018
to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term
To ensure that the Agreement generally is on track,

emissions goals (Para. 20 of the Decision). The stocktake is as an opportunity to assess whether collective
mitigation action as expressed in NDCs is consistent with meeting the global temperature goals of the Paris
Agreement, which is particularly important given the gap in mitigation commitments in intended NDCs (see Para. 17
of the Decision). Beyond mitigation, the stocktake has a wide remit, and covers all of the procedural and
substantive elements of the Paris Agreement.

2NC SQ Solves---Renewables
Renewable growth is feasible and occurring now---technical
challenges are being overcome
Joe Romm 16, Fellow at American Progress and is the Founding Editor of Climate
Progress, Why The Renewables Revolution Is Now Unstoppable, 2/1/16,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/02/01/3743082/renewables-revolution/
Part One of this series explained why the International Energy Agency now projects that, for the planet as a whole, Driven

by

continued policy support, renewables account for half of additional global

generation, overtaking coal around 2030 to become the largest power source.
Part Two explained why renewables are going to grow so quickly in this country over the next couple of decades, especially wind and

it is turning out to be less

challenging than expected to incorporate more and more renewables into the
electric grid and to handle periods of time when demand is high but the wind isnt blowing and/or the sun isnt shining. As
the lead energy specialist at the World Bank, Morgan Bazilian, told Bloomberg after 20 years studying this issue, Very high
levels of variable renewable energy can be accommodated both technically and
at low cost. One very basic strategy is an improved electricity transmission
system. After all, the sun is shining or winds are blowing somewhere across the U nited
States all of the time, as NOAA explained in a news release for a new analysis. Researchers concluded that with
improvements in transmission infrastructure, weather-driven renewable resources could supply most
of the nations electricity at costs similar to todays. According to Alexander MacDonald, co-lead
solar power, at the expense of both coal and natural gas. In this post Ill discuss why

author and recently retired director of NOAAs Earth System Research Laboratory, Our research shows a transition to a reliable, lowcarbon, electrical generation and transmission system can be accomplished with commercially available technology and within 15
years. Quite separate from improving transmission, there are two primary ways the intermittency challenge posed by solar and

half or more of the intermittency problem is really a

predictability problem. If we could predict with high accuracy wind availability and
solar availability 24 to 36 hours in advance at a regional level, then electricity operators have many
strategies available to them. For instance, operators could plan to bring online a backup plant that otherwise needs
wind power is being addressed today. First,

several hours to warm up. An even cheaper way to fill the gap from clouds or a lull in winds is to use demand response, which
involves paying commercial, industrial, and even residential customers to reduce electricity demand given a certain amount of
advance warning. As noted in Part Two, the recent Supreme Court decision in favor of demand response puts efficiency and demand
reduction on a level playing field with generation, which means were going to see a lot more of both in the coming years, since they
are the biggest and cheapest new sources of electricity by far. The Courts 6-2 decision means consumers will now have an
opportunity to receive more value from the new energy technology they put into their homes and businesses, as former Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission Chair Jon Wellinghoff explained. It will also mean the expansion of more clean distributed
resources. Heres why: This is because a smart thermostat not only will lower your bills by more precisely controlling the amount
of heating or cooling energy you use; it will also provide you revenue by being able to participate in demand response programs in
the wholesale energy markets. This also applies to all other controls for appliances in the home, to solar PV systems on the roof, to
batteries and even plug-in electric vehicles. Now, utilities dont have to buy a bunch of expensive, dirty fossil-fuel fired power
plants that run only a short period of time each year during peak demand (or, say, when it is unexpectedly cloudy or windless) at
a very high cost per kilowatt-hour. They can simply bid for demand response resources, which are much cheaper (and, of course,
generate no pollution). Wellinghoff notes, And it applies not only to consumers in their homes, but businesses too. Large
commercial and industrial (C&I) customers with the ability to bid demand response into the wholesale market are now assured the

new
technology is increasingly making it less and less likely for there to be an
unexpectedly cloudy or windless day. As a 2014 article on Smart Wind and Solar Power in Technology Review
put it, Big data and artificial intelligence are producing ultra-accurate forecasts
that will make it feasible to integrate much more renewable energy into the grid. Its
already happening: Wind power forecasts of unprecedented accuracy are making
it possible for Colorado to use far more renewable energy , at lower cost, than utilities ever thought
ability to do so, which will benefit the C&I customer and the system as a whole. A key point, though, is that

possible. The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder makes these forecasts using artificial-intelligence-based
software along with data from weather satellites, weather stations, and other wind farms in the state. And that helped Xcel
Energy, a major power producer in the state, set a remarkable record in 2013 during

one hour, 60 percent of

its electricity for Colorado was coming from the wind . A second way to deal with
the variability of wind and solar photovoltaics is to integrate electricity storage into
the grid. That way, excess electricity when it is windy or sunny can be stored for when it isnt. The biggest source of electricity
storage on the grid today is pumped storage at hydroelectric plants. In such plants, water can be pumped from a reservoir at a
lower level to one at a higher level when there is excess electricity or when electricity can be generated at a low cost. Then, during a
period of high electricity demand, which is typically a period of high electricity price, water in the upper reservoir is allowed to run
through the hydroelectric plants turbines to produce electricity for immediate sale. In the International Energy Agencys 2012
Technology Roadmap: Hydropower, Pumped

storage hydropower capacities would be multiplied

by a factor of 3 to 5, by 2050. The pumped storage will likely be the most useful in China and other developing
countries, which is where most of the growth in hydropower is projected to come. The round-trip efficiency for pumped storage
the fraction of the original energy retained after the water is pumped up and comes back down is 70 percent to 85 percent. That
means 15 percent to 30 percent of the original energy is lost, which is quite good as storage systems go. Consider if you wanted to
use hydrogen as the way to store power, using electrolyzers to convert the electricity to hydrogen, then storing hydrogen on-site
until the electricity is needed, and finally running the hydrogen through a fuel cell to generate electricity again. Losses would likely
exceed 50 percent, perhaps by a lot. That is a great deal of premium low-carbon electricity to lose, which suggests that fuel cells will
only be used for storage in niche applications for quite some time. On the other hand, the round-trip efficiency storing electricity in
batteries is comparable to the round-trip efficiency of pumped storage. The problem has been that, until recently, batteries have

battery prices
are coming down sharply, as huge investments are being made in various types of
battery technologies by electric car companies and others, including utilities. Thats a key reason battery storage for the
electric grid use has started to grow rapidly in this country and around the world. Moreover, in the (slightly) longer term, as the
stunning drop in battery prices continues to spur exponential growth in electric
vehicles (EVs), it may be possible to access their batteries during the more than 90 percent of the time the EVs are parked.
been too expensive for them to be used on a wide scale in most storage applications. But as Ive discussed,

That would potentially allow electric cars to provide storage or other valuable grid services.

2NC ETS Cooperation Fails

The Chinese emissions trading scheme fails---its too large and
complex for them to handle
Jeff Swartz 16, International Policy Director, International Emissions Trading
Association, Chinas National Emissions Trading System: Implications for Carbon
Markets and Trade, March 2016,
http://www.ieta.org/resources/China/Chinas_National_ETS_Implications_for_Carbon_
Markets_and_Trade_ICTSD_March2016_Jeff_Swartz.pdf
4.8 Challenges for Chinas National ETS
Chinas national ETS will be designed based on best practices and lessons learned from the seven ETS pilots and
other ETS jurisdictions, but it will also be shaped to function in the context of Chinas socialist market economy and

Chinas national ETS is likely to face many challenges in

areas that are critical for the good functioning of ETSs. Those issues include:
the staterun electricity market.45

Under the ETS pilots, compliance has been enforced at the

local provincial or municipal level. This has allowed for the operators to negotiate their free allocation
relatively easily and to be in constant contact with their regulators. Under a national ETS, there will be
less flexibility for local DRCs to negotiate free allocation for operators and enforce
compliance in a local context (see the case of Shanghai in Section 4.5) until Chinas State Council
Enforcement and compliance:

regulation on enforcing the ETS is implemented at both the national and provincial levels. The administrative

in the future where the

total number of operators is much greater than currently in the ETS pilots . Such
burden of enforcing compliance will fall on the NDRC and this could pose challenges

challenges largely involve expanding the institutional and staffing arrangements for the NDRCs Climate Change
Department which is a smaller department than other more established units at the NDRC. Like many energy and
environmental regulations in China, the NDRCs compliance provisions will need to have a strong buy-in by local
DRCs for the ETS to be effectively enforced.
Carbon intensity target: Chinas INDC is to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by 60 to 65 percent by

The NDRC will

need to strongly enforce the intensity targets in order for the ETS to function
effectively, as an intensity target does not discourage companies from decreasing
overall production. Allocations under intensity targets are adjusted ex-post, and this could lead to
2030. This differs from an absolute cap on emissions like the EU or California has imposed.

overallocation or liquidity problems down the road for the national ETS.
Allocation: Most of the seven ETS pilots have over-allocated emissions permits and
done so for free in order to generously compensate operators for their initial participation. The NDRC will have to
weigh carefully the merits and risks of over-allocation in the national ETS in order to avoid a policy outcome similar
to what has caused the current surplus of allowances in the EU ETS, for example. The NDRC should consider moving
towards auctioning over time as other ETS jurisdictions have done.

the sheer size of

Chinas national ETS and the number of potential companies and installations that
will be included will prove to be a challenge in scaling-up MRV across the country. It could take
MRV: While China has set up a robust MRV programme under the seven ETS pilots,

several years for the MRV process in China to be reliable enough for the government to move away from free
allocation to auctioning and this could also delay any subsequent policy discussions on linkage with other ETSs.

Trading in the seven ETS pilots to date has been very low and
this has caused liquidity to be abnormally low compared to other cap-and-trade
programmes. Low liquidity and low trading volumes have made it difficult for the seven ETS pilots to show that
Low liquidity and trading:

they are more than just compliance mechanisms. Liquidity has increased, however, with non-Chinese trading
houses being permitted to trade in some of the ETS pilots (Shenzhen, Guangdong, Hubei, and Shanghai). The

national ETS will need to be effective in design so as not to over-allocate allowances and to allow for trading to be
conducted in both spot and exchange transactions. China will also need to introduce carbon trading options
(futures, forwards, etc.) in order for liquidity to be robust, and for the uniformity of its carbon units to be compatible
with any jurisdiction it could link with. China is likely to establish a price containment mechanism to keep prices
stable, but details are not yet available.

2NC Warming Irreversible

Warmings irreversible---itll continue to get worse, even with
zero emissions
Nathan Gillett 11, Manager and Research Scientist, Canadian Centre for Climate
Modeling and Analysis, et al, 1/9/11, Ongoing climate change following a complete
cessation of carbon dioxide emissions, Nature Geoscience 4, p. 8387
Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced global mean
temperature change is irreversible on human timescales1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. We find that not
only is this climate change irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as
Antarctic temperature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate changes are simulated to
continue to worsen for many centuries even after a complete cessation of
emissions . Although it is also well known that a large committed thermosteric sea level rise is expected even
after a cessation of emissions in 2100, our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern
Ocean warming at intermediate depths suggests that this effect may be compounded by ice
shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marinebased sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres. Quantitative
results presented here are subject to uncertainties associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat

our findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern

Hemisphere warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone, and delayed and ongoing
ocean warming at intermediate depths following a cessation of emissions are likely
to be robust. Geoengineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed as a response measure in
uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but

the event of a rapid melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a melting were
driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be
ineffective for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with subsurface ocean warming.

Warming inevitable
Brad Plumer 14, senior editor at Vox, former blogger for the Washington Post,
Two degrees: How the world failed on climate change, 4/22/14,
http://www.vox.com/2014/4/22/5551004/two-degrees
Two decades later, theres just one major problem with this picture.

The idea that the world can stay below

2C looks increasingly delusional. Consider: the Earths average temperature has already risen 0.8C since the 19th
century. And if you look at the current rapid rise in global greenhouse-gas emissions, well likely put enough carbon
in the atmosphere by mid-century to surpass the 2C limit and go past the 4C
limit by century's end. Thats well above anything once deemed "dangerous."
Getting back on track for 2C would, at this point, entail the sort of drastic
emissions cuts usually associated with economic calamities, like the collapse of the Soviet
Union or the 2008 financial crisis. And wed have to repeat those cuts for decades. The climate community has been slow
to concede defeat. Back in 2007, the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published a report noting that the world
could stay below 2C but only if we started cutting emissions immediately. The years passed, countries did little, and emissions

We just
need to act more drastically and figure out some way to pull carbon dioxide back out of the
atmosphere. (Never mind that we still dont have the technology to do the latter.) "At some point, scientists will
have to declare that its game over for the 2C target ," says Oliver Geden, a climate policy analyst at
kept rising. So, just this month, the IPCC put out a new report saying, OK, not great, but we can still stay under 2C.

the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. "But they havent yet. Because nobody knows what will happen if they
call this thing off." The 2C target was one of the few things that everyone at global climate talks could agree on. If the goal turns

out to be impossible, people might just stop trying altogether. Recently, then, some scientists and policymakers have been taking a
fresh look at whether the 2C limit is still the best way to think about climate change. Is this simple goal actually making it harder to
prepare for the warming that lies ahead? Is it time to consider other approaches to climate policy? And if 2C really is so dangerous,
what do we do when its out of reach? The murky origins of the 2C limit Back in the 1970s, climate scientists understood that the
carbon dioxide that humans had been emitting since the Industrial Revolution from cars, power plants, factories was
intensifying the greenhouse effect that warms the planet. They also knew that man-made emissions were increasing each year as
the global economy grew. So how hot would it get? Early calculations suggested that if we doubled the amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere over pre-industrial levels, the Earth would warm somewhere between 1.5C and 4.5C. In the decades since,
scientists have amassed more evidence for this estimate of "climate sensitivity," but they haven't really narrowed the range. The
next step was to figure out how much warming humans could safely tolerate. There were a variety of ideas for defining "dangerous"
interference with the Earths climate in the early 1990s. Maybe we should try to limit the rate of warming per decade, for instance.
Eventually, the 2C limit won out endorsed by, among others, a council of German scientists advising Angela Merkel, the nations
environment minister at the time. Their thinking: human civilization had developed in a period when sea levels remained stable and
agriculture could flourish. Staying within that bound and preventing global average temperatures from rising more than 2C
seemed like a reasonable rule of thumb. "We said that, at the very least, it would be better not to depart from the conditions under
which our species developed," recalls Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, one of the scientists on that German advisory panel who helped
devise the 2C limit. "Otherwise wed be pushing the whole climate system outside the range weve adapted to." Over time,
researchers gravitated toward this limit. An influential 2001 report from the UNs Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
detailed a number of reasons to worry about climate change: increased heat waves and storms, the threat of mass extinctions,
severe economic losses. Many of these so-called "reasons of concern" were projected to get much worse as global warming climbed

the 2C limit is arbitrary. Any limit would be. For instance, subsequent
research has found that plenty of worrisome impacts actually happen well before we hit 2C:
Arctic sea ice could collapse, coral reefs could die off, tiny island nations like Tuvalu
could get swallowed by the rising seas. Conversely, other worrisome changes, such as crop damage in the United States,
might not happen until we go above the 2C threshold. Deciding where to draw this line is a political
judgment as much as a scientific one. (To put it another way, no climate scientist thinks we'll be totally fine if
past 2C. Now, there are good arguments that

we hit 1.9C of warming but totally doomed if we hit 2.1C.) Economists, meanwhile, have often criticized the 2C limit for not
taking costs into account. After all, we dont just burn oil, gas, and coal for fun. We use them to power our cars and homes and
factories. And cutting back won't be painless. William Nordhaus, an economist at Yale, has argued that we should aim
for a temperature limit where the costs of reducing fossil fuels matches the climate benefits. In his book The Climate Casino, he
pegs this limit at 2.5C or possibly higher, depending on how easily we can switch to clean energy sources. Still, despite the
criticisms, the 2C limit has maintained its dominant position for more than a decade in part because it created an easy focal
point for international negotiations. Many policy proposals start by assuming the need to stay below 2C and then work backward to
hash out how each country should cut emissions. The European Unions energy policies consistently reference this limit. The Obama
administrations upcoming rules to restrict carbon-dioxide emissions from US coal plants can be traced back to a pledge President
Obama made in 2009 to help stay below 2C. That raises a question: what will happen if it becomes apparent that the 2C limit is
out of reach? Will we settle on a new limit? Or just give up altogether? Why the 2C limit looks increasingly impossible Heres how
climate experts often think about the 2C limit. Estimates of climate sensitivity tell us that the Earth will eventually warm
somewhere between 1.5C and 4.5C if we double the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over pre-industrial levels. And

if we want reasonable odds of staying below 2C, theres

only so much more additional carbon dioxide we can put in the atmosphere. Thats our
"carbon budget" around 485 billion metric tons. Theres not a lot of wiggle room left. Humans
added the equivalent of 10 billion metric tons of carbon into the atmosphere in
2012, and that amount is rising every year, as fast-growing countries like China and
India build new factories, drive new cars, and burn lots of fossil fuels. At current rates, the
were almost halfway to doubling. So,

world will exhaust its carbon budget in roughly three decades, setting the stage for 2C of warming. (If climate sensitivity turns out

If we want to stay within the budget and avoid

2C, then, our annual emissions need to start declining each year . Older, dirtier coal plants
to be low, that only buys us an extra decade or so.)

would need to get replaced with cleaner wind or solar or nuclear plants, say. Or gas-guzzling SUVs would need to get replaced with

the longer we put this off, the harder it gets the carbon budget gets
countries have delayed action for so
long that the necessary emissions cuts will have to be extremely sharp. In April 2014,
new low-carbon electric cars. But

smaller, and there are more coal plants and SUVs to replace. By now,

the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that if we want to stay below the 2C limit, global
greenhouse-gas emissions would have to decline between 1.3 percent and 3.1 percent each year, on average, between 2010 and
2050. To put that in perspective, global emissions declined by just 1 percent for a single year after the 2008 financial crisis, during
a brutal recession when factories and buildings around the world were idling. We'd potentially have to triple that pace of cuts, and
sustain it year after year. Some climate experts are skeptical that countries can do this while maintaining their historical rates of
economic growth. The fastest that any country has ever managed to decarbonize its economy without suffering a crushing recession
was France, when it spent billions to scale up its nuclear program between 1980 and 1985. That was a gargantuan feat emissions

To stay within the 2C budget,

every country would have to keep up that pace for decades, decarbonizing not just
fell 4.8 percent per year but the country only sustained it for a five-year stretch.

power plants, but factories, and homes, and cars, and airplanes. That goes far
beyond even the most ambitious climate proposals currently being considered,
including Obama's big plan to curb emissions from US coal plants. "If youre serious about 2C, the rates of change are so
significant that it begs the way we see the world. Thats what people arent prepared to embrace," says Kevin Anderson, a climate
scientist at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Research. "Essentially youd have to start asking questions about our current society and
how we develop and grow." Anderson, for one, has argued that wealthy countries may need to sacrifice economic growth, at least
temporarily, to stay below 2C. In December, the Tyndall Centre hosted a conference on "radical emissions reductions" that offered
some eye-popping suggestions: Perhaps every adult in wealthy countries could get a personal "carbon budget" tracked through an
electronic credit card. Once they hit their limit, no more vacations or road trips. Other attendees suggested shaming campaigns
against celebrities with outsized homes and yachts. Not everyone is ready to go radical. The IPCCs latest report suggested that an
ambitious push on clean energy might only put a modest dent in global economic growth rates (a mere 0.06 percentage points per
year). That's partly because the cost of solar and wind power has been dropping far faster than anyone expected. But even when

staying below 2C would depend on a series of long-shot

maneuvers: all nations would need to act right this second, ramp up wind and solar
and nuclear power massively, and figure out still-nascent technologies to capture and bury
emissions from coal plants. Crucially, we'd also have to invent some method of pulling carbon
dioxide out of the atmosphere something that may never work on a large scale.
If any of those assumptions falter, the IPCC noted, costs start rising. And, as the years go by and the
you account for that, the IPCC figured that

worlds nations put off cutting emissions, the odds of staying below 2C look vanishingly unlikely. "Ten years ago, it was possible to
model a path to 2C without all these heroic assumptions," says Peter Frumhoff of the Union of Concerned Scientists. "But because
we've dallied for so long, that's no longer true." In February, Frumhoff co-authored a paper in Nature Climate Change arguing that
policymakers need to take the prospect of breaching the 2C limit far more seriously than they're currently doing. Otherwise, we'll
find ourselves unprepared for what comes next. Whats so bad about 3C or 4C? If 2C looks increasingly out of reach, then its

Four degrees (or 7.2 Fahrenheit) may

not sound like much. But the world was only about 4C to 7C cooler, on average, during the last ice age, when large
parts of Europe and the United States were covered by glaciers. The IPCC concluded that changing the worlds
temperature in the opposite direction could bring similarly drastic changes, such as
"substantial species extinctions," or irreversibly destabilizing Greenland's massive
ice sheet.
worth looking at what happens if we blow past that and go to, say, 3C or 4C.

2NC No Impact---Timeframe
No impact---long timeframe means mitigation and adaptation
will solve
Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School
of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, Climate Change
and Economic Growth, online:
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf
The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and
others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate
threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC
2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b),
precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and
between 2030 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events
such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate
hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless
greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious
problem that deserves attention, societys immediate behavior has an extremely low
probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics
of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to
only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century
(or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume
there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50
years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century
or even a millennium to unfold and many of these potential impacts will never
occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and
dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart longrange climate risks. What is
needed are longrun balanced responses.

Experts and the IPCC vote neg---long timeframe and we can

adapt
Richard Tol 14, Prof of the Economics of Climate Change at Vrije Universiteit and
of Economics at the University of Sussex, Author in Working Groups I, II and III of the
IPCC, author and editor of the UNEP Handbook on Methods for Climate Change
Impact Assessment and Adaptation Strategies, Editor of Energy Economics and
Associate Editor of Environmental and Resource Economics, PhD in Economics from
Vrije Universiteit, Mar 31 2014, Bogus prophecies of doom will not fix the climate,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8d011fa-b8b5-11e3-835e-00144feabdc0.html
Humans are a tough and adaptable species. People live on the equator and in the Arctic,
in the desert and in the rainforest. We survived the ice ages with primitive
technologies. The idea that climate change poses an existential threat to
humankind is laughable. Climate change will have consequences, of course. Since different
plants and animals thrive in different climates, it will affect natural ecosystems and agriculture. Warmer and wetter weather will advance the spread of

These impacts sound alarming but they

need to be put in perspective before we draw conclusions about policy. According to
Mondays report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a further warming of 2C could cause losses equivalent
tropical diseases. Seas will rise, putting pressure on all that lives on the coast.

to 0.2-2 per cent of world gross domestic product. On current trends, that level of warming would happen some time in the second half of the 21st century.

half a century of climate change is about as bad as losing one year of

economic growth. Since the start of the crisis in the eurozone, the income of the average Greek has fallen more than 20 per cent. Climate
In other words,

change is not, then, the biggest problem facing humankind. It is not even its biggest environmental problem. The World Health Organisation estimates

7m people are now dying each year as a result of air pollution . Even on the
most pessimistic estimates, climate change is not expected to cause loss
of life on that scale for another 100 years.
that about

2NC No Impact---Development/Growth
This eliminates negative impacts of warming
Indur M. Goklany 11, science and technology policy analyst and Assistant
Director of Programs, Science and Technology Policy for the United States
Department of the Interior; was associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change off and on for 20 years as an author, expert reviewer and U.S.
delegate, December 2011, Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and
others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming, online:
http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf
the compound effect of economic development and
technological change can result in quite dramatic improvements even over the
relatively short period for which these figures were developed. Figure 5, for instance, covered 26 years.
By contrast, climate change impacts analyses frequently look 50 to 100 years into the
future. Over such long periods, the compounded effect could well be
spectacular. Longer term analyses of climate-sensitive indicators of human wellbeing show that the combination of economic growth and technological change can, over
decades, reduce negative impacts on human beings by an order of magnitude, that is, a
factor of ten, or more. In some instances, this combination has virtually eliminated such
negative impacts.
These figures also indicate that

For instance, during the 20th century, deaths from various climate-sensitive waterborne diseases were all but
eliminated in the U.S. From 1900 to 1970, U.S. GDP per capita nearly quadrupled, while deaths from malaria were
eliminated, and death rates for gastrointestinal disease fell by 99.8%. 11 From 1900 to 1997 GDP per capita rose
seven-fold, while deaths rate from typhoid and paratyphoid were eliminated and from 1900 to 1998 the death rate

This suggests a need to be highly skeptical of global

warming impacts analyses that extend two or more decades into the future if they
for dysentery fell by 99.6%. 12

do not properly account for the compounded effect on adaptive capacity from (a) economic growth built into
emission scenarios and (b) secular technological change.

Growth will radically increase adaptive capacity---their studies

discount it---produces huge over-estimates of warming impacts
Indur M. Goklany 11, science and technology policy analyst and Assistant
Director of Programs, Science and Technology Policy for the United States
Department of the Interior; was associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change off and on for 20 years as an author, expert reviewer and U.S.
delegate, December 2011, Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and
others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming, online:
http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf
the countries that are today poorer will be extremely wealthy (by todays
standards) and their adaptive capacity should be correspondingly higher. Indeed, their adaptive
capacity should on average far exceed the U.S.s today. So, although claims that poorer
countries will be unable to cope with future climate change may have been true for
the world of 1990 (the base year), they are simply inconsistent with the assumptions
built into the IPCC scenarios and the Stern Reviews own (exaggerated) analysis.
In other words,

If the world of 2100 is as richand warmas the more extreme scenarios suppose ,
the problems of poverty that warming would exacerbate (i.e. low agricultural productivity,

hunger, malnutrition, malaria and other vector-borne diseases)

ought to be reduced, if not eliminated,

by 2100. Research shows that deaths from malaria and other vector-borne diseases is cut down to insignificant
numbers when a societys annual per capita income reaches about $3,100. 23 Therefore, even under the poorest
scenario (A2), developing countries should be free of malaria well before 2100, even assuming no technological
change in the interim.
Similarly, if the average net GDP per capita in 2100 for developing countries is between $10,000 and $62,000, and
technologies become more cost-effective as they have been doing over the past several centuries, then their

farmers would be able to afford technologies that are unaffordable today ( e.g., precision
agriculture) as well as new technologies that should come on line by then (e.g., droughtresistant seeds). 24 But, since impact assessments generally fail to fully account for
increases in economic development and technological change, they
substantially overestimate future net damages from global warming.

2NC No Impact---Oceans
The oceans are resilient to climate change---their predictions
are alarmist and empirically denied
Taylor 10 [James M. Taylor is a senior fellow of The Heartland Institute and managing editor of
Environment & Climate News., Ocean Acidification Scare Pushed at Copenhagen, Feb 10
http://www.heartland.org/publications/environment
%20climate/article/26815/Ocean_Acidification_Scare_Pushed_at_Copenhagen.html]
With global temperatures continuing their decade-long decline and United Nations-sponsored global warming

alarmists at the U.N. talks spent considerable time claiming

carbon dioxide emissions will cause catastrophic ocean acidification, regardless of whether
temperatures rise. The latest scientific data, however, show no such
catastrophe is likely to occur. Food Supply Risk Claimed The United Kingdoms environment
talks falling apart in Copenhagen,

secretary, Hilary Benn, initiated the Copenhagen ocean scare with a high-profile speech and numerous media
interviews claiming ocean acidification threatens the worlds food supply. The

fact is our seas absorb

CO2. They absorb about a quarter of the total that we produce, but it is making our seas more acidic, said
Benn in his speech. If this continues as a problem, then it can affect the one billion people who depend on fish
as their principle source of protein, and we have to feed another 2 to 3 billion people over the next 40 to 50

Benns claim of oceans becoming more acidic is misleading , however. Water

with a pH of 7.0 is considered neutral. pH values lower than 7.0 are considered
acidic, while those higher than 7.0 are considered alkaline. The worlds oceans have a pH of 8.1,
making them alkaline, not acidic. Increasing carbon dioxide concentrations would
make the oceans less alkaline but not acidic . Since human industrial activity first
began emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere a little more than 200 years ago, the pH of the
oceans has fallen merely 0.1, from 8.2 to 8.1. Following Benns December 14 speech and public
years.

relations efforts, most of the worlds major media outlets produced stories claiming ocean acidification is
threatening the worlds marine life. An Associated Press headline, for example, went so far as to call ocean
acidification the evil twin of climate change. Studies Show CO2 Benefits Numerous recent scientific studies

higher carbon dioxide levels in the worlds oceans have the same beneficial
effect on marine life as higher levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide have on
terrestrial plant life. In a 2005 study published in the Journal of Geophysical
Research, scientists examined trends in chlorophyll concentrations , critical building
show

blocks in the oceanic food chain. The French and American scientists reported an overall increase of the world
ocean average chlorophyll concentration by about 22 percent during the prior two decades of increasing
carbon dioxide concentrations. In a 2006 study published in Global Change Biology, scientists observed higher

The highest CO2

concentrations produced higher growth rates and biomass yields than the lower
CO2 conditions. Higher CO2 levels may well fuel subsequent primary production,
phytoplankton blooms, and sustaining oceanic food-webs , the study concluded. Ocean
Life Surprisingly Resilient In a 2008 study published in Biogeosciences, scientists
subjected marine organisms to varying concentrations of CO2, including abrupt
changes of CO2 concentration. The ecosystems were surprisingly resilient
to changes in atmospheric CO2, and the ecosystem composition, bacterial and phytoplankton
CO2 levels are correlated with better growth conditions for oceanic life.

abundances and productivity, grazing rates and total grazer abundance and reproduction were not significantly
affected by CO2-induced effects. In a 2009 study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, scientists reported, Sea star growth and feeding rates increased with water temperature from 5C to
21C. A doubling of current [CO2] also increased growth rates both with and without a concurrent temperature
increase from 12C to 15C. Another False CO2 Scare Far

too many predictions of CO2-induced

catastrophes are treated by alarmists as sure to occur, when real-world
observations show these doomsday scenarios to be highly unlikely or even

virtual impossibilities, said Craig Idso, Ph.D., author of the 2009 book CO2, Global Warming and
Coral Reefs. The phenomenon of CO2-induced ocean acidification appears to be no different.

Relations Advantage

1NC Relations Advantage

Status quo solves---relations are stronger than ever
Shannon Tiezzi 15, Associate Editor @ The Diplomat, Taking US-China Relations
Global, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/taking-us-china-relations-global/
Were still over six months away from Chinese President Xi Jinpings visit to the United States,
but you wouldnt know it from the number of bilateral meetings being billed as in
preparation for Xis arrival. The latest, a meeting between U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice
and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi in New York City, provides some interesting insights into
focal points for the big bilateral summit in September. Both China and the U.S. released reports summarizing
the Rice-Yang visit, and the focus was decidedly global. Instead of touching on bilateral subjects, both
governments directed attention to U.S.-China cooperation on global issues: the
Ebola crisis, the North Korea nuclear issue, the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, and
ensuring stability in Afghanistan. The emphasis on Afghanistan is especially interesting, as it marks a
new area of cooperation between Washington and Beijing. The Diplomat has
previously reported on the signs China is willing to take a more active role in mediating
between Afghanistan and the Taliban, including bringing Pakistan to the negotiating table. The U.S. role in all of this has been unclear, with some reports
indicating that the U.S. has plans to participate in negotiations with Afghan officials and Taliban leaders which was denied by U.S. government officials.
The prospect of a negotiation process with the Taliban led by China and sanctioned by the U.S. could be a critical development for Afghanistans future.
Details on possible U.S.-China cooperation on this front remain murky. The statement from National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan
made clear that Rice and Yang discussed Afghanistan in their meeting, but did not offer any additional details. The report from Chinas Foreign Ministry
(translated here by Xinhua) did not mention Afghanistan at all. But given the shared concern for Afghanistans stability, the U.S. and China are
undoubtedly having serious discussions on how to coordinate their efforts. Official summaries of the meeting paid more attention to a long-time point of
emphasis: the North Korean nuclear program. Weve entered another round of speculation as to when (if at all) North Korea will conduct another nuclear
test. When it comes to North Korea, U.S. administrations are always eager to show they have buy-in from China even if verbal commitments never
translate to action (something my colleague Ankit and I discussed in more detail in our latest podcast, featuring Joel Wit). This time around, according to

, Rice and Yang agreed that North Korea would not succeed in its twin pursuit
of nuclear weapons and economic development. The Chinese summary, predictably, was far more muted,
the NSC

saying only that China adheres to the principles of denuclearization and peaceful settlement through dialogue and negotiations. Yang added his hope
that all related parties will exercise restraint, avoid any irritating rhetoric and acts, and jointly maintain peace and stability on the peninsula. Taken
together, these two reports dont spark much hope for a breakthrough on how to approach North Koreas nuclear program. The relative length given to the
North Korea issue in each sides statement shows that both Beijing and Washington are focusing on this issue in the lead-up to Xis visit. However, the
problem is that the two sides have different goals for what a breakthrough would look like. China wants a return to the Six Party Talks or another form of
dialogue, while Washington wants greater Chinese commitment to the sanctions regime and/or a solid North Korean concession on its nuclear program as

U.S.-China relations have always had a global component, but this trend
is only increasing as China becomes more influential on the world stage. In Meehans
a precursor to talks.

statement, the very second sentence underlines that Rice and Yang agreed to strengthen coordination on regional and global challenges. The U.S. and

when it comes to
various security challenges, whether pandemics like Ebola or the threat of
Afghanistan becoming a terrorist haven, there is much common ground.
China have different agendas for the international order (see, for example, my piece on Chinas vision for the U.N.) but

No downward spiral---Obama will maintain stable security

relations with China
Robert Sutter 16, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School
of George Washington University, Obama's Cautious and Calibrated Approach to an
Assertive China, 4/19/16, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/obamas-cautious-andcalibrated-approach-assertive-china
However, recent developments suggest that the significance of these steps was less than first appeared. The public
pressure in two of the areas subsided once arrangements were made to start bilateral talks on cyber theft and
China went along with tougher UN sanctions against North Korea. The abrupt treatment of ZTE was reversed after a
few days of secret consultations, allowing US suppliers to continue shipments to ZTE. The rebuke in the Human
Rights Council turned out to be a one-time occurrence. Meanwhile, the so-called Taiwan issue in Sino-American
relations became more sensitive following the landslide election in January of Democratic Progressive Party, DPP,
candidate Tsai Ing-wen and a powerful majority of DPP legislators.

Rather than do anything that might

rock-the-boat, the Obama government has carefully avoided controversy and

endeavored to sustain peace and stability through cross-strait dialogue.
Obama governments greater resolve against Chinas challenges seems to
focus on the South China Sea disputes and related American maneuvering with Japan, Australia,
In sum, the

India and some Southeast Asian nations to respond to Chinas destabilizing and coercive measures. US Defense

Carter and Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris have repeatedly spoken of
Chinas aggressive actions and what Harris calls Chinese hegemony in East Asia .
Secretary Ashton

They and others point to US military plans to check Chinas advances through deployments, regional collaboration
and assistance to Chinese neighbors. American officials also expect a Chinese defeat in a ruling later this year at
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, undermining the broad and vague Chinese claims used to justify
expansion in the South China Sea.

continued opportunistic and incremental Chinese expansion in the South

China Sea seems likely. The benefits of Xis challenges appear to outweigh the costs. Notably, in China, Xi
appears a powerful international leader while Obama has appeared weak. Chinas probing expansion
and intimidation efforts in the East China Sea have run up against firm and
effective Japanese efforts supported strongly by the United States. These have been
Looking ahead,

complicated for Beijing by Chinas inability to deal effectively with provocations from North Korea. The opportunities
for expansion in the South China Sea are greater given the various weaknesses of governments in that region,
including all the claimants and the main regional grouping ASEAN. And the case at The Hague may incentivize
Chinese expansion.

The Obama governments efforts to counter China are significant. However, they are carefully
measured to avoid serious disruption in the US-China relationship . Those
circumstances have allowed China to use coercion and disruption to advance its
control at neighbors expense without serious cost. The recent cordial US-China summit indicates that this
overall trend will continue during the remaining months of the US president. Whether or not his
successor will have to conduct such a circumspect but resolute policy to deal with the Chinese challenge remains
unclear as the China debate among the 2016 candidates thus far has been characterized by positions notably
tougher than President Obamas carefully calibrated approach to China.

Multiple alt causes to relations

-

Indictment of PLA members (hacking)

SCS
North Korea sanctions

Mark Landler 14 and David Sanger, writers @ The New York Times, Hacking
Charges Threaten Further Damage to Chinese-American Relations, May 21, NYT,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/world/asia/hacking-charges-threaten-furtherdamage-to-chinese-american-relations.html
the decision to indict five members of the
Peoples Liberation Army, an administration official said on Wednesday. But bringing the charges, the official said,
WASHINGTON President Obama was not involved in

was consistent with Mr. Obamas belief that the United States needed to adopt tougher measures after President Xi Jinping brushed
off Mr. Obamas repeated demands that the Chinese government curb the hacking of American companies. Our message wasnt
getting through, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity, as the United States tried to contain Chinas expected
retaliation to the charges. The Justice Department had been assembling its case for several years, the officials said, and worked to
persuade the American firms that were victims of the alleged theft to go public, which many companies were reluctant to do. But the

injected an unpredictable new source of tension to

Chinese-American relations at a moment when the White House was already
rattled by Chinas muscle-flexing in its coastal waters, which has brought it into
conflict with Vietnam, Malaysia, and two treaty allies of the United States, Japan and
the Philippines. Beijing and Washington might soon find themselves at odds over
timing of the indictments had

another sensitive issue: how to rein in the rogue government in North Korea. The
administration is weighing whether to impose further sanctions on Pyongyang that could target
Chinese enterprises active in the North, a move certain to inflame tensions with
Beijing. Mr. Obama discussed the possibility with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan during a private dinner in Tokyo last month,
according to an official familiar with the discussion. While administration officials said the relationship
with China has proved resilient to other blows arms sales to Taiwan, for example, or Mr. Obamas
meetings with the Dalai Lama they acknowledged that bringing indictments against
members of the Liberation Army is different, particularly given the militarys
influential role with Mr. Xi, a relatively new Chinese leader. On Thursday, the administration will
be pressed to go even further. Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, has said he will call for the United States to file a
case against China with the World Trade Organization for sanctioning cyberattacks against American corporate interests. Such a
move, Mr. Schumer said, would put muscle behind the legal indictments. This is an important signal to China and other countries
that cyberattacks against U.S. businesses are absolutely unacceptable, Mr. Schumer wrote in a letter to be delivered Thursday to
the United States trade representative, Michael B. Froman. However, the United States and other countries who are victims of these
attacks are powerless to enforce their own laws if the offending country refuses to extradite the accused. Because cybercrime is a
relatively new phenomenon, there is some question about whether the World Trade Organization could bring cases under its existing
rules. But Mr. Schumer said organization members are required to protect trade secrets, which means that cyberespionage would

the Chinese
reaction to the indictments has been predictable, including suspension of dialogue
on cybersecurity, demands that the indictments be withdrawn, threats of retaliation against American companies or
officials and reminders of what the National Security Agency does. Analysts said they would not be surprised
if the Chinese military retaliated by canceling some contacts with the American
military. For the White House, Mr. Xi poses a major uncertainty. Since ascending to Chinese leadership 18 months ago he has
proved more willing than many expected to risk clashes with Chinas neighbors over
disputed territory in the South and East China Seas. That is driven,
differ little from walking out of a corporate office with the information. So far, American officials say,

No risk of SCS conflict escalation- multiple factors check

-

US wants stability
Obama=peace president
Seasonal pattern
No one wants to take the risk

Xue Li 15, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of

World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, The US and
China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea, Foreign policy, 6/19/15,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-overthe-south-china-sea/
In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind
the scenes while external powers take center stage. Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue,
it seems the U.S. will not only be a director but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military
sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing. However, this does not necessary mean the South

As a global hegemon, the United States main

interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the
South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of
commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones.
Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for
China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict.

securing these interestsand a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is
viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its rebalance to Asia strategy.
In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand
supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories. This position has included
high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN
Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asias approach
to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United

States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a deeper and more enduring partnership role in the AsiaPacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out Chinas destabilizing, unilateral activities
asserting its claims in the South China Sea. His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while Chinas HY-

In 2015, U.S. officials have openly

pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have
sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures
have brought global attention to the South China Sea. However, if we look at the
practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests
at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States.
Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other
ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and Chinas
comprehensive national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a
military confrontation with China over the South China Sea. Barack Obama,
the peace president who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely
to fight with China for the South China Sea . As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is
981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands.

surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I

Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize

the legality of military activities in another countrys EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia
noted in my earlier piece,

joint military exercise in the Mediterranean). Yet when it comes to Chinas large-scale land reclamation in the
Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of
activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil
rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective
role in dealing with Chinas land reclamation. Hence,

the U.S. has no better choice than to become

directly involved in this issue. At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private
diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington
started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the
European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and
different levels have opposed Chinas changing the status quo in this area. Since 2015, Washington has increased
its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area
controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical
miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China. Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop Chinas
construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the
same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles
around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on
board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded
by saying the plane was flying through international airspace. Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman,
Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential freedom of navigation exercise within 12 nautical miles of
the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence its a unlikely the

As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea

becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China
and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations
between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China
Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between
the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military
confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry,
Obama administration will make that move.

as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding,
and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation. For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and
several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But its worth
noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push
ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences
contradict with Chinas One Belt, One Road strategy. In February 2014, in response to reports by Japans Asahi
Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not
necessarily impose an ADIZ. The

Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat

from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the

general situation in the South China Sea region, a spokesperson said. Since the Belt and Road is Beijings
primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with
ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should
accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify Chinas stand on the issue, and propose Chinas

The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal

pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the
second half tends to emphasize cooperation. Considering its timing at the peak of conflict
blueprint for resolving the disputes.

season, the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform
for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive.
(Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform).

This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the worlds attention to the Shangri-La
Dialogue this year. But audiences should be aware that aggressive statements at the Shangri-La Dialogue are not
totally representative of U.S.-China relations. After all, these statements are made by military rather than political
elites. Cooperation will be the key when the U.S. and China have their Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late June,
with the ASEAN Regional Forum and other meetings following later this summer.

New East China Sea agreement solves---it boosts relations and

pacifies nationalists
Akio Takahara 14, professor at the University of Tokyo, is currently a visiting
scholar at Peking University, 12/8/14, Dtente for China and Japan,
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/detente-for-china-and-japan.html?_r=0
President Xi Jinping of China made when he shook hands with Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe of Japan was his blandest face of the entire APEC summit last month. It was their first meeting, and it lasted only 25 minutes. And yet
it was a turning point in relations between China and Japan, especially after renewed tensions over the
That empty expression

East China Sea islands that both states claim as their own known as the Senkaku in Japanese, and the Diaoyu in Chinese. In fact, the Chinese
government had expressed such an outcry over that disagreement in recent months that it would need quite a good excuse to justify to the Chinese public
having any direct contact with Japans prime minister. Hence the strict, lopsided conditions Mr. Xi set before meeting with Mr. Abe last month: Japan would
have to formally acknowledge there was a territorial dispute between the two countries, and Mr. Abe would have to promise to no longer visit the Yasukuni

the two sides reached a

cleverly crafted agreement conveniently open to multiple interpretations. It stated
that China and Japan hold different views about their recent tensions in the East
China Sea allowing the Chinese side to claim to its people that Japan had formally
acknowledged the existence of a dispute, as Mr. Xi required, while allowing the
Japanese government to tell its own audience back home this wasnt so. (Yasukuni was not
mentioned.) Mr. Abe and Mr. Xi deserve credit for this constructive vagueness. By sharing in it, they took a responsible step
toward calming tensions in East Asia. Mr. Abe, in particular, seems to have calculated that while he
would lose points with some supporters, he could bear such a burden more readily than Mr. Xi,
Shrine, which honors Class A war criminals among Japans war dead. But just before the summit

who is struggling to bridge divisions between hawks and doves in Chinas military and foreign policy establishment. This could not have been easy for Mr.
Abe. China has frequently sent patrol boats into the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and the Japanese public generally supports taking a tough
stance against such provocations and on security matters having to do with China. According to a joint survey conducted this summer by the Japanese

93 percent of the Japanese do not have a good

impression of China. But many Japanese also understand that China is an important
neighbor and essential to their own peace and prosperity: In the same survey, over
70 percent of Japanese said the relationship between Japan and China was
important, and about 80 percent expressed concern over its current state or the
need to improve it. Mr. Abe knows this. Mr. Abe also knows Mr. Xi is in a more delicate position than he. On the one hand,
tensions with Japan have economic costs for China . According to Chinas Ministry of Commerce, Japanese
nongovernmental group Genron NPO and the China Daily,

investment in China from January to June 2014 fell by almost half compared with the same period in 2013. Commerce Minister Gao Hucheng told a
delegation of Japanese business people in September that tension between the two countries was hurting economic ties, and that that was something he

The
Chinese leadership uses nationalist fervor to compensate for a deficit in legitimacy,
and to unite the party and the nation, and Japan is a familiar target , especially for the hawks in the
did not want to see. Yet it is also a general principle of Chinese politics that a leader without a solid power base cannot improve ties with Japan.

military and the propaganda department. Judging by the Chinese medias lukewarm coverage of that historic handshake last month, Mr. Xi is not yet

But that encounter has opened the way for

improvement. Although this was not reported in China, Mr. Abe told Mr. Xi during the meeting that he
thought Japan and China could cooperate over four issues to foster greater
cooperation in the East China Sea (including over the implementation of a 2008
agreement on the joint development of oil and gas in the area); deeper economic
relations; a more stable security environment in East Asia and, first and foremost,
greater mutual understanding. The Abe-Xi handshake has already revived
talks that had stalled, like the Policy Dialogue on the Mekong Region and the New
Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century, both of which met recently
secure enough to actively promote the Chinese-Japanese relationship.

in Beijing. The Friendship Committee, for which I serve as secretary general on the Japanese side, is a panel of nonpoliticians that acts as an advisory body
for the prime ministers of the two countries. (We were the first Japanese group of any kind to see Premier Li Keqiang since he assumed office in March
2013.) During our meetings last week, we spent some time clearing up confusion the Chinese media had created on the Chinese side about Mr. Abes
commitment to his pre-summit agreement with Mr. Xi. Then we discussed ways to strengthen the bilateral relationship, for example by establishing a
crisis-management mechanism to avert clashes in the East China Sea. Now Mr. Abe and Mr. Xi must show the Japanese and Chinese peoples the tangible
benefits of such cooperation. That starts by letting them know the promising facts. For example, China and Japan have already been cooperating on
economic and nontraditional security issues, such as energy conservation and pollution control. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force protects Chineseoperated merchant ships in international anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. The Japanese government provides significant technical
assistance and grants to schools and local NGOs in China. A record number of Chinese tourists have been visiting Japan. The Friendship Committee also
discussed ways to strengthen the exchange program that since 2007 has brought to Japan at least 30,000 young people from the Asia-Pacific region,

people-to-people contact may seem, it can change the dynamic

between the two countries by dispelling common misconceptions. More than anything else, in fact, greater
understanding between the Japanese and Chinese peoples can help Mr. Abe and Mr. Xi
overcome pressure from the nationalistic forces in the establishment camps of Japan and China.
including China. However trivial such

Their global governance impact is unnecessary---the liberal

order is locked in
G. John Ikenberry 11, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton
University. A World of Our Making. Democracy A Journal of Ideas. Issue #21,
Summer 2011. http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?
page=1
The main alternatives to liberal orderboth domestic and internationalhave more or less
disappeared. The great liberal international era is not ending. Still, if the liberal order is not in
crisis, its governance is. Yet, given the fundamental weakness of the past international ordersbrought down by world wars and
great economic upheavalsthe challenges of reforming and renegotiating liberal world order are, if anything, welcome ones.

the old
and traditional mechanism for overturning international ordergreat-power waris
no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in
the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several
factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weaponsand
There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First,

the deterrence they generategive great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states.
They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning
international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear
age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit
calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that
great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more
tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the systemwar, invasion, and conquest between great powersthat historically
provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is
introduced into the system.

the character of liberal international order itselfwith or without American

hegemonic leadershipreinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that
is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of
exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups,
Second,

and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and
openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades,
countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this

East Asian countries,

including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many
multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and
offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many
countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing
international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does
appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage
opposition and resistance.
system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO.

the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition
bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India,
Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this grouping of rising
states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic . They all gain from trade
and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or
seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional
interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and
histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions
that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and
access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and reorganization of
governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order.
Third,

all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring
them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system . All the
Fourth,

great powersold and risingare status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that

Great
powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various
key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation
over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities
for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will
grow.
the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states.

Structural barriers to cooperation between rising powers and

great powers
Robert J Lieber 14, Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown
University, 2014, The Rise of the BRICS and American primacy, International
Politics, Vol. 51, p. 137-154
liberal internationalists and others tend to assume that i nternational
r elations are a positive sum game (Keohane, 1984; Ruggie, 1993). Experiences with multilateralism

Equally important,

and with regional international institutions are said to encourage cooperation. Transparency, reciprocity and habits
of collaboration are seen as self-reinforcing. In order to achieve their own domestic needs for economic growth,
countries find not only these experiences beneficial, but such cooperation spills over across related functions and
issue areas. A generation ago, scholars writing and theorizing about regional integration in Western Europe defined
this process as one of spillover. For liberal internationalists and globalists there is at least an implied analogy with
that European experience despite the immense differences in geography, history and path dependence.5 That
assumption has some basis in the areas of economics and trade, though the mercantilist and predatory behavior of
China provides a serious contrary indicator.

In the security realm , however, there is little reason for

such an optimistic assumption. Cases in point include nuclear proliferation (North Korea,
Iran), tensions in East Asia (China, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, the Philippines, the East and South China
Seas) and conflicts in the Middle East (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Lebanon, as well as Israel
and the Palestinians). Nonetheless there are exceptions. Brazil has played a continuing role in UN Peacekeeping. It
assigns nearly 2500 military and police personnel to those missions and has played a leading role in Haiti, where it
has commanded the UNs operation since 2004. It also has headed the maritime component of UNIFIL (Lebanon)
since 2011. In addition, Turkey has participated actively in NATO-led peacekeeping missions in Bosnia (SFOR),
Kosovo (KFOR), and Afghanistan (ISAF).

Skepticism about the BRICS and the momentum assumed by liberal internationalists
has not been scarce.6 Realist scholars have understandably been critical of the assumptions underlying
these approaches as well as of the foreign policy choices they imply. However, other scholars too have found
increasing reason for criticism . For example, Barma et al (2013, p. 56) have recently observed that,
Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated
failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite : stunningly few
instances of international cooperation on significant issues. Moreover, Patrick (2010, p. 44) of
the Council on Foreign Relations has cautioned that, The United States should be under no illusions
about the ease of socializing rising nations. Emerging powers may be clamoring for
greater global influence, but they often oppose the political and economic ground
rules of the inherited Western liberal order, seek to transform existing multilateral
arrangements , and shy away from assuming significant global responsibilities. In this
regard, Laidi has argued that despite their own heterogeneity, the BRICS actually share a
common objective in opposing Western liberal internationalist narratives that run
counter to traditional state sovereignty. Instead, they seek to protect their own prerogatives,
independence of action and national autonomy in an increasingly interdependent
world (Laidi, 2012, pp. 614615).

2NC SQ Solves---General Cooperation

SQ solves every impact and locks in relations --- its strong
enough to buffer shocks
David Shambaugh 13, Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs and
Director of the China Policy Program @ George Washington University, nonresident
Senior Fellow @ Brookings Institute, A Big Step Forward in U.S.-China
Relations,7/20/13,
www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/07/20/a_big_step_forward_in_uschina_relations_105332.html
Note: S&ED = U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
As a result of the recently concluded U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) the
relationship between Washington and Beijing has not only stabilized, but has taken a major
step forward-make that major steps. This year's S&ED builds on the new
momentum in the relationship spurred by the June presidential summit in Sunnylands, California. The totality of
S&ED agreements reached by the two sides July 11-12 is truly impressive-and they
outnumber in quantity and quality those reached even during recent presidential
state visits (2009 and 2011). The announced agreements-91 on the "strategic track" and a similar number on the "economic
track"(although they were not itemized)-are ample testimony to the breadth and depth of the
relationship, and they are concrete steps forward in building what Chinese President Xi
Jinping has described as building a "new type of major power relations ." Of course, the "devil is (always) in the
detail" and there may well be a lack of bureaucratic follow-through in implementing such ambitious agreements. In recent years, similar well-intended
Joint Statements (2009 and 2011) foundered soon after their issuance and failed to be implemented as intended. This time there seems to be a clearer
level of bilateral commitment. A close reading of the strategic track document indicates that the majority of clauses are joint, i.e. "the United States and
China affirm their commitment to...). In the past, the language was more often "parallel," i.e. "The United States maintains that...."; "China maintains
that..." Such parallel clauses are usually code words for disagreements behind the scenes. This time, much of the language (more notably on the strategic
than the economic track) is joint rather than parallel. There are also numerous references that both sides "decided" to undertake various initiatives, while
numerous memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and joint "action plans" were agreed and signed. Behind these linguistic nuances lies a new mutual
strategic commitment and practical bureaucratic cooperation. The other reason for optimism on implementation is that it appears the two sides have
established and expanded the number of joint working groups that will operate throughout the year. New working groups include a Cyber Working Group,
U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group, an International Economic Affairs Consultation, a Legal Advisors Consultation, a Dialogue on Global
Development, an EcoPartnership Dialogue, an Aviation Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Initiative, and continued rounds of previously
established bilateral mechanisms. Meanwhile, other joint dialogues have been upgraded-such as elevating the Counter-terrorism Consultations to the viceministerial level and the Energy Policy Dialogue to the ministerial level. Prior to this year's S&ED, the two governments had in existence around 90 such
bilateral dialogues and mechanisms-after the meeting they now top 100. More importantly, as noted above, many will now operate year-round rather than
once per year or in an episodic fashion. This will provide sustained momentum to the relationship between the annual S&ED and presidential meetings.

The sheer scope of topics covered and agreed are testimony to both the breadth and
depth of the relationship. This includes security and military affairs, regional and
global diplomacy, human rights, legal affairs and law enforcement, nonproliferation
and arms control, customs issues and container security, supply chain security, fisheries and forests, wildlife
trafficking and illegal logging, law of the sea and polar issues, marine science and meteorology, climate change, air
and water quality, public health, development and aid, peacekeeping, nuclear safety, and a variety of energy-related
issues. And these are only issues on the strategic track. The economic track also discussed and
reached agreements in a wide range of specialized and technical areas as well: exchange
rate liberalization, data transparency, global and regional financial stability,
multilateral institutional cooperation (particularly in the IMF, APEC, and G-20), trade and foreign investment, intellectual
property rights and protection of trade secrets, government procurement, anti-dumping, export credits and financing, market opening and distribution

My purpose for detailing this list is not to bore the reader, but to
provide a full sense of the extraordinary scope of the U.S.-China relationship
today. No other inter-governmental relationship in the world comes close
to the breadth and depth of issues of mutual concern to both nations and
which they are working to address together. The China-EU and China-Russia and U.S.-EU
rights, banking regulations, and other issues.

relationships have their own extensive areas of dialogue and bureaucratic interaction-but they both pale in comparison
to the institutionalization of U.S.-China relations today . Institutionalization is one of what I call
the "two I's" in U.S.-China relations-the other being interdependence. These "two I's" interact with the "two c's" in the relationship: cooperation and

Institutionalization is the outgrowth of interdependence and the

manifestation of cooperation-and all three elements serve to buffer and limitthe
competition in the relationship. To be certain,competition and mistrust do exist at the strategic, economic, military, diplomatic, political, and ideological levels-will continue to, and are not to be falsely minimized. But,
exercises like the S&ED are tangible expressions that the two sides now seek
to manage the competition and forge cooperation where possible. That is
the best news we have had in U.S.-China relations for several years , and is good
competition.

news for global stability and development.

The previous US-China climate deal already solved!

Jack A. Goldstone 14 is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars and Hazel professor of public policy at George Mason University, US-China
Relations After APEC, The Diplomat, Nov 18, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/us-china-relations-after-apec/
Last weeks APEC meeting in Beijing shed new light on Chinas relationship with
America and the world. It has become increasing clear what China wants. China seeks a role in Asia comparable to the
role that America has enjoyed with regard to Europe; as the unquestioned (but not always followed) leader of an alliance that seeks
to protect their region from outside pressures and influences. As with the U.S. and Europe, China will continue to seek strong
economic ties outside the alliance where those are helpful, but for security it wants clear leadership and support from other
countries in Asia for Chinas goals of greater economic and military power. China does not simply view the U.S. as a hegemon that it
wants to supplant, but as a country whose days as global hegemon are over. In Beijings view, Washington should make way for
other, equal powers, to have leadership over some areas of the globe. In fact, I think China will find its relationship with other Asian
countries more like Americas relationship with Latin America that is, other Asian countries will view Chinese power with a mixture
of admiration and suspicion, and will foster their own nationalism and resistance to Chinas hegemony even while seeking
advantages from allying with China on certain issues. Overall, Chinas rise to greater regional power and Americas loss of global
hegemon status are inevitable. Americas dominance was a result of victories in WWII and the Cold War that left other powers weak.
But with Chinas rise now with over four times the population and an economy of equal size (in PPP terms) to the U.S. it is
inevitable that a more balanced arrangement of global power should arise. The only real question is whether that transition will lead

There
is a major risk that China and America become rivals, fighting proxy wars or even
direct skirmishes over Chinese control of archipelagos in the western Pacific, and over Chinese conflicts with Japan, the
Philippines, Vietnam, or other countries. Yet that seems to me the less likely outcome. In fact,
China and America share so many interests in a stable global economy, in free and
open sea lanes for transit of raw materials and manufactures, in maintaining peace
in the Asia-Pacific region, and in coping with global environmental threats that
cooperation for the most part is more likely. Last weeks agreement between
China and the U.S. on goals to reduce carbon emissions is an excellent example of that
cooperation. At the same, last week showed how differences could be handled. On human rights, one of the most
to more cooperation between a China and U.S. who increasingly share responsibility for major global issues, or to conflict.

contentious issues, Chinese President Xi Jinping claimed that China was making progress, although that progress was not yet
complete; while President Obama had to make public declarations that the U.S. is not involved in fomenting unrest in Hong Kong. On

last weeks meeting should reassure those who have been forecasting an
inevitable war between a rising China and a declining U.S. The nature of the relationship will
change, but that is good; the world is changing fast and the relationship between the U.S.
and China needs to develop and mature to keep abreast of those changes. Judging
from last week, that process is moving forward nicely.
the whole,

Their internal link is irrelevant --- major underlying factors

mean relations are inevitable
Wei Zongyou 14 is professor of International Relations at Center for American
Studies, Fudan University, China. Previously, he worked as Vice Dean at Institute of
International and Diplomatic Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University, A
New Model for China-US Relations? The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-new-model-for-china-us-relations/
Clearly, the China-U.S. relationship is not a new model of relations and interactions between a rising
power and the established power. Rather, it shows all the classic manifestations of the rising power/established power historical

Is a new model possible? While there is every reason to be

pessimistic about the future of the relationship, Im still cautiously optimistic. There are
several reasons why. First, in contrast to historical patterns, in the postwar era, no country can
expect to rise to great power status through conquest. On the ashes of the World War II, the United
dynamic. That begs a question:

States took the lead in building a world order based on international law and institutions, and abolished the use of war as a
legitimate national foreign policy instrument except in rare situations of self-defense or collective defense with UN Security Council

A new pattern has emerged: States rise peacefully by means of trade,

as Japan, Germany, India and China have done. Second, while China is not entirely
satisfied with the existing international order, which it play no part in creating, it is not bent on
overthrowing it or displacing it with its own alternative. Since 1978, when China first opened its
door to the outside world after 30 years of isolation, it has tried hard to become part of the order, as
witnessed by its entry into WTO, and quite possibly the TPP in the future. And unlike the Soviet
authorization.

Union, which established its own economic bloc, ideological camp, and satellite states, and which was bent on putting an end to the

China is determined to rise peacefully, and has explicitly sought to build

a new type of great power relations as a way of avoiding a repeat of history. Third,
despite the different views concerning disputes in the China seas and maritime and air surveillance in the EEZ, China and
the U.S. hold more than 90 institutionalized bilateral interactions annually , an
unusually high number even by the standards of U.S. and its close allies . While this
engagement alone cannot guarantee that there will be no spats or friction between China and U.S., it does provide
channels to express worries, concerns or dissatisfaction to the other side and get
feedback directly, which in turn helps defuse tensions and prevent
miscalculations, misjudgments and escalation.
capitalist world,

2NC SQ Solves---Trust
Nuclear energy cooperation solves the affs trust internal link
Dong Zhaohui 16, Xinhua news, quoting Daniel Lipman, vice president of the
Nuclear Energy Institute, U.S.-China cooperation on nuclear energy helps build
trust in relations: expert, 3/27/16, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-03/27/content_6978756.htm
Nuclear energy cooperation between the United States and China has yielded tremendous
benefits for both countries and can contribute to trust in the larger bilateral relationship , a
U.S. nuclear energy expert told Xinhua. The United States and China could further enhance
cooperation on nuclear energy as there are vast commercial opportunities for both countries and the
world, Daniel Lipman, vice president of Washington-based Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), said in an interview ahead
of the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Washington from March 31 to April 1. Bilateral

nuclear
energy cooperation "requires a strong foundation of mutual respect and trust
that shared technologies will be used only for peaceful purposes," Lipman said, adding that
it is "not something the United States enters into lightly." Through extensive person-to-person and institutional

commercial nuclear trade can also share best practices on nuclear safety ,
2015, a new agreement formalizing civil
nuclear cooperation between China and the United States entered into force. The U.S.
contacts,

security and nonproliferation, the expert said. In

nuclear energy industry, led by the NEI, played an instrumental role in securing congressional approval for the new
deal. The agreement is "critical for American nuclear suppliers and U.S. foreign policy priorities," said an NEI report
before the pact was approved. "Nuclear cooperation with China advances economic interests, safety culture and
climate goals." Besides nuclear energy cooperation, China and the United States also share an interest in nuclear

the two countries agreed to broaden an established

program on combating illicit movements and smuggling of nuclear materials.
non-proliferation. Earlier this month,

2NC Alt Causes/Relations Impossible

U.S.-China relations impossible --- deep ideological gaps
Aaron L. Friedberg 12, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University,
September/October 2012, Bucking Beijing, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 48-58
Recent events have raised serious doubts about both elements of this strategy. Decades
of trade and talk have not hastened China's political liberalization. Indeed, the last few years
have been marked by an intensified crackdown on domestic dissent. At the same time, the much-touted
economic relationship between the two Pacific powers has become a major source of friction .
And despite hopes for enhanced cooperation , Beijing has actually done very little to
help Washington solve pressing international problems , such as North Korea's
acquisition of nuclear weapons or Iran's attempts to develop them. Finally, far from accepting the status quo,
China's leaders have become more forceful in attempting to control the waters and
resources off their country's coasts. As for balancing, the continued buildup of China's
military capabilities, coupled with impending cuts in U.S. defense spending, suggests that the
regional distribution of power is set to shift sharply in Beijing's favor. WHY WE CAN'T ALL JUST
GET ALONG TODAY, CHINA'S ruling elites are both arrogant and insecure. In their view, continued
rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is essential to China's stability, prosperity, and prestige; it is also, not
coincidentally, vital to their own safety and comfort. Although they have largely accepted some form of capitalism
in the economic sphere, they remain committed to preserving their hold on political power.
The CCP'S determination to maintain control informs the regime's threat perceptions, goals, and policies. Anxious

China's rulers are eager to portray themselves as defenders of the national honor.
remain
deeply fearful of encirclement and ideological subversion . And despite Washington's
attempts to reassure them of its benign intentions, Chinese leaders are convinced
that the United States aims to block China's rise and, ultimately, undermine its one-party system of
about their legitimacy,

Although they believe China is on track to become a world power on par with the United States, they

government. Like the United States, since the end of the Cold War, China has pursued an essentially constant
approach toward its greatest external challenger. For the most part, Beijing has sought to avoid outright
confrontation with the United States while pursuing economic growth and building up all the elements of its
"comprehensive national power," a Chinese strategic concept that encompasses military strength, technological
prowess, and diplomatic influence. Even as they remain on the defensive, however, Chinese officials have not been
content to remain passive. They have sought incremental advances, slowly expanding China's sphere of influence
and strengthening its position in Asia while working quietly to erode that of the United States. Although they are
careful never to say so directly, they seek to have China displace the United States in the long run and to restore
China to what they regard as its rightful place as the preponderant regional power. Chinese strategists do not
believe that they can achieve this objective quickly or through a frontal assault. Instead, they seek to reassure their
neighbors, relying on the attractive force of China's massive economy to counter nascent balancing efforts against
it. Following the advice of the ancient military strategist Sun-tzu, Beijing aims to "win without fighting," gradually

The failure to date to

achieve a genuine entente between the United States and China is the result not of a lack
of effort but of a fundamental divergence of interests . Although limited cooperation on specific
issues might be possible, the ideological gap between the two nations is simply too great,
and the level of trust between them too low, to permit a stable modus vivendi . What
China's current leaders ultimately want -- regional hegemony -- is not something
their counterparts in Washington are willing to give . That would run counter to an axiomatic goal
creating a situation in which overt resistance to its wishes will appear futile.

of U.S. grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the domination of either end of the

The reasons for this goal involve a mix

of strategic, economic, and ideological considerations that will continue to be valid
into the foreseeable future .
Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers.

Bad relations inevitable

Pei March 2014
MINXIN PEI is Tom and Margot Pritzker 72 Professor of Government at Claremont
McKenna College, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2014, "How China and America See
Each Other", http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140755/minxin-pei/how-chinaand-america-see-each-other

But the world has changed a great deal since the neither friends nor foes label
was first slapped on U.S.-Chinese relations two decades ago. The remarkable
expansion of Chinese power and the global financial crisis that ravaged the
economies of the United States and Europe have accentuated the sense that
the West is declining and the rest are rising. The gap between U.S. and
Chinese power, which was already narrowing before the financial crisis, has since
closed further. In 2007, the United States economy was four times as large as that
of China; by 2012, it was only twice as large.
Any substantial shift in the balance of power between two countries is bound
to change their attitudes and behavior toward each other. It should come as
no surprise, then, that new strains have recently emerged in U.S.-Chinese
relations. China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy since 2010, taking
tough stances in territorial and maritime disputes with its neighbors. Its rapid
military modernization program and cyberattacks have unsettled
Americans and their East Asian allies. And Beijing has seen Washingtons
response to this new toughness -- the so-called pivot to Asia -- as a thinly
disguised attempt to contain Chinese power.
Maintaining a reasonable grasp of the fluid U.S.-Chinese relationship is hard enough;
an even tougher challenge is understanding the substantive disagreements
between the two countries on the many issues critical to preserving stable ties. A
new collection of essays edited by the political scientist Nina Hachigian attempts to
accomplish both tasks. The idea behind Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship
in Ten Conversations is simple but clever: for each of ten conversations, it pairs one
leading American expert on Asia with a Chinese counterpart to debate a specific
bilateral issue. Hachigian moderates the series of conversations by framing the key
questions the participants should address; the debaters exchange opinions and
then, in a second round, focus on their disagreements. The result is a book that
summarizes and scrutinizes each sides positions on everything from human rights
to climate change. As a whole, the project is illuminating but disheartening; those
optimistic about the future of U.S.-Chinese ties will find little to cheer in
these pages.
RITES AND WRONGS
On some issues, the American and Chinese debaters share much common ground.
They agree, for example, that the U.S.-Chinese relationship has become
plagued by distrust, particularly as nationalism in China has surged.

Remarkably, even some Chinese scholars acknowledge that many of the

structural causes of friction will persist as long as Chinas domestic
political system remains unchanged.
But sharp, even fundamental, differences emerge in the exchanges on
Chinas military modernization, human rights, Taiwan, and regional
security. The debaters see these issues from clashing perspectives and question
each others underlying premises. The Chinese scholar Zhou Qi insists that China
does not see eye to eye with the West on human rights because the Confucian order
is based on societal rites -- prescribed codes of ritual behavior -- rather than
fundamental individual rights. Andrew Nathan, a Columbia University professor,
flatly rejects this claim, saying it implies that there is a Chinese exceptionalism that
exempts Beijing from complying with universal norms.

2NC No War---SCS
No SCS war---the region is too dependent on China to risk
conflict
Nicolas Jenny 15, final year double degree master student currently based at
Fudan University in Shanghai, 1/28/15, Trade Goes on as Usual in the South China
Sea,
www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/01/28/trade_goes_on_as_usual_in_the_south_
china_sea_110939.html
International relations scholars and journalists have intensely debated the reasons behind China's increased
assertiveness in the South China Sea. But Beijing's foreign policy actions in the region have made most countries
suspicious if not completely resentful of China. This has led some to claim that, China today faces the worst
regional environment since Tiananmen. Its relations with Japan are at a record low; China-ASEAN ties have similarly
deteriorated due to the South China Sea disputes and China's heavy-handed use of its clout to divide ASEAN.'

Despite this resentment, analysts have largely overlooked the trade dynamics
between China and other claimants in the South China Sea dispute. One would
naturally assume that deep suspicions or resentment of Beijing would translate into
diminishing trade ties, yet the opposite has taken place . For example, Vietnam
recorded an 18.9% increase in Chinese imports in 2014 despite Hanoi's attempts to broaden its
import partners. The issue became particularly relevant following China's decision to place an oil rig in disputed

The Philippines, no stranger to Chinese pressure in the South China Sea, also
reported a 12.4% increase of exports to China during the first nine months of 2014. Coincidentally,
China is also the Philippines' third largest, and Vietnam's largest trading partner.
waters earlier in 2014.

While smaller East Asian states continue to hedge their bets against China, there is a resounding pattern in their
trade statistics - they all present a strong trade deficit in China's favour. Vietnam's trade deficit with China reached
a record high in 2014 while the Philippines' highest trade deficit is with China, representing 16% of imports, a 35%

Herein lays the conundrum of the South China Sea dispute:

while claimant states rally against Beijing's nine-dash line, economically, they need
China more than China needs them. Access to China's market has forced foreign
companies and their governments to compromise on politics. While European
companies have compromised on issues such as internet censorship, Southeast Asia's governments
have been forced to compromise on sovereignty in the South China Sea. This economic
increase from previous years.

fact of life for Southeast Asian states has produced ripple effects across policy. For example, following the deadly
anti-China riots in Vietnam, Hanoi promised to reimburse and rebuild China's factories damaged by the protests.
Similarly, the Philippines' economy suffered tremendously in 2012 when China drastically cut banana imports.
China will soon have successfully leveraged its economic power to reach political ends - the consolidation of the
South China Sea as Beijing's core interest. It will not have primarily been through vast military expansion as many
had predicted, but rather through its economic might. Trade has arguably been China's most widely used foreign
policy tool and as China's wealth increases, this is only set to continue. As it should be remembered, the South
China Sea dispute is not all about potential energy deposits in the region. It is a dispute over competing visions of
the South China Sea and a weary China who sees itself surrounded. Heightened trade flows between China and the
claimant states can assure a certain amount of stability in the region. And although many are quick to remind us

today's globalised world stands in stark

contrast to the beginning of the 20th century. Even the Philippine president, Aquino,
argued that territorial disputes in the South China Sea were unlikely to lead to
conflict because no one was willing to sacrifice the huge trade flows in the
region. Therefore, despite the issues over sovereignty and the occasional flare-ups
between various claimants, peace, no matter how precarious, will prevail - no
country is ready, particularly China, to sacrifice trade at the expense of stability.
that trade cannot serve as a deterrent to conflict,

No escalation even if clashes occur

Paul Dibb 14, emeritus professor of strategic studies @ The Australian National
University, Why A Major War In Asia Is Unlikely, March 31, East Asia Forum,
Economy Watch, http://www.economywatch.com/features/why-a-major-war-in-asiais-unlikely.31-03.html
rising tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has led some experts
to draw parallels with the Sarajevo incident, which sparked off World War I in Europe. Yet while is a
significant risk that the conflict will result in a military confrontation, an all-out war is unlikely given
The

economic reasons. The Jeremiah prophets are coming out of the woodwork to predict that there will be an outbreak
of war between the major powers in Asia, just like in Europe 100 years ago. The idea is that a rising China will
inevitably go to war with the United States, either directly or through conflict with Japan. Some commentators are
even suggesting that the Sarajevo incident that provoked World War I will be replicated between China and Japan
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has likened this
situation to what he calls a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago a tinderbox on water. My

There
is undoubtedly a significant risk that Chinas increasing aggressiveness in the East China
Sea and the South China Sea over its territorial claims will result in a military
confrontation, either by miscalculation or design. But a sunk warship or military aircraft
collision is a long way from all-out war. These sorts of incidents have occurred
in the past and have not escalated for example, the North Korean sinking in 2010 of a
South Korean warship, and the collision in 2001 by a Chinese fighter plane with a US
reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately, however, a military incident between China and Japan might be
colleague Hugh White recently proclaimed that the risk of war between China and Japan is now very real.

more serious.

2NC No War---ECS
Nuclear deterrence checks and its empirically denied
- AT: Accidents
Zack Beauchamp 14, M.Sc in IR from London School of Economics, Editor of TP
Ideas and reporter for Think Progress, contributor to Foreign Policy, Why Everyone
Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China, Feb 7, Think Progress,
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/07/3222021/china-japan-war/
This is all dramatically overblown. War between China and Japan is more than
unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two
countries, and international relations more broadly. Its not that a replay of 1914 is
impossible. Its just deeply, vanishingly unlikely. Power One of the easiest ways to evaluate the
risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a
governments decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and
ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations
(realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and theres solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a

The
main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan
significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So lets take them in turn.

and Diaoyus in China. While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on

Japan currently controls the islands, but China claims them,

and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands
of late. But theres one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that
means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in
1914 The War To End All Wars would have a decidedly different meaning in
2014, as wars end would be accomplished by the worlds end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers
the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.

thought they could win the war decisively, East Asias great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange

Saideman calls this

the end of the preemption temptation; nobody thinks they can win by
striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least
nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands. That also helps explain
why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental escalation, isnt as
likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journals Andrew Browne writes that theres a real risk of
between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton Universitys Stephen

an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of
popular nationalist pressure, hes not wrong. But it wont happen just because two planes happen across each

In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled
fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times. Indeed, tensions have flared up a
number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side
of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. Thats because, as MIT
East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep strategic reasons why
each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear
deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the
region, as thats historically caused other regional powers to put away their
differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the islands, which would make any
strong moves by China seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The United States
also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when
tensions are spiking that the United States and its rather powerful navy would
prefer that there be no fighting between the two states. Moreover, the whole idea of
other in the sky.

accidental war is also a little bit confusing . Militaries dont just start shooting
each other by mistake and then decide its time to have a war. Rather, an incident
thats truly accidental say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air
Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap changes the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to

Its hard to envision

this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons.
think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate.

China is shifting away from the ECS to SCS---that makes SinoJapan cooperation likely and lowers the risk of conflict
Justin Chock 15, a student at Oxford University in the MPhil International
Relations program, and is currently a Research Intern at the East West Center in
Washington D.C., Japans One-Way Push Against China: An Unstated
Acquiescence?, 8/17/15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/japans-one-way-pushagainst-china-an-unstated-acquiescence/
Sino-Japanese relations including the ECS disputes are no longer
Chinas priority, and instead the SCS will be its focus in a Pacific Rebalance with Chinese
Characteristics. Various factors could have caused China to prioritize the SCS over
Japan: a larger impetus to secure Chinas vulnerable lifeblood of seaborne trade through the SCS while ensuring
The final possibility is that

the success of the Maritime Silk Road, greater uncertainty with the regions future, too much perceived risk in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, prior success keeping ASEAN divided over SCS issues, smaller militaries to counteract
Chinas actions, and fewer U.S. security commitments to Southeast Asia as compared to the
solid U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (although further outreach to Southeast Asian nations may increase Americas
presence and stake in the region).
Sino-Japanese Cooperation and Challenges Abroad

If the above is true, Japans anti-China rhetoric could be expected to ease following the
passage of the defense legislation in the Diet, at which point the two nations may be in a good
position to resume relationship building. Chinas current acquiescence could be a
signal to Japan that Beijing is willing to make concessions for the sake cooperation ,
with the potential for a positive cycle should Japan reciprocate. In all, contrary to what recent rhetoric
might suggest, the Sino-Japanese relationship looks to be strengthening , but with
Chinas sights on the South China Sea over the long-term, both China and Japan must carefully chart
the course of their relationship as both will find challenges in Southeast Asia rather than in their
backyards.

2NC Liberal Order Inevitable

The liberal order and global institutions are structurally
inevitable---new US-China cooperation is unnecessary
Richard Maher 11, adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci,
Brown, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better
Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1
The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent
position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence
beyond its era of preponderance. This will be Americas fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the
creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be
considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a
long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The
most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for
stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an
era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position

The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation.
Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to
come, ensuring that the U nited States will remain a major player in these regions . The
disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is
profound, and this gap will not close in the next several decades at least. In creating a
to do this.

new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal
traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to
shape other countries preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States
should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating---which reflect basic American
preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power---outlive American preeminence. We know that

institutions acquire a certain stickiness that allow them to exist long after the
features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global
politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international---or even
regional--- institutional architecture that would compete with the American postWorld War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences
for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership
and overwhelming legitimacy . Even states with which the United States has
significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement---China, Russia, and Iran---have strongly
desired membership in these Made in USA institutions. Shifts in the global
balance of power will be reflected in these institutions ---such as the decision at the September 2009
Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase Chinas voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European

Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will
disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled
position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to lock in a
durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and
countries such as Britain and France.

values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own
narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also
served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the
United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are historys only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than
an act of altruism, this will improve Americas strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to
display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the
end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the
rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek

The United States enjoys

better relations with most states than these states do with their regional neighbors.
South and East Asia are regions in which distrust, resentment, and outright hostility abound. The United States enjoys
to challenge or even transform it.19 Cultivate Balance of Power Relationships in Other Regions.

relatively strong (if far from perfect) strategic relationships with most of the major states in Asia, including
Japan, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. The United States and China have their differences, and a more intense strategic rivalry
could develop between the two. However, right now the relationship is generally stable. With the possible exception of China (but

even Beijing views the American military presence in East Asia as an assurance
against Japanese revanchism), these countries prefer a U.S. presence in Asia, and in fact
view good relations with the United States as indispensable for their own security.
perhaps

2NC Multilat Fails

The concept of a global order into which rising powers need to
be integrated is wrong---its way too fragmented
Barma et al., 13 (Naazneen, assistant professor of national-security affairs at
the Naval Postgraduate School; Ely Ratner, a fellow at the Center for a New
American Security; and Steven Weber, professor of political science and at the
School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, March/April 2013,
The Mythical Liberal Order, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146)
AFTER A year and a half of violence and tens of thousands of deaths in Syria, the UN Security Council convened in
July 2012 to consider exerting additional international pressure on President Bashar al-Assad. And for the third time
in nine months, Russia and China vetoed any moves toward multilateral intervention. Less than two weeks later,
Kofi Annan resigned as the joint UNArab League special envoy for Syria, lamenting, I cant want peace more than
the protagonists, more than the Security Council or the international community for that matter. Not only have

this movie before, but it seems to be on repeat. Instead of a gradual trend toward
global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years
essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international coop eration
on significant issues. Global governance is in a serious drought palpable across the
full range of crucial, mounting international challenges that include nuclear
proliferation, climate change, international development and the global financial crisis .
we seen

Where exactly is the liberal world order that so many Western observers talk about? Today we have an international

In the envisaged
liberal world order, the rise of the rest should have been a boost to global
governance. A rebalancing of power and influence should have made international politics more democratic
and multilateral action more legitimate, while bringing additional resources to bear. Economic integration
and security-community enlargement should have started to envelop key players as
political landscape that is neither orderly nor liberal.

It wasnt supposed to be this way.

the system built on itself through network effectsby making the benefits of joining the order (and the costs of

Instead, the world has no meaningful deal

on climate change; no progress on a decade-old global-trade round and no
inclination toward a new one; no coherent response to major security issues around North
Korea, Iran and the South China Sea ; and no significant coordinated effort to capitalize on what is
opposing it) just a little bit greater for each new decision.

possibly the best opportunity in a generation for liberal progressthe Arab Spring.

Its not particularly

global governance has gone missing. What matters is why. The

standard view is that were seeing an international liberal order under siege , with
controversial to observe that

emerging and established powers caught in a contest for the future of the global system that is blocking progress

That mental map identifies the central challenge of American

foreign policy in the twenty-first century as figuring out how the United States and its allies
can best integrate rising powers like China into the prevailing order while bolstering
and reinforcing its foundations. But this narrative and mental map are [is]
wrong. The liberal order cant be under siege in any meaningful way (or prepped to integrate
rising powers) because it never attained the breadth or depth required to elicit that kind
of agenda. The liberal order is today still largely an aspiration, not a description of
how states actually behave or how global governance actually works . The rise of a
on global governance.

configuration of states that six years ago we called a World Without the West is not so much challenging a
prevailing order as it is exposing the inherent frailty of the existing framework.

Multilateralism failsdiverging interests and a lack of faith

guarantee cooperation is at best superficial
Heribert Dieter 14, Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial
Studies, Visiting Professor for International Political Economy at Zeppelin University,
Doctorate in Political Science and Economics, Free University of Berlin, 1/31/14, The
G-20 and the Dilemma of Asymmetric Sovereignty Why Multilateralism Is Failing in
Crisis Prevention, International Relations and Security Network,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=176145
the mantralike repetition of memoranda of understanding, the trade ministers of the G-20 have not been
able to overcome their conflicts of interest and reach a settlement in the Doha Round of the World Trade
Yet, tightening the rules for financial market regulation is not the only field where the G-20 is failing. Despite

Organization (WTO). What are the reasons for this failure?Although the G-20 managed to prevent a revival of protectionist measures
on a broad front in the midst of the crisis, there is a large gap between the announcements of the G-20 and quantifiable results in

There is not one final communiqu that lacks a clear statement stressing
the importance of the WTO and the necessity to conclude the Doha Round. Nonetheless, the
reality of trade policy looks very different. All the states that are preventing the conclusion of the Doha Round
trade policy.

through their vetoes are members of the G-20.

Despite there being little public information available on the reasons for the deadlock in the Doha Round, it is known that the US,
Brazil, and China are blocking its conclusion. The emerging economies Brazil and China oppose the USs demand for the complete
elimination of tariffs on industrial goods. Conversely, the US resists the request to comprehensively abandon subsidies to the

important members of the G-20 no longer

believe in multilateral solutions and would rather engage in preferential
agreements. For experts in the field of international trade, this is a paradox. There is a broad consensus that a single rulebook
agricultural sector.Thus, the Doha Round is not concluded because three

for international trade would facilitate economic growth and contribute to a worldwide increase in prosperity. This, however, cannot
be said for the currently popular free trade agreements. So why are the countries in the G-20 incapable of further developing the
common rules for international trade? One explanation is the lack of a hegemonic power that is willing to guarantee compliance with
the rules of the game, but at the same time establish a system that provides member countries with sufficient economic benefits. In
any event, this is how the postwar economy emerged: The US enforced the system of Bretton Woods and made sure that the
participation in this economic regime remained attractive. Of course, the Bretton Woods regime never was a truly global system,
since member countries of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance did not participate. Still, within the bipolar order of the Cold
War, the US managed to keep the system open and stable. After the collapse of the USSR and the following short-lived unipolar
moment (Charles Krauthammer) of complete hegemony of the US, the multilateral order was being advanced until 1995, the
founding year of the WTO. Since the turn of the millennium and the parallel emergence of a multipolar order, nearly all attempts to

The present multipolar world is

characterized by superficial cooperation. Global Governance, whether in
policies to prevent further climate change or in economic policy, remains
on hold. Even worse: The world is returning to regulation on the level of the nation-state and non-cooperation. The American
organize cooperation without hegemony (Bob Keohane) have failed.

political scientist Ian Bremmer refers to the resulting situation as G-Zero, an era in which groups such as the G-20 will no longer
play a vital role. The negative perception of the international division of labor Apparently, there is no such thing as an identity of
interests of individual states, as assumed by the advocates of global regulation and global governance. In other words:

The gap

between the preferences of individual states is widening rather than narrowing. However,
governments must respect the preferences of their societies in the formulation of policies if they do not wish to lose legitimacy. Then

the different preferences of societies are the immediate result of severely diverging
perceptions of the international division of labor. Even in the G-20, individual societies have very different
perceptions of the effects of globalization and its economic effects. In Europe and the US, many people are
again,

increasingly critical of the international division of labor, if not outright hostile to globalization. According to a number of surveys,
only about one-fifth to one-third of the respondents in OECD countries see greater opportunities than risks in globalization. Even in
Germany, numerous politicians and citizens have been critical of globalization, although Germany strongly benefits from open
markets and the resulting intensification of international trade. Without a political anchoring in the member states, the G-20 has no

The unfavorable perceptions of globalization and the outlined asymmetric

sovereignty have resulted in a standstill in the G-20. Instead of a further development of the
multilateral order, at best the status quo will be preserved . This is why we can expect
future

nothing substantial at least in terms of economic policy and financial regulation from the G-20 summit in St.
Petersburg on September 5 and 6. The structural impediments to successful financial regulation and trade policies on a
supranational level cannot be overcome by the heads of government and state of the G-20. At least there is some hope
in those areas where the countries of the G-20 have identical interests. This applies primarily to measures to close down tax
loopholes. In 2008, ambitious expectations of a comprehensive reorganization of international trade relations through the G-20 were
raised. Unfortunately, the G-20 cannot and will not deliver on crisis prevention. Today, more modest goals will have to be set. The
key obstacle to success in the further development of global rules in trade and finance can be found in the G-20 societies
themselves. Perceptions about globalization need to be addressed by policy makers at the national level, as do the widespread

If societies continue to show

diverging preferences, the development of comprehensive global economic governance
in the G-20 will be all but impossible.
reservations about the international division of labor in the OECD countries.

Air Pollution Advantage/Add-On

1NC SQ Solves
Status quo solves---disregard individual events like red
alerts
Matt Sheehan 16, China correspondent for the Huffington Post, How China Is
(Surprise!) Winning Its War On Air Pollution, 1/7/16,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-air-pollution2014_us_568e592ce4b0a2b6fb6ecb73
Dont let the red alerts, smog-shrouded buildings or blotted-out sun fool you: Beijing and China on
the whole appear to be gaining real ground in the war on pollution.
Beijing saw a 16 percent annual fall in the concentration of the most deadly
type of air pollutant, according to an analysis by the Paulson Institute and Greenpeace of air quality data
from the United States Embassy in Beijing. Though virtually all of those gains were registered during the
summer and early fall, they still proved enough to make 2015 the cleanest year since the
embassy began publishing data in 2008.
In 2015,

Beijings own environmental officials announced a more modest 6 percent improvement in air quality this year, a
smaller margin that some analysts chalk up to Beijings overly optimistic portrayals of pollution levels in 2014. (The
Beijing municipal environmental protection bureau couldnt be reached for comment.)

Those improvements were also mirrored across broad swaths of eastern China,
with a Greenpeace population-weighted analysis of Chinese data showing 15 percent annual
decreases in cancer-causing PM2.5 particles. A separate analysis by Berkeley Earth found an 8
percent year-on-year decrease across much of the country during April-November
2015, though the group cautioned that it was too early to call it a definitive trend.
Credit for those gains goes to falling demand for coal as Chinese heavy industry
slumps, years of investment in renewable energy sources, and an increasingly robust
policy framework for punishing polluters. Chinas economy has also slowed sharply
as the country attempts to transition from export- and infrastructure-led growth to services and domestic
consumption,

a move that should bring further pollution reductions .

1NC No CCP Impact

No CCP collapse---resilience, meritocracy, and legitimacy
check---and theyll adapt, not lash out, if threatened
Eric X. Li 13 is a Henry Crown Fellow at the Aspen Institute. He is also a venture
capitalist in Shanghai who serves on the board of directors of China Europe
International Business School (CEIBS) and is vice chairman of its publishing arm
CEIBS Publishing Group. The Life of the Party, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, 92.1,
EBSCO
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new
generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People's Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth
and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn't stop international media and even some Chinese
intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for
In November 2012,

example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is "unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the
top." To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP'S long-held facade of unity,
which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP
growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China's economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government

Some in China and the West have gone so far as to

predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles.
Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who
suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread
China's politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to
meet the country's ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP'S adaptability,
system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next
decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country's leaders will consolidate the one-party
model and, in the process, challenge the West's conventional wisdom about political development and the
inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a postdemocratic future. ON-THE-JOB LEARNING The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of
self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power,
the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic has pursued a broad
investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course.

range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the
Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang

The underlying goal has always been

economic health, and when a policy did not work -- for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution -China was able to find something that did: for example, Deng's reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the
position of second largest in the world. On the institutional front as well, the CCP has not shied away
from reform. One example is the introduction in the 1980s and 1990s of term limits for most political positions (and
Zemin's opening up of the CCP'S membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s.

even of age limits, of 68-70, for the party's most senior leadership). Before this, political leaders had been able to use their positions to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules.
Mao Zedong was a case in point. He had ended the civil wars that had plagued China and repelled foreign invasions to become the father of modern China. Yet his prolonged rule led to
disastrous mistakes, such as the Cultural Revolution. Now, it is nearly impossible for the few at the top to consolidate long-term power. Upward mobility within the party has also
increased. In terms of foreign policy, China has also changed course many times to achieve national greatness. It moved from a close alliance with Moscow in the 1950s to a virtual
alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as it sought to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy has once more put it at odds with
the United States. But in its ongoing quest for greatness, China is seeking to defy recent historical precedents and rise peacefully, avoiding the militarism that plagued Germany and
Japan in the first half of the last century. As China undergoes its ten-year transition, calls at home and abroad for another round of political reform have increased. One radical camp in
China and abroad is urging the party to allow multiparty elections or at least accept formal intraparty factions. In this view, only full-scale adversarial politics can ensure that China gets

the CCP has arguably been one of the most selfreforming political organizations in recent world history . There is no doubt that Chinas new leaders face a different
world than Hu Jintao did when he took over in 2002, but chances are good that Xi's CCP will be able to adapt to and meet
whatever new challenges the rapidly changing domestic and international environments pose.
In part, that is because the CCP is heavily meritocratic and promotes those with proven
experience and capabilities.
the leadership it needs. However sincere, these demands all miss a basic fact:

2NC SQ Solves
The status quo solves action on air pollution
Eleanor Albert 16, Online Writer and Editor for the Council on Foreign Relations,
Chinas Environmental Crisis, 1/18/16, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinasenvironmental-crisis/p12608
The government has mapped out ambitious environmental initiatives in recent
five-year plans, although experts say follow-through has been flawed. In December 2013, Chinas National
Development and Reform Commission, the top economic planning agency, issued its first
nationwide blueprint (PDF) for climate change, outlining an extensive list of objectives for 2020.
Since January 2014, the central government has required fifteen thousand factories, including large state-owned
enterprises, to publicly report real-time figures on air emissions and water discharges. The government also
pledged to spend $275 billion over the next five years to clean up the air and $333 billion for water pollution. In a
November 2014 joint statement on climate change with the United States,

China committed to hit its

peak carbon emissions by 2030 and to have renewables account for 20 percent of its energy mix by
2030. More recently, President Xi Jinping, on a state visit to Washington, announced that China would initiate a
national cap-and-trade program in 2017.

China is one of the biggest investors in renewables, investing nearly $90 billion in 2014 as
part of its pledge to cut its carbon intensity (far outspending the United States $51.8 billion). Some analysts have
predicted that China is on track to overtake the United States as the worlds leading producer of wind energy by

Chinese firms continue to invest in and partner with international

companies to develop renewable energy technologies.
2016. Meanwhile,

the environmental NGO community has

grown to push the government to stay on track. Thousands of these groupsoften
working with U.S. and foreign counterpartspush for transparency, investigate corruption, and
head grassroots campaigns. Friends of Nature is one of its oldest; Global Village and Green Home are
Though policy implementation has been inconsistent,

among other well-known NGOs. Despite state support, these organizations inevitably face constraints from
government fear that their activities could catalyze democratic social change.

the response to
Chinas crisis has triggered some optimism about the future. What were seeing
now is an entirely new administration with an entirely different outlook on climate
change, writes Greenpeace East Asias Li Shuo. China, once reluctant to take a stand on environmental issues
and climate change, emerged as a leader in negotiations at the 2015 UN Climate Conference in
Despite the political reforms needed to catalyze any real change in the environmental sphere,

Paris where 195 countries signed a breakthrough accord. While China deserves due credit for its ambitious efforts to
curtail its own environmental crisis, Economy says it cannot be assumed that Beijing will follow through on its
promises. The proof will be on the groundand of course, in the atmosphere.

The Chinese government understands the problems with

economic growth---theyre willing to prioritize environmental
protection
Daniel K. Gardner 14, Dwight W. Morrow Professor of History and East Asian
Studies at Smith College, Chinas Off-the-Chart Air Pollution: Why It Matters (and
Not Only to the Chinese) - Part Two, 1/27/14,
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=397
Beijing government is not in denial about the profound pollution problems facing the country. There
appears to be a general agreement in the upper echelons of the party that the
unbridled economic growth of the past few decades has come at a heavy environmental
The

cost that is no longer tenable. The challenge, as they see it, is to curb environmental degradation
without halting the countrys economic development. And thats a challenge indeed, since fossil fuels, especially
coal, have been the engine driving economic momentum. Over the last decade, China has built on average two new
coal-fired power plants every week; and today China consumes slightly more coal than all other countries in the
world combined. [4]

The government now is walking something of a tightrope: on the one hand, economic prosperity
and bringing hundreds of millions of people out of povertyhas been a powerful source of legitimacy for the
Communist Party; on the other hand, the damage resulting from that prosperity, to the air and the waterand to
peoples well-beingis clearly fueling irritation and discontent among the people.

The party plainly is struggling to find the right balance between continued economic
growth and protection of the environment. The Beijing leadership is promoting serious
measures to reduce carbon emissions, from putting caps on coal consumption in
highly polluted regions, to shutting down small and inefficient coal plants, to banning the
building of new coal-fired power plants in the three key economic regions (BeijingTianjin-Hebei, the Yangzi River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta), to introducing trial carbon-trading programs in
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and, Guangzhou. To offset reduced dependence on coal, the government is looking to
expand the countrys energy reserves coming from other fuel sources: namely, natural gas, wind, solar,
hydroelectric, and nuclear (each of which, of course, presents its own set of challenges). Importantly, the
government is also looking to improve overall energy efficiency and thereby lessen energy consumption.
To be sure, formulating policies and enacting measures are not a guarantee of success. But the point here is, yes,

the government is aware of the harm being done to the air, the health of the people, and
perhaps even its own legitimacy, and it is actively responding. Indeed, constructing an
ecological civilization has been a mantra of the Chinese Communist Party since a
2007 speech by then president Hu Jintao. [5]
In addition to these measures, the State Council (Chinas cabinet) issued an Air Pollution Prevention Action Plan

the
Communist Party feels some urgency to tackle the countrys pollution problems
now. Between 2013 and the end of 2017, the government proposes to spend $277 billion to
begin to clean up the air. The plan includes among its 33 measures reducing PM2.5 levels in key industrial
20132017 in September 2013. Whatever its ultimate effectiveness, the plan leaves little doubt that

hubs, cutting coal consumption, increasing non-fossil fuel use, removing from the roads in China all cars registered
prior to 2005, and requiring that the countrys oil refineries produce the much cleaner China V gasoline.

the government in the past few years has offered a

variety of rebate programs to offset the costs of hybrid and electric vehicles. It
has also sponsored trade-in programs designed to rid the roads of big, inefficient
vehicles and replace them with smaller, fuel-efficient ones. And as anybody who has recently traveled to China is
aware, the governments investment in expanding the public transportation system
especially in the tier 1 citiescontinues unabated.
With its concern for vehicle emissions,

2NC No CCP Impact

CCP is adaptable and empirically overcomes major threats
Francesco Sisci 14, Italian columnist based in Beijing, contributes to the Asia
Times and II Sole 24ore, PhD in Chinese Classical Philology and Philosophy from
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Why China wont fall apart, CapX, 11/6/14,
http://www.capx.co/the-great-resilience-of-the-chinese-communist-state/
The resilience of the Chinese state and of the Chinese communist government has
been for decades a source of deep misunderstanding in the West. One can find the first
and most striking instance of this in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Brij Mohan Kaul tried to exploit Chinas weakness: in
Tibet, which in 1959 experienced a widespread uprising lasting three years; and at a difficult time, just after the
massive 19601961 famine had shrunk the population by about 10%. Despite this, India was thrashed in the war.
The defeat was surely due to important tactical mistakes committed by the Indian army. But what is significant is
that in a moment of great weakness in Tibet in particular and in China in general, the Indian attack did not start a
process of societal unravelling of the kind China had seen with the 1840 Opium war. Of course the first Opium war
was a defeat for China and the Indian war had been a victory, but even discounting this, the Communist power in
the early 1960s seemed more solid that the imperial power a century before. In the same year, Nationalist general
Chiang Kai-shek, defeated in the civil war in 1949 and confined to Taiwan, was planning to re-conquer the Mainland.
Chiang had clear intelligence about the poor state of the country in the aftermath of the great famine caused by the
failures of the 1957 Great Leap Forward. Mao had been side-lined, so it looked like a golden opportunity. Yet the war
with India proved the analysis wrong. This was also confirmed by the fact that Nationalist guerrillas in Amdo (the
Tibetan part of Sichuan) and on the border with Yunnan did not meet with much success, and with hindsight the US
was right not to back Chiang Kai-sheks plans. These seems distant history, but as a modest chronicler of events in

China for over a quarter of a century, I witnessed at least four events that might
have caused the government to crumble, and yet nothing of the sort happened.
These include the protest in Tiananmen in 1989, the demonstrations of the Falun Gong in
1999, the SARS epidemic in 2003, and the political attempt of Bo Xilai in 2012. Except
for SARS, the other three were caused by deep rifts in the top leadership and efforts of one faction to eliminate

They were violent internal power struggles causing more damage to

Chinese politics than any foreign interference, and yet nothing happened to
society. The deep-seated reasons for this can be found in an essay I wrote a decade ago. True to that analysis,
another.

ten years later, and despite many predictions to the contrary, there still has been no revolution in China. The fact
remains that while democratic protests have been raging for a month in Hong Kong, adjacent Shenzhen, whose

now is no
time for revolution for the Chinese people, who are experiencing a golden
age in their history and have had no past experience with democracy to pine for. This
people receive uncensored news from the territory, has shown no sign of contagion. In a nutshell,

does not mean that revolutions or democratic demands are impossible in China. A mix of internal forces and
international constraints could change the situation in the next decade. There are two elements which could drive
change. The Chinese economy will be roughly as large as that of the US, and this will draw increased attention and
fear from other countries because China does not share the political framework of the countries that have
dominated the world over the past two centuries the UK and US. Additionally, a large portion of the Chinese
population will enjoy Western middle-class purchasing power, and private enterprises will be required to pay a
larger portion of taxes as they will represent a large share of the GDP but as a whole they mighthave limited control
over how their tax money is spent. These two forces could coalesce but the timeframe within which this happens
may be extended or totally eliminated by a series of measures: for instance, better ties with the Western world,
limited political reforms, or co-opting the best and most powerful private entrepreneurs as political participants.

The party has proved time and again to be able to adapt with minimal
concessions to difficult circumstances, and not only with simple dilatory tactics.
For instance, the recent party plenum showed that the party is more intent on
addressing the corruption in the judiciary and the bureaucracy, which affects the
results of trials and official procedures through the use of bribes or favours from
connections. While this is of little relevance to Westerners more keen on seeing
major political shifts it is of major importance for the majority of common

people in China, confronted every day by overbearing officials and rich people
trampling on their own requests.

Party support is high and resilient

David Martin Jones 14, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from
LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the
China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and
Francis Online
New Chinese companies, such as Huawei, the telecoms giant, Pingan, one of Chinas largest financial institutions, and Haier, the
whitegoods manufacturer, describe themselves as collectives (minyang, meaning run by the people), rather than privately run

The bigger a company becomes, the more important are strong ties to the
party and the greater the benefits that flow from a good political relationship
(McGregor: 219). Modern China is very much, therefore, a political, or managed, economy. Despite the influence exerted
from the centre, the model is sufficiently flexible to permit local initiative .
(siyang).

China, as Jacques observes, has adopted many features from other models of Asian economic success. Yet, it is also driven by a

Darwinian internal competition that pits localities against each

other (McGregor: 175). McGregor shows that Chinese cities, provinces, counties and villages
compete fiercely for economic advantage. At the heart of the China model, as Jacques
concludes, is a hyperactive and omnipresent state, which enjoys a close relationship
with a powerful body of State Owned Enterprises, a web of connections with the
major firms in the private sector, [and which] has masterminded Chinas economic
transformation (615). Moreover, the partys successful creation of a middle class
that is dependent on the state ensures that despite the lack of representative
democratic structures, it enjoys a high level of support. Jacques argues, citing a survey
conducted by Harvard sinologist Tony Saich in 2009, that 95.9 per cent of Chinese were relatively
or highly satisfied with the central government (617). A 2008 Pew Centre survey, cited by
Brady, found that 86 per cent of Chinese people were satisfied with their countrys development, while in 2004, only
42 per cent had agreed with this sentiment. Brady notes that Despite facing multiple
troubles, Chinas party-in-power, the CCP, has regained public support for its
continued rule (29). Jacques states that this high level of satisfaction demonstrates
that the legitimacy or otherwise of the ruling party cannot be reduced to the absence of
democracy (617). Indeed, he claims that the Chinese state enjoys greater legitimacy than
any Western state even though Western-style democracy is entirely absent (618). This view may have some validity,
distinctively Chinese feature of

but it does not reflect the full picture. As Brady, Callick and McGregor show, there is also a darker side to the new China model. The

the party
maintains legitimacy through carefully orchestrated political campaigns,
extensive media controls and cultivation of a group mind that views the current
downside of the miracle Bradys edited volume on Chinas thought management demonstrates that

system as best for the continued development of the country (29). Brady, in her essay on the construction of the political message
informing the Beijing Olympics, argues that the

ultimate goal of propaganda and thought work is

manufacturing consent for the continued political status quo (14). Through this
endeavour of appropriating the Olympics, China relaunched itself as a determined, united, powerful, wealthy, culturally rich nation
apparently singing harmoniously as one. Yet, as the audience was distracted by the spectacle of Chinas rebirth, they may have
neglected to ponder the human, cultural, economic and political cost which lay beneath this drama (30).

No Chinese Econ Collapse

China econ wont collapse
Kevin Rudd 15, former Prime Minister of Australia and a Senior Fellow with
Harvard Universitys John F. Kennedy School of Government, The Future of U.S.China Relations Under Xi Jinping, April 2015,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
It is equally unconvincing to argue that Chinas transformation from an old economic
growth model (based on a combination of high levels of state infrastructure investment and low-wage, laborintensive manufacturing for export), to a new model (based on household consumption, the services sector
and a strongly innovative private sector) is also somehow doomed to failure . This is a sophisticated policy
blueprint developed over many years and is necessary to secure Chinas future growth trajectory through different

There is also a high level of

political backing to drive implementation. The process and progress of
implementation has so far been reasonable .
drivers of demand to those that have powered Chinese growth rates in the past.

to assume that Chinas seasoned policy elites will somehow prove to be less
capable in meeting Chinas next set of economic policy challenges than they have been
with previous sets of major policy challenges over the last 35 years is just plain wrong. China does face a
Moreover,

bewildering array of policy challenges and it is possible that any one of these could significantly de-rail the

it is equally true that Chinese policy elites are more

sophisticated now than at any time since the current period of reform began back in
1978, and are capable of rapid and flexible policy responses when necessary.
Governments economic program. But

the report explicitly rejects

the China collapse thesis recently advanced by David Shambaugh. It would also be imprudent in the
For these reasons, and others concerning the structure of Chinese politics,

extreme for Americas China policy to be based on an implicit (and sometimes explicit) policy assumption that
China will either economically stagnate or politically implode because of underlying contradictions in its overall
political economy. This would amount to a triumph of hope over cold, hard analysis.

Chinas econ isnt going to collapse- multiple factors prove it is

stable
Leon Berkelmans 15, the Director of the International Economy Program at the
Lowy Institute, No, China's Economy Hasn't Reached a Crisis...At Least Not Yet,
8/31/15, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/no-chinas-economy-hasntreached-crisisat-least-not-yet-13744
many people heard the Chinese economy snap last week. I
didn't. The stock market is in trouble, but I'm not too concerned. As I said in an earlier post, The stock
market does not look to be of systemic importance to the Chinese economy . It is
Judging by the headlines,

relatively small, it is not a major source of finance for firms, and stocks are not widely held.
I do think China's next GDP numbers, to be released in October, will be disappointing. One reason
is that financial services, which had accounted for a lot of growth earlier in the year (growing by 17.4%), will likely
have had a poor quarter.

But there some good news stories too. Many people were concerned about low government
revenue growth earlier this year, suggesting this was a sign of a weak economy. That figure has bounced

back nicely, growing at 12.6%, year on year in July, and as far as I'm aware, tax rate increases are not
responsible. A poor manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI; an index gauging manufacturer's sentiment)
seemed to kick off the recent round of hand wringing, but

the PMI for the non-manufacturing sector

has held up so far.

This relates to a general point made by one of my favorite China experts, Nick Lardy of the Peterson Institute. Lardy
thinks

services are growing quite quickly. Moreover, he has this rebuttal to those who doubt the data:

Naysayers question government economic data, continuing to focus on weakness in China's industrial sector and

steel production, for example, is

significantly more energy intensive than entertainment, so the demand for
electricity has fallen sharply as the structure of the economy has evolved .
the extremely slow growth of electric power output. But

It's fair to say there is an entire industry based on the claim that Chinese GDP has long been overstated. But we
don't often hear about the fact that China underestimates housing services in GDP, which is documented in the
appendix of Lardy's book Sustaining China's Economic Growth After the Global Financial Crisis.
I digress. Yes, the Chinese economy faces risks . Debt has ballooned over the last eight years. The IMF,
in its 2014 Article 4 consultation, had these words to say:
Looking at a sample covering 43 countries over 50 years, staff identified only four episodes that experienced a
similar scale of credit growth as China's recent TSF growth. Within three years following the boom period, all four
countries had a banking crisis.

That's a worry. But it does not imply that crisis is a certainty, or even the most likely
result. The IMF, in its 2015 consultation, was more upbeat. And this is money the Chinese owe to
themselves in their own currency. That takes off the table many of the risk factors that have plagued other
emerging economies.
Am I foolishly saying 'This time is different'? Ken Rogoff, a former Chief Economist at the IMF who wrote the book on
financial crises, may suggest that I am. I could look silly in six months. What I am not saying, however, is that

China is certain to grow steadily, without incident, for years . It would be remarkable
if China did not encounter turbulence. I just think we are some way from a full-blown
crisis.

Chinas resilient---challenges are manageable

Flemming J. Nielsen 14, Senior Analyst Danske Bank A/S, 10/23/14, China:
Surprisingly resilient in light of substantial slowdown in investments,
http://www.fxstreet.com/analysis/flash-comment/2014/10/23/
the Chinese economy has been surprisingly resilient in light of the
substantial slowdown in credit growth and investment demand in recent months. The
explanation is that so far the weaker domestic investment demand has been partially offset
by stronger export growth and resilient private consumption . The positive spin on recent
Chinese data is that China at the moment is able to rebalance its economy without a
substantial slowdown in growth .
That said,

Looking ahead there still appears to be some moderate downward pressure on Chinas
manufacturing PMI but risks are starting to look more balanced . There might be some
downward risk from weaker exports. On the other hand, the downside risk from the property market appears to be
declining at least near term. Press reports from China suggest that sales of new homes rebounded in October after
some of the restrictions on home purchases have been eased recently. This suggests that

market will subtract less from growth in the coming months.

the property

the governments targeted easing measures are starting to have an

impact, there is now also less pressure on the Chinese government for more
substantial easing measures like an interest rate or reserve requirement cut.
With signs that

No Chinese Econ Impact

No impact to Chinese economy
Blackwill 9 former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and
Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic
Planning (Robert, RAND, The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic
RecessionA Caution,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf)
Did the recession undermine the grip of the Chinese
Communist Party on the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)? No. Again, as Lee Kuan Yew stressed in the same
recent speech, China has proven itself to be pragmatic, resilient and adaptive. The
Chinese have survived severe crisesthe Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolutionfew societies have been so stricken . These are reasons not to be
pessimistic. Did the crisis make Washington more willing to succumb to the rise of Chinese power because of
PRC holdings of U.S. Treasury Bonds? No. Did it alter Chinas basic external direction and especially
its efforts, stemming from its own strategic analysis, to undermine the U.S. alliance system in Asia? No. Did it
cause the essence of Asian security to transform? No.
Next, China. Again, five years from today.

Economic decline wont collapse the CCP

Pei 9 Minxin Pei is a senior associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-12-09, Will the Chinese
Communist Party Survive the Crisis? Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survivethe-crisis
With no end to the global crisis in sight, many are wondering how long China's economic doldrums will last and what the political impact of stagnation

The conventional wisdom is that low growth will erode the party's political
legitimacy and fuel social unrest as jobless migrants and college graduates vent their frustrations through riots and
protests. Although this forecast is not necessarily wrong, it is incomplete. Strong economic performance has been the single
will be.

most important source of legitimacy for the CCP, so prolonged economic stagnation carries the danger of disenchanting a growing middle class that
was lulled into political apathy by the prosperity of the post-Tiananmen years. And economic policies that favor the rich have already alienated

Even in recent boom years, grass-roots

unrest has been high, with close to 90,000 riots, strikes, demonstrations, and collective protests reported
annually. Such frustrations will only intensify in hard times. It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the
disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute
the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the
world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen . Such
a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and
similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among
the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but
they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe,
North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police
can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic
failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The
CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social
protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force
industrial workers and rural peasants, formerly the social base of the party.

of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And
although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the
dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities.

Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law
enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security
services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest

leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If

worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation,
the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the
regime. If popular unrest is not a true threat to the party's continued rule, then what is? The answer could likely be disunity among the country's elite.
Those who talk of China's "authoritarian resilience" consider elite unity to be one of the CCP's most significant achievements in recent decades, citing
as evidence technocratic dominance, a lack of ideological disputes, the creation of standardized procedures for the promotion and retirement of high
officials, and the relatively smooth leadership succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.