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DOI:
10.1016/j.jlp.2016.08.021
Reference:
JLPP 3309
To appear in:
27 August 2016
Please cite this article as: Kannan, P., Flechas, T., Mendez, E., Angarita, L., Chaudhari, P., Hong,
Y., Mannan, M.S., A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2016), doi: 10.1016/j.jlp.2016.08.021.
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Corresponding author: M. Sam Mannan, Tel.: +1 979 862 3985; fax: +1 979 458 1493; e-mail
address: mannan@tamu.edu
Abstract
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Process safety incidents have large consequences on people, community and environment;
hence, it is important to have a learning organization to build on lessons learned from incidents
both within and outside the organization. In this study, a web-based collection of process safety
incidents is categorized and analyzed in a two-tiered manner to identify proximate causes.
Further, a risk-based framework is used to determine deficiencies in the safety management
systems. 96 incidents were collected and subjected to the analysis. Even though these incidents
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are from across the world, they are not statistically representative due to the lack of a universal
database of process safety incidents. During the analysis, it was observed that 60% of the
incidents resulted in explosions and 16% had equipment malfunction as a proximate cause. In
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addition, the analysis using the risk-based framework showed that incidents were influenced by a
deficiency of safe work practices, operating procedures and conduct of operations. Future work
in this area includes the development of tools for continuous monitoring of safety critical
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1. Introduction
An organization which strives to be at the apex of performance for both production and safety
can be expected to have the attribute of best-in-class safety culture. This characteristic implies
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that the organization continually learns from other companies and itself (Mannan, Mentzer, &
Zhang, 2013). Learning lessons from within and outside the organization is a challenge due to
unavailability of information, insufficient analysis and, lack of delivering lessons in a usable
format. Additionally, there are barriers to incident information sharing because of intellectual
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property and legal implications. In order to learn from incidents, a combination of elements such
as trust in the incident investigation, assessment of consequences severity and people involved,
contribute to the effectiveness of the learning process. Organizational learning theory can be
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used to combine these elements (Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 2014). Another aspect is related to
information availability; incident databases are the core for building the data analysis tree;
however, a comprehensive worldwide or nationwide database is required to perform this
analysis. Current and past attempts include the Process Safety Incident Database (PSID) (Sepeda,
2006), eMARS (Major Accident Reporting System) of the European Union (EU Directive,
1997), IChemE accident database (Powell-Price, Bond, & Mellin, 1998) ARIA database
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(Analyse, 2016) MHIDAS database (Moreno & Cozzani, 2015) WOAD database (DNVGL,
2016) and others. However, these databases have several limitations including, restricted access
(members and stakeholders only), incident collection focused on specific regions and, limited
reporting and update process. This restricts the possibilities for addressing common issues in
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different industries through a common learning platform. Incident databases help to build safer
workplaces by helping organizations to learn and improve their safety management systems.
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Furthermore, databases provide guidance for academic research in order to aid solving industrial
safety issues.
The need for learning from incidents is exemplified by the economic impact that incidents have
on the company and the community. The property damage in the 100 largest losses of the
hydrocarbon industry from 1974 to 2013 was estimated to be more than 34 billion USD (Marsh,
2013). In the difficult economic climate being endured by the oil and gas sector after the oil price
crash in late 2015, the need to prevent incidents cannot be underestimated.
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In the literature, there are various definitions for incident such as the one from the National
Safety Council (NSC) which defines an incident as an unplanned or undesirable event that
adversely affects the completion of the task; specifically for the chemical industry, it is defined
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as any occurrence, condition or action which did or could result in personal injury, damage to the
There have been several attempts to develop incident databases for applying tools to understand
risk and organizational performance; however, some are restricted to limited sectors such as
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biodiesel or ethanol industries, storage tanks, runaway reactions and others (Barton & Nolan,
1989; Chang & Lin, 2006; Olivares, Rivera, & Mc Leod, 2014, 2015). Incident investigation is a
consequence of the reporting of an incident. A study using the eMARS analyzed 121 incidents
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which were classified to identify parameters to improve safety issues (Drogaris, 1993). Olivares
et al. collected incidents of the biodiesel industry worldwide for the period of 2003 to 2013
(Olivares et al., 2014). They analyzed a total of 85 events which led to more than 17 fatalities
and further injuries. The authors found that there was an important gap in the dissemination of
lessons learned. A similar study was performed for the ethanol industry, covering a 16 year
period from 1998 to 2014 (Olivares et al., 2015). They found 125 events gathered from 93 data
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sources (newspaper articles, web resources, etc.) and observed that in 63% of the cases, the
incidents were fires at the facility. Additionally, 16% of the events were attributed to
maintenance related issues. Incident analysis are also performed by the nature of precursor
events such as runaway reactions in the chemical industry (Barton & Nolan, 1989). The analysis
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of incidents from 1962 to 1987 identified the causes contributing to over-heating and reaction
runaways. 189 incidents were analyzed and its causes were classified into process chemistry,
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plant design and operation. The main conclusion was the need for appropriate guidance for
thermal hazard assessment in small and medium-sized facilities. Different studies have also
covered specific process equipment, such as the incidents collection related to storage tanks by
Chang and Lin. The authors looked at 242 incidents with storage tanks over 40 years and
analyzed the incidents using a fishbone diagram (Chang & Lin, 2006). An important finding was
that one-third of the incidents were caused due to lightning and another third was caused by
human error. The technical causes were divided into failure, sabotage, crack and rupture, leak
and line rupture, and others. A more generalized approach towards equipment-based incidents
was carried out using an already existing database (Kidam & Hurme, 2013a). The study was
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restricted to the Japanese Failure Knowledge Database which is managed by academia. The
incident contributors were identified and it was determined that 78% of equipment-related
incidents had technically oriented factors, including design and human interface deficiencies.
Another study of the same database ranked 364 incidents according to its frequency and
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importance in incident prevention, this led to an observation that the most important contributors
were the human and organizational factors which were related to 19% of the incidents (Kidam &
Hurme, 2013b). A study covering 349 petrochemical incidents over a 10-year period in Taiwan
used the data mining classification and regression tree (CART) to examine the distribution and
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rules governing the factors of the incidents. It was observed that pipelines were a major
equipment-related source for incidents (C.-W. Cheng, Yao, & Wu, 2013). Another type of
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incidents are NaTech incidents (natural disaster which results in release of hazardous materials).
A study that focused on identifying and analyzing NaTech events found that quality of available
data is poor and, a specific database is needed for analysis, prevention and mitigation of this type
of incidents (Campedel, Cozzani, Krausmann, & Cruz, 2008).
Databases can be harnessed using a variety of techniques such as frequency exceedance curves,
which focuses on high impact consequences that include injuries and fatalities (Prem, Ng, &
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Mannan, 2010). Databases need to be analyzed keeping in mind the duration of the data
collected, the geographies the data are collected from, and the operational environments of the
facilities reporting the abnormal event. The interpretation of statistics from databases is highly
dependent on the context of the incident, which needs to be taken into account in order to avoid
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maintaining databases from available sources. In this sense, the objective of this work is to
provide a methodology for building databases and analyzing process safety incidents from open
source information.
2. Methodology
The approach used in this study is based on the 20 elements of Risk-based Process Safety
(RBPS) (CCPS, 2007). The previous methodology enables to rapidly identify deficiencies and
further implement lessons from incidents. The deficiencies may be related to some of the next
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four pillars in which the 20 RBPS elements are divided: risk management, commitment to
process safety, learning from experience and, understanding hazards and risk (CCPS, 2007). The
methodology uses guidelines for designing process safety management systems as a basis for
incidents analysis. This allows organizations to directly focus on possible areas of improvement,
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thus reducing the latency of learning from incidents. The salient feature of this work is the widescale applicability of the method even in poor information environments, which are very
common in incident databases. This method can be used internally by companies to identify
issues within their facilities or, on a larger scale for a systematic analysis of incidents within an
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industry sector.
The literature for this work was collected based on incidents reported from Googles web crawler
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(Google, 2016). The web crawlers are used to identify incident related news which are further
notified with the source of the news article. Incident refers to a broad range of upset conditions
relative to normal operations. The term incident has various applications such as human safety,
environmental impact, uncontrolled release of product and operation beyond design limit (Guy
Desjardins, 2012). Incidents may also be defined more specifically by a regulator in a particular
jurisdiction such as the environmental protection agency in the United States, which defines
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incident as a work related event where an injury, ill health (regardless of severity) or fatality
occurred or could have occurred (EPA, 2014). The incidents in this work broadly can be
categorized under the aforementioned definitions, with a focus on process safety related upsets.
The incidents were categorized according to their domain of operation (upstream, midstream,
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downstream). Upstream includes incidents from offshore and onshore production of oil and gas,
midstream includes incidents related to storage and transport of chemicals and petroleum
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products and downstream covers all aspects of process industry including chemicals production,
petrochemicals, refineries, and others. Furthermore, additional information was collected
including the type of incident (fire, explosion, and release), potential causes (Rootcauselive,
2016), and consequences to the environment and the community. In case of multiple
consequences (e.g., incident that led to fire and explosion), the most significant consequence was
used in the results and discussion sections; however, all the consequences were cataloged. An
effort was made to keep an extensive search by collecting information from diverse geographic
zones covering Asia, North America, South America, Europe, Australia and Africa. However, it
was noted that in the absence of a complete and thorough source of information, it would not be
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possible to perform a statistical analysis of the data found. The incidents were grouped into three
zones with zone 1 covering North America, zone 2 consisting of Europe, South America,
Australia and Africa, and zone 3 covering Asia. After data collection, the next step was the
classification of incidents based on industry type, incident category and substance involved.
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Subsequently, the first tier of analysis focused on information from open sources towards the
incident description, potential causes, contributing factors, and consequences. The second tier of
analysis was performed by using the 20 elements of the risk-based process safety guidelines
(CCPS, 2007). These elements provide a framework to prioritize process safety improvements in
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any facility. Based on available information, each one of these 20 elements was analyzed in
order to know if it had or not influenced on the proximate causes of the incidents collected.
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Appendix A - Table 2 summarizes the method employed for analyzing the impact of these
elements on all the 96 incidents in this study. A Boolean scoring system (1 or 0) was employed
to evaluate which elements had the most influence on the incidents. A score of 1 was assigned
to indicate the lack of competency exhibited in that element, while the number 0 was assigned
to indicate either the fulfillment (i.e. the organization or the facility was competent) or absence
of adequate information to infer the competency. To illustrate this concept, when 1 has been
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attributed to the process safety culture risk-based element this indicates that there was a lack of
competency in relation to that element which eventually contributed towards the incident. In the
present paper, process safety incidents were collected for one-year period worldwide, extending
from October 2014 to October 2015. The risk-based methodology proposed in this study was
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applied to analyze and classify these incidents. This framework gives the opportunity to go
beyond compliance towards a continuously improving management system and also, allowing
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the lessons learned to be incorporated into business processes. Finally, some recommendations
were made in order to improve the safety performance in industrial facilities.
The methodology followed in this study is summarized in Fig. 1.
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Classification
Type of industry
Incident category
Substance involved
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Data collection
Media reports
Web crawlers
Internet search
Analysis (layer 1)
Incident description
Potential causes and
contributing factors
Consequences
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Analysis (layer 2)
CCPS's 20 elements for
risk-based process safety
Fig. 1. An overview of the four step methodology for database construction and analysis based
on process safety incidents reported in media.
Table 1
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The risk-based process safety guidelines provide 20 elements to implement or improve a process
safety management system. Detailed definitions can be found in the Guidelines for Risk-based
Process Safety (CCPS, 2007). Table 1 lists these elements which are used in the tier 2 analysis.
E-11
Contractor management
E-2
E-12
E-3
E-13
Management of change
E-4
Workforce involvement
E-14
Operational readiness
E-5
Stakeholder outreach
E-15
Conduct of operations
E-16
Emergency management
E-17
Incident investigation
Operating procedures
E-18
E-9
E-19
Auditing
E-10
E-20
E-7
E-8
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E-6
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E-1
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2015) using Googles web crawlers, as described in the methodology section. The complete list
of incidents along with their description can be found in Appendix A - Table 1. The tiers of
analysis performed on this dataset allow examining the robustness and usefulness of the
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Zone 1 (North
America)
26%
49%
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25%
Zone 2 (Europe,
South America,
Australia, Africa)
Zone 3 (Asia)
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year period around the world, the results presented in this paper should not be interpreted as
comparative analysis between regions. Nevertheless, according to Fig. 2, about half of the
incidents collected (49%) are attributed to zone 3 (Asia). One of the factors that may have
influenced this share is the proliferation of a large number of industrial facilities in this rapidly
developing region; which is also a major population center with an estimated 5 billion
inhabitants by the year 2050 (Bongaarts, 2015). Furthermore, it was observed that zone 2 which
covered the largest geographical area (Europe, Africa, Australia and South America), contributed
only ~25% of the incidents. This low percentage may be attributed to the reduced amount of
incident reporting in the open media, especially in areas such as Africa. However, it may also
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indicate that highly regulated regions such as Europe are exhibiting a higher level of process
safety performance. This may be attributed to the regulatory structure including the Seveso
directives and, better awareness of best practices (Mitchison & Clement, 1998). It is important
to highlight that the incidents reported in this study were found in online sources; hence, in
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countries where media reports of incidents are sparse or there is under reporting, it may
significantly affect the numbers obtained. The analysis here can be assumed to be an
underestimation as compared to the complete incidents dataset.
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The importance of official incident reports worldwide is critical since most of open information
is sourced by media, where there may be an element of speculation. As an example of mandatory
reporting, the Seveso I directive requires all member states to report all major industrial
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accidents involving dangerous substances to the European Commission, which resulted in the
Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), maintained by the Major Accidents Hazards Bureau
(MAHB) in Ispra, Italy (Jones, Kirchsteiger, & Bjerke, 1999). Another example that can be
mentioned is related to PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) in the
United States. This organization administers the national pipeline regulations and requires the
reporting of all loss of containment incidents that meet the pipeline safety regulation criteria (49
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The 96 incidents collected worldwide for this paper resulted in 398 fatalities and more than 2000
injuries. It should be noted that in many of these incidents there were also evacuations and
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shelters in place, which would magnify the total number of people affected. Fig. 3 provides the
distribution of fatalities and injuries for each one of the zones. According to this figure, the
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incidents collected in zone 1 led to 8 fatalities, zone 2 evidenced 112 fatalities and, incidents in
zone 3 resulted in 278 fatalities. Although this is not a comparative analysis, based on the
collected incidents it was observed that the majority of fatalities were in Asia (zone 3). The
skewness of the data towards zone 3 is expected, given some high consequence incidents that
occurred in this region during the past year. As an example, the Tianjin warehouse explosion in
August 2015 resulted in 165 fatalities and several hundred injuries (Huang & Zhang, 2015).
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1600
1457
1200
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1000
Fatalities
800
Injuries
600
353
400
190
200
112
8
0
Zone 2
Zone 3
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Zone 1
278
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Number of fatalities/injuries
1400
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(North America), since the fatality rate in the United States for the oil and gas upstream sector
(offshore and onshore), is seven times higher than for all U.S. workers (Gunter et al, 2013).
50
45
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35
30
Upstream
25
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Number of incidents
40
Midstream
20
Downstream
15
10
5
0
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
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An extrapolation of the previous statistic to other regions would indicate that the number of
incidents in the upstream domain is much higher than what is found in the open media, showing
the need for maintaining comprehensive databases based on information sharing. This can be
extended to cover other sectors such as petrochemicals, refining, pharmaceuticals, bulk
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chemicals, fertilizers and can be maintained by industry organizations, which can then be used to
develop recommendations to improve safety performance. The lack of adequate incident
reporting of upstream incidents, especially in offshore locations, may be the reason of the
skewness of the data set towards the downstream sector. Also, the relative low number of
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midstream incidents found may be due to a lack of media coverage and/or incident reporting
related to pipelines, warehouses and other transportation infrastructure. This needs further
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analysis especially for zone 1 (North America), since much of the midstream infrastructure in the
United States (pipeline network and railroad system) is ageing (Leis, 2015) and can be a leading
indicator for future incidents.
According to Fig. 5, the highest percentage of incidents worldwide comes from the downstream
sector (84%), followed by midstream (14%) and upstream (2%). Downstream incidents cover a
wide range of facilities including refineries, petrochemical plants, chemical process facilities and
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others, which typically form one of the last manufacturing steps in the chemical supply chain.
The significant incident reporting in the downstream sector may be attributed to the relative
proximity of the facilities to population centers. However, this provides a contrasting view, since
midstream infrastructure typically possesses the largest exposure to the general population,
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the most significant process safety incidents historically have been attributed to the downstream
sector. These include the Bhopal gas disaster (Yang, Khan, & Amyotte, 2015), the Flixborough
disaster (Kerin, 2015), the Texas City refinery explosion (Hopkins, 2008) and others. The
downstream incidents reveal a need to renew the process safety management programs to
identify areas of lapses and loopholes to stem the number of incidents. An important tool is the
use of the RBPS elements which is discussed in the analysis tier 2.
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2%
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14%
84%
Midstream
Upstream
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Downstream
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and release. In those cases, the highest impact consequence was used in this section. A complete
list of the consequences can be accessed in the Appendix A. Since the source of the incidents
was on-line media, explosions usually have the highest amount of attention due to their nature of
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large sound and shock wave. This may have resulted in additional coverage by the local
population and media. In contrast, chemical releases may have less attention given that
substances may be released into the atmosphere with high rates of dilution.
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Fire
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21%
60%
Release
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19%
Explosion
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The type of substances involved in the incidents are highly varied, indicating that there is no
specific chemical which can be singled out as the main source of upset events. Although, the
most common substances involved in the incidents collected are crude oil and other
hydrocarbons contributing to ~22% of the incidents, followed by ammonia or anhydrous
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ammonia contributing to ~10% of the events. These observations are in agreement with the fact
that continuous improvement in process safety is required in different areas of the oil and gas
industry, as well as in mature technologies such as ammonia production. In addition, it was
observed that 14 incidents involved organic substances such as cyclohexanol, acrylonitrile,
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methyl mercaptan, acetone and acetal. The hazards represented by organics can be extended into
long term toxicological implications. Since they are easily dispersed into the natural ecosystems
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and enter the food chain, damaging the flora and fauna even long after the incident has occurred.
Hence specific focus needs to be placed on containing incidents which may result in a release of
organics into the environment.
3.2 Analysis tier 1
The classification of incidents was followed by the first tier of analysis, which consisted of
evaluating its potential causes. Since the incidents are relatively recent with limited information
accessible in the public domain, the causes are listed as proximate or potential causes. These
provide an initial insight into the possible reasons for the incident but may not be the ultimate
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root causes, which can only be determined after systematic investigation into the incident. This
analysis was based on a comprehensive potential causes list divided into possible immediate
causes and possible system causes (Rootcauselive, 2016). The results from this tier of analysis
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to report and distribute learnings as they are identified through the course of the investigation.
Many of the incident reports do not mention any on-going investigation or the proximate causes
of the event; 27% of the incidents collected had this attribute and they are listed as having
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unknown causes. This is an important concern since without investigating proximate causes,
the root causes cannot be discovered, which would ultimately result in a lack of learning from
incidents. The lack of adequate equipment, tools or vehicles was the proximate cause for 15% of
the incidents collected. It was also found that 14% of the incidents evidenced lack of procedures
for the task, policies or standards. An adequate set of procedures is a paramount element for the
safe operation of any process facility. They form the interface between the operators and the
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personnel with the control systems of the facility. Other identified proximate causes are
inadequate work planning (14%), lack of training effort (9%), failure in following procedures
(5%) and, inadequate assessment of needs and risk (4%). It should be noted that the percentages
in Fig. 7 do not sum 100% because some incidents evidenced more than one proximate cause,
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and for others there was not enough information about proximate causes since either they were
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4
5
9
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14
14
15
27
10
15
20
25
30
Percentage of incidents (%)
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The 20 elements of the Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) shown in Table 1 were used as the
highest level of analysis. An important outcome from incident investigation and database
learning is a pathway towards implementing changes to existing management systems. To
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increase the ease of learnings from incidents and improving the consistency of the analysis, the
20 elements framework was used for scoring the competence of the management system related
to the collected incidents. The previous analysis was performed in the context of the information
available. A Boolean form of scoring was used, assigning a value of 1 to those elements for
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which a lack of competence was observed during the incident and, a score of 0 in case of
evidencing competence or absence of information. The objective of the analysis tier 2 was to
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determine a rapid method of learning from incidents, identifying low competence areas in
process safety management systems. The 20 elements are divided into four categories (Frank,
2007): commit to process safety, understand hazard and risk, manage risk and, learn from
experience. These 20 elements were analyzed for each of the 96 incidents collected worldwide,
yielding to 1920 points of information. Fig. 8 shows the percentage of points attributed to each of
the categories. The percentages indicate lacking of competence during the incident in the
respective category. It should be noted that some incidents had proximate causes related to lack
of competency in multiple areas. According to Fig. 8, it was observed that 43% of the
information points were related to lack of risk management, 30% to commit to process safety,
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15% to understanding hazard and risk and, 12% failure to learn from experience. This supports
the reasoning that risk management is an important aspect for preventing incidents. Also, it
provides a direction towards improving the state-of-the-art in risk management processes in
industry. Despite the fact that of risk management turns out to be a recurring theme uncovered
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during investigation, the lack of robust systems to manage risk is observed in the incidents
collected. Furthermore, it was found that the lack of commitment to process safety contributed to
30% of the overall deficiencies in the safety management systems. This represents an alarming
need in order to improve process safety awareness and also, to promote safety culture in every
Learn from
experience
12%
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industrial facility.
Commit to
process
safety
30%
Understand
hazard and
risk
15%
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Manage
risk
43%
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Further analysis of each of the four pillars provides insight into the contributing factors resulting
in their deficiency. The lack in the management of risk pillar was related to the majority of
incidents collected. The management of risk is a complex pillar with 9 factors contributing to the
overall risk control; these elements are shown in Fig. 9. The incident analysis showed major
deficiency in three factors, safe work practices (44 out of 96 incidents), and operating procedures
(43 out of 96) and, conduct of operations (41 out of 96). These factors have been highlighted in
incident investigations from past events, such as the lack of adequate operating procedures in the
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Texas City disaster of 2005. It was expected that the safe work practices element had such a
significant impact on the proximate causes of the collected incidents, given that non-routine
work exposes the employees to situations that they are not used to deal with. It was also observed
that that there is a lack of emergency management in 23% of the incidents analyzed. This is
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especially alarming since emergency management and response have a direct impact on the
community around the facilities. Examples of poor emergency response are the West Fertilizer
disaster in 2013 (Pittman et al., 2014) and Tianjin warehouse explosion in 2015 (Huang &
Zhang, 2015), both of which resulted in significant first responder casualties. The training and
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performance assurance element is used to keep employees informed regarding the current state
of the process and procedures and it also keeps them updated with the protocols in case of any
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abnormal event or process upset. Around 24% of the incidents collected showed improper
training and assurance, indicating the lack of awareness in the industry regarding the importance
of training.
Emergency management
22
Conduct of operations
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Operational readiness
35
Management of change
11
Contractor management
Asset integrity and reliability
41
23
8
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14
44
Operating procedures
43
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10
20
30
40
Number of incidents
50
Fig. 10 shows the number of incidents (out of 96) that evidenced a deficiency in each of the
elements related to the commitment to process safety pillar. This pillar provides the basis for
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excellence in process safety by exemplifying the commitment to a strong culture and, the
reflection of process safety as a value and not just as a priority. It was observed that 43 out of the
96 incidents studied exhibited a lack of good process safety culture. A good process safety
culture is demonstrated by the actual performance of management systems in the operating
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facilities and is not limited to the presence of the procedures, audits and documents (Hendershot,
2007). Hence, the operational performance of the safety systems is an important leading
indicator towards a good safety culture. Olive et al. (2006) have further elaborated on the
difference between safety culture and safety climate by illustrating the Challenger and Columbia
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space shuttle disasters. Following the Challenger disaster there was a strong orientation towards
safety in NASA; however, the underlying culture did not promote safety, resulting in another
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disaster (Columbia) almost two decades after the first incident. The steps to build a good safety
culture include the need for basic programs to maintain physical safety of the facility,
management level programs which include leaders participation and finally, employee focused
programs such as training and communication of safety requirements (Olive, OConnor, &
Mannan, 2006).
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Stakeholder outreach
Workforce involvement
12
28
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47
37
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43
0
10
20
30
Number of incidents
40
50
Fig. 10. Elements contributing to the deficiency of the commitment to process safety pillar.
Fig. 11 shows the deficiencies observed in the understanding hazards and risk pillar of the
safety management system. Almost half of the incidents (47 out of 96) evidenced a poor hazard
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identification and risk analysis as a causal factor. Hazards identification is used to determine
incident scenarios which can lead to possible abnormal events; since a process goes through
many stages in its lifecycle, safety reviews can be carried out at various stages in order to check
the scenarios relevance when time passes. In spite of the extensive development in the state of art
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in risk analysis, for example, a study (Tixier, Dusserre, Salvi, & Gaston, 2002) reviewed more
than 62 methodologies for assessing risk in industrial plants; improper hazard identification and
risk analysis continues to be one of the most relevant proximate causes of industrial incidents
(Tixier et al., 2002). The lack of proper hazards identification has also been attributed to several
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major industrial disasters and the deficiency in this key element even today indicates the need for
47
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40
38
40
42
44
46
48
Number of incidents
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Fig. 11. Elements contributing to the deficiency of the understanding hazards and risk pillar.
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The last pillar of a robust safety management system is the requirement of having a learning
organization. Normal accident theory suggests that disasters are the result of complex socioeconomic systems and factors; to prevent these disasters, organizations need to possess certain
characteristics of response systems (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006). The incident learning system is
built on many factors including but not limited to incident reporting, quality of the reporting
system and management commitment to safety. According to Fig. 12, 20% of the incidents
collected (19 out of 96) showed a lack of robust audit systems in the facilities. This is an
important observation since audits provide a platform for improving the functioning of the
system. Auditing is mandatory by several regulatory agencies, such as under OSHA PSM
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standard which mandates compliance audits, and EPAs risk management plan (RMP) (Chemical
accident prevention provisions, 2016).
Performing adequate incident investigations is another important aspect of any continuous
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learning organizations. A complete and in-depth incident investigation of not only major
abnormal events but also near-misses, allows the organization to improve the system based on
lessons to learn. Incident investigation programs also focused on near-misses help to improve the
safety performance through its identification and analysis, taking these as warning signals of
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possible disasters. These programs may be based on frameworks such that individual sites can
analyze their own weak signals and implement system wide improvements (Phimister, Oktem,
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Auditing
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16
14
5
10
15
Number of incidents
20
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Fig. 12. Elements contributing to the deficiency of the learning from experience pillar.
4. Conclusions
A web-based strategy for collection and analysis of process safety incidents has been presented.
The method follows collection of incidents primarily using web crawlers (Google, 2016) and
classifying them using metrics, including incident type, consequences, and geographic zones. A
two-tiered approach was implemented to analyze the proximate causes of the incidents,
combining the available information with a rating system based on the CCPSs Risk Based
Process Safety (RBPS) elements. This strategy has been applied to build a database of incidents
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from October 2014 to October 2015, representing a total of 96 incidents worldwide; which have
been mined to identify important indicators of poor safety management systems.
From this specific sample, it was found that 33% of the incidents were under investigation and
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27% did not mention any on-going investigation or did not have enough information in order to
deduct the proximate causes of the event. This reveals that the sharing of lessons learned from
process safety incidents is a challenge due to unavailability of information in the public domain.
The previous concern highlights the importance of creating a worldwide database as a learning
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platform for sharing the main findings behind the root causes and contributing factors of process
safety incidents.
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In this paper, the 20 elements of a risk based approach to safety were used as the foundation for
the proposed methodology. The contribution of each one of the elements in the factors that led to
the 96 incidents was analyzed, yielding to 1920 points of information. At the same time, the
elements were divided into four categories (Frank, 2007): commit to process safety, understand
hazard and risk, manage risk and, learn from experience. It was observed that 43% of the
information points were related to lack of risk management and 30% to commit to process safety.
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This enables to conclude that risk management is a factor that plays a crucial role on the
prevention of incidents. Furthermore, there is an alarming need to improve process safety
awareness in order to promote safety culture as a priority. Failure to learn from experience was
also a relevant category (12%), which emphasizes the importance of a common learning
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platform.
Given the constraints in collecting the total number of incidents that happened during the one-
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year period around the world, the results presented in this paper should not be interpreted as the
complete incident statistics for this period of time.
Future work in the area of incident collection and analysis can be related to:
(1) Implementation of web crawlers to automatically identify possible incidents from open
sources and, develop systems (automated or manual) to classify incidents both within the
organization and externally.
(2) Encourage information sharing between academia, industry and government to build
robust incident databases to promote data mining and learning.
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(3) Disseminate incident investigation and risk analysis frameworks in usable formats across
specific industry domains. The usability includes appropriate classification, easy
accessibility (web-based, open to public) and, enough details to extract lessons to learn.
(4) Develop systems to continuously monitor the state of the safety management systems in
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the organization.
5. Acknowledgements
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We acknowledge the contribution of Ms. Jeimy Martinez in the collection of the incidents and
Ms. Valerie Green for providing resources for gathering incidents. This research was sponsored
by the Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical
Engineering at Texas A&M University.
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6. Appendix
The appendix Table 1 gives the list of incidents for the period of analysis in a concise format
giving details such as date, location, proximate causes, consequences and references.
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Table 2 gives the analysis of the incidents using the risk-based process safety elements.
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Appendix A: Table 1
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Database of incidents used in the current study giving details of the date, type of industry, type of incident, substance involved,
description of the incident, proximate causes, consequences and the sources of information
11/15/2014
La Porte, TX,
USA
7/2/2015
Maryville, TN,
USA
Type of
industry
Type of
incident
Substance involved
Description/events sequence
Proximate causes
Consequences
Methyl mercaptan
4 Fatalities/1
Injury/OSHA
proposed penalties of
$273,000 for one
repeat and four serious
violations in La Porte
Acrylonitrile
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/97
Injuries/Thousands
evacuated
Ferric chloride
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/0 Injuries
Under investigation
Defective equipment
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Damage to the
facility: $20 million
dollars/Shelter-inplace within a mile
radius of the
warehouse
ABC27 News
(Snyder, 2015)
0 Fatalities/0 Injuries
- Click2 Houston
- (Rasta, 2015)
Not reported
Unknown
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Shelter-inplace order was issued
Not reported
Unknown
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Shelter-inplace for residents
within two miles of
the plant
Madison County,
KY, USA
6/8/2015
Conewago
Township, PA,
USA
F, E
Not reported
8/14/2015
F, E
Not reported
6/7/2015
Elizabeth
Borough, PA,
USA
7/5/2015
35 | P a g e
Brookshire, TX,
USA
AC
C
F, E
F, E
EP
10/21/2014
SC
Location
M
AN
U
Date
TE
D
Incident
number
Source
- OSHA(2015)
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
(Kane, 2015)
- Houston Chronicle
(Grattan, 2015)
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
6/21/2015
Glenville, MN,
USA
F, E
Not reported
Under investigation.
Inadequate tools, equipment & vehicles
Ethanol
Under investigation
10
6/25/2014
Becancour,
Quebec, Canada
Chlorine
11
8/4/2015
Marston, MO,
USA
F, E
Aluminum (molten
metal)
Unknown
0 Fatalities/4 Injuries
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/One home
was voluntarily
evacuated
- AmarilloGlobeNews
(Cortez, 2015)
0 Fatalities/10
Injuries/Evacuation of
17 buildings inside an
industrial park
- CNN
(Goldschmidt, 2015)
0 Fatalities/1
Injuries/Hundreds
evacuated/FRE issued
CSX and Sperry Rail
Service $25.000 fines
each
- ABC News
(Mosquera, 2015)
Acetal
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/1 Injuries
13
4/13/2015
Stinnett, TX,
USA
F, E
Natural gas
14
8/13/2015
Spokane, WA,
USA
Chlorine
4/17/2015
36 | P a g e
Monroe, OH,
USA
F,E
EP
TE
D
Natural gas
AC
C
M
AN
U
0 Fatalities/33 Injuries
F, E
16
F, E
A massive explosion in an
aluminum plant in Missouri
created a monumental smoke
column due to the fire.
Kanawha, WV,
USA
0 Fatalities/2
Injuries/Significant
damage to the facility
0 Fatalities/1 Injury
6/26/2015
2/16/2015
0 Fatalities/5
Injuries/Newport city
manager estimate $1
million in damages to
the plant
Unknown
12
15
RI
PT
7/14/2015
An explosion occurred in an
aerospace company in Newport
which caused huge damages in
the structure of the facility.
SC
Newport, WA,
USA
- Fox news
(AP, 2015e)
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
17
5/13/2015
Jenkins
Township, PA,
USA
Acetone
An electrical discharge in
Acton Technologies company
caused a fire in a warehouse
were acetone was stored.
18
1/8/2015
Not reported
1 Fatalities/2 Injuries
- 13WHOTV
(Whitworth, 2015)
1 Fatalities/2
Injuries/OSHAs
proposed penalties
total $87,780
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/8
Injuries/50 homes
were evacuated
- FOX 28
(Fegan, 2015)
RI
PT
Under investigation
SC
1/6/2015
M
AN
U
19
0 Fatalities/1
Injuries/School
evacuation
2/6/2015
Warsaw, IN,
USA
F, E, R
Methanol
21
8/19/2015
Bainbridge, GA,
USA
F, E
Sodium hydrosulfide
Under investigation
1 Fatalities/1 Injuries
9/4/2015
Sapulpa, OK,
USA
Unknown
0 Fatalities/1 Injuries
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/20 Injuries
Anhydrous ammonia
EP
22
TE
D
20
- Fox 23 News
(Dougherty, 2015)
- Metroforensics
(Callahan, 2015)
9/5/2015
Freeport, TX,
USA
F, R
24
6/9/2015
Freeport, TX,
USA
Pyrolysis gasoline
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Nearby
residents and
employees were asked
to stay indoors
- Houston Chronicle
(Lezon, 2015)
25
6/7/2015
Freeport, TX,
USA
Not reported
Under investigation
1 Fatalities/0 Injuries
- Houston Chronicle
(Zaveri, 2015)
AC
C
23
37 | P a g e
Cyclohexanone,
Cyclohexanol
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Ammonium nitrate
Diesel fuel
Not reported
Natural gas
0 Fatalities/8
Injuries/Firefighters
trucks and bridge were
destroyed. Debris
found up to 1.5 km
away
Unknown
1 Fatalities/"Several"
Injuries/Around 30 to
40 houses damaged
- RT News
(Staff, 2014)
Under investigation
1 Fatalities/"Several"
Injuries/An entire
neighborhood was
devastated
- Daily Mail UK
(AP, 2014)
Unknown
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Damaged
buildings
26
9/5/2014
Charleville,
Queensland,
Australia
27
9/9/2014
Ritterhude,
Osterholz,
Germany
10/23/2014
Ludwigshafen,
RhinelandPalatinate,
Germany
29
3/26/2014
Durban,
KwaZulu-Natal,
South Africa
Not reported
30
11/6/2014
Cordoba,
Cordoba,
Argentina
Not reported
An explosion in a chemical
facility. A gas cloud was seen
above the area immediately
after the explosion.
1 Fatalities/66
Injuries/Damaged
about 20 buildings and
left a crater in the
facility's backyard
31
4/5/2015
Manchester,
Greater
Manchester,
England
FE
Not reported
Unknown
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Smoke and
debris
Inadequate management/supervision
Inadequate work planning
0 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Fine of around
USD $6.4 million (R$
22.5 million).
Environmental impact
causing death of
thousands of fish
- Reuters
(Reuters, 2015a)
Unknown
0 Fatalities/2
Injuries/Two workers
were treated at the
scene as a
precautionary measure
- BBC news
(BBCNews, 2014)
RI
PT
SC
ER
M
AN
U
TE
D
28
Under investigation
4/2/2015
Santos, So
Paulo, Brazil
Diesel fuel
33
11/17/2014
South
Lanarkshire,
Hamilton,
Scotland
Not reported
34
5/14/2015
Ammonia
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/13 Injuries
- BBC news
(BBCNews, 2015d)
35
7/13/2015
Norwich,
Norfolk, England
EF
Not reported
Under investigation
2 Fatalities/0
Injuries/Damaged
buildings
- Norfolk Constabulary
(NorfolkConstabulary, 2015)
38 | P a g e
AC
C
EP
32
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Loughborough,
Leicestershire,
England
Hydrochloric acid
Unknown
Not reported
Not reported
0 Fatalities/0 Injuries
- Loughborough Echo
(Rush, 2015)
1 Fatalities/1
Injuries/Facility
damage
0 Fatalities/11
Injuries/Toxic cloud
- El Pais
(L.Congostrina, 2015)
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/13
Injuries/Damaged
buildings
- Fox News
(AP, 2015c)
0 Fatalities/0 Injuries
- Halifax Courier
(HalifaxCourier, 2015)
Under investigation
9 Fatalities/>100
Injuries
- Daily Post
(Matthews, 2015)
Unknown
0 Fatalities/5 Injuries
- Daily star
(AP, 2015d)
9 Fatalities/26 Injuries
- The Guardian
(AP, 2015a)
Gemlik, Bursa
Province, Turkey
2/12/2015
Igualada,
Province of
Barcelona, Spain
39
August/05
Krefeld, North
RhineWestphalia,
Germany
Nitrogen, titanium
dioxide
40
7/1/2015
Huddersfield,
West Yorkshire,
England
7/25/2015
8/13/2015
Litvnov, st nad
Labem, Czech
Republic
42
43
2/12/2015
39 | P a g e
Aracruz, Espirito
Santo, Brazil
Chlorine
TE
D
EP
41
Propylene
AC
C
38
Not reported
Under investigation
M
AN
U
7/19/2015
37
RI
PT
7/1/2015
SC
36
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
46
9/15/2015
1/18/2015
Auckland, New
Zealand
Salvador, Bahia,
Brazil
Oil derivatives
Anhydrous ammonia
Not reported
Hydrogen
2 Fatalities/3 Injuries/
- Reuters
(Reuters, 2015b)
0 Fatalities/0 Injuries
1 Fatalities/2 Injuries/
Debris
- NZ Herald
(Tait, 2015)
Inadequate maintenance
Failure following procedures
Lack of work rules/policies/standards/procedures
Physical condition ( the accident may have been the
result of maintenance work being carried out under
tight deadlines and long shifts imposed on refinery
workers)
Mental stress
Mental state
0 Fatalities/3 Injuries
- Reuters
(Blount, 2015)
49
Sicily, Italy
9/16/2015
Maridi, Western
Equatoria, South
Sudan
40 | P a g e
0 Fatalities/0 Injuries
85 Fatalities/>100
Injuries
EP
9/27/2014
Oil
AC
C
48
Oil
RI
PT
8/25/2015
Wycarbah,
Queensland,
Australia
TE
D
47
Vitria, Espirito
Santo, Brazil
SC
45
8/26/2015
M
AN
U
44
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
10/18/2014
Chandausi, Uttar
Pradesh, India
Not reported
Fire crackers
RI
PT
50
1 Fatalities/ 1 Injury
- Business Standard
(PTI, 2014a)
17 Fatalities/ Chief
Minister of the state
announced ~ 3000
USD to each victim's
family as
compensation for loss
1 Fatality/ 11 Injuries
- Chemicals Technology
(Rasta, 2015)
10/20/2014
Kakinada,
Andhra Pradesh,
India
52
1/20/2015
Ankaleshwar,
Gujrat, India
4hydroxybenzohydrazide
53
4/8/2015
Greater Noida,
Delhi, India
Not reported
Unknown
1 Fatality/ 2 Injuries
- The Statesman
(PTI, 2015)
Not reported
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/0 Injuries
Under investigation
6 Fatalities/ 10 Injuries
- News 18
(DPSatish, 2014)
8/6/2015
Kanpur, Uttar
Pradesh, India
SC
Under investigation
M
AN
U
Defective equipment
55
3/29/2015
41 | P a g e
Vishakhapatnam,
Seemandhra,
India
AC
C
EP
54
TE
D
51
Fire crackers
A major explosion in a
firecracker unit occurred. The
unit was run illegally by the
owner who was later taken
under custody. Explosions in
firecracker units have been a
prevalent problem in the state
of Seemandhra, India which
needs to be addressed.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
60
61
62
9/22/2014
Lanzhou, Gansu,
China
9/23/2014
Huaihua, Hunan,
China
1/31/2015
linqi, Shandong,
China
2/8/2015
2/19/2015
42 | P a g e
Liaocheng,
Shandong, China
Yichang, Hubei,
China
Ammonia
0 Fatalities/ 33 Injuries
3 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
Limestone
Barium nitrate
6 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
4 Fatalities/ 4 Injuries
3 Fatalities/ 5 Injuries
5 Fatalities/ 2 Injuries
Coke
RI
PT
2 Fatalities/ 5 Injuries
Unknown
SC
Not reported
M
AN
U
59
Yichuan, Ninxia,
China
TE
D
58
9/7/2014
EP
57
9/28/2015
Ethanol
AC
C
56
Vishakhapatnam,
Seemandhra,
India
Urea-based fertilizer;
nitro-based fertilizer
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
3/3/2015
Ordos, Inner
Mongolia, China
Hydrogen,
ammonia
RI
PT
63
3 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
- Yangzi Newspaper
(Scinto, 2015)
3/10/2015
Changzhou,
Jiangsu, China
Not reported
65
3/18/2015
Binzhou,
Shandong, China
Hydrogen peroxide
4 Fatalities/ 2 Injuries
0 Fatalities/ 14 Injuries
3 Fatalities/ 2 Injuries
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
Ammonia
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/ 3 Injuries
- Sina News
(He, 2015)
Paraxylene
67
4/9/2015
Weifang,
Shandong, China
Hydrogen sulfide
4/10/2015
Dalian, Liaoning,
China
4/21/2015
Zhangjiagang,
Jiangsu, China
69
43 | P a g e
ER
AC
C
68
M
AN
U
Zhangzhou City,
Fujian, China
TE
D
4/6/2015
EP
66
SC
64
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
70
4/21/2015
Nanjing, Jiangsu,
China
Glycol
An explosion occurred in a
glycol unit refining tower of a
petrochemical plant.
0 Fatalities/ 1 Injury
Unknown
NA Fatalities/ 0
Injuries
- LiuAn News
(LiuAnNews, 2015)
Unknown
5/10/2015
Bangfu, Anhui,
China
FE
Sodium
72
5/16/2015
Jincheng, Shanxi,
China
Carbon disulfide
8 Fatalities/ 6 Injuries
73
5/18/2015
Dialian, Liaoning,
China
Xylene
An explosion occurred in a
chemical container.
Unknown
0 Fatalities/ 4 Injuries
74
5/25/2015
Laozhou, Jiangxi,
China
Terpene
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
Unknown
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
- Globle Times
- Xinhua News (GlobleTimes,
2015; XinhuaNews, 2015)
3 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
RI
PT
71
An explosion, caused by
sodium metal reacting with
water, occurred in a chemical
plant in Mohekou Bengbu City
Industrial Park. The fire was
put off in one hour.
- Yahoo News
(YahooNews, 2015)
- Sina News
(He, 2015)
6/13/2015
Nanjing, Jiangsu,
China
FE
Epoxyethane
76
6/18/2015
Haolianghe,
Heilongjiang,
China
Ammonia
77
6/18/2015
Tangshan, Hebei,
China
Coal dust
An explosion occurred in a
thermal power generation
company preparation plant.
Unknown
NA Fatalities/ 0
Injuries
78
6/19/2015
Dandong,
Liaoning, China
Under investigation
3 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
44 | P a g e
AC
C
EP
75
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
6/27/2015
Taipei, Taiwan,
China
81
6/28/2015
Ordos, Inner
Mongolia, China
82
6/29/2015
Xiangtan, Hunan,
China
83
84
6/30/2015
7/16/2015
Dongsheng,
Shandong, China
Rizhao City,
Shandong, China
Not reported
Colored powder
FE
Ammonia
Not reported
An explosion occurred in a
petrochemical company in
Xiangtan Jiuhua Industrial
Zone. There was huge smoke.
Not reported
Liquid hydrogen
4 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
- Sohu News
(SohuNews, 2015)
Unknown
14 Fatalities/ 524
Injuries
- CNN News
(Greg Botelho, 2015)
Unknown
3 Fatalities/ 6 Injuries
- Sohu News
(SohuNews, 2015)
Unknown
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
- Sina News
(Herald, 2014)
Unknown
0 Fatalities/ 57 Injuries
- Sina News
(He, 2015)
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
- ROCKETNEWS24 Nee
(ROCKETNEWS24Nee, 2015)
3 Fatalities/ 6 Injuries
Under investigation
RI
PT
80
SC
Enshi, Hubei,
China
M
AN
U
6/21/2015
TE
D
79
85
7/26/2015
86
7/31/2015
Changzhou,
Jiangsu, China
Not reported
Unknown
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
87
8/5/2015
Changzhou,
Jiangsu, China
Methylbenzene
Unknown
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
45 | P a g e
AC
C
EP
Oil derivatives
- Yicai News
(Wang, 2015)
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
88
8/12/15
Tianjin, Tianjin,
China
Ammonium nitrate
89
8/22/2015
Zibo, Shandong,
China
FE
Not reported
90
8/31/2015
Dongying,
Shandong, China
Not reported
An explosion occurred in a
chemical plant, and the fire was
controlled after five hours.
91
9/7/2015
Lishui, Zhejiang,
China
Not reported
Ammonia
94
7/3/2015
46 | P a g e
Ulsan, South
Korean
Aluminum
- BBC News
(BBCNews, 2015a)
Unknown
1 Fatalities/0 Injuries
- CNBC News
(CNBCNews, 2015)
Unknown
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injuries
- IBTIMES New
(Varghese, 2015)
0 Fatalities/ 20 Injuries
- CHINADAILY News
(CHINADAILYNews, 2015)
An explosion occurred in a
chemical plant dealing with
waste aluminum melting. The
explosion occurred when the
operator was melting the
aluminum.
Under investigation
2 Fatalities/ 2 Injuries
- Sina News
(SinaNews, 2015)
Not reported
Under investigation
4 Fatalities/ 1 Injury
- CNN News
(McKirdy, 2015)
SC
RI
PT
Unknown
M
AN
U
9/22/2015
Changzhou,
Jiangsu, China
1 Fatalities/ 9 Injuries
TE
D
Pingdingshan,
Henan, China
- BBC News
(BBCNews, 2015b)
EP
93
9/18/2015
AC
C
92
Under investigation
An explosion occurred at a
chemical plant. Before the
explosion, some workers were
welding the interior of waste
water storage. The blast tore out
the upper structure of the
storage facility, which
subsequently collapsed.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
10/5/2015
Shangyu,
Zhejiang, China
Hexane
Sodium chlorate
An explosion occurred in a
chemical plant. 70 firefighters
and 22 fire engines were used
to prevent the flames from
reaching a nearby warehouse
containing 50 tons of
flammable chemicals, including
sodium chlorate.
Under investigation
0 Fatalities/ 0 Injury
0 Fatalities/ 7 Injuries
- PRAMEYANEWS7 News
(PRAMEYANEWS7News, 2015)
RI
PT
Bukit Jalil,
Malaysia
Under investigation
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
96
5/12/2015
SC
95
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
elements, this indicates that there was a lack in the competency exhibited of those elements which eventually led to the incident. When
0 was attributed to the Incident Investigation element (E-17), it meant that either the incident investigation was conducted or the
RI
PT
information about that element has not been mentioned explicitly in the source surveyed.
Inci
den
t
No.
Process
Safety
Culture
Compli
ance
with
standar
ds
Proce
ss
Safet
y
Comp
etenc
y
Work
force
invol
veme
nt
Stak
ehol
der
outre
ach
No.
E-1
E-2
E-3
E-4
4
5
Manage risk
Co
ntr
act
or
ma
nag
em
ent
Opera
ting
proce
dures
E-5
E-6
E-7
E-8
E-9
E-10
10
11
12
13
TE
D
Process
Knowledge
management
Hazard
Identification
and risk
analysis
Safe
wor
k
pract
ices
48 | P a g e
Asse
t
integ
rity
and
relia
bilit
y
Traini
ng
and
perfor
manc
e
Assur
ance
Manag
ement
of
change
Operati
onal
Readin
ess
Co
nd
uct
of
ope
rati
ons
Emer
gency
mana
geme
nt
Inciden
t
investi
gation
Meas
ureme
nt and
metric
s
Au
diti
ng
Manageme
nt review
and
continuous
improveme
nt
E11
E-12
E-13
E-14
E15
E-16
E-17
E-18
E19
E-20
M
AN
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SC
CCPS Risk-based process safety Principles [Key 1 Lack of adherence; 0 - Compliance/lack of information]
AC
C
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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SC
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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46
47
48
49
50
51
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66
67
68
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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96
51 | P a g e
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SC
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Highlights:
AC
C
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D
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SC
RI
PT
1. A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents from across the world
2. Proximate cause and risk-based analysis to identify deficiencies in process safety
management
3. 96 incidents analyzed with deficiencies identified in critical safety management areas