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1. Penaflor vs Outdoor Clothing

FACTS:
Penaflor was hired on September 2, 1999 as probationary Human
Resource Department (HRD) Manager of respondent Outdoor
Clothing Manufacturing Corporation. Penaflor claimed that his
relationship with Outdoor Clothing went well during the first few
months of his employment. His woes began when the company's Vice
President for Operations, Edgar Lee (Lee), left the company after a big
fight between Lee and Chief Corporate Officer Nathaniel Syfu (Syfu).
Because of his close association with Lee, Penaflor claimed that he was
among those who bore Syfus ire.
When Outdoor Clothing began undertaking its alleged downsizing
program due to negative business returns, Penaflor alleged that his
department had been singled out. Penaflors two staff members were
dismissed on the pretext of retrenchment. He worked as a one-man
department, carrying out all clerical, administrative and liaison work; he
personally went to various government offices to process the
company's papers.
When an Outdoor Clothing employee, Lynn Padilla (Padilla), suffered
injuries in a bombing incident, the company required Penaflor to attend
to her hospitalization needs; he had to work outside office premises to
undertake this task. As he was acting on the company's orders, Penaflor
considered himself to be on official business, but was surprised when
the company deducted six days salary corresponding to the time he
assisted Padilla.
After Penaflor returned from his field work on March 13, 2000, his
officemates informed him that while he was away, Syfu had appointed
Nathaniel Buenaobra (Buenaobra) as the new HRD Manager. Penaflor
was surprised by the news; he also felt betrayed and discouraged. He
tried to talk to Syfu to clarify the matter, but was unable to do so.
Penaflor claimed that under these circumstances, he had no option but
to resign. He submitted a letter to Syfu declaring his irrevocable
resignation from his employment with Outdoor Clothing effective at
the close of office hours on March 15, 2000.
Penaflor then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor
arbiter, claiming that he had been constructively dismissed. He included
in his complaint a prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages,
illegally deducted salaries, damages, attorneys fees, and other

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monetary claims.
The labor arbiter found that Penaflor had been illegally dismissed. The
NLRC apparently found Outdoor Clothings submitted memoranda
sufficient to overturn the labor arbiters decision. It characterized
Penaflor's resignation as a response, not to the allegedly degrading and
hostile treatment that he was subjected to by Syfu, but to Outdoor
Clothings downward financial spiral. Penaflor anchored his certiorari
petition with the CA on the claim that the NLRC decision was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion but the CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Penaflor filed the
present petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was constructively dismissed.
HELD: Yes. CA Decision reversed and set aside
Labor Law
There can be no valid resignation where the act was made under
compulsion or under circumstances approximating compulsion, such as
when an employee's act of handing in his resignation was a reaction to
circumstances leaving him no alternative but to resign
A critical fact necessary in resolving this issue is whether Penaflor filed
his letter of resignation before or after the appointment of Buenaobra
as the new/concurrent HRD manager. If the resignation letter was
submitted before Syfus appointment of Buenaobra as new HRD
manager, little support exists for Penaflors allegation that he had been
forced to resign due to the prevailing abusive and hostile working
environment. On the other hand, if the resignation letter was submitted
after the appointment of Buenaobra, then factual basis exists indicating
that Penaflor had been constructively dismissed as his resignation was
a response to the unacceptable appointment of another person to a
position he still occupied.
The question of when Penaflor submitted his resignation letter arises
because this letter undisputably made was undated. Several reasons
arising directly from these pieces of evidence lead us to conclude that
Penaflor did indeed submit his resignation letter on March, 15, 2000,
i.e., on the same day that it was submitted.
First, we regard the Syfu memorandum of March 1, 2000 and the
memorandum of Buenaobra of March 3, 2000 accepting the position

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of HRD Head to be highly suspect. In our view, these memoranda, while

dated, do not constitute conclusive evidence of their dates of
preparation and communication. Surprisingly, Penaflor was never
informed about these memoranda when they directly concerned him,
particularly the turnover of responsibilities to Buenaobra if indeed
Penaflor had resigned on March 1, 2000 and a smooth turnover to
Buenaobra was intended.
Second,we find it surprising that these pieces of evidence pointing to a
March 1, 2000 resignation specifically, Syfus March 1, 2000
memorandum to Buenaobra about Penaflors resignation and
Buenaobra's own acknowledgment and acceptance were only
presented to the NLRC on appeal, not before the labor arbiter. The
matter was not even mentioned in the company's position paper filed
with the labor arbiter.
Third, the circumstances and other evidence surrounding Penaflor's
resignation support his claim that he was practically compelled to
resign from the company.
Other than its bare claim that it was facing severe financial problems,
Outdoor Clothing never presented any evidence to prove both the
reasons for its alleged downsizing and the fact of such downsizing. No
evidence was ever offered to rebut Penaflor's claim that his staff
members were dismissed to make his life as HRD Head difficult. To be
sure, Penaflor's participation in the termination of his staff members
employment cannot be used against him, as the termination of
employment was a management decision that Penaflor, at his level,
could not have effectively contested without putting his own job on the
line.
The first is the settled rule that in employee termination disputes, the
employer bears the burden of proving that the employees dismissal
was for just and valid cause. That Penaflor did indeed file a letter of
resignation does not help the company's case as, other than the fact of
resignation, the company must still prove that the employee voluntarily
resigned. There can be no valid resignation where the act was made
under compulsion or under circumstances approximating compulsion,
such as when an employees act of handing in his resignation was a
reaction to circumstances leaving him no alternative but to resign.In
sum, the evidence does not support the existence of voluntariness in
Penaflors resignation.
GRANTED
2. Gandara vs NLRC

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GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC

FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work
because his wife delivered their first child. He did not however notify
his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the latter. When the
respondent returned to work he was surprised upon knowing that
someone has been hired to take his place.
ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed.
While a prolonged absence without leave may constitute as a just cause
for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-observance of due
process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal
was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the
illegality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and
therefore illegal.
3. TSPIC Corporation vs TSPIC Employees Union
TSPI, INCORPORATION VS. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION Case Digest
TSPI, INCORPORATION VS. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION
G.R No. 163419. February 13, 2008
FACTS: TSPI Corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the corporation Union for the increase of salary for
the latters members for the year 2000 to 2002 starting from January
2000. thus, the increased in salary was materialized on January 1, 2000.
However, on October 6, 2000, the Regional Tripartite Wage and
production Board raised daily minimum wage from P 223.50 to P
250.00 starting November 1, 2000. Conformably, the wages of the 17
probationary employees were increased to P250.00 and became
regular employees therefore receiving another 10% increase in salary.
In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage rates as mandated
by the CBA. As a result, the nine employees who were senior to the 17
recently regularized employees, received less wages. On January 19,
2001, TSPICs HRD notified the 24 employees who are private
respondents, that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they
were overpaid and the overpayment would be deducted from their
salaries starting February 2001. The Union on the other hand, asserted
that there was no error and the deduction of the alleged overpayment
constituted diminution of pay.

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ISSUE: Whether the alleged overpayment constitutes diminution of pay

as alleged by the Union.
RULING: Yes, because it is considered that Collective Bargaining
Agreement entered into by unions and their employers are binding
upon the parties and be acted in strict compliance therewith. Thus, the
CBA in this case is the law between the employers and their
employees.
Therefore, there was no overpayment when there was an increase of
salary for the members of the union simultaneous with the increasing
of minimum wage for workers in the National Capital Region. The CBA
should be followed thus, the senior employees who were first
promoted as regular employees shall be entitled for the increase in
their salaries and the same with lower rank workers.
4. Serrano vs NLRC
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the
head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann
phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an
independent security agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed
to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or
minimize losses to its business; that private respondent failed to accord
due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use
reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment
would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered
petitioner to be given separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the
private respondent to replace its current security section a valid
ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employers good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not
necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an

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independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated

employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by
law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid
backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just cause,
the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages
would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering
dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes
mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should not
be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination
of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him
before he is dismissed renders the termination without legal effect.
5. Yrasuegi vs PAL
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight
steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from
147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by
the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him
to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return
to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred.
He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February
1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal
weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was
informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such
time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he
was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he
failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated

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refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He

was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report
to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to
his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost
leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of
almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated
effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable
in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight
standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his
weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was
legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed
weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only
invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his
dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other
conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an
employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee
would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners
claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight
from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline.
Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992,
petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight
down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it

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now.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the
context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from
the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless
voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means
that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs
through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature
of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may
not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an
actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to
BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed
itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must
necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight
deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL
should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its
employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards
for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee
as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his
dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his
moral character.

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6. PAL vs NLRC
FACTS: On March 15, 1985, PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of
Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was
immediately implemented, and some employees were subjected to the
disciplinary measures.
The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint
before the NLRC contending that PAL, by its unilateral implementation of
the Code, was guilty of unfair labor practice, specifically Paragraphs E and
G of Art 249 and Art 253 of the Labor Code. PALEA alleged that copies of
the Code had been circulated in limited numbers; that being penal in
nature the Code must conform with the requirements of sufficient
publication, and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to
the rights of the employees. It prayed that implementation of the Code be
held in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with
PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code reinstated and their
cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared guilty of
unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages.
PAL filed a MTD, asserting its prerogative as an employer to prescribe rules
and regulations regarding employees' conduct in carrying out their duties
and functions, and alleging that it had not violated the CBA or any
provision of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a
shared responsibility of the employer and the employees
HELD: YES.
Ratio Employees have a right to participate in the deliberation of matters
which may affect their rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto
and one such matter is the formulation of a code of discipline.
Reasoning It was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of RA 6715,
amending Art 211 of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly considered it a
State policy "to ensure the participation of workers in decision and policymaking processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare." However, even
in the absence of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management
prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina, it
was held that management's prerogatives must be without abuse of
discretion.

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In San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union vs. Ople, we upheld the
company's right to implement a new system of distributing itsproducts, but
gave the following caveat: So long as a company's management
prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of the employee, under special laws or under valid agreements,
this Court will uphold them.
All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of managerial
prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found in law,
a CBA, or the general principles of fair play and justice. Moreover, it must
be duly established that the prerogative being invoked is clearly a
managerial one.
Verily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding
business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the
employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its
employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes of
action. PAL asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies of the
Code, the LA and the NLRC found to the contrary, which finding, is entitled
to great respect.
PALEA recognizes the right of the Company to determine matters of
management policy and Company operations and to direct its manpower.
Management of the Company includes the right to organize, plan, direct
and control operations, to hire, assign employees to work, transfer
employees from one department to another, to promote, demote,
discipline, suspend or discharge employees for just cause; to lay-off
employees for valid and legal causes, to introduce new or improved
methods or facilities or to change existing methods or facilities and the
right to make and enforce Company rules and regulations to carry out the
functions of management. The exercise by management of its prerogative
shall be done in a just, reasonable, humane and/or lawful manner.
Such provision in the CBA may not be interpreted as cession of employees'
rights to participate in the deliberation of matters which may affect their
rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto. And one such matter
is the formulation of a code of discipline. Industrial peace cannot be
achieved if the employees are denied their just participation in the
discussion of matters affecting their rights.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

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7. BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. V NATIONAL FEDERATION OF

LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU)
DAVIDE, JR; April 17, 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor
union. He did not report for work for 1 month due to a grave family
problem as his wife deserted him and nobody was there to look after his
children. He was required to explain. Finding his reasons to be unjustified,
the petitioner terminated him, since according to company rules, absence
for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.
ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company
rules?
HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their
implementation must be fair, just and reasonable. No less than the
Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his
rights not only under a general statement of a state policy but under the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on
a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor
and capital are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public
interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.
8. International School Alliance vs Quisumbing
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732,
is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management
personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws
and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or
will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two:
(1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

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11. MERALCO v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173 (1999)

Principle of Co-determination: a constitutional and legal right where the employees are
given the right to co-determine or share the responsibility of formulating certain policies
that affect their rights, benefits and welfare. (illustrated case: PAL vs. NLRC and PALEA)
Limitation: Grant of the right of participation does not mean co-management of business
nor intrusion into management prerogatives; This principle does not mean that workers
should approve management policies or decisions.
Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) seeks to annul the
orders of the Secretary of labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, wherein
the Secretary required MERALCO and its rank and file union- the Meralco Workers
Association (MEWA) to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the remainder
of the parties 1992-1997 CBA cycle, and to incorporate in this new CBA the Secretarys
dispositions on the disputed economic and non-economic issues.
MEWA is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of
MERALCO.
On September 7, 1995, MEWA informed MERALCO of its intention to re-negotiate the
terms and conditions of their existing 1992-1997 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
covering the remaining period of two years starting from December 1, 1995 to November
30, 1997.[1] MERALCO signified its willingness to re-negotiate through its letter dated
October 17, 1995[2] and formed a CBA negotiating panel for the purpose. On November
10, 1995, MEWA submitted its proposal[3] to MERALCO, which, in turn, presented a
counter-proposal. Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However,
despite the series of meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA,
the parties failed to arrive at terms and conditions acceptable to both of them.
On April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch
of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-152-96, on the grounds of
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practices. The NCMB then conducted a series of
conciliation meetings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Faced with
the imminence of a strike, MERALCO on May 2, 1996, filed an Urgent Petition[4] with the
Department of Labor and Employment which was docketed as OS-AJ No. 0503[1]96
praying that the Secretary assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the
striking employees to go back to work.
Sec of Labor intervened and decided on the issues including:
Union Representation in Committees - The union is granted representation in the Safety
Committee, the Uniform Committee and other committees of a similar nature and purpose
involving personnel welfare, rights and benefits as well as duties.

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Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this petition contending that the Secretary of Labor gravely
abused his discretion in decreeing that the union be allowed to have representation in
policy and decision making into matters affecting personnel welfare, rights and benefits as
well as duties;
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Labor erred in his decision in granting the union a right
to policy and decision making
Held: No.
As regards this issue, We quote with approval the holding of the Secretary in his Order of
December 28, 1996, to wit:
We see no convincing reason to modify our original Order on union representation in
committees. It reiterates what the Article 211 (A)(g) of the Labor Codes provides: To
ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their
rights, duties and welfare. Denying this opportunity to the Union is to lay the claim that
only management has the monopoly of ideas that may improve management strategies in
enhancing the Companys growth. What every company should remember is that there
might be one among the Union members who may offer productive and viable ideas on
expanding the Companys business horizons. The unions participation in such committees
might just be the opportune time for dormant ideas to come forward. So, the Company
must welcome this development (see also PAL v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. 85985, August 13,
1995). It must be understood, however, that the committees referred to here are the
Safety Committee, the Uniform Committee and other committees of a similar nature and
purpose involving personnel welfare, rights and benefits as well as duties.
We do not find merit in MERALCOs contention that the above-quoted ruling of the
Secretary is an intrusion into the management prerogatives of MERALCO. It is worthwhile
to note that all the Union demands and what the Secretarys order granted is that the
Union be allowed to participate in policy formulation and decision-making process on
matters affecting the Union members right, duties and welfare as required in Article 211
(A)(g) of the Labor Code. And this can only be done when the Union is allowed to have
representatives in the Safety Committee, Uniform Committee and other committees of a
similar nature. Certainly, such participation by the Union in the said committees is not in
the nature of a co-management control of the business of MERALCO. What is granted by
the Secretary is participation and representation. Thus, there is no impairment of
management prerogatives.
12. Divine Word vs. Secretary
FACTS:
Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) is the sole and bargaining agent of the
Divine Word University. Sometime in 1985, DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining
proposals. The University replied and requested a preliminary conference which
unfortunately did not take place due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA proposals.
Because of this, the union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock

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and unfair labor practice.

Then, an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU were held after the filing of
the notice of strike. DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals but were ignored by the University.
ISSUE: WON the complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the Union is with merit.
HELD:
A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining" specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent towards collective
bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As it
was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there
was no counteraction of forces or an impasse to speak of.
By reason of the bad faith of the university in its bargaining with the union, it was
declared that it violated its duty to bargain collectively prescribed under the Labor Code
and the mandate under Article 19 of the CC.
Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by the fact that an hour
before the start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it surreptitiously filed the petition for
certification election. And yet during said conference, it committed itself to "sit down" with
the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the conference which would have
legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification election. In so doing, the
University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the
meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as "the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith." Moreover, by filing the
petition for certification election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the
University violated the mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that" (e)very person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
Batch 2
1. Stolt-Nielsen vs. Sulpicio 663 SCRA 291
Facts
Madequillo filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of the POEA against StoltNielsen for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second
contract.
In his complaint-affidavit, respondent alleged that he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine
Services, Inc as Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel Stolt Aspiration for a
period of 9 months. For nearly 3 months of rendering service and while the vessel was at
Batangas, he was ordered by the ships master to disembark the vessel and repatriated
back to Manila for no reason or explanation. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately
proceeded to the petitioners office where hewas transferred employment with another
vessel named MV Stolt Pride under the same terms and conditions of the First Contract.

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On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the POEA. The POEA,
without knowledge that he was not deployed with the vessel, certified theSecond
Employment Contract on 18 September 1992. Despite the commencement of the Second
Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy him with the vessel MV Stolt
Pride. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same refused to comply with the
Second EmploymentContract. On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport,
seamans book and other employment documents. However, he was only allowed to claim
the said documents in exchange of his signing a document. He was constrained to sign the
document involuntarily because without these documents, he could not seek employment
from other agencies. He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorneys fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners bad faith in not
complying with the Second Contract.
The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE. Labor Arbiter rendered a
judgment finding that the Medequillo was constructively dismissed. The petitioners
appealed the adverse decision before the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed with modification the
Decision of the LaborArbiter, by deleting the award of overtime pay. The Partial Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 27
July 2005. The petitioners filed aPetition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
however the CA affirmed the decision of theNLRC.
Issue: Whether or not Medequillo is entitled to compensation when he was not yet
employed or deployed
Held
Yes. The agency argues that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the seafarer
is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. However, even
without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of
petitioners. The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall
commence upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the
port of hire. However, this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of
non-deployment without any valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of the agency of
the alleged poor performance of respondent while on board the first ship MV Stolt
Aspiration cannot be sustained to justify the non-deployment, for no evidence to prove
the same was presented.
We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract
and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The commencement of
the employer-employee relationship, would have taken place had petitioner been actually
deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee
relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the
birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of
action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer
failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
The breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law applicable at that time
was the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The penalty
for non-deployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine. We thus

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decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) which
provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment. Following the law, the claim is still cognizable by the labor arbiters of the
NLRC under the second phrase of the provision.
2. Pert/CPM vs Vinuya, September 5, 2012
FACTS:
On March 5, 2008, respondent Vinuya et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the petitioner Pert/CPM and its President with labor arbiter alleging among others that the
agency deployed them to work as aluminum fabricator/installer for the agencys principal,
Modern Metal in Dubai, United Arab Emirates for a two-year employment whose contracts
were approved by the POEA providing for nine-hours working day, salary of 1,350 AED
with overtime pay, food allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free
transportation, free laundry and free medical and dental services. However, on April 2,
2007, Modern Metal gave respondents, except Era, appointment letters different from that
of originally signed, increasing their employment terms and reducing their salaries and
allowances and removing certain benefits. Further, the working conditions were not as
promised and they repeatedly complained with their agency about their predicament but
to no avail. Respondents resigned from their job citing personal/family problems for their
resignation except for Era who mentioned the real reason which is due to the company
policy. After several weeks, petitioner repatriated the respondent to the Philippines who
shouldered their own airfare except for Ordovez and Enjambre. The agency countered that
the respondents were not illegally dismissed alleging that the respondents voluntarily
resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job. The agency furthered alleged
that the respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits of quitclaim and release.Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that the respondent voluntarily resigned from their
job. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and found that the respondents were illegally dismissed. NLRC also pointed out that the
signing of a different employment contract in Dubai is illegal. Consequently NLRC ordered
the agency and the principal to pay, jointly and severally the respondents salary,
placement fee, and exemplary damages. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the NLRC but modified their judgment adjusting the awards
particularly the payment of their salaries in the light of the Courts ruling in Serrano
striking down the clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of the RA8042 which limits the
entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW. The agency again moved for reconsideration
reiterating its earlier argument and questioned the applicability of the Serrano ruling
because it is not yet final and effective but was denied by the NLRC. Petitioner appealed
with CA which upheld the decision of the NLRC finding the resignation letter as dubious.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Serrano ruling which declared the subject Section 10 of
RA8042 unconstitutional can be given retroactive application in the present caseWhether
or not RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 restoring the subject clause in
Section 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively
RULING:
The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given retroactive application as resolved in Yap
vs. Thenamaris Ships Management in the interest of equity and that the Serrano ruling is

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an exemption to the doctrine of operative fact. Moreover, the SC held that the amendment
introduced by R.A. 10022 cannot be given retroactive effect not only because there is no
express declaration of retroactivity of the law, but because the retroactive application will
result in an impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of the
Serrano Ruling. The SC reiterated that all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective application, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them
retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from the language
used.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution were AFFIRMED.
3. CF Sharp vs. Hon. Undersecretary Espanol Jr.
Facts:
In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement3 with Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd.
(PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in turn appointed private respondent Rizal International Shipping
Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCLs
vessel.
On October 3, 1996, LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement with PAPASHIP to take effect
on December 31, 1996. It then appointed C.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines.
C.F. Sharp requested for accreditation as the new manning agency of LCL with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), but Rizal objected on the ground
that its accreditation still existed and would only expire on December 31, 1996.
Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and Adrias Tjiakouris of LCL
arrived in the Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharps
office. Rizal reported LCLs recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9, 1996, and
requested an ocular inspection of C.F. Sharps premises.
On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and found Savva
and Tjiakouris at C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting hotel staffs, cooks, and chefs for
M/V Cyprus, with scheduled deployment in January 1997.4 The Inspection Report5 signed
by Corazon Aquino of the POEA and countersigned by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp
was thereafter submitted to the POEA.
On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint6 for illegal recruitment, cancellation or
revocation of license, and blacklisting against LCL and C.F. Sharp with the POEA, docketed
as POEA Case No. RV-97-01-004. Then, on January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a Supplemental
Complaint7 adding violation of Section 29 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, for
designating and/or appointing agents, representatives and employees, without prior
approval from the POEA.
For its part, C.F. Sharp admitted that Savva and Tjiakouris conducted interviews at C.F.
Sharps office, but denied that they were for recruitment and selection purposes.
According to C.F. Sharp, the interviews were held for LCLs ex-crew members who had
various complaints against Rizal. It belittled the inspection report of the POEA inspection

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team claiming that it simply stated that interviews and recruitment were undertaken,
without reference to who were conducting the interview and for what vessels.
The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for illegal
recruitment. C.F. Sharp elevated the Administrators ruling to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). On December 19, 1997, the then Secretary of Labor, Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, ruling them guilty.
C.F. Sharps motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5, 1999 by the
then Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,15 it elevated the case to this Court on petition
for certiorari, with the case docketed as G.R. No. 137573. But, in the June 16, 1999
Resolution, this Court referred the petition to the CA. the appellate court declared that the
Secretary of Labor acted well within his discretion in holding C.F. Sharp liable for illegal
recruitment.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 6[,] R.A. NO. 8042 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 13 (b) and (f) AND ARTICLE 66 (sic) OF THE LABOR CODE AS
AMENDED; RULE II (jj) BOOK I; AND SECTIONS 1 AND 6, RULE I, BOOK III POEA RULES
AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.
Held: No.
The first issue having been settled, we now resolve whether C.F. Sharp is liable for illegal
recruitment.
C.F. Sharp denies committing illegal recruitment activities in December 1996. It posits that
the interviews undertaken by Savva and Tjiakouris do not amount to illegal recruitment
under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrants Workers Act. Further, it contends
that the interviews conducted were not for selection and recruitment purposes, but were
in connection with the seamens past employment with Rizal, specifically, their complaints
for non-remittance of SSS premiums, withholding of wages, illegal exactions from medical
examinations and delayed allotments. It claims that it was only upon approval of its
application for accreditation that the employment contracts were entered into and actual
deployment of the seamen was made. C.F. Sharp, thus, concludes that it cannot be held
liable for illegal recruitment.
The reasoning is specious.
Undoubtedly, in December 1996, LCL had no approved POEA license to recruit. C.F.
Sharps accreditation as LCLs new manning agency was still pending approval at that time.
Yet Savva and Tjiakouris, along with C.F. Sharp, entertained applicants for LCLs vessels,
and conducted preparatory interviews.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for

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employment, locally or abroad whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or
entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
On the basis of this definition and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray - the
conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.
The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is of no
moment. From the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be "for profit or
not." Notably, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment,
that renders the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.
C.F. Sharps claim that the interviews were not for selection and recruitment purposes does
not impress.
Indeed, it was Savva and Tjiakouris that conducted the interviews, and undertook
selection and hiring. However, C.F. Sharp cannot steer clear of liability for it conspired with
LCL in committing illegal recruitment activities.
Indeed, C.F. Sharp was aware of these violations when it alleged in its Petition for Review
that:
"in any and all events, the findings relied upon by the Public Respondent show, at best,
that the parties responsible for the alleged acts of illegal recruitment are LCL and its
officers alone, or at worst, LCL and its officers, in conspiracy with petitioner. Yet, it is
petitioner alone, who is severely punished and penalized." (underscoring supplied)
The petitioner-appellant must be reminded that prior to approval of the transfer of
accreditation, no recruitment or deployment may be made by the principal by itself or
through the would-be transferee manning agency, or by the latter, as this would constitute
illegal recruitment by a non-holder of authority under Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to
Article 13(b) and (f) and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II(jj), Book I, and
Sec. 1 and 6, Rule 1, Book III, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment.
The petitioner-appellant alleges that "there is no need for a license to enable LCLs officers
to conduct their alleged activities of interviewing, selecting and hiring crewmen. Indeed,
LCLs officers could have conducted these activities without a license."
Such claim is without legal basis, as direct hiring by employers of Filipino workers for
overseas employment is banned; they can only do so through, among others, licensed
private recruitment and shipping/mining agencies (Art. 18, Labor Code as amended; Sec.
1, Rule 1, Book II, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment)
4. Sto. Tomas vs. Salac
Facts: In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers
abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and

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TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29
and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that
recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of
the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was
passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned
government agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating
the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this
case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was
passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the
validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the definition
by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties
for simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing
inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of
at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file
the criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed.
PASEI argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which
provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to
be in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this
automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative
of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said
provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the
RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.

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a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and nonlicensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they
commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who
engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of
the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said
penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the
law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110,
itself, provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to
existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative
venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make
them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they
were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
conduct of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her
parents received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the
Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and
placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen
was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of RA 8042),
it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of
RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable
with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene.
They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not
automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily
and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that they
were personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins
case.

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5. People vs. Jamilosa

FACTS:Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing to have the
capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for
overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit,
contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Imelda D.
Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center.
Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and
Alma Singh.
According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on her way to SM North
Edsa where she was a company nurse. Appellant introduced himself as a recruiter of
workers for employment abroad. Appellant told her he could help her get employed as
nurse. Appellant gave his pager number and instructed her to contact him is shes
interested. Sometime in January 1996, appellant fetched her at her office, went to her
house and gave him the necessary documents and handed to appellant the amount of
US$300.00 and the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. However, the
appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money. Thereafter, appellant told her to
resign from her work because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for
USA on Feb, 1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to show up. Instead,
called and informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because she had to
go to province because his wife died. Trying to contact him to the supposed residence and
hotel where he temporarily resided, but to no avail.
Witness Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January 1996, she went to SM
North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that time Bamba informed her that she was
going to meet to appellant. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. The appellant convinced
them of his ability to send them abroad. On their next meeting, Lagman handed to the
latter the necessary documents and an amount of US$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label
without any receipt issued by the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone
company called her because her number was appearing in appellants cell phone
documents. The caller is trying to locate him as he was a swindler. She
became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter. One week before her scheduled
flight, appellant told her he could not meet them because his mother passed away.
Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met the
appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her. Appellant
told her that he is an undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her US visa. On their next
meeting, she gave all the pertinent documents. Thereafter, she gave P10,000 to the
appellant covering half price of her plane ticket. They paged the appellant through his
beeper to set up another appointment but the appellant avoided them as he had many
things to do.
The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never told Bamba that he
could get her a job in USA, the truth being that she wanted to leave SM as company nurse
because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba called him several times, seeking

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advices from him. He started courting Bamba and went out dating until latter became his
girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh thru Bamba. As complainants seeking advice on how
to apply for jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman
and Singh sign separate certifications, all to effect that he never recruited
them and no money was involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case against him
because they quarreled and separated.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale
HELD: No. Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not,when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3)
essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under
Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the LaborCode; (2) accused did
not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons
individually or as a group. As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining
witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to be credible and deserving
of full probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the
findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on this Court
absent evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact
or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by
appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him
from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as
consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in
recruitment activities. It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the
accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for
illegal recruitment.

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Case Digests (Valenciano to Panis)

Twenty19 1

People v. Valenciano
(by Patrick Go)
GR No. 180926
10 December 2008
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS
Lourdes Valenciano, Teresita Marquez aka Teresita Imperial, Romeo Marquez aka Rodante
Imperial, and Rommel Marquez aka Rommel Imperial purported themselves to be connected
with Middle East International Manpower Resources, Inc. and obtained money from four
people whom they promised to recruit for work at a factory in Taiwan. Valenciano received
the payments, but turned them over to the Marquezes who issued receipts. While the
Marquezes remain at large, Valenciano was caught and tried. She was found guilty by the
lower court of illegal recruitment in large scale. The CA affirmed the decision. Valenciano
appealed, claiming that she was an ordinary employee of the Middle East International
Manpower Resources, Inc., and that her promise that the four recruits would be employed in
Taiwan was made in good faith, and in the performance of her duties as a clerk in the
company.
ISSUE/S
W/N Valenciano was engaged in illegal recruitment.
RULING
YES. Valencianos claim that she was a mere employee of her co-accused does not relieve her
of liability. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be
held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that the employee actively
and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. 1. As testified to by the complainants,
accused-appellant was among those who met and transacted with them regarding the job
placement offers. In some instances, she made the effort to go to their houses to recruit
them. She even gave assurances that they would be able to find employment abroad and
leave for Taiwan after the filing of their applications. Accused-appellant was clearly engaged
in recruitment activities, notwithstanding her gratuitous protestation that her actions were
merely done in the course of her employment as a clerk. 2. It is sufficient that the accused
promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
Accused-appellant made representations that complainants would receive employment
abroad, and this suffices for her conviction, even if her name does not appear on the receipts
issued to complainants as evidence Doctrine/s One cannot escape liability by claiming that he
is not aware that before working for his employer in the recruitment agency, he should first
be registered with the POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not
malum in se. Good faith is not a defense. Money is not material to a prosecution for illegal
recruitment, as the definition of recruitment and placement in the Labor Code includes the
phrase, whether for profit or not. To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution
is burdened to prove three essential elements: (1) the person charged undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or
more persons individually or as a group.

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Twenty19 2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. MELISSA CHUA, Appellant.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and for five counts of Estafa in
violation of Article 38 (a) of the the New Labor Code of the Philippines, in relation to Art. 13
(b) and (c ) thereof, as further amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA 8042.
Appellant denied the charges.Claiming having worked as a temporary cashier from January to
October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng, she maintained
that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and that Josie, who is her godmother,
was an agent.
Admitting having receivedP80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of which she issued but
denying receiving any amount from King, she claimed that she turned over the money to the
documentation officer, one Arlene Vega, who in turn remitted the money to Marilyn Calueng
whose present whereabouts she did not know.
The RTC convicted appellant of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three counts of Estafa.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision holding that appellants defense that, as
temporary cashier of Golden Gate, she received the money which was ultimately remitted to
Marilyn Calueng is immaterial, she having failed to prove the existence of an employment
relationship between her and Marilyn, as well as the legitimacy of the operations of Golden
Gate and the extent of her involvement therein.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of illegal recrtuitment?
HELD:
The appeal is denied.
LABOR LAW
The term recruitment and placement is defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the
Philippinesas any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged inrecruitment and placement. On the other hand, illegal recruitment is
defined under Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to be undertaken by
non-licensee or non-holder of contracts, or as in the present case, an agency with an expired
license,shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.And illegal recruitment is deemed committed inlarge scale if committed against

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three or more persons individually or as a group.

Thus forillegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three
essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook arecruitment activity under Article 13(b)
or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have
the license or the authority to lawfully engage in therecruitment and placement of workers;
and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually
or as a group.
In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a cashier from January
to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit workers for deployment abroad.Per the
certification from the POEA,Golden Gates license only expired on February 23, 2002 and it
was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002.
Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the complainants to
part with their money upon the fraudulent representation that they would be able to secure
for them employment abroad.In the absence of any evidence that the complainants were
motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of their credibility shall not be
interfered with by the Court.
Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make her any
less an employee to beheld liable for illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation,
together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously participated in
the recruitment process.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of the recruitment
business of Golden Gate that does not free her of liability either.Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, is a special law, a violation of which is malum prohibitum,not malum in se. Intent
is thus immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa, convicted of such
offense.
DENIED
PEOPLE VS. ADESER
(by Nhory Bordonado)
Facts:
In November 2002, private complainant Josephine R. Palo met the spouses Roberto and Mel
Tiongson, agents of Naples Travel and Tours, they introduced Palo to appellant Nida Adeser,
owner and general manager of Naples, to discuss employment opportunities in Australia.
During their meeting held at the Naples office, appellant and the spouses Tiongson informed
Palo that for a placement fee of P80,000, she can work as an apple picker in Australia.
Thus, on November 8, 2002, Palo went to the Naples office and gave Tiongson and Chang,
operations manager of Naples,P15,000 as first installment for the placement
fee. On November 11, 2002, Palo returned to the Naples office and paid P58,500. After
making her payments, she was required to submit her resume and pictures and was promised
that she would be employed within three months.

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More than three months passed, but Palo was not deployed to Australia. Neither did she get
her Australian visa.
In May 2003, she learned from the NBI that Naples had closed down. NBI likewise informed
her that Naples had no license to operate and deploy workers abroad. Upon advice of the
NBI, Palo filed a complaint against appellant, the spouses Tiongson and Chang.
Appellant on the other hand denied the charges against her. She admitted that she was the
owner and general manager of Naples which was a travel agency that offered visa assistance,
ticketing, documentation, airport transfer and courier services, but denied having engaged in
recruitment.
On May 2, 2005, RTC convicted appellant of the crimes of syndicated illegal recruitment
constituting economic sabotage and estafa.
Appellant appealed her conviction but the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether appellants guilt for the crimes of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes. Illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes. The law imposes a higher penalty when the crime is committed by a
syndicate as it is considered as an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor
Code.
Villar vs. People
(by Gremalyn Bernardo)
A Petition for Review1 was filed by petitioner Rosario Nasi-Villar assailing the Decision2 dated
27 June 2005 and Resolution3 dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals. This case
originated from an Information4 for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and 7 of
Republic Act (R.A.)No. 80425 filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur
on 5 October 1998 for acts committed by petitioner and one Dolores Placa. . The Information
reads:
That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province
of Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another through fraudulent representation and deceitful machination, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad[,] demand
and receive the amount ofP6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as placement fee[,] the said
accused being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to engage in the recruitment of
workers abroad to the damage and prejudice of the herein offended party.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos City, Davao del Sur found the evidence presented
by the prosecution to be more credible than that presented by the defense and thus held
petitioner liable for the offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged error by the trial
court in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of the trial court's appreciation of

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the evidence presented by the prosecution. Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June
2005,9 following the principle that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide
open for review, noted that the criminal acts alleged to have been committed happened
sometime in 1993. the Court of Appeals declared that petitioner should have been charged
under the Labor Code, in particular Art. 13(b) thereof, and not under R.A. No. 8042.
Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of the provisions of the Labor Code and found
petitioner liable under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b), and Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The
appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC,
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No. 8042
cannot be given retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law. Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet exist
in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly committed, petitioner argues that law cannot
be used as the basis of filing a criminal action for illegal recruitment.
Issue:
WON the allegations in the information constitutes an erroneous designation of law violated
by the petitioner
Won such erroneous designation of law constitutes a violation of ex post facto law and
retroactive application of RA 8042
Held:
While conceding that there was an erroneous designation of the law violated by petitioner,
the OSG stresses that the designation of the offense in the Information is not determinative
of the nature and character of the crime charged against her but the acts alleged in the
Information. The allegations in the Information clearly charge petitioner with illegal
recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, and penalized
under Art. 39(c) of the same Code. The evidence on record substantiates the charge to a
moral certainty. Thus, while there was an erroneous specification of the law violated by
petitioner in the Information, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's imposition of the
penalty for simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, the OSG concludes. the real
nature of the crime charged is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violatedthese being
conclusions of lawbut by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. What
controls is not the designation but the description of the offense charged. From a legal point
of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the
body of the information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and punished
adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute. In the case
at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had performed
the acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b) and punished by
Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the Information. To prove illegal
recruitment, two elements must be shown, namely: (1) the person charged with the crime
must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any of the activities enumerated in Article 34
of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not have a license or authority to
do so.15 Art. 13(b) defines "recruitment and placement" as "any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising, or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for

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a fee employment to two or more persons, is considered engaged in recruitment and

placement." The trial court found these two elements had been proven in the case at bar.
Petitioner has not offered any argument or proof that countervails such findings.
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time of its
commission. Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found guilty under the Labor Code
which was in force in 1993 when the acts attributed to her were committed. Petitioner was
charged in 1998 under an Information that erroneously designated the offense as covered by
R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which are punishable under the Labor Code. As it
was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she was charged with, she was properly
convicted under the Labor Code, and not under R.A. No. 8042.
There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive application
of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which, among others,
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed or changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed.16 Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have
provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively.
Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the
accused.17
R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a new definition of
the crime of illegal recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is no indication in
R.A. No. 8042 that said law, including the penalties provided therein, would take effect
retroactively. A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively
since its strictures would cover only offenses committed after and not before its
enactment.18 Neither did the trial court nor the appellate court give R.A. No. 8042 a
retroactive application since both courts passed upon petitioner's case only under the aegis of
the Labor Code. The proceedings before the trial court and the appellate court did not violate
the prohibition against ex post facto law nor involved a retroactive application of R.A. No.
8042 in any way.
Ravago vs. Esso Eastern Marine Ltd., G.R. No. 158324, March 14, 2005
(by Hazel Grace Aumentado)
Facts:
Roberto Ravago was hired by Trans-Global to work as a seaman on board various Esso
vessels. On February 13, 1970, Ravago commenced his duty as S/N wiper on board the Esso
Bataan under a contract that lasted until February 10, 1971. Thereafter, he was assigned to
work in different Esso vessels where he was designated diverse tasks, such as oiler, then
assistant engineer. He was employed under a total of 34 separate and unconnected contracts,
each for a fixed period, by three different companies, namely, Esso Tankers, Inc. (ETI), EEM
and Esso International Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd. (EIS), Singapore Branch. Ravago worked
with Esso vessels until August 22, 1992, a period spanning more than 22 years. Shortly after
completing his latest contract with EIS, Ravago was granted a vacation leave with pay. One
the night, a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg while he was waiting for a bus ride in
Cubao, Quezon City. He fractured his left proximal tibia and was hospitalized at the Philippine
Orthopedic Hospital. As a result of his injury, Ravago's doctor opined that he would not be
able to cope with the job of a seaman and suggested that he be given a desk job. Ravago's
left leg had become apparently shorter, making him walk with a limp. For this reason, the

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company physician, Dr. Virginia G. Manzo, found him to have lost his dexterity, making him
unfit to work once again as a seaman. Consequently, instead of rehiring Ravago, EIS paid him
his Career Employment Incentive Plan (CEIP) and his final tax refund for 1992. After
deducting his Social Security System and medical contributions, EIS remitted the net amount
of P162,232.65, following Ravago's execution of a Deed of Quitclaim and/or Release.
However, Ravago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement,
backwages, damages and attorney's fees against Trans-Global and EIS with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration Adjudication Office. Respondents denied that Ravago
was dismissed without notice and just cause. Rather, his services were no longer engaged in
view of the disability he suffered which rendered him unfit to work as a seafarer. They
averred that Ravago was a contractual employee and was hired under 34 separate contracts
by different companies. In his position paper, Ravago insisted that he was fit to resume preinjury activities as evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Marciano Foronda M.D., one of
his attending physicians at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital, that "at present, fracture of
tibia has completely healed and patient is fit to resume pre-injury activities anytime." Ravago,
likewise, asserted that he was not a mere contractual employee because the respondents
regularly and continuously rehired him for 23 years and, for his continuous service, was
awarded a CEIP payment upon his termination from employment.
The Court of Appeals decided that the employment status of seafarers has been established
with finality by the Court's reconsideration of its decision in Millares v. National Labor
Relations Commission, wherein it was ruled that seamen are contractual employees.
According to the CA, the fact that Ravago was not rehired upon the completion of his contract
did not result in his illegal dismissal; hence, he was not entitled to reinstatement or payment
of separation pay.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred, blatantly disregarded the constitutional
mandate on protection to Filipino overseas workers, and countenanced unwarranted
discrimination when it ruled that petitioner cannot become a regular employee.
Ruling:
In a catena of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that seafarers are contractual, not
regular, employees. In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, the Court ruled that seamen and
overseas contract workers are not covered by the term "regular employment" as defined in
Article 280 of the Labor Code. As a Filipino seaman, petitioner is governed by the Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment and the said Rules do not provide for
separation or termination pay. The Standard Employment Contract governing the Employment
of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA, particularly in Part I, Sec.
C, specifically provides that the contract of seamen shall be for a fixed period. And in no case
should the contract of seamen be longer than 12 months. It reads:
Section C. Duration of Contract
The period of employment shall be for a fixed period but in no case to exceed 12 months and
shall be stated in the Crew Contract. Any extension of the Contract period shall be subject to
the mutual consent of the parties.

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Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and
their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually
fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.
(by Che Reyes)
G.R. No. 161757 January 25, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace
International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment
was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the
contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer Hang Rui
Xiong for another 2 years.
When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace,
Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further
alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and
knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter and Court of Appeals: The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission
and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is theory of imputed knowledge between the principal and the
agent
HELD: NO. As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an
extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending [Divinas] employment contract
necessarily bound it,it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed
knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the
principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign
employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the
2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and
its owner cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divinas claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law.

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Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code provides The
agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent,
dealing directly with third persons, thus applies.
Southeastern shipping versus Federico U. Navarra Jr.
(By: Denisse Zoleta)
FACTS:
Petitioner Southeastern Shipping, on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Southeastern
Shipping Group, Ltd., hired Federico to work on board the vessel "George McLeod." Federico
signed 10 successive separate employment contracts of varying durations covering the period
from October 5, 1995 to March 30, 1998. His latest contract was approved by the POEA on
January 21, 1998 for 56 days extendible for another 56 days. On March 6, 1998, Federico,
while on board the vessel, complained of having a sore throat and on and off fever with chills.
He also developed a soft mass on the left side of his neck. On March 30, 1998, Federico
arrived back in the Philippines and the specimen excised from his neck lymph node was found
negative for malignancy. However, on June 4, 1998, he was diagnosed at the PGH to be
suffering from Hodgkin's Disease. On September 6, 1999, Federico filed a complaint against
petitioners with the arbitration branch of the NLRC claiming entitlement to disability benefits,
loss of earning capacity, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. During the
pendency of the case, on April 29, 2000, Federico died. His widow, Evelyn, substituted him as
party complainant on her own behalf and in behalf of their three children. The claim for
disability benefits was then converted into a claim for death benefits. The LA dismissed the
complaint which was reversed by NLRC and CA hence the said petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for the death of the respondent as such death
was during the term of his employment contract.
HELD: Petitioners are not liable to pay to respondents death compensation benefits
LABOR LAW: death compensation benefits
Petitioners are not liable to pay to respondents death compensation benefits for lack of
showing that Federicos disease was brought about by his stint on board petitioners vessels
and also considering that his death occurred after the effectivity of his contract. The law in
protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of
the employer there may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the
interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted as to result in an injustice to
the employer. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer
liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits, but if the seaman dies after the
termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death
benefits. Federico did not die while he was under the employ of petitioners. His contract of
employment ceased when he arrived in the Philippines on March 30, 1998, whereas he died
on April 29, 2000. Thus, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits under the

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Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.

Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. CA's decision holding that the claim for death benefits has not
yet prescribed is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners are not liable to pay to
respondents death compensation benefits.
CATAN VS. NLRC
(Marielle Masaganda)
FACTS
Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi
Arabia as a steelman. The term of the contract provides for 1 year and with automatic
renewal. It was renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudi employer
but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator and crushed his ankle by the
machine he was operating. After the expiration of the renewed term, private respondent
returned to the Philippines, had his ankle operated and incurred expenses.
After, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work and was repatriated. Upon his return,
he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.
On the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate
the employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment, private
respondent filed a claim, against petitioner with respondent Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. The POEA rendered judgment in favor of private respondent.
On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision. Not satisfied with the resolution of the
POEA, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC.
RULING
The court said that there is no merit in petitioners contention.
A private employment agency may be sued jointly and solidarily with its foreign principal for
violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment.
Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement
at the time private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the
employment contract because no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to
the private respondent:
Petitioner contends that even if it is liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it affirmed the award of medical expenses when the said expenses were the
consequence of private respondent's negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia when he
knew that he was not yet medically fit to do so.
The court said that theres No evidence introduced to prove that private respondent was not
medically fit to work when he returned to Saudi Arabia. Nowhere does it say it the medical
certificate issued by the camp doctor that he was not medically fit to work.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merits.
ISSUE:
WON this was grounds for cancellation or suspension of license or authority of M. S. Catan
Placement Agency.
HELD:
Yes, Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or

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foreign-based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment.[Section 10(a) (2) Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor
Code. The Court ruled that a recruitment agency was solidarily liable for the unpaid salaries
of a worker it recruited for employment in Saudi Arabia. Even if indeed petitioner and the
Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement at the time private respondent
was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the employment contract because
no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private respondent
Hornales v NLRC
(Apple Pangilinan)
G.R. No. 118943; Sept. 10, 2001; Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS
Mario Hornales, together with other Filipinos, were sent to Singapore by JEAC
International Management & Contractor Services. Upon arrival, they were met the
owner of Step-Up Employment Agency Victor Lim, and were told that there would be
working as fishermen.
On board the vessel, Hornales and the others were subjected to inhuman working
conditions, such as inadequate supply of food and water, maltreatment by the captain,
and lack of medical attendance. They were also required to work for 22 hours a day
without pay. Unable to bear the situation, Hornales and some other Filipinos left the
vessel while it was docked at Mauritius Islands.
Upon return to the Philippines, Hornales asked JEAC to pay his salaries. In turn, JEAC
required him to surrender his passport promising that they would procure another job
for him, and later gave him P500.
Hornales filed with POEA a complaint for non-payment of wages and recovery of
damages against JEAC, its owner Canayan, and Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation, its surety.
JEAC-Canayans defense: Hornales, Lim, and Min Fee Fishery Ltd are total strangers
to them. This was supported by a
(1) Joint Affidavit of Hornales co-workers in Singapore, stating that Hornales admitted to
them that he didnt apply to any agency , that he went to Singapore as a tourist, and that he
applied directly to Step-Up Agency; and by a
(2) Certification from Step-Up Agency corroborating the statements in the Joint Affidavit.
Supplemental Affidavit of Hornales:
(1) He claimed he knew Canayan since 1990.
(2) While the vessel was docked at Mauritius Islands, Canayan reminded him of his loan
obligations by sending him photocopies of the PNB checks Canayan issued in his favour.
(3) Canayan also sent him agreements whereby Victor Lim was authorized to deduct from his
salary the amount of his loan obligations.
POEA in favour of Hornales
NLRC dimissed complaint; no employee-employer relationship
gave considerable weight to the Joint Affidavit
Since POEA noted that JEAC is a service contractor not authorized to deploy fishermen,
JEAC, could not have deployed Hornales as an overseas contract worker.
What is apparent is that Hornales obtained a tourist passport and plane ticket from
JEAC as a travel agent on a clearly fly now pay later plan (Note: If you didnt read

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the case in the original, it didnt really say kung saang lupalop ng NLRC napulot yang
pananaw na yan.)
ISSUE/RULING: WON JEAC and Canayan were responsible for Hornales recruitment and
deployment to Singapore?
YES. NLRC Decision Set Aside. POEA Decision Reinstated.
RATIO:
The Court started by examining each piece of evidence to arrive at its conclusion.
Joint Affidavit It has no probative value because Hornales wasnt able to crossexamine it and affiants merely swore as to what Hornales told them, but not as to
the truth of the statements.
Certification It was not sworn, and seemed like a last ditch-effort of Step-Up to
help JEAC.
PNB Checks and agreements These strongly disprove Canayans total strangers
theory and revealed a contract of agency.
The factual and legal bases of NLRCs conclusions are bereft of substantial evidence
the quantum of proof in labor cases.
There is nothing on record which shows that JEAC is a mere travel agency. Even
Canayan consistently plead that JEAC is a licensed recruitment agency authorized
to recruit and deploy Filipino contract workers.
NLRC conveniently closed its eyes to the name of Victor Lim, as mentioned in the
agreements, when it ruled that Lim and Ste-Up are indeed total strangers to JEAC
and Canayan.
POEAs decision was more convincing and supported by substantial evidence:
The PNB checks representing salaries from the account of Canayan evidences
latters participation in Hornales recruitment and deployment.
Based from the agreements, the Court wonders where Canayan got the name of
Step-Up if the same is not known to him.
It is very unlikely for Hornales to go to Singapore as a tourist and then land a job
without knowing anyone.
JEAC and Canayans last argument was that, they cant be held liable because there
was no employment contract between him and and Step-Up Agency had been
approved by POEA. They also claim that the absence of a (1) Special Power of
Attorney and (2) Affidavit of Responsibility, as required by the POEA Rules and
Regulations only proves that they did not employ Hornales to Singapore.
To this, the Court said that the acts can be used as a basis of absolving JEAC and
Canayan. At most, theses act of deploying Hornales to Singapore without complying
with the POEA requirements only made them susceptible to cancellation of suspension
of license as provided by the POEA Rules and Regulations. But of course, such
violations should be threshed out in a proper administrative proceeding.
RE JEACs surety: Its liability is also founded on the POEA Rules and Regulations. Cash
and surety bonds are required precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective
recourse against such companies when held liable for applicants or workers claims, as
well as for all valid and legal claims arising from labor violations.

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AVELINA F. SAGUN, Petitioner, v. SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT

SERVICES, INC., Respondent.
(by Carmina Nociete)
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner applied with respondent for the position of caretaker in Taiwan. In consideration of
her placement and employment, petitioner allegedly paid P30,000.00 cash, P10,000.00 in the
form of a promissory note, and NT$60,000.00 through salary deduction, in violation of the
prohibition on excessive placement fees.
The complaint for lack of merit. Specifically, the POEA Administrator found that petitioner
failed to establish facts showing a violation of Article 32, since it was proven that the amount
received by respondent (only P20,840.00) as placement fee was covered by an official
receipt, and because respondent processed petitioners papers as caretaker, the position she
applied and was hired for.
The Secretary of Labor and the Office of the President partially granted petitioners motion for
reconsideration, as they found that there was indeed collection of excessive fees. The
appellate court reversed the rulings of the Secretary of Labor and the OP mainly because
their conclusions were based not on evidence but on speculation, conjecture, possibilities,
and probabilities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the respondents petition for review reversing
the decision of the Office of the President.
HELD:
LABOR LAW
The POEA and the CA are correct in dismissing the complaint for illegal exaction filed by
petitioner against respondent.
In proceedings before administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, the quantum of evidence
required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, or that level of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
In this case, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner are not substantial to show that
respondent collected from her more than the allowable placement fee. In support of her
allegation, she presented a photocopy of a promissory note she executed, and testified on
the purported deductions made by her foreign employer. The Court thus gave more credence
to respondents evidence, that is, the acknowledgment receipt showing the amount paid by
petitioner and received by respondent. Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, an
exhaustive review of the records of this case fails to disclose any other evidence sufficient
and strong enough to overturn the acknowledgment embodied in respondents receipt as to
the amount it actually received from petitioner.
DENIED
LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA and/or GUY DOMINGO

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A. MACAPAYAG, KRISTIAN GERHARD JEBSENS SKIPSRENDERI A/S

GR No. 182430 December 4, 2009
SUMMARY:
Petitioner was hired by respondent to work on one of the latters ship. While on his job,
Petitioner slipped (around June 2000)and was diagnosed with a back injury (see full digest
for exact name). He underwent surgery on August 18, 2000 paid by respondent. After which
undergone physical therapy until Feb 20 2001 (note more than 120 day na) when the
company doctor said he was already fit to work. Petitioner sought a second opinion, and the
independent physician said that he was still injured and still not fit to work. After which he
claimed for additional disability benefit from respondent. LA dismissed, NLRC remanded to LA,
CA affirmed LA.
SC said that in case of doubt, findings of the independent physicians are given more credence
than those of the company-designated physicians. The law looks tenderly on the laborer.
Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial
and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor consistent with the
principle of social justice. In this case, SC adopted the independent physicians diagnosis that
petitioner is still not fit for work. Since petitioner has been injured for more than 120 days, he
is entitled to permanent total disability benefit in the amount of US$60,000.00.
FACTS:
January 4, 2000, Leopoldo Abante (petitioner) was hired by respondent KJGS Fleet
Management Manila (KJGS) to work as able bodied seaman aboard M/T Rathboyne, for a
period of nine months and with a basic salary of US$535.00 per month
while carrying equipment on board the vessel, petitioner slipped and hurt his back
Upon the vessels arrival in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on July 4, 2000, petitioner was brought to a
hospital whereupon he was diagnosed to be suffering from "lower back pain r/o old fracture
lesion 4th lumbar bod
Unable to bear the pain, petitioner was, on his request, repatriated to the Philippines on July
19, 2000.
On July 21, 2000, petitioner reported to KJGS and was referred to a company-designated
physician, Dr. Roberto D. Lim (Dr. Lim),
He was diagnosed to be suffering from"Foraminal stenosis L3-L14 and central disc protrusion
L4-L5"
on account of which he underwent Laminectomy and Discectomy on August 18, 2000,
the cost of which was borne by KJGS.
He was advised to continue physical therapy
February 20, 2001 when he was pronounced fit to resume sea duties. He, however, refused
to sign his Certificate of Fitness for Work.
Petitioner later sought the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Jocelyn Myra R. Caja, who diagnosed
him to have "failed back syndrome" and gave a grade 6 disability rating
which rating rendered him medically unfit to work again as a seaman
He called for the award of US$25,000.00 disability benefits
Petitioner filed on April 27, 2001 a Complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), for disability compensation in the amount of US$25,000.00, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees
LA dismissed the complaint as it was premature since he did not get the opinion of a third
doctor pursuant Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Memo Circular No. 9,

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series of 2000 which says:

in the event of conflict between the assessment of the company-designated physician and the
doctor chosen by the seafarer, the opinion of a third doctor agreed on by both the employer
and the seafarer should be sought
NLRC remanded the case back to LA, CA reinstated LAs Decision
ISSUE:
(1) W/N the opinion of a third doctor is required? NO
(2) W/N Petitioner Abante is entitled to disability benefit? YES
RATIO:
OPINION OF A THIRD DOCTOR NOT REQUIRED
Seafarer can get a second opinion
Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract of 20001 does not preclude
the seafarer from getting a second opinion as to his condition for purposes of claiming
disability benefits
NYK-Fil Ship Management v. Talavera
"[w]hile it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffers a
permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek
a second opinion," hence, the Contract "recognizes the prerogative of the seafarer to request
a second opinion and, for this purpose, to consult a physician of his choice."
Seagull Maritime Corporation v. Dee
while it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered
permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek
a second opinion which can then be used by the labor tribunals in awarding disability claims
In Case of Doubt Favor Labor
Courts are called upon to be vigilant in their time-honored duty to protect labor, especially in
cases of disability or ailment.
If serious doubt exists on the company-designated physicians [findings] resort to prognosis
of other competent medical professionals should be made.
In doing so, a seaman should be given the opportunity to assert his claim after proving the
nature of his injury. These evidences will in turn be used to determine the benefits rightfully
accruing to him.
It is understandable that a company-designated physician is more positive than that of a
physician of the seafarers choice.
It is on this account that a seafarer is given the option by the POEA Standard Employment
Contract to seek a second opinion from his preferred physician
It bears noting that Dr. Lims medical findings did not significantly differ from those of Dr.
Cajas.
POEA standard employment contract for seamen was designed primarily for the protection
and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going
vessels.
Its provisions must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor.
Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect
HFS Philippines v. Pilar
findings of the independent physicians were given more credence than those of the companydesignated physicians

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certification of the company-designated physician would defeat respondents claim while the
opinion of the independent physicians would uphold such claim. In such a situation, we adopt
the findings favorable to respondent.
The law looks tenderly on the laborer. Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in
two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted
in his favor consistent with the principle of social justice
DISABILITY BENEFIT
Permanent disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body
it was only on February 20, 2001 that the Certificate of Fitness for Work was issued by Dr.
Lim, more than 6 months from the time he was initially evaluated by the doctor on July 24,
2000 and after he underwent operation on August 18, 2000
petitioner was seen by dr Lim from July 24, 2000 up to February 20, 2001 or a total of 13
times
Dr. Lim consistently recommended that petitioner continue his physical rehabilitation/therapy
and revisit clinic on specific dates for re-evaluation, thereby implying that petitioner was not
yet fit to work.
Given a seafarers entitlement to permanent disability benefits when he is unable to work for
more than 120 days, the failure of the company-designated physician to pronounce petitioner
fit to work within the 120-day period entitles him to permanent total disability benefit in the
amount of US$60,000.00
DAMAGES (not Important)
moral and exemplary damages, the same cannot be granted, there being no concrete
showing of bad faith or malice on the part of KJGS.
The records show that it shouldered all the expenses incurred in petitioners surgery and
subsequent rehabilitation. And it regularly inquired from Dr. Lim about petitioners condition.
claim for attorneys fees is granted following Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which allows
its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under the
employer's liability laws
recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur
expenses to protect his interest
present case following the refusal by respondent to settle his claims. Pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees of ten percent (10%) of the monetary
award
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 10, 2007,
and April 1, 2008, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are held jointly
and severally liable to pay petitioner the following: a) permanent total disability benefits of
US$60,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; and b) attorney's fees of
ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment.
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY,
INC., Petitioners, v. ESTANISLAO SURIO, et. al. Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

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FACTS:
Respondents Estanislao Surio, et al. were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel
owned by petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. (Eastern).
On December 23, 1993, Eastern filed against Surio, et al. a complaint for disciplinary action
based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in the
Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of
employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters.
The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules
and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
The POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Eastern elevated the matter to the
NLRC. The NLRC also dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, the CA also
denied the Easterns petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the
POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions?
HELD: The petition for review lacks merit.
LABOR LAW: jurisdictionappeal from POEAs decision pertaining to disciplinary actions
Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the
POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases
administrative in character involving such workers.
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of
cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in
accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II,
Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the
POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC.
Court of Appeals decision AFFIRMED.
People v Panis
142 SCRA 664 (1986)
(by J.Era Lipa)
Facts:

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Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a feecharging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and
promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in
violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense
because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four
informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article
39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However,
as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper
authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of
recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code.
Held:
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment
and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with
two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment
is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring (of) workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against
illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a
better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in
pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands
of their own countrymen. (first case: Article 12 Labor Code Book by Azucena)