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- The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) retains jurisdiction over election cases involving candidates who have been proclaimed winners but have not yet assumed office, such as when the oath of office was not properly administered. While one may be proclaimed a winner and take an oath, one is not considered a member of the legislative body until all requirements are met, including valid proclamation, proper oath, and assumption of office.
- The Court also upheld the state's right to deprive persons of the right to vote through laws disqualifying those convicted of crimes. Disqualification is meant to preserve election integrity, not serve as additional punishment. It remains in effect even after a sentence has ended.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) retains jurisdiction over election cases involving candidates who have been proclaimed winners but have not yet assumed office, such as when the oath of office was not properly administered. While one may be proclaimed a winner and take an oath, one is not considered a member of the legislative body until all requirements are met, including valid proclamation, proper oath, and assumption of office.
- The Court also upheld the state's right to deprive persons of the right to vote through laws disqualifying those convicted of crimes. Disqualification is meant to preserve election integrity, not serve as additional punishment. It remains in effect even after a sentence has ended.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) retains jurisdiction over election cases involving candidates who have been proclaimed winners but have not yet assumed office, such as when the oath of office was not properly administered. While one may be proclaimed a winner and take an oath, one is not considered a member of the legislative body until all requirements are met, including valid proclamation, proper oath, and assumption of office.
- The Court also upheld the state's right to deprive persons of the right to vote through laws disqualifying those convicted of crimes. Disqualification is meant to preserve election integrity, not serve as additional punishment. It remains in effect even after a sentence has ended.
recount valid - A candidate affected can file a petition for recount alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers. From the fact, therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has not petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were notconvinced, a discrepancy existed.The Commission on Elections' copies of election returns are authentic copies within the meaning of Section 163 of the Revised Election CodeWhere, as in the case at bar, there were patent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of canvassers, itwas imperative for said board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verificationof authentic copies and recourse to the courts. Cauton v. COMELEC -Irregularity in canvassing of votes: COMELEC issued resolution to open ballots; valid? - the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power, may order the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each ballot box is also tampered like the three copies outside the ballot box, corresponding to each precinct. The Commission on Elections may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party. Once it is found that the copy of the election return inside the ballot box is untampered, the Commission on Elections would then have accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a basis for the prosecution for the violation of the laws relative to elections, and (2) afforded the party aggrieved by the alteration of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a judicial recount of the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.
The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to
protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. Arroyo v. DOJ -DOJ & Comelec creating a a Joint Committee and Fact Finding Team; WON panel undermines - grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re- filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Ongsiako v. Comelec
-WON C. has jurisdiction over Ptr who is
proclaimed as winner; taken oath - Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office nd yet. Also, the 2 requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied. Macalintal v COMELEC -Oversees Absentee Voting Act of 2003: Filipino immigrant affidavit: intent to return to Phil. Is void: WON correct - No.There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter. 2nd The said
provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189. People v. Corral -State has the right to deprive a persons right to suffrage - Yes. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right. Appellants contention: end of punishment ends also his disqualifications for election - No. Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection and not for punishment,. the withholding of a
privilege and not the denial of a personal right."
Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a view. Yra v. Akbayan - is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the reason that he was not a qualified voter in his municipality, connoting that he was not a qualified elector therein, sufficient to nullify his election? - No. One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for. Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides that "No person shall be eligible to any office who is not at time of his election a qualified voter of the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election." It was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right." The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.It should not be forgotten that the people
of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to
be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be respected. Maquiling v. COMELEC -Use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualification to run for public office - We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. FrivaldovCOMELEC No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even
if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not
restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. MercadovManzano DualCitizenisdisqualifiedtoholdpublicoffice The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand,
refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. Lonzanidav.COMELEC Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation was contested and resulted to declaring his opponent winning the election and ordered Lonzanida to vacate the office. The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term of office for two reasons, he cannot be considered elected as the proclamation was void and he also did not voluntary renounce office, but was involuntary severance from office. Abundov.COMELEC The instances wherein such consecutive terms are not considered as having been involuntarily interrupted or broken are as follows: (1)Assumption of Office by Operation of Law; (2)Recall Election; (3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City; (4)Period of Preventive Suspension; and (5) Election Protest MarquezvCOMELEC fugitivefromjustice:No. Although it is provided
in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes Atty.RisosVidalvCOMELEC May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office? Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Arateav.COMELEC the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy wasvoid ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated.A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned
not only those who after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. On the other hand, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy: Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office x x xThe conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the
Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor.On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.Effect of a Void Certificate of CandidacyA cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.As the
Comelec stated in their February 2011
Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.Petition dismissed.