People vs Ferrer Case Digest

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972

FACTS:
Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag, together with five others, were charged with violation of R.
A. No. 1700 or the Anti-Subversion Law which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines and other subversive associations, and punishes any person who
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member of the Party or of any other similar subversive organization. Both accused
moved to quash the informations on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Law is a bill of
attainder. The trial court agreed, and thus, dismissed the informations against the two
accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder
HELD:
No. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that No bill of attainder or ex
port facto law shall be enacted. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rulemaking and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term Communist
Party of the Philippines issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact, the Act applies
not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors. Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary
to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure
their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially
established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the
Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its
subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to

overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place
the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite
the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is
precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a dragnet device
whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would
be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any
specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the
illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the
Party must be shown by overt acts. This constitutes an element of membership
distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organizations unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of
mere adherence to the organizations illegal objectives (People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L32613-14, 27 December 1972, 48 SCRA 382).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.

MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a
duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the
laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of
its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its
ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in
paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting
delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the
first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right
of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the questioned
provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the same is designed
to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the
prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process,
the guarantee of equal change for all candidates, and the independence of the
delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience," are
interests that should be accorded primacy.1
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements in the
cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law is
likewise untenable.

An ex post facto law is one which:.

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the
constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.4
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132
including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law
that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall
apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the
entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a)
of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion in Imbong v. Comelec, L32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-32443.
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
Reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as they are relevant to the issues
in this case, dissents, even as agrees that Republic Act 6132 is not ex post facto.
VILLAMOR, J., concurring:
Concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post facto law and dissents as to
the rest.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The Court's decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11, 1970 in Imbong
vs. Ferrer and Gonzales vs. Comelec1 upholding the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132. Inasmuch as I was unable to participate
in the said cases, 2 I have expressed my contrary view in my separate dissenting
opinion in Badoy, Jr. vs. Ferrer 3 that the challenged provision, together with the Act's
other restrictions and strictures enumerated therein, "oppressively and unreasonably
straitjacket the candidates as well as the electorate and gravely violate the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of
association, and, deny due process and the equal protection of the laws."
I therefore dissent from the Court's decision at bar for the same reason and
considerations stated in my separate dissenting opinion in the case of Badoy.
I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion in ImbongGonzales that "(W)hile it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not
wrong per se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of the broad law-making
authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of
the times. One such act is the party or organization support prescribed in Sec. 8(a),
which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for
the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that 'equality of chances may be
better attained by banning all organization support.' "
I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be construed, as
endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act's sponsor, that "(T)he protection
of the Constitution cannot be invoked for the right of association when the purpose is

a malum prohibitum because such purpose would be "contrary to law" " and "(O)nce the
ban (on party and organization support) is approved into law, the freedom of association
cannot be invoked against it" since the Constitution decrees only that "(T)he right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."4
Such a concept of malum prohibitum vis-a-vis the Constitutional guarantee of freedom
of association which has its root in the Malolos Constitution would render sterile and
meaningless the Constitutional safeguard, should Congress be conceded, in the
exercise of its broad law-making authority, the power to strike down at any time
associations and societies by the simple expedient of declaring their purposes or certain
activities, not wrong per se as "contrary to law" or mala prohibita. I believe that such a
concept begs the question. Obviously, the word "law" in the qualifying clause "for
purposes not contrary to law" does not mean that an enactment of the legislature
forecloses the question with finality and sounds the death-knell. Laws that would
regulate the purposes for which associations and societies may be formed or would
declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the usual constitutional test of
reasonableness and furthermore, must not abridge freedom of speech and press.5

# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion in Imbong v. Comelec, L32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-32443.
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
Reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as they are relevant to the issues
in this case, dissents, even as agrees that Republic Act 6132 is not ex post facto.
VILLAMOR, J., concurring:
Concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post facto law and dissents as to
the rest.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:.
The Court's decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11, 1970 in Imbong
vs. Ferrer and Gonzales vs. Comelec1 upholding the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132. Inasmuch as I was unable to participate
in the said cases, 2 I have expressed my contrary view in my separate dissenting
opinion in Badoy, Jr. vs. Ferrer 3 that the challenged provision, together with the Act's

other restrictions and strictures enumerated therein, "oppressively and unreasonably

straitjacket the candidates as well as the electorate and gravely violate the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of
association, and, deny due process and the equal protection of the laws."
I therefore dissent from the Court's decision at bar for the same reason and
considerations stated in my separate dissenting opinion in the case of Badoy.
I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion in ImbongGonzales that "(W)hile it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not
wrong per se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of the broad law-making
authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of
the times. One such act is the party or organization support prescribed in Sec. 8(a),
which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for
the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that 'equality of chances may be
better attained by banning all organization support.' "
I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be construed, as
endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act's sponsor, that "(T)he protection
of the Constitution cannot be invoked for the right of association when the purpose is
a malum prohibitum because such purpose would be "contrary to law" " and "(O)nce the
ban (on party and organization support) is approved into law, the freedom of association
cannot be invoked against it" since the Constitution decrees only that "(T)he right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."4
Such a concept of malum prohibitum vis-a-vis the Constitutional guarantee of freedom
of association which has its root in the Malolos Constitution would render sterile and
meaningless the Constitutional safeguard, should Congress be conceded, in the
exercise of its broad law-making authority, the power to strike down at any time
associations and societies by the simple expedient of declaring their purposes or certain
activities, not wrong per se as "contrary to law" or mala prohibita. I believe that such a
concept begs the question. Obviously, the word "law" in the qualifying clause "for
purposes not contrary to law" does not mean that an enactment of the legislature
forecloses the question with finality and sounds the death-knell. Laws that would
regulate the purposes for which associations and societies may be formed or would
declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the usual constitutional test of
reasonableness and furthermore, must not abridge freedom of speech and press.5
# Footnotes.
1 Imbong vs. Comelec, L-32432 and Gonzales vs. Comelec, L-32443,
September 11, 1970.
2 Ibid.

3 Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, Mekin vs. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74.
4 Fernandez vs. Oasan, L-9141, Sept. 25, 1956, 99 Phil. 934, 937.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
1 Nos. L-32432 and L-32443, jointly decided.
2 The writer hereof was then on official leave.
3 Nos. L-32456 and L-32551, October 17, 1970.
4 Sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo Tolentino of July 20, 1970, notes in
parentheses furnished; emphasis copied; cit, Art, III, Sec. 1(6), Philippine
Constitution.
5 See 2 Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, 209.

CASE DIGEST ON In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI [35 SCRA 429 (1970)]
November 10, 2010

Facts: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, nonprofit corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates
due process rights of association, freedom of expression and is an ex post
facto law
Issues:
1.

WON it violates three rights?

No. Its set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal

protection of laws.
2.

WON it is an ex post facto law?

No. Ex post facto law defined:

a.
makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act
innocent when done.
b.

aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was

c.

inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed

d.
alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or
different tests
e.
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of right which when done was lawful
f.
deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction
of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
Held: Petition denied. Constitutional act.
Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed
to acts committed after approval of law

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 61776 to 61861. March 23, 1984.]
REYNALDO R. BAYOT, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Renato J. Bihasa for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EX POST FACTO LAW; LAWS

PROVIDING FOR SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS PENDING
TRIAL, NOT IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION. There is no merit in petitioners
contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among
the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office
pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional
prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS; SUSPENSION
FROM OFFICE PENDING TRIAL; APPLICABILITY THEREOF TO ANY OFFICE WHICH
THE OFFICER CHARGED MAY BE HOLDING CASE AT BAR. The claim of petitioner
that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different
from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly
states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he was charged.

DECISION

RELOVA, J.:

Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one
hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a
government auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education
and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of
Treasury and the Teachers Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of
fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teachers Camp resulting in
damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were
filed on July 25, 1978.
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in
the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected.
On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein
petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed
against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now
pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76.
However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among
others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said section, as amended, reads
"Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title
7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against
him."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein
petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the
accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any other public
office which they may be occupying pending trial of their cases.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the
accused including herein petitioner "from their public positions or from any other
public office that they may be holding . . ." (p. 26, Rollo).

Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the
constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law" (p. 28, Rollo). The
motion was denied by respondent court in a resolution dated September 6, 1982.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
It is the submission of petitioner that respondent court acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in suspending petitioner from office as Mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, pendente lite because

1. Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, is a penal statute in which case the provision of
said Act must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and against the State;
2. A close perusal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, as well as the proceedings therein of the
Batas Pambansa is absent of the legislative intent to have said Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
applied retroactively;
3. In the supposition that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively, its
application would violate the Constitutional provision against enactment of ex post
facto law; and,
4. Petitioner cannot be suspended to the position of which he was duly elected by the
people of Amadeo, Cavite, based on an act which has nothing to do with his present
position.
We find no merit in petitioners contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal
provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post
facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that
suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article
24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision,
therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with
crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not
violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner
that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different
from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly

states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he was charged.
ACCORDINGLY, instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, MelencioHerrera, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. and Teehankee, J., are on leave.

BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [128 SCRA 383; NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR

1984]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of
estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said
charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the
commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other
employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teachers camp in
Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nomexistent obligations of the teachers camp resulting in damage to the government of
several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for
municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other
co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.
Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an
ex
post
facto
law.

Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of
Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with
suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which
violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg
to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be
considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial
proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently
occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The
amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving
fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word office
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered
into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a
Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days
after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the
entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the
provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an
ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition
applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused.
This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling
of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to
offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an
offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at
the time the treaty was ratified.

PEOPLE VS. LACSON, G.R. 149453, OCTOBER 7, 2003

Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing
judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be
applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the
basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive
application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch
of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and
included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in
effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to
revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right to due process and equal
protection of the law.
ISSUE:
What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused , can the time-bar rule be
applied retroactively?
HELD:
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State
and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed
resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the
Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused
to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice
to the offended parties.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that
the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor
received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years
to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years
to do so.

Chavez vs. COMELEC , GR 162777, Aug 31, 2004

Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing
Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex
post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an
individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement,
even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal.
ISSUE: Is Sec. 32 of COMELEC Res. No. 6520 in the nature of an ex post facto law?
HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes
a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when
they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined
in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters,
streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture,
image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it
prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials
by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely
does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his
name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for
public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the nonremoval of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such
propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in
the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post
facto law in this case.

Republic vs. Eugenio, GR 176429, Feb 14, 2008

Lilia Cheng argues that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive
effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened
prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001. Thus, she
concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to 1990, could not be the
subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
ISSUE: Can the AMLA bank inquiry order be applied into records of transactions
entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA?
HELD: No ex post facto law may be enacted, and no law may be construed in such
fashion as to permit a criminal prosecution offensive to the ex post facto clause. As
applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal
provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17
October 2001. As much was understood by the lawmakers since they deliberated upon
the AMLA, and indeed there is no serious dispute on that point.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 86774 August 21, 1991
ENEDINA PRESLEY, petitioner,
vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Alejandro dela Rosa for petitioner.
J. Vicente G. Sison for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 28, 1988 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the defendants are enjoined permanently from using the
property in question as apan de sal store or from using it for any other
commercial purposes; the defendants are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiff the sum of P3,803.55 with legal interest from
February 9, 1981 until the said sum is fully paid and the defendants are
further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P4,500.00 as and for
attorney's fees. (Rollo, p. 30)
The facts as stated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary
injunction was filed by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
(BAVA for short) against Teofilo Almendras and Rollo Almendras (now both
deceased and substituted by defendant-appellant Enedina Presley) for
violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject
house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial
purposes and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA
amounting to P3,803.55.
The Almendrases were at the time of the filing of the action the registered
owners of a house and lot located at 102 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village,
Makati, Metro Manila. As such registered owners, they were members of
plaintiff BAVA pursuant to the Deed Restrictions annotated in their title

(TCT No. 73616) over the property in question and defendant Presley, as
lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store'
located in the same address.
At the time the Almendrases bought their property in question from Makati
Development Corporation, the Deed Restrictions (Exh. "C") was already
annotated in their title (Exh. "B") providing (among others) 'that the lot
must be used only for residential purpose' (Exh. "B-1" and "B-2").
When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store, it sent a
letter to the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store (Exh.
"D").
Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air
Subdivision is classified as a purely residential area, particularly Jupiter
Road which is owned by and registered in the name of BAVA.
It has likewise been established that the Almendrases had not paid the
BAVA membership dues and assessments which amounted to P3,802.55 as
of November 3, 1980. Teofilo Almendras contended that there was no
written contract between him and appellee BAVA. Only a consensual
contract existed between the parties whereby Almendras regularly pays his
dues and assessments to BAVA for such services as security, garbage
collection and maintenance and repair of Jupiter Street. However, when the
services were withdrawn by appellee BAVA, there was no more reason for
the latter to demand payment of such dues and assessments. (Rollo, pp. 3031)
After due hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision in favor of BAVA
which was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
On January 20, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Consequently, the petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court raising the
following issues, to wit:
A
THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECENT CONSOLIDATED DECISION EN BANC
OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT PROMULGATED DECEMBER
22,1988 IN RE SANGALANG, BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC. v.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND AYALA CORPORATION G.R. NO.
71169; BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC. v. TENORIO, ET AL.-G.R. NO.
74376; BEL-AIR AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
AND ROMUALDEZ, ET AL G.R. NO. 76394; BEL-AIR VILLAGE

ASSOCIATION INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND FILLEY, ET AL.-G.R. NO.

78182; BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MONCAL, ET AL.-G.R. NO. 82281, WHICH CONSOLIDATED DECISION
APPLIES ON ALL FOURS IN THE CASE AT BAR IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER.
B
THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING
PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE ALMENDRASES
TO PAY THE ALLEGED UNPAID ASSOCIATION DUES IS PATENTLY
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS.
C
THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING
PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES IS
WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS. (Rollo, p. 11-12)
During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox Presley died on
January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs, namely Olivia V.
Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson.
The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealt with in the
consolidated cases decided by this Court promulgated on December 22, 1988
entitled Sangalang, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Ayala Corporation, G.R.
No. 71169; Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Rosario
de Jesus Tenorio and Cecilia Gonzalvez, G.R. No. 74376; Bel-Air v. Court of Appeals and
Eduardo and Buena Romualdez, G.R. No. 76394; BAVA v. Court of Appeals, Dolors
Filley and J. Romero Associates, G.R. No. 78182; and BAVA v. Court of Appeals, Violeta
Moncal and Majal Development Corp., G.R. No. 82281. (168 SCRA 634 [1988])
Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the questioned decision on
November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court. It was
however, aware of the pending case as it made mention of the several cases brought to
court by BAVA against the aforesaid commercial establishments.
The petitioner in the instant case is similarly situated as the private respondents in G.R.
Nos. 74376; 76394; 78182 and 82281 who converted their residential homes to
commercial establishments; hence, BAVA filed suits against them to enforce the Deeds
of Restrictions annotated in their titles which provide among others, "that the lot must
be used only for residential purposes."
The Court in the Sangalang case, however, held:
xxx xxx xxx

... In the Sangalang case, we absolve the Ayala Corporation primarily owing
to our finding that is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the
general public. Insofar as these petitions are concerned, we likewise
exculpate the private respondents, not only because of the fact that Jupiter
Street is not covered by the restrictive easements based on the 'deed
restrictions' but chiefly because the National Government itself, through
the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into a
'high density commercial (C-3) zone,' (See rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 117)
pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01 Hence, the petitioners have no cause of
action on the strength alone of the said deed restrictions. (p. 667; Emphasis
supplied)
In the instant petition, BAVA assails the Court's decision in the Sangalang case, more
specifically the Court's interpretation of Ordinance No. 81-01 passed by the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC) on March 14, 1981. It avers that due to the multitude of
issues raised and the numerous pleadings filed by the different contending parties, the
Court was misled and unfortunately erred in concluding that Jupiter Street was
reclassified as a "high density commercial (C-3) zone" when in fact, it is still considered
as a "(R-1) residential zone."
If indeed private respondent's observations were accurate, the Court will certainly not
hesitate to correct the situation and the case at bar would be the proper occasion to do
so. We have carefully examined the pleadings but have found no reason to reconsider
the Sangalang doctrine. In assailing the Court's decision, the private respondent has
come out with mere assertions and allegations. It failed to present any proofs or
convincing arguments to substantiate its claim that Jupiter Street is still classified as a
residential zone. (See Filinvest v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 664 [1990]) No new
zoning re-classification, ordinance, certification to the effect or jurisprudence for that
matter was brought to the attention of this Court which would necessarily compel us to
take a second look at the Sangalang Case. The Court can not reverse a precedent and
rule favorably for the private respondent on the strength of mere inferences.
The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the
Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions
of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered
into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the
petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said
conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile
with the legitimate exercise of police power. (Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati
Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 [1979]).
We reiterate the Court's pronouncements in the Sangalang case which are quite clear:
It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the
easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air

subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But
they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and
interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the
legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of
contract and is said to be the 'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil
Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it
cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to
promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the
expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. . . (p. 667)
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 8101. The records indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores
have already sprouted in this area. We, therefore, see no reason why the petitioner
should be singled out and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de sal store. Thus, in
accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the respondent court's decision has
to be reversed.
With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55,
the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic after petitioner Presley
purchased the property subject of lease from the Almendrases and settled all
association dues.
Likewise, the demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual
basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court
dated November 28, 1988 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private
respondent is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 86774 August 21, 1991

ENEDINA PRESLEY, petitioner,
vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Alejandro dela Rosa for petitioner.
J. Vicente G. Sison for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction
was filed by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against
TeofiloAlmendras and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by
defendant-appellant Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air
Subdivision that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for
commercial purposes and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA
amounting to P3,803.55.
Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal
Store' located in the same address. At the time the Almendrases bought their property
in question from Makati Development Corporation, the Deed Restrictions (Exh. "C") was
already annotated in their title (Exh. "B") providing (among others) 'that the lot must be
used only for residential purpose' (Exh. "B-1" and "B-2").
When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store, it sent a letter
to the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store (Exh. "D").
Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is
classified as a purely residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and
registered in the name of BAVA.
During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox
Presley died on January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs,
namely Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson. The issues raised in the instant
petition have already been dealt with in the consolidated cases decided by this Court
promulgated on December 22, 1988 entitled Sangalang Doctrine.
ISSUES:
Does the Sangalang Doctrine can be consider in the case at bar?
Does the Deed of Restrictions entirely wrong?

HELD:

We have carefully examined the pleadings but have found no reason to

reconsider the Sangalang doctrine. In assailing the Court's decision, the private
respondent has come out with mere assertions and allegations. It failed to present any
proofs or convincing arguments to substantiate its claim that Jupiter Street is still
classified as a residential zone. (See Filinvest v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 664
[1990]) No new zoning re-classification, ordinance, certification to the effect or
jurisprudence for that matter was brought to the attention of this Court which would
necessarily compel us to take a second look at the Sangalang Case. The Court cannot
reverse a precedent and rule favorably for the private respondent on the strength of
mere inferences.
The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding
the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the
provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely
entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the
petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said
conditions are annotated on the Torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile
with the legitimate exercise of police power. (Ortigas& Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati
Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 [1979]).

Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co. L-24670
(December 14, 1979)
G.R. No. L-24670
94 SCRA 533
December 14, 1979
Facts:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block
31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the vendees transferred their
rights and interests over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase
price. Both the agreements and the deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the
stipulation that the parcels of land subject of the deeds of sale shall be used by the
Buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The restrictions were later annotated in the
Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the said lots issued in the name of Chavez.
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building restrictions
also annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly from Chavez
free from all liens and encumbrances while Lot No.6 was acquired through a Deed of
Exchange from Republic Flour Mills.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme
designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which
forms part of its big landed estate where commercial and industrial sites are also
designated or established.
Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per
ResolutionNo.27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff
completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing
EDSA and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962 or
more than 2 years after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and industrial
zone.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a building devoted
to banking purposes but which it claims could also be used exclusively for residential
purposes. The following day, the plaintiff demanded in writing that the construction of
the commercial building be stopped but the defendant refused to comply contending
that the construction was in accordance with the zoning regulations.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.
2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by defendant-appellee.

Held:
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was impliedly
admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same.
Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now
change its position on appeal.
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the said
resolution, the posture is unsustainable.
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
to to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. The
law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore,
granting that Resolution No.27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure
within the intendment of the word regulation under the provision.
An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of a
municipality should be liberally construed in its favor and that any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the
local government and it shall be presumed to exist. An exception to the general
welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of its powers will
conflict with vested rights arising from contracts. The exception does not apply to the
case at bar.
2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
Invariably described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers and the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of police power may
be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to
the Pasig River as an industrial or commercial zone was passed by the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to safeguard/promote the
health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where
Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. The Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably
justified under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution.
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to
all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental aim of the Government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated.