[G.R. No. 132524.

December 29, 1998]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY* and
HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.

With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third
party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is
willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the
defendant is awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.

DECISION

SO ORDERED.[4] (Emphasis supplied)

MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a decision
is the primary issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner
Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabels petition for appointment as
administratrix of her grandmothers estate by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay)
and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out
of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel
Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the
marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal
case[1] against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio
Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) [2] a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying
for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. [3] The
suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion
which reads:

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8,
1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under
observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as
1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown
marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and
wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July
9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic)
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect
as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the records
that the question of the case and custody of the three children have been the
subject of another case between the same parties in another branch of this Court
in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of the plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be
without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the

findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives
more in fancy that in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). [5] (emphasis
supplied)
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels paternal
grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will. [6]
Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo
Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [7] a petition for
issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay which case was docketed as Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she
is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix of the estate.[8]
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the
surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal
properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect
the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have
been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30)
years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him. [9]
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition,
petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that
respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedents
estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code
an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the
legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent
Isabels father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and
thus, opened succession by representation. Petitioner contends that as a
consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of the
respondent Isabels parents is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and
has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent.
[10]
On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying
petitioners Motion to Dismiss.[11] When his motion for reconsideration was denied
by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998, [12] petitioner, as mentioned
above filed this petition.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying

his motion to dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds
that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was timely
filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents null and void must be upheld; and (d) said decision had
long become final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioners motion to
dismiss was late having been filed after the opposition was already filed in court,
the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his
opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabels allegation that
she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedents son. She further
contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between
the body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for
annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of marriage or
nullifies it. It does not, after hearing a marriage voidable otherwise, the court will
fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil
Code before they are annulled is voidable.
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence
of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. [13] There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. [14]
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did
not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent portions
of which are quoted hereunder. To with:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the
pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as
distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not
adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of

action against a particular defendant.Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in

the maintenance of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also
because if no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
xxx xxx xxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to
file ad maintain this special proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body of the
decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not
declaration of nullity.
The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex A
Motion) prevails over the body thereof is not of a final decision is definite, clear and
unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may
be referred to for purposes of construing the judgement (78 SCRA 541 citing
Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang).The reason is that the
dispositive portion must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as
Annex A of oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code
which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being
conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is
considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.). [15]
The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be
observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.[16]The Rules do
not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules
on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1,
Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed within
the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint. Clearly, the motion

should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners opposition. [17] which is
the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost
two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her
witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of
the motion to dismiss is not only improper but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully
observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict
between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created
the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The
legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is clear
under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the
enactment of the Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI
decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents
is null and void and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage
from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage is
illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83[18] of
the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates
the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. [19]
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144
of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children
by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children under Article 89[20] irrespective of whether or not the parties to the
void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all
its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special
contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions
to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of
children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article
89 which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be

considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the
legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy
the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its
continuance.[22]
Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations
and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make
void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with [23] whereas null and void
is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that
is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when
it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court
simply declares a status condition which already exists from the very beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is the dispositive
portion of the decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents was void or voidable. Such argument springs from a
miscomprehension of the judgment of the Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous
premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositive
portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution
of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or
order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the
questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or
order which may be somewhat confusing, [24] the same is not without
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final
decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect
without need of interpretation or construction which usually is the case where the
order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not
constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is
based.[25]
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion
and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of

the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the
court. In Republic v. delos Angeles[26] the Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any
less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.
x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole
so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and
reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part if
possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with
the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal
quoted earlier shows that the marriage is voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as
1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown
marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July
9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without
sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the finding of
the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy
than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). [27]
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil
Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore
governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary
interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said
provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who
were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their
marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking
appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including
respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation in the
estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without
prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether Letters of Administration
may be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional
rights of the personalities involved over the decedents estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all magistrates of all
levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised in
the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion
that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the
rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the
directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with
the body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and
unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation. [28]
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage after his death?

who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. [2] Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state
the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and
correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. [3] However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at
the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial
is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their
fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare
null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation
to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. [9] This interest proceeds
from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract
of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
[14]
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their
privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma

was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and
that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt
the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire fiveyear continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should
not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to
be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
[17]
The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to
the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited
the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period.
Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void, [18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the

marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered
by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place [21] and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, [23] and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous
and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence
it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a
judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for
the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." [25] "Under ordinary circumstances,
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either
or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage [27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a
final judgment to that effect. [28] For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
[29]
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or
the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such

previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

LOLITA D. ENRICO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 173614

Present:

versus -

HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI

AND
TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO,
Respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 28, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order, [1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity ofMarriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio)

were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were

and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration

born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October

of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the

1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively.She further contended that the marriage

complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June

ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized

1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely:

by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the

Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. [4] On 1 May

action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file

2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the

an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. [6] Six months later, or on 10 February 2005,
Eulogio passed away.[7]

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order, [9] granting the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, [10] dated 7

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the

same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that

March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC
elucidated on its position in the following manner:

Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could
not

have

lived

together

under

the

circumstances

required

by

said

provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was

dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three
months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and
Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the
Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in
Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which
states that such a petition may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that
only the husband or the wife may file the petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The
reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition
is
exclusive
and
this
right
solely
belongs
to
them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the
marriage null and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an

affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with
costs de officio. [13]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by

petitioner
Order

[14]

of

her

Comment

to

the

said

motion,

the

RTC

rendered

an

dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC

reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the
ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of
a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which
provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void
marriage are still living. [16] Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held
that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded
on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog,
328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First
Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The
Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case
of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to
as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of
Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the
wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely
personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the
case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of

this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog
and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the]
basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a
person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced
particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the
lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over
the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the
parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who
should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage
void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already
a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such
vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure
such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted
by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void
marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is
illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such
union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for
the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a
semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable
only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon
the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his
heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but
the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the
wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be
applicable.[17]

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing

Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground

to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to
entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

that no new matter was raised therein.[19]

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of

Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the

the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

nullity of his marriage after his death.

Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court

applies to the case at bar.

We grant the Petition.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,

In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,

countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to

concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs

file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein

enforceable

writs

respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for

of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking

the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the

a direct recourse to this Court. [20] Instead, they should initially seek the proper

effectivity of the Family Code. The Court inNial recognized that the applicable law

relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be

to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code,

burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the

which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [23] What we have before

issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the

us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was

Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of

entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the

courts.[21]However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary

facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

within

their

respective

regions),

to

issue

power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.
[22]

Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in
its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity

of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non

indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis

supplied.)

required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of
the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for

nullity of void marriage.

doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of
the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with
the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application. As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions
for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do
not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and hence can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents

clearly have no

cause

of

action

before the court a

quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs
can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding
for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before
the

Regional

Trial

Court

of

Aparri,

Cagayan,

Branch

6,

is ORDERED

DISMISSEDwithout prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita

D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the latter. No costs.
[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]
SO ORDERED.

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M.

REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It
also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria
Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had
a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null
and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on
August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the
parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria,
private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in
ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they
also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC
of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null
and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He
also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna
Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage
to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to
petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that
his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She
submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3,
1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was
submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null
and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March
29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These
documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner,
are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil
marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before
the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also

appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding
ceremony on April 4, 1982.[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his
marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November
4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996,
the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate
court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not
say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a judicial
decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact
no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a
marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for this
would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage
even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first
marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not have
been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on
marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in
this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private
respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein
petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support
in the amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and
Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition
asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:

binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of law
previously obtaining.[5]

I.

In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also

said:

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY
OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED
BY LAW.

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent
for this case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within
the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.

II
xxx
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS
OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first
marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To
resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed
light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall
discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of
nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate
court rejected petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza[3] and People v.
Aragon[4] are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a marriage
is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment
of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second

marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. . . .[6]
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second
marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent
cases of Bobis v. Bobis[7] and Mercado v. Tan,[8] both involving a criminal case for
bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the
Family Code,[9] under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly
required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so

contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary,
the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the
matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v. Aragon,[11] this Court held
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both
cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage
during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife,
accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second
marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted
accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted
during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial
declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting
valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in
both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a
marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,[12] and Consuegra v. Consuegra,[13] however, we
recognized the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good
faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance
of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the
second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such
declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they
acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. [14]
But
in Odayat
v.
Amante (1977),[15] the
Court
adverted
to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the
charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October
of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales
in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v.
Paras.[16]

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that there is a need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married
Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition
with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void
on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying
on Consuegra, concluded that:[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still
be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19] however, the Court found the second marriage
void without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the
Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually
embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. [20] Article 40 of said Code expressly
required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
In Terre
v.
Terre (1992)[21] the
Court,
applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first
marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held
that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that for purposes
of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals (1993),[22] the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family
Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48,
50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).[23]
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar
circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)[24] the first wife charged a
municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying
his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage
took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation
of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at
that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found
in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.The first marriage of private respondent being
void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested
rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In
the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate
courts finding that despite private respondents deceit and perfidy in contracting
marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus,
coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married
private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier
petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed
petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage

license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both
the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of
their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it
refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on
a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative
defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate
court from giving her defense dueconsideration and weight. She adds that the
interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social
institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two
ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil
ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding
of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not
only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons
for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly
could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her
before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the
absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his
own deceit and perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys
fees. Although the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent
acted duplicitously and craftily in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral
damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim. [26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be
awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage
to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status
as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for
filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation
from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the
husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates
against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are
reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and
the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long
as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R.
BENGZON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision [1] as well as
the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Order [2] dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial
Court refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for
failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo)
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona
(petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first
petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. [3] On 9 May
1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court
granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds.
First, the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum

shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed
Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996
an Order (first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate
their arguments in a hearing.Petitioner Diana filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna
Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the motion. In
denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the
ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial
court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that
contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition
shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise
to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that
respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge
Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first
petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier
dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner
Diana
filed
a
Petition
for Certiorari,
Prohibition
and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order
deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
and denied the motion for reconsideration.

pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res
judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent
Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before filing
the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision
on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE
FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE,
ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action

Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its
first order erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether
the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the
motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second
petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to
be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 0494. To determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis

Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of
action is untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in
violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. [5] A complaint states a cause of action
when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the
defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
violates the right of the plaintiff.[6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition
sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.[7] The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were
legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the
marriage contract attached to the petition. The couple established their residence
in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November

1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970;
Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February
1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present
time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized
housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters
house or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent
and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused
to speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with
Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner,
requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further
insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority
and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their
conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and
explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their
conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents
pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and
reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and
the respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in
respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still
subsists to the present time.

10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as
Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage
and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity
was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the
relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in
accordance with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.[8]
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his
claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. [9] Ultimate
facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements. [10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
[13]
Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the
Family Code, by defining the term in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.

Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the
parties in cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.
[14]

Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines
set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition
is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or
incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave
nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the
marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to
psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (new Rules).[15] Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules
provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as
are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of
the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.(Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion
need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and
behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological

incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion
on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the
petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work,
respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand
everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The
root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as
their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules
require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of
psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this
requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or
omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,[17] the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants
(Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that
the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v.
Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint. [18] Given
the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render
judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping

Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions

certificate of non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first
petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94. [19] Petitioner
Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-941. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath
in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no
action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which
is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status
thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn
certification contemplated herein have been filed. [20]
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his
certificate of non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar
action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of
non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition
or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not
attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the
party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in
the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously
held that the rule of substantial compliance applies to the contents of the
certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of
whether the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case
involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas,
the Court ruled:

xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that
would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not
fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings
considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not
present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No.
04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of
procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis
pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus,
there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second
petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first
petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of
respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The
dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly,
there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and
caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second
petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a
decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme
Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as
to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. [24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable
social institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and
protects.[25] In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of
whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court
must resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each party can present
evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding
that, based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently
alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus,

the second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these

grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May
1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated August 20, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted
between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio
Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., co

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but
he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

G.R. No. 149498

May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer

residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court
granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied
by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation
giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive
pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The
trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that
no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how

Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to

support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita
M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties
pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological
incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his
daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the
needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court,
is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and
child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a
decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a
month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the

promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to
Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party
to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution?
Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other
spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope
up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic
vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases,
the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the
husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove
the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital
obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling
short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of
the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.

must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature

fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita
vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The SolicitorGeneral, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." 14 The foregoing guidelines do not require
that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and
support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent.
Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the
Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal

separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of
abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with
respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated
August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L.
CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he
was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to
courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows
before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966. [1] The civil marriage was
ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. [2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September
18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969; [4] Kenneth David born on
April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976. [6] The conjugal partnership,
nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.

hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed
up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from AntiSocial Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she
committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing
with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an

irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with
several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr.
Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment,
Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named
Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two
children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to
petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back
and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on
December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with
their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special
occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on
April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected
by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the
country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the
Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted
a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious,

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between
DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and
May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is
dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between
the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and
ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. [10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and
manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological
incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner
falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to

give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state
of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons
with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. [13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality
disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and
definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the
records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites,
and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be
equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations
of
a disordered
personality which
make

respondentcompletely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital

state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.
G.R. NO. 158896
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 [17] of the Family Code. However, we pointed out
in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 isnot to be equated with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The
authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman
Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate
court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in
his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first
and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be. [20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

October 27, 2004

JUANITA
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel
were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11
August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the
couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their
marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him
which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him
like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the
physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other
trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and
high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell
and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did
not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological
incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her
own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable

and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond
the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and
suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22)
years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with
her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories
against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving
wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and
family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors
despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a
happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness
stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents
never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to
the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a
hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this
period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness
which became the common source of their quarrels. 7 He, however, characterized
their union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to
Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house. 8 In 1981, when he
became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it was
then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart. 9 He then narrated
incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing
to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor; 10 when she would
visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she
kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his
table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was
away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of
having an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show
her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter
quarrels.14Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate

his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack
of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish
priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer 16 or that he had
a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and
obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner
Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuels office. 19 But when she was there, she
would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the
office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through
respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in
Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked
drawer she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone
number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by
petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith
arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another
occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner
Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka
anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose
professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner
Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria CaratingSiayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational
problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with
love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is
secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita
had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is
characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence
to maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who
are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and
differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative,
depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and

suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego
to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to
the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the
marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire
(along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize
(or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings. The
matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to
satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing
of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of
personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as
per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before
the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery. 25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. She
insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that
they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital
affairs26 which he had admitted to her. 27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would
wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her husband. 28 She stated
further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him
while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already
filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs. 29 She remembered that
after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her
to give him a chance to have a new family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on
petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report
stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature,
conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic]
more than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long
term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of
traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was
also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is
capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu.

Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and

sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the
Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other. 33 The couple would religiously
attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their
community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the
couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there. 36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married
and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life
together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and
obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties relationship sometime in the
early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the
plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk
responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A
wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to
the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as
our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital
partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes
may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May
2001.38

On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on
the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita
psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals.39 Thus:

IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND

RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Courts Ruling

The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there
is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening
the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit
amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set
aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not
only of defendant but also of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING
TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA

Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag 41 is apropos. There, we held that

whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case.
Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as
there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals
did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a
clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the
couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their
wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had
coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained
the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is
procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather,
we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes
outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness
and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of
support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to
file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals 42 where we declared that "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 we
expounded:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of

children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be

psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of
whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted
in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. 46 With this cardinal
state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals 47 that the burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel
herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that
respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr.
Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of
petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her
husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool,
intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he
has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra
marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest
problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl
now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file
the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulitulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy
should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said,
"Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation
of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. 50 It must be shown that
respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own
flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had
[extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point." 52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed
to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with
cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his
salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological

maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 53 In fact, Dr. Maaba,
whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported
that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other
hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion
that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report
clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not
from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences
during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son
to enter the priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by
him,56 and her inability to conceive. 57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a
husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their
individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing
intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel
himself during his direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been
allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple
case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel
might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is
no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where

neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.61
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01
July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.

AIME F. VILLALON, G.R. No. 167206

Petitioner,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),

SO ORDERED.
- versus - Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 18, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition [1] for the
annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and

raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological

incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its

appearance in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines [5] and submitted an

According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity

were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of

opposition[6] to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in
refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c)
his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and
(d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and
consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to
respondent be declared null and void ab initio.

Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies

when he applied for a job at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a
foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic
relationship soon thereafter.[7] After going steady for about two years, petitioner
and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April
22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he believed that

On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer [2] denying petitioners

allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful

it was the right time to raise a family and that she would be a good mother to his
children.[8]

and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their
relationship and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community
standards. Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in performing his
role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners
commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.

In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent.

According to him, their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any
communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love,
affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women.
[9]

On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an

investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties. [3] The report
submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such collusion. [4]

Moreover, their relationship tended to be one-sided since respondent was

unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions. [10]

Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had

symptoms of grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique

two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even when he became

and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted

engaged to and, later on, married respondent. [11] Respondent learned of his affairs

with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual

but reacted in a subdued manner. [12] Petitioner surmised that it was respondents

feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova

nature to be silent and withdrawn.[13]

Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to
another.[18]

In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an
apartment located five to ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke
to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively.
[14]

Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to his children. [15] He

considered himself as a good and loving father and described his relationship with
the children as great.[16]

Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and

respondent based on clinical interviews and psychological tests. [19]
Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in
1980. She discovered that he was having an affair with one of her friends who
worked as a trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut short when the
woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able

Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who

to rebuild their relationship and overcome the crisis. [20]

stayed with him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to

the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the childrens
medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the
conjugal abode.[17]

When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent

averred that she did not know whether her husbands acts could be deemed
womanizing since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13
years apart.[21] She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify

on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder
with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as a pervasive
maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning with main

annulled so he could marry her old friend. [22] She stated that she has not closed her
doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up his extra-marital
relationship.[23]

To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent

presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings
were incomplete because a team approach was necessary in evaluating an
individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity requires the
expertise of a psychiatrist and social worker.

In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract

between herein parties appearing in the Book of Marriage of the
city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila as well as the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon
City.

[24]

SO ORDERED.[28]

Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective
memoranda.[25] The OSG likewise filed a certification [26] pursuant to Rep. of the

Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of

Phils. v. Court of Appeals.[27] In due course, the trial court rendered judgment as

the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of

follows:

Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma. Corazon N.
Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby

ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of
the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision

dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioners petition for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.[29]

Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner
failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged
psychological

As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the

custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the three (3)
children Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria
shall remain with the respondent subject to visitation rights of
petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.

incapacity.

Although

Dr.

Dayan

testified

that

petitioners

psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis
for such a finding. Dr. Dayan also stated that parental marital instability was the
root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or
link the two variables. Moreover, petitioners sexual infidelity was made to appear

as symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same

merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[31] the court held that psychological

incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be
characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. [32] It should

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision

which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. [30] Thus, petitioner took this
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals
erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.

The petition has no merit.

... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that

causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated....[33]
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered

The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that

from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even

petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the

before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such

contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to

conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that

respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father

petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for

to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital

petitioners general claim that on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the

infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of

same time, no details or explanations were given of such circumstances that would

a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his

demonstrate petitioners inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the

spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction

time of the celebration of their marriage.

with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners

personal history.

Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to

establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr.
Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic

Personality Disorder as self-centered, characterized by grandiose ideation and lack

In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[35] we held that the cause of the

of empathy in relating to others, and one with Casanova Complex as a serial

alleged psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and

adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.

its incapacitating nature fully explained. Further

Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual

adulterer, as he wants the court to believe. As stated by respondent herself, it
cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could
be deemed womanizing, especially considering that these instances involved the

The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not

a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. [36]

same woman. In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit

relationship has been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the
symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex who, according to Dr.
Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another.

In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for
respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by
his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondents life
and that the latter did not need or want him. [37] Respondents uncommunicative and

Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering

from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are

withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioners discontentment with the marital

relationship.

manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely

However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[38] refusal to

unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. [34] The evidence on

comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity

record fails to convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of

within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the

the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the

evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he

family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage. [39]

was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good
provider.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the

2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution,
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with
Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on
record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that
there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed 3 in toto the judgment of
the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish
that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects"
were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage. 4 The Court of
Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of
respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at
the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she
failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor
or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.5

MA.
ARMIDA
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida PerezFerraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30,

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed
a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for
review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal
committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. 7 The Court required
respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed
to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court
resolves to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on
the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this
Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. 10 It is a wellestablished principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, 11 save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to
notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, 12 which are unavailing in
the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 13 As all people
may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 14 It is for
this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital
annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there
is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed
that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital

obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave,

permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's
relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well
about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of
time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when
petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of
trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x
x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that
respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he
is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that
one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others
for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when
asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She
replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties
in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of
respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor"
on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or
mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must
be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the
onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of
the marital vinculum.16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"

attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks,
the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend
more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money,
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife
regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,

habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual

infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. 19 No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage
as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it
must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles
35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must
be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. 26 Article 36 should not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical

G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

LEONILO
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

ANTONIO Petitioner,

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between
spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and
breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of
Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm
instead the trial court.

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner discovered
per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had
taken place.15

Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a
subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote
and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only
figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.18

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent

declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents
incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to
the present.8

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner

claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape
and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.13

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents
persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further asserted that
respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of

paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.23

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to
their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay
and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there
was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a

psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes
testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale
(CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and
poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid
of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from
head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under
contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan
was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that
she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for
chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts. 30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from her monthly budget ofP7,000.00.31

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted
respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such
test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that
respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established.
According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground
of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed
with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held
instead
that
only
respondent
was
impaired
by
a
lack
of
due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding
that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the
case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish
respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a
settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court
is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity
of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded
that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts
as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was
decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme
Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a
set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the

declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under
Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of
laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who
are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among
others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce
Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the
time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage
Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was
permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable
marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not
among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just
like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential
requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a
specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse
may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in
the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological

incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the
consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased
by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which
makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and
thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same
time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to
lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice
Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage."65

experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological

disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on
the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates

from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as

intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological
and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the
deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules,
which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably
useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines
are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and
indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is
need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee
was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding
specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was
for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then
in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of
psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity
was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution
to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68

existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of

Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of
Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must
be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in
the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived
from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought
on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower
courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to
the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the
judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a
statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need

not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a

petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves
as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Voidab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with
the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family

Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,

although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of
the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the
fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records
of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this
Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of
facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts.
As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains

whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological

incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

WITNESS:

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses
who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two
(2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event,
both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the
appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner.80

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say
that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There
are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the
affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of
evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter
between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code
likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney,
fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names,
and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to
medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The
lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are
expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is
going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines
that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the
basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask

him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6)
of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means
that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an
affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is
not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and
then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If
there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an
affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid
jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and]
she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the
case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as
the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally
examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse
to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized
by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents
psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners
version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the
veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert
witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated
its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It
has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity
for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her
singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her
marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove
her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks
of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in
extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they
indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at
least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning,
and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her
best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her
marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological
condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations
are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes
respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to
the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states
that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under
the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages
between
misrepresentations
made
by
respondent
and
the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3)
vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated
consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent
point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is
difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration
the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The
appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners
efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing
the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota
of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited
by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty
with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the
conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral
significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that
based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies
of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage
option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly
antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage
Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other
words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practicoconcrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially
binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the
trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of
the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they
are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of
the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After

all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories,
and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier
had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as
incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity
was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on
this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began
its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then
the opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at its formulation of the
doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice
Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological

incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological
incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court
came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents
psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate
that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the
trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that
required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of
evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of
a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we
approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement
that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those
cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review,
where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not
have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually
incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of
Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to
reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that

the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by

the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent
was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was
warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled,
and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the
marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not
vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID
under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57023 June 22, 1995

RAYMUNDO DE LA PAZ, PLACIDO DE LA PAZ, JOSE DE LA PAZ JR., ILOINA
DE LA PAZ, NORITA DELA PAZ, LEONORA DE LA PAZ, and VICTORIA DE LA
PAZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch III, JOSE RAMIREZ, EUGENIO LAAO,
GOMERCINDO BOLANTE, CARLOS BATUNGBAKAL, JACOBO ISIP, BAYANI
RAMIREZ, ALFREDO QUILAQUIL, AGUSTIN DEL ROSARIO, ROMAN DE VERA
JR., MIGUEL ALFONSO, GREGORIO FELLORIN, RODITO MARABE, ALFREDO
PANUGAO, ALFREDO CORONEL JR., DOMINGO BARTOLO, ADRIANO VALDEZ
JR., and ALBERTO DE GUZMAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and mandamus began in 1972 as a complaint for
recovery of possession filed by the petitioners in the then Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Branch III, Olongapo City. Docketed as Civil Case No. 1133-0, it involves
a dispute over a 7,531-square meter parcel of land in Subic, Zambales, being
claimed by the petitioners as communal owners on the strength of their Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-14807 of the Registry of Deeds of Zambales, and by the
private respondents as actual possessors.
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that sometime in 1970 or 1971 the
private respondents illegally entered portions of the said property, established
possession thereof, and introduced illegal improvements. In their answer, the
private respondents admitted that they indeed entered into the said property, but
averred that they did so in the honest belief that it was part of the public domain;
that they introduced the improvements without objection from any party; and that
they have been in peaceful, open, and uninterrupted material possession thereof
for more than ten years.
During the pre-trial conference, some of the private respondents represented by
Atty. Jose S. Sarte did not deny petitioners' title to the subject property, in effect
admitting such fact. The parties then limited the questions to be resolved during
the trial to the following issues: (a) the identity and extent of the land claimed by
the petitioners; (b) whether or not the area respectively occupied by defendants
are within the limits of the said land; and (c) whether or not the parties are entitled
to damages. 1
Atty. Sarte was later substituted by Atty. Nicolas C. Adolfo who attempted during
the trial to ask questions which delved into his predecessorrs pre-trial admission.
When this line of questioning was blocked by the respondent judge, private
respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
with this Court, which was assigned G.R. No. L-38773.
On November 15, 1974, the Court resolved the said petition by declaring that the
only issue between the parties is whether or not the land occupied by the private
respondents is included in TCT No. 14807 of the petitioners, and approved a
compromise agreement dated October 18, 1974, whereby the parties agreed,
among others, to have a relocation survey made upon the property in question, the
result of which snail be respected by them.
The Court also ordered "the parties, including the respondent judge or
whomsoever is acting in his place," to comply with the said compromise

agreement. In other words, the issue of petitioners' title to the land was made to
depend upon the results of the relocation survey.
On June 3, 1977, the court-appointed geodetic engineer, Serafin J. Garcia,
submitted his report which confirmed in part the allegation of the petitioners that
the private respondents were occupying certain portions of their titled land.
This report notwithstanding, a decision was reached in Civil Case No. 1133-0 on
January 19, 1981 (received by the petitioners on January 30, 1981), disposing of
the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
plaintiffs' (petitioners herein) complaint against all the defendants
(private respondents herein). The counterclaims of defendants (1)
Jose Ramirez, (2) Eugenio Laao, (3) Gomercindo Bolante, (4) Carlos
Batungbakal, (5) Jacobo Isip, (6) Bayani Ramirez, (7) Alfredo
Quilaquil, (8) Agustin del Rosario, (9) Roman de Vera, Jr., (10)
Miguel Alfonso, are hereby likewise dismissed.
On the counterclaim of defendants (1) Gregorio Fellorin, (2) Rodito
Marabe, (3) Alfredo Panugao, (4) Alfredo Coronel, Jr., (5) Domingo
Bartolo, (6) Adriano Valdez, Jr., and (7) Alfredo de Guzman,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiffs to jointly and
severally pay each of the said defendants the sum of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
Judge Panis observed that while the complaint was one for recovery of possession,
it was "in reality one for ejectment or illegal detainer."
On February 5, 1981, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that
their action was for recovery of possession and was not an ejectment case.
This was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated March 5, 1981,
received by the petitioners on April 10, 1981.

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioners pray for an order nullifying the decision
dated January 19, 1981, and compelling the respondent judge to issue a writ of
execution enforcing the compromise agreement approved by the Court in G.R. No.
L-38773.
Private respondents argue in their comment and memorandum that since the
petitioners "had not yet entered the land in question (at the time of filing of the
complaint), they had not lost any possession, and the civil case they filed for
recovery of possession was wrong as no possession had been lost by them."
This argument is untenable. It amounts to a recognition by the private respondents
of petitioners' equal, if not greater, right to possess the land in question. It even
confirms the absence of any past or present tenancy relationship between the
parties, which in turn proves the propriety of the course of action taken by the
petitioners.
Private respondents further aver that G.R. No. L-38773 "cannot be enforced as all
proceedings of Civil Case No. 1133-0 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
Branch III, Olongapo City, were null and void as the hearing was done by a judge
without jurisdiction to try it."
This contention is likewise unacceptable. Judge Panis dismissed the action on the
assumption that it is one for ejectment cognizable by the municipal court. Such
supposition is erroneous.
Ejectment may be effected only through an action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. Forcible entry is a summary action to recover material or physical
possession of real property when the person who originally held it was deprived of
possession by "force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth." An action for
unlawful detainer, on the other hand, may be filed when possession by "a landlord,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." 2 Both actions may
be filed with the municipal courts within one year after the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession. Their main difference lies in the time when possession
became unlawful in forcible entry, it is from the time of entry, while in unlawful
detainer, possession which is at first lawful later becomes illegal, as when the lease
contract has expired and the lessee refuses to vacate the premises despite the
demand.

We must rule out forcible entry; there is no allegation in the complaint that
petitioners were denied possession of the land in question through any of the
methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, although private
respondents prior possession was clearly alleged. Neither is the action one for
unlawful detainer; it was noted earlier that there is no lease contract between the
parties, and the demand to vacate made upon the private respondents did not
make them tenants of the petitioners.
In order to gain possession of the land occupied by the private respondents, the
proper remedy adopted by the petitioners was the plenary action of recovery of
possession before the then Court of First Instance. Respondent judge, therefore,
had jurisdiction over the case and should not have dismissed it on the ground of
lack thereof.
Respondent judge should have stuck to the issues defined by the parties during
pre-trial, namely, the identity and extent of the land claimed by the petitioners;
whether or not the area occupied by the private respondents is within the limits of
the said land; and whether or not the parties are entitled to damages. Trial of the
case should have been limited to these three issues. As we held in the early case
of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro: 3
One of the objectives of pre-trial procedure is to take trial of cases
out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. Pre-trial is primarily
intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the
disposition of a cause are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the
element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pre-trial
conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at
the trial, except such as may involve privilege or impeaching
matter.
The determination of the first two issues were delegated to the geodetic engineer
appointed by the court to conduct the relocation survey sought and accepted by
the parties in their compromise agreement.
Ignoring the result of the survey, Judge Panis instead concluded that petitioners'
action is actually one for ejectment. This conclusion is totally without basis, for the
private respondents never alleged in their answers that the complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the action being cognizable by the
municipal court. The only reference made in the separate answers regarding the
jurisdiction or the lack of it of the respondent judge alleges that the lands

occupied by the private respondents are portions of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, an allegation neither proved nor pursued at the trial.
Finally, the private respondents claim that the petition was filed out of time and
that the lower court's decision has gained finality.
Petitioners received a copy of the decision on January 30, 1981, and filed their
motion for reconsideration on February 5, 1981. The running of the reglementary
period to appeal was suspended upon such filing and resumed only when the
petitioners received on April 10, 1981, the trial court's resolution denying their
motion. The old Rules of Court, allowing an appeal from an adverse judgment of
the then Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals to be taken within 30 days
from notice, applies in this case considering that Batas Pambansa Blg. 4 which
uniformly shortened the reglementary period to fifteen [15] days, took effect only
on August 10, 1981. Under this set of facts, the petitioners had 24 more days from
April 10, 1981, or until May 4, 1981, within which to appeal the adverse decision to
the Court of Appeals.
Instead of appealing, petitioners filed, on May 29, 1981, the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
The Revised Rules of Court, under Section 1 of Rule 65, states that the special civil
action of certiorari will lie only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Hence, we reiterate here the rule
that the civil action of certiorari (or mandamus, for that matter) cannot be allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum despite the
availability of that remedy. In other words,certiorari may not be used as a
substitute for a lost appeal. 5
This procedural rule cannot, however, be strictly enforced when to do so would
result in a miscarriage of justice, especially when, as in this case, the petition is
really meritorious and the trial judge indeed committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, respondent judge's grave abuse of discretion was manifested in
three ways: (a) by utterly disregarding the compromise agreement of the parties
approved by this Court; (b) by holding himself without jurisdiction over the case
when in fact he did; and (c) by ignoring the survey report of the geodetic engineer
whom he himself had appointed.

It must be understood that this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeks not a
review of the lower court's decision but its nullification for having been rendered in
excess of jurisdiction. It is not concerned with the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision, but insists that jurisdiction is properly laid in the CFI (now RTC), and is
asking said court to exercise it in this case. It must be noted that the complaint of
petitioners was case.
To correct the situation, petitioner rightly filed the instant petition, a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which may be filed within a reasonable
period from the time the petitioners received notice of the denial of their motion
for reconsideration. In as much as a period of three (3) months is considered
reasonable, 6 the filing of the petition after 45 days from notice is definitely within
the allowable period. The petition must perforce be given due course.
The issue of damages was, however, correctly disposed of by respondent judge
who found no basis for the award of any form of damages" in favor of the private
respondents who were actually occupying portions of the petitioners' land,
according to the relocation survey result. This, as well as the finding that the
respondents who were found not to be occupying the said land should be entitled
to attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00 each, should not be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated January 19, 1981 in Civil
Case No. 1133-0 is hereby nullified and set aside, except the portions dismissing
the private respondents' counterclaim and granting the aforementioned attorney's
fees, which are affirmed. Respondent judge, or whoever is acting in his stead or
behalf, is hereby directed to issue the writ of execution prayed for by the
petitioners in connection with the Court's Resolution in G.R. No. L-38773 dated
November 15, 1974, and in keeping with the relocation survey report submitted by
Engineer Serafin J. Garcia on June 3, 1977.
SO ORDERED.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 164493

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,

versus -

ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 10, 2010

ANGELITO SUAZO
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

and

REPUBLIC

OF

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of
Jocelyns efforts.

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the
July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443,
which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found

another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282. [2] The reversed RTC decision
nullified Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a

ground of psychological incapacity.

petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to

THE FACTS

comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above

historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were

xxxx

residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went

to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their
parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to
Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and
they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelitos

parents

after

their

marriage. They

had

by

this

time

stopped

schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household
help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk.

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in

July 1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels
which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part
of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon
her every time they had a troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of
the defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking
which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to
the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started

from the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time
went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage,

will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got
married?

xxxx
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the
house.
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably
hired by Jocelyn).

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of

violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs
(sic) of violence?

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

psychologist testified at the trial.

Q. Even to other people?

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her

A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]

petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from
Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.

significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were
married.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent
before you got married?

A.

He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical

interpretation of his behavior?

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the

respondent during the time of the marriage the respondent is

suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and

severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and longstanding before the marriage.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given

by the petitioner?

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure
such because psychological disorder are not detrimental to men
but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who
have this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of
disorder.

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is

no pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner was found
to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship
with respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there

is a statement rather on the last page, last paragraph which state:
It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between
the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual
celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible
and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of
having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the
diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it
interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern and
responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and longstanding in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was
present at the time of the wedding and became manifest
thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain
what does chronic mean?

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it

has been there long before he entered marriage apparently, it
came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop
(sic).

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present

during the wedding or at the time of the wedding or became
manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, maam.

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled

on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated

without any employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of
the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of

psychological disorder (sic)?
Court:
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder
will not admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

Court:
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of
the respondent (sic).
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner
suffers a lot (sic)?
Court:
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of
marital relation to the respondent (sic).

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to

the parents (sic)?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was

separated by the respondent (sic).

Court:

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give

due respect more often than not he even shouted at them for no
apparent reason (sic).

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

Court:

Court:

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the
person itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of
personality affect the other party (sic).

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform

marital obligation?

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner

(sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not

the respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not have
peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and
one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as
housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner
never receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she
work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices.
(sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not

shown love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to

sustain the marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his
vices thru the petitioner (sic).

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of

Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing person. [4]

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
pertinently states:[5]

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M.

SUAZO, a petitioner for Nullity of Marriage versus ANGELITO D.
SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

[This pertains to Jocelyns]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

Court:
xxxx
Q. What are the vices?

[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above]

[6]

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached

3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4
siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic,
womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It
was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also
involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described
to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and
parcel of their day to day living.

The

Office

of

the

Solicitor

General

representing

the

Republic

of

the Philippines strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist
failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse

life is adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create
inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives
and motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socioemotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet
capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to
remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks

forward for a better future in spite of difficulties she had gone
through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life
that she set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her
capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her
interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her
tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping
mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends
appropriately.

hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the

law that a person may be considered as psychologically
incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would
render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation,
such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational
judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive
dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next
drink and the next drinks (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia
Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

REMARKS :
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the
testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing
that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with
the respondent.On the contrary, the respondent has not shown

love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being

irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all
a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the
misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one
year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein
the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At
pertinent Molina ruling]
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right
from the start of her married life with the respondent, she already
suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon
her and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a
relative of her husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and
because they were living with her husbands family, she was
obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is a
battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in
his (sic) husbands family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be

attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage, she and
her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage
by her relatives.The petitioner and the respondent had never
developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent
blamed the petitioners family for said early marriage and not to his
own liking.

this

point,

the

RTC

cited

the

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the

testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the
psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not
a Dr. Familiar]attesting that there is psychological incapacity on
the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore,
petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no

psychological incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and
conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a
greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using
the surname of the respondent, although they are now separated,
and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a
slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage
with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be
an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the
serious anti-social behavior of herein respondent.[8]

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated

by this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
THE CA RULING
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the
psychologist testimony quoted above] would only tend to show
that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological
incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the

guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court
of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme
Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the
fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that
medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the
totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos,
however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse,
children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be
sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any
evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental
and psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to

hold that the respondent was psychologically incapable of entering
into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of
marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife
gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is
inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent
may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that
they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that
was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist
that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she
got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that
the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced
into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not
under a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his
ability to engage in productive work and more stable relationships

with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one

of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not
present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were
under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the
respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this
reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca,
our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the
inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the
foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept
of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in
reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the
reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:

1.
The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as
it totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the
marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be
accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the
finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of
petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is
final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-vis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous;

Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns
2.
Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological
incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider
discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory
parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would
make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity
as follows:

marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

THE COURTS RULING

1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible

error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of

judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential

obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic
nature.

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these

criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of
psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which
gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes
psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on
generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a
marriage that actually exists only in name.

marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any

party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it

merely introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables
compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete
definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the
law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and
developed in jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals [9] declared that psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [10]

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or

inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In

other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer

necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and
its gravity, juridical antecedence, andincurability can be duly established.[15]

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases
then already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts x x x

construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the

latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge
the
equivalent
function
of
the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]

itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar
rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules)
promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently
provides:

Molina,

subsequent

jurisprudence

holds,

merely

expounded

on

the

basic

requirements of Santos.[13]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no

requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family

Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts

should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.

tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. [18] Te thus assumes
it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.[19]

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence
presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature
and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to
consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert

Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is

consistent with that of the Canon Law.

testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that
came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This
was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v.
Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a

case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a
marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining
the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that

its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was crossexamined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel

decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless

and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

Ting[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning

Molina,

it

simply

suggested

the

relaxation

of

its

stringent

requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency
with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the

Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: [21]

provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow,

been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and
be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the

particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach
thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact
that there are provinces where these experts are not available.
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now
be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.

of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own

facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely

stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the

abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at
other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration

of

nullity

under

Article

36. The

subsequent Ting

v.

Velez-

evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the

primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current

string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost
xxxx

on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to

the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance

of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is
no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.

marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party
at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent

as

to

deprive

one

of

awareness

of

the

duties

and

responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. [25] It

is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be
shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless

for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]

obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert

of Santos juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This

opinion evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation

is proof of Santoscontinuing doctrinal validity.

report that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the
psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect
manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn

The Present Case

whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must
evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the
application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e.,

As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos

that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the

psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude

psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that

based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were

is grave, severe and incurable.

compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the
appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that
a.

The Expert Opinion Evidence

this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination

is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the
oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of
a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged
psychological condition.

related to him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This
is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same

time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is

supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.

chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his
marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust
was not developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager

information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this
is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the

basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the
psychologists own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for
she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of
this finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed
knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing.

required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a

party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that
psychological incapacity exists.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why

and to what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on
the effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to
undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report
and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported antisocial personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more

chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however,

important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are

on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the

critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.

characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and
neither can they be found in her testimony.
b.

Jocelyns Testimony

marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to

be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report
and the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns

manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition

or illness.

testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to
support a finding of Angelitos psychological incapacity.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different
treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women indicates
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely

abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does

testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment

not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be

and the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the

evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest

marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no

psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this

signs of violent behavior,assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder,

nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of

during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with

the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns

him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before

account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this

or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these

evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related

beatings exactly took place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the

jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.

marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially
affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual
bases

we

now

find

to

be

clearly

and

manifestly

erroneous. Our

ruling

in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative
of

psychological

incapacity,

do

not,

by

themselves,

show

psychological

incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform

36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not
therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied

Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present
case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443.Costs against the petitioner.