Iran: A War has Begun

19

3
Irans Nuclear Programme:
Where is it headed?
Arun Vishwanathan

T he Iranian nuclear programme and its alleged military

dimensions are a vexing foreign policy issue. Despite, several
rounds of talks, not much has changed. In order to understand
Irans programme and its drivers, it is crucial to study the history
of the programme and the stark contrast in the Western approach
to Tehrans nuclear overtures prior to and following the Iranian
Revolution. The Iranian vulnerability to Iraqi missile attacks
during the Iran-Iraq War is a crucial driver for the regimes
nuclear efforts. Many believe that Iran is developing a break-out
capability. However, it is also clear that the Iranian leaders have
not yet made a political decision to acquire the nuclear weapon.
Any attack on Iranian facilities, is unlikely to succeed given the
dispersed and hardened nature of Iranian facilities. Moreover,
such action would ensure that the Iranian regime would press
ahead with developing a nuclear weapon. The more important
question to ponder is how Iran will behave once it has nuclear
weapons. Will Tehrans behaviour be similar to other countries
with nuclear weapons or will it lead the world towards nuclear
Armageddon.
Iran and the P5+1 are at it again! The much familiar song and dance
routine which the world has been witness to every few months over
the past several years has begun once again. In early January 2013,
Michael Mann, the spokesman for EU foreign affairs chief Catherine
Ashton, who leads negotiations on behalf of the United States, Russia,

20

Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics

France, Britain, Germany and China fired the opening shot when he
disclosed that the EU had proposed new dates and venue for a new
round of talks with Iran on December 31, 2012.1 To this, Saeed Jalili,
Irans chief nuclear negotiator and Secretary to the Irans Supreme
National Security Council responded stating that Iran had accepted
that these talks should be held in January, but until now, the details
have not been finalised.2
Not much has changed in terms of positions of the negotiating
parties since the last round of talks that the P5+1 heldin Istanbul,
Baghdad and Moscowwith Iran following a fifteen month hiatus.
The three rounds of talks had ended in stalemate in Moscow in June
2012 as both parties held their ground. The West wanted Iran to halt
production of its 20 percent enriched uranium among other things; Iran
on the other hand, hoped that there would firstly be some offer of
immediate relief from the economic sanctions and secondly,
reconsideration of an EU embargo on Iranian oil slated to begin from
July 1, 2012. In the end, it proved to be a case of the bridge too far.
Through there have been low-level meetings since then, it remains
to be seen whether the new round of talks will make any headway.
Of course, much depends on whether Tehran is feeling the bite of the
new round of economic sanctions heralded by the European Unions
decision not to import any Iranian crude beginning July 1, 2012. If Iran
is feeling the pinchas many believe it isit would influence how
Tehran approaches the new round of talks.3 In many ways, Iranian
approach to the latest round of discussions will signalat least to some
degreethe impact of the economic sanctions.
However, one must not put too much hope into the latest round
of talks. These are in essence talks about talks. Not much progress is
possible until and unless these modalities are ironed out. As Robert
Kelley writes about the recent negotiation between Iran and the IAEA,
The disagreement between the two sides is part of a broader
argument over so-called modalities, that is, agreements setting
the terms and conditions for the IAEAs investigation of specific
activities of concern. The main point of contention has to do with
the sequencing of the questions the agency wishes to address.
Iran insists that this had to be done in a pre-determined order;
after agreed stepssuch as a visit by the agency to Parchin
are taken to resolve each issue, the matter will be considered
closed. In contrast, the IAEA prefers to address multiple issues

Irans Nuclear Programme: Where is it headed?

21

at the same time, since many of the activities that the agency is
looking into appear to be linked. The IAEA also emphasizes that
since follow-up questions could be required to clarify specific
issues if new evidence emerges, it cannot tie its hands in advance
by agreeing to close the file. Iran in turn has complained that
this raises the prospect of it having to answer endless requests
from the IAEA.4

However, this brings one back to the charge much of the Western
and Israeli media levels against Iran. These talks are a faade that Iran
is employing to buy time in order to complete its work towards
achieving a break-out capability. Unfortunately, like much else on the
issue, things are not black and white, there are varying shades of grey
that have to be negotiated in order to find some semblance of truth
and an agreeable solution.

Looking Back at History to Understand Irans Drivers

Dong-Joon Jo & Erik Gartzke writing in the Journal of Conflict Resolution,
provide a very simple yet comprehensive conceptual framework to
identify and analyse the determinants of nuclear weapons
proliferation. 5 Dong-Joon and Gartzke view nuclear weapons
proliferation in terms of opportunity and willingness.
On the demand side, the states willingness to acquire nuclear
weapons is critical. Such willingness can be influenced by security
challenges as a means to deter external aggression. States desire or
willingness can also be influenced by domestic political lobbies or
coalitions and their associated economic development strategies.
Another reason could be the norms of prestige associated with nuclear
weapons and finally the personality factors of individual decision
makers.6
The supply side of this equation looks at states opportunity to
acquire nuclear weapons. This in essence assumes that a states desire
to have nuclear weapons will come to naught unless and until it has
the technology, resources and expertise to build them. In sum, whether
or not a state wants nuclear weapons is irrelevant if it is unable to
acquire them. Any or a combinationto varying degreesof the above
mentioned factors can drive a nations pursuit of nuclear weapons.7
Iran had a rather large nuclear programme under the Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The Iranian nuclear programme was

22

Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics

established during the Shahs regime with the 1957 agreement under
the Atoms for Peace programme. This resulted in the purchase in 1960
of a small 5 MW research reactor for Tehran University. The Iranian
pursuit of nuclear technology began in right earnest with the
announcement of ambitious plans to expand the nuclear programs by
setting up over 20 nuclear power reactors to generate 23,000 MWe by
1994.8 Given the state of the Tehrans relations with the West, these
plans received support from the US, France and Germany with
companies from these countries actively engaging with Iran to set up
nuclear power plants. In 1974, Iran signed contracts with US (6
reactors), West Germany (2 reactors) and France (5 reactors) for the
supply of nuclear reactors along with arrangement for supply of LEU
to fuel these reactors by investing in Eurodif and long term supply
contracts with France, W. Germany & US. In the same year, Iran also
signed a contract with the German firm Siemens to build the first
nuclear plant at Bushehr.9 In 1967, the US supplied 5 MW (th) HEUfuelled, Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) began functioning.10 In the mid
1970s, construction of two 1300 MW (e) nuclear reactors supplied by
West German company Siemens near Bushehr while another 930MW
(e) reactor was to be supplied by France.
Even during the Shahs regime Iran desired to have a complete
nuclear cycle. To this end, Iran negotiated for acquisition of Plutonium
reprocessing technologies from West Germany and some hot cells for
separation of Plutonium from the US. Shahs interest in reprocessing
was a major hurdle during the 1975-76 negotiations of a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement between the US and Iran with the US
opposed to such a demand. Such demands from the Shah raised the
first doubts about the intent of the shah regime.11 The reason for the
US reluctance to agree to the Iranian demand for a reprocessing plant
was that it was unsure about the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEAs) ability to safeguard the plant. The US therefore tried a
different tack by encouraging Iran to participate in a multinational
plant or return the plutonium to the United States.12
However, the doubts that the US had about the Iranian nuclear
intent proved correct when in June 1974, the Shah said that Iran would
get nuclear weapons without a doubt and sooner than one would
think13 Though the remark was immediately disowned, the doubt
about Iranian nuclear designs had been sown in the minds of the
international community. Subsequently, in February 1975, the Shah said

Irans Nuclear Programme: Where is it headed?

23

that Iran had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small

states began building them, Iran might have to reconsider its policy.14
Geoffrey Kemp has described the motivation for the pursuit of the
nuclear weapon by Iran as having been partly motivated by potential
nuclear threats from Israel, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and the Soviet
Union.15
In an interview to Le Figaro in 2003, Akbar Etemad, the founder
and first president of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI),
disclosed of his conversation with the Shah in the mid-70s about the
latters desire to procure a nuclear weapon. Etemad stated that the
Shah at that time had replied stating that it was premature to build a
bomb as it would isolate Iran and prevent transfers of nuclear
technology, but if in 10 to 20 years Irans security situation changed
or other states began to acquire bombs, the nuclear military option
would become a priority. In the interview, Etemad also disclosed that
based on the Shahs statement he had created a special nuclear research
team to give the country access to all technologies, giving the political
decision-makers the possibility of making the appropriate decision and
doing so while time permitted them to build a bomb if that is what
was required.16

The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and Initial

Contact with AQ Khan
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran signalled the death knell for USs
cooperation in Irans nuclear programme. In the aftermath of the
Revolution, the Khomeini regime put the ambitious nuclear
programme drawn up by the Shah on the backburner but decided to
re-start the Bushehr nuclear power plant in 1980 without German
cooperation which had ended following the start of the Iran-Iraq War
in 1980.
The eight-year long war between Iran and Iraq left a deep
impression on the psyche of Iranian political leaders. During the course
of the war burdened with a US-led arms embargo and facing chemical
weapon and Scud-type missile attacks from Iraq, Iranian leaders
realized the need for a strong deterrent. Richard Perry has succinctly
captured the emotions of the Iranians when he wrote The Iran-Iraq
war taught the Iranians a valuable lesson about the importance of
having a credible deterrent force of its own; Iran had none, and they
were extremely vulnerable.17

24

Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics

In October 1988, drawing upon the experiences of the Iran-Iraq

War, the then speaker of Irans Parliament (Majlis), Hashemi Rafsanjani,
spoke to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and called
for the development of nuclear and other unconventional weapons.
He said, The importance of such weapons was made very clear during
the [Iran-Iraq] war. We should fully equip ourselves both in the
offensive and defence use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological
weapons.18 Though he has subsequently rejected nuclear weapons on
many occasions, Rafsanjanis statement captured the impact that the
Iran-Iraq War had on the Iranian nuclear programme and its pursuit
of the nuclear weapon.

Centrifuge Programme and Re-starting of Bushehr Plant

Following the Iran-Iraq War, Iran began to develop an interest towards
setting up an indigenous gas centrifuge programme to enrich uranium.
As reported by the IAEA report, Iran efforts to set up a centrifuge
programme received a big boost with the entry of the Pakistani scientist
Dr. A.Q. Khan. In 1987, Dr. Khan provided Iran with its first set of
technical drawings for the P-1 centrifuge as well as some sample
centrifuge components.
Between 1988 and 2002, Iran made concerted efforts to achieve full
nuclear fuel cycle capabilities with achievements on developing the
uranium mining infrastructure, R&D work on uranium conversion and
enrichment programme. 1991 also saw Iran secretly import about 1
metric ton of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) from China. Importantly,
neither country reported the sale to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).19 Later in March 1994 and subsequently in July 1996,
Iran clandestinely took delivery of the two shipments containing
drawings and components for P-1 centrifuges from Pakistan. IAEA
reports indicate that between 1994 and 1999, there were as many as
13 meetings between Iranian officials and scientists and members of
the AQ Khan proliferation network. Iran reportedly, received drawings
for the more sophisticated P-2 centrifuges in 1995. However, given the
lack of proficiency and knowledge of the Iranian scientists to handle
the advanced centrifuges, work did not progress on the same till about
2002. Importantly, in 1999 and later in 2002, Iran conducted tests on a
few centrifuges installed at the Kalaye Electric Company using some
of the UF6 acquired from China.20 The year 1995 also saw the restarting
of construction work on the Bushehr nuclear power project despite

Irans Nuclear Programme: Where is it headed?

25

opposition from the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. However,

American pressure was successful in persuading Russia to halt
negotiations on the supply of an enrichment plant.
However, the centrifuges installed at the Kalaye Electric Company
were only the tip of the iceberg. In 2001, Iran began the construction
of a facility at Natanz and another Heavy Water reactor at Arak which
was disclosed on August 14, 2002 by the National Council of Resistance
of Iran (NCRI). 21 Later, in December 2002, the Washington-based
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released imagery
identifying the Natanz facility as a gas centrifuge facility.22
Subsequent to these disclosures, the international community in
form of Britain, France and Germany (EU-3) got together and launched
a diplomatic effort to persuade Iran to forgo its uranium enrichment
programme, reprocessing related activities as well as the construction
of the heavy water reactor at Arak. The negotiations resulted in the
signing of the Paris Agreement on November 15, 2004, wherein Iran
agreed to temporarily suspend its nuclear activities.23
The agreement lasted for about two years, during which time Iran
continued its research and development activities and manufactured
centrifuges. Subsequently in August 2005, it resumed operations at the
uranium conversion facility at Esfahan.24 The international community
has been negotiating with Iran on an ongoing basis, in order to
establish all the fact and clear the remaining doubts which remain
about the Iranian nuclear regime.25 However, as time goes by without
the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran making any headway and Iran
simultaneously continuing with its nuclear programme, the time for
the international community to prevent Iran from developing the
capability to break-out seems to be running out.

What do the Drivers tell us about Iran?

It will be interesting to view the drivers influencing Irans nuclear
programme using the lens provided by Dong-Joon Jo & Erik Gartzke.
On the demand or the willingness side, the brief history of the Iranian
programme highlighted Irans security challenges as shaped by its
history. These challenges influence and to a large extent design Irans
security paradigm. Important among them are, the shift in the Wests
behaviour towards the regime immediately after the Iranian
Revolution; and the Iranian vulnerability to Iraqi missile attacks as a

26

Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics

result of Iran lacking any credible deterrent, retaliatory capability.

Another security challenge is Israels possession of nuclear weapons,
its relations with the US; and Irans perceived fears about the Western
attempts at regime change in Tehran. Another reason which will
influence Irans decision matrix is the differences in treatment meted
out to North Korea on one hand and Libya and Iraq on the other. All
these factors will be factored in by Iran on its perception of the threats
to its security and as a result the possible benefits of possessing nuclear
weapons.
In addition, strong domestic lobbies led by the IRGC, which has
become increasingly dominantboth militarily and politicallywithin
Iran could be expected to push for a nuclear deterrent. However, such
a push is tempered by statements from the Supreme Leader stating
that nuclear weapons are anti Islamic. In fact, Seyed Hossein
Mousavian, a former spokesperson for Irans nuclear negotiating team
and the author of The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, has pointed out
in his recent article in The National Interest that religious obligations
will be one of the most reasons why Iran is not after a nuclear weapon.
Mousavian writes:
Based on the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameneis religious
edict or fatwa, the use of nuclear weapons and all other types
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is forbidden or haram
-constituting a sin, while being useless, costly, harmful and a
serious threat to humanity. Irans authorities were informed
about this religious view in 1995, eight years prior to Irans
enrichment program became known to the West. Leaving no
room for discrepancy, all Muslim Shia grand ayatollahs have
issued the same religious fatwa.26

It does seem the Iranian leadership still hasnt taken the political
decision to produce nuclear weapons. In a January 31, 2012 testimony
before the Senate, US Director of National Intelligence, James R.
Clapper Jr. stated American officials believe that Iran is preserving
its options for a nuclear weapon, but said there was no evidence that
it had made a decision on making a concerted push to build a
weapon.27 David H. Petraeus, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency concurred with Clappers view. Interestingly, this sentiment
was recently echoed by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) chief Lt. Gen.
Benny Gantz in an interview to the Haaretz. Lt. Gen. Gantz stated that

Irans Nuclear Programme: Where is it headed?

27

the Iranian leadership is composed of rational people.28 While stating

that Iran is going step by step to the place where it will be able to
decide whether to manufacture a nuclear bomb, the Israeli General said
that the Iranian leader in particular the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, had not decided as of yet whether to go the extra mile and
develop a nuclear weapon.29
Despite, all his bluster about wiping off Israel off the world map
and denying of the Holocaust, Iranian President Ahmadinejad could
be seen as more flexible than others in the Iranian regime. This was
exemplified in the fuel-swap deal which he brokered but could not
carry through in the Majlis due to opposition from the hard-line
clerics.30 In fact, as brought out by Ali Akbar Salehi, Iranian Foreign
Minister, such a deal for a push for fuel swap was met with a push
for more sanctions by the US, hardly the response Iran was hoping
for.31
Thus, currently, Iran does not seem to be speaking in one voice as
far as the decision to produce nuclear weapons goes. It is important
for the US and Israel to recognise and appreciate the existence of such
a debate within Iran. An attackhowever limitedon Iranian nuclear
facilities by US and/or Israel would change all that and lead to a public
groundswell for the regime and push the regime towards a nuclear
weapon option. Such an outcome is in nobodys interest and in fact
defeats the very objective of such an attack.
Moving on to the supply or the opportunity side of the equation,
Iran does seem to possess the technology, resources and expertise to
build nuclear weapons if it makes such a decision. The technical
aspects of the Iranian nuclear programme have been dealt with
extensively in the chapter by Dr. L V Krishnan.32
Thus, despite its security concerns and technical know-how, the
Iranian leadership seems to be vacillating on the actual decision to go
ahead with the production of nuclear weapons. It is however quite
widely accepted that Iran is most likely inching towards a break-out
capability. One could wager that Iran would choose not to break-out
or sneak-out though such decisions have their own set of problems.
Iran in all likelihood would develop a capability to produce a weapon
and unless someone like Israel and/or the US does something
irrational like launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities; Tehrans
nuclear programme is unlikely to reach its tipping point.

28

Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics

Like the Iranians, the Israelis too are not speaking in one voice.
Though Netanyahu has been pushing for a strike claiming that the
window of opportunity rapidly closing, it has not received wide
support from the Israeli security community. Meir Dagan, till recently
the Mossad chief publicly described the bombing option pushed for
by PM Netanyahu as the stupidest idea hes ever heard.33 In fact,
Meir Dagan has been joined by others in publicly expressing their
reservations over going ahead with a military attack against Iran at
this point in time. This list among others includes, Israeli President
Shimon Peres, Yuval Diskin, former director of Shin Bet and Gabi
Ashkenazi, the former Israeli military Chief of Staff.34

How Will a Nuclear Iran Behave?

Much of the debate and writings has focused on the drivers of an
Iranian nuclear programme, whether Iran will go actually nuclear and
how soon it can achieve such a capability. However, an equally
important question is as to how Iran will behave if it acquires nuclear
weapons. Will Iran behave any differently from other countries
possessing nuclear weapons or will it be an irrational actor which
triggers Armageddon?
The call for action against Iran is premised on the fact that Iran is
an irrational actor, one which cannot be predicted. Thus, nuclear
weapons in the hands of such a country would be dangerous.
However, as mentioned earlier, Iran has been described as a rational
actor even by Israeli top generals and intelligence officials. In fact,
Mossad chief, Tamir Pardo has even stated that if Iran was to acquire
a few nuclear weapons, Israel would not face an existential threat.35
Despite, its bluster towards Israel, Iran has shown no recklessness in
its foreign policy. In fact, the last time Iran used force against a
neighbour was over 200 years ago. This was during the Qajar dynasty
when Iran took military action beginning in 1803 against Russian
expansion into the Caucuses.36
The Iranian restraint in its actions in the Strait of Hormuz during
the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War is a case in point. Iran realized that closing
the Strait would be the military equivalent of cutting off its nose to
spite its face. Therefore, it exercised restraint by attacking shipping
primarily in the western gulf, closer to the Shatt al-Arab. Iran laid
mines only in UAE waters and that too not in large numbers. Irans

Irans Nuclear Programme: Where is it headed?

29

activities were confined to intrusive ship boarding and inspection of

cargo bound for Iraq. Later, Iran despite installing Anti-Ship Cruise
Missile (ASCM) batteries at several locations facing the Strait never
fired them at the traffic in the area. Importantly, these batteries were
not used even in the aftermath of the shooting down of an Iranian
passenger airline by the USS Vincennes in 1988.37
The above, paints the picture of Iran being a rational or at the
least, a pragmatic actor. This would therefore mean that Iran would
understand and appreciate the fact that use of its nuclear weapons
under any situation would be suicidal.
This image is diametrically opposite to the one that is portrayed
by the West. In fact, many fear that in response to an attack, Iran might
use its chemical and biological weapons capability or resort to CBR
terrorism.38 There are others who believe that Hamas and Hezbollah
respond to such an attack on Iranian facilities with an attack on Israel
with rockets and missiles which have been supplied to them by Iran
and Syria over the years.39 All of this might be so; Iran is known to
employ strategies to seek asymmetric advantages. However, none of
this is evidence enough to assume that once a nuclear weapons state,
Iran will continue to behave in the same manner.
Thus, looking at the manner in which Iran has shaped and
implemented its military and foreign policy, one could argue that a
nuclear Iran, despite fears to the contrary might not behave very
differently from other existing nuclear weapon powers. Though,
cloaked in ideological and religious language, history is witness to the
fact that Iranian leaders are pragmatic. They too are cognizant of the
devastating effects of nuclear weapons. Therefore, there is no reason
to assume that such pragmatism would not influence Irans nuclear
strategy.

Irans Catch-22 Situation

The problem therefore for Iran is the following. Iran is heavily
dependent on Russian and Chinese friendship to shore up itself
economically and shield itself against the international diplomatic
onslaught. Thus, it cannot afford to lose their support. Learning from
the treatment meted out to North Korea and Libya by the international
community, Tehran understands that the US-led international
community has different standards for nuclear-haves and nuclear

30

Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics

have-nots. Thus, Iranian nuclear capability would be credible enough

to deter American and/or Israeli action only if it tests, regardless of
whether such a test is successful or unsuccessful, as seen from the
DPRKs case.
But if Iran tests, not only does it loose Russian and Chinese
support, it will result in severe international recriminations and loss
of crucial support from China and Russia. Thus the political decision
to test will only occur if Iran feels it is invulnerable against such
pressures. So, how does Iran square this circle? The question to ponder
is therefore the following: What does a Nuclear Iran mean? Does it
necessarily have to mean testing, or could something other than that
also credibly demonstrate its nuclear prowess.
NOTES
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

10.
11.
12.

EU says Iran not responded to nuclear talks proposal, Reuters, January 4, 2012,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/us-iran-nuclear-euidUSBRE9030DA20130104
Iran: Nuclear talks with six world powers to be held in January, Haaretz,
January 4, 2013, available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/irannuclear-talks-with-six-world-powers-to-be-held-in-january-1.491922
Nasser Karimiryan Lucas, Iran feels pinch of new EU oil sanctions, Bloomberg
Businessweek, July 1, 2012, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/201207-01/iran-we-will-confront-new-eu-sanctions
Robert E. Kelley, The International Atomic Energy Agency and Parchin:
questions and concerns, January 18, 2013, SIPRI Expert Comments, available at
www.sipri.org/media/expert-comments/18jan2013_IAEA_Kelley
Dong-Joon Jo & Erik Gartzke, Determinants of Nuclear Weapon Proliferation,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, no.1, pp. 167-194.
Ibid., pp. 169-171.
Ibid., pg. 169.
Olli Heinonen, Irans Nuclear Ambitions and Future Prospects, Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, November 5, 2012, available at http://
belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/Iran%20nuclear%20ambitions%20and%
20future%20prospects.pdf
Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-weapon Proliferation in the
1990s, London, New York: Routledge, 1993, pg. 99; Leonard Spector and J. Smith,
Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Boulder Colorado: Westview
Press, 1990, pg. 236.
Following the Iranian Revolution, Iran entered into an agreement with Argentina
in 1987 to supply a new core which is fuelled by uranium enriched up to 20%.
Dafna Linzer, Past Arguments Dont Square with Current Iran Policy, The
Washington Post, March 27, 2005.
US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation, National Security Decision Memorandum 292,
April 22, 1975, US National Security Council, Washington, DC, available at http:/
/www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc05d.pdf

Irans Nuclear Programme: Where is it headed?

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

31

Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran: Nuclear Chronology, Nuclear Threat Initiative,

February 2010, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825.html.
Ibid.
Geoffrey Kemp, Irans Bomb and What to Do About It, in Irans Bomb: American
and Iranian Perspectives, ed. Geoffrey Kemp, Washington DC: Nixon Center, 2004.
Paul Michaud, Iran Opted for N-bomb Under Shah: Ex-official, Dawn,
Islamabad, September 23, 2003.
Richard M. Perry, Rogue or Rational State: A Nuclear-Armed Iran and U.S. CounterProliferation Strategy, Air Command and Staff College, 1997, pg. 11.
The China Iran Nuclear Cloud, Middle East Defence News, July 22, 1991.
Though China could claim that it was not technically obligated to report as it
was not yet a member of the NPT in 1991, Iran being a member of the NPT was
required under IAEA safeguard agreements to report such acquisition.
The introduction of UF6 gas into the centrifuges was a violation of the Iranian
safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regimes Nuclear
Program, National Council of Resistance of Iran, August 14, 2002, available at,
http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/NCRI/perspex-ncri-topsecretprojects081402.htm
Jeffrey Lewis, NCRI Did Not Discover Natanz, Arms Control Wonk, October
26, 2006, available at, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1274/ncri-did-notdiscover-natanz
Agreement Between the EU-3/EU and Iran Concerning Irans Nuclear
Programme, Acronym Institute, November 15, 2004, available at, http://
www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0411/doc16.htm
George Perkovich, Dealing with Irans Nuclear Challenge, Washington DC, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2003, pp. 1-5; Ivo H. Daalder and James M.
Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003, pp. 184187.
An interesting study on the current status of the Iranian nuclear programme
examining the efficacy of a diplomatic solution is available in Therese Delpechs
paper presented at the conference on Strategic Implications of the Iranian Nuclear
Programme organized by the Aspen European Strategy Forum, September 2224, 2010, Therese Delpech, How Much Time Is Left for a Diplomatic Solution?
presented at the Strategic Implications of the Iranian Nuclear Program, Berlin, 2010,
pg. 21. Shahram Chubin has authored an interesting study focusing on the
domestic support for the Iranian nuclear programme. See, Shahram Chubin, The
Domestic Politics of the Nuclear Question in Iran, presented at the Strategic
Implications of the Iranian Nuclear Program, Berlin, 2010, pp. 7281.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Ten Reasons Iran Doesnt Want the Bomb, The
National Interest, December 4, 2012, available at http://nationalinterest.org/
commentary/ten-reasons-iran-doesnt-want-the-bomb-7802
James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build
a Bomb, New York Times, February 24, 2012, available at, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/middleeast/us-agencies-see-no-moveby-iran-to-build-a-bomb.html?_r=0
This is something the former Mossad chief, Meir Dagan also stated in his
interview to 60 Minutes. Dagan said the Iranian regime is rational, though not
necessarily conforming to the Western idea of rationality. For more details see,

32

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.
38.
39.

Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics

The Spymaster: Meir Dagan on Irans threat, 60 Minutes: CBS News, September
12, 2012, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57394904/thespymaster-meir-dagan-on-irans-threat/
Amos Harel, IDF chief to Haaretz: I do not believe Iran will decide to develop
nuclear weapons, Haaretz, April 25, 2012, available at, http://www.haaretz.com/
news/diplomacy-defense/idf-chief-to-haaretz-i-do-not-believe-iran-will-decideto-develop-nuclear-weapons-1.426389
Brian Murphy, WikiLeaks: Ahmadinejad blocked from making nuclear deal by
hard-liners, Huff Post World, January 4, 2011, available at http://
w w w. h u ff i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / 2 0 11 / 0 1 / 0 4 / w i k i l e a k s - a h m a d i n e j a d blo_n_804204.html
Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran: We do not want nuclear weapons, Washington Post,
available at, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/iran-we-do-not-wantnuclear-weapons/2012/04/12/gIQAjMNnDT_story.html
For more details see, the chapter by Dr. L V Krishnan titled Irans Nuclear
Activities: A Technical Appraisal of Declared Intentions and Reality, which
appears in this book.
Mark Hanrahan, Meir Dagan, Former Mossad Chief, Says Attack On Iran
Stupidest Idea Hes Ever Heard, Huffington Post, September 17, 2012, available
at, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/16/meir-dagan-mossad-iranattack-stupid_n_1888840.html
Christa Case Bryant, Bomb Iran? Why 5 top Israeli figures dont want to do it,
Christian Science Monitor, September 4, 2012, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/World/Middle-East/2012/0904/BombIran-Why-5-top-Israeli-figures-don-t-want-to-do-it/Shaul-Mofaz-oppositionleader
Barak Ravid, Mossad chief: Nuclear Iran not necessarily existential threat to
Israel, Haaretz, December 29, 2011, available at http://www.haaretz.com/printedition/news/mossad-chief-nuclear-iran-not-necessarily-existential-threat-toisrael-1.404227
I am grateful to Ambassador KC Singh for pointing out the fact that Nadir Shah
also invaded (1738-39) into India during the 18th century. I am also grateful to
Dr. Masoud Kalaser for pointing out the fact that Iran also fought with the
Ottoman Empire beginning in the 1620s.
Caitlin Talmadge, Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of
Hormuz, International Security, 33, no. 1, Summer 2008, pg. 87.
Dany Shoham, How Will Iran Retaliate to a Strike on its Nuclear Facilities?
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 542-558.
Jubin Goodarzi, Iran and Syria, United States Institute of Peace, available at
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-syria