Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998

FEDERICO
C.
SUNTAY, petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge,
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents

MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue in
this petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes
respondent Isabel's petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's estate by virtue
of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel CojuangcoSuntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were
born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed
CojuangcoSuntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed
a criminal case 1 against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) 2 a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging
her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living
with their mother. 3 The suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no
effect as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the
record that the question of the case and custody of the three children have been the
subject of another case between the same parties in another branch of this Court in
Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third
party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is
willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the
defendant is awarded said sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of P5.000.00.

SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis supplied).

As basis thereof, the CFI said:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8,
1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under
observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr.Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as
1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown
marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July
9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic)
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without
sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the
neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in
reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). 5 (Emphasis supplied).
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died
on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will. 6
Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo CojuangcoSuntay filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 7 a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which case was docketed as Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the
legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the
estate. 8
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the
decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been
alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and

her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years
and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him. 9
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss
the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as
administratrix of the decedent's estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of
the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate
relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabel's father predeceased
his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by representation.
Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has
no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent. 10 On October 16,
1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 11 When his motion
for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998, 12 petitioner, as
mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as
well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a
special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was
timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabel's
parents "null and void" must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and had, in fact,
been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioner's motion to dismiss was alte having
been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary
civil action and that petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabel's
allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedent's son. She further
contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its
dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the
validity of the marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing declare a marriage "voidable"
otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the
Civil Code before they are annulled is "voidable."
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for
the
purpose
of
annulling
or
modifying
the
proceeding. 13 There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. 14
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted
thereunder, to wit:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent
laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate

considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an

ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and
the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of action against a particular
defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of the
proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs
qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
xxxxxxxxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file
and maintain this special proceedings, that in the case bench, the body of the
decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration
of nullity.
The oppositor's contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex "A"
Motion) prevails over the body thereof is not without any qualification. It holds true
only when the dispositive portion of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal
and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be
referred to for purposes of construing the judgment (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v.
Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive
portion must find support from the decision'sratiodecidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as
Annex "A" of oppositor's motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which
refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and
born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered
legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.). 15
The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate." The 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and
special proceedings. 16 The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a
motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides
that the motion to dismiss may be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint." Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioner's
opposition 17 which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after
respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and
petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but
also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on this
matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case.

In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof
which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The
legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is clear under paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically
declared that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that the legal effect
of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said
marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 18 of the
New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a
marriage may be annulled. 19
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed
never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of
the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages
who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 89 20irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is
set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the
law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal fiction. 21 (Emphasis supplied).
Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character
of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical
consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance." 22
Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and implications,
Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish; to do away with 23whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A
marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is
terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or
condition which already exists from the very beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision
which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void or
voidable. Such argument springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its
dispositive portion.

Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given
issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to
settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the
body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing, 24 the same is not without a
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is
definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction-which usually is "the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not of
record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is
based." 25
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the
decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to
the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. de los Angeles 26 the Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail." This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less
binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.
. . .The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so
as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and
reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part if possible,
and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the
provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864) [Emphasis supplied].
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that
the marriage is voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr.Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as
1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown
marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July
9, 1958, years after plaintiff's mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
xxxxxxxxx

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without
sound reason. The charges in this very handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives
more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). 27
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent
Isabel's parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal
consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of
the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule
just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court
setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of
seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including
respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation the estate of their
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had
predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the
courts of whether the Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court
adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities involved over the decedent's
estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to "all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme
degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision,
because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of
the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be
spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or
interpretation. 28
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISIMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID
NIAL,
ARCHIE
NIAL
&
PEPITO
NIAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?
PepitoNial was married to TeodulfaBellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have

no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that
the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion
of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is
why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the

marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in
the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

10

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly

11

valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that
their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties
to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of
action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED.
1wphi1.nt

12

SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.,
Puno
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

and

of

Kapunan,

the

JJ.,

concur.

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173614

September 28, 2007

LOLITA
D.
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.

ENRICO, Petitioner,
TRINIDAD

CATLI-MEDINACELI,

DECISION

13

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the
Order,1dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil
Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order, 2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad
Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. 3 They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. 4 On 1
May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor
of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 8 of the Family Code, which
exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because
they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony
due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under
one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed
Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the
marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground
that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, 10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme
Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on
March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a) 11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a
Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and
simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is
clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is
exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse
cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and
void.12(Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

14

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs
de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her
Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order 14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of
11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog, 15which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of
a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where
both parties to a void marriage are still living. 16 Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC
held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its
stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000)
in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties
allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal
and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section
2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and the
Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with
respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an
inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would
be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his
marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over
whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law.
The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially
when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because
the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage
will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death
of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the
death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the
(sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall
be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

15

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and
reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June
2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein. 19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question
of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the
Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the
hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse
to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of
last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. 21 However, it
cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its
failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents
posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the
right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we
cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 23 What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the
marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
1wphi1

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

16

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3
August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope
and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio
was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententilexpositore non indiget. When the language of
the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the
sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for
respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses,

17

not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity
of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA
Associate Justice

V.

CHICO-NAZARIO

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
Associate
Chairperson
MA.
ALICIA
Associate Justice
RUBEN
Associate Justice

YNARES-SANTIAGO
Justice

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO

Associate Justice
T.

B.

NACHURA

REYES

ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO
Associate
Chairperson, Third Division

YNARES-SANTIAGO
Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO
Chief Justice

S.

PUNO

18

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127406

November 27, 2000

OFELIA
P.
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

TY, petitioner,

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160,
declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia

19

P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support
for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a
civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977.
However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage null and voidab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on
August 27, 1977, was also declared null andvoidab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160,
praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no
marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he
was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity
of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April
4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their
marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question
this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null
and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his
church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts
therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4,
1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also
appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April
4, 1982.1
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein
petitioner null andvoidab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision.
It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second
marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and
void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of
whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for this
would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a
competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be
disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.

20

x xx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M.
Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab
initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of
P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4,
1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the
Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY
OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED
BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL
EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before
a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over
applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the
second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private

21

respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v.
Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a
marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But
the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be
read into the provisions of law previously obtaining. 5
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case.
Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the nowrepealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
x xx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs
significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving
a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the
Family Code,9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains
no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu.
Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death
of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage.
The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that

22

the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There
is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is
void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that
it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of the
second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in
proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And
since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the
second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We
exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to
FilomenaAbella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo
Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she
married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to
declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court,
expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:18
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of
judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings
in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family
Code.20 Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated
that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for
contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his
first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty.
Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a

23

person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential."
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),22 the
Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147,
148).23
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering
into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely
forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage,
we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and
all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation ofWiegel and the effectivity of the
Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that
despite private respondents "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could
benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony
wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in
the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner
claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a
marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license
issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred
when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She
argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due
consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of
marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and
private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage,
including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was

24

used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof
in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not
only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside
this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue,
but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we
cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA
calls "his own deceit and perfidy."
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although the appellate
court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying
petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her
claim.26
1wphi1

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present
case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which
caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from
her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation.27 There are other remedies.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of
petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND
SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as
monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as
they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

25

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

B.

TERRE, complainant,

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)

attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to
another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or
residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the
respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's
Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order.
In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977
upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain
Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him
out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla
and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that
his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with HelinaMalicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that
Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance
to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of MerlitoBercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the
fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been
abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital
bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5

26

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for
hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her
evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another

hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once
again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her
case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his
evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly
considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for
resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did
so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court.
The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to MerlitoBercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she
was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she
and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having
secured
favorable
advice
from
her
mother
and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in
1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from
his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found
out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp.
21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p.
23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case
No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against
respondent and HelinaMalicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where
a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant
filed an administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when
respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence
without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on
14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent
Jordan Terre married HelinaMalicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into,
respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of
nullity was necessary.

27

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy
and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the
respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will
follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage to HelinaMalicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted,
he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally
single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went
through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After
respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant
without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not
only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of

the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as
claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had
made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects
(Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he

made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as
he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from
complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the
Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with HelinaMalicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll
of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall
be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

28

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 204169

September 11, 2013

YASUO
IWASAWA, PETITIONER,
vs.
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN
IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the September 4, 2012 Decision 2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC denied the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner YasuoIwasawa with private respondent
FelisaCustodioGangan due to insufficient evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the
Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since
then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines
and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple
resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have
happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent
confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and discovered that indeed, she was
married to one Raymond MaglonzoArambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20,
1994.6 This prompted petitioner to file a petition 7 for the declaration of his marriage to private

29

respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article
35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary
evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
(1)
Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to
prove the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2)
Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond MaglonzoArambulo
marked as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3)
Certificate of Death10 of Raymond MaglonzoArambulo marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to
prove the fact of the latters death on July 14, 2009; and
(4)
Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by
the office pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that private
respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond
MaglonzoArambulo on June 20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the
authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial. 12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove private respondents prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while
petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner
who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioners testimony is unreliable because he
has no personal knowledge of private respondents prior marriage nor of Arambulos death which
makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and
Arambulo and the latters death certificate. It further ruled that petitioners testimony about the NSO
certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated
October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of the NSO records
custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office
was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public documents which are
considered self-authenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as
witness. He cites Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie

30

evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial prosecutor himself also admitted the
authenticity of said documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in accord with law and
established jurisprudence. It contends that both Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law
on Registry of Civil Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising from
records and entries made by the civil registrar and categorically declared them as public documents.
Being public documents, said documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of
their due execution and genuineness and consequently, there was no need for the court to require
petitioner to present the records custodian or officer from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG
further contends that public documents have probative value since they are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG
submits that the public documents presented by petitioner, considered together, completely establish
the facts in issue.
In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent indicated that she is not against
her husbands petition to have their marriage declared null and void. She likewise admitted therein
that she contracted marriage with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a second marriage
with petitioner on November 28, 2002. She further admitted that it was due to poverty and
joblessness that she married petitioner without telling the latter that she was previously married.
Private respondent also confirmed that it was when she found out that Arambulo passed away on
July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to petitioner about her previous marriage. Thereafter,
she and petitioner have separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
1wphi1

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in
the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor
the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, 16 which is
void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish
the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is
bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married
Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second
marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married

31

petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private
respondents marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second
marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first
marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The September 4, 2012 Decision
and October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11126203 are hereby SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner YasuoIwasawa and private respondent
FelisaCustodioGangan is declared NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are hereby ORDERED to
make proper entries into the records of the abovementioned parties in accordance with this
Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN
Associate Justice

S.

VILLARAMA,

JR.

WE CONCUR:
MARIA
Chief Justice

LOURDES

P.

A.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS

P.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO
Associate Justice

L.

SERENO

BERSAMIN

REYES

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
MARIA
Chief Justice

LOURDES

P.

A.

SERENO

32

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

MINORU
FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
GalelaMarinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

33

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.
x xxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x xx
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring

34

the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motuproprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x xx as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x xx which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motuproprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct

35

action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead
of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x xx A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x xx be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." 37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x

36

x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in JulianoLlave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody

37

of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lexnationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to

38

capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71

39

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouses right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x xx can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

40

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendentelite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino

41

spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lexnationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.
1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."

42

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

43

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189538

February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC
OF
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation
of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
1

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
4

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
before Judge MamertoCaliflores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in
HansaoPharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that
she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working
as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain
Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for
her to obtain a passport. Respondent also presented as witness a certain EufrocinaNatinga, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage
contract was forged.
6

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the
WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.

44

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the
court found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible
mistake.
10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1)
there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it
to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all
the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage
void ab initio.
11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration couched
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.

12

Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent
to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages
under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
13

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following
grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS
IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB
INITIO.
14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because
the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared
and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters personal
circumstances. In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. Thus, the petition
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding.
15

16

17

We deny the petition.

45

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a
question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does
not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. Here, the issue
raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in
effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a
pure question of law.
18

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then

46

the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since
the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
19

20

21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed,
it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of
the civil register.
22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and
she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she
claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into
such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO,
it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of
the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the
City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where
respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as
well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in
the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards. The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it
was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
23

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz
GalelaMarinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office that:
24

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage, support pendentelite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public

47

prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence
clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court
did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
Associate Justice

M.

PERALTA

WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO
Associate
Chairperson

J.

ROBERTO
Associate Justice
MARVIC
Associate Justice

A.

VELASCO,

ABAD JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice

MARIO

VICTOR

F.

JR.
Justice

MENDOZA

LEONEN

ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division
PRESBITERO
Associate
Chairperson, Third Division

J.

VELASCO,

JR.
Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

48

Pursuant to Section 131, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA
Chief Justice

LOURDES

P.

A.

SERENO

49