Aristotle and the Eleatic Stranger on the Nature

and Purpose of Political Life

Kevin M. Cherry

University of Notre Dame

This article argues that Book I of the Politics represents Aristotles critique of Platos Eleatic Stranger on the specific character
of political rule and the knowledge required for political rule, and that this critique produces a different understanding of
the proper division of regimes and the relationship between political theory and practice. These differences can be traced to
a more fundamental disagreement about nature: Aristotle sees nature as generally hospitable to human life and argues that
the natural end or goal of political association is not mere life but the good life, while the Eleatic perceives nature as hostile
and proposes a minimalist politics, aimed primarily at preserving life. Although the Eleatics view of nature might appear
to be closer to and more compatible with modern political thought, the conception of nature Aristotle presents in his Politics
offers richer possibilities for political theory and political life.

The Beginning of the Politics

ommentators often observe that Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics concludes with a transition to his
Politics. Because the investigation of happiness
and virtue ought to culminate in action, not just knowledge, Aristotle emphasizes the need to go beyond discourses which alone are insufficient for making people
good (NE 1179b15). The first step of such an investigation, he tells us, is to go through what has been well
said by our predecessors (1181b1617).1 Despite Aristotles clear indication that the examination of his predecessors will be the first step of his investigation, many
commentators suggest that it does not occur until Book II

of the Politics.2 There, Aristotle considers the regimes in

speech proposed in Platos Republic and Laws and those
of Phaleas and Hippodamus and then turns to examine
existing regimes said to be well managed: the Spartan, Cretan, and Carthaginian. Most commentators read Book I
as a sort of prologue, a necessary clarification of a certain
reductionist tendency. Yet, in the very second paragraph
of that first book, Aristotle disputes the opinion of his
predecessors:
Those who suppose that the same person is expert in political [rule], kingly [rule], managing
the household, and being a master [of slaves] do
not argue rightly. For they consider that each of

Kevin M. Cherry, Department of Political Science, 217 OShaughnessy Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556
(kcherry@nd.edu).
Versions of this article were presented at the 2006 Southern Political Science Association and Southwestern Political Science Association
meetings, where I benefited from comments by Daniel Kapust and Devin Stauffer. The editors and anonymous reviewers of the journal
helped to improve the manuscript, particularly in the first and sixth sections. Conversations with E. A. Goerner and David OConnor
have helped me to understand better Book I of the Politics. I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation and the University of Notre Dame for
supporting this research and, in particular, to Catherine Zuckert for her careful review of the manuscript.
1

Translations of the Nicomachean Ethics are from Aristotle (2002). For the Greek, I have referred to Aristotle (1988) and occasionally
modified the translation accordingly.
2
To be sure, almost all commentators cite the Eleatic as at least one of the thinkers criticized in this passage. However, most take only
Book II as the review of his predecessors; see Kraut (2002, 18384, 184n6); Newman (1950, 3); Rackham (1996, 642 n. a); and Voegelin
(1985, 281). The notable exceptions are Cooper, who asserts that Aristotle devoted the whole first book of the Politics to the refutation
of the Eleatics notorious argument (1999, 75), and Schofield, who emphasizes that in Book I Aristotles main preoccupation is not the
naturalness of the polis but rather the question: how many forms of rule ( )
are there? And the urge to reply: not just one but several
is the mainspring of the argument (1990, 17). Cooper, however, contends that the Eleatic abandons his notorious position by the end of
the Statesman and becomes more Aristotelian, and I disagree with Schofield insofar as he identifies the Eleatics view as both Socratic and
Platonic. Moreover, neither Schofield nor Cooper explains how Aristotle and the Eleatic Stranger differ on the ends of politics, so neither
is able to account for the reason why Aristotle takes the blurring among the kinds of rule so seriously that he begins his Politics by arguing
against it.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, Pp. 115

C 2008,

Midwest Political Science Association

ISSN 0092-5853

KEVIN M. CHERRY

these differs in the multitude or fewness [of those

ruled] and not in kindfor example, [the ruler]
of a few is a master, of more a household manager, and of still more an expert in political or
kingly [rule]the assumption being that there is
no difference between a large household and a
small city; and as for the experts in political and
kingly [rule], they consider an expert in kingly
[rule] one who has charge himself, and in political [rule] one who, on the basis of the precepts of
this sort of science, rules and is ruled in turn. But
these things are not true. (Pol. 1252a716)3
This is the claim made by the Eleatic Stranger in Platos
Statesman (259ad).
Such a claim is not unique to the Eleatic Stranger, of
course, as Aristotle explicitly refers to those who hold
such views. Similar views are voiced, however ironically
put, by Platos Socrates in the Rivals, or Lovers (which may
be spurious), as well as by Xenophons Socrates (especially
Memorabilia III.4 and III.6 and Oeconomicus XIII.5). The
Eleatic, however, puts forth this view more clearly and
emphatically than any other thinker, and it is likely that
he is the focus of Aristotles criticism, particularly because of the reference to the belief that knowledge justifies the claim to rule. The anonymity of the reference may
seem forced, but it is unavoidable for Plato himself left
the Eleatic Stranger unnamed.4
Aristotle announces his intention to refute these
opinions by investigating what the city is composed of in
order to gain a better view concerning the various kinds
of rulers, how they differ, and whether there is some expertise characteristic of an art that can be acquired in
connection with each of these mentioned (1252a1924).
Book I, then, ought to be read as a consideration of the
opinions of his predecessors, especially those of the Eleatic
Stranger, thus fitting within the framework of the Politics
as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics and suggesting a
greater degree of textual unity within the Politics than is
commonly thought.
Aristotles critique of the Eleatic Stranger remains relevant today. Aristotle believes that political rule and the
knowledge required for political rule are different from
3
Translations of the Politics are from Aristotle (1984). For the
Greek, I have consulted Aristotle (1986) and occasionally altered
the translation.
4
Aristotle is equally ambiguous in talking about the Laws. Simpson notes that Aristotle expressly refrains from explicitly naming Socrates in this chapter about the Laws although he names
Socrates many times in his preceding discussion of the Republic
(1988, 93).

other kinds of rule and their corresponding knowledge.

Contemporary political science seems to side with the
Eleatic: We often speak of international politics and
political economy as well as the politics of the family.
Such an approach implies that there is nothing distinctive
about politics as such; economic, domestic, and international relations can all be subsumed under the political. In
what follows, it is suggested that we, like the Eleatic, differ
from Aristotle on this point because we have a different
conception of natures relationship to human life than he
does.

Knowledge and the Kinds of Rule

Platos Statesman recounts the Eleatic Strangers attempt
to define the statesman for Socrates and his companions.
Taking as his interlocutor a young mathematician and
gymnast also named Socrates, the Eleatic begins by suggesting that the statesman is a knower, to which no one
objects.5 The Stranger splits the kinds of knowledge into
practical and gnostic, that is, a knowledge which is bereft
of action and limited to cognition (such as arithmetic),
and a knowledge which brings things that did not previously exist into being (like carpentry). However, before
determining into which category political knowledge falls,
the Eleatic makes two other arguments.
First, he observes that a ruler ought to possess the
kind of knowledge necessary for his rule, but many actual
rulers, in fact, fail to have this knowledge. Those private
individuals who have the knowledge appropriate to rulers
are capable of advising rulers on the basis of this knowledge and ought, therefore, to be called rulers. It is the
possession of the science which the ruler himself should
have that defines the ruler (259a78), even if most of
those who are called rulers lack that knowledge. Therefore, rulers are not identified by the possession of office
but by the possession of the appropriate knowledge.
This argument is followed by the Strangers contention that there is no difference between the kinds of
rule of the statesman, the king, the slavemaster, and the
household manager. He first narrows the range of possible differences by suggesting that there is no difference
between a household manager and a slavemaster, nor between a statesman and a king. Then he observes there is
little difference in point of rule between a large household and a small city (259b10); the only difference is one
of size, thus implying there is little difference between
5
Translations of the Statesman are from Plato (1986). For the
Greek, I have consulted Plato (1995) and occasionally altered the
translation.

ARISTOTLE AND THE ELEATIC STRANGER

despotic rule and kingly rule. There is but one ruling science, whether it is called royal, political, or economic
(259c23; despotic rule drops out and is not mentioned
again). It is only at this point that the Stranger returns
to his initial question of whether the rulers knowledge
is gnostic or practical. Both of the subsequent questions
have suggested that ruling is gnostic. If one may be rightfully called a ruler without having the power to rule, ruling
cannot be a kind of knowledge which demands practical
application. Moreover, having identified the types of rule,
the Stranger is able to argue that, insofar as a king can do
little for his subjects by means of bodily strength but must
rather rely on the intelligence and strength of his soul
(259c78), the knowledge of ruling must be primarily
gnostic.
The Eleatic Strangers arguments about knowledge
being the sufficient condition for rule and the identity of
the kinds of rule convince Young Socrates to agree with
the placement of statesmanship into the gnostic sciences,
a placement upheld throughout the dialogue. Toward the
end of the dialogue, the Eleatic praises him for recalling
that whoever has the royal science, regardless of whether
he rules or not, must all the same, according to the previous speech, be addressed as royal (292e993a1) and,
later, reasserts that that which is in its being royal must
not itself act but rule those who have the capacity to act
(305d12).6
It is not surprising that the Eleatic Stranger would
suggest, and that his audience would accept the claim,
that the true statesman must be one who knows. The
suggestion that political knowledge is gnostic rather than
practical, however, is more puzzling, particularly insofar
as the claims about the kinds of rule and knowledge as
justifying rule seem to be made in its support. Why, then,
might the Stranger want to make the claim that ruling is
gnostic? First, the disappearance of despotic rule from the
dialogue indicates the Strangers desire to oppose the view,
which will always have its adherents, that politics is simply
about power. If ruling is a kind of gnostic knowledge, rule
cannot be primarily a matter of force. The Stranger also
wants to deny that the statesman brings the citizens whom
6

Rosen argues the dialogue indicates the failure of the division into
gnostic and what he calls practico-production; the statesman is
also a producer (1995, 20). It is, no doubt, true that the statesmans knowledge may bring something about; however, that does
not mean the statesman acts with his body. Rather, the statesman is
said to be like an architect, who may bring about a building without ever using his body: The master-builder [  

] is
not himself engaged in work but is a ruler of workmen (259e).
Aristotle similarly observes that only the people involved with dayto-day political action are considered to be political, since they
alone act, as if they were hands-on craftsmen [  o

], in
contrast to the art of lawmaking [
oo  ], which is architectonic [    o
`] (NE 1141b2329).

3
he rules into being. He may shape or form them, through
education and regulating the marital bonds which result
in procreation, but he does not bring them into being as
a carpenter does a table. Aristotle, in fact, agrees with this
understanding: political expertise does not create human
beings but makes use of them after receiving them from
nature (Pol. 1258a2123).
Aristotle also agrees that the statesman possesses a
form of knowledge, but he denies the Eleatics three
other claims: that there is no difference among the kinds
of rule; that a ruler is defined solely on the basis of
knowledge; and that the knowledge of ruling is gnostic. For Aristotle, the types of rulepolitical, kingly,
household, and despoticare distinguished according to
the end of the ruling relationship: The initial relationships of male/female and (natural) master/slave are necessary for preservation (1252a2628), and, similarly, the
householdthe community formed by these two earlier
pairingsexists for the sake of daily life (1252b1214).
The village, a union of several households, similarly exists to secure nondaily needs (1252b1516). Political
rule, however, is unique to the polis, which comes into
being for the sake of living but exists for the sake of living well (1252b2730). Being directed toward different
endspreservation, needs of daily life, nondaily needs,
living wellthe kinds of rule differ not merely according
to the number of those ruled, as the Eleatic suggests.
Having distinguished the kinds of rule on the basis of the ends they seek to secure, Aristotle cites the
Eleatics position a second time (1253b1619). Here, however, his intention is to go beyond simply distinguishing
the kinds of rule and to arrange these kinds in hierarchical fashion. In particular, Aristotle wishes to emphasize that despotic rule, like parental and marital rule, is
a part of household rule. Aristotle separates the use of
slavesdespotic rulefrom their acquisition (1253b20
1254a17), but also subordinates both the use and acquisition of slaves to household rule. As the usage of
slaves is merely a part of household management, economic rule is not only different from but also superior
to despotic rule. Aristotle says in this context, A part
is not only a part of something else, but belongs wholly
to something else (1254a10). Despotic rule, then, belongs wholly to household management. This devaluation is especially important, for despotism is a kind of
rule which emphasizes powerparticularly power over
the goods and lives of individualsand which Aristotle, like the Eleatic, is concerned to undermine, lest it
lead to the despotic rule typical of Persia (1313b9-10,
1324b11 ff.).
Having shown that despotic rule is merely one part of
household management, Aristotle denies the claim of the

4
Eleatic a third time by observing that all the sorts of rule
are not the same as one another, as some assert. For the one
sort is over those free by nature, the other over slaves, and
household management is monarchy (for every household is run by one alone), while political rule is over free
and equal persons (1255b1520). According to Aristotle,
the kinds of rule differ not only according to their end,
but also because of the kinds of people involved. He uses
the three kinds of rule within the household cited earlier
(1253b110) as his example: While slaves are to be ruled
despotically, the wife ought to be ruled in political fashion, the children in kingly. The different treatments are
justified by the absence or presence of the deliberative part
of the soul, which the slave lacks, the female has without
authority, and the children have incompletely (1259a37
ff.).7
This passage again emphasizes the ignobility of
despotic rule, insofar as it is over those individuals who
are slavish by nature. Moreover, Aristotle instructs household managers to pay greater attention to developing the
virtue of free people rather than of slaves (1259b1920).
Despotic rule is something which economic rule disdains
insofar as it has nothing great or dignified about it,
and, so far as possible, the household manager turns
despotic rule over to others (1255b3337). Although Aristotle seems to make not only despotic but also political
rule subordinate to household management, he soon indicates the priority of truly political rule: For since the
household as a whole is a part of the city . . . both children and women must necessarily be educated looking to
the regime (1260b1316). The highest aim of household
management is fostering virtue among free persons, but
such virtue can be understood only in light of the polis. This conclusion recalls Aristotles first criticism of the
Eleatic Strangers argument: The kinds of rulepolitical,
despotic, economicdiffer according to their ends, but
they differ in such a way that there is a hierarchy among
them, with political rule guiding the exercise of economic
rule, and economic rule guiding despotic rule.
By arguing that political communities are distinguished by the kinds of people participating in them,
Aristotle also denies the Eleatics claim that knowledge
is the sufficient condition for ruling. The character of
the ruler is as, if not more, important than his knowledge: Now the master is so called not according to a science [he possesses] but through being a certain sort, and
7

Aristotles beliefs about human nature, particularly as related to the

questionable justification of natural slavery, have been the subject
of several recent articles, e.g., Frank (2004) and Ward (2005). In addition to undermining the attractiveness of despotic rule, Aristotle
also tries to improve despotic rule by emphasizing the responsibility
of slavemasters to provide an education in virtue for slaves, using
admonition more than command (1260b3 ff.).

KEVIN M. CHERRY

similarly with the slave and the free person (1255b20

23). Despotic rule can be justified only when one has the
proper nature to rule despotically and, perhaps even more
importantly, rules only those who are suited for such rule.
Obviously, Aristotle would agree that knowledge is necessary to rule well despotically, but knowledge alone cannot
justify despotic rule. To impose despotic rule on those who
ought to be ruled politically is wrong, for despotic rule
looks primarily to the advantage of the master and only
incidentally to the advantage of the slave, whereas correct
regimes look toward the common advantage (1278b32
1279a21).
Having observed that ruling requires more than
knowledge, Aristotle also explains that the kind of knowledge involved in ruling is practical, not simply or even
primarily gnostic. In discussing business expertise, he asserts that not only knowledge but also what relates to
practice must be treated. All things of this sort have room
for a free sort of study, but experience in them is a necessity (1258b913). In other words, Aristotle recognizes
that the kind of knowledge necessary for ruling well cannot be acquired only through study.
Business expertise, according to Aristotle, requires
experience because it deals with particular facts: the terrain, the climate, the demand for certain kinds of animals and vegetables. In this way, then, it resembles what
Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics about the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, or phronesis, which
involves making good judgments concerning some particular thing (NE 1140a2830). Phronesis is inextricably
linked with particulars since it has to do with action,
and action is concerned with particulars, the knowledge
of which can be gained only through experience and not
through study (NE 1141b1416). Indeed, it may even require the familiarity that comes with experience more
than the knowledge that comes with study, which is why
we often find that some people who do not have knowledge [yet] who have experience . . . are more adept at action than others who do have knowledge (NE 1141b16
18). But phronesis is not only necessary for individuals; it
is also a necessity for those who manage households and
handle political affairs (NE 1140b1011), and, therefore,
the experience on which it depends is also necessary.8
In sum, Aristotle argues, against the Stranger, the
kinds of ruling are not the same because (1) the associations differ in kind according to their end and not merely
by size, (2) there is a hierarchy among them, and (3) people
have different natures and souls, which demand different
8

Aristotle says phronesis is a broad genus, encompassing knowledge of what is best for an individual, a household, and a city (NE
1141b2942a11), which leads to the question, perhaps answered by
Book I of the Politics, of what the specific differences within the
genus might be.

ARISTOTLE AND THE ELEATIC STRANGER

kinds of rule. We cannot define a ruler based only on his

knowledge because whether one is a ruler also depends
on the nature of both ruled and ruler, and whether he
has acquired the necessary experience. Ruling, therefore,
is not a purely cognitive activity.

The Classification of Regimes

As we have seen, the Eleatic Strangers only condition for
legitimate rule is that the ruler has knowledge. Therefore,
it is unsurprising that he indicates one essential criterion
for distinguishing regimes, and it is equally unsurprising
that Aristotlewho has a more expansive view of what
goes into legitimate rulecritiques the Strangers division
when he offers his own classification: Now an earlier
[thinker] has expressed this view [a six-fold classification
of regimes] as well, though without looking to the same
thing we do (Pol. 1289b56).
The Stranger offers a division of regimes as part of
his attempt to distinguish the greatest enchanter of all
the sophists . . . from those who are in their being statesmen and royalty (291c35). He argues that neither the
number of rulers nor the way in which they rule is the
distinctive mark which identifies them (292c5); rather,
it is simply whether the rulers possess a kind of science
(292c8). The best regime is the only regime in which one
might find the rulers truly with know-how (293c57).
All but this true regime are ruled by pretenders who claim
to possess the science but do not; they are sophists who
merely imitate, as closely as possible, the best regime. All
other divisions among regimes are subordinate to this one
distinctive difference. The Stranger therefore rejects the
conventional opinion, endorsed by Young Socrates, that
regimes ought to be distinguished by looking toward the
forcible and voluntary, poverty and wealth, and law and
lawlessness (291e12; cf. 292ac).
If the city ruled by whoever has the royal science is
the one true regime, regardless of whether it is ruled by
law or by force (292e910; cf. 293ab), neither the number of those being ruled nor the number of those ruling
makes any difference, save for the impossibility of more
than a few ever possessing the ruling science. Not even the
relative wealth or poverty of the rulers matters, only the
possession of knowledge. Young Socrates is agreeable to
the suggestion of the Stranger, including the claim that
one must rule even without laws (293e89). It is only
when the Stranger intentionally provokes himby painting vividly the consequences of such a doctrine, e.g., that
such a ruler might justifiably engage in violent purges of
the citizens (293d48)that Young Socrates objects to
absolute and unbounded rule. It strikes him, as perhaps

5
it strikes us, that consent is a necessary component of
legitimate government.
Consent may be important for the Strangerindeed,
it is one reason why he admits lawful regimes are better
than lawless regimesbut it cannot be a defining trait of
the best regime. True rule is based on knowledge, and it
is impossible, the Stranger says, for a multitude to ever
acquire any art whatsoever, much less political knowledge (300e5, e9). To subordinate the true ruler to consent
would be to subordinate knowledge to opinion, which is
precisely the problem in the imitative regimes. In these
regimes sophists, who know only how to imitate, copy
the laws of the best regimes as far as possible, making use
of trial and error, or experience, rather than knowledge
(300b).
But this imitation, the Stranger warns, comes at a cost.
No law can ever comprehend precisely what is best for every particular circumstance, although law remainseven
in the best regimeindispensable for general guidance
(295ab). A true ruler should not hesitate to deviate from
or change the laws when he sees fit (295e, 296e97c). Such
a ruler can be found only in a regime of a few, small, and
the one, while the other regimes are to be set down
as imitations, some imitating this [better regime] with
more beautiful results, and some with uglier (297b9c1).
However, because imitative regimes lack the capacity to
recognize what is truly best for particular circumstances,
they must adhere to the laws as written. Any attempt to
maintain that flexibility appears tyrannical, because flexibility is easily mistaken for lawlessness (300b). Therefore,
unlike the one true regime, imitative regimes must never
do anything contrary to the writings and ancestral customs of the laws that have been established for them
(301a24).
Having made the fundamental division between the
true and imitative regimes, the Stranger now turns to consider the different kinds of existing regimes. He suggests
that regimes are ruled by either one, few, or many, and
each of these can be distinguished according to whether
such rule is lawful or lawless.9 But the distinction according to lawful or lawless remains secondary to the distinction between the one true regime and all others (302e48)
and becomes necessary only because of the conditions of
human existence that prevent the realization of the perfect
regime (302e).
Of the six imitative regimes, kingship is the best if
it is governed by good laws, but tyranny is the most
9
The Stranger initially seemed to deny that the rule of the multitude
can be further subdivided (291d), but his argument there relied on
the names of different regimes (291d11, 292a). He later repeats
that democracy always has one name but now adds that it, like
the regimes of the one or few, can be distinguished according to
whether it is lawful (302e).

6
difficult under which to live. The Stranger argues that its
by far the first and best to live in the first regime [kingship],
except for the seventh [true knower] (303b23). It is possible that one person could acquire some amount of the
knowledge necessary for ruling; his rule, when bounded
by laws, would best conduce to securing the ends of the
city. Without laws, however, the rule of one person is likely
to be tyrannical and extraordinarily burdensome.
Most people believe that no person could rule justly
without law, which is precisely the kind of rule the true
knower ought to have. In fact, the Stranger himself admits
that there is no king that comes to be in the cities, as we in
point of fact assert, whos of the sort that naturally arises
in hivesone whos right from the start exceptional in his
body and his soul (301d8e2). In other words, the quality of the true knowers soul would not be visible because
the body does not necessarily reflect the soul, as Aristotle observes (Pol. 1254b2055a1). Even if the excellence of
the soul were somehow visible, the multitude would likely
be unable to recognize it because of their lack of knowledge. Because of their close resemblance, all three kinds
of rule by one person look like tyranny (301cd).
Even if it is not the best, then, lawful democracy may
be the best which can be achieved, if we presume that
the same arguments against the rule of one would apply
against the rule of the few. Unlike the rule of one or few,
offices in a democracy are dispersed among a variety of
people, which means that it has little capacity for good or
for evil (303a). It will not achieve much, but nor will it be
burdensome. This makes it both the worst of the lawful
regimes and best of the lawless regimes.
But Aristotle, having argued that political rule is not
primarily a matter of knowledge, denies that there is a
regime based only on knowledge and offers an alternative
division of regimes and a different assessment of their relative worth. He identifies tyranny, the opposite of kingship, as being the deviation from the first and most divine
regime (Pol. 1289a40). Thus, from the start, Aristotles
scheme is compressed from seven to six regimes. Among
these six, he alleges that an earlier thinker has divided
the regimes in the same way, though according to a different standard, i.e., lawfulness (1289b57). However, he
charges that his predecessor erred in considering each of
these to be respectable, for no democracy, oligarchy, or
tyranny should be said to be better but merely less bad
than another.10 Aristotle again appears to be criticizing
Platos Eleatic Stranger without naming him.
10

The Eleatic Stranger praises lawless democracy as the best of all

[regimes] that are unlawful (303a7b1). Moreover, the Stranger
posits a sort of equivalence between the six imitative regimes, all
of which are not genuine (legitimate) (293e34), that Aristotle
rejects.

KEVIN M. CHERRY

Aristotle begins with the same division as the

Strangerrule of the one, few, or manywhich is again
divided into two. For Aristotle, however, this division is
based not on lawfulness, but on whether it governs according to the advantage of the ruler or to the common
good (1279a2631). When rule is for the common advantage, the rule of one is kingship, of few aristocracy,
and of many polity. Those which govern for the sake of
the rulers are said to be deviations [  ]

and are, respectively, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy

(1279a31). Moreover, Aristotle begins, as he so often does,
with what is conventionally taken to be the case, while the
Stranger almost immediately rejects Young Socratess approval of the common distinctions according to force, law,
and money (292a10). Aristotles distinguishing of regimes
according to whether they serve the common good has the
effect of legitimizing some existing regimes which are not
ruled by the true knower. He believes that the kind of
knowledge demanded by the Eleatic is not, in fact, necessary for a legitimate regime.
Like the Stranger, Aristotle modifies his initial division, but the reason for, and manner of, his modifications differ significantly. Whereas the Stranger classified
regimes not only according to the number of rulers but
also according to whether they were law-abiding, Aristotle distinguishes them in terms of the end or purpose they
serve as well as the characteristics of the rulers and ruled.
Immediately after the division according to number and
advantage, he points out that the deviant regimes of oligarchy and democracy are defined not by number, but
rather for whose advantage they rule. Democracy rules
for the benefit of the poor, and oligarchy for the sake of
the wealthy. Though it is almost always the case, it is accidental that the former are more numerous than the latter
(1279b3080a5).
Oligarchs and democrats are ultimately defined not
by their economic status, moreover, but by their concept
of justice. The former, being unequal in wealth, believe
they ought to be unequal in all things; the latter, being
equal in freedom, believe they ought to be equal in all
things (cf. 1280a7 ff., 1301a25 ff.). This is consistent with
Aristotles earlier comments that more than knowledge is
necessary for rule. Oligarchs and democrats justify their
positions by making claims about what they are, that is,
whether they are, or are not, equal.
Like the Stranger, Aristotle recognizes that some
regimes rule according to law and other regimes do
not. But, Aristotle insists, law or law-abidingness is not
the fundamental distinction among the six regimes. While
he concedes that good management does not exist where
the laws have been well enacted yet are not obeyed, he
emphasizes that it is one sort of good management when

ARISTOTLE AND THE ELEATIC STRANGER

the laws are obeyed as enacted, and another sort when

the laws being upheld have been finely enacted (for it is
possible that even badly enacted laws will be obeyed)
(1294a38). Aristotle admits that government by law is
generally better than government by arbitrary decree, but
he insists that the specific character or content of the laws
is paramount and that the character and content of the
laws will reflect both the knowledge and character of the
people who make them. Laws are necessarily poor or excellent and just or unjust in a manner similar to the regime
[to which they belong] (1282b89).
Because the content of the laws depends upon the
character and wisdom of those who make the laws, Aristotle turns to the question of what part of the city ought
to make the laws. The classification of regimes according simply to number is as inadequate as the mere division between law-abiding and lawless. It is a matter not
only of peoples knowledge, or their relative conditions
of equality, but also their relative levels of virtue. Aristotle undermines the claims of the few by championing the
collective wealthand, in at least some cases, virtue
of the majority over the few in deliberation and judging,
and by observing that the claims the few make against the
many can be made by the one against the few (1281a40
ff., 1283b2035). Unlike the Eleatic Stranger, Aristotle believes that the multitude, while incapable of full virtue,
may possess some level of virtuesuch as military virtue,
or perhaps even something higher (see Pol. IV.11)
and the rule of such a multitude is polity (1279a40
79b3). Aristotle gives the good rule of the multitude
a different name from democracy to highlight its proper
orientation.
Because political life requires a variety of goods, it
requires a variety of people who can contribute these different goods (cf. 1276b26 ff., 1277a412). Political life
is a kind of human community, and all those who contribute to that community are citizens. And because of
what they contribute, they not only make the claim to
some share of ruling, but they are in fact justified in doing so. Those who contribute the most to the political
communitythose who contribute most to the noble
actions of the city (1281a23)have a greater part in
the city than those who are equal or greater in freedom and
family . . . or those who outdo them in wealth (1281a4
8). But the observation that the virtuous should have a
greater part in ruling implies that the other groups in
the city should also have some part in ruling. This is what
leads him to propose the mixed regime, in which each
part of the city has its distinct contributions recognized
through appropriate offices. It is not merely instituted to
appease some part of the city; rather, Aristotle says, the
mixed regime is necessary because each part of the city

7
does, in truth, have some part of justice in the claims
they make (1281a910).
Aristotles mixed regime also offers a solution to the
problem, noted by the Stranger, created by the tendency
of the ruling class to change laws to its own liking. Because
mixed regimes do not allow one group to rule simply and
directly in its own interest, they also tend to be ruled by
laws that reflect some general consensus on the common
good. Aristotle is therefore able to praise the rule of law,
not that of human beings, as the best political regime:
it is lawscorrectly enactedthat should be authoritative (1282b23). Law is intellect without appetite,
while asking human beings to rule adds the beast, insofar as humans cannot but be overcome by their passions
in certain circumstances (1287a2831). This is, of course,
not as simple as it sounds, for Aristotle is aware of the
limits of law: laws are completely unable to speak precisely on account of the difficulty of making clear general
declarations about everything (1282b34). Virtuous individuals will be needed even in a regime of good laws, but
the mixed regime provides necessary flexibility in the laws
while avoiding the danger that the particular interests of
one group will dominate the writing of laws.
There may be circumstances in which there are people
who are preeminent in virtue relative to political leadership, and when such persons arise it is just that they
have authority over all matters (1288a1718). But Aristotle concludes that it does not accord with nature for
a part to be over the whole in such fashion (1288a27).
Though such persons may exist, their rule would not be
political, for political rule is of those who rule and are
ruled in turn (1287b38).11 Aristotles reservations about
the rule of one individual are connected to his earlier argument about political rule involving more than knowledge alone. Political rulethat is, ruling and being ruled
in turnis necessary where the multitude contributes to
the goods of political community. It is only when there
is an individual by nature so superior to the rest of the
community that the sort of rule endorsed by the Eleatic
Stranger can be justified.
Aristotles division of the regimes, then, differs significantly from the Strangers. First, because he does not
consider rule to consist essentially in knowledge, Aristotle does not separate a seventh best regime from the six
he divides. Second, Aristotles division of the six existing
regimes is based not on whether they are lawful or lawless, but whether they look to the common advantage. The
kind of rule, as well as the people who rule and are ruled,
11
No peoplepresumably including barbariansare naturally fit
for tyranny, as it is contrary to nature (1287b39). In Book III,
Aristotle says that even kingship is perhaps no longer appropriate,
given the development and spread of political virtue (1286b1022).

KEVIN M. CHERRY

are relevant to the division of regimes. And while both

Aristotle and the Eleatic Stranger recognize the limits of
the rule of law, they differ on whether the rule of law can
be the simply best political regime. Aristotle proposes a
mixed regime that can minimize the dangers of changing
the law while preserving the benefits of having flexibility
in the laws.

Consequences of the Different

Understandings of Politics
Book I and the division of regimes in Book IV are Aristotles only direct responses to Platos Statesman in the Politics, but the differences that emerge are so fundamental
that they have important consequences for the political
theories articulated in the two works.12 One such consequence of the different understandings of politics is a
different stance toward innovation.
Because he both identifies statesmanship with knowledge and recognizes that very few, if any, inhabitants of a
given city will have that knowledge, the Eleatic Stranger
contends that once a city has the second-best laws, it
should not allow anyone to question them. His understanding of politics as a science thus leads to an extremely
conservative practical stance. The Strangers discussion of
the rule of law concludes with a thinly veiled threat against
oneperhaps like the elder Socrateswho would question the laws of a city. Any regime which is comprised of
the wealthy and the multitude, i.e., the few and the many,
would be incapable of discovering the truth about political life. The laws that they do have were based on experience, and any attempt to change themsince it cannot
be based upon knowledgeis bound to be for profit or
private whim (300a5).
Anyone who questions the laws, then, must be considered a talker about highfalutin things, a kind of garrulous
sophist, insofar as he tries to imitate that which neither
he nor anyone else knows (299b710). Such a person will
be accused and tried on the grounds that hes corrupting different people younger than himself by convincing
them to act not in conformity with laws (299b8c1). The
Eleatic argues that those who encounter such a talker will
12
See also 1324b2240. A full account of the differences between
Aristotle and the Eleatic would have to consider in more detail
the Strangers discussion of the mean (283c85c). Here, I must
limit myself to the observation that on the Strangers account, all
actionsvicious as well as virtuoushave a mean, while Aristotle
locates vicious actions in the extremes. The Strangers concept of
the fitting (284e67), then, resembles not Aristotelian prudence
but rather cleverness (NE 1144a24 ff.). Cf. Lane (1998) and Rosen
(1995, 12627).

draw up an indictment and haul him before awhat do

you call it?court of justice (299c23). Platos readers
cannot help but be reminded of Socrates, especially when
the Eleatic goes on to say that one who is convicted of
persuading others contrary to the laws will be subjected
to extreme penalties, for he must in no way be wiser than
the laws (299c56).
Just as he questioned the legitimacy of rule without
consent, Young Socrates objects that if the arts were not
allowed to undergo change, they could not improve and
life, which even now is hard, would prove to be altogether unlivable (299e810). The Stranger counters by
arguing that to permit change in the laws is a still greater
evil than to forbid change in the arts (300a67). Without the knowledge of the true statesman, a change in laws
is more likely to result in a worse situation rather than
a better. It would, the Stranger agrees, be best if a true
statesman could be found and the laws changed to accord with new circumstances, but the second sailing
(    oo  ) requires that change in the laws be
prohibited (300c2).13
Aristotle also takes a somewhat conservative stance
toward innovation in politics, as is evidenced by his criticism of Hippodamus in the Politics for proposing a reward for those who discover something advantageous
for the city (1268b23).14 In contrast to the arts, Aristotle recognizes, all changes in the laws have serious costs.
Change in an art is not like change in law, he explains,
for law has no strength with respect to obedience apart
from habit, and this is not created except over a period
of time (1269a1622). Nevertheless, Aristotle recognizes
that some changes in the law could be advantageous for
the city.
Though there is no formal discussion of changing the
law in the Politics as we have it, there are hints throughout that Aristotle disagrees with the Strangers rejection
of any change in the laws. Cities often suffer from mistakes at their founding which will later require repair
(1302a17), and a wise legislator will be able to identify
the long-term consequences of change (1303b26 ff.). At
one point, Aristotle explicitly refers to a second sailing
13

The second sailing refers to the necessity of using oars when the
wind fails to move the ship. The famous Socratic reference to his
second sailingwhen he turns from studying the physical things
to speechesis Phaedo 99d1.

14
Hippodamus also offers, according to Aristotle, a fundamentally
mathematical approach to politics (1267b21 ff.), and as Rosen notes
about the Statesman, the mathematical setting is somehow inappropriate to the main topic of investigation (1995, 18). In the
Metaphysics, Aristotle criticizes a younger Socrates for abandoning matter in his definitionsa mistake perhaps typical of mathematicians (Meta. 1036b25) and which bears some resemblance to
the political theory of the Eleatic Stranger.

ARISTOTLE AND THE ELEATIC STRANGER

(again,     o o ) as what is required when the

lawgiver fails to constitute the regime properly from the
beginning (1284b19). While the Eleatic believes the second sailing requires adhering to extant laws, Aristotle believes the second sailing requires changing the laws!
According to Aristotle, political knowledge requires
practical experience. Therefore, he observes, better
regimes come to be founded only after people see the faults
of defective rule. One of the explicit tasks for political science, after all, is the discovery of how to preserve regimes
in existence (1288b2834). The Eleatic recognizes that the
rule of law itself was based on a kind of practical experience, trial and error. Aristotle suggests that the same kind
of experience can and should produce incremental modifications and improvements in existing cities over time.
Unlike the Stranger, Aristotle recognizes that the multitudes experience can be helpful in evaluating the possible
consequences of political action, which is why the mixed
regime makes use of the experience of the multitude in
evaluating proposals (1282a14 ff.).
This difference between Aristotle and the Eleatic
Stranger with regard to innovation and change in the law
reflects a more fundamental difference in their understanding of the character of political knowledge. Aristotles practical philosophythat of the Nicomachean and
Eudemian Ethics and Politicsis directed toward not only
thought but also action. While the Stranger begins by asserting that the science possessed by the statesman is gnostic, Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by proclaiming that every art and every inquiry, and likewise every
action and choice, seems to aim at some good (1094a1
2). But while theoretical sciences aim at the good of truth,
the practical sciences aim at the good of action (1139a20
30, 1140b410). Inquiry into the practical sciences aims
not simply at the acquisition of knowledge but at the improvement of our character and our actions.
Having stated that political science is a part of the
gnostic arts, the Eleatic tells Young Socrates that their
procedure has no more cared for the more august than
for what was not (266d710, cf. Soph. 226d27b). This
is, in short, a denial that their endeavor will be directed
toward understanding action, which would be evaluated
in terms of better or worse, not true or false. The perspective from which the Eleatic views politics is that of
a theoretical observer, not a practitioner. The Stranger
confirms this understanding later when he suggests that
the search for the statesman has been undertaken not for
its own sake so much as becoming more skilled in dialectics about everything (285d23). That the Stranger
is relatively unconcerned with political matters is visible
from his action as well as his argument: Unlike Socrates
who remains in Athens, discussing political matters with

9
the young, the Stranger travels from place to place, caring
less for the moral than the intellectual improvement of
those he encounters. Philosophy, for him, is and should
be separate from politics.15
By contrast, at the very beginning of the Ethics, Aristotle declares that the responsibility for not only grasping
the good but also attaining it would seem to belong to
the one that is most governing and most a master art, and
politics appears to be of this sort (NE 1094a2628). At
the beginning of Book II, he states quite boldlywithout
using his characteristic seems or appearsthat our
present occupation is not for the sake of contemplation,
as the other kinds of study are (for we are investigating not
in order that we might know what virtue is, but in order
that we might become good, since otherwise there would
be no benefit from it) (1103b2629; cf. 1179a35b2). As
Richard Kraut summarizes it, the end of the Ethics indicates that the goal of the Politics is to discover how the
polis can contribute to human well-being (2002, 378).
In Book IV of the Politics, Aristotle asserts that
the function of political science, though proceeding
in partfrom theoretical investigations, is practical: the
political expert should be able to assist existing regimes,
not merely to describe them (Pol. 1289a67). This sort
of practical knowledge depends, in part, on theoretical
knowledge, but the latter is insufficient on its own. Living
well, for Aristotle, consists in the proper identification
of aims and ends but also discovering the actions that
bear on the end (1331b2629). The excellence of a city
is achieved not by chance or fortune but by knowledge
and intentional choice, the putting into practice of what
political science tells us (1332a3132). The relationship
between political theory and political practice is much
closer for Aristotle than the Stranger.

Politics and Nature in the Statesman

As has been seen, Aristotle and the Eleatic Stranger differ
in significant ways, but at the root of these differences is
something only hinted at thus far. It will now be argued
that Aristotle and the Eleatic Stranger differ about politics because they differ, more fundamentally, in how they
15
The Sophist, which takes place immediately before the Statesman,
begins with the Strangers assertion that the philosopher, sophist,
and statesman are three distinct kinds of individuals, although they
are difficult to distinguish (Soph. 217ab). By contrast, Socrates proclaims in the Gorgias that he is the only Athenian even trying to
practice (and who thus presumably possesses) the true statesmans
art (521d78), indicating a close connection between philosophy
and politics that is also suggested by the notion of the philosopherkings (Rep. 473d).

10
understand the order of nature and the relationship of
that order to human life.
The Eleatic Stranger presents his understanding of
nature only through cosmological myth.16 Drawing on
the traditional Greek tales about the age of Cronos and
the transition to the age of Zeus, the Strangers version
of the story reveals less about the gods themselves than
about the human condition in the world. In the age of
Cronos, life was much easier; the god provided for the
needs of all humans and beasts, and there was neither
war nor faction nor savagery. There were no regimes or
families, and food was provided spontaneously, without
labor (271d72b). Because the cosmos is not divine, it
cannot always remain in the same condition, however,
and the god has therefore had to withdraw his care. As a
result, human beings must now fend for themselves until
the god resumes his divine care, which will occur only
when the cosmos is about to be destroyed by lack of order
(273d).
We now live in the age of Zeus, and the Strangers
characterization of human life in this age is the point for
the sake of which the whole speech set out (274b12).
When the god withdrew, the beasts grew savage and began attacking human beings, who were not only physically
weak but also without devices and without arts in those
first times (274c12). They did not have to develop such
devices and arts before this because their needs were supplied by the god. The need for humans to develop the arts
gave rise to the stories about the gods providing human
beings with instruction and education, but the Stranger
suggests that these are but storied gifts, and not the truth
of the matter (274c7). Once the god withdrew from the
universe, human beings through themselves had to manage their way of life and their own care for themselves
(274d56). Humans find themselves in a hostile world,
and it is only through devices and artslike, for instance,
politicsthat they can be preserved.17
16
Although I cannot discuss here general principles of what, in
the dialogues, should be ascribed to Plato, I think this particular
teaching of the Stranger is not Platos own because it is unique
to the Eleatic. As Zuckert notes, the Eleatics account is quite different from the explicitly mythical descriptions of the motions of
the heavenly bodies given by Socrates, Timaeus and the Athenian
Stranger, which emphasize the intelligible and thus beneficent
order of the world (2005, 12). However, Cropsey suggests Platos
cosmology can be found in the Statesman (1995, 12, 11621), and
Castoriadis argues the myth represents Platos depiction of a terrestrial world that, abandoned by the god, is doomed to decay and
corruption (2002, 16566).
17
Commentators are nearly unanimous in recognizing this aspect
of the myth as crucial. Arends puts it quite starkly: people need
other people because in the Age of Zeus men are structurally
exposed to the dangers of hunger, heat or cold, and war (1993,
167).

KEVIN M. CHERRY

In light of this human need to preserve and care for

themselves, the Eleatic sees, the primary task of the statesman is to keep the city safe, and any attempt to improve
the citizens must be subordinate to that task. Politics is
understood by the Stranger, according to Stanley Rosen,
almost exclusively in defensive terms, and the enemy is
nature (1995, viii).18 Because divine care has been removed from the cosmos (272b ff.), the Eleatic suggests
through his myth that human beings are weak and unguarded (274b9c1). Politics is about providing the necessary things, about the security of life. The Stranger posits
a hostile relationship between nature and man: Not only
statesmanship but all the arts are created in order to provide what nature does not and even to protect man against
nature itself (274c ff.). The paradigm of weaving which the
Stranger chooses to illuminate statesmanship (cf. 279b)
is thus perfectly appropriate: Weaving is a defensive art,
concerned with protecting the bodyas are the Strangers
other analogies for the statesman, the doctor and the gymnastics coach (279cde).
The right regime is one in which rulers employ science and the just (293d89) to keep the city safe and
make it better from worse to the best of their ability
(293e1). This passage is a critical one in determining
whether the statesman is concerned only with the preservation of life or also with the promotion of virtue. Insofar
as the Stranger says that statesmen must keep the city safe
but that they only should improve the city to the best of
their ability, it seems to emphasize the former task over
the latter. The promotion of at least partial virtue is necessary for the safety of the city, but that is not the same
as promoting the fullness of virtue, let alone promoting
virtue for its own sake.
Later, the Stranger says that good rulers are to always distribute to those in the city that which with mind
and art is most just, and can keep them safe, and make
them better from worse as far as possible (297a7b3). The
statesmans first task is to distribute what is most just
[o  o
], but the central question of the Republicnamely, what is justice?is never raised, let alone answered, in the Statesman (cf. Griswold 1989, 159). When
he laments that the legislator cannot write laws which are
perfectly precise in regulating the just and their mutual
contracts (294e10295a1), the Stranger suggests that the
laws ought to be directed toward securing justice in exchanges and contracts. As Aristotle notes, however, this is
only one part of justice (NE 1129a30 ff.). It is the sort of
18

Even so, Rosen eventually argues that while politics is oriented

towards the body . . . philosophy, or the genuine art of statesmanship, is oriented toward the soul (1995, 162). Such a claim overlooks the Eleatics distinction between philosopher and statesman
(Soph. 217b14).

11

ARISTOTLE AND THE ELEATIC STRANGER

justice guaranteed by a league, which neither is a political

community in the fullest sense nor makes its citizens just
(Pol. 1280b20 ff.).19
Likewise, by saying that a statesman should make
them [those in the city] better from worse as far as possible, the Stranger subordinates the attempt to improve
the character of the citizens to the tasks of distributing justice and keeping them safe. Because of the limited sense
of justice noted above and the subordination of improvement to safety, it seems that keeping the citizens safe is
the primary task of the statesman, paramount for the
Strangers conception of political science. We should not
be surprised, for the physical analogies of the physician,
trainer, and weaverhowever Socratic they appearall
deal with the care and protection of the body. Even the
metaphor of the ship captain is limited to this minimalist
approach: The good captain keeps his fellow sailors safe
and sound (297a2).20
The Stranger describes the particular task of the
statesman as weaving together the opposite characters of
the manly and moderate so as to preserve the city. Again,
however, although part of his weaving is the superintendence of education and the exiling of those who are unable
to be educated, this education is not directed at the improvement of souls for their own sake.21 Rather, he is to
use divine bonds, which are true opinion with steadfastness about the beautiful, just, and good things (309c56),
to bind the city together to the extent possible.
Although many commentators (e.g., Rowe 1995;
Weiss 1995) suggest that this passage shows that the Eleatic
Stranger, like Socrates and the Athenian Stranger, envisions the statesman as responsible for the care of souls,
this conclusion is unsupported by the text.22 At no point
in the dialogue does the Stranger suggest that it is the duty
of the statesman or king to care for the souls of the citizens. In fact, the word soul [   ]
appears rarely (four
19

Stern notes that an association for mutual exchange focused on

the needs of the body which all share (1997, 269) involves a limited
sense of justice and politics, but he argues that the statesman will
go beyond this and be concerned with the just, noble, and good
(270).

20
Although it conflicts with the standard, Platonic reading of the
dialogue, several commentators (e.g., Arends 1993; Griswold 1989;
Kochin 1999; Scodel 1987; Zuckert 2005) have noted this lowering
of the horizons of political life.
21
Young Socrates no longer objects to the use of the purge (cf.
293d4e9 with 308e99a4).
22
There is, of course, a hint that the improvement of soulsat least,
of souls for their own sakeis not to be accomplished by the statesman or anyone under his supervision, but rather the philosopher:
The Stranger has improved Young Socratess skills at dialectic (cf.
285d) and inclined him away from becoming involved with politics
(cf. 299b ff.).

times) in the context of the statesmans weaving of moder

ate and manly; the terms character [ o]
and nature
[ ] are used more frequently. More importantly, to
the extent that statesmanship is concerned about the soul
and virtue, it is for the sake of the citys preservation and
not for the sake of improving individuals.23 That is why the
Stranger is content with fostering true opinion rather
than knowledge about courage and moderation; the virtue
that the statesman fosters in citizens is merely political, in
both its content (opinion, not knowledge) and its end (the
city, not the individual). Even Weiss concedes the statesmans concern for the soul is limited to what is necessary
for the city: The weaver paradigm is in its essence Socratic, as it assigns to the weaver direct concern with the
just, beautiful, and holythough the weaver is concerned
with these as they pertain not only to individual souls but
to the polis as a whole (1995, 222, emphasis added). The
bold claim of the Athenian Strangerthat politics is the
art which cares for souls (Leg. 650b)is nowhere echoed
by his Eleatic counterpart.
By contrast, positing the end of statesmanship as mere
survival is not only consistent with the text but also allows
us to understand the reasoning underlying the first, and
perhaps most puzzling, claim of the Eleatic Stranger: All
of the associationsdespotic, household, political, and
royalare dedicated to the preservation of life. There is
no difference between their ends but only the number of
people within the association.

Politics and Nature in Aristotle

Like the Eleatic Stranger, Aristotle connects his understanding of politics with his understanding of nature.
And while he does not make use of myths, he fails to
give a comprehensive account of how he understands nature, particularly in his practical philosophy. However,
he does offer remarks that, when taken together, indicate
an understanding of naturein particular, natures relationship to human lifevery different from that of the
Stranger. Aristotle sees nature as an orderly arrangement
hospitable, rather than hostile, to human life; this allows
him to have higher hopes and expectations for political
life.
Aristotle introduces nature early in the Politics,
shortly after he cites the opinion of the Eleatic Stranger,
and explains that he will begin by analyzing how things
23

Rosen observes that the Statesman treats politics from the standpoint of the body and this concluding treatment of the statesmans
weaving is no different: the soul is treated as if it were a body, or
as material for the construction of the artifact (1995, 68).

12
develop naturally from the beginning (1252a24). He
traces the development of human communities, from the
first partnerships of male and female and (natural) master
and slave, through the household and village, to the polis,
which while coming into being for the sake of living, it
exists for the sake of living well (1252b2930). In addition to emphasizing that the polis has an end different in
kind, not degree, from the other partnerships, Aristotle
wants to deny that political rule is artificial and merely
conventional. He thus argues that every polis . . . exists
by nature, developing out of the earlier communities
(1252b30; cf. 1253a2).24 The polis exists as the culmination, or perfection [ o],

of those earlier communities,

and nature herself, by granting human beings the unique
capacity for deliberating about the just and advantageous,
provides both the impetus and capacity for that development (cf. Miller 1995, 30 ff.).
But such development would be unlikely, if not impossible, if the earlier human communities were not able
to achieve an ever-increasing amount of self-sufficiency
[ 
].25 This sufficiency, Aristotle argues, is made
possible not only by human effort but also by a hospitable
nature. He believes that there exists a hierarchical teleology in the order of nature such that plants are made for
the sake of certain animals, and that someif not allof
these animals are for the sake of human beings (1256b15
23; cf. 1258a35). We may use some of these for food,
others for tools, and others for necessary materialsfor
instance, to take an appropriately Eleatic example, sheep
for the wool necessary for weaving cloaks.
The fundamental political problem, according to
Aristotle, is distinguishing the rulers from the ruled
(1332b23 ff.). In contrast to his more negative suggestion in Book I, Aristotle claims that nature has provided
the distinction by making that which is the same by type
have a younger and an older element, of which it is proper
for the former to be ruled and the latter to rule (1332b35
ff.). Young citizens, endowed with strength, are well suited
for military service, which enables them to acquire the
necessary experience of being ruled before they become
rulers. Having gained experience in practical matters, they
will develop the necessary prudence to deliberate well regarding the advantageous and judge justly in their middle
24
Commentators disagree about the status of Aristotles argument

that every polis exists by nature [ 

 o
   

]. For
an overview of the literature, as well as a robust defense of Aristotles
claim, see Cherry and Goerner (2006).
25

Strauss says, Man would not be capable of happiness if the whole

of which he is a part were not friendly to him. Man could not live
if nature did not supply him with food and his other wants: nature
has made, if not all animals, at least most of them for the sake of
man (1964, 4142).

KEVIN M. CHERRY

age (1329a2 ff.). Later in life, they will serve as priests,

for it would be improper for anyone other than citizens
to honor the gods (1329a26 ff.). The natural growth of
human beingsin soul and intellect as well as body
provides the necessary distinctions so that a polis can be
harmoniously arranged.26
To be sure, Aristotle recognizes that nature, in fact,
can fail to achieve her intentions and that these failures
can have pernicious consequences for human life.27 What
is significant, however, is that Aristotle describes these as
failures. The implication, then, is that when nature does
achieve her purposes, it is in such a way as to be hospitable
toward human life.
According to Aristotle, therefore, nature is far from
hostile toward human life. Rather, it is generally hospitable
to human life and so makes possible a human community which can be concerned with something more than
the merely necessary. This community is the polis, a compound of families and villages which enables human beings to live happily and finely . . . for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together (1280b4081a3).
The political ruler is therefore to legislate for the goods
of both body and soul, but particularly for the goods of
the soul (1333a3740). Indeed, legislation for the goods
of the body, while necessary, is for the sake of the good of
the soul (1334b2428). Associations which are solely for
the bodily goodssuch as those which defend each other
26

There is reason to believe that Aristotles understanding of nature

as hospitable to human life is not simply a rhetorical device employed in the practical works, as is implied by Salkever (1990, 49).
Simpson dismisses those interpretations that deny Aristotles teleological understanding of nature (1998, 49 n65; 489). Saunders
believes a good case can be made for a grand universal anthropocentric teleology in Aristotle (1995, 86). Such a case is made by
Sedley, who, on the basis of the Politics, Physics, and Metaphysics, argues that Aristotles teleology is ultimately anthropocentric (1991,
179)not in the sense that human beings are the ultimate object
of aspiration of the universe, but rather that man is the ultimate
beneficiary of the order therein (180). He concludes that mans
naturally harmonious relation with his local environment is an inherent feature of an eternal natural order (187), which he characterizes as an anthropocentric cosmic order (190). See also Cooper
(1982) and Metaphysics XII.10. Johnson, by contrast, rejects applying teleology to relationships between organisms (2005, 244).
Finding Book I of the Politics to be a failed application of teleology
to political organization (288), he concludes Aristotles teleology
is most successful on the level of the explanation of the organism
(287). Putting aside his unsatisfactory reading of Book I, even Johnson concedes that the arrangement of nature is such that all the
different kinds can co-exist: their needs are not generally mutually
exclusive (283).

27
See, for instance, Pol. 1254a2632, 1258a41, 1337a12. Pol.
1255b34 is a more difficult example; Aristotle here suggests that
nature often fails to achieve her purposebut the passage involves
human reproduction, which is governed not by biological necessity
alone but also by human deliberation (or the lack thereof). Cf. Pol.
1334b29 ff.

ARISTOTLE AND THE ELEATIC STRANGER

(1280b910, 2526) or promote commerce (1280b2123,

31)are not truly cities (1280b78). Such cities may guarantee just things in exchanges but they do not make
the citizens good and just (1280b1113). Rather, the
city must exist primarily for the sake of living well
(1280a32), and this is why people strive to live together
even when they have no need of assistance from one another (1278b1920). By contrast, the Eleatic Stranger
indicates that in the Age of Cronos, when there was no
human neediness, there were no political communities
[o ] (271e8).
If nature were as hostile as the Eleatic portrays it, it
would be difficult to understand how human life could
transcend the necessary in pursuit of the noble. We nevertheless live in a world in which modern science has
largely displaced Aristotles understanding of an ordered
cosmos. How then can we understand or maintain a view
of politics as anything more than a means of collective
self-preservation? In order to provide a basis for a nobler understanding of political life, Stephen Salkever has
attempted to provide a defense of Aristotelian teleology
on the level of individual species that is not inextricably bound to a false cosmology (1990, 39; cf. 49 ff.). He
argues that Aristotles concept of the human good is
dependent not upon assumptions about the world that
are no longer tenable, but rather a way of life that is
definitive or normal for us as a species. This conception
of the good requires no more than accepting that individuals are members of a species, a group defined by
certain norms that are really there in nature and discovered through empirical inquiry (53). He suggests such a
view of nature is more consonant with Aristotelian ethics
and politics than a deterministic cosmological teleology
which would rigidly override the problematic character of most important human choices (39). However,
Salkever himself admits that contemporary critics would
quite correctly allege that Aristotles approach to political life is one which presupposes a particular conception of human nature and nature simply (58, emphasis
added).28 And it is not so clear that human nature can be
separated from the broader nature simply of which it is
a part.
One of the traits which typify human nature is, according to Aristotle, a natural desire to know (Meta. I.1).
This desire is satisfied by the acquisition and use of the
intellectual virtues, whose exercise is frequently presented
as the highest form of human activity (e.g., NE 1177a12

13
ff.). And it may be impossible to defend Aristotles contention that perhaps the highest form of human existence
is this bios theoretikos, i.e., the contemplation of eternal
beings, without defending his teleological cosmology.29 In
the Ethics Aristotle maintains that there are things which
are known by necessity and therefore must be everlasting (1139b22). Wisdom is said to be knowledge of the
highest things in the cosmos (1141a25), which are most
honorable in their natures (1141b3); it is, therefore, the
most precise kind of knowledge (1141a17). (By contrast,
as we have seen, the Eleatic Stranger denies that the cosmos is ever in the same condition.) Aristotelian philosophy depends, then, on a conception of the heavenly bodies
as eternal and orderly and so capable of apprehension by
human reason.
More pertinently, as Aristotle makes clear in the Politics, human life cannot be discussed in isolation from
the rest of nature. Human beings, although they have a
nature particular to their species, are a part of the natural world in which they reside, and Aristotle always discusses them in that light. The natural environment in
which humans find themselves is significant for the way
of life they choose to pursue as a community. Salkever
fears that a teleological conception of nature might remove the problematic, and so political, characteristics of
human choice. However, nature does no more than determine the framework in which human choice occurs,
but that framework makes possible human flourishing.
Although nature provides adequate resources for human
life, humansunlike animals (1256a25)are required
to choose how to put those resources to use (1256b110,
1332b35, cf. NE 1152b261153a15, 1154b2131). Deliberation about the way in which it is best for particular
communities to do so is, after all, one of the hallmarks of
human speech (1253a919, 1255b3056b5). In this way,
then, Aristotles conception of the hospitable relationship
between nature and humanity is in the mean between the
extremes as depicted by the Eleatic Stranger in the Age of
Cronos on the one hand and the Age of Zeus on the other.
To be sure, not all modern thinkers would accept such
a hospitable view of nature; but neither, as we have seen,
did all ancient philosophers. Obviously, people who believe in a benevolent creator would accept such a cosmology. From a secular and scientific perspective, however,
it may be more important to observe that such a hospitable view of nature also animates much contemporary
environmentalism. Like Aristotle, environmentalists now
argue that the earth would provide for us quite adequately

28

Salkever argues that the background conception of human nature on which Aristotles social science rests is superior to contemporary alternatives; he does not, as far as I can tell, answer the larger
question of how Aristotle conceives of nature simply (1990, 59).

29
Salkever acknowledges that Aristotle emphasizes the theoretical
life as part of the good life, although he claims that Aristotle is not
at all precise with regard to its content (1990, 78).

14

KEVIN M. CHERRY

if we were willing to limit our desires and acquisitions.

The problems arise from a widespread inability to distinguish between the kind of acquisition or use that is both
natural and necessary and the unlimited kind of acquisition or expropriation contrary to natureprecisely the
topic discussed in Book I of the Politics.30

Conclusion
Aristotles critique of the Eleatic, then, flows from his fundamentally different beliefs about nature. Indeed, the differences go deeper than beliefs about human nature and
are rooted in different conceptions of nature in its broadest sense. For Aristotle, the statesman differs from the
household manager and the despot insofar as the former
deals with political life, which is directed toward the noble
and not merely the necessary. The associations of household and village are necessary to secure the goods required
for life, but because nature is hospitable these associations
are able to develop into the political community, in which
the necessary can be transcended in pursuit of the noble.
The Eleatic, because of the overwhelming threat posed
by hostile nature, sees only necessity in all forms of rule
and thus does not distinguish among them or their ends.
Aristotles emphasis on the end of regimes, not their mere
form, accords with his view that regimes can not only
preserve life but can also promote the good life.
Likewise, the Eleaticconcerned only with the
preservation of lifeis more skeptical of change in the
laws than is Aristotle, who is concerned with the quality
of life of the polis. And because the ends of political life
are so low, the Eleatic remains above and uninterested in
politics. Aristotle, on the other hand, sees inherent nobility in political life, which is why he is concerned with its
actuality and not merely in its ideal form or as an object
of abstract inquiry. This difference explains why Aristotle
opens the Politics with a critique of the Eleatic Stranger:
Insofar as the Athenian Stranger and Socrates agree with
Aristotle on the ends of political life and the way in which
politics involves caring for the soul, Aristotles disagreement with the Eleatic is more fundamental.

30
Despite his argument that other animals may exist for the sake of
human beings, as Cooper notes, Aristotle suggests a corresponding
duty of man to take care of those species below him (1982, 19394).
It is surely no accident that after asserting nature is ordered to benefit
humanity, he turns to consider the dangers of unlimited acquisition
on the part of human beings (1256b40 ff.), which is repeatedly said
to be against nature [ 
`  
] (1258b1, cf. 1257a4, 1257b13,
1258b78). For an argument why this is politically destabilizing,
see Smith (1999, esp. 62728).

The Eleatic Strangers depiction of a hostile nature

which makes necessary a politics of preservation anticipates certain aspects of early modern political theory.
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke all begin from a state of
nature in which man is driven by scarcity and conflict to
join a political society. Politics is an attempt to escape nature, rather than to fulfill it. A hostile nature demands the
full attention of political society, and the aims of politics
are necessarily lowered, from the achievement of virtue to
the securing of preservation. In short, the demands of life
take priority over living well.31 A rejection of the teleological view of nature, then, seems to lead to a minimalist
politics concerned with preservation.
On the basis of his critique of the Eleatic, Aristotle
can serve as a more trenchant critic of modern liberalism
than perhaps expected. It is less of an anachronism to put
Aristotle into dialogue with modernity, because he confronted views which bear some resemblance to those of
Hobbes and Locke. However, at the same time, an emphasis on his teleological understanding of nature also makes
the return to Aristotles politics more difficult than most
people are willing to recognize because that understanding has been questioned by modern science. This makes
it important for those who wish to return to Aristotle to
discover to what extent his politics depends on his teleology and to what extent and in what form that teleology
remains tenable today.32

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