Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v.

Montao
GR No. 182836, October 13, 2009
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. (Continental Steel)
and a member of the of Nagkaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel CorporationSolidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union)
filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for Dependent pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between Continental Steel and the Union.The Claim was based on the death of
Hortillanos unborn daughter, due to premature delivery while his wife was on her
38th week of pregnancy.
Continental Steel granted Hortillanos paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits. Seeking reversal of this denial, the
union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA but the parties still
fail to settle their dispute prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).
Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate
the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there
are two elements for the entitlement of the benefits namely: (1) death; and (2)
status as a legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case.
Continental Steel relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that
only one with civil personality could die and a fetus that was delivered dead could
not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.
Atty. Montao, the Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a resolution ruling that
Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed a petition before the Court of Appeals but the
latter denied the same. Hence, this petition with this court.
Issues:
WON Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave with
pay and other death benefits.
Held:
No, the reliance of Continental Steel in Article 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. The issue of Civil Personality is not relevant herein. All the requisites: (1)
death; and (2) status as a legitimate dependent, were present in this case, as
follows:
(1) Death has been defined as cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with Civil
Personality. One need not acquire Civil Personality first before he/she could die.

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(2) An unborn child can be considered dependent as an unborn child is dependent

on its parents. Moreover, Hortillano and his wife are validly married and their child
was conceived during said marriage, hence, making the child legitimate upon her
conception.
SY v. CA
GR No. 127263, April 12, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973. The union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah
Sheryll.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses live separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother
until their son Frederick transferred to his fathers residence on May 15, 1988.
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation but was later
amended, upon motion of Filipina, into a petition for separation of property.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent on
the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence; (2) Sexual infidelity; (3)
attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband
without justifiable reason for more than one year. The petition was granted due to
(1) and (2).
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for absolute nullity of their marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The both RTC and the court of appeals denied the petition. Hence, this appeal by
certiorari with additional contention that their marriage was celebrated without
valid marriage license.
Issues:
(1) WON the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of ceremony.
(2) WON private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Held:
(1) Yes. From the documents presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November
15, 1973, and thus, the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between the Filipina and the private
respondent is void from the beginning.
Note: Although the court has repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue
for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and

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justice, the court have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that
technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants.
(2) The remaining issue on psychological incapacity of private respondent need no
longer detain the court. It is mooted by the courts conclusion that the marriage of
Filipina to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.

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