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I.
DETAILS OF EVENT:
NAME AND TYPE: ADMM-PLUS MM-HADR JOINT EXERCISE (AM-Hex
2016) FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE CHEMICAL LEAK SITE
SCENARIO: As a result of the high magnitude earthquake, industrial factories
and chemical storage facilities are damaged, causing chemical leaks over
large areas. There is a need for a management, response and control system
to assess the situation in a timely manner. The exercise also includes
evacuation of victims and provision of assistance to victims who may have
potentially been evacuated with chemicals.
DATE: 1-11 Sep 2016
LOCATION: 14th MILITARY CIRCLE AREA, CHONBURI, THAILAND
PARTICIPANTS: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and USA
II.
OBJECTIVES:
1.
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5.
III.
NARRATIVE SUMMARY:
mobile truck, their Royal Thai Army, Air Force and Navy decontamination
equipment and mitigation capability. In the afternoon, the US troops
demonstrated techniques and procedures for search and rescue and
evacuation of casualties in confined areas. The day was concluded with
return demonstration of each participating countries with the demonstrated
SAR and evacuation in confined space.
The next day, 06 Sep, the actual field training exercise/ demonstration began
with two (2) scenarios, the first in the morning and the other was in the afternoon. In the
given scenarios, the Incident Coordinating Center (ICC) was established and
coordinating conference focused on collaborative planning and coordination participated
by AMS. The activities involved initial assessment, chemical identification and detection,
observation of casualties and chemical leakage, SAR, CASEVAC, containment and
confinement, decontamination of casualties (ambulatory and non-ambulatory), personal
and technical equipment. Each country was designated to participate in the activities.
They worked harmoniously and responded as one for every given CBRN threat
scenarios. The group focused on threat and risk assessment on identifying, describing
and organizing sets of critical event parameters or observables characterizing various
types of CBRN events. Critical parameters were observed that made participants
concluded that an incident was a CBRN threat to include technological parameters such
as temperature, wind direction and concentration of a threat agent. The work was
carried out through collaboration with all countries. An AAR was executed within the
participating groups after the culmination of every given scenarios.
On the second day, 07 Sep, morning activity started with the visit of Thai Army
Chief. LTC CHATWALAI, the Thai in-charge oriented him to the set-up and upcoming
scenario about chemical leak. After a while, the FTX for chemical leak scenarios
continued. There was one scenario accomplished for this day. The Indonesian doctor as
well as corpsman of US participated in the triage of casualties and managed casualty
collecting areas. The same activities executed but focused more on decontamination of
casualties. The coordination between Thai Air Force and Thai Army Medical Emergency
Response Team established best link for the CASEVAC from the chemical leak area to
the field hospitals. In the afternoon, after action review conducted and all participating
countries solicited their experiences, problems encountered as well as lessons learned
with the exercise.
The third day FTX, 08 Sep, accomplished one scenario. It was observed by the
evaluators from the Exercise Command Group. The outcome turned out a better result.
The activity ended at lunch time and immediately followed with group souvenir photo
shoot. The three day actual event involved different scenarios established to enable this
exercise to identify emergency preparedness and response measures and operational
functions in all phases of a CBRN crisis. The identified parameters and situation
prepared the ground for the development and testing of the integrated practice that was
carried out in all of the succeeding actual scenarios.
As I had been observed, there were various issues identified relating to exercise
for the improvement to the planning of future exercises:
1. Language barriers Language is a barrier since the delegates come from
different countries with diverse languages. It required more time for
discussion with regards to planning and coordination of the assigned tasks,
communications, and instructions. Some AMS need an interpreter in order to
comprehend the directions.
2. Limited Equipment Some participating AMS brought limited equipment for
the exercise which resulted them to utilize host countrys equipment.
3. No designated qualified safety officer A chemically hazardous environment
requires additional safeguards to protect rescuers and patients. The safety
officer ensures accountability of personnel, contamination control, and
identifies safety hazards that occur during the response. In addition, the
safety officer ensures that all patients are decontaminated thoroughly before
entering the cold zone; therefore, the safety officer is the last line of defense
for personnel and the facility. Even with the urgent needs of many victims of a
chemical attack, the staff and patients must not be compromised by chemical
contamination
4. Not established casualty holding area - Establish a plan to handle
decontaminated and contaminated victims of a chemical incident. Ideally,
decon teams decontaminate people at the incident site before evacuating
them to a medical facility, but this cannot be relied upon. However, planners
should anticipate that less-injured patients may self-transport to the nearest
medical facilities and may contaminate these facilities. The plan must include
ways of diverting these people to a holding and/ or treatment area that does
not compromise the healthcare facility. The requirement to remove
all chemical contamination from patients delays their entry into the
healthcare facility but should not delay lifesaving treatment by staff in
appropriate PPE.
IV.
RECOMMENDATION:
recognized as an acute global challenge. It is essential that every AMS military service
develop their resources to respond and mitigate the consequences of such threats to
life, infrastructure and the environment. This is a considerable pressure on the military
in preparing to meet the CBRN/ hazmat threat. Enumerated below are suggestions to
ensure quality of the response is appropriate:
1. Continuous exchange and collaboration - This exercise should be regularly
conducted to have an official collaboration amongst the 18 ASEAN Plus countries
in the field of CBRN training to build common understanding and achieve
interoperability for those authorized measures takes in preparation for anticipated
CBRN incidents to mitigate the loss of life and property and to assist with the
response and short-term recovery that may be required. This includes having
plans, policies, procedures, training, and equipment necessary to effectively
respond to CBRN incidents. It also plays a key role helping the military optimize
their readiness to improve response times, the safety of their personnel and the
public, and their ability to combat a wide and varied range of CBRN/ hazmat
incidents.
2. Standardization of CBRN training - It should be the endeavour of all AMS to have
uniformity in their training curriculum. It would be advisable to follow the
International CBRN training course on minimum standards and non-binding
guidelines on training to first respondents to achieve a sense of uniformity in the
training program.
3. Commitment of sophisticated CBRN assets The personnel skills are useless
without an appropriate equipment to use in the incident of CBRN. It should be
included in the SOP for commitment of capable AMS of their vital CBRN
equipment that involve its transport to the affected host nation.
4. Strengthening CBRN training in the AFP While the efforts of CBRN training at
the Philippine Army are established, the same needs to be replicated at other
AFP units to enable the first respondents to acquaint with the nuances of CBRN
response. It will assist AFP units in building their capacity, skills, and knowledge
in order to counter the CBRNE threat.
5. Acquire high-level detector equipment - Early detection and response are critical,
likewise, the quality and accuracy of information. Ensuring personnel understand
how to correctly operate, interpret and report readings of detection, identification
and monitoring equipment is essential to maintaining a capability to respond to a
CBRN/ HazMat incident. The AFP should respond to these requirements with
innovative tools and strategies that will enhance existing individual training and
collective exercise programs.
V.
CONCLUSION:
The overall result of this exercise came up with ASEAN preparedness and
resilience against CBRN threat using integrated concepts and equipment to
improve the ability to respond to and recover from a Chemical, Biological,
Souvenir Photo of all ASEAN Member States and Plus Country during the last day of
Force Integration Training (FIT) in Chemical Leak Scenario
AMS and Plus Country organizing Collaborative Planning and Coordination at Incident
Center (Command Post)
Four man team from US and Vietnam performing Initial risk assessment, identification
and detection of chemical agents and marking procedures
Royal Thai Air Force and Thai Navy conducting Decontamination of Non Ambulatory
Casualties
Royal Thai Army Medical Emergency Response Team attending to Level 1 & Level 3 Casualties
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration Level A personal protective equipment that
includes a positive-pressure, full-face piece, self-contained breathing apparatus or positive
pressure, supplied-air respirator with escape self-contained breathing apparatus; totally
encapsulating chemical-protective suit; coveralls; long underwear; outer, chemical-resistant
gloves; inner, chemical-resistant gloves; chemical-resistant boots with steel toe and shank; hard
hat; and disposable protective suit, gloves, and boots.