Case 2:07-cr-20124-CM-JPO Document 239 Filed 06/01/10 Page 1 of 8

Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [I} / Pro Se Litigant ,,'~".:I::,
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1104 Andover
Lawrence, Kansas 66049
(785) 842-2785

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 07-20073-CM

07-20124-CM
08-2010S-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,

Defendant 1,

GUY M. NEIGHBORS

Defendant 2,

DEFENDANT [ll'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF

ORAL ORDER GIVEN ON 05/24/2010,

AS WELL AS EXCEPTIONS AND OBJECTIONS

[Pursuant to 18 USC 221 Sec.3440]

COMES NOW on this 1st day of June 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting

as a pro se litigant, is filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Oral Order, given on

05124/2010, as well as, Exceptions and Objections pursuant to 18 USC 221 sec. 3440. The

Motions is as follows:

1). The Defendant (1] Objects and request the Court to Reconsider the ruling given on

05124/2010 to exclude the time resulting from these proceedings specifically from the time

period from May 24th 2010 until the time for trial of September 7th 201 O. And also to the

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Governments oral response to Defendants Motion on Speedy Trial, noted by the court for the

record. This case has been ongoing since 2006 with the government's continuous delays, as the

record would clearly show. [See Ref us. v. Neighbors, Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 36
Pg. J1 (loth cir. 2007) :

" In this case, it was the government's culpability that caused the delay. It is well
established that "the Government bears the burden of ensuring the Defendant's speedy trial
rights are not violated." United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1093 (1993). When the
second indictment was filed here the government did not move to expedite the case. It did not
notifY this court, which did not handle the case under the frrst indictment, that there was a
potential speedy trial issue with the filing of the second indictment. Additionally, the government
did not exercise due diligence concerning the timing of the speedy trial clock. It originally
argued to this court that the speedy trial clock began anew on Count 2 when the second
indictment was filed. But, as noted in the court's prior Memorandum and Order, that
interpretation is directly contrary to a Tenth Circuit case decided just last year."

The Defendant [1] request that the court take judicial notice of this issue. The excludability of

delay "resulting from ... proceedings" under subsection (h)(1) is "automatic" in the sense that a

district court must exclude such delay from a Speedy Trial Act calculation without any further

analysis as to whether the benefit of the delay outweighs its cost. For delays resulting from

proceedings under subsection (h)(l),Congress already has determined that the benefit of such

delay outweighs its cost to a speedy trial, regardless of the specifics of the case. The word

"automatic" serves as useful shorthand. [See, e.g., United States v. Lucky, 569 F. 3d 101, 106

(CA2 2009)] ("Some exclusions are automatic. Other exclusions require judicial action")

(citation omitted)]. The Defendant [1] understands the elements, as well as,judicial discretion,

but due to the continuous delays of the prosecution, discretion is limited as in U.S. 531 F. 2d

1095 in which states, "Dismissal ofan indictment is strong medicine, even where re-indictment is

possible. But we have indicated rather stringent limits to judicial discretion in countenancing

delay." [see ref United States v. Fay, 505 F.2d 1037 (lst Cir. 1974)] This was no inadvertent

error or mistake made by the government, due to this is a pattern of practice to extend the case

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past the time limitations, as per the first dismissal, in which results in bad faith prosecutions, in

which now constitutes gross negligence. [See ref United States v. Kottmyer, 961 F.2d 569, 572­

73 (6th Cir. 1992)(same) (see refArcher, 984 F. Supp. At 323] The government has failed to act

with due diligence and reasonable prudence. The time limitations has already expired, whereby

now this becomes a constitutional violation of the Speedy Trial Act., as well as, ajurisdictional

issue of whether the government can even proceed from this point.

2.) Defendant [1] requests the court take notice. The original Indictment was filed

December 7,2006 case #06-2017] -01/02 CM/JPO. It was dismissed May 4, 2007 with just 7

days left on the speedy trial clock. A continuance of the same Indictment was given a new case

number 07-20073-CM based on the same offense, with two counts added with no new

substantive evidence filed, and a second arrest and search incident occurred June 20, 2007. A

continuance of the same offense re-filed with a different case number does not fall under the

excludable time to meet the "ends ofjustice" to delay the right to a speedy trial absent of the

"proper judicial considerations", in which was never specifically identified or clarified by this

court, in which the court never had given legal or statutory authority, nor any specific

clarification for why the continuance outweighs the best interest of the public, as well as, the

right to speedy trial. Whereby the clockfor this case has already tolled 18 US.c. § 3161 (h)(6).

Also see [United States v. Williams, 511 F.3d 1044, 1055 (lOth Cir. 2007)] (holding the Speedy

Trial Act "does not allow a district court to retroactively grant an ends-of-justice continuance ").

"Late assertion of a right is in no way a waiver of the right."

The Court has already set a deadline until the June 28th 20 I 0 for the Plaintiff to respond, and the

Defendant [1] is aware that she has 10 working days to reply to the response, in which she will

comply with, whereby the dates are already set and any other time should not be excluded.

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Justice delayed is justice denied. Jurisdiction takes precedence in any proceeding once

jurisdiction is raised, in which Defendant [1] has done, whereby until the court determines if the

speedy trial act is violated, we cannot proceed any further, everything else is moot, until the

determination is made, due to the fact that this now becomes a constitutional right violation

under the 6 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

4). See reference below recent case law on writ of Certiorari.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BLOATE v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-728. Argued October 6, 2009-Decided March 8, 2010
Held: The time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable from the
70-day limit under subsection 00(1). Such time may be excluded only when a district court
grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under subsection (h)(7). Pp. 6--18.

(a) The delay at issue is governed by subsection (h)(1)(D) (hereinafter subparagraph (D)),
the enumerated category that renders automatically excludable "delay resulting from any
pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or
other prompt disposition of, such motion." This provision communicates Congress'
judgment that pretrial motion-related delay is automatically excludable only from the
time a pretrial motion is filed through a specified hearing or disposition point, and that
other pretrial motion-related delay is excludable only if it results in a continuance under
subsection (h)(7). This limitation is significant because Congress knew how to define the
boundaries of subsection (h)( 1)' s enumerated exclusions broadly when it so desired.
Although the period of delay the Government seeks to exclude in this case results from a
proceeding governed by subparagraph CD), that period precedes the first day upon which
Congress specified that such delay may be excluded automatically and thus is not
automatically excludable. Pp. 7-10.

(b) This analysis resolves the automatic excludability inquiry because "[a] specific provision"
(here, subparagraph (D)) "controls one[s] of more general application" (here, subsections
(h)(l) and (h)(7)). Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395,407. A contrary result would
depart from the statute in a manner that underscores the propriety of this Court's approach.
Subsection (h)(l)'s phrase "including but not limited to" does not show that subsection (h)(l)
permits automatic exclusion of delay related to an enumerated category of proceedings, but

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outside the boundaries set forth in the subparagraph expressly addressed to that category. That
would confuse the illustrative nature of the subsection's list of categories with the contents of
the categories themselves. Reading the "including but not limited to" clause to modify the
contents of each subparagraph in the list as well as the list itself would violate settled statutory
construction principles by ignoring subsection (h)O),s structure and grammar and in so doing
rendering even the clearest of the subparagraphs indeterminate and virtually superfluous. See
generally id., at 410. Subsection (h)(Il's context supports this Court's conclusion. Subsection
(h)(7) provides that delay "resulting from a continuance granted by any judge" may be
excluded, but only if the judge finds that ''the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial," and records those
findings. In setting forth the statutory factors justifying a subsection(h)(7) continuance,
Congress twice recognized the importance of ade guate pretrial preparation time. See
§§3161(h)(7)(B)(ii), 316l(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court's determination that the delay at issue is not
automatically excludable gives full effect to subsection (h)(7), and respects its provisions for
excluding certain types of delay only where a district court makes findings justifying the
exclusion. The Court's precedents also support this reading of subsection (h)(n. See Zedner v.
United States, 547 U. S. 489, 502. Pp. 10-16.

(d) This Court does not consider whether any of the Act's other exclusions would apply to all or
part of the September 7 through October 4 period that is not automatically excludable under
subsection(h)(l). P. 18.

534 F. 3d 893, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and SOTOMAYOR, 11., joined.
GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BREYER, J., joined.

5). The Defendant [1] Objects and request the Court to Reconsider the ruling given on

05/24/2010 to appoint John Duma as her Legal Advisor, due to the Prejudice he has caused in

both his proffer against his own client, as well as, his bias in his own letters to get his client to

plea, instead of acting with zeal and reasonable prudence and due diligence to protect the best

interest of his client, in which is Defendant [1]. The Defendant [1] requests that the court

reconsider the appointment of John Duma as legal advisor, and appoint an unbiased counsel that

can act with prudence and due diligence, pursuant to the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

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6). The Defendant [1] Objects to the courts reference that the Defendant [1] has went

through numerous attorneys and / or counsels. Previous paid counsels have withdrawn due to

pressure placed upon them by the Prosecutors in this action, due to threats of a subpoena of bank

records and the pattern of practice to file money laundering charges on them for receiving

payment for representation, as in this cause of action, whereby the Prosecuting Attorney was

controlling the outcome of this case. As this shows a pattern of practice of the prosecution,

Defendant [1] requests the court take notice. [See Ref us. v. James McKeighan, case no # 2:06
CR 20066-JWL (Doc 62) (Jdh Cir.)(2007)]

7). The Defendant [1] also raises objections to the Hearing scheduled for the 24th of May

2010, due to the fact that she was not properly notified of the Hearing properly, in which

constitutes violations of notice of a Hearing 10 days prior, unless it is an emergency hearing.

8). The Defendant [1] also raises objections to the Hearing scheduled for the 24th of May

2010, due to the fact that Defendant [2] was not present, in which gives the appearance of an ex

parte hearing, and violates Defendant [2]'s constitutional right to be present during these

proceedings. The Defendant [1] only raises this issue to protect the integrity of the court.

9). The Defendant [1] also objects to the reference that this is a "complex case", when in

fact by the Governments own confession; 80% of the seized evidence should be returned to the

defendants. There are voluminous non probative business records, and witness information, in

which do not pertain to this case, the government is only using this to mislead the court. This is

why Defendant [1] is requesting the Bates system to identify all the 80 to 90% of the seized

property in which were offered by the Government to be returned, in which is not relevant to this

cause of action, as well as, misleading to the court. [see ref Doc 188 p. 6, ~ 3 to p. 7, ~ 1.]

Therefore the government is creating an illusion of a complex case, when it is not. Whereby the

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Defendants Constitutional rights to a speedy trial are being violated on the manufactured

presentation of being a complex case, when it is not. The Defendant [1] has filed a Motion for an

Evidentiary Hearing to expose this in order to protect the integrity of both the court and the case.

THEREFORE for all the reasons as stated above, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors,

acting as a pro se litigant, is filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Oral Order, given on

0512412010, as well as, Exceptions and Objections pursuant to 18 USC 221 Sec. 3440.

Carrie eighbors
Defendant [J] / Pro Se Li igant
1104 Andover
Lawrence, Kansas 66049
(785) 842-2785

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Pursuant to KSA 60-205]

The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class
postage prepaid, addressed to:

Cheryl A Pilate
Melanie Morgan LLC
Defendant [2] counsel ofrecord
142 Cherry
Olathe, Kansas 66061

Guy Neighbors 11520031

Federal Medical Center
P.O. Box 1600
Butner, NC. 27509

Marietta Parker
Terra Morehead
U.S. Attorneys
500 State Ave.
Suite 360
Kansas City, KS 66101

On this 1st day of June 2010.

Carr eigbhors
Defendant [1] / Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover
Lawrence, Kansas 66049
(785) 842-2785

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