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This document summarizes a panel and paper session at the American Association of Geographers annual conference on the controversial limits of disaster risk reduction (DRR) research and action. The panel will discuss the paradox that as knowledge about disasters increases, so too do losses, and will examine this issue through the lens of databases used to evaluate disasters and the impacts of DRR policies. Questions will address the dominant databases, how they define key concepts, whether they align with experiences on the ground, and how their outputs are shaped by institutional and political factors. The paper session will explore the temporal dimensions of disasters and DRR that have been overlooked, such as the timescales involved in risk assessment and policy implementation.
Originalbeschreibung:
Agenda o debate sobre a relação entre o Disater Risk Reduction (DRR) & Reseach and Action (R&A)
This document summarizes a panel and paper session at the American Association of Geographers annual conference on the controversial limits of disaster risk reduction (DRR) research and action. The panel will discuss the paradox that as knowledge about disasters increases, so too do losses, and will examine this issue through the lens of databases used to evaluate disasters and the impacts of DRR policies. Questions will address the dominant databases, how they define key concepts, whether they align with experiences on the ground, and how their outputs are shaped by institutional and political factors. The paper session will explore the temporal dimensions of disasters and DRR that have been overlooked, such as the timescales involved in risk assessment and policy implementation.
This document summarizes a panel and paper session at the American Association of Geographers annual conference on the controversial limits of disaster risk reduction (DRR) research and action. The panel will discuss the paradox that as knowledge about disasters increases, so too do losses, and will examine this issue through the lens of databases used to evaluate disasters and the impacts of DRR policies. Questions will address the dominant databases, how they define key concepts, whether they align with experiences on the ground, and how their outputs are shaped by institutional and political factors. The paper session will explore the temporal dimensions of disasters and DRR that have been overlooked, such as the timescales involved in risk assessment and policy implementation.
MORE OF THE SAME? PANEL AND PAPER SESSIONS (scroll down for the paper session!) American Association of Geographers annual conference, 5th to 9th April 2017, Boston
Panel Session The controversial limits of DRR R&A (1): How to best manage disasters? Organizers: Patrick Pigeon (Universit Savoie Mont Blanc) and
Julien Rebotier (CNRS-LISST)
Stakes related to disaster prevention have never been higher during then now. Therefore, it makes sense to find a wide range of international research programs and a huge amount of already existing academic production on DRR policies. Yet, a common and disturbing paradox arises from this huge amount of knowledge available on disaster and DRR policies. According to this paradox, the more we know, the more we manage, and yet, the more we are supposed to lose (White et al., 2001). This panel session reconsiders this famous paradox, which looks so much disturbing if not provocative (Pigeon et Rebotier, 2016). Indeed, societies are today safer than in the past, people live longer and the quality of life has increased for a larger number of people than ever before in History, even if it mirrors unequal conditions. Still, a pervasive sense of insecurity grows parallel: governments and institutions are increasingly asked to provide more security and to prevent more disasters. In the face of such ambiguous statements, on what basis do we assess disasters and damages? Defining disasters and losses, so as to value them and to create databases, if not knowledge management systems (KMS) which integrate already existing databases and information coming from a wide range of stakeholders, is a critical issue. But databases and KMS address nothing but a part of the many controversial limits to DRR R&A, demanding to reach a broader insight of the issue. If Whites paradox stresses on the limitations DRR policies still meet, it should also lead the panel to see how to integrate those limitations into decision-making processes in DRR field. The whole argument that reconsiders the paradox relies on three main points: an ambiguous balance (1), multiple limitations (2), and still, the necessity to act in spite of long-standing difficulties (3). (1) There is no doubt about the difficulties to evaluate the evolution of both disasters and their impacts. It is easy
enough to put in perspective the amount of knowledge and
research programs related with DRR policies and damages related with disasters at different scales. It is much harder to quantify the damages that have been avoided, or even to shed light on relative evaluation of damages, along time (Mitchell et al., 2014). Might the controversial paradox be reconsidered, because of the difficulties of valuing losses and the contributions of DRR policies to prevention? What about the evolution of assets and stakes, which should be integrated in the assessments? (2) A large literature stresses the different kinds of obstacles, barriers or conditionings, which may explain why do DRR R&A seem to stall (Wisner et al., 2004; UNISDR, 2015). Either in terms of databases, conceptual approaches, or policies and its implementation, there are multiple limitations to achieving a good DRR. Is the controversial paradox a biased way to address DRR R&A balance? Which points would explain why the paradox has gained international recognition in spite of its limitations? And which points does the same paradox induce not to consider while assessing DRR policies outcomes? (3) The paradox appears to be stuck to the impossibility to get rid of disasters and of inescapable damages. But, as such, the paradox does not shed light enough on the main drivers behind those limitations DRR policies still meet. The place of uncertainty and imperfection in both knowledge and action in DRR lacks acknowledgment. It explains why DRR policies are necessary and necessarily limited, and why it makes sense not to stress on limitations only, because it is still possible to act in spite of uncertainties. Understanding limitations also justifies why it is so much important to address DRR policies in contextualized ways, collectively, on shared, fair and open basis. KMS are seen as new tools for assessing disaster prevention policies and for contributing to prevent disasters. But how can they be used as tools helping decision making at local scales is still an issue to be settled. Is a situated and politically rooted analysis of DRR R&A enough to give sense to the repeated paradox that stems apparently from most of disaster prevention policies outcomes? Do KMS or other collective platforms of knowledge and action contribute to reduce the limitations? At what conditions? In a 100 minutes panel session, there is no room for addressing so many controversial issues. Still, not presenting an encompassing perspective of the limits of DRR R&A makes it impossible to catch the paradox at stake in-depth. Even worse, neglecting a broader view blindly reproduces specialized and siloed approaches that fail addressing underlying obstacles. Drawing on such a big picture of the limits of DRR R&A, the panel session will target one of the main pillars of the White et al.s controversial paradox. Databases are mandatory to evaluate disasters and impacts, as well as DRR policies, and set shared balances. But neither facts nor figures do speak for themselves
(nor for everyone)! The panel session will address databases
issues according to the following questions: - What are the dominant databases, their pros and cons, among academics and practitioners? - On what definitions of main concepts (like risk, disasters, etc.) do databases rely? - Are there correspondences between DRR databases and the multiple actors experiences of risks and disasters on the ground? When there are not, which experiences and actors do databases advocate for, and which ones do they ignore? - Behind scientific matters and technical issues, what are the institutional, political, cultural conditionings that frame the organization and collection of data? How does this weight on databases outputs? - Which kind of knowledge is required to fuel DRR databases and KMS, in conceptual as well as in technical terms? For which use? - What are the conditions for achieving more shared and open databases? Please send questions to the session organizers Patrick Pigeon (patrick.pigeon@univ-smb.fr) and Julien Rebotier (julien.rebotier@cnrs.fr). MITCHELL T., GUHA-SAPIR D., HALL J., LOVELL E., MUIR-WOOD R., NORRIS A., SCOTTL., WALLEMACQ P., 2014, Setting, measuring and monitoring targets for reducing disaster risk. Recommendations for post-2015 international policy frameworks, Overseas Development Institute, London, accessed online on September 13th, 2016, http://www.odi.org/publications/8448-settingmeasuring-monitoring-targets-disaster-risk-reductionrecommendations-post-2015-international-policy-frameworks PIGEON P., REBOTIER J., 2016, Disaster Prevention Policies. A Challenging and Critical Outlook, ISTE-Elsevier, London-Oxford. UNISDR, 2015, Global Assessment Report on disaster risk reduction. Making development sustainable: The future of disaster risk management, UNISDR, Genve, accessed on line on September 13th, 2016,https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/42809 WHITE G.F., KATES R.W., BURTON I., 2001, Knowing better and losing even more: The use of knowledge in hazard management , Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, vol. 3, n 3-4, pp. 81-92. WISNER B., BLAIKIE P., CANNON T., DAVIS I. (dir.), 2004, At Risk, natural hazards, peoples vulnerability and disasters, Routledge, London.
Paper Session Epistemological and theoretical limits
The controversial limits of DRR R&A (2): Exploring the temporal dimensions of disasters and DRR Organizers: Sbastien Nobert (University of Leeds) and Julien Rebotier (CNRS-LISST)
Discussant: Kevin Grove (Florida International University)
The last decade has been plagued with reports of environmental disasters impacting the lives of billions of people around the world (e.g. UNISDR 2015). Already this year, 2016, a myriad of disasters has been reported, ranging from earthquakes and floods to heat waves and wildfires. This has catapulted environmental hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) to the forefront of 24-hour news. Some have described this prominence of disasters as symptomatic of an era in which catastrophes have become regimes of governance (e.g. Dupuy 2002, Aradau and van Munster 2011). This Foucauldian take on catastrophes has influenced the development of a critical geography of risk and hazards, which has mixed Roberto Espositos process of immunization (2011), Ulrich Becks notion of reflexive modernity (1992) and indeed Michel Foucaults biopolitics (2004) together to explain the immuno-politics of DRR (e.g. Anderson 2010, Adey and Anderson 2011, Gove 2014). This immuno-politics proposes the total protection of valued (neo-liberal) life through a series of practices (e.g. structural and semi-structural measures) and ways of thinking such as applying the precautionary principle, resilience or mitigation (Neyrat 2008). Thus far, critical geographers have been interested in identifying the ways in which this kind of politics operates and transforms relations to life (e.g. Grove 2014), while DRR scholars have instead argued in favour of promoting its development in a world increasingly defined as being in permanent crisis (White et al. 2001). If these two different streams of the geography of risk and disasters have made this immuno-politics their centre of attention, they have also participated in overshadowing other dimensions of disaster politics in the wider realm of disaster studies more generally (Guggenheim 2014). One of those dimensions remains the temporalities produced by and embedded in DRR practices and in disasters themselves. While temporalities seem to have made a comeback as a subject for geographical inquiries, what kind of time constitutes the disruptions unfolded by disasters and DRR practices requires some investigation (Nobert et al. forthcoming). This question opens up temporal dimensions involved in and produced by disaster politics, but perhaps more importantly, it leads to an examination of a facet of disaster management that has too often been left unquestioned by both DRR critiques and proponents, despite the fact that time is a major concept in disaster management. Thus, this session wishes to engage with DRR as a heuristic of social and environmental relations, making it possible to shed light on the overshadowed temporalities of disasters and DRR practices more generally. Topics may include, but are not limited to the following: Temporal politics of anticipatory, preparedness and preemptive regimes; Temporalities and instrumental rationality in DRR; Phenomenological exploration of disasters and hazards; Differentiated time production in disaster management;
Univocal clock-time and multiplicities of times in DRR politics;
DRR and the production of futures; Internal and external times in risk management; Time and governmentality; Rhythms of disasters. Please send abstracts (max 250 words) and / or questions to the session organizers Sbastien Nobert (s.nobert@leeds.ac.uk) and Julien Rebotier (julien.rebotier@cnrs.fr) no later than October 15th, 2016. References: Adey, P. & Anderson, B. 2011. Event and Anticipation: UK Civil Contingencies and the Space-Times of Decision. Environment and Planning A, 43:2878-2899. Anderson,B.2010.Preemption,Precaution,Preparedness:AnticipatoryActionandFuture Geographies.Progress in Human Geography, 34:777-798. Aradau, C and van Munster, R. 2011. Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown, London: Routledge. Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. Dupuy, J-P. 2002. Pour un catastrophisme clair: Quand l'impossible est certain. Paris: Seuil. Esposito, R. 2011. Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life. Polity: Cambridge.
Foucault, M. 2004. La naissance du biopolitique. Cours au Collge de
France (1978-1979). Paris: Seuil. GroveK.2014.Agency,affectandtheimmunologicalpoliticsofdisaster resilience,EnvironmentalandPlanningD:SocietyandSpace32:240256. Guggenheim,M.2014.Introduction:Disastersaspoliticspoliticsasdisasters,inTironi, M., Rodriguez-Giralt, I. & Guggenheim, M. (eds.), Disasters and politics: materials, experiments, preparedness. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, (Sociological Review Monograph): 1-16. Neyrat,F.2008.Biopolitiquesdescatastrophes.Paris:MF,CollectionDehors. Nobert,S.,Rebotier,J.,Valette,C.,Bouisset,C.andClarimont,S.Forthcoming.Resilience for the Anthropocene? Shedding light on the forgotten temporalities shaping post-crisis management in the French Sud Ouest, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses. UNISDR, 2015, Global Assessment Report on disaster risk reduction. Making development sustainable: The future of disaster risk management, UNISDR, Genve, accessed on line on September 13th, 2016, https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/42809 White, G.F., Kates, E.W. and Burton, I. 2001. Knowing better and losing even more: The use of knowledge in hazard management, Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, 3:81-92.