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2 STATE OF ARIZONA
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4 V
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6 STEPHEN KANDIK
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10 CA-CV 2009-0180/ CT-20090056
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16 APPELLANT PETITION FOR
17 SUPREME COURT
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19 REVIEW OF ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
20 DIVISION TWO
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22 DISMISSAL/DECISION
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27 June 1, 2010
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37 (Preface –All the required elements for this petition are contained in this
38 document, however; time has run out for me to order them more to your
39 liking or as others might have, please excuse my short comings.)
40
41 Judicial disqualification for bias or impartiality
42
43 ******The U.S. Supreme Court (has) held that "Disqualification is
44 required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions
45 about the judge's impartiality. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
46

47 ******Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a


48 judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v.
49 Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988)
50 (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance);
51 United States v. Balistrieri,779 F.2d 1191(7th Cir. 1985)

52 ******(Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality,


53 whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ...the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
54 §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge
55 but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial
56 process.") United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985).

57 ******Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recues himself in any proceeding


58 in which (t)he(i)r impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v.
59 O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d
60 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant
61 not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received
62 justice."

63 ****“Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of


64 the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.” United States v. Sciuto,
65 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or
66 prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
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68 ¶ 1) It is my understanding that the Arizona Supreme Court receives the lion’s

69 share of the of the governments portion of the proceeds of ARS 41-164 1722 the
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70 Arizona photo enforcement statute and presumably fines from its traffic light

71 ticketing arm A.R.S. 28-645 (A)(3)(a) as well. You, your Honor, know better than

72 I, if you should stand down or not.

73 ¶2) At issue, is whether rouge jurists and complicit prosecutors in Arizona will

74 get away with refusing an American citizen the right to subpoena witnesses to

75 court. Also weather, after the fact; the Appellant Courts and prosecutors will

76 succeed in utilizing frivolous procedural maneuvers to evade a mandatory,

77 nondiscretionary responsibility to declare an irrefutably null judgment, null.

78 And furthermore; will the state be allowed to permanently deny an illegally

79 convicted citizen his (wrongfully deprived) driving privileges and retain his court

80 fees and bond money under the cloak of justice? (The following legal citations

81 are from my Div, 2 Appellant Court brief page 41.)

82 ******Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1574: Void judgment. One


83 which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be
84 asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any
85 time and at any place directly or collaterally. Reynolds v.
86 Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092. One which
87 from its inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal
88 efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or support a right, of no legal force and
89 effect whatever, and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or enforcement in
90 any manner or to any degree. Judgment is a "void ..." if court that rendered
91 judgment ...acted in a manner inconsistent with due process." Klugh v. U.S.,
92 D.C.S.C., 610 F.Supp. 892, 901.
93
94 *******Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F. 3d. 689 (1968) j 7 Moore’s Federal practice,
95 2d ed., p. 512 60.23 The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced by
96 fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes
97 final.”
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98
99 ¶ 3) Here and now, I declare the invalidity of the void judgment of this case, and

100 erg the court to honor my rights and uphold the constitution as they have sworn

101 to, by asserting, that the judgment in question is null and void.

102 ¶ 4) For over a year, the Arizona courts have been in possession of clear

103 incontrovertible evidence that my civil rights were violated in traffic court. You

104 have an audio recording of magistrate Levitt forfeiting jurisdiction in her first

105 utterances in court, by denying my 8 subpoenas, in blatant defiance of the local

106 rules of practice (of the 5, which sought witnesses, 2 were exclusively for

107 witnesses). The court has these original subpoenas on record, and no additional

108 evidence is necessary to declare the nullity. (The following legal citations are

109 from page 42 of my brief.)

110 ******Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal
111 jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law,
112 must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D.
113 278
114
115 ******When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief
116 is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (
117 Colo. 1994).
118
119 ******"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction." Joyce v. US,
120 474 F2d 215.
121
122 ¶ 5) Division 2 has elected to seize discretion not lawfully available to them, and

123 has chosen to act upon a frivolous discretionary motion to dismiss, rather than

124 the nondiscretionary dictates of the higher courts just sighted. The appellant

125 judges should have informed the prosecutor, that his claims were unfounded,
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126 and that his motion was denied. (All precedents contained forthwith are from my

127 Appellant Court brief)

128 ****“The court is to protect against any encroachment of Constitutionally


129 secured liberties.”It is the duty of the Courts to be watchful for the
130 Constitutional Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments
131 thereon. Their motto should be Obsta Principiis." Boyd v. United 116 U.S. 616
132 at 635 (1885)
133
134 ****No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert its full authority to
135 prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution." Downs v. Bidwell
136 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
137
138 ¶ 6) In their motion to dismiss the prosecutor bandied about the term "face

139 validity" repeatedly, suggesting that, if a state statute appears to achieve, what it

140 professes to accomplish (even if it actually does not), this bars higher courts from

141 redressing clear violations of a defendants rights or abuses of legal processes.

142 The prosecutor whimsically endeavored to trump the bill of rights with Arizona's

143 local rules of practice, And what’s worse I think he believes it!

144 ****"Insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the


145 land,...(constitution) it is superseded thereby." (16 Am Jur 2d 177, Late Am
146 Jur 2d. 256)
147
148 **** "When an act of the legislature is repugnant or contrary to the
149 constitution, it is, ipso facto, void." 2 Pet.R. 522; 12 Wheat. 270; 3 Dall. 286; 4
150 Dall. 18.
151
152 ****"It (the legislature or statutory laws) may not violate constitutional
153 prohibits or guarantees OR AUTHORIZE OTHERS TO DO SO." Lockard v.
154 Los Angeles 33 Cal2d 553; Cert den 337 US 939.
155
156 ¶ 7) More importantly, and this is key, on page 5 paragraph 11, of the Cities
157
158 Motion to dismiss, is this underlying core precedent:
159
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160 ***** in State v. Anderson, 9 Ariz. App. 42, 43 779 P.2d 59, 60 (1969), the
161 court of appeals interpreted the above section, A.R.S. §22-375, to mean: This
162 section denies the right of appeal from a City Court beyond the Superior Court
163 except in those instances wherein the constitutionality of a statute is involved.
164
165 ¶ 8) In response to this sham tactic, I’ve include the table of contents from my

166 Div 2 brief, amply demonstrating that the motion was proffered disingenuously

167 and acted upon in a blatant error undermining the cause of true justice:

168 TABLE OF CONTENTS:


169
170 * THE STANDING ISSUE PAGE 3-17
171 STANDING CHALLENGE – CONSTITUTIONALITY CHECK
172
173 *DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AN JUDICIAL FRAUD PAGES 17-27
174 WITNESS SUPPRESSION – OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
175
176 *EXTRAODINARY CIRCUMSTANCE'S PAGES 27–30
177 EVASION OF DUTY TO INFORM ON ISSUE OF FACT
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179 *DUE PROCESS DENIED AND VOID JUDGEMENTS PAGES 30–45
180 LOSS OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND NULL JUDICIAL
181 ORDERS
182
183 *SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS PAGES 45-48
184 JUDICIAL DISDAIN FOR SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT
185
186 CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE PAGE 49
187
188 ¶ 9) This page clearly shows how a keen legal mind like the prosecutors would

189 be hard pressed to not see that the issues in play are virtually all predicated on

190 constitutional grounds. Somehow the court bought in and conveniently

191 misconstrued their actual jurisdictional dominion over this matter. Why was this

192 motion allowed, Does the city reflexively playing fast and loose with the rules or

193 is it my particular due process rights they hold in contempt? And why has the
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194 Court teamed up with the plaintiffs to undermine and deny my constitutional

195 protection?

196 ****"The State cannot diminish rights of the people." Hertado v. California,
197 110 U.S. 516
198
199 ****"Constitutional 'rights' would be of little value if they could be indirectly
200 denied." Gomillion v. Lightfoot 364 U.S. 155 (1966) cited also in Smith v.
201 Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.644
202
203 ****“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
204 rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda v Arizona,
205 384 US 436, 491; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
206
207
208 ADDITIONAL FOUNDATIONAL AND RELATED ISSUE
209

210 ¶ 10) on page 17 of my Superior Court brief, I wrote “I WAS FORCED TO

211 DEFEND MYSELF WITHOUT ANY OF MY WITNESSES...” This obviously

212 should have been a big red flag to Superior Court Judge Miller, correct?

213 ******The judge has a duty to continually inspect the record of the case, and
214 if subject-matter jurisdiction does not appear at any time from the record of
215 the case, then he has the duty to dismiss the case as lacking subject-matter
216 jurisdiction. Should a judge act in any case in which he does not have subject-
217 matter jurisdiction, he is acting unlawfully, and without any judicial authority
218 U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980);
219 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821),
220
221 ******“inspection of the record of the case has been ruled to be the
222 controlling factor. If the record of the case does not support subject-matter
223 jurisdiction, then the judge has acted without subject-matter jurisdiction.”The
224 People v Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928)
225
226 *****"If the record does not show upon its face the facts necessary to give
227 jurisdiction, they will be presumed not to have existed.” Norman v. Zieber, 3
228 Or at 202-03
229
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230 ¶ 11) Judge Miller failed to comply with the law and dismiss this case as he
231
232 Should have, once he recognized that due process was breached? After reading
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234 My brief, shouldn't the prosecutor have desisted from further actions as well?
235
236 Why then advance this case, was it done to protect a felonious jurist?
237
238 *****The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "Since such jurisdictional defect
239 deprives not only the initial court but also the appellate court of its power over
240 the case or controversy, to permit the appellate court to ignore it ... [would be
241 an] unlawful action by the appellate court itself." Freytag v. Commissioner,
242 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Miller, supra.
243
244 ******Any judge or attorney who does not report a judge for treason as
245 required by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C.
246 Section 2382.Under Federal law
247
248 ¶ 12) Clearly everyone involved in the adjudication of this case has engaged in, to

249 some degree or another, fraud or the cover up thereof. I have continually tried to

250 bring this matter to a close, yet circumstances seem to be steering me toward the

251 Federal Courts for Justice, an so be it, Truth, the evidence, God (by way of my

252 inalienable creator bestowed rights) and the Constitution are all on my side.

253 ******Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to


254 determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Bonner
255 v. Circuit Court of St. Louis. 526 R2dl33h 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting
256 Bramlet v. Wilson. 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)
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258 ¶ 13) Division 2 could and should have moved beyond the theoretical, for a

259 month, they were in possession of all the evidence necessary to determine that I

260 was unquestionably entitled too, and that they were obligated too, provide me

261 with relief, by way of nullification. Yet, instead when the plaintiffs exceeded the

262 time the law allows for rendering a brief, somehow they were miraculously
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263 granted an extension of time to produce one, without even petitioning for it. And

264 even then, they didn't submit the appropriate brief stipulated by the court, but

265 rather a bogus motion to dismiss, which I mistook for a brief.

266 *****Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against


267 consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S. v.
268 Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
269
270 ¶ 14) What could be more unjust. In order obtain $300 of ill gotten gains the

271 City, State and Courts have ignored fraud, a nullity and have...

272 a) Bilked me out of upwards of a $1000 of court costs.

273 b) Suspended my license in blatant defiance of their own revised

274 statutes baring such suspensions. (see my mandamus)

275 c) (for more than 6 months now they've) impinged on my ability to

276 earn a living, due to this unlawful suspension (it's been years, since I've

277 earned a pay check in Arizona) pulling my license was underhanded,

278 and excessively cruel and unusual punishment to inflict for a minor civil

279 fine, (which I should note, is my only moving violation in decades).

280 d) Needlessly forced me to repeatedly litigate my cause, just to have

281 a null decision acknowledged as such (this is a pointless abuse of process).

282 e) And lastly, they have shut their eyes to insurmountable evidence

283 of multiple felonies and left the perpetrators free, to evade prosecution

284 and retaining seats on the bench, which enables them to continue preying

285 on an robbing the citizens of Arizona, if these actions go unredressed.


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286 ****"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Offutt v. United States,
287 348 U.S. 11, 14(1954)
288
289 *****"Aside from all else, 'due process' means fundamental fairness and
290 substantial justice. Vaughn v. State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 54, 456 S.W.2d 879,
291 883." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 500
292
293 ******Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is
294 fair and right and just." Solebee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Justice
295 Frandfurter dissenting.)
296
297 ¶ 15) In whose eye would this appear fair, right or just? Certainly not the public

298 reading this on the net, nor those who will be spoon fed sound bites about this

299 case, from the main stream media (anxious to smear Arizona over it's perceived

300 immigration police state stances). This is an obvious hustle: the first judge denies

301 due process, the second judge overlooks the infringement and at the third stage,

302 the appellant court claims additional redress is outside of constitutional

303 protections. Voila, Arizona has concocted a treasonous scheme to bypass the bill

304 of rights...

305 Standing Revisited


306
307 *****standing is a "jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party
308 or the Court at any time City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166
309 (Miss. 2000) (citing Williams v. Stevens, 390 So. 2d 1012, 1014
310 (Miss.1980)).P23.
311
312 ***** (...standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be
313 raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18, 95 S. Ct.
314 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975) (“The rules of standing …are threshold
315 determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”).
316
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317 ¶ 16) I will spare you the reiteration of my previous standing challenge, but I do

318 here and now, raising the issue again and challenge the plaintiff prove they hold

319 a legal and constitutional right to have charged me, particularly as I outlined on

320 pages 3-17 of my appellant brief.

321 ¶ 17) Furthermore, I must point out that this is the second issue( #1 -

322 nullification), which I've brought before an Arizona Appellant bench, which

323 Federal Courts have determined that I am entitled to do at "any time". I believe

324 the Appellant Court, knew full well, that a petition for nullification and a

325 challenge of standing submitted in a timely and legal fashion, deserved fare

326 consideration and certainly outweigh a motion to dismiss predicated on a

327 falsehood and turned in after the clock had run out for spurious and frivolous

328 motions.

329 ¶ 18) It's as though the State and Courts are scoffing at me and the bill of rights,

330 and no longer care about public appearances anymore, so they're not even

331 putting forth any effort to mask obvious bias's and improprieties.

332 ******"It is not the function of our government to keep the citizen from
333 falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government
334 from falling into error." Perry v. United States 204 U.S. 330, 358
335
336 ¶ 22) Drafted on Memorial Day 2010 in remembrance of those who have and

337 will die(d) in defense of my constitutional grantees of a fare trial, witnesses

338 and proper appeals.

339
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340
341
342 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
343 AND SERVICE
344
345 6/2/2010
346
347
348
349
350
351 PURSUANT TO ARCAP 14(B), I, STEPHEN KANDIK, CERTIFY
352 THAT THIS ATTACHED PETITION FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW
353 (ACCORDING TO MICROSOFT WORD) CONTAINS 3866 WORDS. AND
354 THAT TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES COMPORTS TO ALL OTHER
355 REQUIREMENTS LAID OUT FOR E-FILLING.
356
357 STEPHEN KANDIK
358 210 S. SHERWOOD VILLAGE DR.
359 TUCSON AZ 85710
360 (520) 245-0527
361
362
363 2 COPIES OF THE FORGOING PETITION FOR SUPREME COURT
364 REVIEW WERE MAILED ON 6/2/2010 TO:
365
366 WILLIAM F. MILLS
367 SUPERVISING PROSECUTOR
368 P.O. BOX 27210
369 TUCSON, AZ 85701-7210
370
371 RE: 2 CA-CV 2009-0180/ CT-20090056
372
373
374
375
376
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377
378 COURT OF APPEALS
379 STATE OF ARIZONA
380 DIVISION TWO
381
382
383 ORDER
384
385 2 CA-CV 2009-0180
386 Department A
387 Pima County
388 Cause No. CT20090056
389
390 RE: STATE OF ARIZONA v. KANDIK
391
392
393 Pursuant to Motion to Strike Appellant’s Memorandum and Dismiss His Appeal, and no
394 response having been filed,
395
396 ORDERED: The above-entitled appeal is DISMISSED.
397
398 Judges Howard and Kelly concurring.
399
400 DATED: April 21, 2010
401
402
403
404 ______________________________
405 Philip G. Espinosa
406 Presiding Judge
407
408
409 Copies to:
410
411 Stephen D. Kandik
412 210 S. Sherwood Village Dr.
413 Tucson, AZ 85710
414
415 William F. Mills
416 TUCSON CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
417 P.O. Box 27210
418 Tucson, AZ 85701
419
420 Hon. Michael O. Miller
421 Judge
422 Pima County Superior Court
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423 110 W. Congress


424 Tucson, AZ 85701
425
426 Patricia A. Noland
427 Clerk of the Court
428 Pima County Superior Court
429 110 W. Congress
430 Tucson, AZ 85701
431
432

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469 APPENDIX
470
471
472 NOTEWORTHY FACTOIDS?
473
474
475 ¶ 19) In court over a year ago, I...

476 • Pointed out that the city had broken the law by

477 shaving yellow light times, and now they have publicly stated that they

478 will be reextending yellow time lengths.

479 • In court and my first brief, I asserted that the city

480 had violated federal laws by tampering with traffic devices an painting

481 arbitrary wait lines in, oddly enough these lines are being blotted out.

482 • In my first brief, I pointed out that the State

483 (unconstitutionally) would suspend peoples licenses as leverage to

484 enforce this racketeering scam, yet since then, the state has been forced

485 (probably not by their consciences) to back peddled and will no longer

486 consider this grounds for class c suspension, interesting huh.

487 • In court and my briefs, I made it clear that the

488 implementation of this law violated section 13 article's 2, 9, 33, as well

489 as the U.S. 9TH, now I understand ADOT is going to yank the plug on

490 its highway program, really makes you think.


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491 • In both my briefs, I made It clear that I had a right

492 to pretrial discovery because "extraordinary circumstances" clearly

493 existed... since then the city has gone in and scrubbed that term out of

494 its local rules of practice. To these scoundrels, even in an extreme

495 situation, they don't want people to have grounds for resisting their

496 lawlessness.

497 ¶ 20) Was this flurry of activity purely coincidental or is it overt evidence that

498 the City and State, have been caught on the wrong side of the law. Clearly they

499 have willfully engaged in fraud to prevent my witness from derailing their

500 extortion racket. In any case, the good news is the state is currently in retreat

501 mode and the city won't be far behind.

502 ¶ 21) With all these concessions and changes the plaintiffs have made, I could not

503 be convicted today on this charge, even in a kangaroo traffic court like Levitt's.

504

505 PRO SE RIGHTS


506
507 ****PRO SE RIGHTS "Following the simple guide of rule8(f) FRCP that all
508 pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice"... "The federal rules
509 reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
510 counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose
511 of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.". Conley v. Gibson
512 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)
513
514 ****Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded,
515 are sufficient"... "which we hold to less stringent standards than formal
516 pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S. 519 (1972)
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517 ****Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se


518 litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as
519 lawyers Jenkins v. McKeithen 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959) Picking v. Pennsylvania
520 R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
521
522 ******The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their
523 pleadings and papers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use
524 common sense to determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C, v. Elliott, 953
525 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also,United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644,
526 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has special obligation to construe pro se litigants'
527 pleadings liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-
528 07 (D.N.J. 2000).
529
530 ******Pro se litigants' court submissions are to be construed liberally and held
531 to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court 944 can
532 reasonably read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to
533 cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence
534 construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v.
535 MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v.
536 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(quoting Conley
537 v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines
538 v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v.
539 Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day,
540 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be held
541 to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58
542 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).
543
544 ******Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 920 of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or
545 section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
546 party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
547 costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
548 omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be
549 held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was
550 clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.
551