Asset

management
Report
Asset management

Asset integrity management

involving integrated RBI and RCM
New risk based methodologies have been developed over the past 10 years that may give improved
risk control and enhance profitability through asset optimisation. The methods allow prediction of
the effect of changes to inspection, maintenance and operation on the plant risk profile and
reliability. Risk Based Inspection (RBI), Reliability Centred Maintenance, Reliability Availability
and Maintainability (RAM) offer quantitative predictions of the plants risk, reliability and
availability. The paper introduces the concept of streamlined RCM and seamlessly integrated RBI
and RCM. Examples are also presented from DNVs world-wide experience of more than 220 RBI
and combined RBI/RCM projects for the refinery and petrochemical industry.

or any Asset Management

improvement strategy it is
imperative to gain acceptance and acknowledgement
of the fact that to improve the overall plant profitability, maintenance,
inspection and reliability must
play a key role together with operations to understand the factors
that affect asset performance and
availability.
Short term improvements in
profitability can lead to large
property damage losses if the
plant performance is increased
without understanding the effect
of changes to operation, maintenance and inspection practices
on the risk of individual asset
(equipment) and systems. New
methodologies for prediction of
the effect of inspection and maintenance on the plant risk profile
are available. Risk Based Inspection (RBI), Reliability Centred
Maintenance, Reliability Availability and Maintainability (RAM)
analyses are predictive methods
that offer quantitative assessment
of the plants risk, reliability and
availability.

38

HYDROCARBON ASIA, MARCH/APRIL 2003

Service experience
Statistics from the hydrocarbon
industry show that large property
damage losses are increasing.
James Coco [1] recently presented
world-wide statistics for the

hydrocarbon industry upstream

and down stream. Table 1
shows a list of the largest financial losses in the process
industry during the period 1970
to 1999.

Table 1: 1970-99 large property damage losses world-wide in excess of US

$150,000,000 [1]
Date

Location

Plant Type

Event Type

PD Loss $MM

17/08/1999

Turkey

Refinery

Earthquake

200

27/09/1998

Mississippi

Refinery

Hurricane

200

25/09/1998

Australia

Gas Plant

Explosion

200

25/12/1997

Malaysia

Gas Plant

Explosion

282

13/12/1994

Iowa

Chemical

Explosion

224

27/05/1994

Ohio

Chemical

Explosion

200

09/11/1992

France

Refinery

VCE

262
187

16/10/1992

Japan

Refinery

Explosion

23/10/1989

Texas

Petrochemical

VCE

839

18/09/1989

Virgin Islands

Refinery

Hurricane

207

05/05/1988

Louisiana

Refinery

VCE

368

04/05/1988

Nevada

Chemical

Explosion

383

14/11/1987

Texas

Petrochemical

VCE

285

23/07/1984

Illinois

Refinery

VCE

268

04/03/1977

Qatar

Gas Plant

VCE

174

01/06/1974

England

Petrochemical

VCE

164

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leading to the large

property damage for
refineries, gas plants,
petrochemical plants
and offshore oil and
gas production were
attributed to:
Inadequate PHAs/
QRAs/Risk Assessments
Use of wrong or
poorly designed
equipment
Inadequate indication
of process conditions
Inadequate management of change
process
Lack of strong mechanical integrity
program
Lack of enforcement
of Lockout/Tagout
procedures
Warnings from near
misses, other accidents went unheeded

nised with the focus on Risk Management and implementation of

Risk Based Inspection. Increasing
number of plants have implemented Risk Based Inspection
although it is important to recognise that the majority, however,
have been using qualitative methods that do not provide information
about the actual risk level and how
changes to the inspection and
Figure 1: Average losses related to various refinery
maintenance practises affect the in[1]
equipment
dividual equipment risk and the
overall risk level.
It can be speculated why there
is a trend towards increasing
number of large property losses
in the hydrocarbon industry and
in refining in particular, as seen
from Figure 2.
Plants inevitably get older and
risk increases due to ongoing
damage such as corrosion, fatigue, creep, etc. However, in
times of increasing competition
Figure 2: 5 year interval comparison of number of
and low margins, plant owners
refinery losses world-wide [1]
are trying to sweat their assets
whilst lowering
their operating
Based on the statistics it is found
expenses, which
that refineries accounted for almeans
that
most half of the largest losses
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
ce
world-wide. Figure 1 shows that
and
inspection
piping and heaters account for the
activities may
largest average losses in refinersuffer and are no
ies. Leaks causing vapour cloud
longer adequate
explosions (VCE) are the worst
to maintain the
case loss scenarios and as seen
required safety
from Table 1, 44% of the major
level. The challosses in petrochemical, refinerFigure 3: The asset integrity and plant optimisation
lenge to the plant
ies and gas plants were caused by
challenge
owners is illusVCEs and 38% by explosions.
trated schematically in Figure 3.
Hence, the integrity of pressure
All the above causes are related
To improve overall plant profitcontaining equipment is of major
to the elements of process safety
ability,
Maintenance, Inspection,
concern and the trend of increasmanagement, mechanical integrity
and
Reliability
must play a key role
ing number of losses in the
and change management. Some of
together
with
Operations
and the
hydrocarbon industry overall and
the failures have also been associfactors that affect asset (equipment)
among the refineries in particular
ated with improper design of the
performance and availability must
is very worrying, additionally so
equipment for particular process
be thoroughly understood.
as plants gets older. Figure 2
conditions such as wrong material
By assessing past performance,
shows a 5-year comparison perselection. Furthermore, the imporidentifying the risk among inditaining to number of losses in
tance of including the actual
vidual equipment and identifying
refineries according to James
condition and operation of the
[1]
opportunity areas for improveCoco .
plant equipment in risk assessments
ment, plants can move towards a
The root causes of the accidents
is becoming more widely recog-

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HYDROCARBON ASIA, MARCH/APRIL 2003

39

Asset management

risk based management philosophy

New regulations
reflecting the latest thinking in:
pertaining to HSE, PSM
Reliability Centred Maintenance
and MI
Risk Based Inspection
Changes to HSE regulations have
Life Cycle Analysis
been implemented or will be im Unit Performance Analysis
plemented within a few years in
Work Order Automation
many countries in Asia, including
It is of utmost importance that
Indonesia and Malaysia. Regulaactivities arising out of the Asset
tions are changing from being
Management Strategy support the
prescriptive to becoming functionPSM program with regard to Meality or risk based. In Australia,
chanical Integrity, Process Safety
following the tragic Esso Longford
Information, Management of
Gasplant accident a new regulaChange, and Training among
tion by the Victorian Government
others. To accomplish this, the asregarding Asset Integrity has been
set register, SAP, RBI and RCM
enforced [4]. This is the Asset Integsoftware, corrosion management
rity Management under the
database and reliability software
Occupational Health and Safety
systems will ultimately require in(Major Hazard Facilities) Regulategration so that changes in one
tions MHD GN 18 Rev D February
equipment item is recognised in
2002. The core concepts of this
the plant-wide system.
regulation are as follows:
Reliability software systems for
Asset Integrity programmes proquantitative assessments of equipvide the mechanisms by which
ment criticality would also
the integrity of equipment and
normally include methods and
control systems is ensured. Mantools for reliability, availability
aging the integrity of an asset
and maintainability (RAM 1 ) simuinvolves a broad understanding
lation to identify critical units,
of the lifespan of the asset, its
current age and the rate at which
systems, functions, equipment and
it is ageing.
processes and to support the RCM
The integrity of equipment beanalysis.
gins with, and subsequently relies
Procedures for handling situaupon, an accurate, comprehentions where code requirements are
sive, written definition of design,
no longer satisfied need to be imoperating and maintenance
plemented as part of the
parameters.
Mechanical Integrity procedures.
The Asset Integrity management
These situations must be handled
programme should be subject
by having an appropriate system
for Fitness-For-Service and remainto continual improvement via
a series of relevant feedback
ing life assessment in place to
ensure safe operation
even if equipment
temporary or permanently no longer meets
the code requirements. Appropriate
references are API RP
579 Fitness-For-Service [2] and BS 7910 :
1999 : Guide on
methods for assessing
the acceptability of
flaws in metallic struc- Figure 4: Pareto curve from RBI analyses of
Chemical plant 900 equipment and piping items
tures [3].

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HYDROCARBON ASIA, MARCH/APRIL 2003

mechanisms. This means that systems managing fault-reporting,

the availability and deployment
of suitable personnel and equipment and the scheduling and
ranking of routine maintenance
activities should be audited to
ensure they are implemented as
intended.
The tools that may be utilised in
the maintenance and measurement
of asset integrity include reliability
engineering, reliability centred
maintenance, determination of
critical operating parameters / safe
operating windows and inspection
(including non-destructive testing
and risk-based inspection).
It is apparent from the above
Victorian Government regulation
for Asset Integrity Assurance that
tools such as Reliability Centred
Maintenance and Risk Based Inspection play a prominent role in
the maintenance and monitoring
of the effectiveness of asset integrity system.

DNVs risk based inspection

approach
A methodology for RISK BASED
INSPECTION (RBI) has been developed by the American Petroleum
Institutes (API) Committee on Refinery Equipment and Det Norske
Veritas (DNV). This methodology
has been documented in the Base
Resource Document for Risk Based
Inspection [5] API publication 581
and the API recommended Practise RP 580 on application of RBI.
DNV has developed RBI software
for API and DNVs own ORBIT
Onshore for refineries and petrochemical plants based on API 581.
The software calculates the risk for
each individual equipment and piping item using the expression:

where Pof is the probability of

failure.
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DNV has recently issued a

Recommended Practice DNV-RPG101: Risk Based Inspection of
Offshore Topside Static Mechanical Equipment [6] . This
recommended practice describes
the approach to Risk Based Inspection of Offshore topsides piping and
pressure vessels. The methodology
is essentially similar to the API 581
methodology but differs due to the
different consequence analyses (escalation assumed) and that it does
not use generic failure frequencies
(GFF) for the starting point for the
probability of failure calculations
but is using limit state functions
describing the various damage
mechanisms and a calibrated
probabilistic analyses model.
RBI combines knowledge of damage mechanisms and damage
progression rates, inspection effectiveness with load and resistance
models to determine the probability of failure causing leaks with the
consequence of failure to obtain
the risk. Conventional quantitative
risk assessment methodologies are
used to assess the consequences of

these leaks. A quantified ranking

of process equipment and piping
in terms of personnel and environmental risk, loss of production and
damage cost, focuses the inspection towards high risk components
and potential/active inspectable
damage mechanisms for an optimal utilisation of inspection
resources on key assets. In any plant
a relatively large percentage of risk
is usually associated with a small
percentage of the equipment. A
typical example of the cumulative
risk for a chemical plant with 900
equipment items derived by RBI
analyses is shown in Figure 4. It is
seen that a small portion of the
equipment i.e. 10% of the equipment items contribute 93% of the
risk of operation.

DNVs approach to
streamlined RCM
and RCAM
Streamlined RCM processes essentially the same as applied by
DNV has been implemented successfully by Shell and ExxonMobil
and is still the method of choice

for most refining and process facilities.

It is pertinent to ask how does
streamlined RCM mirror the conventional RCM process and how
does it differ?
A comparison between the classical, Aladon Ltd., RCM process to
the streamlined RCM process with
regards to the seven questions asked
in performing classical RCM is
shown in Table 2.
The first question, when using
the classical RCM approach,
would define the function of each
physical asset. This would
lengthen the analysis time by defining what each pump, motor,
exchanger, control loop, etc.
would do to support the process.
The streamlined method would
define the function of a system of
components. An example would
be a feed preparation function
where several pumps, filters, heat
exchangers and control loops
would all be analysed as performing the one function of Deliver
preheated, filtered feed to furnace
section at a rate of 2300 to 2500

TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF THE SEVEN QUESTIONS ASKED IN

CLASSICAL AND STREAMLINED RCM.
1

2
3
4
5

The seven questions asked in

performing classical RCM
What are the functions and the
associated performance standards of the
asset in its present operating context?
In what ways does the asset fail to fulfil
its functions?
What causes each functional failure?
What happens when each functional
its functions?
In what way does each failure matter?

What can be done to predict or prevent

each failure?

What if a suitable predictive or preventive

task cannot be found?

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The comparable questions asked in

performing streamlined RCM
What is the function of the system of components
being analysed and the corresponding functional
failures?
For each component integral in performing the
function, what are the failure modes?
What are the functional failure effects?
Is the functional failure effect critical or non-critical?
(Specific criteria are developed to determine criticality)
If failure effect is critical, what are the dominant, failure
causes for each failure mode?
For each dominant failure cause, is there a
recommended task or action to
a) mitigate the effects of failure
b) extend the time between failures
c) detect a hidden failure
If failure effect is non-critical, are there specific reasons
for performing cost effective maintenance?

HYDROCARBON ASIA, MARCH/APRIL 2003

41

Asset management

bpd and a temperature and pressure of 260 deg F, 125 psig. The
functional failure would in most
cases simply be Fails to deliver
preheated, filtered feed.
Question number two in the classical method refers to how the
functional failure of each asset is
defined. This is sometimes referred
to as failure states.
In the streamlined process, the
idea is similar but failure states are
referred to as failure modes and
are only applied to the functional
failure at the system level.
Question three is used in classical RCM to determine failure
causes. This provides an in-depth
analysis of each identified cause of
failure. Streamlined RCM uses the
failure modes from question two to
determine the failure effects of each
components failure mode. The big
difference here is the large number
of failure causes versus the relatively small number of failure
modes. Example: for a process
pump, the failure causes in classical RCM would normally include;
corrosion, impeller wear, seal leakage, lack of lubrication, bearing
seizure, fouling, etc. the failure
modes used in streamlined RCM
are simply fails to run, fails to start,
externally leaks.
Question four refers to the failure effects in the classical process
that streamlined already covered
in question three. Question four in
the streamlined process determines
the criticality of the failure effects.
Example: failure infers plant shutdown, or unit shutdown. Each
failure effect from question three is
compared against a predetermined
criteria of criticality. This can be a
quantified statement, a qualifying
sentence or a weighted matrix;
whichever the client prefers.
Question five on the classical side
is the critical or non-critical determination where the consequences
of failure are defined. The streamlined process asks in question five,

42

HYDROCARBON ASIA, MARCH/APRIL 2003

what are the dominant failure

operation and human resources that
causes? The advantage of asking
are not normally considered for
the question here is that it greatly
classical RCM analyses. Hence,
reduces the time spent determinRCAM therefore involves a number
ing failure effects and also leads
of steps to assess the effectiveness
directly into the task selection step
of systems and processes already
in question six.
in place prior to implementing the
Question number six is similar
new methodology.
for both classical and streamlined.
Following the assessment of the
Classical RCM tends to limit the
effectiveness of existing systems
tasks selected to preventive and
and processes, the actual maintepredictive tasks where streamlined
nance optimisation process is
RCM uses all possible task catnormally conducted as a pilot study
egories in determining the
of selected units at the plant. An
recommended actions. This inoverview of the critical steps of the
cludes design modifications,
streamlined RCM of the RCAM
procedure changes and operational
process is presented by the bullet
strategy considerations.
points below. One key feature of
The seventh question finishes the
the process is the combined RCM
task selection process for both clasand RBI screening analysis.
sical and streamlined RCM. The
RCM - process overview
classical RCM asks if there are any
Project Development
tasks beyond predictive and pre System Screening and Selection
ventive that should be considered.
(Common process for RCM and
The streamlined process determines
RBI)
whether there are cost effective
Risk Criteria Parameters (Agree
tasks that should be performed for
on risk criteria with client)
components that were determined
Functions and Functional Comto be non-critical. The bottom line
ponents
in comparing the two processes is
Component Types and Failure
that the same task recommendaModes
tions, based on failure modes and
Failure Consequences
failure effects, are developed, ready
Failure Cause Determination
to be implemented. Experience
Task Selection
shows that the streamlined method
Maintenance Optimisation and
accomplishes this in only 10% to
task bundling with inspection
20% of the time.
activities
Apart from the differences be Implementation
tween the DNV streamlined RCM
approach and classical RCM
there is another very important difference. Whereas
conventional RCM is normally
only focused on planning and
scheduling of maintenance activities, the DNV approach also
involves the other parts of Mechanical Integrity. These are
the elements of the Reliability
Centred Asset Management
(RCAM) process. The DNV
RCAM process recognises that
successful mechanical integrity relies on many factors Figure 5: Four stages of development of
related to management, design maintenance strategies
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