Manila Prince Hotel v.

GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter
to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise
of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,

prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to
operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC

G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997

FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case
for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between
petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising
the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by
Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act
as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would
constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The
use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes
that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the
law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide
for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a

subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national
and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the
Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

gumalal digest
LAMBINO V. COMELEC (2006)
EN BANC
[ G.R. NO. 174153, October 25, 2006 ]
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.
ALTERNATIVE

LAW

GROUPS,

INC.,

INTERVENOR.

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON

III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
INTERVENORS.
ATTY.

PETE

QUIRINO

QUADRA,

INTERVENOR.

BAYAN REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON DR. CAROLINA PAGADUANARAULLO, BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON DR. REYNALDO
LESACA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL
JOEL MAGLUNSOD, HEAD REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL DR.
GENE ALZONA NISPEROS, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM REPRESENTED BY
FR. DIONITO CABILLAS, MIGRANTE REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON
CONCEPCION BRAGAS-REGALADO, GABRIELA REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY GENERAL EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
REPRESENTED BY SEC. GEN. CRISTINA PALABAY, ANAKBAYAN REPRESENTED
BY CHAIRPERSON ELEANOR DE GUZMAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
REPRESENTED BY CHAIR VENCER CRISOSTOMO PALABAY, JOJO PINEDA OF
THE LEAGUE OF CONCERNED PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSMEN, DR.
DARBY SANTIAGO OF THE SOLIDARITY OF HEALTH AGAINST CHARTER
CHANGE, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS OF HEALTH ACTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERVENORS.
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, AND ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
INTERVENORS.
LUWALHATI
ARTURO
TRADE

RIACASA
M.

UNION

LUWALHATI

DE

CONGRESS
RICASA

OF

ANTONINO,

INTERVENOR.

CASTRO,

INTERVENOR.

THE PHILIPPINES,
ANTONINO,

INTERVENOR.
INTERVENOR.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.

ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN,
JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, AND AMADO GAT INCIONG,

INTERVENORS.
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, AND RUELO BAYA,
INTERVENORS.
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
AND
MR.
VICTORINO
F.
BALAIS,
INTERVENORS.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL
VILLAR,
JR.,
INTERVENOR.
SULONG

BAYAN

MOVEMENT

FOUNDATION,

INC.,

INTERVENOR.

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,

ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, AND RANDALL TABAYOYONG, INTERVENORS.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
INTERVENORS.
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEGA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S.
LIM
AND
PANFILO
LACSON,
INTERVENORS.
JOSEPH EJERCITO
INTERVENORS.
[G.R.

ESTRADA

AND
NO.

PWERSA

NG

MASANG

PILIPINO,
174299]

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., AND RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY
CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., AND COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION
Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups[1] and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with theCOMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)[2] and Section 7[3] of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative
and
Referendum
Act
("RA
6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million
individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 17 of Article VI (Legislative Department) [4] and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)[5] and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." [6] These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections[8] declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend
the
Constitution.[9]

Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1.
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
2.

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling
3.

There

is

no

merit

to

the

petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution
for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisitSantiago, as the present
petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The
Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court
exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative,

propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to

allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this
Court's raison
d'etre.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

MENDOZA V COMELEC (2010)

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010 ]
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO
M. PAGDANGANAN, RESPONDENTS.

PEREZ, J.:

Facts
This case involves the election protest filed with the Commission on Elections
against Joselito R. Mendoza (Mendoza), who was proclaimed elected Governor of
Bulacan in the 14 May 2007 elections. Mendoza garnered 364,566 votes while
private respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) got 348,834 votes,
giving Mendoza a winning margin of 15,732 votes.
After the appreciation of the contested ballots, the COMELEC Second Division
deducted a total of 20,236 votes from Mendoza and 616 votes from Pagdanganan.
As regards the claimed ballots, Mendoza was awarded 587 ballots compared to
Pagdanganan's 586 ballots. Thus, the result of the revision proceedings showed that
Pagdanganan obtained 342,295 votes, which is more than Mendoza's 337,974
votes. In its Resolution dated 1 December 2009 (Division Resolution), the COMELEC
Second Division annulled the proclamation of Mendoza and proclaimed
Pagdanganan as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan with a winning margin of
4,321 votes.

The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Division Resolution on 8 February 2010. On 4 March
2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order denying Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration
and granting Pagdanganan's Motion for Execution of the Division Resolution
Issue

Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion when it failed to credit petitioner's
claims?
Whether or not, the COMELEC en banc has the power to hear and decide the case.

Ruling
Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact that despite the
existence in its books of the clearly worded Section 6 of Rule 18, which incidentally has been
acknowledged by this Court in the recent case of Marcoleta v COMELEC,[5] itcompletely ignored
and disregarded its very own decree and proceeded with the questioned Resolution of 8 February
2010 and Order of 4 March 2010, in all, annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R.
Mendoza as the duly elected governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza to cease
and desist from performing the functions of the Governor of Bulacan and to vacate said office in
favor
of
respondent
Roberto
M.
Pagdanganan.
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is underscored by the fact that the protest that
petitioner Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007 overstayed with the COMELEC until the present
election year when the end of the term of the contested office is at hand and there was hardly
enough time for the re-hearing that was conducted only on 15 February 2010. As the hearing
time at the division had run out, and the re-hearing time at the banc was fast running out, the
unwanted result came about: incomplete appreciation of ballots; invalidation of ballots on
general and unspecific grounds; unrebutted presumption of validity of ballots.
Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does
not have the authority to decide election cases in the first instance as this authority belongs to the
divisions of the COMELEC Specifically.
Sec.3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission En
Banc.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution of the COMELEC
promulgated on 8 February 2010 in EPC No. 2007-44 entitled "Roberto M. Pagdanganan v.
Joselito R. Mendoza," the Order issued on 4 March 2010, and the consequent Writ of Execution
dated 5 March 2010 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.The election protest of respondent
Roberto M. Pagdanganan is hereby DISMISSED.