Information Dominance as an Affirmative Countermeasure against

International Terrorism

by
Peter Reynolds Stephenson

Abstract
This paper hypothesizes that it is possible and practical to apply information
dominance as an affirmative countermeasure against terrorism by non-state actors in
much the same manner that states use information superiority in the conduct of
international politics and economics. The issue that it addresses is whether or not there is
sufficient foundational information relating to terrorism, information science,
international law and information warfare to develop a generalized meta-framework for
applying concepts of information dominance in a counter-terrorism context much as these
principles are applied in modern state-on-state warfare.
The paper examines all of these foundational areas and applies the findings to the
development of an information dominance meta-framework, or a framework of
frameworks applied specifically to the problem of counter-terrorism. The author
concludes that such a meta-framework is both feasible and practical.
The meta-framework (The Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance
Framework, or CTIDF), is constructed based upon information, techniques and
technologies that are well established in their various fields. Simply put, the CTIDF is a
comprehensive, interdisciplinary, holistic approach to the application of elements of
information conflict to the problem of counter-terrorism.
This paper is a summation of the thesis (unpublished) prepared in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the authors Master of Arts in Diplomacy degree at
Norwich University in June of 2007.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper breaks new ground in the application of several information
technologies. Some of these technologies are what the author refers to as hard
technologies and some are what the author considers soft technologies. Hard
technologies are those that lean towards application of computer and communications
systems to problems of information management. Soft technologies are those that lean
more towards sociology and information content. When these technologies combine,
they offer opportunities for the use of information both as an offensive weapon and as a
defensive tool.
In this paper, the author explores one application of this approach that he refers to
as information dominance. Information dominance is a term that one generally sees used
in a state-on-state context. However, here the author attempts to generalize the term and
codify exactly what it means. In that regard, the concept of information dominance
theory allows broad application as a framework for more common techniques of
information warfare and information operations. Specifically, this paper looks at the
potential application of information dominance in the context of counter-terrorism.

2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Information Conflict
The literature on information conflict and related topics as a basis for international
relations is surprisingly rich. This literature falls into two distinct categories. First, there
is the theoretical literature. This explores various concepts of information conflict as they
apply to international relations in the information age. The second category comprises
operational treatises, often written by military authors. While this body of work does not
address terrorism directly, it does lay groundwork for further discussion in that context.

2.2 Terrorism
There is a growing body of literature on terrorism. This literature addresses the
topic of terrorism in at least four distinct ways:

Historical foundations for terrorism

Terrorism motivations

State sponsorship of terrorism

Major terrorist groups, their histories, motivations, strategies and tactics

2.3 Important Foundational Research

One of the earliest discussions on the convergence of terrorism and information
systems appears on the Information Warfare Site on the Internet. Galley discusses the
concept of computer terrorism and concludes that it is possible, even likely (Galley;
1996). He writes: It would be suicidal for any dictator such as Saddam Hussein at the
present time to conceive a major offensive without benefiting of the advantages from the
principal Achilles' heel of the Western civilization: information systems.

In retrospect, we know that Hussein did, in fact, attempt to manipulate

information systems but not quite in the manner that Galley suggests. Rather, Hussein
attempted to use propaganda, misinformation and disinformation to influence both his
own people and the rest of the world.
The first cogent public discussion of information warfare in the context of
terrorism appeared in 1999 (Denning; 1999 pp 68-74). In her book Information Warfare
and Security Denning discusses several facets of information warfare that range from
cyber warfare (including what today is called computer network attack or CNA) to
misinformation and disinformation. She quotes Mark Pollitt, then a special agent in the
FBI but, ultimately, the chief of the FBIs computer forensics laboratory, as defining
cyber terrorism as,
the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information,
computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.
(Pollitt; 1997 in Denning; 1999 p 69)
She further reports the first known instance of a cyber attack (1998) by terrorists:

[E]thnic Tamil guerrillas were said to have swamped Sri Lankan

embassies with thousands of electronic mail messages. The messages read
"we are the Internet Black Tigers and were doing this to disrupt your
communications." An offshoot of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
which have been fighting for an independent homeland for minority
Tamils, was responsible for the incident." (Wolf; 1998 in Denning; 1999 p
69)
However, Arquilla and Ronfeldt foresaw the emergence of cyber war as early as
1993 and described it as,
conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to

information-related principles. It means disrupting if not destroying the

information and communications systems, broadly defined to include even
military culture, on which an adversary relies in order to know itself:
who it is, where it is, what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threats
to counter first, etc. It means trying to know all about an adversary while
keeping it from knowing much about oneself. It means turning the
balance of information and knowledge in ones favor, especially if the
balance of forces is not. It means using knowledge so that less capital and
labor may have to be expended. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1993)
This description was important because it began the process of defining the notion of
information conflict. This early work evolved by 1999 to include a well-formed vision of
the realm of information conflict as we see it emerging today. Although they did not
connect cyber war with terrorism, their description in 1993 did not preclude later
application of information conflict in a terrorism context.
Dunn was an early leader in expanding the notions of information warfare and
traditional international relations theory into a single, converged concept (Dunn; 2002).
Eriksson and Giacomello (Eriksson and Giacomello; 2004) expand independently on
Dunns theories (although they do not cite Dunn in their paper) and offer a superb
bibliography of supporting references.
Armistead (Armistead; 2004), however, took some of the most important steps in
converging international relations theory, information warfare and information operations
into a single set of converged concepts that supported practical application.

Building on

Dunns work, he also expanded the seminal work of Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and
Ronfeldt; 1999).
Arquilla and Ronfeldt developed and expanded the notion of noopolitik, which
included the notion of the noosphere. This was an important step forward because it
recognized information, not simply information systems, as a key element of information

warfare and information operations. It built upon their earlier work (Arquilla and
Ronfeldt; 1993) and of others published in a book edited by them called In Athenas
Camp (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 2003). From a theoretical perspective, the topics addressed
in this collection of essays were seminal in shaping thinking about information conflict
but still did not address terrorism directly.
Significant, though perhaps unintended, insight on the relationships of
information warfare and terrorist insurgencies comes from work by ONeil (O'Neil; 205).
In his book, the author describes nine succinct insurgent types and a well-developed
discussion of effects of disunity within insurgent/terrorist groups. This discussion offers
insights into ways to use information warfare to disrupt terrorist groups and lessen their
effectiveness. One final important paper in this regard deserves our attention. The
Militant Ideology Atlas (Combating Terrorism Center; 2006) offers insights into
militant groups, their relationships and the nature and sources of their ideologies.
An important foundation for any discussion of conflict in cyberspace is
international law of conflict. The preeminent authority on international law in
cyberspace is Wingfield and his book The Law of Information Conflict (Wingfield; 2000)
is the authoritative reference on the topic.

2.4 The Nature of Information Conflict

Information conflict is not yet well understood and has not yet reached the level
of a formal discipline. Armistead, Dunn, and Arquilla and Ronfeldt are the primary direct
contributors, although supporting theories from such indirect contributors as Shannon
(information theory) are important.

2.4.1 The Infosphere: Information Battlespace in the Twenty-First

Century
One of the most important concepts when one considers information conflict is
the difference between hard and soft power. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and
Ronfeldt; 1999) introduced the concept of noopolitik. Noopolitik is defined by Arquilla
and Ronfeldt as foreign-policy behavior for the information age that emphasizes the
primacy of ideas, values, norms, laws and ethicsit would work through soft power
rather than hard power.
The author discusses this notion in detail in a paper produced as part of the Master
of Arts in diplomacy program at Norwich University (Stephenson; 2006). Soft power, in
the context of noopolitik, is the power of information. However, information comes in
many guises. Even when one considers information, one may make a distinction between
the hard power end of the information continuum and soft power. Thus, we describe the
information continuum as bipolarextending from the hard power pole in the context of
information (cyber conflict) to the soft power pole (pure information and thought). In the
center of the continuum is the space where hard and soft power converges. The soft
power pole of the continuum we refer to as the noosphere. The convergence we refer to
as the infosphere. The hard power pole comprises cyber events (i.e., those actions that
predominantly involve technology). We may represent this bipolar information
continuum graphically as shown in Figure one.

Figure 1 - Information Continuum

Most information conflict takes place in the infosphere. However, certain forms
of information conflict operations may occur at either the hard or soft power ends of the
continuum. At the cyber end, we find computer network attack (CNA) and other
technical operations such as the development of web sites on the Internet. At the
noosphere end, we find pure information that may include propaganda, misinfor mation,
and disinformation, especially as web site content. Therefore, information conflict, and
especially information operations as waged by information warriors, 1 may occur in all
three areas of the continuum, but its results will be most observable in the infosphere.
We may break information conflict into the subsets of offensive conflict and
defensive conflict. While this paper will address both of these subsets, the author is most
concerned with the application of offensive information conflict in the context of
counterterrorism.
We may apply the concept of the information continuum to describe the
interactions of hard and soft power within a second continuum: that of criminal activity
and warfare. Information conflict is present in contexts other than war. One can observe
the effects of information conflict even in the corporate world. For example, the
manipulation of information that positively portrays one organization and negatively
portrays that organization's competition is a form of information conflict.
Criminal organizations such as gangs may use elements of information conflict
for intimidation (e.g., gang graffiti) at the soft end of the continuum. The author has
direct experience with the use of information conflict in an attempt by a fraudster to
Information warriors include those individuals with specialized capabilities such as experts in
cyber conflict, hackers, propagandists, public relations experts, intelligence analysts, and political analysts.
1

implicate his partner in a federal crime. In this example, the fraudster used a trivial
example of an information operation to penetrate his partner's computer and place
incriminating evidence in the form of documents on that computer.
Because information conflict can apply to the second continuum of criminal
activity to warfare, we may add a dimension to the graphical representation in Figure one.
We illustrate that additional dimension in Figure 2.

Figure 2 - S econd Dimension of Information Conflict: Criminal -Warfare Continuum

Any operation, tactic, or strategy that includes or depends for its success on the
manipulation of information in any form and the subsequent manipulation of individuals,
groups of individuals, or populations is an example of information conflict. For reasons
that this paper will examine in a later section, the application of the tactics and strategies
of information conflict to the problem of counterterrorism may be promising.
It also is practical to superimpose the notion of terrorism upon the representation
in Figure 2. Some have suggested that terrorism has strong criminal elements associated
with it. For example, the Interparliamentary Union, an international organization of
parliaments of sovereign states:
Unequivocally condemns terrorism as a criminal act, noting that terrorism
endangers the territorial integrity of countries and their national and
international security, destroys innocent lives and the physical and

economic infrastructure, and destabilises not only legitimately constituted

governments but society as a whole. (Interparliamentary Union; 2003)
Terrorism, as well, is a criminal act as determined in the Article 155 of the
Criminal Code of the Republic Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan; 2005). Many other countries
including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United
States consider terrorism to be a criminal act (The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs; 2005). With that characterization in mind, we can superimpose
the notion of terrorism as a criminal act on the graphical representation of Figure 2.
Figure 3 now shows a nearly complete graphical representation of information conflict.

Figure 3 - Inclusion of Terrorism in the Graphical Representation of Information Conflict

From Figure 3 we can see that terrorism falls in the continuum between criminal
activity and warfare containing elements of both. We may also surmise that information
conflict relating to terrorism, as with the rest of the continuum between criminal activity
and warfare, appears largely in the infosphere. However, this is not to imply that there
are no elements of information conflict relating to terrorism at either of the opposite poles
of the continuum.

We could add a third dimensiona Z-axisthat relates to other uses of the

continuum, intelligence, for example. One might think of the Z-axis as consisting of
slices that mirror and are behind the continuum of Figure 3. We position these slices
along the Z-axis extending from operational intelligence (closest to the front) to pure
intelligence that consists largely of situation reports without any direct resultant action
implied. Each slice stands alone as an explicit definition of an intelligence goal within
the overall continuum illustrated in Figure 3.
2.4.2 Information Theory
Claude E. Shannon first expounded the notion of information theory in 1948
(Shannon; 1948). According to Shannon: The fundamental problem of communication
is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at
another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are
correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities.
While Shannon concentrated largely on the engineering problems associated with
communication, the basic description of the communication problem leads to an
understanding of how one may apply elements of both offensive and defensive
information conflict to one's benefit. Shannon provides a graphical representation of a
generalized communication system. His representation is reproduced in Figure 4.

Figure 4 - S hannon's S chematic Diagram of a General Communication S ystem

Shannon applies the notion of entropy to his theory of information systems.

Shannon's definition of information entropy is the measure of the average information
content that may be associated with a random outcome. If, probabilistically, there is an
equal likelihood of all potential outcomes, the value of entropy is at the maximum. If, on
the other hand, the outcome is a probabilistic certainty, the value of entropy is zero. The
objective of the communication system is to achieve entropy of zero.
However, as we can see from Figure 4, the potential for the injection of noise in
the signal path between the transmitter and the receiver exists. By way of clarification,
the notions of an information transmitter and an information receiver do not necessarily
connote technical objects.
Consider the child's game of telephone. As a simple message passes from one
end of a line of children to the other, it is likely that the message received at the distant
end will not be the same message sent from the original transmitter. In this case, each
child with the exception of the first and last in the row is both a transmitter and a
receiver. Each child receives the message and passes it to the next child in line. The
process continues until the final child (receiver) receives the message. Because each
child is not only a transmitter and a receiver, but also a noise source, entropy generally is

greater than zero.

One might also interpret this process as consisting of a transmitter (first child in
the row), a receiver (last child in the row) and a noise source (all of the other children
between the transmitter and the receiver). This analysis allows us to hypothesize that by
controlling the noise source one might control the entropy of the information at the
receiver, achieving the level of entropy desired. This has interesting implications in the
use of information conflict as a countermeasure to terrorism.
For example, one might insert misinformation or disinformation (noise) in the
transmission path (web site, communications link, or other means of conveying
information) from a terrorist leader (ideological leaders such as political theorists,
religious figures, etc.) to terrorist groups in the field. As well, one might reinterpret
ideological mandates. Transmitting credible analyses of fundamental ideological tenets
with the analysis slightly shifted (noise) to one's benefit might well have an impact upon
an ideologically driven enemy.
Additionally, when it is to ones benefit, one might insure that there is no noise in
the transmission and that a clear message with entropy of zero arrives at the receiver.
Shannon graphically describes how to accomplish this. His representation appears in
Figure 5.

Figure 5 - S hannon's S chematic Diagram of a Correction S ystem

Notice in Figure 5 that a Correction System requires an observer, the role of

which is to (1) collect information from the source (prior to transmission) and the
destination (after receiving), (2) compare the two versions of the information and (3)
submit the corrected version to a correcting device that delivers the information to the
destination.
Considering figures 4 and 5 one might conjecture that the management of
information based upon Shannon information theory is not simply interesting but,
arguably, useful as a tool of information conflict. Managing information becomes an
exercise in managing entropy. One may manage entropy at multiple points on the
information continuum shown in Figure 3. The mathematical analyses in the Shannon
paper are rigorous and are beyond the scope of this paper.
2.4.3 Scale-Free Networks
Barabasi and Albert first described the concept of scale-free networks in 1999
(Barabasi and Albert; 1999). In their early descriptions, Barabasi and others demonstrate
the concept through examples including the Internet, World Wide Web, and certain types

of social networks (Barabasi, Ravasz, and Vicsek; 2001). These networks contradicted
earlier views of network growth (Erdos and Renyi; 1959, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1-25;
2002) that viewed networks as growing like chains, stars or all-channel networks where
all nodes connect more or less randomly to each other. Erdos graphed these networks as
a typical bell curve while Barabasi, et al described them as power law networks.
An important aspect of scale-free, or power law, networks is the concept of
preferential attachments. These networks are characterized by growth (continued
expansion) and preferential attachment (new nodes prefer to attach to nodes with the
largest number of already connected nodes) (Barabasi and Jeong; 2003).
Besides a new view of the growth of scale-free networks, Barabasi and his
colleagues described another important factor. Scale-free networks are extremely
resistant to error and failure but are not resistant to attack (Barabasi, Albert, and Jeong;
2000). These factors (preferential attachment and error/attack tolerance) become
extremely important when using information superiority as a countermeasure against a
terrorist network.
2.4.3.1 Social Networks as Scale-Free Networks
While Barabasi et al described social networks in general as scale-free, other
researchers extended that concept to include, explicitly, terrorist groups and terrorist acts
(Matthew and Shambaugh; 2005, Clauset and Young; 2005, Stripling; 2007). Of these,
the Stripling paper may prove the most valuable in that it extends and updates Barabasis
theory relative, explicitly, to terrorist networks and, more specifically, to the al Qaeda
network.

In his paper, Stripling adds the notion of directed links between nodes showing
that not all terrorist links are two-way. This accounts for different types of interactions
within the same network (financial support, logistical support, training support,
operational support, etc.). These interactions characterize the state of global terrorist
networks well. Since the early years of this century, terrorist networks have tended to
become far less centralized than they were in the 1990s and earlier.
Because a successful attack against a scale-free network depends upon disabling a
critical number of nodes, and because other nodes tend to attempt to rebuild the network
after a failure, two important points emerge. First, disabling links is not an effective way
to disable a scale-free network because the links will re-establish wherever possible.
Second, a critical mass of node destruction must occur before the network becomes
effectively disabled. Two groups of researchers have shown that careful selection
(targeting) of nodes can cause a cascading effect that will bring down the network
(Motter and Lai; 2002, Moreno, Gomez, and Pacheco; 2002). Inducement of a cascading
effect using information superiority may affect terrorist networks and may offer an
effective countermeasure against them.
Another strong proponent of the notion of scale-free social networks (although he
refers to them as small world networks) is Sageman (Sageman; 2004). Sageman has
taken the work of Barabasi et al and applied it to his seminal work on characterizing
terrorist networks.
2.4.4 Information Superiority
The notion of soft power is a staple in the writings of Dunn (Dunn; 2002) and

Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1999). Additionally, Armistead wrote an
entire book on the topic of soft power and its role in modern warfare (Armistead; 2004),
building upon the work of Dunn and Arquilla and Ronfeldt. This author explored these
writers in the context of various lenses on international relations and proposed a theory of
information dominance that builds upon prior work in the field (Stephenson; 2007).
Armistead, however, did not expand extensively on why traditional views of
international relations are limited in the context of the information age. For that we must
turn to the writings of Eriksson and Giacomello (Eriksson and Giacomello; 2004).
Another challenge is that virtually all theories of international relations, including
those proposed by the above writers and researchers do well at analyzing events that have
passed but have proven, based upon this writers research, to be weak at anticipating
trends or events of interest. Thus, beyond providing basic understanding of why things
happened the way that they happened, virtually no current theory offers a direct path to
actionable intelligence.
2.4.4.1 Information Dominance Theory
This author proposed a theory of information dominance that takes into account
the need to anticipate the actions of an organization or state. Information dominance
theory uses Rosens definition of anticipatory systems for the purpose of expanding upon
the past and anticipating the future (Rosen; 1985). Rosen defines an anticipatory system:
An anticipatory system is a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its
environment that allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the models

predictions pertaining to a later instant.

We also may turn to Rosen for a concrete description of complexity (Rosen;
1998), A system is simple if all its models are simulable. A system that is not simple,
and that accordingly must have a nonsimulable model, is complex.
This is important because this author speculates (Stephenson; Feb 2006) that part
of the difficulty in developing an anticipatory international relations theory is the
complexity of such systems. This complexity increases when the target is not a welldefined nation-state, but, rather, is a non-state entity such as a terrorist group or network.
However, the success of a program of information dominance as an affirmative
countermeasure against terrorism requires an anticipatory system to be useful. The
authors paper proposes:

[A] theory of IR that views international politics viewed through the

lens of information operations as a Theory of Information Dominance. By
its name, one can see that this theory would share concepts with structural
realism in that it seeks to explain the relationship of an actor to its
environment from the perspective of power. This is consistent with
Dunns thinking.
Information Dominance Theory must account for a broad discourse on
international politics, economy, law, military power and other elements of
international relations. It also would be useful if such a theory could
anticipate the behavior of actors on the international stage.
The application of Rosens theory of anticipatory systems to create appropriate
models, along with information dominance and social network theory may offer the
underpinnings of an actionable response to extremist terrorism using information warfare
and operations.

2.4.5 The Components of Information Conflict

Kopp defines information conflict as a more generalized term used to
describe what most of the literature calls Information Warfare, InfoWar, or IW
(Kopp; 2006). In turn, Wingfield gives the definition of information warfare as
[i]nformation operations conducted during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or
promote specific objective over a specific adversary or adversaries. To understand this
definition, Wingfield also provides a definition of information operations as [a]ctions
taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending ones
own information and information systems. (Wingfield; 2000)
If we look at a somewhat more generalized characterization of information
conflict, we find that it contains elements of information warfare, information operations
and cyber warfare or cyber conflict (information warfare restricted to cyberspace).
2.4.5.1 Active and Passive Information Conflict
We may characterize information conflict in other ways as well. One
differentiator is whether the operations involved are active or passive. Active
information conflict includes actions taken in the context of exploiting an adversary
directly. These are actions taken against the adversary.
Passive information conflict includes defensive action and actions taken against
an adversary without the intent of direct exploitation using those actions. An example of
such an action is reconnaissance or spying. This could involve such activities as
intercepting communications and breaking their cipher if necessary, monitoring public
information from and about the adversary. It might also include accessing information

provided by insiders and espionage agents placed inside the adversarys ranks. Active
and passive information conflict may exist in the context of either offensive or defensive
information conflict.
2.4.5.2 Information Warfare
Information warfare as a concept is not new. Several writers have attempted to
define it and the most common definitions combine the definitions of information warfare
and information operations. Conceptually, information warfare is exploiting an
adversarys information systems while protecting our own. Information warfare
generally is thought of in terms of active, ongoing conflict the same as conventional
warfare.
However, information warfare is not always a hot war. For example, there are
writers who believe that China, although not engaged in a shooting war with the US,
none-the-less, believe that we are at war with China (Jones, et al; 2002, Exhibit 7). The
Chinese view of information warfare focuses, in part, upon preemption or, in terms used
by Sun Tzu, winning war without fighting (Yoshihara; 2000). Yoshihara describes six
pillars of information warfare:
1. Physical Attack/Destruction Use of kinetic (physical) attack to render
offensive IW systems unusable.
2. Electro-Magnetic Warfare Undermining the adversarys IW
capabilities through use of electro-magnetic energy.
3. Computer Network Attack (CNA) Using computers to attack
computers and computer systems.

4. Military Deception Manipulation and falsification of information

misinformation, disinformation, etc.)
5. Psychological Operations use of mechanisms such as propaganda to
influence perceptions.
6. Operations Security Defensive mechanisms that prevent the adversary
from collecting or analyzing your information.
2.4.5.3 Cyber Conflict
Rattray defines cyber conflict as Efforts to dominate/gain advantage in
cyberspace to achieve objectives (Rattray; 2006). In simple terms, cyber conflict is
information conflict in cyber space. Cyber conflict tends toward the technical end of the
information warfare spectrum.
2.4.5.4 Information Operations
Information operation is, arguably, the best understood of the terms related to
information conflict. However, it also is the least stable in terms of solid definitions
because the concepts that make it up are in a constant state of flux.
Generally, information operations are considered part of an information war. The
difficulty with this, however, is that a war implies an ongoing declared conflict with an
identifiable enemy. Information operations may or may not fit cleanly within that
paradigm. Information operations may be carried out as part of a war, to be sure, but they
also may be carried out as individual skirmishes in a propaganda war between states
where no declared hot war exists.
This should not be confused, however, with the notion that information operations

are a subset of information warfare. In fact, in todays parlance, quite the opposite is
true. Information warfare grows out of information operations, not the other way round.
Armistead (Armistead, Chapter 1; 2004) describes information operations both
vertically and horizontally. Vertically, he describes [c]apabilities and related activities
for IO as:

Civil affairs

Computer network attack

Deception

Destruction

Electronic warfare

Operations security

Public affairs

Psychological operations

He differentiates information warfare and information operations based upon the

notion that a war is narrow while information operations are broad. Armisteads
information warfare focuses upon a military infrastructure while information operations
generalizes across economic, political, information and military infrastructures. We may
say, however, that in the context of information conflict, an information operation may
be, but must not necessarily be, part of an information war.

2.5 The Nature of Terrorism

An understanding of terrorism in depth is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, a few key elements determine how one might approach an effective use of

information superiority as a counter-terrorism tactic. The first of these elements is an

understanding of terrorist goals and objectives. This is an element that is not well
understood by most Westerners and it is key to any successful information warfare effort.
The second element is some detail as to the target. While there are hundreds of
terrorist organizations (over 70 in Iraq alone) ranging in size from a few members to al
Qaeda with over 50,000 members worldwide, only a few are of real consequence. Scalefree social network theory implies that by attacking some key groups successfully, we
can disable most of the terrorist infrastructure.
The third element is understanding the tools that terrorists use to plan and execute
their attacks. Finally, a concise characterization of terrorist tactics and motivations is
important. Sun Tzu said, If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear
the result of a hundred battles.2 Understanding what drives terrorists, what their tools are
and how they operate will assist in understanding where their weaknesses are.
2.5.1 Goals of Terrorism
Todays terrorists have multiple goals and their goals have multiple aspects.
Sageman produced a concise study of why Salafist terrorists perform acts of terrorism
(Sageman; 2004). He characterized this group of terrorists, the most prominent of todays
terrorist networks, in the preface to his book as the global Salafi jihad. Sagemans
study was unique in that it drew from detailed first person information about more
than170 mujahadin. It also was unique in that it was the first to explore seriously the
notion of social networks based upon scale-free network theory (referred to by Sageman
2 There are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of translations of this venerable classic on The Art of War.
This one is the 1910 translation from the Chinese by Lionel Giles. It may be found at
http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html.

as small world networks).

Hoffman characterizes terrorist goals as political (Hoffman, 40; 2006). However,
when one examines contemporary terrorism and terrorist groups, one finds that
Sagemans Salafists dominate them. Thus, for the purposes of this paper we will focus
upon Salafists (or as some refer to them, Islamist fundamentalists) and their
motivations.
Islamist motivations are complex and are rooted in strict fundamentalist
interpretation of the Koran and the teachings of Muhammad. Various sects, such as the
Wahabist sect, interpret these teachings so strictly that they have added to and augmented
Islamic teaching to include the duty of jihad. In the early 1900s Sayyid Qtub took up the
Wahabist teachings and proclaimed that there must be jihad to establish a true Muslim
state, a departure from traditional Wahabist doctrine (Sageman, 10ff; 2004).
The duty of jihad consists of the near jihad and the far jihad. The far jihad
aims to create a global jihad with the goal of a global Muslim state. This fundamentalist
interpretation is at the heart of most of the Islamist terrorism seen today. There are other
aspects, such as poverty, a view that justice has bypassed Muslims and other socioeconomic factors. However, before one can address those factors using information
warfare, one must understand the cultural underpinnings of Islamist terrorism. This issue
suggests one fertile target for information operations. Another fertile target, affected by
all of the other factors, is terrorist fund-raising and other support or sponsorship from
individuals, groups and states.
One observable facet of the jihad is its dependence upon communicatio ns.
Communications allow the jihadists to plan terrorist acts, obtain funding, spread

propaganda, proselytize, and recruit followers. These communications comprise every

type from mouth-to-ear conversations to sophisticated use of the Internet and the World
Wide Web. Clearly, Islamist communications fall well within both Shannon
communication theory and the political theories of Dunn, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and
others.
2.5.2 Important Terrorist Groups
Based upon the authors research and open source data, there are over 70 terrorist
groups in Iraq alone.3 Globally, there are at least 76 terrorist groups aligned in one way or
another with al Qaeda. This makes al Qaeda, with an estimated 50,000 members
worldwide, arguably the most important terrorist organization within the Islamist
terrorism networks (MITB; 2007).

2.6 The Law and Information Conflict

In the context of this paper, there is little need to explore this area in depth. Most
of the seminal work on this topic has been done by Wingfield (Wingfie ld; 2000).
However, it is useful to note where the law and information conflict either are adequate
or are inadequate to address terrorist activities.
Many analysts address terrorism and the law both domestically and
internationallyby viewing terrorist acts as criminal acts. In this regard, it may be useful
to analyze the convergence of the law, information conflict and terrorism. To that
purpose, this section offers a brief discussion of the legal issues potentially involved in
the use of information warfare, information operations and cyber conflict as tools for
3

One particularly useful open source for this type of information is MITB Terrorism Knowledge
Base - http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp

counter-terrorism.
The context for this section is counter-terrorism, terrorist groups and sub-national
actors. The question to be answered is, does international or domestic law prohibit the use
of elements of information dominance, especially cyber conflict, in the context of
counter-terrorism? The primary reference for this section is Wingfield; 2000.
Wingfield is very clear:
International communications law contains no direct and specific
prohibition against the conduct of information operations by military
forces, even in peacetime. The established practice of nations provides
persuasive evidence that telecommunications treaties are regarded as
suspended among belligerents during international armed conflicts.
Domestic communications laws do not prohibit properly authorized
military information operations. Accordingly, neither international nor
domestic communications law presents a significant barrier to information
operations by US military forces. (Wingfield, 473; 2000)
What is still unclear is how this affects the use of information operations against a
sub-state actor where there can be no official war in the traditional sense. In this case,
perhaps one must fall back on domestic law, because acts involving telecommunications
and cyber space, originating within that countrys borders, are controlled by that
countrys laws. However, in the absence of any direct prohibitions, we must accept for
now that there are no reasons, either in international or domestic law, why information
operations may not be used, by authorized military personnel, in a conflict against
terrorist groups.