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INTERNAL SECURITY
TERROR THREAT TO INDIA & THE STATE RESPONSE
1.

Changing face of Terrorism

India has been one of the most consistent victims of terrorism since independence. While terrorism in
Punjab started in the early 80s, the oldest and still unsolved violent struggle against the Indian state has
been raging in the North-east part of the country. Even though it has not hogged as much limelight as
terrorism in other states, it is strategically as important as Terrorism in J&K.

The nature of terrorism has undergone a sea change over the last couple of decades. Traditionally, it used
to bound to a particular territory, (for example Punjab or Kashmir Valley). But now, it has become more
defused with no specific area or even a well-defined political objective. This makes tackling the problem
and targeting of terrorists much tougher than ever.

Example: Jihadi Terrorism not only has a Global footprint, the trigger for attacks is also not located within
the country now. There have been attacks in India in retaliation of incidents in other parts of the world. Further,
no longer terrorists organizations are Indian controlled. For example, Terrorism in Punjab was carried out by
Punjabi youths and outfits were also Punjabi. Similarly, Terrorism in J&K was started by Kashmiri youths
before the movement was hijacked by Pakistan as part of its low intensity war with India. Compared to these,
today's terrorism is mostly handled by Pakistani establishment, either directly or through outfits like LeT, JeM
and IM etc.
2.

Terror Threats Faced by India:

Except for the North-east, India has faced 4 broad Terror movements over last 3 decades.

It started from Punjab in the beginning of the 80s which lasted for about 1 decades.

The Terrorism in J&K started around 1990 and is still smoldering.

3rd is the Naxal or left wing terrorism that is continuing in a slow civil war pattern for last almost 40 years
and is spreading gradually in the hinterlands.

Finally, we have the new global Jihadi Terrorism that has no Geographical or Political agenda per se, but
which has become the most prevalent, spread out and troublesome type of terrorism the country has
witnessed.

With time and the evolution of Technology, the operational methodology of terrorists has also evolved. 3
crucial aspects need attention.

1st, the Firepower has increased tremendously, thanks to the increased resource flow from Pakistan, which
allows terrorists to mount attacks of much higher scale and finesse.

2nd, the Radicalization and recruitment has become more sophisticated, thanks to the internet.

3rd, India has also become the target in the global jihadi plan of outfits such as ISIS and Al Qaeda which
are not only instigating violence through sleeping modules, but also attract educated urban youths to
spread Terror Agenda on social media and to fight in alien lands. There are over 100 Indian youths who
are estimated to be fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

To fight this evolved terror network, which is more international, operates in physical and cyber space and has
state support from across the border, a comprehensive, smart, innovative and coordinated approach is required
which is radically different from what has been the case so far. Fighting terror is no longer a game of area

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dominance in a particular state or region, it is now an interplay of state of the art intelligence, cyber warfare,
seamless coordination among agencies and most important of all, ruthless efficiency in eliminating high profile
targets to render terror modules headless. But our system comes across as confused, unprepared and haphazard
with low political will to root out terror infrastructure.
3.

Drawbacks in Intelligence Infrastructure

The US Department of State's Country reports on Terrorism in 2013 pointed out the weaknesses of India's
counter terrorism policy, mentioning that India's efforts to counter terrorism were seriously hampered by
impediments to coordination and information sharing between agencies. In addition, it said, law enforcement
organizations displayed a limited command and control capacity.
a.

India has a multitude of intelligence agencies. These range from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), working
under the Home Ministry for the National Investigation Agency (NIA), created after the 2008 Mumbai
attacks. Then there are CBI; RAW; National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), which was created
in 2004 as a scientific organization under the National Security Adviser, which in turn, works under PMO;
Defense Intelligence Agency; Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI); Directorate of Air Intelligence
(DAI) and Directorate of Navy Intelligence, working under Indian Navy. These various departments are
supposed to coordinate and cooperate with one another in the sharing of intelligence. However, coordination
on the ground is not up to the mark. Experts also opine that there is competition among intelligence
agencies which prevents information sharing.
Examples: Mumbai attacks brought these failures to the fore. The response of central and state agencies
were slow and sending intelligence from the Central Government to the Law Enforcement Personnel was
inefficient. Another classic example is that of Yasin Bhatkal, the accused in orchestrating a series of
deadly bomb blasts and one of the co-founders of the terrorist Indian Mujahideen Group. Kolkata Police
had arrested him in 2008 in a fake currency case, but he was released later because the police was unaware
that, he was on the NIA's most wanted list. He was finally re-captured in a hideout on India's border with
Nepal in 2013.

b.

A crucial weakness that most intelligence agencies suffer from is the lack of resources. They most often
fall short of trained officers and finances. The case of NIA is an example. The elite agency was created
in response to the Mumbai attacks and is modelled on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's counterterrorism
wing. Headquartered in Delhi and having 6 branch offices, the agency is facing as much as 30 % manpower
shortage on its sanctioned strength of a little over 800 people. This has forced the agency to depend on
outside agencies. The shortage is worst in Kolkata and Guwahati, which have emerged as the hotbed of
Jihadi Terrorism.

c.

Non-Unified Institutional Structure However, the muddled intelligence situation is not the problem, but
the symptom of the fact that India does not have a unified system to fight terrorism. The internal security
system is fragmented and poorly coordinated. There are a multitude of investigative and law enforcement
agencies at the center and in the states which are responsible for law and order. Incidentally, state police
forces have their own counterterrorism and intelligence units, which are weak and work in an isolated
manner. The central and state agencies coordinate through joint committees and task forces. But these are
very slow and because of mistrust competition over resources or simply incompetence, are unable to
integrate efforts in any crunch situation.

d.

Lack of adequate Legal Provisions moreover, there are legal provisions that are unaddressed still. India
till date does not have a comprehensive law to fight terrorism. There is a cobweb of acts dealing with
issues of internal security which include the National Security Act of 1980, the Code of Criminal
Procedures of 1973, the Arms Act of 1959, the Explosive Substances Act and 1908, the Armed Forces
(Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 and
the Religious Institution (Prevention of Misuse) Act of 1988.

There have been attempts made to create an Anti-terrorism law, but they have failed for various reasons. For
example, in 2002, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was created which gave extended powers to the
Government for fighting terrorism. However, some measures, such as the ability to keep terror suspects in
custody without bringing them to trial, met with objections, and the law had to be repealed in 2004 on alleged

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misuse of the law. But some states such as Karnataka and Maharashtra have created laws like Maharashtra
Control of Organized Crime Act (MCOCA) 1999 and the Karnataka Control of Organized Crime Act 2000
respectively that deal with terrorism. However, most states do not have any specific law to deal with terror
suspects.
Because of these institutional shortcomings, even those actions which do not require hard capacity building,
are often left hanging. For example, despite being a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the
Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and the Asia/Pacific Group on
Money Laundering, India has not put in place procedures for freezing and confiscating terrorist assets without
delay.
What transpires thus, is that India needs to immediately brief up NIA, create a strong NCTC and rearrange
the terrorism fighting organizations which are equipped with adequate physical infrastructure, manned with
suitably trained manpower and which do not face a cash crunch. Most importantly, the agencies must be least
in number and have a mechanism to seamlessly communicate and strike whenever needed, without jurisdictional
conflicts.
Broader Framework to Deal with Terrorism:
At present there is a 4 constraints paradigm in India, which consisted of lack of political consistency, lack of
political consensus, lack of operational capacity, and lack of operational coordination, as per a research report
published by Center for Security Studies, a major think tank on security issues. While the initial 2 are exercises
in creating political constituency, the latter 2 are elements of hard-core capacity building, both at manpower
level and at institutional level.
There is no question that there is a dire requirement for a comprehensive overhaul of the entire counter
terrorism system. The new terrorism is not isolated to infiltration of terrorists from across the border who can
be neutralized by the Army or the BSF. Nor are terrorists interested in killing a defined set of people. Today's
terrorism is a highly diffused threat with hidden terrorists, motives, targets and highly evolved communicating
and operating styles.
To fight this type of enemy with a fragmented structure is a recipe for disaster. As such, there has to be an
agency which has complete jurisdiction over the entire activity spectrum, from intel gathering to investigate
cases and from arresting suspects to carry out targeted killing of terrorist leaders. There would always be a gray
area between normal law and order maintenance and fighting terrorism and states need to cede that much
power to center as is necessary to deal with terror threats. Where states need to stand up and be counted is
on police modernization as police is often the 1st line of engagement and defense against Terror Suspects.
KPS Gill, a former DGP of the Punjab Police, who is credited with defeating terrorism in Punjab, mentions
clear political resolve, rejection of public support for the militants and the Rajiv-Longowal peace accord along
with effective utilization of police and central para-military forces and effective intelligence network as success
factors for defeating terrorism in the state. What is important is the political backing and deft handling of social
reasons supplemented the hard military actions. Mahadevan refers to lack of political will and lack of political
consensus as reasons for failure of Indian counter terrorism efforts. But as was the case in handling terrorism
in Punjab, a strong political will across spectrum is needed to tackle threat from the new terrorism.
Ultimately, counter terrorism is as much about eliminating terrorists as it is about creating an environment so
that terrorists don't find constituency. It is the latter where imaginative and accommodative socio economic
policies play the decisive role. The fruits of development must reach the remotest places and to every section
of society. There are enough evidences that youths from poor, illiterate and disenfranchised societies fall prey
to terrorist and separatist ideologies. Also, there is a greater need to engage with our neighbors who are not
well equipped to ensure that their hinterlands are not used against India. Typical examples could be Nepal,
Bhutan, Bangladesh etc. India could use big brotherly diplomacy to strengthen their policing and border
management capabilities. On the other hand, it would have to work harder diplomatically to isolate hostile
countries such as Pakistan and China so that they desist from abetting terrorists targeting India.
Right to have a Safe and Secure life is every Indian's Birth Right. Regardless of political grievances, no entity
or individual can be allowed to kill people. Terrorists have a global agenda backed with global money and
operational capabilities. Counter terrorism efforts have to remain a few steps ahead. A disintegrated institutional

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structure and lack of consensus among political parties have long harmed India and helped anti-Indian forces.
We can hardly afford to do it anymore.
Why India needs a Counter Terrorism Institution?
India has been living in a hostile neighbourhood, especially on its western flank. Both state and non- state actors
are involved in various kinds of subversive and terrorists acts. The present institutional set up in India to deal
with Anti-terror operations is:
1.

Intelligence:

IB (Intelligence Bureau), RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and MAC (Multi Agency Centre) are involved
in gathering intelligence. Multi Agency Centers collate intelligence information from different sources and
disseminate them from different states as well as centres as such.
2.

Counter Terror operations:

Counter Terror Operations are carried out by NSG (National Security Guard) and local police. The local police
which act at the ground and is many a times 1st respondent. Other agencies like Army and special elite forces
are also involved as and when required in aid of the civilian force.
3.

Investigation:

Investigation and prosecution is done by NIA which draws its power from Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
1967.
4.

Center State Relations and Counter Terrorism:

From the legal angle law and order, police are state subjects. But article 355 enjoins upon the Union duty to
protect the state and entry 2-A of Union List gives power to the Union to deploy its forces in aid of civil power
of the state. These clear the issues regarding federal arrangements and issues thereof.
After 26/11 attacks there was a clamour for strengthening of Counter Terror Structures. In the wake up of
26/11 attacks NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Centre) and NATGRID (The National Intelligence Grid)
were proposed. Along with this CCTNS (Crimes and Criminals Tracking and Networking System) to connect
all the police stations was proposed. For further reforms or to analyse the need of new institutions the present
issues must be studied.
What are the issues in Present Set Up?
a.

Co-ordination: There is absence of co-ordinations among the different agencies (intelligence, counterterror operations) as was evident in Pathankot attck.

b.

Training and Capacities: Even lite forces like the NSG suffer from chronic problems of acquisition and
training. The state police does not undertake minimum required firing rounds.

c.

Human resource: All the agencies face the shortage of staff. The National Investigation Agency (NIA)
has only 579 of the 816 personnel sanctioned, compared to the FBI's 34,019 staff, over 12,000 of whom
are actual investigators.

d.

Financial resources and technical resources crunch is also faced. Local police don't have enough funds for
fuel to undertake local visits.

e.

Autonomy, accountability, professional leadership and institutional ethos all are missing in many cases. No
heads ever roll in case of failure of intelligence or operations.

f.

Policing and State Delhi Police, for its part, has neither specialist equipment nor protocols for dealing with
attacks on schools, malls or theatres - all, as recent experience around the world shows, potential targets.

g.

Political will is missing.

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Do we need new Counter Terrorism Institution?

A new institution subsuming all the staggered institutions will increase the coordination and smoothen the
process of operation. But it will not be sufficient. Capacities of the state police forces should be increased.
Required Changes in NCTC:
Post Mumbai attacks of 2008, the need for a powerful umbrella organization to fight terrorism was felt as
intelligence and coordination failures started to become clearer. In this environment, the idea of the National
Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) was mooted. The elite agency was modelled on the National Counterterrorism
Center of the USA and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre of Britain. It was envisioned as an organization
which was capable of "preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place, and
responding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators," according to the them Home Minister
P Chidambaram. The NCTC had been envisaged as an umbrella organization, which could exercise control
over agencies like the National Investigation Agency (NIA), the National Technical Research Organization
(NTRO), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) and the
National Security Guard (NSG). NCTC was originally planned to be put under IB.
However, the body has not seen the light of the day because of the opposition of states who consider it as
diluting the federal structure of the country. This is because unlike the American National Counterterrorism
Center, which deals only with strategic planning and integration of intelligence, or the British Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre, which has also has a coordinating role, the NCTC has sweeping powers to conduct operations.
This, the states say, goes against the constitutional provisions which place law and order under the states list.
While the Government has altered the original provisions by keeping the NCTC out of IB and handing over
arrested suspects to state police, but these have still not satisfied states and resultantly, the all-important
terrorism fighting organization remains hanging in limbo.

NAGALAND PEACE ACCORD

The Naga Peace Accord, a framework agreement as it has been termed, was signed between the National
Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the Government of India on August 3, 2015. The
signing of the pactmarksthe culmination of over 80 rounds of negotiations spanning 16 years, with the 1st
breakthrough madein 1997 when a ceasefire agreement was sealed.
1.

Background

Nagas are a congeries of tribes living in Eastern Himalayas (Naga Hills) along the Burma border.

The 2 major demands of the Naga Movement are independence and creation of greater Nagaland by
merging of Naga-inhabited areas of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Manipur

2.

Details of Accord Although exact details of the Accord are not out, but following has been reported
through media and experts

There is a ceasefire Agreement till April 27, 2016.

They will drop their demand of sovereignty.

Non-Territorial Framework under this Instead of Greater Nagalim, there will be greater autonomy for
Naga in other states by establishment of autonomous district councils. Thus there wont be any territorial
division of other states.

3.

Critical Analysis:

Benefits
a.

Advantages of a Non-Territorial Framework for all

To Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur maintain the territorialstatus quowhile only giving
up developmental privileges in their Naga inhabited areas to a new Naga non-territorial body.

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To Nagas meet their core demands such as recognition of their unique history and culture,
Naga leverage over deciding the development path for the Naga inhabited areas, etc.

b.

Accord has been signed with the strongest insurgent group, the NSCN (IM) which moreover has
demonstrated representation across tribes. Rival group NSCN (K) is on decline.

c.

The accord is supported by various Naga civil society groups (shows that it enjoys support among people)
like the Forum for Naga Reconciliation, Naga Hoho, Eastern Naga Peoples Organisation, Naga Mothers
Association, Naga Students Federation and the specific Hohos of the 14 Naga tribes

d.

It shows the flexibility and realism of the NSCN (IM) to alter goals and will provide a platform of social
support for the NSCN (IM) comprising of Naga civil society groups who are insistent on a peaceful path
to conflict resolution.

e.

Resolution of Naga conflict can offer a way forward to resolving many other ethnic conflicts in the region
such as those involving Kukis, Meiteis, Bodos, Dimasas, Hmars, and Karbis.

Challenges

The exact details are still not out.

Its a framework Agreement only, the groundwork needs to be done.

Not an all group/party accord

o

Rival faction NSCN (khaplang) has been excluded from accord it broke ceasefire with GOI
(Government of India) in March 2015 and following it up with the June 4 ambush in Manipur that
killed 20 military personnel.

Shillong accord of 1975 wasnt accepted by some leaders of Naga movement and led to formation
of NSCN. Thus it needs to be allparty accord.

It will be opposed by other 3 states.

Can be a time-buying step by NSCN (IM) to regroup itself. According to intelligence, post accord, it has
increased its cadre strength.

5.

Way Forward

Naga Movement leader should remember the following

In 2014 General Elections, Nagaland recorded a voter turnout of 87% which shows faith of Naga
people in Indian Democracy.

Mizo peace accord, 1985 ended the insurgency and led to development of Mizoram (has peace and
highest literacy).

So whats the way forward

-

Bring NSCN (K) also on board via negotiations. If it doesnt, then reach out to Myanmar and
formulate a coordinated mechanism to deal with separatist and terror groups using hard power.

Prevent illegal migration from Bangladesh which threatens their identity.

Protect their Indigenous Rights of Land.

Aim for Socio-economic development of the region. Following recent steps in this direction are a
good move.

Budget 2015 announced the creation of Indian Institute of Science Education and Research (IISER) to
be setup in Nagaland.

In April 2015 Government announced a direct daily air flight from Delhi to Dimapur in Nagaland via
Kolkata.

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Conclusion:
It is only a Framework Agreement, which means that it is an agreement to pave the way for a final
settlement by laying out the framework on which it will be worked out. Until contentious issues that still dog
the agreement to settle Indias longest running ethnic insurrection are resolved the issue cannot be settled.
The real challenge to a Naga settlement lies in its implementation not the least because the Nagas are a
divided people, on account of the tribal nature of the society, and also because they have suffered discrimination
at certain times and witnessed insurgency. Such agreement, however, is welcome because, it gives a sense of
urgency to a dialogue that has gone on for too long.

BODOLAND - BTAD (BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AREA DISTRICTS)

Bodoland BTAD (Bodoland Territorial Area Districts)
1.

About Bodoland
a.

Bodoland or BTAD created in 2003 consists of 4 districts of assam , namely, Kokrajhar, Chirang,
Baksa and Udalguri.

b.

A Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) created under 6TH Schedule of the Constitution has been
given legislative powers over 40 subjects.

c.

Demography of bodland: 30 % of the population is Bodos (who are STs) and rest comprises of
Adivasis, Bengali Muslims and Hindus and Assamese.

2.

Violence in Bodoland is a common feature. In past 5 years some 3,500 riots have been reported, most
recent being the dec 2014 Violence by NDFB (songbijit) against Adivasis and Retaliatory violence by
violence.

3.

Reason for Violence

4.

a.

Demand for a separate state of Bodoland,

b.

Occupation of their land by illegal Bangladeshi migrants.

c.

Illegal migration from Bangladesh who have settled on their land (loss of land rights),

d.

Adivasis demand to be included in ST list

i.

They argue that 34 of the 40 seats of BTC are reserved for STs. Now Bodos having ST status
dominates it, although they are of only 34% of population.

ii.

This is opposed by Bodos who dont want to loose power.

Solution
a.

Security Measures
i.

Have permanent security forces here

ii.

Intensify operations against the Militants

iii. Curb the proliferation of illegal Weapons

iv.
b.

Seek cooperation from Bhutan and Bangladesh

Solve Underlying Reasons:

i.

Stop Bangladeshi migrants, deport them back and Update land records

ii.

Ensure Equal Rights and Opportunities to all Socio-religious and Ethnic communities in the
area and if need arises then review the BTAD Model, where the Minority Bodos rule over the
majority non-Bodos.

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CHAKMAS and HAJONGS

1.

2.

3.

4.

Who Are They ?

a.

Chakmas are Buddhist, Hajongs are belongs from Hindus.

b.

They were inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
who migrated to india and settled in Arunachal Pradesh due to following reasons
i.

Their land was submerged by the Kaptai dam in the 1960s.

ii.

Faced religious persecution in East Pakistan.

Supreme Court in september 2015 ordered that Chakmas and Hajongs needed to be protected, and
their claims of citizenship need to considered As per applicable procedure. Reasons
a.

Almost all present-day Chakmas and Hajongs were born in india thus, should be Citizens by Birth.

b.

Settlement of (these) people in Arunachal Pradesh will help in developing the unoccupied regions.
besides, the presence of stretches of vacant land along the border is strategically not desirable.

Arunachal Pradesh Government argued that they were not against Indian citizenship for Chakmas and
Hajongs, but objected to their permanent settlement in Arunachal Pradesh.
a.

Their settlement goes against the Inner Line Permit provisions,

b.

Dilute the Constitutional safeguards for the indigenous communities of the state,

c.

Affects the dempography of state thus threatens their identity and puts pressure on its limited
resources. (According to a 1998 white paper, numbers of chakma had increased by 300% from the
original numbers in 1965)

Arunachal Pradesh Government subsequently filed a review petition in SC.

CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF DEFENCE FORCES

Challenges Before Indian Military

Key Challenges:
1.

The 3 Armed Forces are desperately short of Modern Equipment.

2.

Mistrust between the civilian bureaucracy and top military leadership has never been more pronounced
as it was during Antony's tenure as Defence Minister. The mutual suspicion has held back vital
reforms in higher defence management of the country.

3.

Changing socio-economic conditions have impacted the military as never before, resulting in a spate
of suicides, fratricide and increasing instances of rebellion in the ranks, a worrying trend no doubt.

A look at major deficiencies across the 3 services is frightening. For instance, the Army's light helicopters
are more than 40 years old; it has not bought new Artillery Guns since 1987 (although the Parrikar-led
Defence Acquisition Council has ordered purchase of fresh Guns, their induction is still an year away).

The Indian Navy is short of Conventional Submarines since its fleet of diesel-powered submarines is
down to a single digit. Submarines in production in Indian shipyards are at least 4 years behind schedule
and they are going to be without vital defence against enemy missiles for a while.

The Indian Air Force is down to 33 squadrons of Fighter Jets against the required strength of 39
squadrons. Its 8 year old plan to purchase 126 new Combat Jets is yet to come to fruition, although a
contract negotiating committee is currently in the final stages of negotiations with French manufacturers
Dassault Aviation and hoping to ink a mammoth 20 billion dollar deal soon. Even then, the 1st lot of
18 aircrafts will enter service only in 2017 and only if the contract is signed before the end of 2014.

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Big Bang purchases apart, the Government needs to urgently turn its attention towards some basic issues.
The infantry that hard working, non-complaining arm of the Army needs new and more lethal Weapons.
So the Assault Rifle, the Carbine, Light Machine Gun (LMG), the Sniper Rifle and even the Anti-Tank
Guided Missile (ATGM), essentials in an Infantry battalion, need to be replaced over the next 5 years.
Many of these weapons currently used by the troops, are of 1960s vintage.

Purchasing major platforms and weapons is only part of the future plan. Maintaining them is a major task.
That 35 Indian Air Force planes and Helicopters have crashed between April 2011 and December, 2015
and the Navy has suffered 24 major and minor accidents since January 1, 2011, killing 20 persons, points
to a much deeper rot which needs urgent correction.

The situation will however not change until the Civil-Military relationship in the country is overhauled.
The post-1947 history is replete with episodes that suggest a constant state of tension between the
'generalist' bureaucracy and the 'specialist' military leaders, with the political executive watching and
sometimes encouraging the bureaucracy to keep the military under control.

The political executive, starting with India's 1st Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, has generally excluded
the Military leadership from the decision-making process at the highest levels. In 1999, the Kargil Review
Committee (KRC) under renowned strategic thinker and writer K. Subrahmanyam had, among other vital
issues, focussed on reorganisation of the higher Defence Management.

The KRC recommendations were followed by the formation of a Group of Ministers (GoM) which set
up 4 task forces on Intelligence reforms, Internal security, Border management, and Higher defence
management to undertake in-depth analysis of various facets of the management of National Security.

After year-long deliberations, the GoM, among other comments observed: "There is a marked difference
in the perception and crisis of confidence among civil and military officials within the MoD and Service
Head Quarter regarding their respective roles and functions. There was also lack of synchronisation among
the 3 Departments in the MoD, including the relevant elements of Defence Finance. The concept of
'attached offices' as applicable to Service Head Quarter; problems of inter-sectional relativities; multiple,
duplicated, and complex procedures governing the exercise of administrative and financial powers and the
concept of 'advice' to the Minister; all these had contributed to these problems."

The Defence minister will have to crack the whip to get the Bureaucrats to work on the advice of the
Military and not allow them to be unilateral in their approach.

Re-organisation of higher defence management apart, the Indian Armed Forces are grappling with a crisis
of identity. The Army for instance remains rooted in an outdated, British-inherited system that is struggling
to cope with the combination of challenges posed by the demands of modern warfare and a society that
is undergoing a great churn.

This has posed a great challenge to the famous officer-men relationship in the Indian Armed Forces. In
the past decade, the Armed Forces have had to face a new problem; increasing incidents of indiscipline,
suicides and fratricide. Are these incidents happening because the traditional bond between officers and
men, the bedrock on which the military functions, is fraying at the edges?

Some studies have been initiated to get to the root of the problem after it was noticed that more than 90
soldiers were committing suicide every year since 2003, going up to an alarming 150 in 2008. Adding to
the worry are the growing cases of indiscipline and intolerance. In 2012 alone, there were at least 3 cases
of a showdown between men and officers. At least 50-60 soldiers of an Artillery Unit clashed with a group
of officers after a young officer allegedly beat up a jawan, leading to near mutiny among the soldiers. There
were a couple of other instances where tension between jawans and officers boiled over, both the incidents
happening in 2 different Armoured Regiments, one following a suicide by a soldier. This set the alarm bells
ringing in the Amy Headquarters.

There are external factors too. The fact is, the society no longer respects the soldier and his work in
protecting the Nation. A local politician, a thanedar, etc., seem to command more clout in the society
today. This has often led to loss of self-esteem among ordinary soldiers. That Australian cricketer Philip

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Hughes who died in an unfortunate accident on the cricket field garnered more news space than 3 Indian
soldiers who were martyred in Jammu the same day while battling Terrorists, says something about our
priorities. The soldier needs constant support from the society he protects.
Standing committte on Defence on status of Armed Force in India The Standing Committee on Defence, which presented its report to Parliament on the last day of the Monsoon
Session, has highlighted several shortcomings that need immediate attention.
Key recommendations:
1.

2.

Wheeled Guns
a.

The Defence Ministry, in its reply to the Standing Committee, had said that "Arms and Ammunitions"
were "by and large available" with the Army. The Committee, headed by Maj. Gen. (retd). B.C.
Khanduri, has said "it fails to understand what does 'by and large' mean".

b.

The Ministry's response, the Committee has said, gives "false hope" that Ammunition levels in the
Army are as per the authorised strategic Artillery Profile 2027. The Committee has asked the
Ministry to provide details of the Programme, and to step up efforts to adhere to timelines.

Missiles:
a.

3.

4.

5.

Rifles:
a.

The Committee expressed "dismay" that Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)
"started working on INSAS Rifle way back in 1982 but surprisingly it took 14 years in its development.
But, just after 3 years, the quality of rifle tested in Operation-Vijay revealed that product was not
up to the mark.

b.

The Committee find[s] it shocking that even years of expertise has not evolved DRDO to develop
a world class basic product like Rifle". Lacunae in the weapon were revealed by the 1999 Kargil
conflict, but DRDO has not been able to provide a good rifle to the Army. The Committee has asked
why rifles were not being procured from elsewhere?

Numbers:
a.

As revealed by replies in Parliament and disclosures made to the Standing Committee, the Armed
Forces face a major shortage of officers, especially in junior ranks.

b.

According to the Committee's report, the Army is short of 9,642 officers - 40,095 against the
stipulated strength of 49,737. The Navy is 1,561 officers short, and the Air Force 659.

c.

Attempts are being made to address the situation by making Short Service Commission more
attractive. It is hoped that attractive perks and recommendations of the 6th Pay Commission would
be able to attract youngsters to the profession of arms. The Committee has asked the Ministry to
explore the reasons behind younger people no longer looking at the Armed Forces as a Career.

Lack of Funds a.

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The Army has been facing a major shortage of vehicles to carry missiles. This has affected the
deployment of missiles at strategic locations. Replying to the Committee's recommendations that
the private sector be engaged to make missile-carrying vans, the Defence Ministry had said that, the
Defence PSU, Bharat Earth Movers Limited, was in a position to supply the vehicles. "The planning
process of Army should not be hampered due to non-availability of missile carrying vehicles," the
Committee has said.

The Defence Ministry has noted the lack of funds as one of the reasons behind porous pockets along
the India-Myanmar border.

www.iasscore.in

6.

b.

The Ministry, in its reply to the Standing Committee, has said that "non-allotment of funds" to the
Border Roads Organisation (BRO) resulted in only 4.5 km. of the proposed 15.73 km. fence along
the border being completed.

c.

The Defence Ministry's disclosure is significant in the backdrop of the recent killing of 18 Army
men by insurgents in Manipur along the India-Myanmar border. The Army had carried out a cross
border raid subsequent to the attack. "It is astonishing to find that as many as 78 insurgent active
groups have been earmarked in one state of the North-East. Our neighbouring countries are espousing
a form of perennial and subtle war in which a substantial amount of operational preparedness is
absolutely essential," the Standing Committee has noted.

d.

Assam Rifles is mandated to guard the 1,631 km. India-Myanmar border. All Assam Rifles units and
formations operate under the command of the Army. 15 battalions of Assam Rifles with 77 Company
Operating Bases are deployed along the strategic border, 7 of these battalions are in Manipur.

Air Force Trainer:

a.

The Intermediate Jet Trainer project by state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has run into
troubled waters. The project that started in 1999 has made no headway, the Committee has noted.
The non-induction of IJT Sitara has compelled the IAF to extend the life of the Kiran trainers. "By
not taking effective steps to procure trainer, the Government is jeopardising the lives of our pilots,"
the Committee has noted. Experts have blamed the absence of trainers for the spate of MiG-21
crashes.

Steps by NDA Government

1.

Within a year, the Narendra Modi Government has brought significant changes to India's Defence Policy.

2.

It has ended the paralysis on Arms Acquisition and put greater emphasis on creating a defence industrial
base.

3.

It has encouraged the participation of private and foreign capital in Indian defence production. These
initiatives have created a much better policy environment for the DTTI (Defence Technology and Trade
Initiative).

4.

Equally important, Defence Minister Mr. Parrikar has demonstrated the political will to shake things up
in the MoD, which had become acutely sclerotic under Antony's extended reign. Parrikar decisively cut
through the bureaucratic logjam on the purchase of Rafale fighters.

5.

He has also taken the surgeon's knife to the DRDO. After sacking the DRDO chief earlier, Parrikar has
separated the posts of DRDO chief and scientific advisor to the Defence Minister.

6.

For the 1st time since Indira Gandhi brought a young scientist, V.S. Arunachalam, to head the DRDO in
the early 1980s, Parrikar has injected younger blood into leadership positions.

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