Rubrico v. Macapagal-ArroyoG.R. No.

18387118 February 2010

Facts:
On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa
Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and
Security Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in
Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and detained at the air base without
charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation, but only after she
signed a statement that she would be a military asset.Despite her release, she was
tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has
happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the
Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful
resulted from their investigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which
indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the
abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ
of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents
be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of
petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended
party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing
conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the
petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and
Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in
the case.
On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment,
dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and
Ombudsman.
Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an
amparo petition.
Ruling: No.

DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo
proceedings [C]ommand responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and
applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command
responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons
subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense,
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,
foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control
over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of
individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of
Command Responsibility While there are several pending bills on command
responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under
that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal
basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to
these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to
have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In
other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal
culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may
have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to
pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in
question to its natural end [T]he right to security of persons is a guarantee of the
protection of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting
effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of
the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the
Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an
objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by

private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously The
privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate
the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light
of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by
the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to
secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.
ABALLO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R NO. 198732 JUNE 10, 2013
FACTS: Christian 23 years old, a dancer, met AAA a 17 years old, his
choreographers niece, in her uncles place. When she stayed in her uncles
place, AAA and Christian became sweethearts. He succeeded in convincing her to
have repeated sexual intercourse because of his promise to marry and an assurance
that they will use the withdrawal method so she will not get pregnant. AAA,
however, became pregnant, and Christian, was shocked with the development,
proposed that she had an abortion. She acceded to the request but failed. Hence a
child was born out of the relationship. When confronted by her mother, Christian
promised to marry AAA. The mother later filed a case for violation of Section 10(a)
of Republic Act 7610. He argues that his promise to marry and use of the
withdrawal method are not inducement or persuasion as to make the case within
the purview of the offense. The phrase due to the coercion or influence of any
adult is the relevant phrase for interpretation. According to him, it must be
accompanied by some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute child abuse.
ISSUE:Whether or not Christian may be convicted for violation of Republic Act
7610.
HELD: Christian is convicted for the violation of Republic Act 7610. The Supreme
Court: Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads: SEC. 5. Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. In view of
the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo s actuations may be classified as
coercion and influence within the purview of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610: First, the most crucial element is AAAs minority. It is undisputed that
AAA was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is hence,
considered a child under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not capable of fully

understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in consequence, remained

vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case. Based on this
premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and
Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive
on this point: For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child
abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give
consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law is clear:
it seeks to punish [t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. A
child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because
of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection. The harm which results from a child s bad decision
in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business
deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her
attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to
have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of
ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection
against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like
petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as
fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Second, coupled with
AAAs minority is Caballos seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23
years old at the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older
than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed
Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the
latter. Third, Caballos actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and
influence. Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her,
and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not
get pregnant since he would be using the withdrawal method for safety.
Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and
eventually give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded. Fourth, at least,
with respect to the parties first sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash
and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on
her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of

duress.. An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo s incipient advances and
in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to
reason that she was put in a situation deprived bf the benefit of clear thought and
choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other choice would,
nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA s minority as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballos acts constitute coercion and
influence within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual
intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed
as a child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse; as such, the
second element of the subject offense exists. In fine, finding all elements to be
present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo s conviction for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
GEORGE BONGALON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 169533,
MARCH 20, 2013
FACTS: Bongalon was charged for the crime of child abuse under Sec. 10 (a) of RA
7610. Bongalon allegedly physically abused and/or maltreated Jayson (12 years old)
with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left
check and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter s family. On his part,
Bongalon denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson but only confronted
him when the latter threw stones at her daughters, calling them as Kimi and
for burning one of his daughters hair. Both the RTC and CA held Bongalon guilty
of child abuse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Bongalon constituted child abuse within the
purview RA 7610.
RULING: NO. Sec 10 (a), Art. VI of RA 7610 under which Bongalon was charged
states: Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other
Conditions Prejducial to the Child s Development (a) Any person who shall
commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child s development including those covered
by Art. 59 of PD 603, as amended, but not covered by the RPC, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Child abuse, on the other
hand, is defined by Sec. 3 (b) as maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
which includes: x x x (2.) Any acts by deeds or words which debases, degrades, or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; x x x Not every
instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes child abuse. Only when the
laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to
debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under RPC. In
this case, the records showed that the laying of hands on Jayson have been done at
the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just

suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and his companion. With the loss of his selfcontrol, he lacked the specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being that was so essential in the crime
of child abuse. However, considering that Jayson suffered physical injury requiring
five to seven days of medical attention, Bongalon is liable for slight physical injuries
under Art. 266 (1) of the RPC.
Malto v. People, GR 16473 (Case Digest)
Focus Topics: Abuse; Minors and Incapacitated; Parens Patriae; Government;
Elements; State
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give.
FACTS
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student,
AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the
incident, petitioner and AAA had a mutual understanding and became
sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioners threat to end their relationship,
AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAAs mother lodged a complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant City Prosecutor charged the
petitioner in an Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610. During
the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a
professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage
and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce
his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in
fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain
petitioners conviction and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as
amended and sentenced him to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his
acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610; and thereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the grounds
that there was no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by
reason of their sweetheart relationship

HELD
NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The first element
of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the
accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party.
The third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party. Since all
three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art.
III of RA 7610. Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and
consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of
mutual love and affection. The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness
and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of the victim. It
operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the
accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases
under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because
of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should
protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to
adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy
under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination. In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of
giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
To provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination. [A]s well as to intervene on behalf of the child
when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child

fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination
or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian,
teacher or person having care and custody of the same.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies,
consistent with the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to
promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and
happy life.