Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 78763 July 12,1989
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and APOLINARIO
M. SIGNO, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
Dominador Maglalang for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking
the annulment of the resolution of the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated March 12, 1987 (p. 28, Rollo) in NLRC Case
No. NCR-8-3808-83, entitled, "Apolinario M. Signo, Complainant, versus
Manila Electric Company, Respondents", affirming the decision of the
Labor Arbiter which ordered the reinstatement of private respondent
herein, Apolinario Signo, to his former position without backwages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as
supervisor-leadman since January 1963 up to the time when his services
were terminated on May 18, 1983.
In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the
petitioner company for electrical services at his residence at Peafrancia
Subdivision, Marcos Highway, Antipolo, Rizal. Private respondent Signo
facilitated the processing of the said application as well as the required
documentation for said application at the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal.
In consideration thereof, private respondent received from Fernando de
Lara the amount of P7,000.00. Signo thereafter filed the application for
electric services with the Power Sales Division of the company.
It was established that the area where the residence of de Lara was
located is not yet within the serviceable point of Meralco, because the
place was beyond the 30-meter distance from the nearest existing
Meralco facilities. In order to expedite the electrical connections at de
Lara's residence, certain employees of the company, including
respondent Signo, made it appear in the application that the sari-sari
store at the corner of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the subdivision, is
applicant de Lara's establishment, which, in reality is not owned by the
latter.
As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's
residence were installed and made possible. However, due to the fault of
the Power Sales Division of petitioner company, Fernando de Lara was not
billed for more than a year.
meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law
as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July
30,1987,152 SCRA 140).
In view of the foregoing, reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in
the instant case, but without the award of backwages, considering the
good faith of the employer in dismissing the respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
and the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated March 12, 1987 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order
issued on August 3, 1987 is lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
10
11
12
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees, while clinging to the same
philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the
terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed
by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or
improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law,
may be the subject of negotiations between duly
recognized employees' organizations and appropriate
government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism
for the settlement of labor disputes in the public sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and
procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the
resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving
government employees. In case any dispute remains
unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies
under existing laws and procedures, the parties may
jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector LaborManagement] Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms
and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement
of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved
grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil
service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment
to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of GovernmentEmployees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
and government- owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for
the purpose of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner
union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed
by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More
importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management
13
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the
Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The
prosecution is now before us on certiorari. 3
EN BANC
CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of
P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug,
private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and
expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four
separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to
Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not
charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one
person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b),
he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or
more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for
a fee. " 2
14
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce
upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such
failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put them to personal
use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the
same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima
facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin
Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the
questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that
would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted
as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The trouble with
presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued
without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or
not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case,
certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background
facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the
campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has
victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land,
and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of
their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at
the hands of theirown countrymen.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are
set aside and the four informations against the private respondent
reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
15
REGALADO, J.:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by
a syndicate and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the
Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of
Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses Dan and Loma
Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 5, alleging
That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and
June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist
and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y
Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5)
Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo
Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos, without first having
secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor. 1
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three
accused but not one of them was arrested. 2 Hence, on February 2, 1989,
the trial court ordered the case archived but it issued a standing warrant
of arrest against the accused. 3
Thereafter, on learning of the whereabouts of the accused, one of the
offended parties, Rogelio Salado, requested on March 17, 1989 for a copy
of the warrant of arrest. 4 Eventually, at around midday of February 26,
16
Previously, the Goce couple was able to send her son, Reynaldo Agustin,
to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned complainants through
Lorenzo Alvarez who requested her to introduce them to the Goce couple,
to which request she acceded. 18
Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that
the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied
any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution. She insisted
that the complainants included her in the complaint thinking that this
would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses. She
failed to do so because in truth, so she claims, she does not know the
present address of the couple. All she knew was that they had left their
residence in 1987. 19
Although she admitted having given P500.00 each to Rogelio Salado and
Alvarez, she explained that it was entirely for different reasons. Salado
had supposedly asked for a loan, while Alvarez needed money because
he was sick at that time. 20
On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein
appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale, and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, as
well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00. 21
In her present appeal, appellant Agustin raises the following arguments:
(1) her act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall
within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article
13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) there is no proof of
conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the Goce
spouses; and (3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised
overseas employment to the complainants. 22 These three arguments
being interrelated, they will be discussed together.
Herein appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor
Code. Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 2018, provides that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited
practices enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article further provides
that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a) when
illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by
a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another; or (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale,
i.e., if it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a
group.
17
At the outset, it should be made clear that all the accused in this case
were not authorized to engage in any recruitment activity, as evidenced
by a certification issued by Cecilia E. Curso, Chief of the Licensing and
Regulation Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
on November 10, 1987. Said certification states that Dan and Loma Goce
and Nelly Agustin are neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers
for overseas
employment. 23 Appellant does not dispute this. As a matter of fact her
counsel agreed to stipulate that she was neither licensed nor authorized
to recruit applicants for overseas employment. Appellant, however,
denies that she was in any way guilty of illegal recruitment. 24
It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did was to introduce
complainants to the Goce spouses. Being a neighbor of said couple, and
owing to the fact that her son's overseas job application was processed
and facilitated by them, the complainants asked her to introduce them to
said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her heart, she complied
with their request. Such an act, appellant argues, does not fall within the
meaning of "referral" under the Labor Code to make her liable for illegal
recruitment.
Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not;
provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement. 25 On the other hand, referral is
the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment
after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a
selected employer, placement officer or bureau. 26
Despite Agustin's pretensions that she was but a neighbor of the Goce
couple, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses paint a different
picture. Rogelio Salado and Dionisio Masaya testified that appellant
represented herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency.
Ramona Salado was offered a job as a cutter/sewer by Agustin the first
time they met, while Ernesto Alvarez remembered that when he first met
Agustin, the latter represented herself as "nagpapaalis papunta sa
Oman." 28 Indeed, Agustin played a pivotal role in the operations of the
recruitment agency, working together with the Goce couple.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the
ability to send a worker abroad." 29 It is undisputed that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to
send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give
her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. 30
It cannot be denied that Agustin received from complainants various
sums for purpose of their applications. Her act of collecting from each of
the complainants payment for their respective passports, training fees,
placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses unquestionably
constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law. In fact,
appellant demanded and received from complainants amounts beyond
the allowable limit of P5,000.00 under government regulations. It is true
that the mere act of a cashier in receiving money far exceeding the
amount allowed by law was not considered per se as "recruitment and
placement" in contemplation of law, but that was because the recipient
had no other participation in the transactions and did not conspire with
her co-accused in defrauding the victims. 31 That is not the case here.
18
said malefactors duly taken into custody. We see no reason why the same
doctrinal rule and course of procedure should not apply in this case.
Indeed, the trial court was justified and correct in accepting the version of
the prosecution witnesses, their statements being positive and
affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of credit than the mere
uncorroborated and self-serving denials of appellant. The lame defense
consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot overcome the
evidence presented by the prosecution proving her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 37
The presence of documentary evidence notwithstanding, this case
essentially involves the credibility of witnesses which is best left to the
judgment of the trial court, in the absence of abuse of discretion therein.
The findings of fact of a trial court, arrived at only after a hearing and
evaluation of what can usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies
of witnesses, certainly deserve respect by an appellate court. 38
Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court on the matter of credibility
of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 39
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate herself from conviction, appellant argues
that there is no proof of conspiracy between her and the Goce couple as
to make her liable for illegal recruitment. We do not agree. The evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly establish that appellant
confabulated with the Goces in their plan to deceive the complainants.
Although said accused couple have not been tried and convicted,
nonetheless there is sufficient basis for appellant's conviction as
discussed above.
In People vs. Sendon, 40 we held that the non-prosecution of another
suspect therein provided no ground for the appellant concerned to fault
the decision of the trial court convicting her. The prosecution of other
persons, equally or more culpable than herein appellant, may come later
after their true identities and addresses shall have been ascertained and
19
20
21
# Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval
Gutierrez; Paras and Vasquez, Jr., concurring.
2 Records, p. 6.
3 TSN, December 22, 1992, p. 15.
4 Exhibits, p. 1.
5 Exhibits, p. 2.
6 TSN, January 28, 1993, p. 17.
7 Rollo, p. 29.
8 Records, pp. 78-85.
9 People v. Pantaleon, G.R. No. 108107, June 19, 1997.
10 TSN, December 22, 1992, pp. 29-30.
11 TSN, December 22, 1992, pp. 14-16
12 247 SCRA 780 (1995).
13 Exhibit A for the prosecution, Exhibit 5 for the defense,
Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
14 Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court.
15 People v. Geron, G.R. No. 113788, October 17, 1997.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
positions of the remaining claimants, on the one hand, and the petitioner,
on the other.
To begin with, let it be borne in mind that seamen's contracts of the
nature We have before Us now are not ordinary ones. There are specie,
laws and rules governing them precisely due to the peculiar
circumstances that surround them. Relatedly, We quote from the
Manifestation and Comment of the Solicitor General:
The employment contract in question is unlike any
ordinary contract of employment, for the reason that a
manning contract involves the interests not only of the
signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino recruiting
agent (herein petitioner), the foreign owner of the vessel,
and the Filipino crew members (private respondents), but
also those of other Filipino seamen in general as well as
the country itself. Accordingly, Article 12 of the Labor
Code provides that it is the policy of the State not only "to
insure and regulate the movement of workers in
conformity with the national interest" but also "to insure
careful selection of Filipino workers for overseas
employment in order to protect the good name of the
Philippines abroad". The National Seamen Board (NSB),
which is the agency created to implement said state
policies, is thus empowered pursuant to Article 20 of the
Labor Code "to secure the best possible terms and
conditions of employment for seamen, and to insure
compliance thereof" not only on the part of the owners of
the vessel but also on the part of the crew members
themselves.
Conformably to the power vested in the NSB, the law
requires that all manning contracts shall be approved by
said agency. It likewise provides that "it shall be unlawful
to substitute or alter any previously approved and
certified employment contract without the approval of
NSB" (Section 35, Rules and Regulations in the
recruitment and placement of Filipino seamen aboard
foreign going ships) and authorizes the employer or
owner of the vessel to terminate such contract for just
causes (Section 32, Ibid). Among such just causes for
termination are "bad conduct and unwanted presence
prejudicial to the safety of the ship" (Guidebook for
shipping employers, page 8) and material breach of said
contract.
The stringent rules governing Filipino seamen aboard
foreign, going ships are dictated by national interest.
There are about 120,000 registered seamen with the NSB.
Only about 50,000 of them are employed and 70,000 or
so are still hoping to be employed. Those Filipino seamen
29
30
31
32
Japan last April 19, 1979 which would have been saved if
your crew did not violate their employment contracts.
(Annex "K"of Petition),
In the light of all the foregoing and the law and policy on
the matter, it is submitted that there was valid
justification on the part of petitioner and/or its principal to
terminate the manning contract. (Pp. 12-14, Manifestation
and Comment of the Solicitor General.)
At first glance it might seem that the judgment of the NLRC should have
more weight than that of NSB. Having in view, however, the set up and
relationship of these two entities framed by the Labor Code, the NSB is
not only charged directly with the administration of shipping companies
in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment by seeing to it that our
seamen "secure the best possible terms of employment for contract
seamen workers and secure compliance therewith." Its composition as of
the time this controversy arose is worth notingfor it is made up of the
Minister of Labor as Chairman, the Deputy Minister as Vice Chairman, and
a representative each of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National
Defense, Education and Culture, the Central Bank, the Bureau of
Employment Service, a worker's organization and an employee's
organization and the Executive Director of the Overseas Employment
Development Board. (Article 23, Labor Code) It is such a board that has to
approve all contracts of Filipino seamen (Article 18, Labor Code). And
after such approval, the contract becomes unalterable, it being "unlawful"
under Article 34 of the Code "for any individual, entity, licensee or holder
of authority: (i) to substitute or alter employment contracts approved and
verified by Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof
by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same
without the approval of the Department of Labor." In other words, it is not
only that contracts may not be altered or modified or amended without
mutual consent of the parties thereto; it is further necessary to have the
change approved by the Department, otherwise, the guilty parties would
be penalized.
The power of the NLRC in relation to the works and actuations of the NSB
is only appellate, according to Article 20 (b), read in relation to Article
223, principally, over questions of law, since as to factual matters, it may
exercise such appellate jurisdiction only "if errors in the findings of fact
are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant." (par. d)
The NLRC has noted in its decision that respondents were originally made
to believe that their ship would go only to the Caribbean ports and yet
after completing trips to Inchon, Korea and Kuwait and Keelung, Taiwan, it
was suddenly directed to call at Kwinana, Australia, an ITF controlled port.
The record shows that this imputation is more apparent than real, for
respondents knew from the very moment they were hired that world-wide
voyages or destinations were contemplated in their agreement. So much
so that corresponding steps had to be taken to avoid interference of or
33
trouble about the ITF upon the ship's arrival at ITF controlled ports. As
already stated earlier, the ITF requires the seamen working on any vessel
calling at ports controlled by them to be paid the rates fixed by the ITF
which are much higher than those provided in the contract's signed here,
to the extent of causing tremendous loss if not bankruptcy of the
employer.
And so, as revealed to the NLRC later, in anticipation precisely of such
peril to the employer and ultimate unemployment of the seamen, in the
instant case, the usual procedure undeniably known to respondents of
having two payroll's, one containing the actually agreed rates and the
other ITF rates, the latter to be shown to the ITF in order that the ship
may not be detained or interdicted in Kwinana, was followed. But
according to the NLRC, this practice constitutes deception and bad faith,
and worse, it is an effect within the prohibition against alteration of
contracts approved by the NSB, considering there is nothing to show that
NSB was made aware of the so-called addendum or side agreement to
the effect that should the ship manned by respondents be made to call an
any ITF controlled port, the contract with ITF rates would be shown and, if
for any reason, the respondents are required to be actually paid higher
rates and they are so paid, the excess over the rates agreed in the NSB
contract shall be returned to petitioner later.
It is of insubstantial moment that the side agreement or addendum was
not made known to or presented as evidence before the NSB. We are
persuaded that more or less the NSB knows that the general practice is to
have such side contracts. More importantly, the said side contracts are
not meant at all to alter or modify the contracts approved by the NSB.
Rather, they are precisely purported to enforce them to the letter, making
it clearer that even if the ships have to call at ITF controlled ports, the
same shall remain to be the real and binding agreement between the
parties, in intentional disregard of whatever the ITF may exact.
We hold that there was no bad faith in having said side contracts, the
intent thereof being to put into effect the NSB directed arrangements that
would protect the ship manning industry from unjust and ruinning effects
of ITF intervention. Indeed, examining the said side agreements, it is not
correct to say that the respondents were caught unaware, or by surprise
when they were advised that the ship would proceed to Kwinana,
Australia, even assuming they had been somehow informed that they
would sail to the Caribbean. Said side agreements textually provide:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Addendum Agreement entered into by and between
KYOEI TANKER CO., LTD., Principals, of the vessel M.T.
"JANNU", represented herein by VIR-JEN SHIPPING &
MARINE SERVICES, INC., Manila, Philippines, as Manning
Agents (hereinafter referred to as the Company),
and
34
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63
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41
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16.
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16
91
42
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42
g
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19.
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17
95
51
S
G
D
.
43
The NLRC has cited Wallem Philippine Shipping Inc. vs. The Minister of
Labor, G. R. No. 50734-37, February 20, 1981 (102 SCRA 835). No less
than the Solicitor General maintains that said cited case is not controlling:
A careful examination of Wallem Philippine Shipping Inc.
vs. The Minister of Labor, G. R. No. 50734-37, February,
20, 1981 shows that the same is dissimilar to the case at
bar. In the Wallem case, there was an express agreement
between the employer and the ITF representative, under
which said employer bound itself to pay the crew
members salary rates similar to those of ITF. When the
crew members in the Wallem case demanded that they
be paid ITF rates, they were merely asking their employer
to comply with what had been agreed upon with the ITF
representative, which conduct on their part cannot be
said to be a violation of contract but an effort to urge
performance thereof. Such is not the situation in the case
at bar. In the case at bar, petitioner and private
respondents had a side agreement, whereby private
respondents agreed to return to petitioner whatever
amounts petitioner would be required to pay under ITF
rates. In other words, petitioner and private respondents
agreed that petitioner would not pay the ITF rate. When
private respondents used ITF as threat to secure increase
in salary, they violated the manning contract. Moreover,
in the case at bar, petitioner terminated the manning
contract only after the NSB authorized it to do so, after it
found the grounds therefor to be valid. On the other hand,
the termination of the manning contract in the Wallem
case was without prior authorization from the NSB.
It will be noted that private respondents sent a cable to
petitioner demanding an increase of 50% of their basic
salary as the only solution to the ITF problem at a time
when the vessel M/T JANNU was enroute to Australia, an
ITF port. The fact that private respondents mentioned ITF
in their cable clearly shows that if petitioner would not
accede to their demands, they would denounce petitioner
to ITF. Thus, Chief Mate Jacobo Catabay in his report
dated April 23, 1979 (Exh. 10-A) stated:
On our departure at Keelung, we did not
have destination until three days later
that Harman cabled us to proceed to
Senipah, Indonesia to load fun cargo to be
discharged at Kwinana, Australia. Captain
told everyone that if only we stayed so
long with the ship, he will report to ITF
personally in order to get back wages. In
view that we only worked for three
44
Footnotes
1 NSB Case No. 2250-79 is a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of earned wages filed by 27
officers and crew/members of the vessel M/T "Jannu"
against herein petitioner while NSB2252-79 is a complaint
for breach of contract and recovery of excess salaries,
overtime pay filed by petitioner against the complainants
in the other case.
2 Please see clarification of the point that respondents
were misled as to whether they were hired for worldwide
voyages or not in the latter part of this opinion.
45