Esther Moraes

B.A. History Honours, II Year

Assignment #3
Q. Why did Stalin sign a pact with Hitler in August 1939? Why was it shortlived?
The Nazi Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed by von Ribbentrop and Molotov on behalf of
Hitlers Germany and the USSR respectively on August 23 rd, 1939. It lasted for approximately 2 years
before relations between the two governments deteriorated completely. The Nazi Soviet Pact, also
known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, decisively affected the course of World War II and is still
seen as one of the most dramatic moments in World War history. Broadly, the pact declared that the
Soviet Union would, in the event of a war, maintain a neutral stance vis--vis Germany this, after
years of anti-fascist propaganda and concerted efforts to rally the rest of Europe against Italy and
Germany.
The Pact had two protocols one that was public, and another that was a secret protocol, known at
that time only to the signatories and the leaders of the USSR and Germany. Publicly, the pact stated
that both countries agreed to not attack each other, whether individually or jointly with other
powers, to maintain neutrality in the event of attack by a third party on either country, and to settle
all disputes in a friendly manner, without the use of force. The additional secret protocol divided the
Baltic region and Poland into German and Russian spheres of interest. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was
preceded by an economic agreement that was signed four days earlier, which agreed to increase trade
between the two countries. Germany was to provide equipment, machinery and manufactured goods,
while the Soviet Union had to provide food and raw materials like coal and oil.
Although the Nazi-Soviet Pact is seen as one of the greatest failures of the USSR during World War
II, it is important to understand the context in which the Pact came about. To do this, we need to trace
the development of the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union from the 1930s, and the Russia-Germany
relations from the late 20s to the Second World War. In doing this, one sees that the Nazi-Soviet Pact
was largely the result of the Soviet foreign policy..being made on the hoof, and territorial insecurity
that the USSR was faced with at the time.
The 1920s were a time when the USSR had tenuous diplomatic relations with the rest of the world:
with respect to Europe, trade and political links were made gradually and painstakingly, but were
broken due to Europes fear of the spread of communism; links with China and Japan were always
precarious. At this time USSR was just recovering from civil war; in terms of its foreign policy its
main goals were to be recognized by the world as a legitimate nation, and to end its isolation and to
protect itself from Western interference as in the Civil War. It was thus necessary to sign treaties of
non-aggression with the European states that bordered it, and to attempt to do the same with Western
Europe, who were extremely cautious of the USSR, given that the Comintern continued to exist.
Hence at the Genoa meet in April 1922, which was the first international meet that the USSR was
invited to, USSR signed a treaty with the only other European power that was willing to link itself to
Russia Germany, the other outcaste in Europe at the time. This treaty was the Treaty of Rapallo,
which established trade links between the two countries. The Treaty of Rapallo was extended again
later that year, and again under Hitler in the form of a neutrality agreement for five years in 1931.
In the early 1930s Soviet Foreign Policy was dominated by the belief that capitalism was in
shambles and the time for Communism had arrived. With Europe overrun by the Great Depression,
the rest of the world feared this prospect since it seemed all too likely. To this end, Stalin decided that

it was time to push for communism more aggressively, and so moderates like the socialist parties in
Europe were to be done away with they only got in the way of the revolution. In a way the
Comintern did contribute to the rise of Hitler: the chasm between the Socialist Party and the
Communist Party in Germany split the anti-fascist vote, allowing the Nazi Party to come to power.
Although Russian and Germany shared a neutral relationship in 1931, by 1933 Hitlers fascist regime
began propagating anti-Bolshevik and anti-Slav propaganda. Anyone who opposed Hitler in Germany
was killed in the Night of the Long Knives, including the socialists and communists. Between the
years 1933 and 1936, Western Europe tolerated acts of aggression by [Italy and Germany] as long as
the actions did not lead to a major war. Nazi Germany posed a major threat to the USSR at this point:
Germany had a better army than the USSR, and had made its expansionist plans clear. It had also
signed a pact with Britain, France, and Italy thus the USSR was back to being isolated. At the same
time, Japan was also at odds with the Soviet Union and making aggressive overtures. In the year
1936, Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, which increased the possibility of the
Soviet Union being forced to fight wars on two fronts.
The USSR had to take whatever measures it could to protect itself. By 1935, there was another shift
in Soviet foreign policy: in the League of Nations the Soviet Union called for a collective security
against the aggressor states, particularly Germany. Through the Comintern Stalin wanted to mend the
rift between the socialist and communist movements in the form of popular fronts and offered to
provide support to them in Europe. It also signed a defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia and
France. The USSR needed to prevent a war or an attack for as long as it could in order to build on its
army. The Western Powers, for their part, maintained a policy of appeasement and toleration to
Germany and Italy, given their own weaknesses the Great Depression had badly affected a large part
of Europe, especially Britain.
Between 1935 and 1938, the situation continually worsened, given that none of the other European
powers wanted a war and thus had policies of appeasement and toleration of acts of aggression the
only country that offered stiff resistance to the Nazis is the Soviet Union, who increasingly appeared
to be a champion among the European states, valiantly fighting the new demon, fascism. Traditional
powers like France and Britain, however, did absolutely nothing. When Italy invaded Ethiopia they
attempted to make peace with the former at the expense of the latter. In the Civil War that broke out in
Spain, the Popular Front government was pitted against Spanish rebels under Francisco Franco.
Although the USSR had initially agreed to maintain a neutral stance like the rest of Europe, once the
fascists sided with the rebels, they had no choice but to assist the socialist government which the
western powers did not do. Soviet help, however, was limited, since they intervened through the
Comintern and not as an individual country. The main aim as far as Stalin was concerned, was to
prolong the war as much as possible, in order to keep Italy and Germany busy and focus on rebuilding
their own military.
Western Europe, for its part, maintained their policy of non-intervention and appeasement in order to
postpone the possibility of war. Although the Soviet Union persistently called for collective security
and was eager for an alliance with the western powers, the increasing popularity of the USSR fuelled
their fear that Bolshevism would infiltrate their country. Fascism was the lesser evil, in their view;
Britain hoped that by uniting Western Europe, Hitler would be forced to expand eastwards, where
fascism could defeat communism once and for all.
Meanwhile it increasingly seemed that USSR was being pushed into isolation yet again, as in 1936
Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, and Italy and Germany created an alliance under

the Rome-Berlin Axis. The USSR attempted to strengthen the mutual assistance pact of 1935 with
France but France was so anxious to maintain Britain as its ally and by fear of the left that staff talks
dragged on from 1935 to 1937 before finally falling through.
In 1938 Hitler continued with his expansionist aspirations, annexing first Austria, then Western
Czechoslovakia. France did not come to its aid, breaking the pact made in 1935.
By 1939, after annexing Austria, all of Czechoslovakia and angling towards Poland, Hitlers
Germany was the most powerful force in Europe. By this point Western Europe had realized that if
Poland fell to Germany, they were the next target. Carley points out that the illusion that Nazi
Germany would deal with Europes communist problem dissipated in 1939.
Britain and France suddenly realized that an alliance with USSR was in fact desirable the
alternative to this was annexation by Germany, or worse, a German-Soviet alliance. In order to
prevent this, and in order to guarantee the protection of Poland and prevent German domination,
France and Britain needed the help of USSR. However, Britain and the USSR had not had normal
relations since the 1920s and France was under the thumb of Britain. Throughout talks between the
three, USSR was insistent for a tripartite military alliance against Germany. Although the staff talks
that took place from 1935-37 with France fell through, the Soviet Union readily agreed to provide
whatever help they could to Western Europe in the event of an attack. The Foreign Commissar of the
time, Litvinov, also sent a definitive 8 point tripartite political and military alliance against Nazi
Germany to Britain. The British Cabinet, however, was still extremely uncomfortable by the thought
of agreeing to an alliance with the USSR, being blindsided by their hatred of Bolshevism and the fear
of betrayal. This, naturally, affected the relationship of France and the Soviet Union.
There were also technical and logistical issues that hindered the possibility of a pact with Western
Europe. Since the USSR did not share a border with either France or Britain, in order to be able to
assist either country they needed the sanction of Poland, Romania, or Hungary for the Red Army to
pass through their land. All three of these countries were extremely suspicious of the USSR. It was
believed that if the Red Army passed through their land they would not leave it: they were
apprehensive of potential annexation by the USSR. Romania and Poland had also recently acquired
new lands which were originally part of the Soviet Union, so the fear of it being taken back also
contributed to their stance vis--vis the USSR. Without their permission the USSR could offer limited
help to the Western Powers.
In 1939, the Western Powers aimed to extend talks with USSR about the possibility of an alliance for
as long as possible so as to prevent them from turning to Germany. As far as the they were concerned,
the maintenance of the status quo was desirable that the deadlock between Germany, Britain,
France, and the USSR would continue, preventing any major shift in the balance of power in Europe.
With every definitive proposal sent by Russia to Britain, they received a vague, subtly non-committal
response. Months were spent debating the key issues: guarantees of the Baltic states, a definition of
'indirect aggression', and negotiations for a military convention tied to the political agreement. To the
USSR, it appeared that the Western Powers wanted their help without wanting to provide any in the
event that Germany moved eastwards. Neither side was willing to compromise on the fundamental
elements of their proposals; by August 1939 the USSR had threatened to break off talks if Britain and
France did not agree to a straight triple alliance guaranteeing the security of the contracting parties
against direct aggression, if not an agreement that involved Poland and Romania allowing passage
for the Red Army.

By this time the Soviet Union had also responded to the Germanys overtures, since the possibility of
a Western Alliance was growing increasingly unlikely and pressure was building. Germany had its
own interests in an alliance with the USSR: they wanted to ensure non-interference of the Soviet
Union in the event that they invaded Poland. Germany also wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from
entering into an alliance with the Western Powers, since that meant that Germany would be
surrounded, jeopardizing its plans for further expansion. These talks, however, were far more
cautious. Both Carley and Geoffrey Roberts emphasise the Soviet Unions hesitation in agreeing to a
pact with Germany. However, there was also a resurgence of Japanese aggression at this time. In light
of all these instabilities, the Soviet Union had no choice but to make a quick decision. If, between 12 th
August and 15th August the Western Powers did not agree to an alliance with the USSR on terms
favourable to it, the Soviet Union would unite with Germany. Thus it happened that the Nazi-Soviet
Pact was signed on 23rd August, almost immediately after the falling through of the Britain-FranceUSSR talks. This volte-face demonstrated by the Soviet Union drastically brought down its
international standing; after being the main player behind the anti-fascist force in Europe, this was an
incredibly hypocritical move. However, the Nazi-Soviet Pact came with its own set of instabilities.
Although the pact was meant to last for ten years, both signatories knew this was meant to be
temporary relief: Germany and the USSR was fundamentally opposed in their ideology and despite
having announced their friendly relations Hitler was determined to take down Communism,
eventually if nothing else. If Hitler wanted to be able to freely invade Poland, Stalin wanted a
guarantee that war with Germany could be held off until sometime in the future, when the Soviet
Union had enough military strength to be able to retaliate. The Pact also ensured that the Germans
would ease Japanese-Russian tension.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact is traditionally seen as a goal that the Soviet foreign policy was aiming
towards over a long period of time, beginning in the mid to late 30s. There are various views on
when exactly the Soviet Union decided to re-align itself with Germany. However, using the GodKrisiza archives, Geoffrey Roberts successfully points out that during this time Soviet foreign policy
was in fact highly uncertain of itself and seemed to have been improvised along the way. Evidence
shows that the secret protocol, although meant to be an attractive offer to the USSR, was only taken
advantage of by Stalin a month after Hitler. What needs to be kept in mind is that in the event of an
alliance with either the west or Germany, the aim was not to build trust between the signatories: the
point, for the Soviet Union, was to buy time. This was also true for the Western Powers, since they
had their own internal and external issues and could not afford war with Hitler. However, given their
indecisiveness, Stalin had no option but to realign himself with the Nazis. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was
indeed a shortlived one; by 1941 Germany had decided that Soviet cooperation was no longer
necessary, and invaded the Russian sphere of control in Poland, startling Stalin, so much so that it
took the USSR three hours to retaliate, giving Germany a significant head start.

Bibliography
Carley, Michael Jabara: End of The Low, Dishonest Decade: Failure of the Anglo-FrancoSoviet Alliance in 1939; Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.45, Taylor-Francis Ltd, 1993.
Marples, David R.: Motherland: Russia in the 20th Century; Longman, New York, 2002.
Riasanovsky, Nicholas V.: A History of Russia; OUP, 1963.
Roberts, Geoffrey: The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany; Soviet Studies,
Vol.44, Taylor-Francis Ltd, 1992.
Service, Robert: A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin; Penguin Books,
2003.