Collaboration with Japan brought greater benefits to Southeast Asian

nationalists than did resistance. How far do you agree with this view?

The Japanese Occupation was a significant episode in many of the

Southeast Asian nations where they observed a dramatic transformation
of the political climate that enabled the nationalists to realistically aim for
the achievement of independence for the first time. However, the way
they perceived the arrival of the Japanese can be said to be the turning
point in the benefits, in which the level of achieving independence they
managed to obtain. For the nationalists who collaborated with the
Japanese, they took it upon their advantage to use their latters resources
to train the former and form formidable armies as well as support from
them to garner the support of the masses while learning how to run the
government. Compared to the nationalists who chose to resist the
Japanese, they managed to garner better materials for building an army
from the Allies, securing the goodwill of the returning colonial powers with
their anti-Japanese movements and the popular support from the masses,
which increased the nationalist leaders credentials. This essay seeks to
argue that collaboration with Japan brought about greater benefits to the
Southeast Asian nationalists than did resistance to a large extent as they
were able to gain the trust of the Japanese first rather than just oppress
them and not being able to further their nationalist stance.
Collaborating with the Japanese provided an opportunity for the radical
nationalist leaders to gain access to the masses under the pretext of
garnering support for the Japanese war effort. This enhances their
credentials and prominence as nationalist leaders. An example can be
seen in Indonesia, where the Japanese had permitted the use of national
symbols and the use of Bahasa Indonesia in the administration, instead of
imposing the Japanese language on them, which helped to increase the
sense of national identity among Indonesians. They also allowed PUTERA
(1943) and subsequently Jawa Hokokai (1944) to establish a network of
radios linking Java and the outer islands, enabling Sukarno to broadcast
his speeches and reach out to an unprecedented number of Indonesians
to promote the nationalistic cause. This enabled Sukarno to gain mass
support, even in the rural areas, so they can unite to overthrow the
Western Colonial powers in their fight for independence. Similarly in
Burma, the Thakins open collaboration with the Japanese gave them
access to the Burmese masses, utilising the nationalist slogans such as
Burma for Burmans, to whip up popular enthusiasm for the Japanese
Occupation and using the Burma National Army to promote the nationalist
cause without fear of Japanese suppression, inculcating a common sense
of national identity. This mass support allowed the nationalist leaders to
cultivate and instil a sense of belonging in the masses to garner their

support in pursuit of independence, hence benefitting them from

collaboration with the Japanese.
Collaborating with the Japanese had also allowed the opportunity for the
nationalist movements to acquire organised, well-trained and modern
military forces with the support of the Japanese, giving them a dramatic
boost to the feasibility of revolutionary tactics. For example in Indonesia,
the Japanese sponsored the establishment of Pembela Tana Air (PETA) in
1943 which was a well trained paramilitary force of 65,000 which would
then become the backbone of the Indonesian Republican Army after the
Japanese defeat. They also created the Barisan Hizbullah in 1944 which
was the military wing for Masyumi. Similarly in Burma, we see the creation
of the Burma Independence Army which later served to form the 10,000strong Burma National Army in 1943 led by General Aung San.
Furthermore, the acquisition of a strong military arm greatly improved the
nationalists negotiating position with the returning colonial powers in
their struggle to achieve independence after 1945 instead of continuing
the never ending futility of an armed revolt due to the greater superiority
in terms of weapons the colonial powers possessed. Like the 1926-1927
revolts by the Partai Komunis Indonesia as well as the Saya San rebellion
from 1930-1932 in Burma.
Resisting the Japanese also brought about benefits to the nationalists. This
is because e they had the opportunity to acquire an organised, welltrained and modern military force with the support of the Allies, mostly
the US. For example, in Vietnam, the Japanese Occupation had served to
strengthen the communists militarily since the Vietminh obtained vital
economic and military aid from the Allies to fight the Japanese. They saw
the creation of a well-trained and well-equipped Vietnamese guerrilla
army that numbered 5000-strong by September 1944 under the strong
leadership of the Indochinese Communist Partys Vo Nguyen Giap, and
would form the bedrock of the post-war anti-French resistance movement
seeking to achieve independence for Vietnam. Similarly in the Philippines,
the Japanese occupation had served to be a golden opportunity for the
Communist Party of the Philippines to collage the pre-war political
dominance of Partido Nacionalista with the formation of its military arm,
Hukbalahap in 1942 under Luis Taruc. They received substantial US
military assistance and hence was the best, most organised and most
effective anti-Japanese resistance force in Southeast Asia. Thus, they were
able to gain the military arm that would prove to be useful in resisting
against the Japanese from colonising their countries and subsequently,
the returning colonial powers.

However, these nationalist movements will still be suppressed after the

Japanese Occupation as they are largely the communists, which led to the
colonial powers especially USA itself, to supress and try to remove them
from the ruling power as part of the Cold War element, where communists
had to be contained to avoid the spread of the communist ideology. Thus,
their credibility was undermined in this case.
In addition, with resistance of the Japanese, the nationalist leaders were
able to secure the goodwill of the returning colonial powers in view of their
anti-Japanese resistance efforts, which was a boost to the negotiating
positions of the nationalist leaders. For example in Indonesia, covert
resistance by Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin where they tried to create
an underground anti-Japanese resistance movement, supported by
Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, which boosted their anti-Japanese
credentials in the eyes of the Western colonial powers which deemed to
be politically useful after the Japanese defeat in 1945. Similarly in Burma,
the covert resistance movement against the Japanese had laid the
foundation for the creation of the Anti-Fascist Organisation (AFO) in 1944.
Thus, with the covert resistance put up by them, it further enhanced their
negotiating positions towards the returning colonial powers where they
would be more willing to grant independence to the respective countries
after the Japanese Occupation.
However, the willingness of the nationalists to collaborate with the
Japanese provided a platform for them to subsequently switch to use of
resistance tactics, depending on circumstances to best advance their
nationalist agenda of achieving independence. Thus, starting with
resistance would just mean that they would straight away be repressed by
the Japanese without them making full use of what the Japanese can
afford to give them in essence of supporting the full use of what the
Japanese can afford to give them in essence of supporting the Japanese
War effort. This can be seen exceptionally well in Burmas case as Thakins
had collaborated with the Japanese to make use of the Japanese support
to advance their primary nationalist objectives of achieving independence,
only to turn against the Japanese after 1944 in view of Japans declining
military fortunes using their positions in the Ba Maw government as cover
while organising anti-Japanese activities.