wo £-Gh, 2Nyaaya Voiseshika}: Anaikantika, , dd
Re a ee nero wt?
ibo it docs not fall under ,the category af a fallacy, The
definition, however, covers the accredited cases of recognized
fallacies which according to the Naiyaayika are of five different
_ types, viz (1) auaikaantita,. (the inconclusive piobans (middle
term) lacking invariable concomitance with the probanddm (major
. term); (2) viruddla (the contradictory probatis which is invariably
concomitant with the absence of the probandum; (3) asidha
_ (unproven probans); (4) _Satpratipasha (the “counter~balanced
probans); and (5) baadhifa (the contradicted probans). ‘The
inconclusive ,(azaikaantita) probans , thwarts ° the process of
‘ inference by violating the universal concomitance (waapti), which
js one of the conditions of inference. The frustration of inference
may be direct or indirect through the violation of the ccnditiéns
of inference, Now, the conditions of inference, are (Q) the
universal concomitance of the probans with’ prohandun; (ji) the
subsistence ofjsuch probans in the subject—which is expressed
vin the minor’ premise. The combined product of these two
premises is the synthetic judgement (paraamarsa) which immediately
Jeads to inference of the conclusjon, If by reason of tny defect
postesséd of firet! because | it ist a chill”
_, These arguments. “dre jMlusergiion’ of thé aforésuidféllacy bécatise
“the concomitance " between" ‘thé’ fadt of being! ariybrdt id ‘being
amperishable’ is ot cdpable'' oF Being | ascertained "[“iii!]! The
‘inconsequential THeonelusive | Brobihs * arigds 'Whesi“thelsubjeottis
the totality of eaistént’ things ‘and’ the! probindaind ithe: probandum
are absolute universdl Gonedpts a8 for inst in’ thé! argument,
‘AIL things are namable hecaus€ they “tee ‘cognizable,’ Phettis'no
case left over where the’ cbricdmitaheé Between’ ‘the! probate. ahd
probandum ‘dan be tested gs ‘all’ existents have’been’ ihluded!tin
the denotation of the'subject. This’ | sub-spbaies of ‘fallasy thowever
has been a subject of heated cdittroyersy and Gangesa succeeds
in vindicating this fallacy on the psychological ground of failure
of a knowledge of universal cohcothitance, the failure ibeing due
to the absence of an dcerdited example where ‘the concomitance
can be ascertaitied. ' PEP ee ame cee ae
et Virtiddha, Hee Qareet,
2) The contradictory probans [Viruddta} being auvaviably
concomitant with the edniradietory' of the probaridun'contradidts
the cognition of the necessary concomitance of ‘the ‘probans ‘with
the probandtim and thus ‘tlwarts inferenge by" ‘removing Orie of
its conditions, iz nod tie
“Asi@etia, at
(8. tAélddha’ {unproven} admits ef several sana
varying with the ternte of the eyllugigm that may be inbiréven,(GK D-Nyniya Mraisedhiltagid-yo
i Satpratipalshar
mE
--CiJ:The subject - may be difiction: ‘and. this! would: invalve :the
t fallacy ‘oftthe | unproven subject ;{adsrayasiddha). -The-~ “a¥gumeit,
h “The-golden: hill: ist, possessed: of; fire, betause it sis»pdssesded .of
~esmke}. is! abortivé,-inasmiich’as ‘no: synthetié judgement - scognizing
‘thespresence. of smoke-concomitant-with fire in a fiction is. possible.
seni this:judgement:is invarinbly- the immediate catiS of, inference,
hofiit} ‘Phere thay! bepa: case of! unproven ;probans -(svarupaasiddha)
sivherevthe prdbans.is:knowmito: be:.non-existent; ins:the subject,
citistin the argumentjThe lake-is!.on