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DAM BREACH FLOOD ROUTING FOR A ROCK-FILL DAM ON RIVER

1) INTRODUCTION

Dams have been playing a vital role in the development of any country by meeting the water
demand for domestic use, irrigation, power generation, flood protection etc. There are about
45,000 large dams in the world. Lemperiere (1993) concluded that, todays dams are ten
times safer than fifty years ago, but population numbers downstream of dams have increased
by a factor of twenty and are continuing to grow and such a growth of population is making
the economical, technical criteria in determining the yardsticks of sustainable development.
About 5% of the dams have been failing due to several factors like floods, landslides,
earthquakes, deterioration of the foundation, poor quality of construction and act of war etc.
When a dam fails or is deliberately demolished, large quantities of storage water are suddenly
released, creating major flood wave capable of causing disastrous damage to downstream
people and property.
2) HUNDREDS OF DAM FAILURES IN USA AND CHINA DUE TO MANY REASONS

According to the American Dam safety officers, out of 75,000 dams in USA, several
hundreds of them are disasters waiting in the wings. Far too many dams are facing the risks
of failure, threatening lakhs of human lives and billions of dollars worth of properties. Out
of many old dams about 50-year old ones account for 85% of the dams by 2020 and most of
these dams were built without adequate spillway capacities to release flood waters during
torrential rains, causing extreme floods that overtop the dams ,resulting in their collapse
Even in China the Water resources Minister, Zing Ping recently stated that about 68 dams
collapse every year. During the last 50 years about 3500 out of about 85,000 dams collapsed,
placing dam collapse rate at 4%.In Guangdong province 50% of the dams amounting to 3685
are classified as Dangerous Reservoirs. Many cities are under threats of dam collapses and
among them are 25.4% of cities with 179 dangerous reservoirs, and16.7% of county towns
1

Ramesh M, Asst Professor, GITAM, Andhra Pradesh, India, m_rameshgitam@yahoo.co.in


Dr.S.Surya Rao, Professor, GITAM, Andhra Pradesh, India, s_suryaraogitam@yahoo.co.in
3
Dr.K. Manjula Vani, Professor, J.N.T.U, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India, ronilekha@yahoo.com
2

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao, GITAM, Andhra Pradesh, India, profshivajirao@hotmail.com


with 285 reservoirs. In addition to 146 million people, about 9 million Hectares of cultivated
fields also face serious threat. In fact in 1975,the collapse of Banquiao Dam caused death of
1,00,000 people due to drowning and 1,40,000 people due to the repercussions of the floods
like epidemics and food shortage.
Predetermination of dam-breach flood wave propagation to the downstream river is very
much essential. All the existing and the future major dams located in earth quake prone areas
and region of heavy rainfall should be analysed for such a possible calamity, the flood due to
the dam-breach should be routed downstream in the river, the possible peak river stages and
river discharge-magnitudes and the times of occurrence with reference to the time of dambreach should be computed. Accordingly the down stream developments can be controlled,
the necessary engineering measures can be undertaken and the emergency action plan can be
formulated to mitigate the disaster.
In the present study an attempt is made to predict the dam-breach outflow hydrograph for a
major rock-fill dam of 5.4 billion cubic meter capacity which is proposed at Polavaram in
Andhra Pradesh, India on the Godavari river, for a specified dam-breach pattern and the
breach outflow hydrograph is routed through the downstream Godavari river reach of about

92 km from Dam site to the tail end of river which joins the bay of Bengal. The influence of
variation of time of breach of embankment dams is also carried out.
The objectives of the study are:
1) To predict the breach pattern
2) To route the dam-breach flood superposed on the monsoon flood through the river system
and determine the peak flood stage, peak flood discharge and their times of occurrence as a
function of distance from the dam, stage and discharge hydrographs at different stations along
the downstream river.
3) GOVERNING EQUATIONS

Some investigators used several existing dam-break models and concluded that the U.S
National Weather Services (NWS) Dam Break flood forecasting model (DAMBRK) is
reliable and well documented model. The governing equations of the model are the complete
one-dimensional Saint-Venant equations of unsteady flow. The system of unsteady flow
equations is solved by a non-linear weighted four-point implicit finite difference method. The
1-D Saint-Venant unsteady flow equations of conservation of mass and conservation of
momentum are as follows:
Q A Ao
Q Q 2 / A
h

gA
S f S e 0 ( 2)

q 0 (1)

x
x
x
t
in which, Q is the discharge; A is the active flow area; Ao is the inactive storage area; q is the
lateral outflow; x is the distance along waterway; t is the time; g is the gravitational
acceleration; h is the water depth; Sf is the friction slope; Se is the expansion-contraction
slope.
4) DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY

The significant features of the rock fill dam considered in the study are as follows: The height
of the rock fill dam above the deepest foundation level is 40 m and the upstream slope is
2.5H: 1V and the down stream slope is 2H: 1V. The length of dam at crest level is 2.3 km and
the width of crest is 12.5 m. Length of reservoir is about 50 km. The gross storage capacity of
the reservoir is 5,411 Mm3, in which live storage is 2,100 Mm 3. The capacity of spillway is
1.02 Lakh cumecs. The maximum water level (MWL) is 53.0 m, Full Reservoir Level (FRL)
is 45.72 m, spillway crest level is 30.0 m, Natural G .L is 13.5 m.
5) INPUT DATA

The rock-fill dam on the Godavari river is considered for the study. 1,000-year frequency
discharge hydrograph is considered as inflow hydrograph to the reservoir. The spillway
discharges corresponding to the reservoir head of water, the reservoir water level versus the
reservoir volume capacity curve is considered for reservoir routing. Breach characteristics are
determined by Froelich.DL (1995a) equations. The hypothetical cross-sectional details of
down stream river reach are determined by Laceys formula for the available flood discharge
data of the Godavari river basin [CWC(2006)] and used in routing the dam-breach flood,
through the down stream river reach.( For tabulated input data, vide last page)
6) COMPUTATION OF THE BREACH DETAILS

Breach initiates at a certain point on the top of the earthen or rock-fill dam due to
overtopping. The breach widens and deepens and results in increasing flood flow through the
breach. The predominant mechanism of breaching for earthen or rock fill-dam is by erosion
of embankment material by the flow of water over the dam. When the breach stems from
overtopping, excessive shear stresses on the surface induced by water flow, initiates erosion
process. Erosion will begin when local shear exceeds a critical value, after which earthen dam
material is set in motion. The formation and duration of breach depending on the height of

the dam, the material used for the dam construction, compaction of material, quantity and
duration of flood flow. Overtopping breaches are usually either rectangular or trapezoidal in
shape. The duration of breach is usually few minutes to few hours.
Coleman S.E, Andrews.D.P and Webby M.G (2002) carried out experimental studies on
overtopping breaching of non-cohesive homogeneous embankments. The non-dimensional
equations for prediction of breach pattern, from their studies are given as
Lb* = Lb/H = 16 (hb*)1.5 -------(3)

H b* = (2.30 t* + 1) -1 -------(4)

Where Lb* = Lb / Hs, hb* = hb / Hs , Hb* = Hb / Hs, t* = gt2/Hsx106


Lb= length of breach crest, Hb = Height of breach crest above foundation,
g= acceleration due to gravity, t = time of breach.
Froelich.DL (1995a) studied 43 no. of breached dams of height ranging from 4.5 to 85.5 m
and statistically derived predictors for breach pattern are given as
Bavg = 0.1803 ko (Vw.)0.32( Hb)0.19 --------(5)

Tf = 0.00254 (Vw.)0.53( Hb)-0.9---------- (6)

Where Bavg = Average breach width, m; Tf = Time of failure, hrs; Ko = 1.0 for piping, 1.4
for overtopping failure modes, Vw = volume of reservoir, m3 ; hb = height of breach, m.
The author (2003) carried out least square analysis for 13 No. of historic medium dam failure
cases and developed an empirical equation for average breach width (B), m and for the time
of breach (T), hrs.
B= k (Hd)0.7 (vr)1.76 --------------(7)

T= 26.28 (Hd)0.67 (vr) -0.264 ---------------------(8)

Where k = 2.78 x (10)-13, Hd= Height of dam, m Vr= volume of reservoir, m3


While using all the above breach predicting equations the calculated breach width from the
Coleman (2002), and author (2003) breach equations are greater than crest length, but the
calculated breach width from the Froehlich (1995a) breach equation is about 663m. Hence
the breach width of 663 m is considered. In this study the calculated time of breach from the
Coleman (2002), Froehlich (1995a) and author (2003) breach equations are about 7.38 hrs,
13.23 hrs and 0.84 hrs respectively. The time of breach of 0.84 hrs is considered in this study.
7) ROUTING OF THE BREACH FLOOD
a) NWS - Dam Break Flood Forecasting (DAMBRK) Model Description

The U. S National Weather Service (NWS) developed DAMBRK program (Fread, 1988) is
reliable, well documented. The model has wide applicability, it can function with various
levels of input data ranging from rough estimates to complete data specification, the required
data is readily accessible and it is economically feasible to use with minimal computational
effort on microcomputers.
DAMBRK model can be used to develop the outflow hydrograph from a dam breach and
hypothetically route the flood through the downstream valley. The governing equations of the
model are the complete one-dimensional Saint-Venant equations of unsteady flow, which are
coupled with internal boundary equations representing the rapidly varied flow through
structures such as dams and embankments, which may develop a time dependent breach.

Also, appropriate external boundary equations at the upstream and downstream ends of the
routing reach are utilized. The system of equations is solved by a nonlinear weighted fourpoint implicit finite difference method. The flow may be either sub-critical or supercritical.
The hydrograph to be routed may be specified as an input time series or it can be developed
by model using specified breach parameters (size, shape, time of development). The possible
presence of downstream dams which may be breached by the flood, bridge / embankment
flow constrictions, tributary inflows, river sinuosity, levees located along the downstream
river, and tidal effects are each properly considered during the downstream propagation of the
flood. DAMBRK may also be used to route mud and debris flows using specified upstream
hydrographs. High water profiles along the downstream valley, flood arrival times, and
hydrographs at user-selected locations are the standard DAMBRK model output.
b) APPLICATION OF THE NWS-DAMBRK MODEL

The DAMBRK model is thoroughly studied. This model has been applied for several
historical dam failure cases [Machhu dam-II, Gujarat, Teton dam,U.S.A] and satisfactory
results have been obtained. The DAMBRK model has also been applied for a medium rockfill dam (Rampada Sagar dam, Andhra Pradesh) to predict the maximum water levels along
the down stream river for a hypothetical case of dam failure.
The NWS-DAMBRK flood-forecasting model is used in this study. The breach outflow
hydrograph is predicted and routed through the downstream Godavari river reach over a
length of 92 km. i.e. from Dam location to the tail end of river. The peak flood stage and the
peak flood discharge profiles w.r.t distance from the dam are predicted, the times of
occurrence of these quantities at different locations in the downstream river reach are also
computed. The flood stage and the flood discharge hydrographs at different stations in the
downstream river reach are also determined.
8) RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS

It is assumed that when the Godavari River and its tributaries are simultaneously in flood
state, and if the inflow flood to the reservoir exceeds the designed capacity of spillway, then
the excess inflow flood overtops the dam. The overtopping of flood- water over the rock-fill
dam initiates the breaching of the dam and large volumes of reservoir water releases into the
river gorge and the breach flood wave propagates down the river in the downstream direction.
The dam-breach flood routing is carried out using NWS-DAMBRK model, for a hypothetical
breach pattern for a rock-fill dam on the Godavari river basin. The duration of development
of the breach from initiation to its final dimension due to overtopping flood is considered as
0.84 hrs and the consequent outflow through the breach and over the spillway is at its
maximum value of 3,23,773 cumecs. The breach outflow flood is routed through the
Godavari river system over a length of 92 km i.e. from dam location to the tail end of river.
The resulting stage and discharge hydrographs at different locations on the downstream river
reach are presented in Fig 3 to Fig 8. The predicted peak stage and peak discharge
hydrographs w.r.t downstream distance from dam site to the tail end of river are presented in
Fig 1 & Fig 2. The results of the sensitivity analysis of influence of duration of the breach of
embankment dams on the peak flood discharge and on the peak flood depth of water are
presented in Table 2 & Table 3, and Fig.9 & Fig.10 respectively.
The peak flood flow value of 3,23,773m3/sec, depth of water of 31.16 m occurred near the
dam in 0.84 hrs from the commencement of breach. It takes further 6.34 hrs time for this peak
flow to reach 30 km away from the dam and the peak flow at this section attenuated to about
2,56,320 m3/sec, and depth of water at this section is reduced to 20.29 m. It takes further
13.92 hrs time for this peak flow to reach 92 km away from the dam and the peak flow at this
section attenuated to about 1,98,982 m3/sec, and depth of water at this section is reduced to

8.59 m. Similarly the peak flow, peak stage and their times of occurrence at different
locations on the downstream river reach are tabulated in Table 1.
9) DAM BREAK ANALYSIS IN EIA REPORT BY STATE GOVERNMENT:
The Andhra Pradesh State Government , the project proponent submitted to the Central
Government the Environmental Impact Assessment Report including the dam break analysis
report prepared by the Experts of the National Institute of Hydrology, Roorkee in June 1999.
The authors of the report emphasize that the objective of the report is to do hypothetical dam
break flood analysis by preparing 1)input data of the study area compatible to the DAMBRK
model, 2) the result in outflow hydrograph at various stations downstream of the dam and 3)
the inundation map of the area. For the dam break flood the worst possible scenario is taken
with the failure time as 30 minutes, breach length as 450 meters corresponding to the river
width at bed level. The side slope of the breach is taken as 0.05 which corresponds to the
slope of the Godavari river banks at the dam site. Dam-break occurs here by overtopping
when the reservoir water level elevation is 53.32 meters that corresponds with the level at the
top of the dam. The reservoir capacity at the top of the dam is calculated by extrapolation
from the area elevation curve of the reservoir.
For the dam-break flood computation and routing NWS DAMBRK programme was used.
Outflow hydrographs were taken for different sites at downstream distance of 6km, 12km,
20km and 30km respectively. As compared to the outflow peak flood of about one lakh
cumecs (35 lakh cusecs) corresponding to passage of hydrograph over the spillway, this
hypothetical dam break flood reaches a peak discharge of 1.56 lakh cumecs (55 lakh
cusecs)at dam site and 1.42 lakh cumecs( 50 lakh cusecs) at 30km downstream of the dam at
0.5hours and 10.7 hour after the dam break respectively. Hence the peak flood for This dam
failure will be one and half times the corresponding peak flood for no failure case, with the
design flood as the inflow flood. A map with the boundaries of inundated area on both sides
of the river banks are presented both for the spillway design flood for no-dam failure case and
also for the hypothetical dam break flood of higher intensity. While the no-dam failure case
design flood would pass through the river course and confined within the banks, the high
intense flood due to This dam-break would inundate the lands for about 267sq.kms on the left
bank side and 195 sq. kms on the right bank side.
Population likely to be inundated due to the collapse of This dam consequent to a maximum
credible accident caused by extreme floods, earthquakes, human failures, construction
defects, Dam collapses or sudden flood releases from dams in the upstream reaches of the
river in other states etc.
POPULATION LIKELY TO BE DROWNED IN CASE POLAVARAM DAM FAILS
Town
Rajahmundry
Dowlaiswaram
Mandapeta
Ramachandrapuram
Amalapuram
Kovvuru
Nidadavolu
Tanuku
Bhimavaram
Palakollu
Narsapur
Yanam

Population
4,00,000
40,000
50,000
42,000
55,000
40,000
45,000
70,000
1,45,000
80,000
60,000
30,000

Mandals (E.G)
Sitanagaram
Korukonda
Kadiyam
Atreyapuram
Mandapeta
Ramacharndrapuram
Alamuru
Ravulapalem
Kottapeta
Kapileswarapuram
Pamarru
Tallarevu
I.Polavaram
Mummidivaram

Population
75,000
80,000
85,000
65,000
80,000
70,000
70,000
80,000
80,000
70,000
70,000
80,000
70,000
70,000

Mandals (W.G)
Kovvuru
Chagallu
Nidadavolu
Pentapadu
Undrajavaram
Tanuku
Attili
Ganapavaram
Akiveedu
Undi
Penumantra
Penugonda
Achanta
Viravasaram

Population
70,000
66,000
70,000
72,000
73,000
70,000
70,000
70,000
75,000
65,000
65,000
70,000
65,000
65,000

Total Population

10,57,000

Ainavilli
Gannavaram
Ambajeepeta
Mamidikuduru
Razole
Amalapuram
Uppalaguptam
Rayavaram
Malikipuram
Sakinetepalli
Allavaram
Katrenikona
Total Population

65,000
75,000
65,000
70,000
70,000
75,000
62,000
70,000
75,000
75,000
70,000
75,000
18,92,000

Bheemavaram
Mogalturu
Narsapur
Palakollu
Elamanchili
Iragavaram
Palacoderu
Kalla
Poduru
Peravali
Total Population

80,000
75,000
80,000
50,000
75,000
70,000
65,000
70,000
65,000
70,000
16,66,000

Government experts calculated that when the This dam collapses the devastating flash floods
will enter Rajahmundry Kovvuru region within 10 hours, with a flood depth of 20m. The
floods enter in 14 hours in Tanuku, Ravulapalem, Mandapeta area within a flood depth of 17
m and Attili, Kothapeta, Draksharamam areas within 17 hours to a depth of 14 m and
Naraspur, Amalapuram and Mummidivaram regions within 3 to 4 hours to a height of 10 m
resulting in the Watery grave for about 45 lakhs of people in East and West Godavari districts.
Thus a vast stretch of land between Kolleru lake and Kakinada containing hundreds of
villages will be drowned causing deaths of about half a million people and few hundred
thousands of cattle besides destroying the paddy fields covering more than a million acres of
fertile delta lands. The submersion in the catchment area of the This reservoir is estimated at
2.3 lakhs of people who have to be rehabilitated in suitable areas that are provided with all
buildings and other infrastructure facilities to protect their culture and quality of life.
Unfortunately the state government has not presented the comprehensive results of the dam
break analysis report prepared by the Roorkee institute and hence they could not prepare the
risk assessment and also the Disaster Management Plan as required under the provisions of
the Environmental Protection act. The state cabinet and the people of Godavari delta were
completely kept in darkness about the Environmental Impacts of the This project.
10) DAM SAFETY CRITERIA IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES:
In the case of the design of the dams the determination of extreme floods, inflow floods,
safety check floods and spillway design floods are followed in different countries with
different geographical, topographic and weather conditions in addition to ecological,
sociological and economical criteria. The design floods for the spillways in the dams are
based upon different criteria in countries like United States, United Kingdom and India as
detailed in the following tables. The criteria followed for the case of this dam was taken by
the A.P.State Government as 500 years return flood in 2005 and it was directed to be
upgraded to 1000 year return flood. But in view of the emerging global warming impacts the
Godavari catchment is expected to experience more intense storms of longer duration
resulting in increase of floods by more than 20% and hence the design criteria for extreme
floods in Godavari must be correspondingly raised.
In his latest article on design flood for dams F.Lemperiere,(International Journal on
Hydropower & Dam, Issue2, 2005) stated that the discharge of extreme floods (such as the
probable maximum flood) is in the range of 3 times the likely maximum discharge during the
dams life. He stated that the failure of the dams by floods is caused by a small overtopping of
the embankment dams and a huge overtopping of high concrete dams. The yearly
probability of the design flood used for dams usually lies between 1/500 and 1/5000. He
advocated from a realistic approach a safety check flood of very low probability (often

chosen as the PMF), for which are accepted a reservoir level close to the crest of the dam and
also some limited damages. He questions whether for answering the yearly probability of
the maximum flood for ensuring safety of dam should be 1/1000 or 1/1,00,000 or quite nil.
He states that the criteria for answering this question and the design methods are often the
same as 50 years ago and have not been adopted to the present knowledge and conditions. He
emphasizes that today there is much more data on extreme rains and floods which were
considerably underestimated 30 years ago. According to him one of the most critical design
criteria is that the volume and flow of an extreme flood (PMF) lie in the range of 2 to 5 or an
average of 3 times the flow and volume of the maximum flood likely to happen during the
life of the dam, i.e over 100 years. He says that the true return period of an estimated 1000
years flood used as design flood may well be 200 years or 5000 years. He emphasizes
that the design of mot existing dams are those under construction are based on a design
flood which can be spilled (and possible partly stored) without damage. This International
expert says that many small ungated embankment dams may withstand the peak maximum
flood; but very large gated dams with a design flood of yearly probability of 1/1000 may fail
for a 1/10000 flood with all gates open or for an yearly flood incase of all gates jamming. He
further states that the evaluation methods are not the same for safety check flood which is
close to the extreme floods and for the operational flood which is close to the 100 years
flood. According to the reports on maximum reported flood collected from all over the world
based upon catchment areas (ICOLD bulletin 125, page 75) the peak floods are presented :
Extreme flows reported worldwide
Catchment area, S(km)2
1
10
100
1000
10,000
1,00,000
Flow (m3/sec)
100
600
4,000 15,000 40,000
1,00,000
3
2
Flow(m /sec) per (km)
100
60
40
15
4
1
About 50
About 2
And may be roughly represented by 2 formulae: Q = peak flood discharge in cumecs
For S<300 km2, Q = 10,000(S/300)0.8
S>300 km2 , Q= 10,000(S/300)0.4
Comparison between dams of the same or similar region is reliable because the impact of
the different soil and vegetation conditions is very similar including its shape and slopes.
http://www.hydrocoop.org/Shall_we_forget_the_traditional_design_flood.doc
USA STANDARDS DESIGN FLOODS - HAZARDS
S.No.
Dam
Hazard
PMF Value
Remarks
1.
High
High
1.0 PMF
2.
Intermediate
Moderate
0.5 PMF
3.
Small
Low
0.25 PMF
100 years flood
http://www.aswcc.arkansas.gov/DAMRULES.htm
Note: Before 1900 design flow was based upon collection of data on high water marks on
buildings and structures for calculating peak flood and spillways were designed by using a
multiple of this known maximum flood as a factor of safety. But some dams failed because
engineers used for spillway design the previous historical floods that are indicative of the
maximum flood likely to be experienced by the dam during its design life.
RELATION BETWEEN Q FACTOR AND RETURN PERIOD OF FLOODS
S.No.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Q (Cumecs, m3/s)
36.3
18.2
10.9
7.3

Factor
1 (PMF)
0.5(PMF)
0.3 (PMF)
0.2 (PMF)

Return period
1,000,000 years
10,000 years
1,000 years
150 years

5.

6.2

0.17 (PMF)

100 years

UK (1978) ICE GUIDELINES ON DESIGN FLOODS FOR DAMS IN TERMS OF PMF

S.No.
Flood
Return period
1.
0.3 PMF
1,000 year Return period flood
2.
0.5 PMF
10,000 year Return period flood
3.
1.0 PMF
Category-A high dams with high hazard potential
Note: Britain is over safe with its guidelines based on local conditions including PMF.
http://www.defra.gov.uk/Environment/water/rs/pdf/defra_rs_flood-etc-21.pdf (See page-41)
http://www.defra.gov.uk/Environment/water/rs/pdf/defra_rs_flood-etc-20.pdf
GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING DESIGN FLOODS, (CWC,INDIA)
S.No. Structure
Recommended design flood
1.
Spillways for major and a) PMF determined by unit hydrograph and
medium projects with storages probable maximum precipitation (PMP)
more than 60Mm3
b)
If (a) is not applicable or possible floodfrequency method with T = 1000years
2.
Permanent barrage and minor a) SPF determined by unit hydrograph and standard
dams with capacity less than project storm (SPS) which is usually the largest
60Mm3
recorded storm in the region.
b) Flood with a return period of 100 years (a) or
(b) whichever gives higher value
3.
Pickup weirs
Flood with a return period of 100 or 50 years
depending on the importance of the project.
4.
Aqueducts (a) Waterway
Flood with T = 50 years
(b) Foundations and free board Flood with T = 100 years
5.
Project with scanty or Empirical formulae
inadequate data
Ref: CWC India Estimation of Design Flood Peak, Report No.1/73, New Delhi, 1973.
11) FURTHER STUDIES

Dam-breach flood wave propagation models are very much dependent on the geometric and
temporal dam-breach characteristics. The empirical equations presented in this paper for
predicting the breach profile are to be refined by considering the data of several numbers of
historical large earthen dam failure cases. The hypothetical cross-sectional data of downstream river, which determined from the Laceys formulae are used in this study. The actual
cross-sectional data of the Godavari river including flood plains on the down stream of dam
may be considered for accurate simulation of dam breach flood characteristics. The sediment
flow routing may also be considered to predict the riverbed profile
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was carried out as a part of Research Project entitled Dam Breach Flood
Analysis funded by Department of Science & Technology (SERC) New Delhi, India. The
Funding of the study by the DST
(SERC), India, is gratefully acknowledged.
Table 1. Details of peakstage, peak flow and their times of occurrence at different
locations on the downstream of dam (For Time of breach, Tf = 0.84 hrs).

Distance
from the
Dam (km)

Width of River
(Assumed), m

Peak flood
depth of
water (m)

Time of
occurrence of
peak depth (hrs)

0.0
4.0
6.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
42.0
52.0
72.0
92.0

1800
1880
5200
5900
6200
6500
8000
9000
9500
10500
10600
11600
12500

31.16
26.75
25.95
24.73
24.05
23.44
22.15
21.24
20.29
18.20
16.87
13.59
9.58

2.56
4.28
4.75
5.67
6.12
6.58
7.94
8.99
10.17
13.09
15.05
18.56
21.10

Peak flood
flow
(Cumec)

Time of
occurrence of
peak flow(hrs)

323773
311685
303581
292263
287868
283810
272806
264507
256320
238007
225252
208484
198982

0.84
1.52
2.18
3.19
3.62
3.99
5.06
6.12
7.18
9.78
12.12
16.42
21.10

INPUT DATA USED FOR THIS DAM ON GODAVARI RIVER


1
1130.2
55.0
50.0
53.32
2.0
170000
30000
13
1
0
0
13.5
900.0
0
4
13.0

0
637
45.72
53.32
53.32
120.0
130000
20000
5
2

0
333.0
40.0
0.05
0.0

3
238.0
36.0
13.5
35.72

13
160.0
32.0
663.0
0.0

0
60.0
24.0
0.84
9900.0

0
22.5
18.0
13.5
4000

1
0
13.5
0.0
1200.0

90000
20000
6
3

80000
20000
1
4

70000
20000
0
5

60000

50000

40000

0
7

20
1350
0

34
1800
0

40
2350
0

60
2900
0

16

21

32

40

1000.0
0
6
12.8
1200.
0
10
12.2
1350
0.0
12
12.0
1500.
0
14.0
11.8
1600.
0.0
20
11.0
1800.
0
30.
9.8
2500.
0
52.
7.0
5000
0
92.
2.0
10000
0
0.035
0.50
0.50
-0.5
-0.6
0

1250
0

1800
0

3500
1000

4500
4500

21
3100
0

28
5200
0

33
6000
2700

40
8800
5000

22
3650
0.0

28
5900
0

34
7000
5000

40
9800
7150

22
3800
0

28
6200
0

35
8300
5200

40
10100
12900

21
4000
0.0

27
6500
0

34
8600
5200

40
10500
15500

20
4400
0

25
8000
1000

33
10800
6000

40
13700
15200

19.
5000
0

24.0
9500
3000

30
13000
9000

40
16300
18200

15.
7500
2000

21.0
10600
4500

30
16000
11000

35
20300
20200

11.
12500
4000
0.035
0.50
0.50
-0.5
-0.6
0

15.0
14600
8000
0.05
0.50
0.50
-0.5
-0.6
0

30
20000
15000
0.05
0.50
0.50
-0.5
-0.6
0.00027

35
30300
20200
0.05
0.50
-0.5
0.12

(Repeat 11 times more)


0.50
0.50
0.50
-0.5

-0.5

-0.5

0.001

120.

REFERENCES

1) Choi, G.W., and Molinas, A. (1993) Simultaneous Solution Algorithm for Channel
Network Modeling, Water Resource Research, Vol. 29, February, 321-328.
2) Coleman, S.E., Andrews, D.P., and Webby, M.G., (2002) Overtopping Breaching of
Noncohesive Homogeneous Embankments, Jl. of Hydraulic Engg., ASCE,Sept, 829-838.
3) CWC (2006), Central Water Commission, Krishna and Godavari basin, Hyderabad.
4) Fread, D.L. (1998),DAMBRK: The NWS Dam-Break Flood forecasting Model, Office of
Hydology, National Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland.
5) Froehlich, D.L.(1987), Embankment Dam-breach Parameters, Proceedings of 1987
conference on Hydraulic Engineering, ASCE, Aug.1987,570-575.
6) Froehlich, D.L.(1995a), Embankment Dam-breach Parameters Revised, Proc. 1995
ASCE Conf. on Water Resources Engineering, New York, 887-891.
7) Froehlich, D.L.(1995b), Peak outflow from Breached Embankment Dams, Jl. of Water
Resources Planning and management, ASCE, 121(1), 90-97.
8) ICOLD (1973), Lessons from Dam Incidents, abridged edition, USCOLD, Boston.

9) Kamalam., P.S.(2004) Flood Routing in Tree Type of Channel Networks, a M. Tech


Thesis submitted to the Dept. of Civil Engineering, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam.
10) Lemperiere.F (1993), Dams that have failed by flooding: an analysis of 70 failures,
Journal of Water Power and Dam Construction, September 1993, 19-25pp.
11) Nguyen, Q.K., and Kawano, H., (1995) Simultaneous Solution for Flood Routing in
Channel Networks, Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 121, Oct pp. 744-750.
12) Ramesh.M and Praveen. T.V (2003), Dam-breach Flood Routing, Dr.of National Cont.on
Hy & water.Res. HYDRO-2003, PP 45-48.
13) Ramesh.M, S.Surya Rao and K.Manjula Vani (2005), Dam Breach Flood Analysis for
High Rock-fill Dam, Proc. of International Conference on Advances in Structural Dynamics
and its Applications (ICASDA), December 2005, 345-365pp.
14) Ramesh.M, K.Manjulavani and Shivaji Rao.T (2006), Dam Break Analysis as a Critical
Parameter for Safety of Irrigation Projects R.P.Sagar dam on Godavari river, National
Seminar on Disaster Management, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, 27-28 February
15) Rao, K.L., (1995) Indias Water Wealth, Orient Longman Limited, New Delhi, India.
16) Satish Chandra, and Perumal, M (1985), Dam-break Analysis of Machhu Dam-II, Report
of N.I.H, Roorkee, India.
17) Singh, V.P. and Scarlatos, P.D.(1998), Analysis of Gradual Earth Dams Failure,
JI.Hydr.Div.ASCE, Vol.114, No.1, 21-41.
18) Surya Rao, S., S. Murthy Bhallamudi, S.K. Tewari, Ravi Bhushan Kumar, (2000) Flood
Routing in Tree Type Channel Networks, ISH Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, Vol. 6,
No.1, pp 35-45
19) Tewari, S.K., (1996) Flood Routing in Tree Type of Channel Networks, a M. Tech
Thesis Submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering, IIT Kanpur
20) Tony, L. Wahl (1998), Prediction of Embankment Dam breach Parameters, Dam
Safety Research Report, DSO-98-004, US Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation.
21) Wurbs, R.E.(1987), Dam-break Flood Wave Models, Jl.Hy. Div.ASCE, Vol.113, 29-46.

Peak flow, cumec

Breach Flood Discharge, cumecs

350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Distance from the dam, km


Fig.1. Peak discharge profile

Breach Flood Depth, m


35
30

Peak depth of water, m

25
20
15
10
5
0
0

20

40

60

Distance from the dam, km


Fig.2. Peak flood water depth profile

80

100

Discharge, cumecs

350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
0

10

15

20

25

30

Time from the Commencement of the breach, hrs

Water depth, m

Fig.3. Discharge hydrograph at section 0 km downstream


from the dam

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0

10

15

20

25

Time from the Commencement of the breach, hrs


Fig.4. Stage hydrograph at section 0 km downstream from
the dam

30

300000
250000
Discharge,
cumecs

200000
150000
100000
50000
0
0

10

15

20

25

30

Time from the Commencement of the breach, hrs


Fig.5. Discharge hydrograph at secton 30 km
downstream from the dam

25

Water depth, m

20
15
10
5
0
0

10

15

20

25

Time from the Commencement of the breach, hrs


Fig.6. Stage hydrograph at section 30 km downstream
from the dam

30

250000

Discharge, cumecs

200000
150000
100000
50000
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Time from the Commencement of the breach, hrs


Fig.7. Discharge hydrograph at secton 92 km downstream
from the dam

12
10
Water depth, m

8
6
4
2
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

Time from the Commencement of the breach, hrs


Fig.8. Stage hydrograph at section 92 km downstream from
the dam

60

Table 2. Details of peak flood discharge (cumecs) for different times of dam failure
(Tf) and Times of occurrence (To, in hours) at different locations on the downstream
of dam.
Distance
fro
m
th
e
Da
m
(km)
0.0
4.0
6.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
42.0
52.0
72.0
92.0

Tf=2hrs
Flow

321811
311475
303307
291683
287180
283048
271983
263662
255473
237131
224335
207440
198158

Tf=4hrs

To
(hrs)

Flow

2.0
2.4
3.0
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.95
6.96
7.98
10.48
12.77
16.98
21.58

Tf=6hrs

To
(hrs)

315377
308661
300103
288671
284283
280292
269474
261276
253169
234986
222221
205252
196481

4.0
4.2
4.4
5.6
5.8
6.2
7.4
8.2
9.4
11.8
14.0
18.2
22.6

Flow

306617
301395
295419
284179
280086
276253
265829
257868
249973
232108
219466
202526
194470

Tf=8hrs

To
(hrs)

6.0
6.3
6.3
7.2
7.5
7.8
8.7
9.6
10.8
13.2
15.3
19.5
23.7

Flow

296976
291796
288384
278749
274574
270946
261303
253638
245901
228569
216152
199374
192291

To
(hrs)

8.0
8.4
8.4
8.8
9.2
9.6
10.4
11.2
12.0
14.4
16.4
20.8
24.4

Tf=13.23hrs
Flow

To
(hrs)

267443
265652
263156
257322
255157
252565
244978
238496
231714
216306
205081
189439
183816

13.33
13.33
13.33
13.89
13.89
13.89
14.55
15.2
15.88
17.86
19.84
23.80
27.12

Table 3. Details of peak flood depth of water ( in meters) for different times of dam
failure (Tf), and Times of occurrence (To, hours), at different locations on the
downstream of dam.
Distance
Tf=2hrs
fr Depth To
o
(hrs)
m
th
e
D
a
m
(k
m
)
0.0
4.0
6.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
42.0

31.15
26.72
25.92
24.70
24.03
23.41
22.12
21.21
20.26
18.16

3.3
5.0
5.5
6.4
6.8
7.3
8.5
9.7
10.8
13.7

Tf=4hrs
Depth

31.06
26.63
25.83
24.63
23.95
23.34
22.05
21.14
20.19
18.08

To
(hrs)

4.8
6.4
6.8
7.8
8.2
8.6
9.8
11.0
12.0
14.8

Tf=6hrs
Depth To

(hrs)

30.89
26.51
25.71
24.52
23.85
23.24
21.96
21.04
20.10
17.97

6.6
8.1
8.4
9.3
9.6
9.9
11.1
12.3
13.2
16.2

Tf=8hrs
Depth To

(hrs)

30.68
26.35
25.56
24.37
23.71
23.11
21.84
20.93
19.98
17.85

8.4
9.6
10.0
10.8
11.2
11.6
12.8
13.6
14.8
17.2

Tf=13.23hrs
Depth To

(hrs)

29.87
25.74
24.97
23.86
23.22
22.64
21.41
20.52
19.57
17.44

13.2
13.9
13.9
14.5
14.5
15.2
16.5
17.2
17.8
20.5

16.82
13.54
9.52

15.6
19.3
21.6

16.74
13.43
9.40

16.8
20.4
22.6

16.63
13.30
9.25

18.0
21.6
23.7

16.50
13.15
9.09

19.2
22.4
24.4

350000
300000
Peak flood discharge,
cumecs

250000

2hrs

200000

4hrs

150000

6hrs

100000

8hrs
13.23hrs

50000
0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Distance from the dam, km


Fig.9. Peak Discharge Profiles for different durations of
breach formations

35
30
25

2hrs

20

4hrs

15

6hrs

10

8hrs

Peak depth of
water, m

52.0
72.0
92.0

13.23hrs

5
0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Distance from the dam, km


Fig.10. Peak Stage Profiles for different durations of breach
formations

16.08
12.69
8.78

22.5
25.8
27.1

ANNEXURE I
Main works:
Earth-rock fill dam
Spillway in right
flank
Power House in left
flank
Catchment area at
head work site
a) Gross
b) Un-intercepted
(between Polavaram
and Pochampadu
Gross storage at FRL
(145.72m)
Storage at MDDL
( +41.15 m)
Live Storage above
MDDL (+41.15 m)
Submersion (Lands)
Andhra Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh
Orissa
Total
Top level of gates
Crest level
Size of gates
No of gates

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE PROJECT

Design Flood
2310 M long (7579ft) Max. flood (1953)
906.50 M long (2974 Annual rain fall
ft.)
9 Units of 80 MW
Yield to be utilized
each
Duty
Full Reservoir level
Low water level
3,06,643 sq. km
(MDDL)
2,15,957 sq. km)
Max. tail water level
Min. tail water level

0.102 M.cumecs
85,000 cumecs
: 1022.95 mm

5.111 TMCum
(194.60 TMC)
3.381 TM Cum
(119.40 TMC)
2.100 TM Cum
(75.20 TMC)
Ha
44,513
1,504
1,026
47,043
45.72 m
+25.72M
16M x 20M
44

Village Submersion:
Andhra Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh
Orissa
Total Villages

Nos
233
10
7
250

Length of dam
Top of dam - level
Average bed level
Deep bed level

2310 M
+53.32 M
15.00 M
+3.00 M

Deep foundn. level


Spillway between
abutments
Left Canal Ayacut
Right Canal Ayacut

(-) 6.10M
906.50 M

336.57 TM Cft
750 Ha/cum
+ 45.72 m (+150.00 ft
+ 41.15 m (+ 135.00 ft)
+ 30.48 m (+ 100.00 ft)
+ 13.64 m (+ 44.75 ft.)

1.62 lakh ha.


1.29 lakh ha.

Estimation of Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)

a.
b
c
d
e
f

Frequency
(years)
25
50
100
200
500
1000

Magnitude
(cumecs)
63,600
72,300
81,400
89,800
1,01,000
1,09,400

Magnitude
(Lakh cusecs)
22
26
29
32
36
39

ANNEXURE-II: INADEQUATE SPILLWAY CAUSES FAILURE OF DAMS (Cases in Gujarat):

Thus This project made of Earth and Rock-fill dam may be subjected to a maximum credible
accident for various reasons. Moreover like so many dams which collapsed due to
inadequate spillway capacities, This dam also has been designed about 30 years ago with
highly inadequate spillway for discharging the peak floods. About 20 irrigation dams in India

have collapsed. Even in Gujarat state several dams failed due to mistakes committed by the
civil engineers in the design of the spillways as can be seen from the following table.
Design Floods, Actual Floods And Revised Spillways For Some Projects, Gujarat
River Valley
Total
Spillway Design
Highest observed Revised
Projects in
Catchment
Flood as per
flood (Cumecs)
Spillway
Gujarat
Area (sq.km) Project Report
(Cumes)
(cumecs)
Dharoi
5485.84
11213.00
14150.00
21662.00
Dantiwada
2862.00
6654.00
11950.00
18123.00
Machhu-I
735.00
3313.00
9340.00
5947.00
Machhu-II
1928.71
5663.00
16307.00
20925.00
Damanganga
1813.00
11100.00
12900.00
12854.00
Source: Narmada, Water Resources & Water Supply Dept., Government of Gujarat
http://www.sardarsarovardam.org/faqs/answers.htm#1
Even in the case of Machchu dam failure the Morvi town was ill prepared to meet the 2
storey high wall of water that burst fourth from the dam 5 km upstream of the town and swept
away the town on 11-8-1979 within a matter of 9 minutes. The waters receded after 4 hours
and there were no emergency evacuation and disaster management schemes prepared as is the
practice in USA for ensuring dam safety under the dam safety act that requires dam break
analysis risk assessment and disaster management. Instead of the state Government officials
at Rajkot the first news of the tragedy were known by the Americans who learnt about the
dam collapse through the orbiting weather satellite much earlier than the Indian officials. The
state officials admitted that the rainfall in the previous 24 hours was about 23 inches while
the dam was designed to accommodate a maximum of 44 inches rainfall during the whole
year.
ANNEXURE-III Dam
Type
Tigra (MP)
Masonry
Kundali (Mah)
Masonry
Pagara (MP)
Composite
L.Khajauri(UP)
Composite
Ahraura (UP)
Earth
Kaddam (A.P.)
Composite
Kaila (Guj)
Earth
Panshet (Maha)
Earth
Kharagpur (Bih)
Earth
Kadakvasla (Maha) Masonry
Kedarnala (MP)
Earth
Nanaksagar (UP) Earth
Chikhole(Kar)
Masonry
Kodagnar (Tam)
Earth
Machchu (Guj)
Earth
Mitti (Guj)
Earth
Jamunia (MP)
Lawa-Ka-bas (Raj)

INDIAN DAMS THAT COLLAPSED


Ht(m)
Years
Causes
26
1914 - 1917 Overtopping
45
19241925
Structural
27
1927 - 1943 Overtopping
16
1949 1949 Piping
22.4
1954- 1955 Piping
22.5
1957 1958 Overtopping
26
1954 1959 Piping
53.8
1961 1961 Piping
24
- 1961 Overtopping
40
1875 - 1961 Overtopping
21.3
1964 1964 Piping
16.5
1962 -1967 Piping
36.8
1969 -1972 Structural
17.7
1977 1977 Overtopping
24.7
1972 1979 Overtopping
16
1982 1988 Overtopping
10
2002
2003

ANNEXURE- IV
Failure
Dam
mode
type

- SELECTED CATASTROPHIC DAM FAILURE CASE STUDIES


Height Length Peak
Storage Vol
Depth Breach Breach
(m)
outflow
(M
above
above
height width
(cu.m/sec) cu.m)
breach breach
(m)
(M
(m)
cu.m)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
34
-6850
22.5
22.2
28
31
93

S.
No

Dam

Builtfailed

(1)
1.

(2)
Apeshapa
(Colarado)
Davis
reservoir
(California)
Euclides
(Brazil)
Hatch town
(Utah)
Johnstown
(Pansilvania)
Kaddam
(India)
Machchu
dam
Mammoth
(USA)
Nanak sagar
(India)
Gros
(Barzil)
Sallisoliveire
(Brazil)
Teton dam
(Idaho)

(3)
19201923
19141914

(4)
Piping

(5)
Earth

Piping

Earth

12

--

510

58

58

12

12

19581977
19081914
18531889
19571958
19741979
19161917
19621967
19601960
19661977
19751976

Overtopping

Earthfill

53

--

1020

13.6

--

58

Piping

Earthfill

19

238

3080

14.8

14.8

Overtopping

38

284

8500

18.9

Overtopping

Earth &
rockfill
Earthfill

125

--

--

Seepage

Earthfill

60

4180

Seepage

--

21.3

--

--

Overtopping

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Breach
formation
time
(Hrs)

Failure
time
(Hrs)

(14)
0.75

(15)
2.5

Breach
and
empty
time
(Hrs)
(16)
--

21

--

7.0

--

53

131

7.3

--

7.3

17

18

151

3.0

18.9

24.6

24.4

95

0.75

3.5

3.5

214

--

--

15

137

--

1.0

--

--

110

--

--

60

540

--

2.0

--

--

2520

13.6

--

--

21

--

--

3.0

--

16.0

--

9700

210

--

--

16

46

--

12.0

--

Rockfill

35.0

--

9630

660

660

36

35

165

6.5

--

--

Overtopping

Earthfill

35

--

7200

26

71

36

35

168

--

2.0

--

Piping

Earthfill

93

--

65120

356

310

77

87

151

1.25

4.0

--

( Reference: Wahl Tony.L , Prediction of Embankment Dam Breach Parameters, Dam Safety Research Report, Bureau Reclamation, July 1998)

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