India and R2P

Conflict, Security & Development
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Singing the tune of sovereignty? India and the

responsibility to protect
Madhan Mohan Jaganathan & Gerrit Kurtz
To cite this article: Madhan Mohan Jaganathan & Gerrit Kurtz (2014) Singing the tune of
sovereignty? India and the responsibility to protect, Conflict, Security & Development, 14:4,
461-487, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2014.930591
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2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &

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Conflict, Security & Development, 2014

Vol. 14, No. 4, 461487, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.930591
Analysis
Singing the tune of
sovereignty? India and the
responsibility to protect
Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016
Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz

With
an
ostensible
commitment
to
calibrated
engagement
to
renewed
sovereignty and non-intervention and a
suspicions after the fallout of the Libya
long standing involvement in United
intervention. The paper argues that mainly
Nations peacekeeping operations, Indias
domestic factors can account for these
position on R2P seems puzzling. Still,
changes in Indias R2P policy. Despite these
despite the rhetoric about India being an
changes, however, Indias main concerns
emerging power, it often abstains from
with R2P display remarkable consistency:
diplomatic engagement beyond its region,
an insistence on the consent of the state; a
including in R2P situations. What explains
narrow definition of its scope involving a
its
cautious
high threshold of violence; the exclusive
attitude and limited practice? The paper
authority of the UN Security Council; and
shows that Indias position has evolved in
a deeply ingrained scepticism towards the
three phases since 2005, from scepticism via
utility of the use of force.
sceptical
interpretation,
Madhan Mohan Jaganathan is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and
Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He has an MSc and
MA from Madras Christian College, Chennai and an MPhil and PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi.
Gerrit Kurtz is a Research Associate with the Global Public Policy Institutes peace and security programme. His
main research interests are peace and conflict studies, international organisations, global norms and South
Asian politics.
q 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.

This is an Open Access article. Non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly attributed, cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way, is
permitted. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
462
Introduction
In spite of being considered an emerging power, it is striking that India often abstains
from active diplomatic involvement in concrete crisis situations beyond its region. Equally,
Indias long-standing contribution to robust peacekeeping operations by the United
Nations contrasts with its lukewarm response to the principle of a responsibility to protect
(R2P) populations from atrocity crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity.1
After a very prominent, though highly sceptical role, at the end of the negotiations on R2P
at the World Summit in 2005, India has expressed a very cautious attitude and pursued a
limited diplomatic practice concerning R2P. This puzzle is what the present paper seeks to
unravel and explain. Why has India refrained from actively engaging with R2P
diplomatically despite its peacekeeping practice? The existing literature on the subject is
deficient. One trend has been to solely attribute interest-driven motives and risk-averse
strategic culture to Indias behaviour.2 Another tendency is to characterise its position as
ambiguous,3 oscillating between strong criticism of Western interventionism and practices
of regional hegemony.
This paper provides an alternative explanation. A systematic examination of R2P cases,
notwithstanding the nuanced differences of each, is revealing: domestic sources through
the presence of the so-called regional and other political parties in coalition governments
and the role of individual decision-makers influence Indias foreign policy-making
process. In addition, India continues to privilege the principle of sovereignty and its
corollary, non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Inherent in Indias respect for
sovereignty is the notion of morality,4 which echoes the value of sovereign equality. This
implies that India considers sovereignty to be a value worthy of respect and adherence.
Accordingly, non-intervention is construed not just as a foreign policy objective rooted in
rational considerations but a deeply ingrained moral value. This is not to suggest that
India has always refrained from intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Indias
insistence on the principle of sovereignty is, to a large degree, however, a result of its earlier
inferences in its South Asian neighbourhood. In addition, domestic and personality-based,
individual-level factors considerably influence the rhythm of Indias evolving position.
These propositions are useful in appreciating the manner in which India has perceived,
interpreted, deliberated upon and responded to R2P in recent times.
Based on a detailed analysis of statements, speeches and other policy pronouncements
as well as personal interviews with experts and policy-makers in New Delhi, London and
Singing the tune of sovereignty?
463
Berlin, the paper identifies three phases in the evolution of Indias position on R2P. The
first phase began in the years before 2005, continued through the World Summit in 2005
and lasted until June 2009. This phase was characterised by deep scepticism towards the
institutionalisation of R2P. During this period, Indias R2P policy was divided between the
government in Delhi and the permanent representative of India to the United Nations in
New York.
It was only with the first debate at the UN General Assembly in July 2009 that India
began to positively engage with the concept of R2P;5 it recognised the notion of
sovereignty as responsibility.6 It was during this second phase, which lasted from July
2009 to February 2011, that Indias attitude towards R2P turned positive; its interpretation
of R2P included a limited scope with exclusive authority vested in the United Nations
Security Council. Indias decision to go along with the consensus with regard to UN
Security Council resolution 1970 in the wake of the crisis in Libya fits this interpretation.
With the unfolding of the crisis in Libya in 2011, especially in the wake of regime
change, India became less supportive and more apprehensive of R2P, signalling the third
phase. In this phase, which began in March 2011 and continues as of 2014, Indias support
for R2P has not faltered completely;7 its attitude is still positive but more sceptical towards
pillar three of R2P that includes coercive measures.8 This position was confirmed by
Indias embrace of the Brazilian proposal of a responsibility while protecting (RwP) in
2012, which demanded greater attention to the implementation of Security Council
mandates and criteria for the use of force by the Council.9
The article is structured in the following manner. First, it narrates the historical
experiences of India with an emphasis on recent Cold War history. Second, it examines
Indias policy after the end of the Cold War until 2004. Third, the analysis focuses on the
period from 2005 to date. These three phases are delineated, discussed and interlaced with
a number of concrete cases and multilateral debates, notably in the two years of Indias
non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council in 2011 and 2012. The article
explains Indias engagement with regard to the situations in Myanmar after cyclone Nargis,
the end of the war in Sri Lanka, the intervention in Libya and the humanitarian crisis in
Syria as well as its diplomatic interventions in UN debates. Fourth, an attempt is made to
provide an explanation for Indias stance on R2P. The conclusion elaborates the inferences
drawn from the study.
464
In search of lineage: the imprint of history

Indias perspective on R2P, if it is to be appreciated accurately, needs to be historicised.
To this end, this paper asks: what is it in terms of experience and memory that shapes
Indias attitude, interpretation and practice vis-a`-vis R2P? The British rule from 1858 to
1947 has had an indelible imprint on Indias psyche, social fabric and public policy.10 For a
nascent state that has managed to extricate itself from colonialism and emerge as an
independent sovereign state, it was very important to preserve its newly found sovereign
space. The stress on sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states
is as much a rational consideration as it is a normative position.

The emphasis on non-intervention suited India, which was facing an uphill battle to
consolidate its territorial integrity and deflect international attention from the dispute
with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, several parts of Indiasuch as the semiindependent princely states, the Portuguese colony of Goa, the North-East, Tamil Nadu
and Punjabhad resisted assimilation, thereby posing challenges to nation-building.11
The persistence of these difficulties reinforced Indias normative resolve to stress nonintervention by great powers in its region. Jawaharlal Nehru, Indias first prime minister,
considered non-intervention to be the defining attribute of sovereignty and the
foundational principle of international order.12 He based his foreign policy on this basic
premise. The centrality of non-intervention was becoming the anchor for Indias foreign
policy, finding expression in the five principles of peaceful co-existence (Panchsheel)13
and the formulation of non-alignment thereafter.
Non-alignment literally meant staying away from power configurations in the Cold War
international system.14 Substantively, it implied preserving freedom, retaining
independence and asserting autonomy on issues of international importance and matters
of foreign policy.15 Notwithstanding the rhetoric of non-alignment, India was considered
to be tilted towards the former Soviet Union rather than the United States; the Indo-Soviet
treaty of friendship and co-operation in 1971 was the clearest manifestation.16 Indias
relationship with the Soviet Union diluted its adherence to non-alignment; it strongly
criticised the British and French intervention in Egypt in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 but
responded only mildly towards the Soviet intervention stopping the Hungarian revolution
the same year.17 It is worth noting that non-alignment had its roots not just in the
ideological preference of Jawaharlal Nehru but also in the preferences of domestic
constituencies such as political parties, which were echoing and advocating a left-of-centre
465
worldview.18 In essence, from the very beginning Indias foreign policy has been linked to
the domestic theatre.
Indias intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 is often considered a textbook illustration
of humanitarian intervention by many Indian commentators as well as Wheeler.19 The
outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan in March 1971 resulted in the influx of millions of
refugees into the Indian state of West Bengal.20 India intervened in December 1971 to
contain this flow and liberate East Pakistan. India initially claimed that it was acting for
humanitarian reasons to halt the ongoing genocide in East Pakistan committed by
Pakistani troops and militias.21 This line of justification, however, was not accepted by the
international community. With the Security Council unable to reach a decision beyond
transferring the issue to the General Assembly, the latter passed a US-sponsored resolution
demanding an immediate ceasefire.22 All this prompted India to revert to the more
acceptable justification of self-defence,23 and to draw a relevant inference:24 the
international community would not accept humanitarian justifications for military
interventions.25 Indias intervention may also be attributed to the calculation by the Indira
Gandhi Government that projecting strength26 and diverting attention from a brewing
domestic economic crisis would enhance its popularity. Moreover, the very personality
and leadership style of Indira Gandhi seemed to have galvanised the state towards
intervention.27
The other significant instance of military intervention during the Cold War was the case
of Sri Lanka in the 1980s. Ostensibly aimed at protecting the Tamil population in Sri Lanka
suffering from an economic blockade against the rebels of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE),28 the initial Operation Poomalai consisted of the forceful delivery of
humanitarian assistance by airdrops on 4 June 1987.29 India described the Sri Lankan
actions as almost genocidal in their objective30 and India effectively stopped the Sri
Lankan offensive with the airdrop. The following negotiations between the Indian and Sri
Lankan governments yielded an agreement on a large-scale intervention, the Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF), tasked with disarming the LTTE and ensuring a political conflict
resolution process. In essence, the mission to Sri Lanka turned out to be a failure; the IPKF
was mired in the fight with the Tamil Tigers, which it was not able to defeat even with more
than 50,000 troops deployed.31 India withdrew its troops in 1990 in an attempt to limit the
fiasco.
The operation ended up dissatisfying almost every group possible, including the Tamils
in Sri Lanka and those residing in the state of Tamil Nadu in India. It ended up fighting
466
Tamils instead of saving them, alienated the Tamil Tigers from India (which had
previously trained and supported them), and significantly reduced Indias influence on the
island. The unpleasant experience of that endeavour rendered India much more risk averse
on matters of intervention. It reinforced pre-existing preferences for upholding the
sovereignty of states and adhering to non-intervention in the internal affairs as a matter of
prudence and principle.
As the cases of East Pakistan and Sri Lanka demonstrate, India has significantly deviated
from the proclaimed principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. For India, nonintervention referred to great powers refraining from interference in the South Asian
region, where India saw itself as the natural regional hegemon. In addition, domestic
considerations influenced Indian decision-makers in sending troops into East Pakistan
and Sri Lanka, responding to the refugee flows in West Bengal and South India.
Post-Sri Lanka, India has not undertaken major interventions in its neighbourhood.32
In fact, the Gujral Doctrinewhich derives its name from the former Prime Minister of
India, Inder Kumar Gujralreaffirms the centrality of sovereign territoriality, especially of
small states in Indias neighbourhood.33 Grounded normatively in non-reciprocity, the
doctrine implies that India shall not insist on reciprocity but give and accommodate what
it can in good faith and trust with its neighbours.34 The Gujral Doctrine was not just an
innovative foreign policy framework; it heralded change and translated into a visible
improvement in Indias relations with its neighbours including Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Nepal and Sri Lanka.35 As the IPKF left Sri Lanka, India encountered a turning point in its
domestic politics as well. The end of the 1980s marked the advent of coalition politics in
the Indian political system. Between 1989 and 2014, no political party has been able to
form a government on its own, and has had to rely on a host of other parties to form a
majority.
In search of trace: Indias perspective on humanitarian

intervention and R2P, 1991 2004
Indias calibrated support for R2P in the contemporary period can be traced to its deepseated apprehensions towards humanitarian intervention earlier. Throughout the 1990s,
India remained unconvinced of the rationale for humanitarian intervention. There are
several reasons for this circumspection. Primarily, India perceived humanitarian
intervention as an infringement of sovereignty and viewed the utility of the use of force
467
in international affairs as very limited. In addition, India continued to be sceptical of

Western intervention in the light of failed promises and high selectivity in Somalia, the
Balkans and Rwanda. Lastly, India wanted to avoid becoming the target of international
criticism, owing to human rights violations in its own territory, especially in Jammu and
Kashmir.
During the first Gulf War, India supported United Nations Security Council Resolution
678, which condemned Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait.36 However, when the United
States and its allies began to pursue a coercive modus operandi, Indiaas a nonpermanent member of the Security Council in 1991 and 1992abstained from voting on
Security Council Resolution 688, which was used by the US, the UK and France to justify
imposing no-fly zones on Iraq.37 India condemned the suffering and loss of life of
innocent people but reminded the council that it was not for the international community
to decide what should be done, for that would impinge on the internal affairs of States.38
It is the scale of Indias involvement in UN peacekeeping that is often highlighted and
compared with its cautious and reluctant support for R2P. These two practices are neither
contradictory nor antithetical. Indias participation in UN peacekeeping is conditional
upon the respect for sovereignty, the consent of the government and clear rules of
engagement. For example, India ascertained that there was no functioning government in
Somalia in 1993. In that case the question of overriding the sovereignty of the state did not
arise, and India waited until the United Nations was vested with authority to command the
peacekeeping operation.39 It supported the United Nations Security Council Resolution
794 and provided a large contingent to the peacekeeping mission.40
India cites the international failure in Rwanda to make the argument that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, it is not sovereignty that poses an obstacle for effective intervention.
There was no such impediment in Rwanda. Rather, effective intervention is hindered by
lack of political will and, more importantly, the absence of strategic interests for the great
powers to commit themselves. As part of a non-aligned proposal,41 India was ready to
commit troops to the UN mission in Rwanda during the genocide, but not without the
backing of the UN Security Council.42 In the same vein, India did not hesitate to criticise
the so-called safe-zones in the former Yugoslavia by the United Nations Protection Force,
which were not matched by an adequate mandate to defend them. According to the force
commander from India, Satish Nambiar, the massacre in Srebrenica, which was one of
these safe zones, was waiting to happen.43
468
Indias wariness of humanitarian intervention grew more pronounced after NATO

intervened against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, because of the impending
atrocities in Kosovo in 1999, as Western states warned. Characterising the operation as
illegal, India pointed out that NATO was bypassing the United Nations Security Council
and violating international law.44 India even co-sponsored a Russian draft resolution that
condemned the intervention, although it was not a member of the Security Council at that
time.45
After the episode of Kosovo, Indias stance on intervention essentially remained the
same: scepticism about the motives that underpinned such operations and circumspection
of the attendant consequences. It joined the consensus of the non-aligned movement and
reiterated its viewpoint that under international law there was no right to undertake
humanitarian action.46 It specifically rejected the moralist language of the proponents of
humanitarian interventions who asked can we stand by and let people die [ . . . ]?.47 That
was not the right question, India argued one year after the Kosovo war, because while
superior firepower could put an end to genocide by paramilitary gangs, fighting the
roots of the problem required a long-term international presence.48 This reflected its
strategic culture in terms of a sceptical attitude towards the utility of the use of force in
general.
It is therefore not surprising that a regional roundtable with non-governmental
organisations, held by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty in June 2001, enlisted several criteria that would need to be established for
any intervention. These include the restriction of the scope of possible crimes covered to
the most heinous crimes, such as genocide, imminent or ongoing gross human rights
violations and mass murder; fulfilment of the precautionary principles later enumerated
in the final report (i.e. right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable
prospects);49 and the stipulation that if at all possible, intervention should occur on the
basis of the invitation of the government of the state in which the intervention is to
occur.50 These points summarise Indias priorities and concerns on the issue of
humanitarian intervention.
Under the government of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition led by the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India viewed R2P as interchangeable with humanitarian
intervention. It therefore concluded in 2002 that the concept has not found acceptance
among the vast majority of the membership of the United Nations and that [f]urther
discussion of this subject would, in our view, be infructuous.51 Nevertheless, the
469
government also tried to present India as an upcoming major power and to improve its
relations with the United States, and even considered sending a sizable number of
peacekeeping troops to US-occupied Iraq in 2003.52 Indias relatively mild criticism of the
unilateral intervention indicated a more flexible view of international institutions and the
use of force, beyond the rhetoric of non-interventionism.53
In search of pattern: the evolution of Indias position on

R2P, 2005 2013
First phase: sceptical interpretation and cautious go-ahead, 2005 to June
2009
During this phase, the Government of India perceived R2P as humanitarian
intervention by another name, which is to say that it was highly sceptical. From the
perspective of Western powers, India was the worst of the recalcitrant.54 The dominant
research on the World Summit takes the same perspective, arguing that most dangerous
[ . . . ] was the eleventh-hour attack launched by India.55 Interviews with former policymakers in India confirm the general story but shine a different light on this
interpretation of events. India did try to block the whole section on R2P at the last
minute and its actions were strongly influenced by the personal style of its permanent
representative, Nirupam Sen.
Indias priorities at the World Summit concerned development, disarmament and
institutional reform, including, above all, changes in the set-up of the Security Council.56
For R2P, Sen did not even have a brief from New Delhi.57 Consequently Sen, a left leaning
diplomat, constructed Indias position himself, building on the long-standing position on
humanitarian interventions, Indias overall priorities as well as his own convictions.
He accepted that atrocity crimes could justify international intervention, but he insisted
that the threshold for this be very high. If at all possible, the government or at least the
relevant regional organisation should consent to it. R2P could only work, he argued, if the
institutional architecture of the United Nations is adjusted significantly. It had to apply to
all states equally and every possibility of its misuse had to be avoided. As a start, the
permanent members of the Security Council should declare that they would refrain from
using their veto powers in situations where the General Assembly had determined R2P
would apply. In an interview, he claimed that he put this request forward at a meeting
470
during the negotiations, pointing to the demands by Western civil society for a similar
restraint of the veto power. Once there was agreement on this issue, negotiators could have
moved forward; but not a single flag went up, not from Canada, not even from
Switzerland,58 Sen said. After this incident, our position really hardened.59
Consequently, Sen tried to put in as many qualifiers as possible.60 Sens campaign to
limit the applicability of R2P reached boiling point in the week before the vote on the final
draft of the outcome document.61 Calculating for maximum impact, he threatened Indias
objection to the document even as heads of government had already started to land on the
tarmac in New York. His main concern, he insisted, remained the restraint on the veto
(a voluntary restraint, already a concession instead of a [legally binding] Charter

amendment, he said). At this late stage of the negotiations, he tried to change at least the
title of the concept62reflecting the less contested debate about the protection of civilians
in peacekeeping. Some high-level diplomacy ensued that included the British Foreign
Minister and the Canadian Prime Minister,63 who struggled to reach Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh because he was already in the air.64 In the end, Sen could not add more
qualifiers than he did.
Two factors help to explain why an individual ambassador with anti-American leftist
views could shape Indias agenda on R2P so strongly at the World Summit. First, Sens
rhetoric coincided with the views of many countries in the non-aligned movement, in
which India liked to present itself as a leader.65 Second, Sen could feel comfortable in
voicing his socialist views because of coalition dynamics. In the first United Progressive
Alliance Government (UPA I), the Left Front supported the Congress-dominated coalition
from 2004 to 2008. Shadowing the subsequent split between the Left Front and the more
liberal-minded (and US-friendly) Congress party, New York and Delhi did not seem to
have been on the same page on R2P at that time. Sens superior, Foreign Secretary Shyam
Saran, often did not agree with Sen, who frequently ruffled feathers in New York with his
confrontational attitude. Indeed, Saran claimed that India has supported R2P all along.66
Because the coalition government depended on the outside support of the Left Front, Sen
could be confident to air his leftist views, especially on an issue that was of little
importance to the Ministry of External Affairs.
During the remainder of his time as permanent representative, Sen continued this
policy. When UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon tried to formally establish the post of a
Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect, India joined other states in obstructing
the initial funding in the General Assemblys Fifth Committee in 2007. Since the General
471
Assembly had not yet produced a common understanding of the concept in question,
particularly in the context of national sovereignty, the move was premature and lacking a
legitimate mandate.67 India also objected to the proposed renaming of the other related
Special Advisors title to Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass
Atrocities on the grounds that mass atrocities had not been defined by the General
Assembly or in the outcome document.68
Indias stance on R2P was reflected in its response towards the situation in Myanmar in
the context of a natural catastrophe. Indias soft and engaging approach, stressing capacitybuilding and closed-door diplomacy, yielded concrete results. It provided humanitarian
assistance to the afflicted population when cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 May
2008.69 This effort was in contrast to that of major Western donors and non-governmental
agencies, which were denied access by the ruling State Peace and Development Council
until 6 May 2008 and thereafter only with considerable restrictions.70 Bernard Kouchner,
the French Foreign Minister, had resorted to R2P when he called for the forceful delivery of
international aid to Myanmar.71 In contrast and demonstrating the fruits of its low-key
engagement policy, Indias aid was even delivered by Indian naval ships and a military
transport aircraft.72
Indias engagement in the final stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka is also symptomatic of
its larger attitude, interpretation and practice with regard to R2P. In its determined effort
to eliminate the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Government, headed by President Mahinda
Rajapakse, pursued an operation that killed thousands of civilians, especially Tamils, and
rendered many more homeless and internally displaced.73 India expressed a concern at the
humanitarian situation74 and reiterated that there is no military solution to the
conflict.75 In addition, it made clear that any solution will have to be achieved within the
political framework, i.e. the sovereign territory of Sri Lanka.76
Indias rhetoric became increasingly critical in its official pronouncements and
statements, declaring that a continuation of military strikes after the ceasefire would be
totally unacceptable.77 A stronger statement was made by the Minister for External
Affairs, who not only expressed unhappiness at the continued killing of innocent Tamil
civilians in Sri Lanka but also reminded the Sri Lankan Government that it has a
responsibility to protect its own citizens.78 The timing of this statement can be attributed to
the elections to the lower house of parliament in India which were held between 16 April
and 13 May 2009. This rhetoric also reflected significant domestic pressure for the UPA I
Government from its parliamentary ally DMK, a major political party in the state of Tamil
472
Nadu. The pressure was further amplified by protests in the state that culminated in a brief
hunger strike by the chief minister, Muthuvel Karunanidhi from the DMK.79
Consequently, India pressed the Sri Lankan Government for three 48-hours unilateral
ceasefires and extracted a commitment in late April that the armed forces would stop using
heavy weapons.80
Still, India was playing a difficult game between domestic pressure and strategic
objectives in destroying the LTTE and retaining influence in its neighbourhood. India had
supported the Sri Lankan Government in fighting the LTTE long before, including with
radar equipment and a naval blockade.81 Subsequent developments suggest that India did
not want to antagonise Sri Lanka. In May 2009, at a special session of the UN Human
Rights Council, India aligned with the Government of Sri Lanka against a European draft
resolution,82 criticising the special session as an unfortunate development, thereby
politicising the work on reconciliation.83
Second phase: positive attitude and cautious commitment, July 2009

February 2011
During this phase, India expressed a positive attitude towards R2P, acknowledging its basic
tenets while adhering to the fundamental aspects of its interpretation. Hardeep Singh
Puris takeover as the permanent representative of India at the United Nations in 200984
signalled the second phase of Indias position on R2P. It was at the first General Assembly
debate on R2P in July 2009 that the differences between Hardeep Singh Puri and Nirupam
Sen became evident. Sen, in a new role as special advisor to the General Assembly
president on R2P, drafted the presidents concept note for the panel discussion and
interactive dialogue on R2P.85 In an attempt to interpret the language included in the 2005
outcome document as narrowly as possible, Sen emphasised the value of sovereignty and
identified an international role in upholding R2P as problematic, transforming the people
to be protected [ . . . ] from bearers of rights to wards of this agency [of external
intervention].86
With his arrival in New York, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri made it clear to UN
officials that India was taking a new tack on R2P.87 A change of personality coupled with a
change in the coalition arrangementcharacterised by the absence of the Left parties in
the second UPA coalition (UPA II)88created a conducive environment for India to
display a much more positive attitude towards R2P. This implied the creation of
473
manoeuvrable space for the UPA coalition to move closer towards the United States,
solidify the civilian nuclear co-operation agreement and become more receptive to R2P;
change was indeed observable when Hardeep Singh Puri assumed office as the new
permanent representative of India at the United Nations. At the first General Assembly
debate on R2P, held in July 2009, Indias official statement delivered by Puri dispelled
apprehensions by stressing that it has been its consistent view that the responsibility to
protect its population is one of the foremost responsibilities of every state.89 However, the
statement continued to insist on several caveats, such as peaceful means, and the need for
extra vigilance in the context of application of R2P.90
A comparison with Indias earlier policies demonstrates that the 2009 statement
indicated a change in style and emphasis rather than in substance. For abstract multilateral
discussions about a political concept such as R2P, however, style and emphasis matter a lot.
India has come to see the state obligations under R2P as a long-established principle of
sovereignty as responsibility practised in democratic states such as its own. This insight
explains, in part, why India has not engaged with or contributed to the evolution of the
R2P norm conceptually. India contends that responsibility is inherent to sovereignty and
therefore does not perceive the need to coin a new international concept that entails
something already codified in democratic constitutions as basic state responsibility.
In August 2010, for the first time, India explicitly conceded that a state could fail or be
unable to protect its population for whatever reason and recognised that under those
circumstances the international community does not want to be an innocent bystander.91
However, it voiced scepticism regarding the efficacy of early warning mechanisms for the
implementation of R2P in so far as they did not involve member states.92 While accepting
that states are obliged to protect their citizens, India highlighted the predicament of the
state in dealing with militant groups.93 It underscored that under such situations states
cannot but take appropriate action,94 qualifying its support for the first and second pillars
of R2P. This point of view resonates with its rationale for the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act which allows wide-ranging discretion for the operation of armed forces in counterinsurgency operations. The Act continues to be operational despite pleas from several
quarters including members in the Union Cabinet for its repeal.95 With regard to the
protection of civilians, India emphasised that the response of the Security Council and the
international community must be proportional to the threat involved and maintained
that force is not the only way of protecting civilians.96
474
Indeed, Indias support for pillars one and two of R2P echoes its long-standing
conviction that, except in very rare cases, states are best equipped to respond to crisis
situations. The task of the international community is therefore to assist and support the
building of the capacities of governments in fulfilling their obligations. Similarly, India
endorsed improving the analytical capacities of the UN Secretariat, including for early
warning. At the same time, it reminded its fellow member states that in the cases of
Rwanda and Srebrenica, which they cite frequently, missing information and analysis were
not the central problem; the problem was competing strategic, political or economic
considerations of those on whom the present international architecture had placed the
onus to act.97
Indias voting behaviour and statements during the crisis in Libya in early 2011
confirmed its cautious attitude towards R2P. Indias vote in favour of resolution 1970
could be seen in the context of its presence in the Security Council, which considerably
reduced its leeway for opting out of the exercise; rather, it was impelled to take a concrete
stance on the issue. India also felt it had to show solidarity with its traditional Arab and
African non-aligned partners, urging it to vote for the referral of the situation in Libya to
the International Criminal Court,98 despite its opposition to the Rome Statute.99 More
importantly, India was considerably influenced by the need to protect its own nationals
caught in the quagmire.100
Third phase: proven apprehensions, serious concerns and limited

engagement, March 2011
Indias serious concerns with the implementation of Resolution 1973 in Libya signal the
third phase of its position on R2P. This phase is marked by heightened attention to any
measures under the third pillar of R2P and the demand for accountability and monitoring
measures in its embrace of the Brazilian proposal of a responsibility while protecting
(RwP), formalising its previous insistence on caveats for the use of force. Available
evidence suggests that India was indeed weary (sic)101 of the endeavour in Libya from the
very beginning and preferred a cautious and gradual approach in dealing with the
situation.102
When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 approving a no-fly zone over
Libya as Gaddafis troops were advancing on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, India
abstained. The rationale for the decision was clear. It deplored the use of force, which was
475
totally unacceptable and stressed the importance of political efforts to address the
situation.103 In addition, India said that the resolution authorises far reaching measures
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and expressed its typical view that there should be
full respect for sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya.104 The use of the
expression all necessary measures in paragraph 4 of the resolution, amounting to a blank
cheque for the intervention, was not palatable and struck a jarring chord for India, which
decided at that point to not go along with the resolution.105 Several scholars make a link
between Indias abstention and domestic considerations such as the presence of a large
Muslim population within its territory.106 While it remains unclear to what extent Indian
decision-makers were moved by this consideration, leaders of the Muslim community, a

traditional constituency of the Indian National Congress party, had called the intervention
unacceptable before the vote.107
As the NATO-led intervention in Libya effectively came to assist the rebel forces, leading
coalition members declared: so long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its
operations so that civilians remain protected.108 The experience confirmed Indias
suspicion of the lofty rhetoric. An official statement read, we find several member-states
all too willing to expend considerable resources for regime change in the name of
protection of civilians.109 As India stressed, almost all aspects of resolution 1973, namely
pursuit of ceasefire, arms embargo, and no-fly zone, were violated not to protect civilians
[ . . . ] but to change the regime.110
In effect, India articulated its core concerns relating to R2P forcefully and with
considerable clarity. In Libya, India witnessed what it had always dreaded seeingthe
instrumentalisation of R2P to justify regime change. The resulting debate led India to
specify its R2P policy further. Notably, it embraced Brazils proposal of responsibility while
protecting, which reflected its previous focus on stringent criteria and conditions for the
use of force.111 In effect, India reiterated that the real problem lies with the interpretation
and application of Pillar III.112 The Indian point of view was that the support aspect
including the capacity building under Pillar II, should take precedence over the response
aspect under Pillar III.113 It rejected the addition of violations in the 2012 report by the
Secretary-General on these grounds,114 while its permanent representative to the United
Nations Singh Puri stressed: the trigger point for invocation of R2P is not human rights
per se [ . . . ] it has to be mass atrocities.115 Further, the concern was that R2P must not
become a tool in the hands of the powerful to pressurise weaker states, and bring about
regime change.116
476
India continued to pursue diplomatic practices in support of R2P in Syria. India was
particularly wary of Western (and Arab) attempts to condemn regime violence, impose
sanctions, supply weapons to the rebel forces or even intervene militarily. India claims credit
for removing a stalemate in the Security Council (temporarily), as it took on a diplomatic
initiative in August 2011.117 Under its presidency, the Security Council issued its first
presidential statement on the crisis,118 something that had been fought over for months.
When its objections against the first Security Council draft resolution were removed, it joined
the consensus on the second draft resolution in February 2012. These objections referred to
the threat of sanctions or even (implied) military measures and avoiding selectivity in calling
for the renouncement of violence.119 In the summer of 2013, while criticising the Syrian
Government for the use of chemical weapons, India nonetheless insisted that any course of
action would have to be under the auspices of the UN and not outside its framework.120
In a slight turnaround, India voted in favour of two resolutions which were critical of Sri
Lankas record with regard to reconciliation and accountability for alleged war crimes and
crimes against humanity in 2012 and 2013 at the UN Human Rights Council
(UNHRC).121 The vote can be largely attributed to domestic demands from Tamil Nadu,
especially from the DMK.122 India did, however, help to tone down the language of the
2012 resolution and emphasise its core priority for state sovereignty: [a] democratic
country like Sri Lanka has to be provided time and space to achieve the objectives of
reconciliation and peace.123
However, at the UNHRC in March 2014, India abstained from the resolution that asked
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to undertake a comprehensive
investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes
by both parties in Sri Lanka between 2002 and 2009.124 While domestic factors were
decisive for the decision,125 the abstention was in line with Indias long-standing rejection
of country-specific resolutions and its scepticism with regard to an international role in
criminal investigations.
In search of explanation: making sense of Indias stance

on R2P
What explains Indias perspective and position on R2P? The existing literature on the
subject is useful but only to a limited extent. The first strand of explanation interprets
Indias stance on R2P in particular and its behaviour in general as characterised by
477
ambiguity or ambivalence.126 If ambiguity implies the fact of something having more

than one meaning127 or the quality of being open to more than one interpretation,128
Indias perspective on R2P is clearly unambiguous. The central tendency of Indias stance is
revealing: a clear privileging of the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity and its
corollary, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Where sovereign
states are seen as culpable of mass atrocities or gross human rights abusessuch as the
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka or SyriaIndias tilt has been towards
the side of caution, which implies that, above all, it favours the principle of sovereignty.
It is worth emphasising that Indias behaviour has generally defied a priori theoretical
postulates. Indias position on R2P is grounded in its social and cultural roots, shaped by
its historical experiences and influenced by domestic and individual-level factors.
An identity-based understanding may be useful in shedding light on Indias perspective.
To a certain extent, India is overwhelmed by how other actors (i.e. states) perceive it
currently; a rising or an emerging power is the term in vogue. Accordingly, India is
conscious of its fluid identity in international society. The dilemma is whether to act
responsibly so as to satisfy the expectations or to carve out its own niche and become a
major power on its own terms. Unlike Brazil, which has promoted the idea of RwP, India is
merely responding to the discourse rather than fleshing out its own proposal.129 An
attitude of cautious support towards R2P amidst acute concerns such as the infringement
of sovereignty and the legitimacy of such enterprises probably echoes this tension.
Indias behaviour defies the description of the state as a unitary and rational actor.130
It would be futile to understand Indias perspective on R2P without recognising its internal
dynamics. The deliberation over R2P has been initiated and shaped during the coalition
era. Indias stance on Sri Lanka is a case in point. The pressure exerted by the DMKa
political party in Tamil Nadu with whom the INC, the prime constituent of the UPA
coalition government was keen to sustain the electoral alliancewas influential. India
shifted the scale and voted in favour of resolutions that were mildly critical of Sri Lanka at
the UNHRC in 2012 and 2013.131 Indias turnaround yet again at the UNHRC in 2014 by
deciding in favour of abstention demonstrates that domestic considerations are not just
influential but tied to electoral calculations and swing considerably, thereby vacillating
Indias foreign policy, especially on the issue areas of humanitarian intervention and R2P.
Another significant variable that can explain Indias practice with regard to intervention
and R2P is the personality and leadership of decision-makers. The priorities, preferences
and idiosyncrasies of leaders matter in the Indian context. Nirupam Sens leftist views
478
contrasted those of Shyam Saran, the foreign secretary, at the World Summit, as well as
those of Sens successor as permanent representative to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri.
Individual ambassadors at the United Nations can achieve such disproportionate
influence because of the very limited personnel capacities of the Ministry of External
Affairs,132 especially in terms of policy-planning and the UN divisions. This means that
tensions in Indias foreign policy are often not resolved officially. These individual
differences reflect larger debates within the Indian strategic community and the
administration. While decision-making in the Ministry of External Affairs is often
insulated from these debates, the political leaderships priorities also take into
consideration such strategic ideas, for example Indias strong support for the Brazilian
initiative of RwP may have been influenced by a priority for co-operation with other
emerging powers.
Indeed, in the last two decades or so, India has exercised very little norm
entrepreneurship in international politics in general, and concentrated instead on
ensuring favourable conditions for domestic development. This contrasts with Indias
earlier leadership at the United Nations, with Prime Minister Nehru championing a
foreign policy based on such moral principles as decolonisation, nuclear disarmament and
anti-racism.
Apart from the domestic and institutional factors, it is important to reflect on the social
and cultural moorings of India and analyse their probable influence in shaping the
discourse on R2P. Quite often, the notion of non-violence is invoked to highlight the
pacifist tradition that India seemingly adheres to in its conduct in international
relations.133 In the words of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the doctrine of non-violence
is more natural for the people at large than that of violence.134 It needs to be stated that
within the social contours of the Indian landscape, non-violence is more rhetoric and less
an enduring social practice.135 As Ambedkar, a social and political leader, observed: the
perpetration of violence is a fact [ . . . ] though not many will readily believe this.136 The
social order in India is witness to violence along the lines of caste, religion, gender and
region in a regular and systematic fashion.137
Violence has become so common and a matter of almost everyday occurrence that it is
considered normal in the minds of people. In the extremely stratified society of India,
violence perpetrated towards minorities, women and the so-called lower caste groups,
viz. Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes has not been taken
seriously by policy-makers.138 It may be argued that decision-makers who are socialised in
479
this matrix of violence do not just end up saying that the sovereign state is the final arbiter
of all issues but also insist firmly that the threshold level of violence, for sovereignty to be
trumped and external intervention to step in, ought to be very high, pointing to the
insistence on a narrow definition of the scope of R2P in terms of its four core crimes.
Nonetheless, a related point that deserves to be mentioned is that in the Gandhian
philosophical tradition, means do matter considerably and have to be justified on their
own terms irrespective of outcomes.139 In the context of the R2P debate, Indias stress on
peaceful means despite the ends may be seen as flowing from this tradition. It is
pertinent to note that while emphasising the means employed in any endeavour, the
Indian tradition simultaneously exhibits a preference for order. In the external sphere,
Indias preference for order is manifest in its defence of the sovereign state during the
course of the R2P debate; in the internal domain, it is evident in its continual quest for
maintaining domestic stability. It is this preoccupation with order that translates into
Indias fixation with sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of states.
Conclusion
The purpose envisaged in this study has been to explain Indias interpretation, attitude and
practice vis-a`-vis R2P and the change, if any, with respect to these parameters. The
preceding analysis makes it clear that Indias stance on R2P, notwithstanding the nuances,
has been cautious and calibrated. India is in agreement with pillar one and pillar two but
apprehensive about pillar three.
Indias respect for sovereignty underlies its basic position on R2P; the influence of
domestic factors explains the identification of three phases in the evolution of such a
position. It is important to stress that various factors contribute to Indias perspective on
R2P. While the notion of sovereignty is critical, it can be considered as a background
variable setting the tone of Indias position. This factor is modulated sufficiently by
domestic and individual-level factors. Indias practice on R2P and concrete stance during
an actual crisis situation depends on the interplay between these factors, where coalition
dynamics, public opinion and the preferences of individual policy-makers have to be taken
into account.
This paper has argued that Indias policy on R2P has evolved in three phases since 2005.
The first phase was marked by deep scepticism. The second phase was characterised by a
480
positive attitude. The third confirmed its apprehensions while not watering down the basic
support for R2P entirely. As a matter of principle, India has been forthright in stressing
that sovereignty is the cardinal principle in international relations, taking precedence over
the international responsibility to protect. Its dogged insistence on the consent of the state
before the entry of the international community manifests this in great clarity.
Indias emphasis on the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council
notwithstanding its unrepresentative characterfor applying R2P and undertaking
intervention makes it clear that legitimacy matters unequivocally. The idea is that if
sovereignty has to be overridden at all, in the rarest of rare circumstances, it ought to
command a robust mandate that emanates from the United Nations. In effect, these
caveats imply that, if ever questions pertaining to the application of R2P arise, India tends
to grant the state in question a reasonable benefit of the doubt. This is evidenced in Indias
stance on Sri Lanka, Libya and the ongoing crisis in Syria. In essence, this would mean
allowing considerable time and space for the erring sovereign state to make necessary
amends and fulfil its responsibility to protect its population.
In Indias worldview, sovereignty connotes the responsibility to protect its subjects;
therefore, there is no need to assign a new label such as responsibility to protect. That is
why India did not follow the style of Brazil (with RwP) in a conceptual contribution to
the global debate on R2P. However, much more deeply, India also might not have wanted
to consciously engage in a debate over a concept where it felt its core foreign policy
principles were at stake and was only gradually accepting R2P as a fundamentally different
idea than the long-rejected notion of humanitarian intervention.
Indias foreign policy does not preclude its participation in a global debate on R2P. Its
support for R2P is based on the premise that the sovereign state will not be circumvented
but rather rendered functional so as to discharge its duty in a responsible manner.
Ultimately, whether India will display more leadership or norm entrepreneurship on R2P
depends on the priorities of its leaders and how virtuously they manage to play the tune of
sovereignty.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Gregor Hofmann, Benoy Khare, C.S.R. Murthy, Philipp Rotmann, Oliver Read
and the two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments and excellent feedback. This article is
part of a collaborative research project on Global Norm Evolution and the Responsibility to Protect
(www.globalnorms.net), generously funded by the Volkswagen Foundation through its Europe and
Global Challenges programme.
481
Endnotes
1. For an overview of the concept of R2P and its empirical
26. See Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 58, 84, 135 and 301.
issue.
27. Critics have characterised Indira Gandhis foreign
2. See Raja Mohan, India, Libya and the Principle of

Non-Intervention.
3. See Virk, India and the Responsibility to Protect.
4. For a discussion on morality of states, see for instance,
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations.
5. Puri, Statement at the General Assembly Plenary
Meeting.
6. Ibid.
7. Puri, Remarks at the Informal Interactive Dialogue.
8. Puri, Statement at the Informal Interactive Dialogue
on State Responsibility and Prevention.
25. Hall, Tilting at Windmills?, 9.
evolution, see Rotmann, Kurtz and Brockmeier in this
9. See the introduction to this special issue for a full

narrative of the evolution of R2P.
10. See for instance, Singh, Address in Acceptance.
policy as paranoid. See Cohen, India: Emerging Power,

19 and 35.
28. Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention,
895.
29. R. Hariharan, A Tale of Two Interventions. The Hindu,
28 July 2012; Gandhi Opponents Back Move. The New
York Times, 5 June 1987.
30. According to a statement handed over to the Sri Lankan
foreign minister. See Dixit, Assignment Colombo, 99.
31. Richardson, Paradise Poisoned, 533.
32. The only exception is Indias intervention to restore
the government of the Maldives in 1988 (that had
been ousted by a coup). India intervened, however,
only after the request was received from the
11. See for instance, Brass, The Politics of India.
government of the Maldives. See Hagerty, Indias
12. Jawaharlal Nehru observed: [ . . . ] Nations by coop-
Regional Security Doctrine, 359.
erating with one another, in tolerance, and recognising
33. Gujral articulated the doctrine when he was the
diversities, by respect for one another as sovereign
Minister of External Affairs during the United Front
nations, by not interfering in one anothers affairs, can
government with Deva Gowda as the prime minister
survive, progress and advance [ . . . ]. See Nehru,
in 1996. The United Front was a Janata Dal-led
Foreword to Paths of Peace..
coalition government comprising 13 parties which
13. Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
assumed office on 1 June 1996 with the support of
existence, which were enunciated on 29 April 1954, is
the Indian National Congress. Inder Kumar Gujral
based on the following principles: (1) Mutual respect
was the Minister for External Affairs and later
for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2)
became the prime minister on 21 April 1997. He
Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference;
continued to hold the portfolio of external affairs
(4) Equality and mutual benefit; and (5) Peaceful co-
throughout that government. See Gujral, Aspects of
existence. See India, Ministry of External Affairs, Joint
Indias Foreign Policy, 161; Gujral, Indias Foreign
Statement on Panchsheel.
Policy; and Cartwright, Indias Regional and
14. Nehru, Broadcast to the Nation.
International Support, 407 408. See also Nayar,
15. See for example, Mansingh, Indias Search for Power, 14.
Policy
16. Mitra and Schottli, The New Dynamics, 32. On the
Coalitions, 25.
and
Performance
under
Democratic
treaty with the Soviet Union, see Mohanty, The Indo-
34. Gujral, Aspects of Indias Foreign Policy, 161.
Soviet Friendship.
35. See Harshe, South Asian Regional Co-operation,
17. See for instance, Mazumdar, Indias Search for a Post-Cold

War Foreign Policy; and Alam, The Concept of NonAlignment. See also Harshe, Indias Non-Alignment.
1104 1105. See also, Gupta, India in the Twenty-First

Century, 307 310.
36. UNSC, Resolution 678.
18. Mansingh, Nehrus Foreign Policy, 4.
37. UNSC, Resolution 688.
19. Interviews with Indian experts, Delhi, April 2013;
38. UNSC, Meeting Records, 2982nd Meeting.
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 55 77.

20. Marwah puts the number of refugees that had crossed
39. Krishnasamy, A Case for Indias Leadership, 228.

40. Singh, Speech at 48th Session.
the border from March to December 1971 at 11
41. UNSC, Report of the Independent Inquiry.
million. Marwah, Indias Military Intervention, 560.
42. Interview with Chinmaya R. Garekhan, New Delhi,
21. Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 63.

22. UNGA, Question Considered by the Security Council.
23. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 98.
24. Banerjee, India and R2P, 94.
April 2013.
43. Interview with Satish Nambiar, New Delhi, 19 April
2013.
44. Sharma, NATO Military Action.
482
45. UNSC, Draft Resolution.
on the Situation in Sri Lanka, 22 April. Emphasis added.
47. UNSC, Meeting Records, 4109th Meeting, 15.
79. Karunanidhi Launches Indefinite Fast on Lankan
48. Ibid.
Issue. Livemint & The Wall Street Journal, 27 April
49. See ICISS, The Responsibilty to Protect, 32 37.
2009.
50. ICISS, Regional Roundtable Consultation.

51. UNGA, Official Records, Fifty-seventh Session, 16.
52. In face of deep domestic resentment, India ultimately
80. Moorcraft, Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers, 140

144
81. Gokhale, Sri Lanka, 121, 125.
decided against sending troops to Iraq. See John
82. Sri Lanka introduced a counter-draft that was adopted
Kifner, After the War: Other Forces; India Decides
by a majority of the Human Rights Council, including
Not to Send Troops to Iraq Now. The New York Times,

15 July 2003.
53. Raja Mohan, The Changing Dynamics, 38.
54. Interview with Western diplomat, London, June 2013.
55. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 88.
78. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by EAM
46. UNSC, Meeting Records, 4037th Meeting, 22.
56. Interview with Ambassador B.S. Prakash, Joint
India. See UNHRC, Assistance to Sri Lanka.

83. India, Permanent Mission of India, Statement by H.E.
Mr A. Gopinathan.
84. Hardeep Singh Puri Named Indias Permanent Envoy
to UN. The Indian Express, 16 April 2009.
85. Interview with Nirupam Sen, New Delhi, March 2014.
Secretary United Nations (Political Division) in 2005,
86. UNGA, Concept Note on the Responsibility.
Delhi, April 2013
87. Interview with Edward Luck, Berlin, June 2013.
57. Here and in the following: interview with Nirupam

Sen, Delhi, March 2014.
88. The Left Front withdrew support to UPA I coalition on

8 July 2008; thereafter, the coalition continued to rule
58. Ibid.
owing to the support of the Samajwadi Party (SP). The
59. Ibid.
UPA II coalition, which did not rely anymore on the
60. Ibid.
61. Based upon extensive (but only Western) interviews,
Pollentine claims that Sen made his final demand in a
Left, was elected in May 2009.

89. Puri, Statement at the General Assembly Plenary
Meeting.
meeting of the negotiating Group of 15 (of which he was a
90. Ibid.
member) on 12 September, one day before the adoption
91. Puri, Statement at the Informal Interactive Dialogue
of the draft by the General Assembly. See Pollentine,

Constructing the Responsibility to Protect, 34142.
on Early Warning.
92. Ibid.
62. See Traub, The Best Intentions, 385 386.
93. Puri, Statement during the Open Debate.
63. For more details concerning the role of Europe during
94. Ibid.
the World Summit, see Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk in

this issue.
64. Interview with British diplomat, London, June 2013.
65. Interview with former UN official, London, June 2013.
95. See for instance, Sandeep Joshi, Armys Stand Makes it

Hard to Amend AFSPA: Chidambaram. The Hindu, 7
February 2013. See also Looking Within: Chidambaram Makes a Point. The Statesman, 6 October 2013.
66. Interview with Shyam Saran, Delhi, April 2013.
96. Puri, Statement during the Open Debate.
67. UNGA, Summary Record of the 23rd Meeting, 9; Teitt,
97. India, Permanent Mission of India, Intervention by
Paper Tiger or Platform, 200.

68. UNGA, Summary Record of the 23rd Meeting, 10.
Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri.

98. Hardeep Singh Puri explained that the Arab League
69. Selth, Even Paranoids have Enemies, 386.
had approached us and said look, rivers of blood will
70. Ibid.
flow, when Gaddafi attacks Benghazi and, therefore, the
71. See Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk in this issue.
international community has to step in. See Puri,
72. India, Ministry of External Affairs, On Indias

Assistance.
73. See UNGA, Report of the Secretary-Generals Panel.
74. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Indo-Sri Lanka
Joint Press Release.
75. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Suo-Motu Statement.
76. Ibid.
77. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by EAM
on the Situation in Sri Lanka, 17 April.
Keynote Address.
99. See UNSC, Meeting Records, 6491st Meeting, 2.
100. The Minister of External Affairs S.M. Krishna made a
categorical statement in Lok Sabha: There are around
18,000 Indians in Libya [ . . . ] we are putting in place
plans for possible evacuation by land, air and sea from
Libya [ . . . ]. See Krishna, Statement by Minister.
101. Hardeep Singh Puri appears to have used weary
instead of wary in his keynote address at Harvard. See
Puri, Keynote Address.

102. Ibid.
underline the dissenting opinion of the Finance
103. Puri, Explanation of Vote.
Minister P. Chidambaram who expressed the personal
104. Ibid.
view that India should have supported the UN
105. UNSC, The Situation in Libya.
resolution. See India Should have Supported UN
106. See for instance, Manoj Joshi, Dodgy Stand on Libya.
Resolution against Sri Lanka: P. Chidambaram. The
Mail Today, 24 March 2011; Mukherjee, Perspective.

107. Foreign Military Intervention in Libya Unacceptable:
Indian Muslims. The Milli Gazette, 5 March 2011.
108. Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy,
Libyas Pathway to Peace. The International Herald
Tribune, 15 April 2011.
109. India, Permanent Mission of India, Statement by
Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri.
110. Puri,Remarks at the Informal Interactive Dialogue.
111. For more details on RwP, see Stuenkel and Tourinho in
483
this issue.
Indian Express, 28 March 2014.

126. See Virk, India and the Responsibility to Protect.
127. Cambridge Dictionaries Online. Available at: http://
dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/ambiguity?
qambiguity [Accessed 10 October 2013].
128. Oxford Dictionaries Online. Available at: http://
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ambiguity?
q ambiguity [Accessed 27 June 2013].
129. For an Indian critique of this, see Khilnani et al.
Nonalignment 2.0. Also notice the attempt to reset
foreign policy. On this, see Sandeep Dikshit,
112. Puri, Remarks at the Informal Interactive Dialogue.
Manmohan Favours the Reset of Foreign Policy. The
113. Ibid.
Hindu, 5 November 2013. See also Salman Haidar,
114. Ibid.
Reset of Foreign Policy. The Statesman, 12 November
115. Puri, Keynote Address.

116. India, Permanent Mission of India, Statement by
India.
117. Interview with MEA official, New Delhi, April 2013.
118. UNSC, Presidential Statement.
2013.
130. Jaganathan and Sunmbul, Emerging Power?, 308;
Jaganathan, India in International Society.
131. UNHRC, Promoting Reconciliation, 2012; UNHRC,
Promoting Reconciliation, 2013.
119. India, Permanent Mission of India, Draft Resolution
132. While the exact figures differ, India has considerably
on Syria; India, Permanent Mission of India,
less diplomats than other middle powers and just about
Explanation of Vote.
120. UN Backing Must for Syria Action. The Statesman, 7
September 2013.
as many as Singapore. See Tharoor, Pax Indica, 319.

133. See for example, Gandhi, India of My Dreams, 68.
134. Ibid.
121. UNHRC, Promoting Reconciliation, 2012; UNHRC,
135. Jaganathan, India in International Society. For a
Promoting Reconciliation, 2013. The resolutions
critique on Gandhian thinking from the other end of
asked the Sri Lankan Government to implement the
the spectrum, see for instance, Karnad, The Cultural
recommendations of its own Lessons Learned and
Context of Moralpolitik, 219.
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and refrained from
136. Ambedkar, Untouchables or the Children, 3978.
calling for an international investigation.
137. Jaganathan and Sunmbul, Emerging power?, 308.
122. Interestingly, the DMK withdrew its support to the
138. See for instance, Narula, Broken People, 3. The author
UPA government in March 2013: the reason being that
observes, [p]ublic outrage over large-scale incidents of
it was not satisfied with Indias stance at the UNHRC.
violence or particularly egregious examples of dis-
See DMK has Taken Right Decision in Withdrawing
crimination fades quickly, and the state is under little
Support to UPA: Karunanidhi. The Times of India, 21

March 2013.
pressure to undertake more meaningful measures.

139. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 67.
123. India, Permanent Mission of India, 19th Session of the

Human Rights Council.
124. UNHRC, Promoting Reconciliation, 2014, para-
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Conflict, Security & Development

ISSN: 1467-8802 (Print) 1478-1174 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccsd20

Singing the tune of sovereignty? India and the

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Date: 07 April 2016, At: 10:35

Conflict, Security & Development, 2014

Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz

sovereignty and non-intervention and a

suspicions after the fallout of the Libya

long standing involvement in United

intervention. The paper argues that mainly

Nations peacekeeping operations, Indias

domestic factors can account for these

position on R2P seems puzzling. Still,

changes in Indias R2P policy. Despite these

despite the rhetoric about India being an

changes, however, Indias main concerns

emerging power, it often abstains from

with R2P display remarkable consistency:

diplomatic engagement beyond its region,

an insistence on the consent of the state; a

including in R2P situations. What explains

narrow definition of its scope involving a

high threshold of violence; the exclusive

attitude and limited practice? The paper

authority of the UN Security Council; and

shows that Indias position has evolved in

a deeply ingrained scepticism towards the

three phases since 2005, from scepticism via

utility of the use of force.

q 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.

Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz

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Singing the tune of sovereignty?

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Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz

In search of lineage: the imprint of history

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is as much a rational consideration as it is a normative position.

Singing the tune of sovereignty?

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Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz

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In search of trace: Indias perspective on humanitarian

Singing the tune of sovereignty?

in international affairs as very limited. In addition, India continued to be sceptical of

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Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz

Indias wariness of humanitarian intervention grew more pronounced after NATO

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Singing the tune of sovereignty?

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In search of pattern: the evolution of Indias position on

Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz

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(a voluntary restraint, already a concession instead of a [legally binding] Charter

Singing the tune of sovereignty?

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