40:3 (2006) 548569

NOUS

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

ERIC FUNKHOUSER
University of Arkansas

The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other
properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting
topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of
abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical
amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation can yield in solving some
basic metaphysical problems. The goal in what follows is twofold. First, I
argue for a novel understanding of the determination relation. Second, this
understanding is applied to yield insights into property instance (e.g., trope)
individuation, how different property types can share an instance, the relation between property types and property instances, as well as applications
to causation (mental causation, in particular).
1. Criteria for a Successful Analysis
The determination relation holds between property types. A successful analysis of this relation should accord with the following truisms about determinables and their determinates:
1. The following canonical pairs must turn out to be related as determinable
to determinate: colored/red, red/scarlet, and shaped/circular. The first
two examples show that properties are determinables or determinates only
relative to other properties. Red is determinable relative to scarlet, but
determinate relative to colored.
2. For an object to have a determinate property is for that object to have
the determinable properties the determinate falls under in a specific way.


C 2006, Copyright the Authors
C 2006, Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Journal compilation 

548

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

549

For example, being scarlet is a specific way of being red, and being
red is a specific way of being colored. This notion of specificity with
regard to determinables-determinates can be compared and contrasted
with other standard specificity relationse.g., the disjunction-disjunct,
conjunct-conjunction and genus-species relations.
An object instantiating a determinable must also instantiate some determinate under that determinable. Colored objects must be red or yellow or
blue, etc. No object is merely colored simpliciter.2
An object instantiating a determinate also necessarily instantiates every
determinable that determinate falls under. Every scarlet object is also red
and colored.
The determination relation is transitive, asymmetric and irreflexive. Since
scarlet determines3 red and red determines colored, scarlet determines
colored. But since scarlet determines red, red does not determine scarlet.
Furthermore, scarlet, like all properties, does not determine itself.4
Determinates under the same determinable admit of comparison in a way
unavailable to pairs of properties with no determinable in common.5 For
example, an ordering or similarity relation obtains between determinate
colorse.g., red is closer to orange than it is to green.6 But no such comparison can be made between red and, say, circular.
The transitive chain of a determinable and the determinates under it does
not go on forever. At some point there is a property that does not allow of further determination. Call such a property super-determinate.
Coca-Cola red might be a super-determinate of colored. Similarly, the
chain of determinables a determinate falls under comes to an end somewhere. Let us call a determinable property that itself falls under no determinables super-determinable. Colored and shaped might be superdeterminable.

In addition to the above truisms, we should provide a further, but more

controversial, requirement:
8. Instances of determinables and their determinates do not causally exclude
each other.

It is reasonable to hold that property instances are the relata of causation.7

Minimally, it makes sense to speak of a causally relevant property instance.8
A common constraint on theories of causation is that they should not countenance too much causal overdetermination. Only in rare cases does more
than one sufficient cause converge on a common effect. Two bullets may simultaneously strike a condemned man in the heart and kill him, but this is
surely a freak coincidence. In general, it is unlikely that there will be distinct
sufficient causes for the same effect. Exclusion principles can be applied to
property instances converging on a common effect, as well.9 It is unlikely
that there would be two (or more) causally sufficient property instances for
some effect. However, determinables and their determinates do not seem to
causally exclude one another.

550

NOUS

Consider a pigeon trained to peck at red objects.10 A scarlet triangle is

put before our pigeon, and she pecks. It is truthful and appropriate to say
that the sight of a red triangle caused her to peck. And it also is truthful and
appropriate to say that the sight of a scarlet triangle caused her to peck.11
But it does not seem that this pecking is causally overdetermined. Similar
situations arise for other determinables and determinates. Margie impressed
her teacher by scoring an A on her final exam. In fact, Margie scored a
95% on her final exam. Margies A performance caused her teacher to be
impressed, and her scoring a 95% is the specific way in which she scored
an A. But this is not a case of overdetermination. Somehow determinables
and their corresponding determinates do not succumb to causal exclusion
principles.
A successful analysis of the determination relation will accord with, and
hopefully explain, the above features.
2. Formalizing and Modeling the Determination Relation
2.1. A Two-Featured Analysis
Most central to the notion of determination is the idea that to have a determinate property is to have the determinable properties that determinate falls
under in a specific way. However, this notion of specification can be easily
misunderstood. Intuitively, scarlet determines red, but red and square does
not determine red. But, in some sense, to be red-and-square is a specific way
of being red, so not every sense of further specifying a determinable counts
as determination. Rather, determinates specify their determinables with respect to only a limited number of features. This point is missed in current
discussions of determination, which often indiscriminately count cases of realization as instances of determination (or vice versa),12 but was properly
noted by both W.E. Johnson and Arthur Prior in the first half of the 20th
Century. Arthur Prior wrote:
Determinates under the same determinable have the common relational property,
presupposing no other relation between the determinates themselves, of characterising whatever they do characterise in a certain respect. Redness, blueness,
etc., all characterise objects, as we say, in respect of their colour; triangularity,
squareness, etc., in respect of their shape. And this is surely quite fundamental
to the notion of being a determinate under a determinable.13

Proper understanding of a determinable requires discovering the features

along which it can be determined.
Following Priors lead, we can note that a determinable property X is
determined only with respect to its X-ness (or X-ity, or similarly appropriate
grammatical construction). Red and square is not a determinate of red, for
the addition of the square constituent in no way further specifies the redness.
By placing proper emphasis we can see why this conclusion is warranted. A

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

551

determinate of red is red in a particular way. Redness, like any color, can
only be determined with respect to hue, brightness, and saturation. These
are the minimally sufficient criteria according to which all colors can be
distinguished from one another. Colors differ to the extent, and only to the
extent, that they differ in hue, brightness, or saturation. As such, these are
the three variables along which colors can be determined. As Johnson noted:
Our familiar example of colour will explain the point: a colour may vary according to its hue, brightness, and saturation; so that the precise determination of a
colour requires us to define three variables which are more or less independent
of one another in their capacity for co-variation; but in one important sense
they are not independent of one another, since they could not be manifested in
separation.14

We should look for similar features of other determinables, for it is only

according to such features that a property can be determined. Let us call
such features the determination dimensions of a property.
Determinables and determinates often have features in addition to their
values along these determination dimensions. Let us call these, the second
type of features, their non-determinable necessities. Such features are so-called
because they are features that each instance of a determinable type must have,
but which do not allow for variation. For example, triangles are 3-sided,
closed, plane figuresthese features are required of all triangles. While instances of triangular must have such features, these are not features along
which triangular is determined. As Johnson properly noted, determinates
under the same determinable differ in a particular wayi.e., along their
determination dimensions. But determinates under the same determinable
cannot differ with regard to their non-determinable necessities. For example,
two triangles cannot differ in their 3-sidednesssuch features do not admit
of degree or variation. Determinates under the same determinable have exact similarity in non-determinable necessities, but differ with regard to their
values under the same determination dimensions.
How do we discover the determination dimensions of a given determinable,
X? The easiest way is simply to inquire after the ways in which determinates
under the determinable X can differ from one another with regard to their
X-ness. Since colors can differ from one another only with respect to hue,
brightness, or saturation, these are the determination dimensions for colored.
This may seem like a crude test,15 but the procedure can be supported with a
scientific one. The scientific investigation of colored and sound, for example,
has led to distinctions among different color concepts and sound concepts, as
well as empirically discovered dimensions along which colors differ from each
other and sounds differ from each other. There is disagreement over the precise determination dimensions for such properties, but the scientific pursuit
of, and debate over, these dimensions reveals a (perhaps tacit) commitment
to the existence of some such determination dimensions.16

552

NOUS

According to some sparse property theorists (e.g., Scientific Realists),

properties are legitimized by making a unique contribution to a scientific
law, or by marking a real similarity in objects.17 Successful application of
these laws and similarity judgments requires input along only a limited number of dimensionsthe determination dimensions. With respect to the laws of
geometry, it makes no difference if the rectangle under consideration encloses
a football field or a landing striponly the side lengths matter. Rectangles
differ from one another only with respect to side lengths. When calculating
area, it does not matter if the area is covered with artificial turf or concrete. It
is obvious that geometry operates at this level of abstraction. And the other
sciences operate with their own abstractions. Some well-confirmed equations
relate the acceleration of an object to other properties. When inputting an
acceleration, whether the object is heavy or red or beautiful is irrelevant. An
apple and a football can each fall with the same accelerationtheir difference in material constitution does not mark a difference in their acceleration.
So weight, color, aesthetic merits, etc., are not determination dimensions of
acceleration.
It may be helpful to provide a sample list of determinables and note the
dimensions along which they can be determined.
Determinable

Determination Dimensions

Triangular

3 side lengths

Colored

hue, brightness, and saturation

Temperature

degree

Mass

grams (or other mass unit)

Snapping

???

We can run through some examples to see why the above properties are
determined along these features only.
Triangle A and triangle B have the same 3 side lengths as measured according to some metric. At most one triangle can be formed from 3 given
side lengths, so we know that these triangles do not differ in their interior
angle measurements. All geometric and trigonometric facts about a triangle
can be derived from the 3 side lengths. With only the information that A
and B are triangles with the same side lengths, we can appropriately conclude that A and B do not differ in their triangularity. Even if the realization
bases of these triangles differ in mass, transparency, material constitution,
color, or some other feature, they do not differ in triangularity. This shows
that mass, transparency, material constitution, color, etc. are not dimensions
along which triangular is determined.
A childhood riddle asks, Which weighs more: a pound of feathers or a
pound of gold? Of course, they weigh the same. We should take this very
seriously. The feathers and gold in no way differ in weight, though they

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

553

differ in density, material constitution, monetary value, etc. Weight is not

determined along these other lines. Weights cannot differ but for being more
or less along one dimension.
Because it can be determined along only one dimension, weight is a simple
determinable. Colored and triangular, since they have more than one determination dimension, are complex determinables. But not all properties with
constituent parts should be thought of as complex determinables. For example, the linear momentum of an object is the product of its velocity and mass.
Still, velocity and mass are not determination dimensions of momentum.
Why?Because objects with different velocities and masses can nevertheless
have the same momentum (e.g., a 4 kg object moving 6 m/s has the same
momentum as a 6 kg object moving 4 m/s). While momentum may be complex in the sense of having constituents, it is not complex qua determinable.
Momentum is determined along one dimension onlye.g., that dimension
measured in kgmeters per second units.
Sometimes a causal law relates individual determination dimensions to
an effect. To borrow an example from Fred Dretske, the pitch of a sound
may be that in virtue of which a glass shatters.18 Pitch is just one of the
determination dimensions of sound. In this case it seems plausible to take
the pitch of this sound as a property instance in its own right. This position is
encouraged by the presence of a law, or counterfactual dependency, relating
the pitch (specifically) to the shattering, and a belief that property instances
are the causal relata. The legitimacy of complex determinables like sound
would be vindicated were there also laws relating the whole pitch-timbreloudness bundle to some effect. The status of complex determinables is a
difficult philosophical problem for which I have no answer. It may be that
ideal science will countenance only simple determinables. If not, we should be
able to make a principled distinction between pitch-timbre-loudness bundles
(i.e., the complex determinable sound) and shape-color bundles. Pitch, timbre,
and loudness may be properties in their own right, but many think they also
combine to form a unitythe property sound. Shape and color are also
properties in their own right, but they do not seem to combine to form a
similar unity. It is not enough that pitch, timbre, and loudness necessarily cooccur (i.e., whenever/wherever there is a certain pitch there is also a certain
loudness). For, every colored thing must also have a shape, though we do not
think color-shape is a unity on par with sound.
It has been fairly easy to find the determination dimensions for the examples we have discussed thus far. But for some determinables it is harder
to list the dimensions they can be qualified along. A bolt snaps; it snaps
suddenly. Intuition suggests that two bolts that snap at different rates differ
in their snapping, so we judge that the latter determines the former. But
along what other dimensions can snapping be qualified? Loudness? Forcefulness? Material constitution? The dimensions are not as clear-cut as for
geometrical shapes, colors, temperature, and mass. This might be explained

554

NOUS

by the fact that the property snapping is less scientific than these others. One
hypothesis is that the scientifically legitimate properties, the kind that really
back causal judgments, are either determinable along precise dimensions or
are super-determinate. It would then be inappropriate to worry about the
identity of snapping instances, as they are not legitimate causes.
While hints of our notion of a determination dimension can be found in
Johnson and Prior, neither develops such a notion (nor the complementary
notion of a non-determinable necessity). We have seen that limiting determination to our determination dimensions accords well with our ordinary
judgments about determinables, as well as their scientific applications. It is
now time to put this two-featured view of determinables to work.

2.2. A Mathematical Model

We can construct mathematical models for our determination theory. Each
determinable that can be modeled as such is determined along n determination dimensions. For such determinables, by taking each dimension as an
axis we can construct n-dimensional spaces. Instances of those determinable
property types correspond to unique points in those n-dimensional spaces.
Instances corresponding to the same point exactly resemble each other in
all aspects relevant to individuating that kind, since they have the same determination dimension values (and cannot differ in non-determinable necessities).19 The determination dimensions may be bounded on one end (e.g.,
temperature has an absolute zero, but no absolute upper bound), bounded on
neither end, or bounded at both ends. Also, these dimensions may be continuous or discrete. Our primary examples each involve continuous dimensions,
but we can easily provide cases in which discrete units are used. The property
costing more than $100 is determined by the precise dollar cost, and dollars
come in discrete units (i.e., in hundreths).
Color properties are 3-dimensional. Hue, brightness, and saturation provide us with our x, y, and z coordinates. Call the n-dimensional space a
property spans its property space. Color property C determines color property D if and only if Cs property space is a proper subset of Ds 3-dimensional
property space. Each point in these 3-dimensional color spaces correspond
to a super-determinate color type. A point is the limiting case of a property
space. Each instance of colored corresponds to some point in its property
space (i.e., super-determinate color type), and instances corresponding to the
same point exactly resemble one another in all intrinsic aspects.
We can generalize sufficient conditions20 for determination as follows:
Property B determines property A if: 1) property A and property B have the same
determination dimensions, 2) property B has the non-determinable necessities
of property A, and 3) the property space of B is a proper subset of the property
space of A.

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

555

Condition 1) is partly justified by condition 3). Since the property space

of B is a proper subset of the property space of A, property B must have
values along As determination dimensions. Furthermore, B cannot have any
other determination dimensions. If As determination dimensions were not
exhaustive of Bs determination dimensions, then it would be possible for
instances corresponding to the same point in Bs property space not to exactly
resemble (i.e., they could differ in the determination dimension value(s) not
shared with A). But the property space of B is supposed to be a proper
subset of As property space, and all A instances corresponding to the same
point exactly resemble each other. Condition 2) is required in order that
property B be of the same category as property A. For example, triangular
has determination dimensions for each side length. Points within the property
space of triangular must also meet the non-determinable requirements for
triangulare.g., be a 3-sided, closed, plane figure. Finally, condition 3) shows
that property B is property A in a specific way. There are points in As
property space but outside of Bs property space, so having property B is just
one way of having property A.
2.3. Does the Mathematical Model Generalize to Cover All Determinables?
Not all determinables can be so handily modeled, however. Consider, for
example, the super-determinable shaped.21 Rectangular, triangular, and
circular, are all determinates of shaped, but they cannot be represented by
a fixed number of determination dimensions. The determination dimensions
for shapes will need to include features like the number of sides, lengths of
sides, and their interior angles. Corresponding to each side, there would have
to be a distinct axis for its length. But rectangles, triangles, and circles have
different numbers of sides, and so they will require different numbers of axes
corresponding to their lengths. Since these determinates have different numbers of determination dimensions, they are not embedded in the same model
and appear to have distinct property spaces. But they are all shapes!
Does shaped then provide a counter-example to our 2-featured analysis
of determination? Such properties22 do show the limitations of our simple
method of mathematical modeling. But, fortunately, our core analysis of
determination applies equally well for the relationship between shaped and
its determinates. The property shaped is an abstraction, characterized by its
determination dimensions and non-determinable necessities. The laws of
geometry and trigonometry (and perhaps algebra and calculus) provide us
with the determination dimensions for shaped. We easily recognize number
of sides, side lengths, and interior angles as three such ways that shapes can
vary. But note that side lengths does not provide us with a fixed number
of determination dimensions, but dimensions that vary corresponding to the
number of sides. Still, we do have a schema for the determination dimensions
of shaped. For example, for each side let there be another determination

556

NOUS

dimension representing that sides length. The schema for the determination
dimensions of shaped might be as follows: the determination dimensions for
a given shape property will be the minimal dimensions by which the number
of sides, their lengths, and their interior angles can be distinguished. Shaped
itself, the super-determinable, spans all compossible values for number of
sides, side lengths, and interior angles. Its determinates are limited values
along these 3 schematic determination dimensions (e.g., roughly, square corresponds to 4 sides, of any equal lengths, at closed right angles); precise
values for the number of sides, side lengths, and interior angles represent
super-determinate shape properties. This shows that the subset relation, in
this case as applied to schematic determination dimensions, is the key relation
in our analysis.
While we cannot construct a simple n-dimensional model of the property
space for shaped, we still can provide an analysis of determination that covers shaped and other properties that are difficult, if not impossible, to model
mathematically. The general idea is that super-determinables come with limited determination dimensions, or a schema for producing such determination
dimensions, which span a range of values. Determinates are simply properties that fall under the (schematic) determination dimensions of some determinable, but have determination dimension values that span a proper subset
of the determinables range. As with the mathematically modeled properties,
being a proper subset of is the critical relation. We can then provide the
following necessary and sufficient conditions for determination:
Property B determines property A iff: 1) property A and property B have the
same determination dimensions (or are governed by the same determination dimensions schema), 2) property B has the non-determinable necessities of property A, and 3) the range of determination dimension values for B is a proper
subset of the range of determination dimension values for A.23

2.4. What Are Determinable/Determinate Instances?

We have spoken of determinable and determinate instances without yet defending a particular understanding of property instances. Passing comments
on this matter are in order. The determination dimensions of our models are
suited for taking abstractions with ontological seriousness (though they can
be adopted by the Nominalist as well), and reflect the position of the Property Realisti.e., believer in universals or tropes. A 15-pound red bowling
ball may exactly resemble a 15-pound black bowling in weight. In making
this comparison we are attending to abstract features of the bowling balls.
Here abstract does not mean outside of space and time. On the contrary,
the weight of the red bowling ball is located at the same place as the red
bowling ball. Indeed, spatial-temporal properties should be part of our individuating conditions for property instances.24 Our sense of abstract derives from Locke, with the process of abstraction understood as involving a

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

557

subtraction.25 Strip away the balls color, hardness, and all its other features,
until you are left with only its weight.
But are these property instances particular or universal? While this analysis
could be adapted to the needs of the believer in universals, as stated it best
coheres with a trope ontology. This is because the present model explains
how different property types, namely a determinable and its determinate,
can share an instance. So, an instance of red can be identical to an instance
of scarlet. But, universals are supposed to be wholly present, and strictly
identical, in each of their instances. An instance of red can also be identical to
an instance of crimson. However, an instance of crimson cannot be identical
to, or even exactly resemble, an instance of scarlet. But a commitment to
(Aristotelian) universals and the transitivity of identity would require this.
The believer in universals can accept the present model only at the expense
of according determinable property types a lesser status, as in the manner of
Armstrongs denial of determinable universals.26
In what follows I will simply assume that property instances are tropes.
There are several independent reasons for accepting a trope ontology, none
of which will be discussed here.27 For those not yet willing to accept tropes,
the present view is offered as a theory with great explanatory merit. If our
property space analysis can account for the 8 desiderata of the determinabledeterminate relation (given in section 1), while also explaining other traditional features of properties (e.g., an understanding of how properties are
related to their instances), then we have made a strong, indirect case for
tropes.
2.5. Individuating Property Instances
Utilizing our property space models, we can now provide criteria for individuating property instances (tropes). Borrowing familiar notation, let us
schematize property instances as follows: [(O, t), P].28 This is to be read as
Os having/being P at t. O is an object or spatial location, t a time (span),
and P a property type. Such property instances occur if, and only if, O really
is P at t. One such property instance might be Toms shirt being scarlet at
noon. Because of problems with individuating objects (e.g., is Toms shirt
identical to the cloth that constitutes that shirt?), it might be thought easier to understand O as standing for a spatial location. Further, the spatial
and temporal components could be combined. Though we might individuate
tropes by their spatial-temporal location in this way, I prefer to speak of
objects (as opposed to the spatial-temporal regions themselves) as, generally,
instantiating tropes. For many properties it is an empirical matter whether
their instances exclude one another from a given location (i.e., at most one instance of that property can exist wholly in a given spatial-temporal region).
So, it would be inappropriate to build such exclusion into our individuating conditions for property instances in general. Putting these complications
aside, let us continue to use the more familiar object-time schematization.

558

NOUS

From our understanding of determinables we can conclude that [(x, t), P] =

[(y, t), Q] if and only if:
1. x = y,
2. t = t, and
3. Q and P correspond to overlapping sections of a property space, in one of
the following 3 ways:
a) Q and P correspond to the very same region of a property space (type
identity), or
b) the property space of Q is a proper subset of the property space of P, or
vice versa (determinate-determinable relationship), or
c) the property spaces of Q and P partially overlap, and the property instance corresponds to a point in the region of overlap (partially overlapping determinates of a common determinable).29

These conditions yield the desired result that Toms shirt being scarlet at
noon is identical to Toms shirt being red at noon.
One could complain against these conditions that at most we have shown
that determinables share instances with their determinates. However, with
our trope identity conditions we claim that only determinables and determinates can share an instance. What justifies this further claim? The answer is
short. Each trope corresponds to a unique point in its determinables property
spaces, so each trope has its non-determinable necessities and determination
dimensions essentially. Most properties will fall under some determinable.
Even if they do not, they are some kind of abstractions, with their own accompanying determination dimensions. In extreme cases, there are properties
that fall under no determinables and have no determinates themselves. Instead, they possess a property space that consists simply of a point. (Recall
from section 2.2, a point is still a property space.) A fictional example of
such a property, for some particle, would be on. A particle that is on interacts with other particles in predictable ways, but there are no varieties of
on-ness and no broader category (i.e., determinable) that on falls under.
Still, this property is some abstraction, with an unanalyzable determination
dimension. I take it that some microphysical properties are really like on in
this regard.
Furthermore, tropes are abstract particulars, and they do not possess any
features apart from those given by their non-determinable necessities and
determination dimensions. For example, mass tropes do not have color. But
tropes of types not related as determinable-determinate differ in at least one
determination dimension (i.e., they do not share the same property space).
Since tropes across property spaces differ in the possession of at least one
such determination dimension, they cannot be identical. So, properties with
property spaces not related as determinable-determinate cannot share an
instance.

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

559

3. Confirming our Analysis

The 8 truisms about determinables and determinates given in section 1 should
be derivable from a successful analysis of the determination relation. Let us
see how each truism follows from our analysis. For ease of explanation,
the derivations that follow will use mathematically modeled determinables
as examples. But they generalize to cover determinables/determinates that
cannot be mathematically modeled, as well. The key notion behind many of
the derivations, proper subset of determination dimension values, is shared
by all determinables/determinates.
1. Our necessary and sufficient conditions do yield the verdict that our
canonical exampleslike colored/red, red/scarlet and shaped/circularare,
in fact, related as determinable to determinate. We can easily see this with our
first pair. Colored and red each has only 3 determination dimensionshue,
brightness, and saturation. Further, whatever non-determinable necessities
are had by colored are also had by red (though, it is unclear what these would
be). And finally, the property space of red is a proper subset of the property
space of colored (i.e., colored spans all compossible hue-brightness-saturation
values, whereas red spans a limited range of hue-brightness-saturation values).
2. Our conditions for determination require that the property space of a
determinate be a proper subset of the property space of its determinables. To
be a proper subset the determinate must specify a more limited range along
at least one determination dimension. Further, the notion of a determination
dimension explains the limited ways in which determinates specify the determinables they fall under. Proper subsets arise only from a further specification
along determination dimensions, so our analysis does not let specifications
like red and square count as a determinate of red. Red and square does not
have more precise values along the hue, brightness, or saturation dimension
than does red.
Nor is red a determinate of red or square. A sparse property theorist could
reject this possibility from the beginning by denying that there are such disjunctive properties. However, even granting such properties, we can see that
they are not determinables. Red or square does not have a single property
space. We do not admit disjunctive determination dimensions.
3. An instance of a determinable corresponds to a unique point in that
determinables property space.30 Determinables necessarily admit of multiple
specifications, so each point in a determinables property space also belongs
to a proper subset of the property space. However, we have not yet said
that each proper subset of a property space is itself a property space. Our
analysis allows us to be a sparse property theorist. Such a theorist does
not countenance a property for just any carving of the property space. For
example, take randomly disjoint subsets of the property space of colored.
While a random collection of disjoint subsetse.g., the sum of a certain

560

NOUS

range of blues, oranges, and lavendersdoes constitute a proper subset of

the property space of colored, we are not required to judge the collection a
property space. Our necessary and sufficient conditions afford us this option
by presupposing that A and B actually are properties. Since determinates are
properties and it is open to our theorist to accept a sparse property ontology,
we have not yet shown that determinable instances are also instances of
determinates.
Fortunately, this conclusion can be reached in a few ways. The easiest
way is to admit super-determinate properties corresponding to each point
in a property space. This approach is friendly to even the sparse theorist.
In fact, most judge super-determinates to be more acceptable than determinable properties. David Armstrong is one sparse theorist who accepts only
super-determinate properties.31 If all points correspond to super-determinate
properties, instances of determinables are then instances of some determinate (specifically, some super-determinate property). But many determinables
are also divided into exhaustive sets of non-super-determinates. Each instance
of colored, while being some super-determinate shade, also falls under some
non-super-determinate, for example. And, of course, we could be an abundant property theorist and simply grant property-hood to every subset of a
property space.
4. An instance of a determinate corresponds to a point in that determinates property space. Because the property space of a determinate is a subset
of each of its determinables property spaces, each point in the determinates
property space is also located in each determinables property space as well.
So, necessarily, an instance of a determinate is an instance of each determinable that determinate falls under.
5. We can prove transitivity as follows. Assume C determines B, and B determines A. Then the property space of C is a proper subset of the property
space of B. Also, the property space of B is a proper subset of the property space of A. Being a proper subset of is a transitive relation, so the
property space of C is a proper subset of the property space of A. Similarly,
they each share As non-determinable necessities. Therefore C determines A,
and the determination relation is transitive.
Our analysis also entails that the determination relation is asymmetric and
irreflexive. B determines A only if the property space of B is a proper subset
of the property space of A. No property space can be a proper subset of a
proper subset of itself (e.g., A cannot be a proper subset of B if B is a proper
subset of A), so the determination relation is asymmetric. Furthermore, the
property space of A cannot be a proper subset of the property space of A,
as nothing can be a proper subset of itself. So, the determination relation is
irreflexive.
6. Ordering and/or similarity judgments among determinates under the
same determinable are also explicable on our framework. As a first pass,
similarity between such determinates can be understood as nearness of their

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

561

corresponding points in the property space. Our mathematical model offers

an explanation of why orange is more similar to red than it is to blue: orange
property space points are closer to red property space points than they are
to blue property space points.
These judgments of nearness are difficult, though, when more than one
determination dimension is involved. We quickly discover that we cannot
make judgments of similarity/ordering simpliciter for such determinables, but
only similarity/ordering judgments relative to one determination dimension.
This is particularly evident when one determination dimension makes more
subtle distinctions (e.g., as measured in the pure number of such distinctions)
than another. For example, assume a world in which there are only two superdeterminate values for the brightness of colors: dim and bright. In this world,
there is still the same spectrum of hues as in the actual world. Pick a point
in this property space. This point has a neighbor that is one over on the
hue scale (leaving brightness and saturation fixed) and another neighboring
point one over on the brightness scale (leaving hue and saturation fixed).
Is the color represented by the first point equally similar to each of these
neighbors? It appears not. Why?Because the move along the brightness
dimension is much greater than the move along the hue dimension. And
even when there are numerous possible values for each dimension, a similar
problem still arises. Namely, there is no common scale according to which
values along the different determination dimensions can be compared.
Similarity of determinates is best understood when limited to a single
determination dimension. There is a common metric along which nearness
of, say, hue can be evaluated. Minimally, when point B lies between points
A and C according to hue, then the hue of A is more similar to the hue
of B than it is to the hue of C. Obviously, simple determinables do not
pose an incommensurability problem, as they admit only one determination
dimension.32
7. Our model also clarifies the notions of a super-determinable and superdeterminate. Super-determinables correspond to entire property spaces (i.e.,
the full gamut of values along the determination dimensions). Values along
these determination dimensions may be unbounded. In that sense, a determinate may fall under an infinite number of determinables. For example, having
a 4 kg mass appears to fall under the determinables having under 5 kg mass,
having under 6 kg mass, and so on ad infinitum. As before, a sparse property theorist can reasonably deny that there such determinable properties.
But it does seem that there is a super-determinable property governing this
property spacei.e., having a mass simpliciter. Entire property spaces are the
super-determinables.
Every trope corresponds to a point in a property space. Points in property spaces have precise values along each determination dimension. Therefore, every trope is super-determinate. While each trope is an instance of a
super-determinate property type, it is also an instance of every determinable

562

NOUS

that super-determinate falls under. In holding every property instance to be

super-determinate, we follow in the tradition of Locke and Berkeley. Though
they disagree about the status of general ideas, both agree that everything
out in the world is super-determinate.33 There are no triangles lacking precise side lengths. Similarly, our abstractions should not be confused with
indeterminates.
8. Stephen Yablo has held that even though determinable events are not
identical to their determinate correlates, these events do not causally exclude
one another.34 Yet, he provides no explanation for this non-exclusion. As
such, it appears to be an ad hoc exception to exclusion principles. It would be
better if we could explain why determinate instances do not causally exclude
instances of the determinables they fall under.
The easiest explanation for this lack of causal exclusion is to establish
an identity. If the determinable instance just is identical to the determinate instance, then obviously there can be no exclusion. This justification
for determinable-determinate non-exclusion has been advocated by Cynthia
and Graham Macdonald, as well as Douglas Ehring.35 Ehring correctly criticizes the Macdonalds position that property instances are exemplifications
of universals, yet different universals can still share an exemplification. Ehring
instead opts for the trope view that I favor. The present theory is an improvement on Ehring (1996) in that it more precisely specifies the requirements for
different properties to share an instance. Our development of determination
dimensions and property spaces is critical to this specification.
We should also take this trope identity more seriously than do some trope
theorists who allow for different property types to share a trope. If tropes are
the causal relata, as most trope theorists (including myself) believe, then they
are causes however described. So, when a scarlet trope causes a pecking, then
a red trope and colored trope cause a pecking as well (because the scarlet
trope is identical to a red trope, and the scarlet trope is identical to a colored
trope). This is to accept the Davidsonian line that causes are such regardless
of how they are described. It would be explanatorily misleading to say that
the pigeon pecked because she saw a colored object (since it suggests that
she would have pecked at blue or orange things as well). Yet it is nevertheless
true that the pigeon pecked because of the color of this thing (since the color
of this thing is scarlet).
4. An Application: Determination and the Mental
By arguing that mental properties are determinable relative to their physical realizer properties, Stephen Yablo has revived interest in the determination relation.36 The claim is, for example, that being in physical state P 1 is
a determinate of being in pain. If true, this conclusion would be of extreme
importancefor, given the present analysis, mental and physical properties
could share an instance and the mental would avoid causal exclusion worries.

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

563

Yablo argues that two commonly accepted features of the mental-physical

relationmultiple realizability and supervenienceentail that they are related as determinable to determinate. From multiple realizability, being in
physical state P 1 is just one specific way in which a person can be in pain,
just as being scarlet is one specific way of being red. This observation is
supposed to show that criterion 2 from section 1, the key feature of determination, is met. Further, criterion 3 is met because a person in pain must
have one such physical realizer or other. By supervenience, if one is in physical state P 1 , then one must37 be in pain. (Compare: If something is scarlet,
then it must be red.) This claim purportedly shows that the mental-physical
relation fits criterion 4.
There is a beautiful simplicity to Yablos reasoning that the mental and
physical are related as determinable to determinate and that, just like red and
scarlet do not causally exclude each other, mental properties are not causally
excluded by their physical realizers. But despite the initial attraction of this
view, by applying our understanding of the determination relation we can see
that the mental and physical are not related as such.
To discover the determinates, if any, of being in pain, believing that p, or
any other mental property, we need to discover the determination dimensions
for such mental properties. That is, we need to uncover the ways in which
pains can differ from one another in their pain-ness, beliefs can differ from
one another in their belief-ness, and so on for other mental properties. It
makes sense to speak of people having exactly resembling pains or beliefs.
Plausibly, two people who believe the same content with the same confidence
level do not differ with regard to that belief. It can be difficult to determine
if such sameness of content and confidence level holds, but it is still plausible
that beliefs differ from one another only along these lines. Jack believes that
Nebraska has a panhandle, and Jill believes that Nebraska has a panhandle. Each believes this content with 90% confidence. From this information
alone, I submit that Jack and Jill exactly resemble each other with regard to
this belief. This parallels the way in which Jack and Jill would have exactly
resembling hair color if their hair shared the same hue, brightness, and saturation values. Content and confidence are the only determination dimensions
for believing that p. This is supported by the fact that folk psychological laws
(and/or the laws of cognitive science and/or decision theory) care only about
these two dimensions of beliefs.
The laws of intentional psychology are blind to the physical hardware that
implements these beliefs. Suppose Jack and Jill are on a game show and asked
to name all the U.S. states that have a panhandle. We can confidently predict
that Jack and Jill will each include Nebraska on their list. Why?Simply
because we know that Jack and Jill each believe the content Nebraska has
a panhandle with 90% confidence. Note that we do not have to inquire
after the physical hardware realizing their beliefs. Our prediction would in
no way be altered if we discovered that Jacks belief is realized in physical

564

NOUS

state P 1 and Jills in physical state P 2 . These differences are simply irrelevant
as far as our psychological generalizations go. And there is nothing peculiar
about this game show example. Any psychological law relating that belief
to another mental state or to action would be indifferent to the physical
hardware. And this observation generalizes to other mental states: content,
attitude, phenomenology and similar psychological-level features are the only
determination dimensions for mental properties.
On this understanding, believing that p is similar to our earlier examples
of triangular and mass in that the material constitution is not a determination
dimension for any of them. Just as a steel triangle can have the exact same
triangularity (i.e., side lengths) as a wooden triangle, and a steel ball can have
the exact same mass as a wooden block, Jacks belief (in physical hardware
P 1 ) can have the exact same belief-ness as Jills belief (in physical hardware
P 2 ).
Some might reject our conclusion and insist that the physical realization of
a belief is a determination dimension on par with content and attitude toward
that content. Others, more moderately, may opt for an agnosticism that leaves
them open to the possibility of an empirical reduction of folk-psychological
kinds to, say, neuroscientific kinds. This raises a general concern about our
approach. Surely some reductions have occurred in the history of science.
In cases of reduction the properties of some science, with their distinctive
determination dimensions, are identified with the properties of some more
basic science, with different determination dimensions. But, it seems that the
present approach would rule this out, as difference in determination dimensions is difference in properties. How is reduction possible on this model?
And given that reduction is possible, how can we be confident that the folkpsychological and neuroscientific property spaces are not such a case?
Discovering determination dimensions is an empirical matter and, as such,
folk-psychological reduction cannot be ruled out a priori. There is not enough
space to present a full explanation of reduction of property spaces here, but let
us sketch a picture of how reduction of property spaces is to be understood.
It is (or was) epistemically possible that the property spaces of higher-level
sciences, like psychology, would be supplemented with the determination
dimensions of a lower-level science. Or, the higher-level determination dimensions (epistemically) could even be completely replaced in favor of the
lower-level determination dimensions. Applying this point to our example,
the folk-psychological determination dimensions (epistemically) could have
been supplemented with physical realizer determination dimensions, or (epistemically) could even have been replaced in favor of purely neuroscientific
determination dimensions.
The critical question is: What would justify such supplementation or replacement? Supplementation would be justified if the predictive and/or explanatory powers of the higher-level science could be increased by adding
lower-level determination dimensions, without too great a loss in simplicity

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

565

and generalizability of the higher-level laws. This last clause reveals that we
are dealing with vague standards. Of course we could gain more accurate predictions of human movement by utilizing the determination dimensions of
chemistry, but doing so would involve us in complexities that folk-psychology
can conveniently overlook. Though it is an empirical matter, it seems that
the details needed to increase the predictive and/or explanatory powers of
folk-psychology would come at too great a cost to the generalizability of such
laws. Replacement would be justified if the generalizations of the higher-level
laws could be captured purely in terms of the determination dimensions of
a lower-level science, where these lower-level determination dimensions have
proved their worth with respect to other predictive/explanatory tasks. This is
another empirical issue, but it again seems that the robust patterns picked out
by the laws of folk-psychology cannot be captured utilizing only lower-level
categorizations. In this sense, the special science and their property spaces
are autonomous.
It is important to note that on this picture of property spaces and reduction, the properties are out there in the world, with determination dimensions to be discovered. There is not necessarily a property corresponding
to each possible combination of determination dimensions we can concoct.
In more familiar terms, there is not necessarily a property corresponding to
every possible predicate.
Can anything else be said about the irreducibility of psychology, apart
from what has already been said about the laws of psychology being blind
to the implementation details? Ironically, one of Yablos explicit premises in
arguing for the physical determining the mentalmultiple realizabilityis
sufficient to show that the physical does not determine the mental. Further,
the multiple realizability of the mental in the physical is almost universally
held by philosophers, so a non-determination conclusion should be widely
accepted. The amazingly simple argument goes as follows.38 When we say
that the mental is multiply realizable in the physical, we mean that the same
belief type, say, can be realized in many physical types. Note, in particular,
that even super-determinate belief types are multiply realizable. That is, beliefs
corresponding to the same point in the property space of beliefs can nevertheless differ in physical realizationthere can be a physical difference without
a mental difference. Since the mental property instances exactly resemble,
but the physical property instances do not, the mental property instances
are not identical to the physical property instances. The mental and physical
differ with regard to at least one determination dimension, so they cannot
be related as determinable to determinate.
A general conclusion to draw is that higher-level properties are not generally determined by their lower-level implementing mechanisms (realizations).
Here we break with many who mistakenly judge the realization relation to
be a species of the determination relation. Examples of higher-level properties include having temperature X, transparency, believing that p, and being


NOUS

566

such-and-such computer program. Each one of these has a lower-level implementing mechanism (realization). But, differences at the lower-level do not
necessarily mean that there is a difference at the higher-level. Functionalists
have long observed that the same belief or computer program can be realized in various lower-level mechanisms. Such multiply realized beliefs do not
differ in their belief-ness, so the lower-level mechanisms do not determine
the belief. Heat, transparency, mental states, and computer programs can all
be super-determined by the determination dimensions of the higher-level at
which they reside. Similar points hold for abstract properties, like mass
and shaped, and their surrounding concreta. A wooden triangle can have the
exact same shape as a steel triangle. The addition of such concrete features
does not determine the shape property.
The application to the mental is just one of many that could be made. Our
analysis of the determination relation distinguishes it from the realization
relation and provides us with an apparatus for determining when different
property types share an instance. This is an especially important contribution
if, indeed, property instances are the causal relata. Regardless, our property
spaces and determination dimensions provide a novel way of understanding
the relation between property types and their instances.39

Notes
1

The first systematic account of the determination relation belongs to W.E. Johnson, Logic,
Vol. 1, (Cambridge University Press, 1921), pp. 173185. Johnson also introduced the terms of
art determinable and determinate. The most sophisticated and extensive treatments of the
determination relation since Johnson are found in: Arthur Prior, I. Determinables, Determinates, and Determinants, Mind Vol. LVIII, No. 229, (January, 1949), pp. 120; John Searle,
Determinables and the Notion of Resemblance, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp.
Vol. 33, (1959), pp. 141158; and David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge
University Press, 1997), pp. 4863. Prior (1949) documents discussion of similar relations by
John Locke, as well as in the extensive literature on the genus-species relation.
2 One might object that something can possess a determinable property, be specified by a
disjunction of determinates, though not have any one determinate in particular. For example,
quantum indeterminacy might allow for determinables with indeterminate determinates. While
this may be true of microphysical phenomena, the macro-properties we are normally concerned
with do have some determinate or other. That is, even granting quantum indeterminacy, in
normal cases criterion 3 still holds. For example, it is still the case that if something is colored
it has some particular color, and if something is shaped it has some particular shape. And even
quantum indeterminacy is probabilistically qualified. An amendment for the quantum level
might be that every object instantiating a determinable also instantiates certain determinates to
certain probabilities. Settling this debate would take us too far afield. Criterion 3 is typically
taken as a prerequisite for determination, and will be assumed throughout.
3 Determines (and its variants) is used throughout as a term of art meaning is a determinate of, rather than its more common use as signifying a causal or supervenience relation.
4 Irreflexivity follows from criterion 2.
5 The presupposition is that there arent generic determinableslike being some property
or otherthat all properties fall under. Determinables mark a genuine category of difference.

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

567

Things genuinely differ in their color or shape, but things do not genuinely differ in their being
some property or other.
6 I am assuming a subjectivist understanding of color as defended by, say, C.L. Hardin in his
Color for Philosophers, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988). In later appearances
of this example, I suggest how objectivist reinterpretations can be made.
7 Arguments that property instances are the causal relata can be found in: Douglas Ehring,
Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1997), pp. 7677; and L.A. Paul, Aspect Causation, Journal of Philosophy, (2000), pp. 235
256.
8 This is the lesson to be learned from criticisms of Donald Davidsons Anomalous Monism.
The worry expressed there is that according to Davidsons theory only the physical property instances are causally efficacious. As just a sampling, see: Fred Dretske, Reasons and Causes,
Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989), pp. 115; Jerry Fodor, Making Mind Matter More, Philosophical Topics, 17 (1989), pp. 5980; Ted Honderich, The Argument for Anomalous Monism,
Analysis 42 (1982), pp. 5964; Terence Horgan, Mental Quausation, Philosophical Perspectives
3 (1989), pp. 4776; and Frederick Stoutland, Oblique Causation and Reasons For Action,
Synthese 43 (1980), pp. 351367.
9 See my Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83
(2002), pp. 335351.
10 This example is taken from Stephen Yablo, Mental Causation, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 2, (1992), p. 257.
11 We should distinguish, however, between those properties that are causally efficacious (a
metaphysical notion) and those properties that are causally relevant (an epistemic/explanatory
notion). The triangles being scarlet might have been causally efficacious with regard to the
pigeons behavior, but this property of the triangle might not be relevant with regard to explaining
the pigeons behavior. This is especially true if citing the scarlet color suggests contrasts with
other shades of red. This distinction between causal efficacy and relevance will arise later as
well. I thank an anonymous referee for stressing the relevance of this distinction.
12 Examples of such confusion are found in Yablo (1992); Sydney Shoemaker, Realization
and Mental Causation, in Physicalism and Its Discontents, eds. Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 78, 80 and 85; Douglas Ehring, PartWhole Physicalism and Mental Causation, Synthese 136 (2003), p. 375; and Lenny Clapp,
Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations, Journal of Philosophy XCVIII, 3 (March 2001),
p. 125.
13 Prior (1949), p. 13.
14 Johnson (1921), p. 183.
15 I do not want to give the impression that determination dimensions can be known purely
a priori, say, by conceptual analysis. For more on this, see section 4.
16 Sometimes color theorists use alternative vocabulary, but generally approximately the
same individuating criteria are accepted. For example, on the Munsell Color System these same
3 criteria are termed hue, value, and chroma. Alternative models of the color space are
provided by the Ostwald and C.I.E. color systems. Objective color theorists provide alternative
determination dimensionse.g., wavelength, purity, and luminance. Similarly, sound is typically
analyzed into three components: pitch, timbre, and loudness. It is controversial whether this
list is exhaustive. But, timbre is sometimes characterized negatively such that other determination dimensions are excluded. For example, timbre is sometimes simply defined as that feature
which allows listeners to distinguish sounds of the same pitch and loudness. Each of these alleged determination dimensions may itself have determination dimensions, further complicating
matters.
17 The classic statement of Scientific Realism with regard to properties is found in David
Armstrongs Universals and Scientific Realism (2 Volumes), (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

568

NOUS

18 Fred Dretske, Explaining Behavior, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), p. 80; and
Dretske (1989).
19 Relational features that are irrelevant to individuating that kind, like space-time location,
are not included as determination dimensions.
20 These are only sufficient conditions because not all determinables can be modeled as
such. For the others, and the more general necessary and sufficient conditions, see section 2.3.
21 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for bringing this example, and the problem it
represents with regard to mathematical modeling, to my attention.
22 There are many other properties, like shaped, that cannot be (easily) mathematically
modeled. Just as shaped has different determination dimensions corresponding to the number
of sides of the particular shape, there can be different determination dimensions for genetic
properties corresponding to the number of chromosomes for the particular DNA, different
determination dimensions for chemical properties corresponding to the number of elements
forming the molecule, etc. Still, there is a schema for picking out the determination dimensions
corresponding to the abstractions of each science.
23 Property space will now be used to cover such ranges in determination dimension values,
as well as the n-dimensional spaces discussed in section 2.2.
24 Jonathan Schaffer argues that tropes are to be individuated by spatial-temporal location
(as well as resemblance) in his The Individuation of Tropes, Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 79, No. 2, (June, 2001), pp. 247257. The criteria for individuating tropes provided in section
2.5 follow Schaffer in (partially) individuating tropes by spatial-temporal location. However, we
also offer an explanation, in terms of our property spaces, of the resemblance component of
trope individuation.
25 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), II.xi.9.
26 See Armstrong (1978, 1997).
27 The following present the most systematic and/or influential accounts of tropes: D.C.
Williams, On the Elements of Being I, reprinted in Properties, eds. D.H. Mellor and Alex
Oliver, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997); G.F. Stout, Are the Characteristics of
Particular Things Universal or Particular? II, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 3,
(1923), pp. 114127; Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); J. Bacon,
Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). For some
prominent disagreements, see Chris Daly, Tropes, in Mellor and Oliver (1997), as well as
almost any work by David Armstrong on property theory.
28 This is borrowed from the notation Jaegwon Kim uses for his events (i.e., exemplifications
of universals) in Kim, Supervenience and Mind, (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 9. My
adoption of this schematization should not be seen as judging property types to be ontologically
prior to their tokens (tropes). Like most trope theorists, I take property types to be classes of
resembling tropes.
29 I wish to thank an anonymous referee from this journal for bringing this third possibility to my attention. The example he/she gave is of two overlapping color types that might
share an instancesay, orangish red and yellowish red. Clearly, neither is a determinate of the
other.
30 Or, given the possibility discussed in footnote 2, each instance of a determinable may
correspond to various points in that determinables property space, to various probabilities.
31 Armstrong (1978, Vol. I), p. 117.
32 It is a merit of the present analysis that it explains why we cannot issue absolute similarity judgments regarding complex determinables. Such judgments must always be relative to a
determination dimension. I wish to thank an anonymous referee for drawing this merit of the
analysis to my attention.
33 Locke, Essay, III.iii.6, and Berkeley A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Kenneth Winkler, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1982), Introduction.

The Determinable-Determinate Relation

569

34 Yablo (1992), p. 259; pp. 273279. While holding that determinables and determinates do
not causally exclude one another, Yablo does hold that one of them can nevertheless be a better
candidate for occupying the role of cause than another. For example, if the pigeon pecks at only
scarlet things, the triangles being scarlet is more appropriately judged the cause than its being
red (i.e., since there are shades of red that the pigeon would not peck at). But this is another
point at which the distinction between causal efficacy and causal relevance, as used in footnote
11, is relevant. Contrary to Yablos emphasis on the explanatory aspect of causation (causal
relevance), causal exclusion principles concern the metaphysical notion of causal efficacy.
35 Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, Mental Causes and Explanation of Action, in Mind,
Causation, and Action, ed. L. Stevenson, R. Squires, and J. Haldane (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1986); and Douglas Ehring, Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances, Nous
30:4 (1996), pp. 461480.
36 Yablo (1992). Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (1986) provides an earlier application of
the determination relation to mentality.
37 This must can be read with varying strength (e.g., mere nomic necessity, metaphysical
necessity, etc.), depending on ones view of supervenience.
38 A similar argument is made in Ehring (1996), p. 473.
39 Thanks to Tamar Gendler, Karson Kovakovich, Jonathan Schaffer, Ted Sider, Robert
Van Gulick, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments.