https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-B7SpCsay11no8WgTfmFGAk5wHNCioJ5wiP7q91RX0/edit#heading=h.

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VILLANUEVA vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 74577 : December 4, 1990
192 SCRA 21
Facts: The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of land
identified as Lot 13. After they died, they had 2 surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas. The
southern portion, described as Lot 13-C, assigned to Modesto; the northern, to Federico.
Modesto Aranas died on April 20, 1973 and his wife predeceased him on July 16, 1971. They had no children.
But Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate children named Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas.
These two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As security therefor they mortgaged to Bernas their father's
property, Lot 13-C. In the "Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage" a relative, Raymundo Aranas, signed the
agreement as a witness.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage over Lot 13-C and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. Bernas consolidated his
ownership over Lot 13-C, the mortgagors having failed to redeem the same and had the latter's title (In the name of
Modesto Aranas) cancelled and another issued in his name.
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City
against Jesus Bernas and his wife. In their complaint, the plaintiffs prayed that the latter's title over Lot 13-C be
cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land on the grounds that the discovery of two (2) wills:
1.

2.

Executed February 11, 1958 by Modesto Aranas

Modesto Aranas' will, on the other hand, left Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas all his interests in his
conjugal partnership with Victoria "as well as his own capital property brought by him to (his)
marriage with his said wife."
Executed October 29, 1957 by his wife, Victoria Comorro.
Victoria Comorro's will allegedly left Consolacion and Raymundo, and Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas, in
equal shares pro indiviso, all of "interests, rights and properties, real and personal . . . as her net share
from (the) conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas . . ."

The judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court having been otherwise affirmed in toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, Consolacion Villanueva appealed to this Court. Her co-plaintiff,
Raymundo Aranas, did not.
Issue: Whether or not Consolacion Villanueva has right over Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon standing by
virtue of Victoria Camorro's last will even though he name is not mentioned in Modesto Aranas will
Ruling: No, Villanueva has no right over Lot 13-C. Certain it is that the land itself, Lot 13-C, was not "conjugal
partnership property" of Victoria Comorro and Modesto Aranas. It was the latter's exclusive, private property,
which he had inherited from his parents registered solely in his name. This is what Article 148 of the Civil Code
clearly decrees: that to be considered as "the exclusive property of each spouse" is inter alia, "that which is
brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative
title." Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place during his
marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his "exclusive property" because acquired by him,
"during the marriage, by lucrative title."
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on about two (2) years ahead of her husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of
Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973. Victoria never therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and
hence, had nothing of Lot 13-C to bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else.
The Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of
the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the
wife, belong to the conjugal partnership," and buildings "constructed, at the expense of the partnership,

during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of
the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Proof, therefore, is needful of the time of the
making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the
character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. No such proof
was presented by Consolacion Villanueva or any one else.
Furthermore, Bernas' mode of acquisition of ownership over the property, by a mortgage sale, appears in all respects
to be regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever.

PERLA G. PATRICIO vs. DARIO III

G.R. No. 170829
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for
partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and
their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner
Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731
(175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters,
more or less.[2]
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of
Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in
the names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the
subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence
petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,[3] the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner:
Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered
the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the
subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.[4]

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on August 11,
[5]

2003, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon
a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially
reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should
continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that
the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a
minor beneficiary of the family home.[6]
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS
EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND
SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON
FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP.[7]
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-yearold son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the
same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even after the expiration
of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property
continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who
is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving
heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the

decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of
age at the time of the death of their father,[8] hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last
during ones lifetime.[9] It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside,
including the land on which it is situated.[10] It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family.[11] The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues
to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent
of the value allowed by law.[12]
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its
beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something
merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by
the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article
154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband
and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the
Code.[13]
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife,
or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend
upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who constituted the family
home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a
family on the continuing existence of the family home:

Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or
of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home, the
property will remain as family home for ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary
living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home
will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there are
beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten years, unless at the
expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs who are
beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning the property after the period
provided by this article? We believe that although the heirs will continue in ownership by not
partitioning the property, it will cease to be a family home.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is dependent upon
whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as long as there is one
beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are already dead, the family home will
continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years
and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are compelling
reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property
or who constituted the family home.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive
and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a
minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a
minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family
home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10
years and aminor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary
reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor
beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites
must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art.
154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head
of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent,
can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all descendants of the

person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor
son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and
grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years
from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him.The liability for legal support falls primarily on
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his
immediate family.The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially
the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus,
despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite
of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and
who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.[16] Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on
family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot
be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount. [17]
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they
have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to
follow the order of support under Art. 199.[18] We agree with this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the relatives, the
stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability
for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any
evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons
legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to
dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such
as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property
to prevent these situations from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,[19] no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and
may insist on partition on the common property at any time.An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.[20]
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have ordered a partition by
commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.Not more than three competent and disinterested
persons should be appointed as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and
to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without
great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the
same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless
one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall
order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly.
[21]

The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil
Code.[22] Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same
share as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by the
decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to the surviving
spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same share as each of her two surviving
children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla
Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court

after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition
of the properties in the same action.[24]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680
dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual
physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the following manner: Perla
G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and
bounds of the property and the proper share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in accordance
with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to one
of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the
just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

MEDINA vs. MAKABALI

G.R. No. L-26953

Once more Courts are asked to arbitrate between rights and duties of parents and children, and between parent and
foster parent.
Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, Joseph Casero, was sought to be enforced by habeas
corpusproceedings in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in its Special Proceeding No. 1947. After hearing, the
writ was denied by the Court, and the case was appealed directly to this Supreme Court exclusively on points of law.
Uncontested facts found by the Court below are that on February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to
a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by

respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a
married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son;
had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health; and
sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his
expenses.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children
apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the
offspring of both women are in good terms with each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a
mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.
The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed that the boy is fairly intelligent as a
witness. He never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was calling the respondent his "Mammy". The Court
informed him that his real mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with his real mother or the
respondent. The boy pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court asked him, "Why do you
choose to stay with your "Mammy?" He answered, "She is the one rearing me." This confrontation was
made in the presence of the two women, Zenaida, the petitioner, and the respondent, Dra. Makabali, in open
court. (C.F.I. Rollo, p. 39).
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he reaches
the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the
writ prayed for. The real mother appealed, as already stated.
We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody
of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education
and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that
for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother (Do.) This is as it
should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus
vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his
parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational
aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pea, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of
parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." 1
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge
of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and
development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in
these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not
even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the
child could derive from being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother
and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.lawphi1.et
It is hinted that respondent's motivation in refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce petitioner to pay for the rearing
of the child. This is not acceptable, for Dra. Makabali knew (at least at the trial) that any expectation on her part is
illusory, given Zenaida's meager resources, yet expressed willingness to care and educate him.
No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we hold
that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.