Family Code

*Articles 2 and 3 FC: ESSENTIAL AND FORMAL REQUISITES OF

MARRIAGE

On August 18, 2003, the OSG countered alleging that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.

Silverio vs. Republic

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

favor of the Republic.

Ponente: CORONA, J.
Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras

Hence, this petition.

Issue: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex
appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment

Facts:

surgery?
On November 26, 2002, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition

for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
He alleged in his petition that his name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his birth certificate. His sex was registered as "male."

Ruling: NO
A Persons First Name Cannot Be changed on the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of

sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to

using his true and official name.

be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

No Law Allows the Change of Entry in the Birth Certificate as To Sex on

the Ground of Sex Reassignment

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of

petitioner.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that

is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.

Family Code
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Castro

is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status.

G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate as to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences.

Ponente: PUNO, J.
Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras
Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar. The marriage
was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the
marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in

First, the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual

the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations.
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March
1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S., Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States.
She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the
possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
Hence, she sought a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Edwin F. Cardenas, claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them
prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Family Code
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the

Sevilla vs. Cardenas

Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila which stated that xxx License no. 3196182
does not appear from our records.
The trial court denied the petition alleging that the certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to
the celebration of the marriage between the parties.
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court which reversed the
Decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between the contracting
parties null and void.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Is the certification of the local civil registrar of Due Search and Inability
to Find adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license?

G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006

Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras
Facts:
In a complaint, Jaime O. Sevilla claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, he was forced to sign a marriage contract
before the Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a
marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage
license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

Ruling: YES
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime testifying
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970,

that it was even Jaime who asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because

the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides

she loved him, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in

that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by

Baguio. On May 19, 1969, before a minister, she was made to sign documents

a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,

which she understood as their civil wedding. On May 31, 1969, they had the

absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged.

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for Jaime said that he made inquiries

registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the

with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage

law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

license was obtained. Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local

Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29,

Registry of San Juan, identified the three (3) Certifications.

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "Due Search and Inability to
Find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.

The trial court declared the marriage null and void.

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals where the RTCs
decision was reversed.

Family Code
Issue: Are the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan sufficient

Nollora, Jr. vs. People

to declare the marriage as null and void ab initio?

G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011
Ruling: NO
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Note that the first two certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated 11 March 1994 and 20 September 1994, bear
the statement that "Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our
full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said

Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras

Facts:

statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best
efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792

Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Rowena P. Geraldino were charged with the
crime of Bigamy.

due to its "loaded work."

Atilano was already married to Jesusa Pinat on April 6, 1999. Despite
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of Ms. Perlita Mercader,

such, Atilano contracted a second marriage with Rowena on December 8, 2001.

who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person
Jesusa, as witnesss, testified that she and Atilano met in Saudi Arabia.

in charge of the said logbook had already retired.

Atilano courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married. While working in
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that

Saudi, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife. Because of this,

utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License

she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines. Upon arrival in the

No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of

Philippines, Jesusa learned that indeed, Atilano contracted a second marriage

performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the

with Rowena when she secured a certification as to his civil status from the

certifications, is effectively rebutted.

National Statistics Office (NSO).

Upon learning this information, Jesusa confronted Rowena at the
latters workplace in Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage to
which Rowena allegedly affirmed. Despite this knowledge, she allegedly still
married Atilano because she loves him so much.
Atilano admitted having contracted two (2) marriages. He, however,
claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with Jesusa. As a Muslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam
belief.

Family Code
The trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino. CA affirmed

*Article 4 FC: EFFECT OF ABSENCE, DEFECT OR IRREGULARITY OF THE

RTCs decision.

REQUISITES

Issue: Is Nollora guilty of the crime of bigamy despite the fact that he is a

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

Muslim convert?
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
Ruling: YES
Ponente: PER CURIAM, J.
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage
has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3)
Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; and (4)
Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense alleging that his
religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, Nollora
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance
with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P. D. No. 1083).
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that
In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Family Code of the Philippines, or
Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall apply.
Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.

Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras

Facts:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, Hon. Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr., Presiding
Judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, were charged with several offenses
relating to the discharge of their office.
As

to

the

first

charge

on

illegal

solemnization

of

marriage,

complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without

the requisite marriage license. Thus, several couples were able to get married
by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to Baroy despite the
absence of a marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did
not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not
sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the
reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Issue: What are the consequences to be faced by Judge Palaypayon and Nelia
Baroy due to their act of illegally solemnizing marriages?

Family Code
Ruling:

Araes vs Occiano
By

solemnizing

marriage

without

marriage

license,

Judge

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002

Palaypayon as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity
in not complying with the formal requisites of marriage and under Article 4(3)
of the Family Code of the Philippines. He shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and

Ponente: PUNO, J.
Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras
Facts:

behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of

Mercedita Mata Araes charges Judge Salvador Occiano with Gross

justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed

Ignorance of the Law alleging that on 17 February 2000, Judge Occiano

with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only

solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the

be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond

requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his

suspicion.

territorial jurisdiction.

The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of

Since the marriage was a nullity, Araes right to inherit the vast

marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided

properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of

for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the

receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio
and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the

Judge Occiano, on the other hand, averred that he was requested to

validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity

solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been

shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he was

Hence, Judge Palaypayon is imposed with a fine of P20,000.00 with a

informed that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of

stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future

travelling to Balatan. He was asked if he could solemnize the marriage in

will definitely be severely dealt with. Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, on the other hand,

Nabua, to which request he acceded.

is dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Judge Occiano further avers that before he started the ceremony, he

carefully examined the documents submitted to him by Araes. When he
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting. However, due to
the earnest pleas of the parties and the influx of visitors, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that the

Family Code
resetting of the wedding might aggravate the Orobias condition. After the

marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary

solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and

to law and subjects him to administrative liability.

admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
Judge Occiano should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage

void.

without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a
On 12 September 2001, Araes filed her Affidavit of Desistance. She

marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that

confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after

the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota

reading

of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage

the

Comment

filed

by

Judge

Occiano,

she

realized

her

own

shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Judge Occiano did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage

Issue: What are the consequences to be faced by Judge Occiano by virtue of

of petitioner.

his solemnization of marriage without the requisite marriage license and outside
his territorial jurisdiction?

Judge Occiano cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance

filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the

Ruling:

withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the

authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to
solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, we

exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.

Morigo vs. People
G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.

held that, An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in

Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for 4 years.

Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia

Barrete. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of Judge Occiano is limited

to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the

sweethearts.

Family Code
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines. Both agreed to get

(1) The offender has been legally married;

married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

(2) The first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada

presumptively dead;

leaving appellant Lucio behind.

(3) He contracts a subsequent marriage; and
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against Lucio which was granted.

(4) The subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.

On October 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at

the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what

On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration

transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the

of nullity of marriage in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with

presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is

Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy. And on

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must

August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol convicted Lucio of the crime of Bigamy. He

have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was

then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while the criminal case was

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no

pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in the

semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.

civil case declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no

Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly

marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision,

valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he

which then became final and executory.

first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent

marriage. Hence, Lucio cannot be convicted of the crime of bigamy.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court affirmed RTCs ruling as to

the bigamy case.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Is Lucio guilty of the crime of bigamy?
Ruling: In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

Family Code
Alcantara vs Alcantara

Ruling: NO

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

In cases previously decided by the Supreme Court, it can be deduced

that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the

Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the

Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras

local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
this case, the marriage contract between the Restituto and Rosita reflects a

Facts:

marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by Restituto M.

local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in

Alcantara against Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and

that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was

Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City

issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the

Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for

fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro. They got married on the same day, 8 December

Restituto attempted to demolish the probative value of the marriage

1982. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony at the San

license by claiming that neither he nor Rosita is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.

Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage

However, issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the

was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The

residence of either of the contracting parties is considered a mere irregularity

alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the

that does not affect the validity of the marriage. It only holds the party or

marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and

parties responsible for the irregularity civilly, criminally and administratively

they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar

liable.

of the place.

Restituto also harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license

Rosita, however, asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains

number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the

that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from

marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage

the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleges that Restituto

contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number

only

7054033. However, it is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere

filed

the

annulment

of

their

marriage

to

evade

prosecution

for

concubinage.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs ruling.

typographical error.
Likewise, the issue raised by Restituto that they appeared before a
fixer who arranged everything for them will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage

Issue:Is the marriage between Restituto and Rosita null and void?

ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.

Family Code
Moreover, all that the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has

more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to

been issued by the competent official which may be presumed from the

have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented

issuance of the license.

the following pieces of evidence:

Hence, the marriage between Restituto and Rosita cannot be declared

null and void.

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to

Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to
the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

*Article 22 FC: PROOF OF MARRIAGE

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25,
De la Rosa vs. Vda. De Damian
G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006
Ponente: CORONA, J.
Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras

1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability
Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United
States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa

Facts:

Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; and

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo

Rustia and Josefa Delgado.

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated

that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
Issue: Was there a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado?

petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were
never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners pointed out that no record
of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the
absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage
transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were
married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife
until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning

Ruling: YES
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.
Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in
support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the
marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration
under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa

Family Code
Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia

*Article

married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of

REQUISITES AND EXCEPTIONS

26:

VALIDITY

OF

MARRIAGES

CELEBRATED

ABROAD,

marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome
the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.
Second, Elisa Vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony
they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo

Republic vs. Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras

Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two
had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen

Facts:

the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the

Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial

Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City.

baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of
the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the
alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had
no hand in its preparation.

Crasus alleged that after the celebration of their marriage, he

discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of

In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward

respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent

legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are

Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce

presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always

papers.

presume marriage.

sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom

Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters

she eventually had a child.

Fely, on the other hand, refuted Crasus allegation and said that she
may had been indignant at Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of
the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. Indeed,
she left for abroad for financial reasons as Crasus had no job. After securing a
divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship.

Family Code
The recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Fely is now sought

Republic vs. Orbecido III

for.
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Issue: Is Article 26 of the FC applicable in the case at bar?
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
Ruling: NO
Contributor: Alona Suzell B. Ruyeras
As it is worded, Article 26 of the FC, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.

By its plain and

literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of

respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.

Facts:

Although the exact date was not

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.

Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City.

established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their

obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the

son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been

United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.

naturalized as an American citizen.

In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988.

At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and

pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus.
Hence, the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada RosalIyoy remains valid and subsisting.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. Hence, the
OSG raises this petition.
Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Ruling: YES
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 which is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse

Family Code
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer

and Cipriano.

married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as

obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites

As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently

coming within its contemplation.

for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence

duly submitted by Cipriano concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization

1.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

2.

citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.

of his wife. Accordingly, Cipriano must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, the party pleading the recognition
of a divorce decree must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, respondent must also

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of

show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically

the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce

required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to

is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American

citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her