Ching Leng, a Chinese man was granted Philippine citizenship upon his marriage

to a Filipina in 1950. His wife filed an adoption to Ching's five illegitimate minor
childen. The adoption was granted. Ching then filed a petition to cancel the alien
certificates of registration of said minors on the theory that they have become
Filipino citizens by virtue of the adoption. Is Ching Leng correct? Explain.
Cheng Leng is wrong. The Alien certificates of registration will not be cancelled
because the adopted children have not become Filipinos (see p. 312). Minor children
refer to legitimate children only and not the illegitimates.
Question: The RTC of Sindangan appointed X as guardian of minor Y, in a special
proceeding. Y is allegedly the son of a U.S. Veteran. X received the arrears of
beneficiary Y. Later on, the U.S. Veterans Administration filed a case in Washington
D.C. for the refund of the benefits received by Y, on the ground of wrong payment
since it was found that the U.S. Veteran was a fake. Question: Does the court in
Washington D.C. have jurisdiction concerning the case of refund? Explain.
Answer: No, the point of contact here is the Philippines.
It was ruled: The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the
decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on
claims properly submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the
present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant.
There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must
be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans'
Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions
where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to
their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any
law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions
where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would deprive our
tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities
of the veterans' Administrator.
(In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian
and oppositor-appellee, vs. ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, G.R. No. L9620June 28,1957petitioner-appellant.)
In an analogous case, we have ruled:
By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality
of his vesting order. He cannot therefore now dispute this power. (Brownell vs.
Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz., 4772.)
From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee
guardian, for the ward's benefit, the latter became their lawful possessor and he
cannot be deprived thereof on the sole allegation of the Veterans' Administrator that
the money was erroneously paid. The burden lies upon him to satisfy the court that
the alleged mistake was really committed; and the Philippine courts' determination
of the question is as binding upon the Veterans' Administrator as upon any other
litigant.
Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not
properly filed in the guardianship proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned

with the ward's care a custody and the proper administration or management of his
properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the property in the hands of the
guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate proceeding.
G.R. No. L-5877
September 28, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO MENDOZA
PARAS, C.J.:
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years,
with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de
Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the
first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On
February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted
another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage
gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null
and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first
marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third
marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge
for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor
General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to
Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a
previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs.
Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is
not controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein,
Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary
formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without
merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema
was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section
29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his
second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,

and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from

mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second
marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead,
so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent
court.1wphl.nt
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.
Leouel Santos vs. CA

GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two
got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound.
Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr.
Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the
interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got
a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he
desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were
of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with
him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all
the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was
denied.
Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24,
1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a
son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son
that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years
old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered
in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and
go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for
a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the
State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada
and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner
filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot
give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens

because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to
discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.
The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine
laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos
sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the
divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao
and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages
and attorneys' fees.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., vs COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA C. MEJIA,

FACTS: Plaintiff, Gilda C. Mejia, shipped thru defendant, Philippine Airlines, one (1)
unit microwave oven, from San Francisco, U.S.A. to Manila, Philippines. Upon arrival,
however, of said article in Manila, Philippines, plaintiff discovered that its front glass
door was broken and the damage rendered it unserviceable. Demands both oral and
written were made by plaintiff against the defendant for the reimbursement of the
value of the damaged microwave oven, and transportation charges paid by plaintiff
to defendant company. Plaintiff filed the instant action for damages against
defendant in the lower court. Defendant Airlines alleged inter alia, by way of special
and affirmative defenses, that the court has no jurisdiction over the case; that
plaintiff has no valid cause of action against defendant since it acted only in good
faith and incompliance with the requirements of the law, regulations, conventions
and contractual commitments; and that defendant had always exercised
the required diligence in the selection, hiring and supervision of its employees.
Petitioner airlines argues that the legal principle enunciated in Fieldmens Insurance
does not apply to the present case because the provisions of the contract involved
here are neither ambiguous nor obscure. The trial court justified its award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees in favor of private respondent
that since the plaintiffs baggage destination was the Philippines, Philippine law
governs the liability of the defendant for damages for the microwave oven. And
that, plaintiff has established that defendant acted in bad faith when it denied the
formers claim on the ground that the formal claim was filed beyond the period as

provided in the Air Waybill when actually, Concepcion Dio The court finds that the
petitioner acted in bad faith in denying private respondents claim, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this appeal for Certiorari., sister of plaintiff
has immediately filed the formal claim upon discovery of the damage.
ISSUE: WON the air waybill should be strictly construed against petitioner.
RULING: NO. SC held that there can be no further question as to the validity of the
terms of the air waybill, even if the same constitutes a contract of
adhesion. Whether or not the provisions thereof particularly on the limited liability
of the carrier are binding on private respondent in this instance must be determined
from the facts and circumstances involved vis-a-vis the nature of the provisions
sought to be enforced, taking care that equity and fair play should characterize the
transaction under review. However, it should be borne in mind that a contract of
adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable, for being subversive of
public policy, only when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the
dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it,
completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Just because we
have said that Condition No. 5 of the airway bill is binding upon the parties to and
fully operative in this transaction, it does not mean, and let this serve as fair
warning to respondent carriers, that they can at all times whimsically seek refuge
from liability in the exculpatory sanctuary of said Condition No. 5. We find nothing
objectionable about the lower courts reliance upon the Fieldmens Insurance case,
the principles wherein squarely apply to the present petition. The parallelism
between the aforementioned case and this one is readily apparent for, just as in the
instant case, it is the binding effect of the provisions in a contract of adhesion (an
insurance policy in Fieldmens Insurance) that is put to test.

Alitalia V. IAC | Narvasa, J. (1990)

RATIO DECIDENDI
It should only be deemed a limit on liability only in those cases where the
cause of death or injury to person is not attributable to or attended by any
willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct
on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible
and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury.
FACTS

Dr. Pablo was invited to take part in a meeting in Italy.

She accepted the invitation to read a paper in the meeting and booked a
flight to Italy with Alitalia.

She arrived in Italy a day before the meeting but her baggage including the
suitcase which contained her paper did not arrive.

Completely distraught, she did not attend the meeting.

Once back in Manila, she demanded that Alitalia make reparation for the
damages suffered by her.
o

She was offered airline tickets which she rejected. She sued Alitalia for
damages.

ISSUE/HELD
WoN the Warsaw Convention should have been applied to limit Alitalias
liability YES
RATIO

It should only be deemed a limit on liability only in those cases where the
cause of death or injury to person is not attributable to or attended by any
willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on
the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible and
there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury.

The Conventions provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other

breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage.

The Warsaw Convention has been held inapplicable where there was
satisfactory evidence of malice or bad faith attributable to its officers and
employees.

No bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the

employees of Alitalia.
o

Dr. Pablos luggage was eventually returned to her belatedly but

without appreciable damage.

The fact is however that some special species of injury was caused to
Dr. Pablo because Alitalia misplaced her luggage and failed to deliver it
to her at the time appointed.