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San Beda College

San Beda College of Law


638 Mendiola St, San Miguel,
Manila, Metro Manila

Criminal Law II

Submitted by:
Zarraga, Alyssa R.
1-S
To:
Atty. Nelson A. Salva

PEOPLE VS LOL-LO
43 PHIL 19

FACTS: On or about June 30, 1920, 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In one of the boats
was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other was 11 men, women and children. The 2nd
boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat
was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for
food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men,
and violated two of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo
and Saraw.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of pircacy in this
case
HELD: Yes. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular
state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where
the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it
matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for
those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." All of the elements of the crime of
piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

PEOPLE VS TULIN
364 SCRA 10

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FACTS: M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7
fully armed pirates. The pirates, including the accused, detained the crew and completely took
over the vessel. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio
messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in
the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which,
however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14,
1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride".

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over the crime committed outside the
Philippine waters or territory

RULING: Yes. The attack on and seizure of the vessel and its cargo in this case were committed
in the Philippine waters even if the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore
where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy,
hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters. Moreover, piracy falls under Title
One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential
Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.

PEOPLE VS CATANTAN
278 SCRA 761
FACTS: On June 27, 1993, Pilapil brothers, Juan and Eugene, were fishing in the sea some 3

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kilometers away from the shore of Tabogon, Cebu when suddenly a boat caught up with them.
They were later identified as the accused. The accused then boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils
and Catantan pointed his gun at the brothers. Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheek and tied
him. Juan was ordered by the accused to ferry them to Daan Tabogon using their pumpboat.
However, as they went farther, the engine stopped running. Catantan ordered the Pilapils to
approach the boat, cautioning them not to say anything.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused violated PD 532

RULING: Yes. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere
other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing
their boat. Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down
and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to their
lair.Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended
by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that
Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the
Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

ASTORGA VS PEOPLE
412 SCRA 51

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FACTS: On September 1, 1997, the RSOG of the DENR sent a team to the island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the
governments campaign against illegal logging. There they met Benito Astorga, the Mayor of
Daram. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called
for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues,
arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioners house in Daram, where
they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention

RULING: Yes. Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who,
without legal grounds, detains a person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce
such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is
compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused,
then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will. In the case at bar, the
restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants
were not allowed by petitioner to go home.This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and
arrival of almost a dozen reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to
encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. In the case at bar, the
restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants
were not allowed by petitioner to go home.This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and
arrival of almost a dozen reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to
encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses.

CAYAO VS DEL MUNDO


226 SCRA 492
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FACTS: On October 22, 1992, a bus driven by complainant almost collided with an owner-type
jeepney owned by respondent-judge. Complainant was picked up by policeman and was brought
to the house of the judge. Complainant was compelled by respondent to choose a punished, to
wit: ( a ) t o
(b)

face

revocation

acharge
of

his

of

multiple

driver's

attempted

license;or

(c)

homicide;
to

be

put

i n jail for three (3) days. Of the three choices, complainant chose the third. Thereafter,
complainant was escorted by the policemen to the municipal jail. Although not incarcerated,
complainant remained in the premises of the municipal jail for three days.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent-judge is guilty of Arbitrary Detention

RULING: Yes. While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as respondent had
intended, however, complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea
of confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to
qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
liberty. Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when
he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds.

MILO VS SALANGA
152 SCRA 113

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FACTS: An information was filed against private respondent and some other private persons for
maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his
constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat
conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of
Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of Abritrary Detention
RULING: Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority
to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to
be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the
powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio
captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same
duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

PEOPLE VS GARCIA

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G.R. No. 126252


Facts: On November 18, 1994, the accused boarded a jeep carrying a plastic bag and he seated
beside the driver. Two policemen who were in civilian clothes were also in the jeepney. The
policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from the plastic bag carried by Garcia.
To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow the accused. When the two policeman were
certain that it was indeed marijuana that the accused was in possession of, they quickly
identified themselves and arrested Garcia. The accused, after the arrest, was turned over to the
CIS office at the Baguio Water District compound for further investigation.
Issue: Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of the person as provided for in Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that there was no irregularity with the turn over of the
appellants to the CIS office. It was clarified that this has been the practice of the arresting
officers as their office had previously arranged with the CIS for assistance with respect to
investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office being more specialized in the area of
investigation. Neither can the police officers be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at
the CIS office. Art. 125 of the RPC penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some
legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable
by the afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the record bears that appellant was
arrested for possession of 5 kls. of marijuana in Nov. 28, 1994 at 2 p.m. - a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. He was detained for further investigation and delivered by the
arresting officers to the court in the afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant
for purposes of investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law. i.e., 36 hours from the
time of his arrest.

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AGBAY VS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN


309 SCRA 726
FACTS: On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was
arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A.
7610. On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan
demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had failed to deliver the
detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from
September 7, 1997. Private respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authority
RULING: Art. 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a
person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail. More
specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods
prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of
the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to the
corresponding judicial authorities. The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125
mean "the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the
temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public
offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by law.

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LADLAD VS VELASCO
GR. NO. 172070
FACTS: Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police
officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao,
Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran was
later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial determination of
probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not Beltran can be charged with Rebellion

RULING: No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive
or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done
in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted
the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents. The bulk of
the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed
by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain
Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February 2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February
2006, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the
afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran and other individuals on board a vehicle which
entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted,

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they were met by another individual. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member
of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2)
he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent
party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part
in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that
Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he
was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed
specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution
of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion.
Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a
leader of a rebellion.
In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25
February 2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided
details in his statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other petitioners attended in
2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly
discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case
for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code,
not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring
down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under
Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the
Information against Beltran in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not
Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a
"tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found
probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.

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PEOPLE VS SILONGAN
G.R. No. 137182
FACTS: The appellants in this case, who are a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel surrenderees, were convicted in the Regional Trial
Court for the crime of kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention of Alexander Saldaa and his
three companions. The four victims were taken to a mountain hideout and the appellants
demanded ransom money for their release. Alexander was detained for six months until he was
finally released.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of kidnapping committed by the accused should be absorbed in
rebellion
RULING: The argument that the crime was politically motivated and that consequently, the
charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping is without merit. As held in Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the political motivation for the crime
must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because it
is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro
National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of kidnapping was
committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding
that the crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently
proven their allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel
surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the
defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.

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PEOPLE VS OLIVA
349 SCRA 435
FACTS: Appellant in this case, who represented themselves as NPA, were charged with
Kidnapping with murder committed against Jacinto Magbojos. There were no eyewitness but
nevertheless, they were convicted on the basis of several circumstantial evidence deduced from
the testimonies of 3 prosecution witnesses. Oliva asserts that he should have been charged with
rebellion instead of kidnapping with murder considering that he is a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and a Commander of the New Peoples Army. He claims that the killing
was committed in furtherance of rebellion, hence, it should be absorbed in rebellion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of kidnapping with murder committed by the accused should
be absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
RULING: No. True, one can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and
kidnapping were committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion. Corollarily, offenses
which were not committed in furtherance of the rebellion, but for personal reasons or other
motives, are to be punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the rebellious
acts. In the instant case, there was no evidence at all to show that the killing of Jacinto Magbojos
Jr. was in connection with or in furtherance of their rebellious act. Besides, it was not
indubitably proved that Oliva was indeed a member of the New Peoples Army.

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PEOPLE VS LOVEDIORO
250 SCRA 359
FACTS: SPO3 Lucilo was shot several times by the accused and three others. Lovedioro was
identified by Nestor Armenta as one of the persons who shot SPO3 Lucilo. Lucilo died on the
same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds. Lovedioro was charged with
murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Lovedioro contends that he
should be charged of rebellion instead of murder because he is a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA).
ISSUE: Whether or not Lovedioro should be guilty of rebellion instead of murder
RULING: No. The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes
involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One
aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance
are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character. It follows,
therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted
of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and
mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and
of itself, suffice.

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PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ
99 PHIL 515
FACTS: On March 15, 1945, herein appellants were accused of conspiring, confederating and
cooperating with each other, as well as with 31 other defendants. A criminal case was charged
before the Court of First Instance of Manila. They were accused of being members of the PKP
Community Party of the Philippines which was actively engaged in armed rebellion against the
government of the Philippines. With the party of the HUKBALAHAP, they committed the crime
of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting and others enumerated in 13 attacks on government
forces or civilians by HUKS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson and robbery
RULING: No. Murder, arson and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion as
means necessary for the perpetration of the offense. Such common offense is absorbed or
inherent in the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135 constitutes one
single crime, it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48 which
requires therein the commission of at least 2 crimes.

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PEOPLE VS DASIG
G.R. No. 100231
FACTS: Pfc. Catamora noticed 8 persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting
suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc.
Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance
on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City.
Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape. The
team captured Nues and confiscated revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the
group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who was shot on his left arm and was subsequently
apprehended. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed Pfc. Manatad. He
likewise admitted that he and Nues were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were
"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.
He contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at
most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for participating in the act of rebellion
RULING: Yes. In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the
sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while
manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice
that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of
overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the
killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of
the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct
assault upon a person in authority."

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PEOPLE VS CABRERA
43 PHIL 84
FACTS: On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a
member of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this
city. The arrest of the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage
committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila
police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary. As one outcome of the tumultous
uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge upon the police of
the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila against the participants in the public disturbance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of sedition
RULING: Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the
State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who
rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of
vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The
trial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been
committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.

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PEOPLE VS UMALI
96 PHIL 185
FACTS: A raid was staged in the town og Tiaong, Quezon between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening
of November 14, 1951 by armed men. The raid resulted in the burning down and complete
destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the
house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of
Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the
wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one
house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the
town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?
RULING: Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder
and physical injuries. The object of the attack was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc.
one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public
official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this
was sufficient to costitute sedition.

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PEOPLE VS NABONG
57 PHIL 455
FACTS: The appellant is an attorney and he had been retained to defend one Juan Feleo against
a charge of sedition that had been preferred against him. Feleo was in those days a recognized
leader of the communists in Nueva Ecija, and was related by marriage to the appellant. After
Feleo had been arrested and taken away, Ignacio Nabong delivered a speech in a meeting. In the
course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the Constabulary. While Nabong was
talking his words were attentively listened to by deputy fiscal Villamor, as well as Captain
Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo, all of whom understood the Tagalog language. At the same
time Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo took notes of the substance of this part of the
speech.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition
RULING: Yes. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the
Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it
was evidently intended to be understood. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to
incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. The words used
by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to resist and use violence against the
agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the order of
the Government. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact
result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities.

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GELIG VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 173150
FACTS: The son of the accused was a student of Gemma B. Micarsos. On July 17, 1981, herein
accused confronted Gemma after learning that she called her son a sissy while in class.
Accused slapped Gemma and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. She
suffered contusions. Later on, it was found that she suffered an incomplete abortion. The RTC
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the complex crime direct assault with
unintentional abortion. However, the Court of Appeals found her guilty only of the crime of
slight physical injuries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of direct assault
RULING: Yes. Direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways:
first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and
second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance. The case of Lydia falls under the second mode. Its
elements are: 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.; 2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his
agent.; 3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official
duties.; 4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties.; 5. That there is no public uprising.

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RIVERA VS PEOPLE
462 SCRA 350
FACTS: In March 1993, Police Inspector Leygo, Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and Patrol of the
La Trinidad Police Station and SPO1 Basquial came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung at the
stall of accused Rivera. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop unloading the manure as it violates La
Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. I-91. The driver complied with the police directive and was escorted
by the police. However, members of the police under Inspector Leygo later saw the same truck. After a
chase, Inspector Leygo asked the accused why he insisted on defying the ban on the unloading and
loading of chicken manure. Instead of answering however, the accused pointed a finger on the policeman
and uttered words like Babalian kita ng buto, Ilalampaso kita, and Pulis lang kayo, and other
unsavory and insulting words. Inspector Leygo who was a little bit angry warned the accused to stop
uttering further insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy and then informed him that he was
being arrested for violation of the chicken dung ordinance. The accused removed his jacket, placed it
inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance and challenged the policeman. Inspector Leygo then
approached the accused and warned him anew that he was being arrested. The accused responded by
punching Inspector Leygo on his face, particularly on his lip. The two then grappled as Inspector Leygo
tried to hold the accused. Finally, with the help of other policemen, the accused was subdued. The
accused was then pushed into one of the police cars but he resisted until Castro, one of the chicken dung
dealers in the area, boarded the police car to accompany him. The trial court convicted petitioner of the
crime of direct assault. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court.
Held: No. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on occasion of such performance. Petitioners case falls under the second mode, which is the more
common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b)
when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in
authority.
At the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. He was
wearing the designated police uniform and was on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when
he first came upon the truck unloading chicken manure. Because the unloading of chicken dung was a
violation of La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck driver to return
from where he came, but petitioner, in defiance of such lawful order, commanded the truck driver to

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return to Shilan, the place where the truck was first intercepted, and on being informed that the same
truck had returned, the lieutenant had every reason to assume it did return for the purpose of unloading its
cargo of chicken dung, thus stopped it from doing so.

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PEOPLE VS ABALOS
258 SCRA 523
FACTS: In the evening of March 20, 1983, while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police
Major Cecilio Abalos, were having a heated argument, a woman shouted Police officer, help us!
Somebodys making trouble here. The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then appeared at the scene and
asked Major Abalos, What is it, sir? The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around
to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured
a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby
Ford Fiera vehicle. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece
at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine
collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained
from that blow.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Held: No. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under
Article 148 of the RPC. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition,
except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common
way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or
the offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. Appellant
committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack,
use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is,
that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. Here, Labine was a duly appointed
member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to Article 152 of the RPC. There is also no dispute that he was in the actual
performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and
order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he personally
knew Labine to be a policeman and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts
should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly
demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter,
there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the
instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means
deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the
same time by appellants father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the
victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

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PEOPLE VS DURAL
223 SCRA 523
FACTS: The prosecution witnesses while on their way to the tupadahan, heard successive
gunfires. They run and hid themselves near a store. From the place they were hiding, they saw 3
men - each of them armed with a pistol, firing at 2 Capcom soldiers on board a Capcom mobile
car. Two of the gunmen positioned themselves beside each of the side of the mobile car while
the third gunman whom they identified as accused claimed the hood of the mobile car and
positioned himself in front of the car. After the 2 Capcom soldiers were immobilized, the
gunman standing near the driver's seat opened the left front door of the car and took the pistol
and armalite of the Capcom soldiers. Thereafter, the three gunmen left.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was direct assault upon an agent in authority?
RULING: Yes .There is no doubt in that appellant Dural and the (2) other gunmen knew that the
victimswere members of the PhilippineConstabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were
then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims, who were agents of persons in
authority, were in the performanceof official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. For
having assaulted and killed the saidvictims, in conspiracy with the other two (2) gunmen,
appellant Dural also committed directassault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon
an agent of a person in authority.

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TECSON v. CA
370 SCRA 181
FACTS: A buy-bust operation was held by the Central Bank Operatives in order to capture a
certain Mang Andy who is involved in a syndicate engaging in the business of counterfeit US
dollar notes. Members of the buy-bust operation team acted as poseur-buyer, approached Mang
Andy inside the Jollibee restaurant. When the civilian informer introduced them to Mang Andy,
the latter was convinced and drew 10 pieces of US dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment,
Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Mang
Andy whom they later identified as herein petitioner, Alejandro Tecson.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable under Art. 168 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: Yes. It is true that in Art. 168, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled with
intent to use the same by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime. However,
from the facts of the case it can be inferred that the accused had the intent to use the fake dollar
notes. In the course of the entrapment, petitioners natural reaction from the seeming interest of
the of the poseur-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly shows
his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note that prior to the buybust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with the petitioner to arrange a meeting
with the prospective buyers. It was actually the petitioner who planned and arranged said
meeting and what the informer did was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective
buyers. Clearly therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the intention
to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that he was only instigated
to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overcome the legal presumption that public
officers regularly perform their official duties.

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CLEMENTE VS PEOPLE
652 SCRA 382

FACTS: The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code. The petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft
drink from the Manila City Jail bakery but was refused because it was found out that it was fake.
So, Francis de la Cruz reported the matter to jail officers. Consequently,the jail guards conducted
a surprise inspection and found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the accused. The
defense of the accused was the defense of frame up.

ISSUE: Whether all the elements of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false treasury or
bank note in this case are present?

RULING: In this case, the Supreme Court, citing People v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the
findings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession and use of
false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro,
possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal
offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with
intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show
that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis
dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not
presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz
that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500
bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela
Cruz to use the P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal
knowledge.

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HERNANDEZ VS HERNANDEZ
642 SCRA 646

FACTS: PMRDC entered through its president into various agreements with co-respondents
Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), in
connection with the construction of the Isabel Homes housing project in Batangas and of the
Monumento Plaza commercial and recreation complex in Caloocan City. PMRDC entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby it was given the option to buy pieces of land
owned by petitioners. Petitioners insist that the obligation of PMRDC to deliver back the TCTs
arises on its failure to exercise the option to purchase the lands according to the terms of the
MOA, and that the deliberate refusal of PMRDC to perform such obligation gives ground for the
rescission of the MOA. This thesis is perched on petitioners argument that the MOA could not
have possibly been novated by the DAC because Demetrios signature therein has been forged.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was forgery in this case

RULING: No. Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be presumed from a
mere allegation but rather must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the
party alleging the same. The burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not been
conclusively discharged by petitioners because first, nothing in the records supports the
allegation except only perhaps Demetrios explicit self-serving disavowal of his signature in open
court.

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TAMANI VS SALVADOR
647 SCRA 132

FACTS: Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided parcel of land.
Based on the TCT, respondents own 345 sq. m. of the property whereas the Spouses Tamani own
the remaining 431 sq. m. Spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz
(Cruz) as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of Php 2,500.00.
Subsequently, Cruz sold the disputed property to respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale
for the same consideration. Thus, the respondents acquired ownership over the whole area of
776 sq. m. The signature of Tamani appearing on the August 17, 1959 Deed of Sale seemed
forged.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner committed forgery

RULING: No. Although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of evidence
inarguably favors petitioners. During cross-examination, Sorra (document examiner from the
PNP Crime Laboratory) explained that the differences she accounted for were not "variations,"
which are normal and usual deviations. She explained that variations are attributable to the fact
that humans are not machines, such that it would be impossible to have two perfectly identical
handwriting samples. Instead, Sorra clarified that the differences were "different" based on the
hesitation in writing in the questioned signature. Sorra was steadfast that the similarities between
the questioned signature and the standard signatures is attributable to the fact that the case
involved a "simulated forgery" or a copied forgery, such that there will be similarities, but the
similarities will be superficial.

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GUILLERGAN VS PEOPLE
641 SCRA 511

FACTS: Petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptrollers Office,
to cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with
supporting time record and book. Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of
signatures of the payees, Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon
(Butcon), the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on the
Remarks/Sig column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and facilitate the processing of
the time record, book, and payrolls.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of public document

RULING: Yes. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1)
the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of
his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171; and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case. Guillergan was a
public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was the comptroller to the PC/INP
Command in Region 6. His work as comptroller did not include the preparation of the
appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official custody of the pertinent documents.
His official function was limited to keeping the records of the resources that the command
received from Camp Crame.

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GALEOS VS PEOPLE
642 SCRA 485

FACTS: On February 14, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, the accused, a former Municipal
Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, in such
capacity, falsified a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the
Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein
that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew
that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused
Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S.
Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT GALEOS IS LIABLE FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENT
RULING: YES. Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Such crime is committed in any of the following
acts: 1.) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2.) Causing it to appear
that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3.) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them; 4.) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. The
elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee
had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public
document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he
has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or
(2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.27 Likewise, in falsification of
public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent
to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.28
All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been
established by the prosecution.

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GONZALUDO VS PEOPLE
481 SCRA 569

FACTS: In 1985, Ulysses Villaflor took one Rosemarie Gelogo as her mistress into his house in
Bacolod City. After Ulysses death, said mistress offered to sell the 2-storey for P80,000.00 to
herein petitioner Gonzaludo but the petitioner was not interested so he introduced Gelogo to
Spouses Canlas. Gelogo ang Gregg Canlas executed a Deed of Sale and it was witnessed by
Gonzaludo. Gelogo represented herself as the lawful owner of the house by using the name of
Rosemarie Villaflor.
ISSUE: Whether or not of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document
having conspired with Gelogo
RULING: No. For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public document must exist. To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Court has time and again ruled that the following requisites must
concur: (1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (2) that
such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud; (3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the
very cause which induced the offended party to part with his money or property; and (4) that as a
result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. In this case, the third element is absent.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when
she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey
house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who
parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging
Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses,
but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient
cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie
cannot be held liable for estafa.
However, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making
untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be
the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her
real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public
document.

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GARCIA VS CA
477 SCRA 427

FACTS: The accused, being in possession of a receipt for P 5,000 dated January 21, 1991 issued
by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down payment of the sale of a house and lot to accused,
made alterations on the said receipt and made it appear that it was issued on January 24, 1991 in
the amount of Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and in fact, the said
accused fully well knew that the receipt was only for the amount of Five Thousand Pesos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC

RULING: Yes. The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a
document; (2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has
changed the meaning of the document; and (4) that the changes made the document speak
something false. When these are committed by a private individual on a private document the
violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in
addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the
same to a third person. Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and without
convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private complainant, the Court
holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the
requirement of damage, this is readily apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had
received P50,000 when in fact he did not.

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OANI VS PEOPLE
GR No. 1339984
FACTS: During the school year 1988-1989, the Panabo High School in Panabo, Davao del
Norte, headed by its Principal, Leopoldo Oani, implemented the free secondary school program
of the government. During the period of November 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, the high
school received the amount of P648,532.00 from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) for Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE). Of the said amount,
P551,439.13 was earmarked for the purchase of various supplies, materials and equipment. On
March 1, 1990, the DECS Secretary received a letter from the Parents Teachers Association of
the ssid school regarding the investigation of Principal Oani and Bonifacio Roa, the Resident
Auditor regarding the alleged overpricing of 12 fire extinguishers for P15,000.00 each. The
Regional Office of the COA then issued Assignment Order No. 90-137 dated March 2, 1990 to a
team of auditors, composed of Jaime P. Naranjo, as Chairman, and Bienvenido Presilda and
Carmencita Enriquez, as members. The amount of P55,000.00 was certified as available for the
purpose. Instead of conducting a public bidding, Oani decided to purchase the fire extinguishers
from the Powerline Manufacturing Industry (Powerline, for brevity) for P54,747.00. The
members of the Audit Team that conducted a re-canvass for fire extinguishers of the same brand
and features as those supplied by Cunanan discovered that each unit could be purchased for only
P2,970.00, inclusive of 10% allowance. The purchase of the nine units of fire extinguishers was,
thus, overpriced by P23,040.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner violated RA 3019
RULING:Yes. The Certification is dated January 1988, making it appear that it had been issued
before the subject fire extinguishers were purchased on June 27, 1989. However, Cunanan could
not have executed the Certification in January 1988 because paragraph 4 thereof indicates that it
was issued pursuant to COA Circular No. 91-368. It bears stressing that COA Circular No. 91368 was issued only on December 19, 1991, long after Cunanan signed the Certification. In fine,
Cunanan could not possibly have issued a certification pursuant to an administrative circular
which did not as yet exist. Hence, no such certification was issued on June 27, 1989, the most
plausible explanation being that it was executed and signed by Cunanan only after December 19,
1991. Besides, the petitioner never submitted the certification when the auditing team conducted
its investigation. If the certification was indeed issued as early as January 1988, the petitioner
should have submitted the same to the auditing team. The trial court saw through the petitioners
chicanery and declared in its decision:
Accused Oani submitted for the purpose a Certification dated 10 July 1988 issued by the Panabo
Fire Station, Panabo, Davao and the Certification dated January 1988, issued by a certain
Francisco R. Cunanan, proprietor of Powerline, that the latter is an exclusive distributor of the
purchased fire extinguishers and that no subdealer was appointed to sell the same.

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PEOPLE VS MORALES
G.R. NO. 172873
FACTS: Roldan Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with
possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The trial court and the CA
found Morales guilty of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: What is the nature of appeal in criminal cases?
RULING: Appeal in criminal cases possess a unique nature. The appeal throws the whole case
open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we
find the present appeal meritorious. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts
findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not
apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome
of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the
records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this
case falls under the exception.The identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal
to the prosecutions case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of
corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both
possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales.

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PEOPLE VS PERALTA
GR No. 17347
FACTS: Elmer Peralta was arrested after the District Drug Enforcement Group (DDEG) staged a
by-bust operation with one police officer (SPO1 Alberto Sangalang) acting as poseur-buyer. An
informant introduced the police officer to Peralta and the former informed Peralta that the police
officer was a dance instructor in need of shabu for himself and his fellow dance instructors so
they could endure the long nights. The police officer gave Peralta a marked P500.00 bill for a
sachet of shabu. At a signal, Sangalang told his informant to go out and buy cigarettes. On
seeing the informant come out of the house, the police back-up team rushed in. They arrested
accused Peralta, took the marked money from him, and brought him to the police station.
Meanwhile, the sachet of shabu was marked "AS-1-210702" and taken to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for testing. The contents of the sachet tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The prosecution presented the police officer. He
alone testified for the government since it was thought that the testimonies of the other police
officers would only be corroborative. The prosecution also dispensed with the testimony of the
forensic chemist after the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of Chemistry
Report D-332-02, which showed that the specimen tested positive for shabu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution presented ample proof that the police officers involved
caught accused Peralta at his home, peddling prohibited drugs.
RULING: NO. The elements of the sale of illegal drugs are a) the identities of the buyer and
seller, b) the transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and c) the existence of the corpus delicti.
With respect to the third element, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus
delicti has been preserved. This is crucial in drugs cases because the evidence involvedthe
seized chemicalis not readily identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or
substituted. The prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs. It
must present testimony about every link in the chain of custody of such drugs, from the moment
they were seized from the accused to the moment they are offered in evidence. But here the
prosecution failed to show the chain of custody or that they followed the procedure that has been
prescribed in connection with the seizure and custody of drugs. To begin with, the prosecution
did not adduce evidence of when the sachet of shabu was marked. Consequently, it could have
been marked long after its seizure or even after it had been tested in the laboratory. While the
records show that the sachet bore the markings "AS-1-210702," indicating that Sangalang
probably made the marking, the prosecutor did not bother to ask him if such marking was his.
Sangalang identified the seized drugs in a manner that glossed over the need to establish their
integrity. Since the seizing officer usually has to turn over the seized drugs to the desk officer or
some superior officer, who would then send a courier to the police crime laboratory with a
request that the same be examined to identify the contents, it is imperative for the officer who
placed his marking on the plastic container to seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that
usually cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. If the drugs were not
in a plastic container, the police officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way the

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drugs would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused.
Further, after the laboratory technician has tested and verified the nature of the powder in the
container, he should seal it again with a new seal since the police officers seal had been broken.
In this way, if the accused wants to contest the test made, the Court would be assured that what
is retested is the same powder seized from the accused. The prosecutor could then ask questions
of the officer who placed his marking on the plastic container to prove that the suspected drugs
had not been tampered with or substituted when they left that officers hands. If the sealing of
the seized article had not been made, the prosecution would have to present the desk officer or
superior officer to whom the seizing officer turned over such article. That desk officer or
superior officer needs to testify that he had taken care that the drugs were not tampered with or
substituted. And if someone else brought the unsealed sachet of drugs to the police crime
laboratory, he, too, should give similar testimony, and so on up to the receiving custodian at the
crime laboratory until the drugs reach the laboratory technician who examined and resealed it.

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PEOPLE v QUE MING KHA


GR No. 133265
FACTS: On May 16, 1997, members of the Central Police District received a phone call from an
informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in the
transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. A
team was immediately dispatched to the reported place. Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite side of the street going toward the direction of
Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, the van hit a boy. A
concerned motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital. When the police finally
intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers to the driver and passenger of
the van and informed them that they committed the crime of reckless imprudence and asked for
his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the driver's seat while Que sat on the
passenger's seat. The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks
placed on the floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it
contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. The arresting officers
thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Each of
the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which contained around one kilo of the white
crystalline substance. Upon examination, the substance was found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
ISSUE: Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
RULING: The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but
acquitted appellant Que. It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the
contraband at the time of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a
regulated drug without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section
15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug." To exonerate himself,
Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at the back of the van. We
are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum. In such case, the lack of
criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's
contention that he did not know that there were illegal drugs inside the van cannot constitute a
valid defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the
Supreme Court acquitted Que. Que had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the
shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it
hit Elmar Cawiling. No less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of
Que and recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's
guilt, the Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.

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MARIFOSQUE vs PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 156685
Facts: Petitioner Nazario Marifosque was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
direct bribery by the Sandiganbayan, defined and penalized under the 2nd paragraph of Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contended that said money was not for him but as
reward money for the police asset who demanded that he be given 350 pesos per cylinder
tank. Petitioner further averred that he was only collecting on behalf of the police asset and that
he already gave an advance of 1,000 pesos to said asset and only collecting the balance of 4,800.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Direct Bribery

Held: Yes. Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to
his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So
Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave
1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money,
was not corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers testified that petitioner
attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which
showed that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had he been engaged
in a legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and indignantly
protested the violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. His
solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident, even though he was no
longer on duty, betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a corrupt desire on his
part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in
obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer complaining about
the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received earlier.

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MANIPON vs SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-58889
Facts: Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City
and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor. Pursuant to
that assignment, Manipon sent a notice to the COMTRUST garnishing the bank accounts of
Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not
inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the
judgment under execution. Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the
garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn. However,
when the two met again, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they
will have something for the New Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon
would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged
to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to
NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon
by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to
put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with
fluorescent powder.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused committed direct bribery
Held: Yes. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received
directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or
promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not
constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. In this case, all
the elements are met.

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SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. No. L-65952
Facts: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal
of Quezon City. The case was assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an
Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from
Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of
Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required
amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof.
The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal
in the Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of Bribery
Held: Yes. The principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can
be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On
this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit. The evidence for the prosecution clearly
and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged
and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for
violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed
that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited,
P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a
criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not
constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner
was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that
the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery.

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FORMELLIZA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
159 SCRA 1
FACTS: Petitioner has been with the government service for around 20 years. She was the
personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in
Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her duties include the processing of the
appointment papers of employees. A certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was employed with NIA on a
project basis and she was terminated on December 31, 1983. Pursuant to the verbal instructions
of the regional director of the Administration, however, she continued working. According to
Mrs. Mutia, she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed appointment.
When she approached the regional director about it, she was advised to see the petitioner but the
latter refused to attend to her appointment unless given some money. On February 27, 1984,
Mrs.Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the province.
The PC officials arranged for an entrapment with marked money bills. On February 29, 1984,
the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia agreed to meet at the canteen at 9:00am. Mrs. Mutia then notified
the PC authorities about the arrangement. At the canteen, petitioner and Mrs. Mutia occupied a
table and were joinedby some officemates Mrs. Florida Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano, while the
PC officials occupied separate tables. Sergeant Abanes brought along a camera to document the
entrapment. Mrs. Mutia maintains that after taking the snacks she handed the marked money
bills under the table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the money with her left
hand. At that moment, the PC officials approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the
money. Sergeant Abanes took photographs of the sequence of events. The petitioner was arrested
and was brought to the PC crime where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. The
respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner accepted the supposed bribe money.
HELD: Petitioner Leonor Formilleza is acquiteed. An exception to the general rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition of this character calls for application in this case.
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code
is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift of material consideration.
There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and
consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for
safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstances or act to showsuch acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that
the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage
unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical
custody some gift, money or other property.

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POZAR VS CA
132 SCRA 729
FACTS: That on or about the 17th day of December, 1979, in the City of Angeles, the abovenamed accused, being then an applicant for probation after he was convicted of an offense
feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum of
P100.00 in a paper bill under circumstances that would make the said City Probation Officer,
liable for bribery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused violates Art. 212 of Revised Penal Code.
RULING: No. We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for
probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut and
since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and
procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that his
act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to
complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not
criminal. WHEREFORE, accused acquitted.

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CHUA vs NUESTRO
A.M. No. P-88-256
FACTS: Complainant filed an administrative charge against the respondent for allegedly
delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after demanding and getting from
her the sum of 1500 pesos. On September 12, 1988, when the court issued a writ of execution,
Chua and counsel asked respondent Deputy-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to immediately enforce
the writ of execution against the defendant, and for the purpose, they agreed to give 1000 pesos
to the respondent. Respondent received the amount of 1000 pesos on September 12, 1988;
however, the next day, they saw the respondent talking with counsel of defendant and that the
respondent was hesitantin proceeding to carry out the writ of execution. Respondent even asked
for a additionalamount of P500.00; consequently, in the afternoon of the same day, respondent
went to the premises in question and when he arrived there, but he was told by the judge not to
proceed because a supersede as bond was filed. Nevertheless, he found the premises locked, and
at the insistence of the complainant, they broke the padlock and entered portion B of the
premises. Later, counsel for defendant arrived and showed them the official receipt of payment
of the supersede as bond and so he discontinued the execution proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner and counsel can be charged of corruption of public official
RULING: Yes. While we cannot fault the sheriff for his hesitance to immediately carry out the
writ of execution because the defendant still had time to file supersede as bond to stay execution,
we find duly proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent Deputy Sheriff Edgardo
D. Nuestro received the amount of P1,500.00 from the complainant and her lawyer as a
consideration for the performance of his work. This amount is distinct from the sheriffs fee and
expenses of execution and was not intended for that purpose. It was indeed a bribe given and
received by respondent deputy sheriff from the complainant.

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CHANG VS PEOPLE
496 SCRA 321
FACTS: Petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of Makati and Pacifico San Mateo, the Chief of
Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurer's Office found out
that GDI has a tax deficiency of P494,000. The Office of the Treasurer then issued an
Assessment notice to GDI to pay the unpayed taxes. GDI asked for a validation of the
assessment and petitioners asked for a meeting with GDI representatives. On that meeting,
petitioners offered GDI that if they could pay P125,000, the tax would be settled. Thinking
that it was the right tax assessment, GDI prepared P125,000 in check. Petitioners made it clear
that it was not the tax due and gave two options: either to pay the petitioners P125,000 or pay the
Municipality P494,000. GDI then alerted the NBI and the petitioners were caught in an
entrapment operation.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners were guilty of corrupt practices by illiciting bribe to fix tax deficits
RULING: Yes. The fact that petitioners willingness to meet with GDI representatives despite the
receipt of the latter of deficiency assessments notices to settle tax deficiencies, refusal to accept
of the initial payment of P125,000 for the municipality, and the petitioners' handing over to GDI
representatives the Certificate of Examination on which was annotated "NO TAX LIABILITY
INVOLVED" establishes that the criminal intent originated from the minds of petitioners to
illicit bribes.

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BUSTILLOS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
486 SCRA 545
FACTS: The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner Anuncio Bustillo, then
incumbent mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, and his daughter Rowena Bustillo in the
Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Official Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code by making it appear that municipal funds were expended for the purchase of lumber from
Estigoy Lumber when in fact said lumber were actually purchased from Rowena Woodcraft, a
single proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustillo. In view of the criminal charges
against the petitioner, Sandiganbayan then suspended the petitioner from office for 90 days.
The petitioner argues that Sandiganbayan has no basis to suspend him because he contends that
the Information filed against him and his co-accused is invalid because it failed to allege the
element of gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification, or that the "integrity of the
[falsified] document was tarnished.
ISSUE: Whether the Information charged against the accused was valid to justify the
Sandiganbayans resolution of suspending the accused.
RULING: The information is valid. The allegation of intent to gain, the party benefited or
prejudiced by the falsification, or tarnishing of a documents integrity, is not essential to
maintain a charge for falsification of official documents. Such charge stands if the facts alleged
in the Information fall under any of the modes of committing falsification under Article 171.
Suspension from office is mandatory whenever a valid Information charges an incumbent public
officer with (1) violation of RA 3019; (2) violation of Title 7, Book II of the RPC; (3) any
offense involving fraud upon government; or (4) any offense involving fraud upon public funds
or property. While petitioner correctly contends that the charge filed against him and his coaccused does not fall under Title 7, Book II but under Title 4, Book II of the RPC, it nevertheless
involves "fraud upon government or public funds or property.

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TEVES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
447 SCRA 209
FACTS: That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal
Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in
the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating
with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having
a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is
actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.
ISSUE: Whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No.
3019
RULING: Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. Conspiracy must be established
separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond
reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime,
all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of
criminal design. Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a
spouse or any person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is
essential that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance
of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act must consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his coconspirators. We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or
knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the second mode of violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as acts in
furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would render her
equally liable as her husband. If ever she did those acts, it was because she herself was an owner
of the cockpit. Not being a public official, she was not prohibited from holding an interest in
cockpit. Prudence, however, dictates that she too should have divested herself of her ownership
over the cockpit upon the effectivity of the LGC of 1991; otherwise, as stated earlier,
considering her property relation with her husband, her ownership would result in vesting direct
prohibited interest upon her husband. In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty
of guilt. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the
crime and that the accused is either responsible for its commission or has conspired with the
malefactor.
PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
G.R. NO. 164368-69

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FACTS: An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent. A
separate Information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him. In the information, it
was alleged that on or about 04 February 2000, then President Estrada without having been duly
authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the
offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his
tenure and his true identity as the President of the Republic of the Philippines, represented
himself asJose Velarde in several transactions and used and employed the said alias which is
neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias
punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142
HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel that mere
communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. In
order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself
out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to
publicly use the alias must be manifest. The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada
signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his
intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not be said to
have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that
Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas
alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these
representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in
privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected
or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the
documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim
that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing.
Petition was denied.

BAHILIDAD VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 165195
FACTS: A complaint was filed by the Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned

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to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious
grants and donations using funds of the provincial government. A special audit was conducted in
the Sarangani province. Included in the list of the alleged fictitious associations that benefited
from the financial assistance given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Peoples
Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP),
which received a check in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner
Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bahilidad was correctly found guilty of conspiring with the said public
officials
RULING: NO. There were no overt acts attributed to her to adequate hold her equally guilty of
the offense. There was no showing that petitioner had a hand in the preparation of the
requirements submitted for the disbursement of the check. There was no evidence presented that
she was instrumental to the issuance of the check in favor of WIP, nor was there any showing
that she interceded for the approval of the check.

DAVALOS vs PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 145229
FACTS: On January 14, 1988, petitioner, as thesupply officer of the Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash advance of P18,000 for the
procurement of working tools for a certain NALGO project. Petitioner's receipt of the amount
is evidenced by his signature appearing in Disbursement Voucher No. 103-880-08. Two demand
letters were received by the petitioner from the Provincial Treasurer to submit aliquidation of the
P18,000 cash advance. The petitioner failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner be held guilty of malversation of public funds

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RULING: Yes. The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the said crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer; 2. That he has the custody or control of funds or property
by reason of the duties of his office; 3. That the funds or property are public funds or property
for which he is accountable; and 4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. The failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. There can be no dispute about the
presence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the position of a
supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque. In that capacity, he
receives money or property belonging to the provincial government for which he accountable.In
malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of funds
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of
the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's civil liability and be considered a
mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.

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CHAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G. R. No. 149613
FACTS: A routine audit examination of the accountability of the petitioner was conducted. The
audit was conducted during the leave of the petitioner. A second audit was conducted, where the
auditor found a shortage in petitioners cash accountability. A demand letter was issued to the
petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage. Petitioner was thus indicted
before the Regional Trial Court for Malversation of Public Funds.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds.
Held: The burden of proof that the subject audit reports contain errors sufficient to merit a reaudit lies with petitioner. What degree of error suffices, there is no hard and fast rule. While
COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987[13] (which, as reflected in the above-quoted
Deputy Ombudsmans Order of July 28, 1997,[14] was cited by COA Director
Alquizalas when he opposed petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation
before the Ombudsman) recognizes that a re-audit may be conducted in certain instances, it does
not specify or cite what those instances are.
The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitioners account the shortage in the
collections actually done by Bas.
Petitioner, nonetheless, could have shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of Bas, by
way of rebutting the disputable presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which
states:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall beprima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Petitioner, however, failed to do so.
Not only did she omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper authority upon her discovery
thereof; she even practically admitted to having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages.

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TABUENA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR Nos. 103501-03
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for
alleged malversation of a total of P55 million from the public funds of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) . The informations filed on three separate dates in 1986 accused
them, as accountable officers of intentionally withdrawing said amount for the ostensible
purpose of paying a non-existent obligation of MIAA to the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), but which they misappropriated and converted for their personal use and
benefit.
In their defense, petitioners claimed that they acted in good faith and in compliance with a
verbal (week before January 8, 1986) and later, a written order from no less than former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986, the latter
allegedly commanded petitioner Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of MIAA, "to pay
immediately the PNCC, thru this Office (Office of the President), the sum of FIFTY FIVE
MILLION (P55,000, 000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said
company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this
Office dated January7, 1985. . . ." (The Ongpin Memorandum). On the assumption that MIAA
indeed had a due and demandable debt to PNCC for work done on the airport, Tabuena, with the
help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo M. Peralta, MIAA Assistant General Manager and
Financial Services Department Acting Manager, respectively, made three withdrawals from the
account of MIAA with the Philippine National Bank first, on January 10, 1986 for P25 million,
then on January 16, 1986 for another P25 million, and lastly on January 31, 1986 for P5 million.
The three manager's checks covering the withdrawals were all applied for and issued in the name
of Tabuena. Curiously, while the checks were issued by MIAA extension office of PNB, they
were encashed at the Villamor Air Base branch. Each time the cash was delivered directly to the
office of Marcos' private secretary, Fe Roa-Gimenez. The latter issued a receipt signed by her
but only after the last delivery. No PNCC receipt was ever given to petitioners. (Weirdly, the
issued receipt was dated January 30, 1986.) Tabuena and Peralta described the procedure
themselves as "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure." Not only were
there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement, the P55 million was paid in cold cash.
Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of
PNCC, even affirmed in court that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the
months of January to June of 1986.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the
amended informations
RULING: YES. Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or
abandonment, some other person to take public funds...." Accused stress their charge is

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intentional malversation but it would appear that they were convicted of malversation by
negligence. In support of their theory that such variance is a reversible flaw, malversation cannot
be committed intentionally or by negligence at the same time. Sandiganbayan was without
jurisdiction to convict them of malversation of negligence where the amended informations
charged them with intentional malversation. Conviction of a crime different from that charged
violated their constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.

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TETANGCO vs OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 156427
FACTS: Petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on January 26,
2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman
and P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, on March 5, 2001,
Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the financial assistance from the City of
Manila when such disbursement was not justified as a lawfu lexpense. In his Counter-Affidavit,
Mayor Atienza denied the allegations. The mayor maintained that the expenses were legal and
justified, the same being supported by disbursement vouchers, and these had passed prior audit
and accounting.
ISSUE: Whether accused committed a violation of the anti-graft law
RULING: The Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was
neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite any law or
ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the financial
assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for. The
Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art.220 of the
Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 220. lllegal use of public funds or property. Any public
officer who shall apply any public fund or property under his administration to any public use
other than that for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall
suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half
to the total of thesum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damages or
embarrassment shallhave resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also
suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.If no damage or embarrassment to the
public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to 50 percent of the sum
misapplied. The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the
offender is an accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property
were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or
properties had been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance.
To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they
had been originally appropriated by law orordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in
this case.

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ABDULLA VS PEOPLE
GR No. 150129
FACTS: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use
of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more
commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this
Court on petition for review under Rule 45. On or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused: Norma Abdulla and Nenita P. Aguil, both public officers, being then
the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their
positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the
performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with Mahmud I. DAarkis, also a
public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages
of casuals, the amount of P40,000.00, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the
salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice
of public service .Appellants co-accused, NenitaAguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting
the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her.
ISSUES: Whether the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.
RULING: There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose payment of the
wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high
priority which laborers wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and
not on the weakness of the defense.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary
school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of
technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated
by law, is therefore absent. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

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PARUNGAO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 96025
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds allegedly committed by him
as a municipal treasurer. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him of malversation of
public funds but convicted him instead of illegal use of public funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of illegal use of public funds
RULING: The essential elements of the crime of malversation are: (a) the offender is a public
officer; (b) by reason of his duties he is accountable for public funds and property; and (c) he
appropriates, takes, or misappropriates, or permits other persons to take such public funds or
property, or otherwise is guilty of misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
The essential elements of this crime, more commonly known as technical malversation, are: (a)
the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he applies public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and (c) the public use for which the public funds or property
were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law
ordinance.
A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distinct and different
from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his
own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter's personal
use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration
not for his or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was
appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation of public funds charged in the information. Since the acts constituting the crime of
technical malversation were not alleged in the information, and since technical malversation
does not include, or is not included in the crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot
resultantly be convicted of technical malversation.
Considering however that all the evidence given during the trial in the malversation case is the
same evidence that will be presented and evaluated to determine his guilt or innocence in the
technical malversation case in the event that one is filed and in order to spare the petitioner from
the rigors and harshness compounded by another trial, not to mention the unnecessary burden on
our overloaded judicial system, the Court deems it best to pass upon the issue of whether or not
the petitioner indeed is guilty of illegal use of public funds.

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Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the utilization of this
fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road was merely an internal
arrangement between the Department of Public Works and Highways and the barangay captain
and was not particularly provided for by law or ordinance. There is no dispute that the money
was spent for a public purposepayment of the wages of laborers working on various projects
in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers' wages enjoy as claims
against the employers' funds and resources. In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating
the CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared
guilty of the crime of illegal use of public funds.

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PEOPLE VS AYUMAN
427 SCRA 248
FACTS: On April 22, 1997, Ermita Ayuman, the wife of the accused, rushed her five-year old
son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center. When a
nurse, took the child's vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on arrival. Ermita's statement was
noted in the emergency room record. An autopsy was done to the dead body of Sugar Ray. On
April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. The accused was nowhere to be found. Neither did he
report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997. Afterwards, she went to the precinct and gave a
testimony to SPO1 Catulong against her husband for killing their son.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide.
RULING: Yes. The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse;
The key element here is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the above elements
were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
And also, the circumstances cited by the trial court, when viewed in their entirety, were as
convincing as direct evidence and as such, negate the innocence of the accused. Otherwise
stated, the prosecution established beyond a shadow of doubt, through circumstantial evidence,
that accused committed the crime of parricide.

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PEOPLE VS PUEDAN
G.R. No. 139576
FACTS: Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his grandson, Reymark, went to the house of appellant
Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet. Luceno was fashioning out a mortar for pounding palay near his
house when Florencio and Reymark arrived. Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to buy a
piglet from him. Appellant suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five times using a sharp
pointed knife locally known as plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno fled towards
the house of his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his parents house and told his mother,
Erlinda, what transpired. Erlinda ran swiftly to Lucenos place but Florencio was already dead.
Leah, wife of appellant, admitted having an illicit relationship with Florencio. Their relationship
had been going on for two years and was known in their Barangay. In the morning of February
21, 1995, Florencio came to their house, while she was breastfeeding her child, and was looking
for her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is entitled to invoke the defense of death under exceptional
circumstances under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING: No. By invoking this defense, appellant bears the burden of proving the following: (1)
that a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years
of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2)
that he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical
injury in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse.
To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and the victim in
flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter. However, all that
appellant established was the victim's promiscuity, which was inconsequential to the killing.
What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically opposed to the
convincing accounts of the prosecution witnesses.

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PEOPLE VS. ABARCA


G.R. NO. L-74433
FACTS: Accused Francisco Abarca has a wife who had an illicit relationship with Khingsley
Paul Koh which started when he was reviewing for the 1983 Bar exam in Manila and his wife
was left in Tacloban. Upon reaching home, he found his wife Jenny and Khingsley Koh in the
act of sexual intercourse. When the wife noticed the accused, she pushed her paramour who got
his revolver. The accused who was peeping above the build-in cabinet ran away. He went to look
for a firearm and got a rifle. He went back to his house but was not able to find his wife and her
paramour so he went to the mahjong session where Khingsley hangouts. He found him playing
and then he fired at him 3 times with rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were
occupying the adjacent room of the mahjong room were hit as well. Koh died instantaneously
but the spouses were able to survive due to time medical assistance. Arnold was hit in the
kidney. He was not able to work for 1 and months because of his wounds and he was
receiving P1000 as salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the defense nder exceptional circumstance
under Art. 247 of RPC
RULING: Yes. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the
act of illicit copulation. The foregoing elements of Art. 247 of RPC are present in this case:
1) legally married surprises spouse in the act of sex with another person; and that he kills any or
both of them in the act or immediately after. Although an hour has passed between the sexual
act and the shooting of Koh, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused. Articvle 247 only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct
by-product of the accused's rage.
Regarding the physical injuries sustained by the Amparado spouses, the Supreme Court held that
the accused is only liable for the crime of less serious physical injuries thru simple negligence or
imprudence under 2nd paragraph of Article 365, and not frustrated murder. The accused did not
have the intent to kill the spouses. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all
the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. In this
case, the accused was not committing murder when he discharged rifle upon the deceased.
Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.

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PEOPLE VS CORICOR
79 PHIL 672
FACTS: Appellant was found by the lower court guilty of murder committed on September 15,
1941. The evidence for the prosecution was presented on October 20 and 21, 1941, and the
evidence for the defense on October 21 and 22, 1941. Six witnesses testified for the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant committed the crime of murder under Art 248 or
death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances under Art. 247 of the RPC
RULING: A careful weighing of the evidence both of the prosecution and the defense leads us to
the conclusion that appellant's version as to the circumstance under which Pedro Lego was killed
is the more credible. That appellant should have gone to the house of Severino Regis to invite
Pedro Lego and his wife to come to appellant's house so as to advise Isabel, because she had a
paramour, one Saturnino Caaya, as testified to by Catalina Regis, appears not to tally with the
fact that, according to the testimony of the accused, not contradicted by the same Catalina Regis,
he went twice to her to complain about the illicit relations between Pedro Lego and Isabel, to the
extent that appellant manifested to Catalina that if he should surprise Lego in flagrant copulation
with Isabel, he will kill them and would forget that Lego is his uncle.
The court applied in the case at bar Art 247, the death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. Conjugal fidelity committed by a married woman and her paramour
is punished, as adultery, by article 333 of the Revised Penal Code with from 4 months to 6 years
of imprisonment, and the one committed by a husband and his mistress, as concubinage, by
article 334, with imprisonment from 6 months and 4 years and 2 months for the erring husband
and banishment for the mistress. Under article 334, not all cases of conjugal infidelity committed
by a husband is punishable. The great majority of them are left unpunishable. No fiscal will
think of prosecuting the husband who should indulge in sexual intercourse with discreet
mistresses or with prostitutes. For such acts of conjugal infidelity, some punishable with short
terms of imprisonment, others with simple banishment, and still others not punishable at all,
article 247, in effect, confers to the offended spouse the power to inflict the supreme penalty of
death. The banishment provided for the killer is intended more for his protection than as a
penalty. Such a twisted logic seems possible only in a paranoiac mind. It is high time to relegate
article 247 to where it properly belongs, to the memory of the sins that humanity promised to
herself never to commit again. The majority of the Court, however, opines otherwise.
For all the foregoing, setting aside the appealed decision, appellant is found guilty of the offense
of having killed Pedro Lego as punished by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and,
accordingly, is sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of banishment, and to indemnify the

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heirs of Pedro Lego in the sum of P2,000.

PEOPLE VS MALLARI
404 SCRA 248
FACTS: While Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball game at the barangay basketball
court, Rufino and his brothers attempted to stab Joseph by using a bladed weapom. However,
Joseph was able to run away. Rufino then boarded and drove a truck parked near the basketball
court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his
immediate death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for the crime of
murder
RULING: Yes. The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph.
Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died
instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the
killing of Joseph. The case of People v. Muoz is not applicable in this case. In the said case, the
police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in
carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the
victim, which caused the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the
victim by running over him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills
another by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle
qualifies the killing to murder.

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PEOPLE VS WHISENHUNT
368 SCRA 586
FACTS: On September 24, 1993, the accused took advantage of superior strength and attacked
assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by stabbing
her with a bladed weapon in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death and thereafter outraged or
scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping off her head and different parts of her body.
ISSUE/S :1.) Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of strength is present.
2.) Whether or not scoffing of the victim's body is to be appreciated in court to qualify the crime
to murder.

RULING: 1.) No. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of
the crime. The fact that the victim was a woman does not establish that the accused committed
the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the relative strength
of the aggressor and the victim.
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this case,
nobody witnessed the actual killing.
2.) Yes. The mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse
of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only
beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the
dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the
ground.

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PEOPLE VS CONTINENTE
339 SCRA 1
FACTS: Donato Continente and several others were initially charged with the crimes of murder
and frustrated murder in two separate Information dated June 20, 1989 in connection with the
shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in
Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his
driver, Joaquin Vinuya.
ISSUE: Whether or not the element of treachery is present qualifying the crime to murder.
RULING: Yes. The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended
by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially
to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make. The evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately
adopted by the accused to ensure the commission of the crime without the least danger unto
themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his
companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which
was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in
Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said
car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe
during the said ambush is murder.

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PEOPLE VS ANTONIO
335 SCRA 646
FACTS: On November 2, 1996, a deadly confrontation ensued during a game of cards between
two friends, which resulted in the fatal shooting. The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former
professional basketball player, was shot dead. The killerAlberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time
chairman of the Games and Amusement Board, was convicted of murder by the trial court. It
was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially acquainted.
ISSUE: Whether or not treachery is present in this case
RULING: No, Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused
made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and
specially to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense
which the victim may take.
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute treachery where the aggressor did not
consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was arrived at
on the spur of the moment. There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard,
such as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to
face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforeseen. Even if it could be
said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no treachery. In People v. Chua, we
reiterated our consistent view that: While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden
impulse, it was preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that
indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard. Thus, treachery could
not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression
of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation
between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it
cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery.

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PEOPLE VS TEEHANKEE
249 SCRA 54
FACTS: Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home in Makati. Roland John
Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a
block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her
parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while
Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.While Leino and Maureen were walking, a
car driven by accused came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road.
Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me your)
I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D. Chapman saw the
incident and stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused on the reason why he was
bothering them. The accused pulled out a gun and fired at Chapman. As a result of the incident,
3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused. Initially, he was charged with murder for
the killing of Chapman, and two frustrated murder for the shooting and wounding of Leino and
Hultman. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and
during the course of the trial, the Information for frustrated murder was amended to murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is evident premeditation and treachery in the commission of the
crime.
RULING: No. It has been consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim
would not constitute treachery. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly
and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to
prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant
acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each
other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The
shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of
appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of
Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The
evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When
appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between
them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the
pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by
appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless
position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of
Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant used to prepare
for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery
was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of
Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.

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PEOPLE VS. MANERO


218 SCRA 85
FACTS: The Manero brothers, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren
Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were
conferring with three others of a plan to liquidate a number of suspected communist
sympathizers. Among their targets were Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene
alias Tabagac and Villaning. On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto
Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be
killed in his stead. Later on, the accused, proceeded to the house of Bantil. After a heated
confrontation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at Bantil who was able to parry and was hit
at the lower portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he was again fired upon by Edilberto. He
was able to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. Moments later, while
Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14
Armalite. Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km.125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of
Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to
the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and
burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his
motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and
executed a thumbs-down signal.Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As
Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted
Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto
jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of
gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of
defense of alibi which would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill.
RULING: No. The court held that it is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi
must not only be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.There is no physical impossibility where
the accused can be at the crime scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More
important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. In this case, there were
two eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused. Contrary to the claim of the Lines
brothers, there is a community of design to commit the crime. Based on the findings of the lower
court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr.
Fuvali. They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of the crimes and the
furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the
fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal
acts. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime

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and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every
act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where
there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. While it may be true that Fr.
Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group
targeted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he
was an Italian priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended victims, it will
be suffice to kill another priest as long as the person is also Italian priest.

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PEOPLE V. UNLAGADA
389 SCRA 224
FACTS: Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to
attend a public dance at Negros Occidental. After two hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short
break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside,
they decided to have a drink and bought beer. Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle,
left to look for a place to relieve himself. A dark bearded man then walked past him, approached
Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering of 7,
ganged up on Danilo and hit him with different weapons. Danilo fell to the ground and died
before he could be given medical attention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder instead of
tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code
RULING: A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who
engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between
a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of
the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a
tumultuous affray within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee
or free- for- all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one
another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of
them. Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully
unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin
Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to
accused- appellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by
surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.

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PEOPLE VS MARAMARA
317 SCRA 222
FACTS: Accused- appellant was held in the yard of accused- appellants house in Brgy. Calpi,
Claveria Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo
Donato was dancing with certain Rowena Del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of the accused,
approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away while
Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about two meters
away from where Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused- appellant took his handgun and fired at the, hitting the latter at the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen
brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out.
The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of Miguelito bore lacerated
wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more than two persons.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray
RULING: No. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray
purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing 4 stab wounds in
different parts of his body- two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm.
Then accused- appellant with his hand- gun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato
positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelitos killer.
While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may lend
verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him these
wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the
defenses version stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to
the circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death.

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SISON VS. PEOPLE


250 SCRA 58
FACTS: On July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos
loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a rally but it was denied. Despite this setback, three
thousand gathered at the Rizal Monument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. Colonel
Dula Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse. The police pushed the crowds and used tear gas
to disperse them.
At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. Annie Ferrer was
there and they informed her of the dispersal and Ferrer angrily ordered them gulpihin ninyo ang
mga Cory hecklers! A few minutes later, she was arrested by the police. Somebody then
shouted kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon! a commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, cigarette
vendor, saw the loyalists attacking the persons in yellow. The man in yellow t- shirt was Salcedo
and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked
and mauled him. He was hit on various parts of his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so
he could extricate Salcedo from them but the maulers pursued Salcedo. Sumilang was able to
tow Salcedo but Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the
head. De Los Santas, Tan boxed Salcedo while Pacadar. Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw,
Sision repeatedly boxed him.
Salcedo managed to get away but accused pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. The
mauling resumed at the Rizal monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collapsed and lost consciousness. Salceda was taken to PGH where he died upon arrival.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is murder
and not death caused in a tumultuous affray
RULING: For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that: (1)
there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled
and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the
course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that
the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be
identified. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and
they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be
called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have
occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually
after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that

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one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion
and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the
incident.

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DADO V. PEOPLE
392 SCRA 46
FACTS: In order to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat, the
Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams, which composed of petitioner and
CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga. The team saw somebody
approaching and when he was about 5 meters away from the team, Balinas told Eraso to wait,
but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the
approaching man. Thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot. The victim turned out to be the
nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Silvestre
Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner
guilty of homicide.
RULING: It appears that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner had intent to kill the
victim. The prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent
to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to
life. Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the
other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. Absent an intent to kill in
firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime
are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the
offender has no intention to kill that person. However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm.

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PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA
389 SCRA 224
FACTS: Salufrania boxed and strangled Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania, his wife which caused her
injuries resulting in her death and the death of the child who was still in its maternal womb.
Filomeno was charged with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion. Filomeno
alleges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion, as there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an
abortion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion is proper
RULINGH: No. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows: 1. That there is a
pregnant woman; 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion; 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted; 4. That as a result of the violence the fetus
dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. It has been clearly established
(a) that Marciana Abuyo was 7 to 8 months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was
voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence,
Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion was caused by the same
violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily
exerted by Filomeno upon her. However, the intent to cause the abortion has not been
sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate
strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In
fact, Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause an
abortion.

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PEOPLE V. GENOVES
61 PHIL. 382
FACTS: Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow she claims
she owned. Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his fist causing her to fall to the
ground several times. During which time, Soledad was heavy with child. Soledad ,by such fall,
suffered pains in the abdomen. According to testimony, the deceased was in good health the day
before. From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it culminated in the painful
and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way carrying, but the other
baby could not be delivered. Soledad and both babies died. Genoves was then charged and
convicted by CFI Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide with abortion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the complex crime of homicide with abortion is proper
RULING: No, the abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and
the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to Soledads death. Genoves
must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act.

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AGUIRRE VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE


G.R. NO. 170723
FACTS: Petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of Articles
172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.7610, against respondents alleging the apparent
instructions of respondents actually scouted, prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the
medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation via
bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement mutilated or abused his common law
brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother went through a
vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the
complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common law sister of Larry
who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy
does not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an
organ in the context of law and medicine.The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts
alleged did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his
reproductive organ. Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State
Prosecutor dismissed the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss
outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation
RULING: No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
Art. 262 The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction. Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods. A straightforward scrutiny of the above
provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the
facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., the
vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still
very much part of his physical self.

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LI V. PEOPLE AND CA
427 SCRA 217
FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide for the
death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watching television at
home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Janes
boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li
and a certain Eduardo Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house
of the Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted something to Li and Sangalang. Then petitioner
Li shouted back. An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by petitioner
carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran
back to his house. The witnesses Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag
him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once.
Immediately thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once. Petitioner
denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a baseball bat Christopher Arugay
hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near the shoulder. The deceased
who is armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the head, causing him to lose his hold on
the baseball bat and fell semi-unconscious or unconscious. In such a condition, it is highly
improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical injury
instead of homicide
RULING: Yes. It ruled that the only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims
right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims
supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the
effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of
the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.
What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any
methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an
appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and
impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of
the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence
reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently remains
at large.

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PEOPLE V. OGA
431 SCRA 354
FACTS: Ignacio and his wife were awakened by the loud banging of corrugated GI sheet coming
from the barracks of his co-construction worker which was about 3 meters away. Ignacio and
his wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they were surprised and disarrayed to see his coworker, herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter, Irene, who was also naked. Irene
testified that the appellant summoned her to his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for
her she approached him. However, appellant suddenly pulled her and laid her on a wooden bed.
The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as his clothes. He inserted his penis into
her vagina. It was only at around 2:00 a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron
sheet that enclosed the appellants barracks. Appellant did not deny that he had several
intercourse with Irene but interposed sweetheart story.
ISSUE: Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case
RULING:No. Even if she was pulled down to the bed, she was not threatened with bodily or
physical harm by a knife, bolo or any object or instrument that the appellant could have
employed so as to create a real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily
harm. Irenes overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the reasonable
standard of human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is unnatural for an intended
rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a feeble attempt to free herself despite a
myriad of opportunities to do so. This constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the appellant.

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PEOPLE VS AGSAOAY
430 SCRA 450
FACTS:The accused, armed with a bolo by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with JOSEPHINE AGSAOAY, his
daughter, a 17-year old minor against her will and without her consent. Furthermore, the victim
was again raped by the accused 2 days after using a bolo to scare and threaten the said victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority.
RULING: Yes.The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against
her will or without her consent. Consequently, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution
must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he accomplished
such act through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented.
The sole important issue in a rape case is the credibility of the victims testimony, in view of its
nature in which only two persons are normally involved. Hence, in adjudicating such issue,
jurisprudence has established the following guidelines: (1) the victims testimony must be
scrutinized with extreme caution since an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but
difficult for the accused to disprove it; and (2) when her testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
In the case at bar, we find Josephines account of her ordeal in the hands of appellant forthright
and credible.

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PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
369 SCRA 179
FACTS: The accused is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
RULING: No. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws. this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of
the people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Election is the expression of the
sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest
or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of
the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of
its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of
a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.

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PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN
329 SCRA 270
FACTS: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the
ground floor of their house to prepare drinks for her children. There she saw Primo Campuhan,
helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Then she heard
Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were
already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis
with his right hand. Horrified, she cursed and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and
pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran
out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were
living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the
barangay officials who detained. Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel s
hymen was intact.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed a consummated statutory rape
RULING: No. The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primos penis was able to
penetrate Chrystels vagina. Failure to prove such penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be
considered consummated rape, however, only attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Also,
there were no physical signs of injuries on the witness body to conclude a medical perspective
that a penetration has taken place. In rape cases, it is important that a valid testimony and
medical certificate complements each other, for relying alone on testimonial evidence may
create unwarranted or mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully establish a proof that the
penis, in reality, entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that the
rape was consummated.

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PEOPLE VS ECHAGARAY
257 SCRA 581
FACTS:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority.
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly
consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing
testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim
herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal
prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the
case.

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PEOPLE VS TAN
G.R.NO. 177566
FACTS: Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom.The accused
conspired together, by force and intimidation, used high powered firearms to deprive Ruiz SaezCo y Lim of his liberty for purposes of extorting moneys and made it as a condition for his
release of the victim. Based on the victims account, the ordeal he had gone through can be
divided into three distinct segments, namely: (1) the forcible taking, (2) the asportation, and (3)
the protracted detention. The first segment was the Mamatid (in Cabuyao, Laguna) episode
where he was held by armed men at gunpoint and forcibly boarded in a car. The second segment
covered the entire forced journey of the victim from Mamatid to the detention house in Taytay,
Rizal. And the third segment was the Taytay episode. It covered the full length of the victims
involuntary confinement spanning eight (8) days until his stirring rescue. There is no doubt that
the victim was deprived of his liberty throughout all the episodes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal liability of the appellants in each and every episode
established beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty for kidnapping or illegal detention.
RULING: There were no eyewitnesses who testified on the abduction. While the victim testified
on the three episodes, he failed to see and identify any of his captors until he was rescued as he
was blindfolded most of the time during his captivity. He did not see the face of the persons who
abducted him in Mamatid and those who formed the entourage which brought him to Taytay. To
conclude that those who were captured during the rescue operation were also participants in the
forcible taking and asportation is to lower the level of evidence required for conviction.
The third episode, however, is different. The criminal participation of the appellants therein was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG correctly recommended that they should be held
liable therefor. The unexplained presence of appellants in the house where the victim was held
captive leads to no other conclusion than that they participated in his illegal detention. Not a
single appellant could convincingly explain his presence at the crime scene.

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PEOPLE V. RODRIGO
G.R. NO. 173022
FACTS: Oliver Caparas, then 13 years of age, was waiting for a ride to school when four men
forcibly seized and boarded him into a car wherein he was blindfolded and taken to Baguio. The
next day, Eleazar Caparas received a call from the kidnappers asking for Php 10 Million ransom
in exchange for the release of his son, Oliver. In the meantime, the kidnappers went to Bonitas
Resort in Pangasinan. After three days of negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom
money to Php 1.7 Million. Through Olivers uncle, the kidnapper were able to receive the
money. Then, they brought Oliver to a Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway, gave him
money and told him his uncle inside a canteen in the gas station would fetch him. After the
kidnapping incident, an investigation was conducted by the Intelligence Section of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan, through SPO2 Epafrodito Aliling and
SPO2 Antonio Chungtuyco. It appears that one of the suspects was a member of an NPA rebel
returnee group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr. Upon the killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend,
dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of the group, was invited for questioning. On that
occasion, she admitted her participation in the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and implicated
appellants.
ISSUE: Whether or not elements constituting the crime of kidnapping are present to convict
appellants of the said crime.
RULING: Yes. Under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Kidnapping is
committed with the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender is a
private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; and (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) that in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) that the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five days; or (b) that it is committed simulating
public authority; or (c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female or public officer. It is evident from the testimonies of the witnesses that the
essential elements of kidnapping were present. First, appellants are private individuals. Second,
Oliver was abducted by four armed men. Third, he was detained in a house in Pangasinan
against his will. Fourth, the detention lasted for seven days. Fifth, Oliver Caparas was a minor at
the time of the kidnapping incident.

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MADSALI, ET AL. V. PEOPLE


G.R. NO. 179570
FACTS: After a confrontation between the victim and her aunt Inon Dama while fetching water,
the appellant (Maron) and his father (Sajiron) appeared suddenly in the victims house with a
gun and told the victim to come with them. When she refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands
behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There,
Sajiron had carnal knowledge with the victim against her will while Maron stood guard and
watched them. They left the forest and brought the victim to the house of Egap, where she was
detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard the victim and to shoot her if she would
attempt to escape. A day after, the victims mother came to get her; unfortunately Egap refused
and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of
losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities. Egap
asked the victim if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. She was then forced to sign an
unknown document, which she was not able to read. Nine days after she and Sajioron were
married by Imam Musli Muhammad. After the marriage, she and Sajiron lived in the house of
Egap. While detained, she did not try to escape because her house was very far from the place
where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would
attempt to escape. Months after the marriage, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
RULING:Yes. Further perusal of the allegations in the information appears that the crime
charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of serious
illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him
or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In this
case, although the victim was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a
piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.

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PEOPLE VS SILONGAN
G.R. No. 137182
FACTS: Appellants, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Alexander Saldana, America Rejuso, Jr.,
Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco for the purpose of demanding ransom in the amount of Php 12
Million, detaining and depriving Alexander Saldana of his personal liberty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
RULING: Yes. The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined
and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victims
liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the
same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be
present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element
is no longer necessary. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from Alexander, as to warrant
the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of
ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding
ransom.

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PEOPLE V. SURIAGA
381 SCRA 159
FACTS:An information was filed with the RTC charging Ruben Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz and
Joel Isidera with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention committed as follows: That
on January 22, 1995, accused Ruben Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz, conspiring together, kidnapped
and took away Nicole Ramos, a two-year old female child, without the consent of her parents,
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the latter, and thereafter, detained her and deprived her
of her freedom and liberty up to and until 4:30 in the afternoon of the following day. Joel Isidera,
having learned of the kidnapping and without having participated therein as principal or
accomplice, took part by assisting the principal accused to profit by the effects of the crime by
accompanying and driving for accused Ruben Suriaga to the place where the pay-offs was made
and receiving the ransom money in the amount of Php 100,00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ruben Suriaga is guilty of kidnapping for ransom.
RULING: Yes. The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the person
detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show
that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and that it was the intention
of the accused to deprive the mother of the childs custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of
kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the
following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without
personally seeking permission from her father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a
shanty where Rositas sister lived, without informing her parents of their whereabouts; 2) he
detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight
and the following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of Php 100,000 through telephone calls
and gave instructions where and how it should be delivered.

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PEOPLE V. LLAGUNO
285 SCRA 124
FACTS: Appellant Judy Reyes, together with two others, was charged in an Information with the
following: that said accused, armed with firearm, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intend, did then and there kidnap and detain
one Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly shot said Bienvenido
Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
physical injuries as a consequence of which he died a few days later. Although appellant, was
charged with kidnapping with murder, the trial court convicted him only of murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court did not, however, find
him liable for serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code because the
victim was detained only for one day.
ISSUE: Whether or the trial court is erred in not finding accused liable for illegal detention.
HELD: Yes. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by
the trial court, clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority
to do so. Banzon testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellants
room. Banzons testimony significantly jibes with the physical evidence showing that the victim
sustained multiple abrasions in both arms. Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that several
employees called her up in the morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home
because there was a man hanging at the back in one of the buildings of GF International. Dr.
Cenizas testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
victim was deprived of his liberty by appellant. It must be emphasized that appellant was
charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, not of two independent
charges of kidnapping and murder. In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of
the offender. Hence, in deciding this appeal, the Court is not confined to the conviction for
murder; rather, the scope of its review encompasses the offense charged in the information,
which the prosecution sought to prove. It is a well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the
whole case wide open for review and empowers (even obligates) the appellate court to correct
such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been assigned.
When an accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the whole case. Since the information
charged the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts constituting slight illegal
detention were necessarily included in the information, and may thus be validly taken into
account in the resolution of the present appeal. Manifestly, appellant was fairly apprised of the

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nature of the crime of slight illegal detention and granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. At
this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court merely made a finding that
appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal detention for the sole reason that the victims
detention did not exceed five days. The court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally
detained the victim for at least one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal
detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a
qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no proof
beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove
culpability for slight illegal detention

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PEOPLE V. DADLES
278 SCRA 708
FACTS: Appellant Narito alias Naring Dadles was charged in two separate informations, to wit:
That on or about 24th of May 1989, in the Municipality of Binalbagan, Province of Negros
Occidential, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first abovenamed accused, in company of his five other co-accused, whose true names are still unknown
and herein designated only as Ka Morito, Ka Willy, Ka Dindo, Ka Mike and Ka Juanito, who are
still at large, aremed with assorted firearms of unknown calibers, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain, and keep Alipio Tehidor and Dioniso
Tehidor and bring them somewhere in the hinterlands of said municipality, under restraint and
against their will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victims of their civil
liberties since then up to the present. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant
of two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting appellant with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.
RULING: Yes. Based from the evidence presented during the trial, the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping the victims. However, since none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention)
was proved and only the fact of kidnapping was established, we find that the crime committed is
slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

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PEOPLE V. ROLUNA
231 SCRA 448
FACTS: Eight person, including accused Roluna were charged with kidnapping with murder.
Witnesses claimed that they saw victim Anatalio Moronia stopped by accused and several others.
The victim was alleged to have been threatened with firearms and hand bound behind his back.
The accused claimed that he was taking care of an ill relative at the time of the kidnapping. The
RTC found Roluna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping with
murder. The accused raised that the body of the victim has not surfaced and that the unexplained
disappearance cannot be blamed on him as there is all possibility that the victim may still be
alive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the victim is sufficiently proved and the accused be held
liable for it.
RULING: The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person who has
been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years. However, the Supreme Court decided that there were insufficient circumstances to hold
the accused responsible for the death of the victim. The testimony of the witnesses stating that
the victims hands were bound by a companion of the accused is not enough to prove that the
accused killed him. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping
with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the
prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the
events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accusedappellant for the death of Moronia. The SC thus decided that Since none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention)
was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that
the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

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PEOPLE VS PASTRANA
387 SCRA 342
FACTS: Erma Postejo, a domestic helper in Canada, is the mother of Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola
and 9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr. her son by a common-law relationship. She was introduced to
accused-appellant Rubi-Rose who offered to work on the processing of Willys travel documents
to Canada. Rubi-Rose asked for P 18,300.00 as processing fee. Later on, accused-appellant
informed Erma that Willy was suffering from bronchitis. Erma sent P 5,610.00, P 3,000.00 to be
given to Doroteo and the remaining balance should pay for Willys medical treatment. Then on
March 16, 1997, accused-appellant fetched Willy and Aresola from their home in Caloocan and
brought them in Tondo. Aresola went home and Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant
was asking Erma for sums of money which Erma refused to transmit. March 27, 1997, accusedappellant informed Doroteo that Willy was missing and that he was last seen playing inside her
apartment. Erma returned to the Philippines to look for her son. Erma found out that Willy was
never treated for any illness. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges against her but
the trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of kidnapping
and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING: No. The Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270
of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with
the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to
his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but
rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere
negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and
maliciously wrong. The issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As consistently ruled by
the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight
and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses
through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. In the instant case, there is no
reason for us to disregard the trial courts finding that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.

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PEOPLE VS TY
263 SCRA 746

FACTS: Accused Ty owns, administers and manages St. John's Clinic in Caloocan. In 1987, a
sick baby Arabella Somblong was confined by her mother Johanna but since she had no money
and no one to leave the child at home, they agreed to keep the baby in the extension building as
a boarder for 50 pesos a day. The baby was visited only once in 5 years by the mother and the
father. The baby was put up for guardianship to a relative of the Ty's. After five years, Johanna
came back to claim the child. The guardians meantime had the child baptized and named
Cristine Neri and would not return the child to the mother. It so happened that there were many
babies left behind that time and the attending Pediatrician had in that five years relocated abroad.
A complaint was filed for kidnapping and failure to return a minor to her parents. The Ty's were
convicted by the RTC and subsequently appealed.
ISSUE: Was an abandoned child by mother still be claimed as being kidnapped as in Art 270
RPC?
RULING: The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the
child (among the many they took care of and put up for guardianship)clearly negate the alleged
deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. It is noteworthy that
they were motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and high regard for
her welfare and well-being. The child turned out to be not the same child as claimed by Johanna
to be hers.

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PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
175 SCRA 743
FACTS: Accused was convicted of the crime of kidnapping and failure to Return a minor as
defined in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, for wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
illegally kidnap and carry away EDWARD POLICARPIO, a one year and three months old baby
boy, for the purpose of selling him and separating him from his mother, Mrs. EUGENIA T.
POLICARPIO, carrying him away without the knowledge and consent of his said parents, and
deliberately failing to return him to his mother. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court
erred in convicting her of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and
penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, as it was not proven that the custody of
the minor victim Edward Policarpio had been entrusted to her and that she deliberately failed to
return or restore said minor to his parents or guardians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor under article 270 of the RPC
RULING: Yes. It has been established by the clear, strong and positive evidence of the
prosecution that the taking of the minor child Edward was without the knowledge and consent of
his parents. Said criminal act was perpetrated while Mrs. Policarpio had her back turned to the
child and accused-appellant and while Mr. Policarpio was temporarily away from the group. An
essential element that the offender must be entrusted with the custody of a minor person is
lacking in the case and the accused-appellant Angelina Mendoza is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code.

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PEOPLE VS SANTOS
387 SCRA 157
FACTS: It is not unknown that a debtor occasionally would suffer from the malady of selective
amnesia. The case is a tale of one unfortunate creditor who might have sought to rouse her
absent-minded debtor from the haze of forgetfulness.
On 10 December 1996, at six o'clock in the morning, Leonida de la Pea was at home in
Barangay Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan, with her eight-year old niece, Christine Lovely
Mae Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived. Five decently dressed men stepped down from
the vehicle and entered the house. The first, who was attired in a business suit, introduced
himself as Rocky Alberto and his companions as agents of the Criminal Investigation Service
("CIS").[1] Alberto asked Leonida about her unpaid obligation to Josephine Santos. Leonida
answered that she had already paid the debt before the barangay captain of Umingan. Moments
later, another vehicle, a brown colored car, stopped in front of the house. Henry Salimbay (the
barangay captain of Umingan), Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and two unidentified males
and one unidentified female, alighted. Leonida rushed to confront Salimbay, telling him that
Josephine had sent the CIS agents to demand payment of her debt and that it was Josephine who
should instead be accosted. Sensing an escalating tension between the two women, the barangay
captain decided to leave, telling the parties that it was best for both of them to just amicably
settle their differences.
ISSUE: Is the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of grave coercion?
RULING: The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave coercion.
Grave coercion carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P6, 000.00.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium term. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum that can be imposed is
anywhere from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
and from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum.

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PEOPLE VS ASTORGA
283 SCRA 420
FACTS: Appellant appealed the courts decision on Criminal Case No. 8243 wherein appellant
was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code or the kidnap
and detention of a minor. Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the
prosecutions witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the
accusation weakened the case. Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the 8-year-old
Yvonne Traya which shouldve been apparent and proven upon conviction. He claimed that the
court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked Yvonne up
which is an important element in kidnapping.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.
RULING: The court agreed with the appellants contention. The evidence does not show that
appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellants forcible
dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or
restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no lock up. Accordingly, appellant cannot be
convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony
committed was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.

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VALEROS VS PEOPLE
483 SCRA 10

FACTS: Renato Chito Baleros forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with
a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to
have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed
against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape
RULING: Yes. Art. 335 of the RPC, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or
intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1

By using force or intimidation

When woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious

When woman is under 12 years of age or demented

Art. 6 of the RPC defines attempted rape when offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The attempt which RPC punishes is the act that has logical connection to the crime that should it
have been successful, the attempt would lead to the consummation of rape. However, there was
no carnal knowledge in the case. The pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou
did not necessarily constitute an overt act of rape. Moreover, the petitioner did not commence
any act that was indicative of an intent to rape Malou. The petitioner was fully clothed; there
was no attempt to neither undress her nor touch her private part.
In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential requisite. Therefore for an attempted rape,
accused must have commenced the act of penetrating but for some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration was not completed. Thus petitioners act of
lying on top of her, embracing and kissing her or touching her private part do not constitute rape
or attempted rape.

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ONG CHIUN KWAN VS CA


345 SCRA 688
FACTS: Crazy Feet is a business establishment owned by Mildred Ong. On April 24, 1990,
Wilfredo Infante was ordered by Ong Chiu Kwan to relocate Crazy Feet's telephone, electric and
water lines without a permit from appropriate authorities. Mildred Ong filed a case against Ong
Chiu Kwan for unjust vexation and the Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust
vexation under Article 287, second paragraph. The Court declared Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of
unjust vexation hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.
RULING: Yes. Having admitted that he ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines
without the permit to relocate such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred Ong. To
add, the electric, water and telephone interruption happened during the operation of the business.

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PEOPLE VS REYES
399 SCRA 628

FACTS: PO1 Eduardo C. Molato of Station 4, Western Police District, Sampaloc, Manila was on
his way home on board a passenger jeepney. When he alighted at the corner of Lapu-lapu Street
and Northbay Boulevard South he saw the victim being held up by two persons. The one in front
of the victim forcibly took his wristwatch while the other one stabbed him at the back. He fired
one warning shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu Avenue. He chased
them but when he saw the victim, he hailed a tricycle and asked the driver to bring the victim to
the nearest hospital. He continued chasing the suspects up to Phase II until he reached Agora, but
the suspects were gone. The incident happened swiftly but PO1 Molato had a good look at the
face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was about 8 to 10 meters away from them.

The accused-appellant was the only one arrested. Regional Trial Court of Malabon found Danilo
Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime Robbery with homicide. The accusedappellant filed an appeal saying that the court erred in convicting the him notwithstanding the
fact that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt and that the court erred in
giving full faith and credence to the testimony and identification made by PO1 Molato.

ISSUE: Whether or not regional trial court erred in convicting Danilo Reyes for the crime of
Robbery with homicide.

RULING: No. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force
upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus
lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide
in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The positive identification of the accused, when
categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
such defenses are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law

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PEOPLE VS SUELA
373 SCRA 183

FACTS: Private complainant was at the masters bedroom located at the second floor of his
townhouse in Quezon City. He was watching television thereat, together with his adopted son,
Norman Rosas, and his former co-teacher and good friend, Geronimo Gerry Gabilo, who at that
time was engaged in the real estate business. Suddenly, three persons sporting ski masks,
bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a knife, barged into the room. Court finds the
accused Nerio Suela y Hembra and

Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Appellants appealed in Court
of appeals saying that RTC erred in convicting them of the said crime.

ISSUE: Whether appellants can be convicted of robbery with homicide

RULING: There was no showing that appellant Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so
as to leave him no choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear was that the giving of the
money was done not out of fear but because it was a choice private complainant opted because
he wanted to get the information being offered to him for the consideration of P200,000.00 . In
fact, the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of possibly having a lead in
solving the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As such, the elements of
simple robbery have not been established in the instant case, hence, appellant
Edgar Suela should be acquitted of that charge

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PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ
432 SCRA 104

FACTS: Cesar Yuzon, a forty-four-year-old sweepstakes ticket vendor, saw his cousin-in-law,
the appellant, and Catapang dragging his seventy-two-year-old auntie, Natividad Yuzon
Mendoza, in the direction of a forested area where there were also mango and coconut
trees.Cesar shouted, "Hoy, bakit ninyo kinakaladkad ang aking tiya?" Catapang and the appellant
approached and told him not to interfere. Cesar followed them and concealed himself behind a
mango tree about ten arms length away, and saw them forcibly taking money, a pair of earrings
and a necklace from the bag of his aunt, who was lying prostrate on the ground. That afternoon,
Natividads son, Nemensio Mendoza, had already started looking for his mother. Cesar joined
the search at 5:00 p.m. together with the barangay captain and some of the barangay folks. The
cadaver of Natividad was found at about 11:00 p.m.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in holding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the robbery with homicide despite the uncorroborated, inconsistent and
contradictory testimony of the alleged eyewitness Cesar Yuzon

RULING: Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal
case are sufficient explanations for a witness delay in reporting the crime to the
authorities. Such failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the
truth per se of the complaint. Likewise, the natural hesitance of the witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal case, and their unwillingness to be involved or dragged
into a criminal investigation is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect their
credibility

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PEOPLE VS REYES
427 SCRA 48

FACTS: Barangay Captain William Magpantay received a radio report from barangay kagawad
that someone managed to gain entry into the house of Dr. Aurora Lagrada, and that she had
shouted for help. Magpantay, a barangay councilman and a barangay tanod responded and
proceeded to the house of the doctor. The policemen passed by the garage and opened the
door. They saw the bloodied Lagrada, naked from the waist up, sprawled sidewise on the floor
opposite the sink near the kitchen

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide.


RULING: To sustain a conviction of the accused for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution was burdened to prove the essential elements of the crime, viz: (a) the taking
of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the
property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandiand (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime
of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. The accused must
be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the homicide being
committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. The homicide may precede
robbery or may occur thereafter. What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intrinsic
connection between the robbery and the killing. The latter may be done prior to or
subsequent to the former. However, the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking
of the victims life. Furthermore, the constituted crimes of robbery and homicide must be
consummated.

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PEOPLE VS DANIELA
401 SCRA 619

FACTS: Manuel, armed with a .38 caliber gun and holding fluorescent lamp, entered the
bedroom or Ronito and Maria Fe. They ransacked the room and divested Maria Fe of her
necklace, rings and earrings. Manuel Daniela ordered Jose Baylosis to kill Ronito while Daniela
was raping the house maid. Apellants Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis were convicted of
robbery with homicide, sentencing them to death and directing them to pay to the heirs of the
victims. Manuel and Jose assail the decision of trial court and insist that the court erred in
convicting them for it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant are guilty beyond reasonable doub

RULING: Yes, OSG contends that the prosecutor mustered the required quantum evidence to
prove the constitutive elements of robbery with homicide. The evidence on the record shows that
the object of the appellants was to rob the victim of their money and personal properties and kill
Ronito on the occasion of robbery. A conviction for robbery with homicide required certitude
that robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. However, the law does not require that the sole motive of the
malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. In People vs.
Tidula, The court ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another, it does not
preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. A conviction
for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is committed before, during, or after
the commission of the robbery.

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PEOPLE VS NAPALIT
396 SCRA 887

FACTS: Ricardo Napalit, conspiring with others, whose true names, real identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, all armed with unknown caliber firearms, with intent of (sic) gain and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there barging inside Tondo General
Hospital located at Honorio Lopez Blvd., Tondo, announcing a hold-up, ordering the
people/employees thereat to lie down on the floor, grabbing the cashier and ordering him to open
the vault and filing cabinets and once opened, take, rob and carry away the following, to
wit:cash money consisting of unions collection, professional fees, patients fees, cash advances
and salaries of employees amounting to, more or less --- P1,300,000.00
Accused-appellant was found guilty of robbery in band with homicide defined and
penalized under Article 294 (as amended by R. A. 7659). In his brief, accused-appellant ascribes
the following errors to the trial court: The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and even granting that accused-appellant was a
co-conspirator in the plan to commit robbery, the trial court, nonetheless, erred in attributing to
him and holding him liable for the crime of homicide which happened on the occasion of the
robbery.

ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in deciding the case

RULING: No, when the issue of credibility is involved, appellate courts generally do not
disturb the findings of the trial court since the latter is in a better position to pass on it, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it
is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if considered, could
affect the outcome of the case

In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of witnesses Santos and Saclolo to
be worthy of credence. From the transcripts of the stenographic notes of their testimonies, this
Court finds that, indeed, they merit credence. They are straightforward and consistent

Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not indispensable in conspiracy.

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It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.[32]
From the time accused-appellant and his companions entered the hospital and announced a
holdup up to the time they fled, in the course of which security guard Gomez was shot, there can
be no other conclusion than that they hatched a criminal scheme, synchronized their acts for
unity in its execution, and aided each other for its consummation.

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PEOPLE VS CAMPOS
361 SCRA 399

FACTS: Felicidad and Mercelina prepared to sleep. Their bedroom and the kitchen were located
inside the mini mart. Felicidad turned off all lights in the store except the kitchen
light. Mercelina laid on the bed with her two-year old son, Christopher, while Felicidad laid on
the floor beside them. At around midnight, Felicidad roused from her sleep and stood
up. Suddenly, someone stabbed her on her left arm. She started to shout as her assailant
continued to stab her. She was hit on her abdomen, left arm, and left side. She fell to the floor in
a sitting position and she looked at the person who stabbed her. She recognized accused
Alejandro Campos, who worked at the neighboring gravel and sand area and frequented their
store to buy gas. She also noticed accused Renato dela Cruz standing near the door of the
room. She knew accused dela Cruz because they used to work together in the Cefel's General
Merchandise Store, a hardware store adjacent to the mini-mart. Suddenly, accused Campos
moved towards Mercelina and started stabbing her. Mercelina, still lying on the bed, woke up
and shouted for help. Accused Campos kept stabbing her. Thereafter, the two accused left
hurriedly, exiting through the storeroom of the minimart.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of Robbery with Homicide

RULING: In order to be convicted of robbery with homicide, four (4) elements are necessary:
(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against the person;
(b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandi; and, (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof the crime of
homicide was committed. Court finds insufficient evidence to show that accused-appellant dela
Cruz was guilty of the first three elements of robbery with homicide. In robbery with homicide
cases, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the
crime.

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PEOPLE VS VERCELES
388 SCRA 413

FACTS: Maribeth Bolita was awakened by a man fondling her breast and other private
parts. She tried to resist and fight back but her strength proved too weak against her
aggressor. She later identified her aggressor as Mamerto Soriano. While she was being ravished,
she saw two men standing at the door, whom she identified as accused Mario Verceles and Felix
Corpuz. Soriano undressed her then kissed her on the body and fondled her breasts for five
minutes. There he removed his pants and laid her on the floor and tried to insert his penis inside
her vagina. Maribeth lost consciousness and when she came to, her private part was very painful
and the three accused were gone. The Court hereby finds accused Felix Corpuz and Mario
Verceles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape. Accused Felix
Corpuz and Mario Verceles interposed the instant appeal. They alleged that the trial court erred
in discharging Jerry Soriano as a state witness, in appreciating conspiracy among the accused, in
not considering as mitigating circumstance the voluntary surrender of Mario Verceles, and in
awarding damages to the private complainants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal lacks merit

RULING: The appeal lacks merit. The trial court did not err in discharging Jerry Soriano to be
utilized as a state witness. First, the testimony of Jerry Soriano was absolutely necessary as the
prosecution has no direct evidence to prove the identity of the malefactors Mamerto Soriano,
Felix Corpuz, Mario Verceles and Pablo Ramos. Second, Jerry Sorianos testimony was
corroborated in its material points by other prosecution witnesses and physical evidence. These
are: (a) the testimony of Maribeth Bolito that there were three malefactors, one of whom
sexually abused her and two of whom just stood at the door; (b) the testimony of Rosita Quilates
that her properties were stolen; and (c) the testimony of SPO2 Renato Solomon that they were
able to recover the stolen properties from a certain Andres Tirano who bought them from
accused Mamerto Soriano. Lastly, Jerry Soriano does not appear to be the most guilty for he was
not a co-conspirator in the robbery with rape. He merely accompanied the accused and received
three hundred pesos as his share in the proceeds of the sale of the stolen properties. Besides, the
question of whether Jerry Soriano appears to be the most guilty is a factual issue. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape,
although not all of them took part in the rape.

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PEOPLE VS TAMAYO
385 SCRA 43

FACTS: Nelson Tamayo, by means of force, violence against, and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the room and residence of one Mary Anne
Guazon, and once inside, poked a fan knife on her throat, covered her mouth and inserted his
penis into the mouth of the said victim, held her, undressed her, pulled down her shorts and
panty and succeeded in having sexual interoucrse with her against her will and consent.
Tamayo, with intent to gain, took and carried away cash money amounting to P500.00 belonging
to the said victim.Tamayo was charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape.
Tamayo appealed insisting that the lower court erred in finding accused appellant guilty of
special complex crime of robbery with rape despite his guilt not having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in finding Tamayo guilty of the crime charged

RULING: The court maintains that the trial court did not err in handing down a judgment of
conviction. However, it posits that the crime comiitted is not the special complex crime of
robbery with rape under Article 294, but two separate crimes of rape and robbery. For a
conviction of crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed
by reason or occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. It contemplates a situation
where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belong
to another and rape is committed on occasion thereof as an accompanying crime. If the original
design was to commit rape but the accused, after committing rape, also committed robbery
because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct
offenses.

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PEOPLE VS DOMINGO
383 SCRA 43

FACTS: Complainant Raquel Indon and her minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and
Jeffer were sleeping inside their house when she was awakened by the sound of appellant
kicking their door open. She immediately recognized the accused, since the kitchen light
illuminated his face. Armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the
mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed her, using the six-inch screwdriver. When she tried to
escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She then grabbed him and ran
towards the gate. However, before reaching the gate, she fell down and appellant stabbed her
right leg. The appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin, hitting the latter twice on the arm and
twice on his left chest. Marvin died on 3 April 2000 as a result of these injuries. After stabbing
Marvin, appellant returned back to the house, towards Raquels two daughters Michelle and
Melissa. Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted on her; while
Michelle, who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained serious physical injuries. The
appellant also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the screwdriver, but
the latter managed to run to the house of Raquels sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help,
but the appellant followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to
subdue the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not murder was committed

RULING: Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon, Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer Indon were
merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not even given the slightest provocation when
appellant attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the killing of Marvin Indon and Melissa
Indon, both minors who could not be expected to defend themselves against an adult, was
considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for murder. The penalties imposed were
adjusted accordingly.Appellants conviction for frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution failed to prove appellants treachery or evident
premeditation in his assault against Rolando Galvez, who came to the scene of the crime to
subdue the appellant. Qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established. Marvin
Indon and Melissa Indon were both minors when they were killed by the appellant. The killing
by an adult of a minor child is treacherous. Moreover, the victims in this case were asleep when
appellant barged into their house and attacked their family. The attack was clearly unprovoked,
and they were defenseless against him.

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PEOPLE VS LAGO
358 SCRA 440

FACTS: Accused Reyderick Lago testified that accused Cozette Aragon who was his
classmate in English approached him and asked him to accompany him to the house of his uncle
to get a project and collect his salary. Aragon also invited Lisbog to go with them. Thereafter, he
came to know that Diadid also proceeded to the house of Aragons uncle at the back of Don
Bosco in Kalentong.
Upon entering the gate of the house, Aragon opened the jalousie window with the use of a
beinte nueve balisong and unlocked the door. Aragon let them in. Lisbog was instructed to wait
outside. While he was seated on the sofa, Aragon and Diadid went inside the room. Suddenly, he
heard somebody was groaning from the room. Afraid, he immediately left the place and went to
the house of his grandmother in Mandaluyong who advised him not to leave the place anymore.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide

RULING: This Court has ruled that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence
or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be
held guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if they did
not all actually take part in the homicide; that is, unless it appears that those who did not do so
endeavored to prevent the homicide.
The elements of this special complex crime are the following: (1) the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery
or on occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.
The records and the pleadings show that all the above-mentioned elements are present in the
case at bar. Appellant and his cohorts broke into the house of Aragons uncle took the victims
wallet and cash, wrist watch and several pieces of jewelry amounting to P67,000 and, in the
course of the robbery, stabbed and killed the victim.

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PEOPLE VS SULTAN
331 SCRA 216

FACTS: Victim was on her way home from a visit to her cousin she was accosted by someone,
later identified as accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her
neck and announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her to his house along
where he, through threat and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her. After satisfying his lust,
he ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went out of the room to smoke.
After ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, he came back, untied her, and once again with threat and
intimidation sexually abused her. Thereafter, he tied her hands and told her that he loved her and
that he would answer for what he had done to her. In her effort to release herself from his
clutches she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps convinced that she was going to run away with
him, he allowed her to go home at noon to get her things. She immediately reported the abuse to
her sister, who immediately reported the same to his friend, a police officer. The accused was
arrested the next morning and brought to the police headquarters for further interrogation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape.

RULING: YES. Accused-appellant might not have employed force in committing the rape but
he definitely used intimidation which was sufficient to make complainant submit herself to him
against her will for fear of life and personal safety. Intimidation is subjective so it must be
viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime, and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces fear, as in the present case,
fear that if the complainant does not yield to the bestial demands of accused-appellant something
would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter.

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LAUREL VS ABROGAR
GR No. 155976
FACTS: The accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping
and aiding one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by
conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which
connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is
destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated
amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.

ISSUE: Whether international long distance calls and the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone services are considered as personal properties subjected to theft.

RULING: In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting
various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which
petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs
facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order
issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, which denied the
Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment) for theft, is AFFIRMED. The case is
remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to
amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and
business of the private offended party.

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GABLOIA VS PEOPLE
480 SCRA 436

FACTS: The RTC convicted Alfonso Gaviola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. On September 6, 1997 at 7:00 AM, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto
Mejarito, and a barangay councilman saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo
Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees and deliberately took, harvested and gathered 1500
coconuts thru the supervision of Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola from the plantation of Cleto
Mejarito without his authority and consent. The said accused admitted that the coconuts were
taken upon his instruction but insisted that the trees were planted from the lot he inherited from
his father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said accused is guilty of qualified theft

RULING: Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states that theft is committed by any person,
who with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of neither persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent. Theft is
likewise committed by: (1.) Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner; (2.) Any person who, after having maliciously
damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and (3.) Any person who shall enter an enclosed state or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals or other forest or farm products. Thus, the elements
of theft are: 1). That there be taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to
another; 3) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner and 5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. According to Article 310: Qualified theft - The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degree than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have intent to steal
(animu furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful
possession of personal property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general
criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioners claim of good
faith in taking the coconuts from private complainants land is a mere pretense to escape

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criminal liability.

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LUCAS VS CA
389 SCRA 749

FACTS: Herminigildo Lucas was charged with theft before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Br. 69, Rizal, together with Wilfredo Navarro and Enrique Lovena. The
Information alleged that on or about 8 June 1990 the three (3) accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stole
and carried away one stereo component, a 14-inch colored TV, an electric fan, twenty-three (23)
pieces of cassette tapes, one (1) box of car toys, four (4) pieces of Pyrex crystal bowls, cash
ofP20,000.00 and jewelry worth P10,000.00, valued at P100,000.00 all belonging to Luisito
Tuazon. The accused made an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Lucas alleges that it
was impossible for conspiracy to have existed among the accused. He claims he did not know
his co-accused Navarro and Lovena; neither did they know him on or before 8 June 1990.

ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy is essential to make the petitioners liable of committing the
crime of theft

RULING: No. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit
the crime. It may be deduced from the concerted acts of the accused, indubitably demonstrating
their unity of purpose, intent and sentiment in committing the crime. It is enough that the
accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense and that they had the same
purpose or common design, and that they were united in its execution. To sustain a conviction
for theft, the following elements must be present: (1) personal property of another person must
be taken without the latter's consent; (2) the act of taking the personal property of another must
be done without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things;
and, (3) there must be an intention to gain from the taking of another person's personal property.

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PEOPLE VS MANERO
347 SCRA 667

FACTS: At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He
entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago towed the
motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled
some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and
rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter
simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the
priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang
ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at
the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest,
Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over
the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired
anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter
on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced
and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded
positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a conspiracy on the part of all of the accused, hence guilty of
the crime of murder, attempted homicide and arson

RULING: YES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit
a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and
every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed
where there is singularity of purpose and unity in its execution is present.
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely
innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali
and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For
sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide
assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and
the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage.
Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in
furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr.
Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have

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delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit
the criminal acts.

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ABUNDIO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
205 SCRA 108

FACTS: The accused, a public officer, being then the District Engineer of the Department (then
Ministry) of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Office, Virac, Catanduanes, and as such have
access and control of the motor pool of the DPWH, committing the offense in relation to his
duties, and taking advantage of his official position, with intent to gain and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal, without the
consent of the government, the chassis of Willys Jeep valued at P15,000.00 in the Inventory and
Inspection Report of Unserviceable Property dated December 2, 1982, of the DPWH, Virac,
Catanduanes, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was properly convicted of qualified theft

RULING: No. It is universally recognized that the crime of theft implies an invasion of
possession, and this doctrine is well accepted in both the common-law and civil law
jurisdictions. It follows therefore, that there cannot be theft when the owner has voluntarily
parted with the possession of the thing. A felonious taking characterizes the crime of theft. The
facts clearly show that there was no furtive taking or unlawful asportation, in the criminal sense,
of the chassis. The physical and juridical possession of the subject chassis was transferred to the
petitioner, at his request, with the consent of the Motor Pool Officer, Engineer Alberto. The
delivery of the chassis to the petitioner was properly documented. A taking which is done with
the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious. Lack of malice or
criminal intent on the part of petitioner was sufficiently established in this case.

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PEOPLE VS SALVILLA
184 SCRA 671

FACTS: The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they
entered the establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out
for her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the
office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two
daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all
they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag
wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded
with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed.
Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the
latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
UItimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the
girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary
suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be
amputated. The medical certificate described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock
when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several major operations during the
course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."

ISSUE: Whether the crime of robbery was consummated or was merely attempted.

RULING: The crime of robbery in this case was consummated. There is no question that in
robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is
known as the element of asportation the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the
possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus
revertendi. Those factual allegations of the appellant that while the "giving" has been proven, the
"taking" has not, are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified
that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently
handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor
handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she
thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently
proved. The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and
control of the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.

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ROQUE VS PEOPLE
444 SCRA 98

FACTS: Antonio Salazar (Salazar) is a member/depositor of the Basa Air Base Savings and
Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) as evidenced by his passbook No. 1359. He was made to
sign two ledgers when he opened his savings account. On November 16, 1989, Salazar made a
deposit of P2,000 at the BABSLA; however, he did not make any withdrawal, nor did he
authorize anyone to do the same on that date or on November 17, 1989 or for the whole month
of November of that year. Salazar disclosed that around July 1990 he heard that the funds of
other depositors were missing inside the BABSLA and were supposedly clandestinely
circulating around the base. Prodded by this news, and considering that the balance in his
passbook was P46,000, he went to the BABSLA to withdraw P40,000, but was informed that his
balance at the BABSLA was insufficient to cover the withdrawal. He was not allowed to
withdraw. Rosalina de Lazo, the general manager, informed him that several withdrawals were
made on his account amounting to P30,500, as evidenced by three (3) withdrawal slips.
Included among these withdrawal slips is one with the amount of P10,000, dated November 16,
1989. Salazar claimed that the signature appearing on said withdrawal slip was not his
signature. He does not personally know who made the withdrawal ofP10,000. Salazar assumed
that the one in control of the funds made the withdrawal.

ISSUE: Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the
lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony

RULING: YES. In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity
of a bank teller. In People v. Locson, the this Court considered deposits received by a teller in
behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies
with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day for the
purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical possession
remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-cited cases,
beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the
felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of
confidence, and the bank places money in the tellers possession due to the confidence reposed
on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.

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PEOPLE VS BUSTINERA
431 SCRA 284

FACTS: From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding
appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft for the unlawful
taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows: The undersigned
accuses Luisito D. Bustinera of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows: That on or
about 25 December up to the 9 January 1997 in Quezon City, the said accused being then
employed as one of the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs in
Diliman, Quezon City, and as such has free access to the taxi he drives, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed
upon him by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266worth PHP 303,000.00
belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the
amount of PHP 303,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused- appellant had intent to gain when he failed to return the taxi
to its garage

RULING: Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has
been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti- carnapping law and
not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. The anti- carnapping law is a special law,
different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. Since
appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping
law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does
not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.

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PEOPLE VS SALONGA
G.R. No. 131131

FACTS: This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR NO. 18551 which
modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal
Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua.
Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the
crime of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document in an information
alleging that on or before 23 October 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and
aiding one another, and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank
and Trust Company (Metrobank), with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of
officers authorized to sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of
Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such
transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a
simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear
genuine and authorized, through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain
for themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust
Company in the total amount of P36,480.30. On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision
finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of
Commercial Document.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft?


Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper?
DECISION: The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accusedappellant in the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of
the blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano
of the spot audit group testified that the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as
reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the
check was issued without any transaction. Mariano also testified that after finding basic
differences in the signature of bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check
with other specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing
therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing in
the cashiers check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15,
1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in

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his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00. The crime charged is
Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. Since the value of the check is
P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and 1 year of each additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309,
paragraph 1 of the RPC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specified in
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition,
forging the signatures of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was
resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. Falsification
of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of qualified theft
resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that, where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft
is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under Article
166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum period, the correct
penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

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CARIAGA VS C.A.
G.R. No. 143561
FACTS: Jonathan Cariaga v. CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for review on
certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan Cariaga of
qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company
(DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC
supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators. In
October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of
METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the
pseudonym Canuto Duran. Duran became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private
electrician, and he said that his boss needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a
gold panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the
same to him. Duran was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his
cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). Durans undercover work came to an end when Sgt.
Villasis apprehended him on February 1989. Duran then confessed in order to persuade
Ricardo and the others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to
the police station and confessed to their participation as fence for Jonathan Cariaga. The
prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the subpoena cannot be
personally served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn
statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latters
alleged illegal dismissal.
ISSUES: Whether or not Ricardos sworn statement is admissible as evidence; Siton is a credible
witness; guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven
DECISION: the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION (1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn
statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a
testimony of a witness unable to testify in court. In Tan v. CA , the Court has held that unable
to testify does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only
subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat
which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to
arrest, but, it did not in the present case. (2) Credible. (3) Guilty.

QUINAO VS PEOPLE

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G.R. No. 139603

FACTS: Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private complainant Francisco
Del Monte are claiming ownership over the land in question. Accused-appellant presented a tax
declaration and alleged that the land being claimed by the complainant is different from the land
litigated in Civil Cases No. 3561. Trial Court finds accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of
Real Rights in Property. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land
in question could be held liable of usurpation of her own property?
DECISION: Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court
convicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations,
surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record and in accordance with the
applicable law under Article 312 of Revised Penal Code.

The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's real
property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession or usurpation was
committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to
sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real
property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person,
and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to
the person ousted of possession of the property.

In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1)
occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person;
(2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping
the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to
give any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.

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ONG VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 140904

FACTS: Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned and
operated by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While she normally bought jewelry
on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover the jewelry she bought in
December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the checks would be funded on
their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with the
stamp "Account Closed."

Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10 counts of
violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the same Code?
HELD: The appeal is impressed with merit. Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution
grants the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to
enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted of
an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. From the allegations in an
information, the real nature of the crime charged is determined. In the case at bar, the
Information alleged that petitioner issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds
in the bank and failing to fund them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations
clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the earlier quoted paragraph
2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false
pretenses or fraudulent acts the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or
issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check
despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense
or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a). Under paragraph 2(d),
if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be
presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred
from mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of
dishonor being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly

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charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder. In the case at bar, as priorly
stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that petitioner
received notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of
the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This leaves it unnecessary to
pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioners defenses of good faith
and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For,
on notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check,
petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the amount
covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution stipulated
that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the
total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank
check. In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her acquittal is in order. The
judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.

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VELOSO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 149354

FACTS: Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon City,
is a restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of Companies, Inc. Ramon Sy
Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and general manager. Roland Veloso, petitioner, claiming to
be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an occasional guest at the
restaurant. Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while at
the said restaurant having dinner, had a conversation with Ramon. This led to a friendly bet
between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator.
Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both
agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results
showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet. On August
22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretary called Eva Anne Nanette Sto. Domingo (Eva), the
restaurants assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table corresponding to ten
persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he would pay for one table,
his commitment to petitioner. However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23,
1995, he asked that four (4) additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same.
Hence, Eva had four additional tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramons account.
The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00. When the Sales Invoice
was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay, explaining he was a guest of Ramon. Due to
petitioners stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should send the bill. Petitioner
instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuencos office as he was always present there. It turned
out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that office. Hence, the bill was sent to his
address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but still, he refused to pay. The lawyer
for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no avail. Consequently, petitioner was
charged with estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 31, Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of estafa

DECISION: The court DENIED the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA finding petitioner Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Appellant insists that he is only civilly
liable for an unpaid debt. We reviewed the records very closely and found that petitioner and his
guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and
insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the understanding between
petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only one table. We agree with the

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Solicitor General in his brief for the People that petitioner employed fraud in ordering four
additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes
him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.
BONIFACIO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 153198

FACTS: Private complainant Ofelia Santos was a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of
jewelry. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner Crisanta Bonifacio was introduced to her. She
expressed interest to see the pieces of jewelry Santos was selling. On March 21, 1996, petitioner
received several pieces of jewelry from Santos. She signed a document acknowledging receipt of
the jewelry and agreeing to sell these items on commission basis. She also promised to remit the
proceeds of the sale or return the unsold items to Santos within 15 days. Petitioner failed to turn
over the proceeds of the sale within the given period. She, however, returned some of the unsold
items at a later date. The value of the pieces unaccounted for amounted to P154,000. On March
28, 1996, petitioner asked Santos for new sets of jewelry to sell under the same terms and
conditions. Again, on due date, petitioner failed to account. This time, the value of the unpaid
and unreturned items amounted to P91,500. On April 3, 1996, petitioner once more accepted
several pieces of jewelry and signed an acknowledgment receipt under the same terms and
conditions. On due date, petitioner again failed to pay. The pieces of jewelry left unpaid and
unreturned amounted to P38,500. In a letter dated July 25, 1996, Santos demanded from
petitioner the payment of the total amount of P244,500. Petitioner gave her two checks
amounting to P30,000 as partial payment. The checks, however, bounced for being drawn
against insufficient funds and being drawn against a closed account, respectively.
ISSUE: Whether the CAs decision of rendering judgement of petitioner being guilty of Estafa is
correct

DECISION: The petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b), RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner. The
words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property
as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. In
an agency for the sale of jewelry, it is the agent's duty to return the jewelry on demand of the
owner. The demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accusedagent to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Here, petitioner admitted
that she received the pieces of jewelry on commission. She likewise admitted that she failed to
return the items or their value on Santos' demand. On the other hand, the testimony of her lone

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witness, Lilia Pascual, failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence that she misappropriated the
items or their corresponding value. She also never appeared in the trial court to refute the charge
against her. Hence, the trial and appellate courts' conclusion of guilt by misappropriation was a
logical consequence of the established facts.
RECUERDO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 133036

FACTS: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as
payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A
demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by
which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional?

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DECISION: A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the
same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that
any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment.
B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties,
its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as
being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance,
before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. It is not required
much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee banks representative as a
witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency of funds. The
prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the
elements of the offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she
deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the
checks returned unpaid with a notation drawn against insufficient funds stamped or written on
the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly
given to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or
make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.GONZALUDO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 150910
FACTS: Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the Bacolod City
Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita Manlangit in Bacolod City.
Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulyssess mother at the latters house at Bacolod City. Later,
Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a teaching job in
Catubig, Samar prompting her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar.

After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to Bacolod City. And, in
December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00 a small house located near that of his
mother at Purok 5, Mansungay, Bacolod City. Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie
Gelogo as his mistress and brought her into the house. In time, improvements were made on the
house and the house was transformed into a 2-storey structure. After Ulyssess demise in January
of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey house for P80,000.00 to
herein petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Since the
house was being sold for a cheap price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and
Melba Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced
the Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the Deed of Sale, Rosemarie Gelogo signed as Rosemarie
G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the 2-storey house. By virtue of the
same deed, vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all of Rosemaries rights and interest on the subject
house.

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Later, upon complaint of Ulyssess widow Anita Manlangit, an Information dated May
31, 1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging Rosemarie Gelogo,
alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas and petitioner with the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. The trial court acquitted the Canlas
spouses but convicted petitioner of the crime charged. The appellate affirmed the trial courts
judgment of conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal
Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estafa is not present?

DECISION: The petition is partly impressed with merit. For an accused to be convicted of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of the two
crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. There is no question that the
first, second and fourth elements are present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by
Rosemarie Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or
false pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and private
complainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the very least
prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioners thesis, however, that there is
here an absence of the third element contending that private complainant Anita Manlangit, who
was the offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any money or property by
means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense or fraudulent representation
by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in petitioners submission. The Court finds no cogent reason
to depart from the settled principle that the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously
committed with the act of defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration
which induced the offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the
present case.

While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case,
when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones
who parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging
Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses,
but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient

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cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie
cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason must this be for herein petitioner. The
lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve petitioner from
criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public document under the same
Information charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document.

It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in a
complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the
accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner
conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of
facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such
sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order
to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond
reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and
petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case.
Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document,
but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Document.

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DELA CRUZ VS PEOPLE


G.R. No. 150439

FACTS: That on or about and during the period comprised from the month ofDecember 1994 to
January 1995, inclusive, or thereabouts in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Great
Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village, Inc., and Hock Wan Restaurant Corporation, in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused being then the payroll clerk of said
Corporations, existing domestic corporations primarily engaged in the restaurant
business, with principal places of business at 798 Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and 489
Nueva St., Binondo, Manila, respectively, and by virtue of her position as such, received
from said corporations in trust, during the said period a total sum of P471,166.11
representing the excess amount paid to the employees of said corporations as salaries
under the obligation of accounting and turning over the said excess to said corporations,
but she did not do so in violation of the trust relationship existing between her and said
corporations, which amount, once in her possession, far from complying with her
obligation aforesaid, went into hiding and failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to
return the same whereby misappropriating, misapplying and converting the said amount
to her personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said corporation
represented by their common personnel manager Manuel M. Matammu in the total
amount of P471,166.11 Philippine Currency.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST PETITIONER IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT HER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AS CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION;
WHETHER OR NOT FORMAL DEMAND IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE IN THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION
DECISION: The court premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May
2001 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The questioned decision is hereby REVERSED.
Accused-petitioner Amelita dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa defined under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
cash bond for the accused-petitioners provisional liberty is ordered returned to her, subject to the
usual accounting and auditing procedures. Ominously, such bait, though hearsay evidence, was
acknowledged hook, line and sinker by the court a quo, and worse, affirmed by the appellate
court. Not even one iota of documentary or object evidence was presented that would give a
semblance of correctness to the actions of the said courts.

CRIMINAL LAW 2

In sum, from the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with propriety
and due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent evidence on which to
base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral certainty. Only the
checks and acknowledged payroll slips were presented to show the culpability of the accusedpetitioner, and, sadly, said documentary evidence were the only basis for the theory that there
was an over-computation of the payrolls. What the trial court used to convict the accusedpetitioner are documents that had no direct relation to her. It would have been different had the
accused-petitioners computations been used as the basis for comparing the acknowledged
payroll slips. That way, it would be clearly shown that she had over-computed the salaries due
the employees to enable her to misappropriate said excess.
In other words, the trial court failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accusedpetitioner over-computed the payroll and pocketed the excess money. The Court finds the
testimonies and documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent
weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on accusedpetitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this
jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not inclined to hold that
the evidence is conclusive that she is not guilty, neither is it convinced that she is so, based on
the circumstances of this case. The Court is, thus, under a long standing legal injunction to
resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner. Undeniably, the convergence of the
circumstances vis--vis the evidence established by the prosecution, especially the tenuous
testimonies of the witnesses, must ineluctably result in a favorable verdict for the defense.

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PEOPLE VS JULIANO
G.R. No. 134120
FACTS: The accused purchased 190 sacks of milled rice from JCT Agro-Development
Corporation and in payment she issued a check for a value of P89,000, knowing at the time of
issue that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said check. When
presented for encashment, it was dishonored by the bank for reason of insufficiency of funds. On
the following month the accused issued another check that was again dishonored by the drawee
bank for the same reason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT Agro-Development Corporation.
The trial court found her guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks
Law) and Estafa. Appellant appealed her conviction for estafa to the Court of Appeals, but still
found her guilty, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretense, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, committed the offenses.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable doubt to convict the appellant
for estafa?
DECISION: The Court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and acquitted Lea
Sagan Juliano for the crime of estafa. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting false
pretenses or any fraudulent act. Nevertheless, appellants civil liability to JCT remains, in the
amount of P89,000, which is the value of the sack of rice she purchased.

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PEOPLE VS CUYUGAN
G.R. Nos. 146641-43
FACT: That on or about the 18th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, Rica G.
Cuyugan, defrauded and deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following
manner to wit: that said accused with intent to defraud and well knowing that her account
with the bank was already closed, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
make out and issue to private Complainant the several checks. in the total amount of
P396,000.00 simultaneous with the receipt by the accused of cash money from private
Complainant also in the total amount of P396,000.00 but which checks when presented
to the drawee bank on their maturity dates were promptly dishonored for reasons of
Account Closed and notwithstanding demands made on her, accused failed and refused
and still fails to redeem or make good the said checks face value thereof, to the damage
and prejudice of the private Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P396,000.00.
That on or about the 12th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded and
deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following manner to wit: that the
accused with intent to defraud and well-knowing that her account with the bank has no
sufficient funds, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out and issue to the private
Complainant Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 03A058532P postdated June
10, 1994 in the amount of P150,000.00 simultaneous with, for and in consideration of
cash money from private Complainant in the total amount of P150,000.00 but which
check when presented to the drawee bank on maturity date was promptly dishonored for
reason of Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) and notwithstanding demands on
her, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good the said
check or its value, to the damage and prejudice of the private Complainant in the total
aforesaid amount of P150,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the crime of estafa
DECISION: The judgment dated December 20, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 117, finding appellant RICA G. CUYUGAN, liable for three counts of estafa
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED, for lack of sufficient
evidence to prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt.However, she is ordered to pay private
complainants the balance of her obligation The transaction between appellant and the
Abagat spouses, in our view, was one for a loan of money to be used by appellant in her
business and she issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the
obligation to make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation
is civil in character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised
Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of
repayment. We find appellants allegation, that the Abagat spouses entered into a joint

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venture agreement with her for the supply of materials with the AFP, is self-serving. But
we also note that the trial court convicted appellant on a general allegation that all the
elements of estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code had been proved
by the prosecution without making any reference to or giving any proof of the actual
fraud that appellant allegedly committed to make her liable for estafa. It is elementary
that where an allegation in the information is an essential element of the crime, the same
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. In this case, the
prosecution did not establish specifically and conclusively the fraud alleged as an
element of the offenses charged.

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PEOPLE VS REMULLO
G.R. Nos. 124443-46
FACTS: That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993, in the Municipality
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power to contract,
enlist and recruit workers for job/placement abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment job placement abroad to the
complainants, ROSARIO CADACIO, JENELYN QUINSAAT and HONORINA MEJIA,
without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment, thus committing illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of [Article 38(2) in
relation to Article 39 (b) of the Labor Code]. That in or about and during the months from March
to May 1993 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of false pretenses and
fraudulent representation made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, with
intent to defraud the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT to the effect that she would send her
abroad for the purpose of employment and would need certain amount for the expenses in the
processing of papers thereof, which representations the accused well knew was (sic) false and
fraudulent and was only made by her to induce said complainant to give and pay, as in fact the
latter gave and paid to her the amount of P15,000.00 which the accused once in possession of
the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate and convert
to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant JENELYN
QUINSAAT in the aforementioned amount of P15,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty for large scale illegal recruitment

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DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 132, is hereby AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 95-653, for illegal recruitment in large
scale, appellant NIMFA REMULLO is found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P100,000; and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654, 95-655 and 95-656 for estafa, she is
declared guilty sentenced in each case to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) one day of prision mayor, and to pay by way of
restitution P15,000 to each of the private complainants, Jenelyn Quinsaat, Rosario Cadacio and
Honorina Mejia, together with the costs. Anent appellants conviction for estafa in Criminal
Cases Nos. 95-654 to 95-656, we find no error committed by the trial court. Their conviction and
sentence are fully supported by the evidence on record. For charges of estafa to prosper, the
following elements must be present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. In this case, appellant clearly
defrauded private complainants by deceiving them into believing that she had the power and
authority to send them on jobs abroad. By virtue of appellants false representations, private
complainants each parted with their hard-earned money. Each complainant paid P15,000 as
recruitment fee to appellant, who then appropriated the money for her own use and benefit, but
failed utterly to provide overseas job placements to the complainants. In a classic rigmarole,
complainants were provided defective visas, brought to the airport with their passports and
tickets, only to be offloaded that day, but with promises to be booked in a plane flight on another
day. The recruits wait in vain for weeks, months, even years, only to realize they were gypped,
as no jobs await them abroad. No clearer cases of estafa could be imagined than those for which
appellant should be held criminally responsible.GUINHAWA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162822

FACTS: Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles,
including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. His office and
display room for cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil
Azotea as his sales manager. On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi
L-300 Versa Van and from the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco, Manila. Guinhawas
driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was
traveling along the highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The
van went out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into the
canal parallel to the highway. The van was damaged, and the left front tire had to be replaced.
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund of their money
before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the confrontation between her and
Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC before it was sold to
them, and after it was damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint
from the DTI. On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of

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paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Naga City.
ISSUE: Whether or not under the Information, the petitioner was charged of other deceits under
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
DECISION:

The

petition

is DENIED.

The

assailed

Decision

and

Resolution

are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding circumstances of the


case, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment. The petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It bears
stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity to reveal to the private
complainant that the van was defective. They resolved to maintain their silence, to the prejudice
of the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had no special knowledge of
parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding circumstances, she relied on her belief that the
van was brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the petitioners fraudulent
nondisclosure or concealment. The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent
omission on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their collective
fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a certain act or the transaction of a
given affair, or the performance of certain business is confided to an agent, the authority to so
act will, in accordance with a general rule often referred to, carry with it by implication the
authority to do all of the collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main
act or business authorized.

PEOPLE VS BALUNTONG
G.R. No. 182061

FACTS: Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon,


causing the complete destruction of the saidhouse and the death of Celerina
Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on
JoshuaSavarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The
Trial Court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
of double murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
but in light of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death to
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts correct in charging the accused the complex
crime of double murder and frustrated murder?

CRIMINAL LAW 2

DECISION: The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE , and
a NEW one is rendered findingappellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion p er p etua with no eligibility for
parole and other civil damages modified. The assailed CA
decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered as follows:
Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Appellant is
ORDERED to pay the damages and other expenses. How Felicitas acquired such
knowledge was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she was crossexamined thereon. Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set
on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder
with frustrated murder. This is especially true with respect to the death of
Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get
even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring
house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely
entered the burning house to save her grandsons. While the above-quoted
Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder,
appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge
for Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson
under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613,
lies in the intent in pursuing the act. As reflected above, as it was not shown
that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would
only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed
by arson. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or
necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.

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PEOPLE VS MURCIA
G.R. No. 182460
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province
of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason of causes independent of the will;
that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented
her death, all to the damage and prejudice of said offended party. Appellant was the lone witness
for the defense. He stated that while he was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside
the house to get a glass of water. He followed her and gave her water. He noticed Felicidad light
a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He got into a heated
argument with Herminio. The latter struck him in the head. He immediately went inside the
house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo, went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter
ran away and appellant chased him. Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the
actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the
knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost consciousness because, apparently, he was
struck by something in the back. Appellant denied setting the house on fire. On 30 May 2006,
decision was rendered by the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson
and frustrated homicide,
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Arson and frustrated homicide
DECISION: The appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part of
Herminio. This Court does not discount the fact that there was a fight between appellant and
Herminio which preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot be presumed that
Herminio will automatically give a false testimony against appellant. His testimony, having
withstood cross-examination, has passed the scrutiny of the lower courts and was held to be
credible. The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that
there are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is
based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
damage caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand,
Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills,
plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.

CRIMINAL LAW 2

PEOPLE VS MALNGAN
G.R. No. 170470

FACTS: From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay


Chairman in the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab
driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2,
2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant
EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head
turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her
employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen
to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified
as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed
that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed
her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where
she finally alighted, after paying for her fare. Thirty minutes later, at
around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered
that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay
Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing
shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire. When Barangay
Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report
from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly
before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid)
coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila
and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same
housemaid) who was acting strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street.
Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods
proceeded

to Balasan

Street and

found

the

woman

who

was

later

identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively


identified the woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods
apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation.
At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa,
Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accusedappellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon
inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay
Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents
outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire
because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a

CRIMINAL LAW 2

broomstick in going home. Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over


to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her
to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further
investigated and then detained.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a complex crime of arson and homicide


DECISION: The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in CA
G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of
accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be
imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In
accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. In cases where both burning and death
occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or
arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:(a)
if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on
the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson , and the resulting homicide is absorbed;(b) if,
on the other hand, the m ain objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only; lastly,(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there
are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/ murder and arson.

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PEOPLE VS OLIVA
G.R. No. 122110

FACTS: August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino Manguba
(hereinafter referred to as "Avelino") and his family were sleeping in their house in San Jose,
Claveria, Cagayan. Avelino went out of the house to urinate. He saw Ferigel set the roof of their
house on fire with a lighted match. Awakened by the loud barking of dogs, Avelino's wife sensed
danger and peeped through a hole in their wall. She also saw Ferigel burn the roof of their house.
She shouted, "Perry is burning our house!" and called out to the neighbors for help. While the
fire razed Avelino's house, Ferigel and three others, Dominador Oliva, Marcos Paderan and
Arnel Domingo watched at a distance of about five (5) meters. One of the neighbors, Benjamin
Estrellon (hereinafter referred to as "Benjamin") went to the nearby river and fetched water with
a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by Ferigel at close range. Benjamin
tried to run, but he slumped and fell to the ground. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death.
Avelino, his wife, and Benjamin's son, Noel, witnessed the shooting since they were only about
five (5) to six (6) meters away from Ferigel when the incident occurred. The place was brightly
lit by the burning roof and visibility was not a problem. On August 24, 1993, a post-mortem
report was made on Benjamin's cadaver, revealing the following: "II POSTMORTEM
FINDINGS: "Cadaver is in a state of rigor mortis and with postmortem lividity at back."Gunshot
wound of entrance 0.9 cm. at left lateral mid-scapular area going medially and anterosuperiorily,
10 cms. deep without exit.""III. CAUSE OF DEATH "Internal Hemorrhage due to gunshot
wound at back."

ISSUE: Whether or not that the testimonies should be taken into consideration, same with alibi
and defense

DECISION: We find no reversible error and affirm the conviction.


Whether or not Benjamin was shot while he was on the street or when he was in the act of
pouring water on the burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. We agree with the Solicitor General
that Benjamin could have been on the street while pouring water on the burning roof . The two
testimonies were not inconsistent. Also whether or not Benjamin immediately fell or tried to run
away after he was shot is not important. The fact is that he was shot; any act of his after he was
shot would not change the shooting, which at that point was fait accompli. Equally insignificant
is whether the gun used was a long firearm or a short firearm. Identification of the weapon only
becomes critical when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. In this case, the trial court
did not doubt the identity, and neither would we. There are 2 elements of arson: (1) that there is

CRIMINAL LAW 2

intentional burning; (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Proof
of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecution for felonies and offense. Corpus delicti is the
body or substance of the crime. It refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimonies
of the witnesses. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of
the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. The uncorroborated testimony of a single
eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.
Here, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

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PEOPLE VS ACOSTA
G.R. No. 126351

FACTS: Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of
Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend
of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M.
Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief that
appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of
appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived in the house
owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio
Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant. At about 4:00 to
5:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness Mona
Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was
carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her house and approached appellant who,
when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would burn the house of
complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness
Aquinos query, she returned immediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she
heard the sound of broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant.
When she peeped through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainants house, which
was unoccupied at that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and
lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellants wife who arrived at the
place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.

DECISION: In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances
taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion,
that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no
direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding him guilty
thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record: First, appellant
had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible
for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged,
nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient
motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel
aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.
Second, appellants intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on

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fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainants) which was burned later in the
night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the
same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife.
BELTRAN VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567
FACTS: Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage
and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of
psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on
concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial
question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
DECISION: The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting
issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the
criminal action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage
exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks
being prosecuted for concubinage.

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NERI VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 96715
FACTS: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo in the City of Baguio.
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and
witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped
first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then
proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in
the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the
door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where
accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's
request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two
accused. About forty-five minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could
already come down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision.
Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a
pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her
husband had later on traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently cohabiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Neris alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the
criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.
DECISION: The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in
Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code relates only
to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involve any illegal contract
which either of the contracting parties is now seeking 171 | P a g e Background image of page
171 to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering
into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other
persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had
"consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is
therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings.

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AMPLOYO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 157718

FACTS: Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and
playing the breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her consent.
Amployo contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1) the incident
happened at 7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast of an 8 year old is
still very much underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched her breast, it was
merely to satisfy a silly whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is only acts of
lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and not child abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof
had not been proved.

ISSUES: Whether or not lewd design was established; Amployo violated RA 7610.

DECISION: *Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a
minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No.
7610.The first element is lewd design.
The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is characterized
by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste
design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts
carrying out such intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious.
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and
the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot
be pigeonholed into a precise definition.
Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has
conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would have
been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only
happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act
to the very same victim in the past.
*The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioners act of purposely touching Kristine Joys
breasts (sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of
Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also
one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As

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case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the third element, there is
no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the incident
in question.

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PEOPLE VS MONTERON
G.R. No. 130709

FACTS: On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking
home from Wangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was walking on a
secluded portion of the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see
where the stone came from, she was hit again on the mouth. She fell down unconscious.[2]
When Mary Ann came to, she found herself lying on the grass naked. Accused-appellant was
lying on top of her, also naked. She struggled but accused-appellant, who was stronger,
restrained her.[3] He placed his penis on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She
frantically grabbed his erect penis and pushed it away from her. This caused accused-appellant to
stand up in pain. Mary Ann ran towards the road while putting on her clothes. Mary Anns
cousin, Arnel Arat, witnessed the whole incident as he was then walking to Wangan Agricultural
School. He met Mary Ann while the latter was running away and brought her home. When they
got home, Mary Ann told her uncle what happened. Her uncle, in turn, told her mother. That
afternoon, upon complaint of Mary Ann, the Calinan Police Precinct arrested accused-appellant.
The following morning, Mary Ann was brought to the City Health Office of Davao City where
she was examined by Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma. The latter found that Mary Anns hymen was intact
and had no laceration, but her labia minora was coaptated and her labia majora was gaping.[4]
On March 12, 1996, accused-appellant was formally charged with rape. At his arraignment,
accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[5] After trial, the lower court convicted him of the
crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape
.
DECISION: The decision is is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Marianito Monteron y Pantoras
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the victim, Mary Ann Martenez, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P25,000.00 as moral damages. Accused-appellant also contends that it was unlikely for him to
strip naked and commit rape in broad daylight. In this connection, suffice it to say that lust is no
respecter of time and place. It is known to happen in the most unlikely places such as parks,
along roadsides, within school premises or even occupied rooms. Rape has also been committed
on a passageway and at noontime.
While accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its attempted
stage. Mary Ann clearly testified that accused-appellant only placed his penis on top of her
vagina. In fact, she was able to grab it and push it away from her, causing accused-appellant to

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stand up. The pain she felt may have been caused by accused-appellants attempts to insert his
organ into hers. However, the fact remains, based on Mary Anns own narrative, that accusedappellants penis was merely on top of her vagina and has not actually entered the same.
Accused-appellant has commenced the commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of
undressing himself and the victim and lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. In the case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance which
prevented the insertion of accused-appellants penis in her vagina.

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PEOPLE VS PEREZ
G.R. No. 113265

FACTS: At about 6:00 A.M. on May 31, 1990, Manuel Perez woke up Jennifer who lying
asleep on the cemented floor of the house. The door and the windows of the house were closed.
Manuel Perez ordered Jennifer to remain lying down on the cemented floor and began
undressing Jennifer. Manuel then kissed the cheeks of Jennifer. He proceeded to kiss and touch
the breasts of Jennifer as well as the upper part of Jennifers body. Manuel, who was dressed in
short pants, did not remove the same but he unzipped the zipper of his short pants. He pulled the
legs of Jennifer apart and placed himself on top of the body of Jennifer. He then inserted his
private part inside the private part of Jennifer. All this time Jennifer protested and complained of
pain but was unable to resist because Manuel threatened to kill her. After satisfying his lust,
Manuel again threatened Jennifer not to tell anybody about what happened to her. Jennifer left
the house after the incident and proceeded to the nearby house of her aunt, Othelia Marco, who
was then out of the house. Jennifer glanced at the clock in Othelias house and found out that it
was 6:00 A.M. in the morning of May 31, 1990. Jennifer remained outside the house until
Manuel called her later on to clean the bleedings.
It was not until June 3, 1990 that Jennifer disclosed her harrowing experience to a certain
Malou (Marilou Castellano), a kumadre of her mother, who was then staying with them. Malou
promised to help her. She brought her to the Navotas Police Station in order to report the rape
incident. The Navotas police, however, told them to report the matter to the Malabon Police
Station. Malou and Jennifer then proceeded there, but they were advised that the matter fell
under the jurisdiction of the Kalookan City police force. Malou and the victim, however, did not
proceed to the Kalookan City police force as it was already late in the evening.
The next day, Jennifer reported the incident to her aunts, Othelia Marco and Myrna
Casapao. They then accompanied Jennifer and Malou to the Kalookan City police station, where
Jennifer filed a complaint for rape against appellant. After the police investigation, Jennifer was
advised to go to the then-Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City for a physical examination. However, it was only on June 13, 1990, that Jennifer
submitted herself to a physical examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape


DECISION: The decision is finding appellant Manuel Perez y Magpantay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that appellant is also ordered to pay the victim,

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Jennifer Dimaano y Casapao. Having examined the entire record, we find that the totality of the
evidence presented by the prosecution proves beyond doubt all the elements of rape. Private
complainant testified as to how appellant had carnal knowledge of her. The carnal knowledge
took place under circumstances of violence and intimidation. Her testimony is supported by the
results of the medico-legal examination conducted upon her at the police crime
laboratory. Moreover, she positively pointed to appellant in open court as the person responsible
for her defilement. Against said positive identification, appellants puerile defense of denial will
not hold water, for he does not even deny that he was with the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime. Moreover, his attempts to cast ill motive on private complainant or her
family for fabricating the charge of rape against him have no evidentiary weight. It would be
most unnatural for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story of rape by her mothers
common-law spouse; allow a medical examination of her genitalia; and subject herself to a
public trial and possible ridicule, all because her maternal relatives want her mother to separate
from her common-law spouse. Perforce, appellants conviction must stand.

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PEOPLE VS COLLADO
G.R. Nos. 135667-70

FACTS: TO TIE A CHILD of tender years spread-eagled to her bed to abuse her in the privacy
of her home is despicable enough; to encroach on her innocence unashamedly in front of her
younger brother is to descend to the deepest recesses of depravity. Thus the incorrigible lothario
transgressed all norms of decency, morality and rectitude when he molested his nine (9)-year old
victim in the presence of her six (6)-year old brother and severed all strands of gratefulness to
her parents who gave him food, shelter and livelihood for four (4) years. Messeah is the daughter
of Jose Noli Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was composed of his wife Julie, and their three
(3) children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The accused Jessie Ventura Collado, son of Jose
Nolis cousin Benjamin, was living with them since 1989. While waiting for an opportunity to
become a seaman himself like his uncle Jose, Jessie served as the family driver. Aside from
driving Julie, Jessie would also drive the school service vehicle operated by the Dumaoal
spouses. Since Jose was almost always at sea and having no househelp, their children were
oftentimes left in the care of Jessie. But, instead of taking care of them as their surrogate father,
he took advantage of Messeah by sexually molesting her at home, and worse, even in the
presence of her younger brother. There were four unfortunate occasions that constituted the
crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape

DECISION: The court finding accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO guilty of


Statutory Rape and three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in is MODIFIED. Messeahs
failure to reveal the sexual abuses to her mother does not taint her credibility. Her silence was
impelled by both fear for her life and shame for the degradation that had befallen her. It is not
uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat
against her life. Silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim. In fact, the burden of keeping
such a secret took its toll on her health. Jose Noli testified that when he arrived for a vacation in
August 1993, he noticed that his children looked blank and pale, especially Messeah who looked
thin, complained of dizziness and headaches and sometimes threw up. He and his wife had
brought Messeah to several doctors, before one finally diagnosed Messeah as suffering from
nervous breakdown and psychological trauma.
The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Jessie's alibi that he was driving the family car on
the disputed occasions cannot stand up to his positive identification as the perpetrator of the
crime by both Messeah and Metheor. Neither can we believe Jessie's allegation that Julie only

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wanted him out of their house because she favored her own relative over him. No mother in her
right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a
prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person
responsible for her child's defilement. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that a rape victim
and her family would publicly disclose the incident and thus sully their honor and reputation in
the community unless the charge is true. In fact, if Julie only wanted Jessie out of her house,
then why would the Dumaoal family file the complaints against him only on 13 April 1994,
when it is clear that he had already left the household as early as 22 October 1993. Neither does
this explain why the Dumaoal spouses felt compelled to change residences in such a short period
of time. As Jose Noli testified, they made the move even before All Saints Day, which shows
that they left their familiar surroundings and uprooted their family all within ten (10) days just so
they could ensure Messeahs safety.
Moreover, we agree with the Solicitor General that the only reason why the Dumaoal
spouses agreed to let Jessie go home to the province instead of filing charges against him was
because they were "torn between seeking justice for their daughter and preserving her and the
familys reputation. There was also the Christian desire to forgive and give a blood kin a new
chance at life knowing the gravity of the penalty that would be meted out to him. To interpret
their actuation any other way would be most unfair to parents who are equally suffering with
what befell their only daughter.

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DULLA VS C.A.
G.R. No. 123164

FACTS: On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with
bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein
petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano ako ng uncle ko," while
doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to demonstrate what had been done to
her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to her. The matter was reported to Barangay
Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child, the latters guardian, and three barangay tanods,
went to the house of petitioner to confront him. As petitioners father refused to surrender his
son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban sought assistance from the nearby Western Police
District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears; however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation
and ran away. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, whereupon
trial ensued. In her testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled her organ and showed
her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on and that
she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her. The medical report on
Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes, who examined the child on February 3, 1993, showed
that hymen of the victim is still intact.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that Andrea was
coached by her guardian. He likewise denied that he escaped from Lumaban and his men on
February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid any trouble that time. The trial court
found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether Andrea is a competent witness.
RULING: The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Under Rule 130,
Section 21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on account of immaturity, are incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully are
disqualified from being witnesses. In People v. Mendoza, the Court held:
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts
respecting which he is examined.The requirements then of a childs competency as a witness are
the following:(a)

Capacity of observation,(b) Capacity of recollection(c)

Capacity of

communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the


foregoing, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.
In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she testified.
Despite her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questions put to her. She
answered "yes" and "no" to questions and, when unable to articulate what was done to her by

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petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During her interrogation, she showed an
understanding of what was being asked. She was consistent in her answers to the questions
asked by the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the judge.

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PEOPLE VS JAVIER
G.R. No. 126096
FACTS: Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father, Amado
Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November, 1994 and December,
1994, which resulted to Julias pregnancy.
Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the crime of
incestuous rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon failure of the prosecution to
prove the use of force by Amado in the second and third complaints, he was just convicted of
qualified seduction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction for qualified seduction is proper in the complaint for the
crime of rape?
DECISION: No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by accused, the
latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape contains
allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the latter in case the
prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425
[1997]). To do otherwise would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot
be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA
144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two
felonies have one common element which is carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly
vary in all other respects (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).

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PEOPLE VS MANALANSANG
G.R. Nos. 110974-81
FACTS: Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her father, a 44-year
old taho vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991. On direct examination, Jennifer
testified that she was raped eight times in the taho factory in Tondo, the workplace of her
father. On cross examination, however, Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape incident
was committed in the taho factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape incidents were
committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money every time they had
sexual intercourse. The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his daughter
in Manila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly, the crime of
qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the victims statement?
DECISION: No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified seduction.
The inconsistencies on victims testimony for evidence cannot be dismissed as trivial. Trial
courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused.
The prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. As SC has said: Rape is a very emotional word, and
the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous
female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist.
However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape
charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection.
Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman
decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While
they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she
demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice
based on the law.
The prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and
contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1, 1991, the
Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there
with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a harrowing
experience at the hands of her father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that
she stayed with him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991
showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the
fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape
but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the
crime). This is especially true because she said she had been given money by her father

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everytime they had an intercourse.


The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it was not an
ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual torture can hardly be
expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from complainants testimony is that
although accused-appellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or
intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accused-appellants moral ascendancy
over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living with them, having separated from
complainants mother in 1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was committed by
means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant cannot possibly be convicted of
qualified seduction without offense to the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and
to be informed of the accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction.
Neither can qualified seduction include rape.

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People v. Subingsubing
228 SCRA 188
FACTS: Mary Jane S. Espilan, a highschool student that time, is sixteen years old and
unmarried. While the accused Napoleon Subingsubing is the complainant's uncle, the brother of
her mother and the son of her grandmother. Said accused was then living with his mother and his
niece in the same house. Mary Jane alleged that when she was about to go out to attend her
afternoon classes in school, Napoleon forcibly pulled her to the bedroom of the grandmother,
pointed his Garand rifle at her, then punched her in the stomach as a result of which the former
lost consciousness. When the complainant regained her senses, she noticed that she was en
dishabille and her vagina was bloody. She felt pain in her private parts and is quite certain she
was raped or abused. The accused who was then standing outside the room warned the
complainant not to tell anybody what happened or else he will kill her. Hence Mary Jane did not
report the incident to her grandmother or to anyone for that matter. The accused did sexually
abused her niece in two more incidents.
However, the accused at the trial, denied the charge of rape as narrated above and proferred a
different story - interposing consent on the part of the complainant as a defense. He also
professed that he had only one incident of sexual intercourse with the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Subingsubing is guilty of rape.
HELD: No. The accused is guilty of the crime of Qualified Seduction under Article 337 of the
RPC and not rape.
A careful perusal of the records of the present case reveals, even if were to assume
arguendo that the defense of consent on the part of the complainant was not sufficiently
established, that the evidence for the prosecution cannot, on its own, stand and suffice to
establish the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. A perusal of the
records and the testimony of the complainant discloses contradictions and inconsistencies on
vital details which lead one to seriously doubt the veracity of her story. The Court also cannot
help but question the conduct of the complainant after the alleged incidents of rape. Her
behavior after the alleged incidents directly contradicts the normal or expected behaviour of a
rape victim.
As things stand, for failing to meet the exacting test of moral certainty, it is incumbent to
set aside the trial court's judgments of conviction for rape. However, the Court must state that it
finds conclusive evidence (no less than the accused-appellant's admission) that on 25 November
1989, the accused Napoleon Subingsubing had sexual intercourse with Mary Jane Espilan when
she was only 16 years of age. The complainant and the accused were living in the same house.
The accused is the uncle of the complainant, brother of her own mother.
Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18
years of age and committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit: any person in public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or

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any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education and custody of the woman
seduced. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying circumstance in the offense. Notably, among the
persons who can commit qualified seduction is a "domestic".

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People v. Alvarez
55 SCRA 81
FACTS: A complaint for rape signed by the offended party herself that an information was filed
against appellant Nicanor Alvarez. It is worded thus: "In the City of Naga, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape and have sexual intercourse with
the herein complaining witness, [Loreta T. dela Concepcion], a virgin 13 years of age and sisterin-law of the herein accused, while she was asleep by putting himself atop of her body, against
her will and without her consent." The complainant lived in the house of the accused as she was
taking care of the accused and her sisters son. At the hearing, two witnesses testified for the
prosecution, a certain Dr. Honesto Marco, who issued a medical certificate after examining the
complainant, fully seven months and sixteen days after the alleged rape, to the effect that she
was in an advanced stage of pregnancy something rather obvious from her physical condition, 2
and the complainant. It was therefore solely on the basis of the testimony of the offended party
herself that the lower court in the decision now on appeal, found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape.
HELD: No. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside. He is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Seduction.
Hence, in his capacity as head of the family and master of the house, appellant was, for
all intents and purposes, the custodian of the complainant. But even though he were not clearly
or formally entrusted with the custody of the offended party, it is beyond doubt that, as the latter
was serving in his house or was therein as a domestic a term embracing 'persons usually
living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in this sense, a part
thereof' ... the appellant upon taking advantage of his authority and abusing the confidence
and trust reposed on him as master of the house, violated the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article
337 of the Revised Penal Code."
The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any
of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 'is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ... even
though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of
the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an
integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple
seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an
abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud.'"

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People v. Pascua
406 SCRA 103
FACTS: The RTC of Pangasinan finds the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four
counts of rape. Private complainants Liza and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twins aging 12
years old at the time of the crime. The appellant was their neighbor in Calvo, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. Liza and Anna considered appellant as their grandfather although he was not related
to them.
It was alleged that private complainants were playing near the house of the appellant when
the latter called Liza and instructed her to buy juice at the store. Liza obeyed. After she returned
from the store, the appellant ordered Liza to go inside his house and lie down on the floor.
Appellant then removed Lizas pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis into
her vagina and made push and pull movements. Liza tried to scream but appellant threatened to
kill her.
After the sexual intercourse, the appellant gave Liza P10 and warned her not to reveal the
incident to her mother and she remained silent.
The same thing happened again when Liza was called by the appellant as she was
passing by his house. Lizas twin sister, Anna, suffered the same fate at the hands of the
appellant twice.
The accused was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on four
counts as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by RA 7659. Insisting on his innocence, the appellant claims in his appeal that he is
not guilty of rape because private complainants voluntarily submitted to his sexual desires. The
appellant even postulates that, if there should at all be any liability on his part, it should only be
for simple seduction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly held the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape and not the crime of simple seduction.
HELD: Yes. The prosecution was able to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed
by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy his lust.Untenable is the argument of the Pascuat
that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338
of the RPC, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some deceitful promise or
inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this promise or inducement. In this
case, the appellant claims that the acts of sexual intercourse with the private complainants were
in exchange for money. He declared that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna,
he would promise them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant presented no
proof that private complainants consent was secured by means of such promise. As aptly opined
by the trial court, the money given by the appellant to private complainants was not intended to
lure them to have sex with him. Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure
that nobody discovered his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than

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enough to show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private complainants was totally
absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies established that the appellant had sexual
intercourse with them without their consent and against their will. Considering that the victims
accounts of what the appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial
court correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-year-old twins,
Liza and Anna Paragas.

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People v. Teodosio
198 SCRA 121
FACTS: On that fateful day of December 19, 1985 Elaine and appellant were together from 7:00
o'clock in the morning when they met in front of the Fargo Department Store in Caloocan City
when they attended the Christmas party at the Manila Central University, where Elaine was
enrolled, up to 10:00 A.M. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Luneta where they took a stroll.
Then they went to the Fiesta Carnival at Cubao, Quezon City and they ate at a nearby
McDonald's restaurant. They later proceeded to Lyceum where appellant took his examinations
at about 2:30 P.M. Then he fetched Elaine at the canteen where she was waiting. They rode the
metropolitan light rail transit at the Central Station up to Doroteo Jose Street. Upon alighting
therefrom, they walked to the Champion Lodging House. After drinking two glasses of
pineapple juice, they had sexual intercourse. They stayed overnight in the said motel.
It was alleged that the accused, being much older than Elaine, dragged her to the hotel
and took advantage of, deceived and abused the latter sexually by raping her when she was
unconscious on account of her having drunk the drugged softdrink or pineapple juice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape
HELD: No. The accused was acquitted of the crime of rape neither can he be convicted for
simple seduction. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to prove
that their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the prosecution, served to
demolish the same.
Firstly, her medical examination did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any
force on her. Indeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped during the
many hours they were together going from one place to another, but she did not. She was
enjoying their tryst. Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all. She did not show any
sign of having had a traumatic experience.
Verily, the foregoing circumstances disproves the theory of force and involuntariness in the
sexual interlude of the two. What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by
their mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus
consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liable for rape as
there was none committed. It was a consensual affair.
Neither the crime committed by appellant is simple seduction in Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code. All the elements of the offense are present. Frankly 1. Elaine was over 12 and
under 18 years of age; 2. She is single and of good reputation; 3. The offender had sexual
intercourse with her; 4. It was committed by deceit.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully persuaded her to
give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that attended the commission of the
offense.11
Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged nor necessarily

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included in the offense charged in the information. The only elements of the offense alleged in
the sworn complaint of the offended party is that she is over 12 years of age when appellant had
carnal knowledge of her.

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People v. Lining
384 SCRA 427
FACTS: That on or about the 5th day of October, 1997, at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or
less, in sitio Buho, Barangay Mabuslot, municipality of Pinamalayan, province of Oriental
Mindoro, the accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in common accord, with lewd and
unchaste design, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with threat and
intimidation with use of a deadly weapon, forcibly abduct one Emelina Ornos, a 15-year-old girl,
towards an unoccupied house and thereat and pursuant to their criminal conspiracy and
motivated with lustful desire, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and had carnal
knowledge one after the other of said victim against her will and without her consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, use of deadly
weapon and abuse of superior strength are attendant.
Accused Lining denied the accusations against him and disputed the findings of the trial
court. He alleged that in the morning of October 4, 1997, his brother-in-law Artemio Salvacion
invited him to attend a barangay dance in Nabuslot. Later that afternoon, he fetched Ildefonso
Magararu and together, they went to the house of Artemio, arriving thereat at about eight oclock
in the evening where they also met Russel Bolquerin, Allan Salvacion and Lian Salvacion,
Lining was not able to attend the dance party because Artemio requested him to look after the
palay in his house. Instead, he and Ildefonso had some beer and pulutan in the house of Artemio
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Lining guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of abduction with rape and another crime of rape
HELD: Yes. The accused-appellant could only be convicted for the crime of rape, instead of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Indeed, it would appear from the records that the
main objective of the accused when the victim was taken to the house of Mila Salvacion was to
rape her. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant has nothing to offer other than alibi. Further, the testimonies of
accused-appellant and the other witnesses for the defense are not consistent on some material
points. The inconsistencies of the testimonies only added doubt on the mind of the Court
regarding the veracity of the statements of the defense witnesses.
Even a woman of loose morals could still be a victim of rape, for the essence of rape is
the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will and without her consent ] Neither the absence
of physical injuries negates the fact of rape since proof of physical injury is not an element of
rape
Finally, it should be stressed that one who clearly concurred with the criminal design of
another and performed overt acts which led to the multiple rape committed is a co-conspirator.
Therefore, accused-appellant is deemed a co-conspirator for the act of rape committed by his coaccused Lian Salvacion and should accordingly be penalized therefor.

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People v. Egan
382 SCRA 326
FACTS: Lito Egan alias Akiao, thirty-six (36) years old, was an avid admirer of a twelve (12)year old girl named Lenie T. Camad. Both the accused and Lenie were members of the Manobo
indigenous cultural community in Mindanao and residents of Sitio Salaysay, Marilog, Davao
City.
On 6 January 1997 Lenie and her cousin Jessica Silona were fetching water at a deep well
several meters from Lenies house in Sitio Salaysay. In the afternoon, the accused appeared from
nowhere and forcibly dragged and pushed Lenie towards Sitio Dalag, Arakan, Cotabato. He
threatened to kill her if she resisted. Before leaving the site of the deep well, he likewise
terrorized Jessica by brandishing his hunting knife which forced the girl to scamper for safety.
About 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Jessica was able to report to Lenies father, Palmones
Camad, the abduction of his daughter. For four (4) months, the datus attempted a customary
settlement of the abduction in accordance with Manobo traditions. In exchange of the hand of
Lenie in marriage, the accused agreed to give 2 horses to the family of Lenie. When the accused
failed to fulfill his promise, the father demanded the unconditional return of his daughter to his
custody.
Since the amicable settlement was not realized, Akiao forcibly relocated Lenie to
Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where the latter was successfully rescued. Information for
Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed against the accused and after several warrants of arrest
and attempts to arrest him, he was finally arrested at Arakan, Cotabato.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial, accused tried to
prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under Manobo rites in the house of her
father after he has given the family, the dowry. The accused allegedly delivered the horse to the
father, but was again refused when the
latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded that because he
failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed against him.
The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of forcible
abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Egan is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD: No. The decision of the court in convicting accused-appellant LITO EGAN alias Akiao
of forcible abduction with rape is modified and Egan is instead declared guilty of Forcible
Abduction only under Art. 342 of the RPC. All the elements of forcible abduction were proved
in this case. The victim, who is a young girl, was taken against her will as shown by the fact that
at knife-point she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her abode. At
her tender age, Lenie could not be expected to physically resist considering the fact that even her
companion, Jessica Silona, had to run home to escape accused-appellant's wrath as he
brandished a hunting knife. Fear gripped and paralyzed Lenie into helplessness as she was

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manhandled by accused-appellant who was armed and twenty-four (24) years her senior.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was done
con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word lewd is defined
as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has
relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs
were established by the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the
victim after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while Lenie
was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and
although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she
The logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part, and their
respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy of full faith and credit.
Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under
Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and voluntary. Proof
of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and
P2,000.00, with two (2) wild horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her
hand in marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the old man
Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his matrimonial aspiration
with Lenie.
The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accused-appellant which in
reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they were, surely, Lenie would not have
jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having held her against her will and molesting
her and, on top of it all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could
have easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing
untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal reaction would have been to
cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with whom she had a passionate affair. But, on
the contrary, Lenie lost no time in denouncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and
the authorities the disgrace that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father
would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the couple
for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and seeking the
intervention of the datus in resolving the matter.
The sexual abuse which accused-appellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design
inherent in forcible abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot
form the other half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the principal purpose
of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity and that her abduction would
only be a necessary means to commit the same. Surely it would not have been the case that
accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during her four (4)-month captivity, as she
herself admitted, if his chief or primordial intention had been to lay with her. Instead, what we
discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and parcel of her
forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime which was to
remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be and to take her to
some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not

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only to seduce the victim but also to separate her from her family, especially from her father
Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of forcible abduction.

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People

v.

Garcia

378 SCRA 288


FACTS: Cleopatra Changlapon, was nineteen years old and a sophomore student of B.S.
Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University. She left school at 6:30 p.m. to go home to
Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was crossing Bonifacio Street, Baguio City, Cleopatra was
pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door closed and the van sped away and fell
unconscious.
When Cleopatra came to, she was inside a room. She was totally undressed and was
lying flat on her back on a bed. In the room with her were four men. The Bombay-looking man
lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held her left arm. Another man with long
hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right chin with a
lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but accused-appellant held her right arm. While
accused-appellant was seated on her right side and holding her, the Bombay-looking man
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her.
After the Bombay-looking man finished having sexual intercourse with Cleopatra, accusedappellant took his turn and went on top of her. The third man, whom Cleopatra noted had
pimples on his face, went on top of her. The fourth man was next in raping Cleopatra. By that
time, she was feeling helpless and was too tired to struggle. As the fourth man was having sexual
intercourse with her, she saw the Bombay-looking man burning her panties with a lighted
cigarette. She closed her eyes and heard the men laughing. After the fourth man finished raping
her, he got up. She felt dizzy and her private parts were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to
move, but accused-appellant hit her on the abdomen.
One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatras face which made her vision
blurred. She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she blacked out. When she
regained consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere between Tam-awan and
Longlong. It was still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body and
was unable to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to ride the
taxi, she boarded it just to get home. The taxi brought her to her house. Cleopatra just kept
crying and was unable to talk when asked. After some time, when she was able to regain her
composure, she told them that she had been raped by four men.
The Court finds Jeffrey Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and likewise of the three (3) crimes of rape in conspiracy with
three (3) others whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown.
Accused-appellant assails his conviction based on complainants identification. According
to him, the identification was improperly suggested by the police. We are not persuaded. Based
on our own review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither influenced
nor induced by the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her molesters. On the contrary,
the transcripts convincingly show that complainant was left to freely study the faces of the thirty
or more inmates on the basketball court below to see whether she recognized any of them. There
was no suggestion from the police to point to the new detainee, who had just been arrested on

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another rape charge.


ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Garcia of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape.
HELD: No. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs. The crime
of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge
with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation;
(2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented. In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged
the elements of forcible abduction, i.e., the taking of complainant against her against her will
and with lewd design. It was likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused
conspired, confederated and mutually aided one another in having carnal knowledge of
complainant by means of force and intimidation and against her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly
established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreover,
the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant succeeded in
forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape.
Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
He should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three coaccused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted efforts
to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused helped
one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the other
three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to
stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the
rape committed personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well.
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first
rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes
of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of
the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime
of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.
The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when
committed by more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus, accusedappellant should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape.

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People

v.

Napud

66 SCRA 25
FACTS: Esmaylita also filed two separate complaints, one for rape and another for forcible
abduction with rape. In Criminal Case No. 44263 for rape, the complaint alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of September, 1994, in the Municipality of Janiuay, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Alfredo Napud Jr. conspiring, confederating with Tomas Amburgo to better realize their purpose
and armed with a butchers knife (pinute) with deliberate intent and lewd design by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned against her will and consent, after Tomas Amburgo had raped
her.
When arraigned in each of the three cases, both Napud and Amburgo pleaded not guilty
to the charges. The third accused, Romel Brillo, has remained at large.
Both Amburgo and Napud raised the defense of denial and alibi. The trial court summed
up Napuds version as follows:
Accused Alfredo Napud, Jr., alleged that in the afternoon of September 20, 1994, he butchered
the ducks of Betty Barato, their neighbor at Brgy. Matag-ub, Janiuay, Iloilo, and then helped her
husband in cooking it; that he and Betty Baratos son, husband, and father, had a drinking spree
inside the latters house from 8:00 oclock that same evening until 2:00 oclock the following
morning, September 21, 1994 and chose to sleep at the Baratos house the rest of the time until he
was awakened at about 5:30 oclock in the morning by Betty Barato informing him that Brgy.
Councilwoman Teresita Napud was summoning all male residents of the barangay to assemble at
the basketball court for reasons that he did not know; That when he and about 20 other male
residents were made to form a line-up he saw Ernesto Benedicto who looked at each of them in
the line-up; that after a while all the others in the line-up were sent home while he was brought
to the police headquarters where he was again presented to Esmaylita Benedicto and Greg
Cantiller but both of them said that he was not the one; that it was only about 11:00 oclock that
same morning inside the cell at the police headquarters, when Esmaylita Benedicto came back,
that she identified him as the one who allegedly robbed their parents house and raped her, in the
early morning of September 21, 1994.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting him of rape by means of force or
intimidation
HELD: Yes. The trial court found that the forcible abduction with rape alleged in Criminal Case
No. 44264 was absorbed by the rape charged in Criminal Case No. 44263. The evidence for the
prosecution shows that Esmaylita was brought by Amburgo and appellant to a banana plantation
some 1-1/2 kilometers away from her house for the purpose of raping her. Both men then
successively had carnal knowledge of her at said place. Where complainant was forcibly taken
away for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, then the rape so committed may absorb the
forcible abduction. The trial court, thus, correctly held that the rape charged and proved in

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Criminal Case No. 44263 already absorbed the forcible abduction with rape complained of in
Criminal Case No. 44264.

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Manuel v. People
476 SCRA 461
FACTS: Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaa. He met Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan
City sometime in January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student,
while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one
thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he
was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They
were married before the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in
their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, starting
1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in
January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support. Tina learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him.
She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that
his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed
in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial
Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten
years, and an amount of P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary
reward for moral damages was affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manuel is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Yes. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression
that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an
absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with
malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact
or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense

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negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;

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Diego v. Castillo
436 SCRA 67
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q.
Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or
rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:
a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos.
In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil
status of single;
b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Divorce and purportedly
issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247 th
Judicial District), it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore
existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and
Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.
c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein
complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy,
parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and
adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.[if
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on
February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:A careful study of the disputed decision
reveals that respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and
jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the
honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment.
HELD: No. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized
under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the
judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously,
intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge
to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the
judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same
was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case
submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is
unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the
judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

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That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains
the law.
As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused,
she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be
proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint.
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

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Abunado v. People
426 SCRA 662
FACTS: The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo.
Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her
husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato.
She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a
certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.
An annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for
bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial
court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966.
It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida
remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with
the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy. On Appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court appreciating the
mitigating circumstance that the accuse seventy six years of age then.
He argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was
contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman
while his first marriage was subsisting.
HELD: No. The statement in the information that the crime was committed in or about and
sometime in the month of January, 1995, was an obvious typographical error, for the same
information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias
Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the information was
defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction
unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been
raised. It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
possesses all the requisites for validity. All of these have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the
Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court
of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

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the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.

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Morigo v. People
422 SCRA 378
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she
filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a
suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab
initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: No. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing
of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family
Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means
that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date
of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no
appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision
had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.

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Mercado v. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS: Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for
having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27,
1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As
shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential
requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his
previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant
had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo
Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no
judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of
such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He
was still at the time validly married to his first wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is guilty of bigamy in spite of the filing the declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage.
HELD: Yes. It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not
a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family
Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x
x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the
first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him
with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed
the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view

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effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

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Garcia v. CA
266 SCRA 201
FACTS: On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office an "Affidavit of Complaint" charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P.
Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No.
6085, for being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without
the said marriage having been dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which
marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989 and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his
letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner
informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy.
The trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case. The court
believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for the
offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under Article 25
of the same Code, then said offense should prescribe in fifteen (15) years as provided in Article
92 of the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage of the accused to one
Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the offense
charged has already prescribed when the information was filed in this case on November 15,
1991. The argument presented by the prosecution that it was difficult for the complainant to
obtain evidence of the alleged first marriage, hence, the prescriptive period should be counted
from the time the evidence was secured will not hold water.
The petitioner then appealed to the CA. He contended therein that: (a) the trial court
erred in quashing the information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the
accused was barred from filing the motion to quash the information against the accused. As to
the first, the petitioner argued that bigamy was a public offense, hence "the offended party is not
the first or second (innocent) spouse but the State whose law/policy was transgressed." The
petitioner added that the "interchanging use" In Article 91 of the RPC of the terms "offended
party," "authorities," and "their agents" supports his view that the State is the offended party in
public offenses.
The CA gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that the petitioner
discovered the private respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the information in this case was
filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years after the discovery of the offense, then
the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. It further held that the quash of an
information based on prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after arraignment
and even on appeal, for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the criminal liability of a person is
"'totally extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the crime, which is a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability." Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defense.
Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to annul
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and to compel the respondent court to remand

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the case to the trial court for further proceedings.


ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's
order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.
HELD: No. It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the
petitioner does, that only the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other public
offenses, and, therefore, only the State's discovery of the crime could effectively commence the
running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that "[t]he period
of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ."
It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances.
The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272. The
information therein, which he copied in full in the petition in this case, describes him as the
"offended party" who suffered "damage and prejudice . . . in such amount as may be awarded
under the provisions of the Civil Code."
The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the
discovery of the crimes, but to their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision
of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.14324 is AFFIRMED.

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Fermin v. People
GR No. 157643
FACTS: This is a case for Libel filed by a showbiz couple namely, Annabelle Rama Gutierrez
and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C Tugas before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Brach 218. The two (2) criminal informations
uniformly read, as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-inChief of Gossip Tabloid with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District,
Quezon City, and circulated in Quezon City and other parts of Metro Manila and the whole
country, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, publicly
and acting with malice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously print and
circulate in the headline and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995
the following material, to wit:
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN
DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE
IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN
ANG

ASUNTO

NILA DUN,

BUKOD

PA SA NAPAKARAMING

PINOY

NA

HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN


NIYANG

HARAPIN

SA

STATES

DAHIL

SA

PERANG

NADISPALKO

NILA,

NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES


NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA
SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely false
and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said
ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to
be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and
contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of the
said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas both pleaded not guilty.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint Decisions dated
January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the
CA. The appellate court, in its Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of
petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous
article. The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution

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dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.


ISSUE: Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for libel?
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas
cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was evident from
his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit.
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which
provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is
chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of
each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. However, proof adduced
during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the
corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or
publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article.
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article 360
includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but
also the person who prints or publishes it.
Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the
publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified
as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are
in this case.
Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and
publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was written. Moreover, his
alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at the Mother of
Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending
physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work.
However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the appellate
court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of the Supreme Court, But,
of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because with
his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject article in the
June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the mantle of press freedom,
and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on her
arguments by analyzing the libelous articles, to wit:
The banner headlines of the offending article read:

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KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE


RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA
STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN SI
ANNABELLE!
On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold letters,
are:
HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL
NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN
NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG
HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA
KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON NA RIN SIYANG
INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA KABABAYAN NATING
NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA
PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA
IBINEBENTA NILA NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA
NAGKAPROBLEMA, MILYON-MILYON ANG INVOLVED,
KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI SA PILIPINAS
NOON.

A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,


real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead. In determining whether the statement is defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would
certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation (that
the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in
America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being
fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade
prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings
from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made
publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were
identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.

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Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public
officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public
interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected
speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his
duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise
to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being
personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers
and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and
dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast
media or in print, about their personal lives.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel should be
upheld.

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Buatis v. People
485 SCRA 275
FACTS: On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Pieraz, retrieved a letter
from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope,
and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her husband's desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the
letter and made out its content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity,
Metro Manila
August 18, 1995
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , PasigCity, Metro Manila
Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed
to our client; using carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs.
Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity, Metro Manila--undersigned much to his regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint
for disbarment against you.
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless
for you to cite specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter
of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing
administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of
justice, so as we can prove 'who is who once and for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;

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(Signed)
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in- Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: 'Satan, senile, stupid,
[E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject
letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and
they all chided him telling him: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it
was at the behest of the president of the organization 'Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga
Manggahan or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of
his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August
1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that
letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had
made and sent another letter, this time dated
August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed
before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents,
among which was his admission that indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the
letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 1997 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of libel.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA which, in its Decision
dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court. The CA denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Buatis is guilty of libel?
HELD: Yes. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and (d) the victim must be

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identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is
publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it
has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to
all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author
of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when
found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed
to respondent himself.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in
their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid
down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the
following to say on this point:In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two
rules of construction are conspicuously applicable:(1)That construction must be adopted which
will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense
in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered.(2)The published matter
alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any
subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account.The whole
question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having
been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect
of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.ry
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18,
1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as 'lousy', 'inutile',
'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the
character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner
have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: 'Ginagawa ka
lang gago dito.
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule
laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the
imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice
in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious (malice in law). A
reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for
writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed

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petitioner's good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the
legal inference of malice.
Thus, the Supreme Court find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the
findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.

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Magno v. People
480 SCRA 276
FACTS: This is a case for Libel committed by Dolores Magno on various occasions against
Cerelito T. Alejandro, the formers neighbor for almost 20 years at PucayVillage, Marcos
Highway, Baguio City.
In the afternoon of March 2, 1991, Cerelito, while at the upper portion of his house, saw
Dolores write on the wall at the back of her garage the following words: 'Huag Burahin Bawal
Dumaan Dito ang Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso katulad ni Cere Lito O. Cedring.
Feeling that he was the 'Cere', 'Lito or 'Cedring being alluded to, Cerelito reported the
matter to the local police and filed an affidavit-complaint with the Fiscal's Office.
Subsequently, or on March 9, 1991, at around 4:00 p.m., Rodelito, Cerelito's 16-year old
son, while on his way to buy bread at a nearby store, saw Dolores writing something on her
garage's extension wall with the use of a paint brush and red paint. In full, the writing reads:
"HUAG BURAHIN BAWAL DUMAAN ANG SUSPETSOSA BASTOS AT MAKAPAL NA
MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW NG ASO KATULAD NI
CERELITO." After reading what was thus written, Rodelito proceeded with his errand and, upon
reaching home, related what he saw to his father.
Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to, Cerelito lost no
time in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP). Pictures were then taken of the
aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding,
following an investigation, probable cause for libel against Dolores, filed the corresponding
information giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R.
Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito, Dolores, in the
morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver her 3-page letter-answer
written in yellow pad and addressed to the station sub-commander.
At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to and instructed
Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white, long, ordinary envelope to Fe
Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the house at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed
envelope to Cerelito, who immediately read the three (3) separate letters contained in the
envelope. Evelyn followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching
home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991.
The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was addressed to
spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the information in Criminal Case No.
8806-R, this unsigned letter reads:
If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila then comply & if your
husband can't understand this simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang
kahig isang tukang pamilya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag
na niya kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa
Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa siyang
marumi at putang ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng tao.Huag niyang

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ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin.Siya ang magnanakaw at


mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa lote
ninyo.Pinalakad ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo magsalita mambintang
ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang magnanakaw ang
asawa mo para malinaw.
The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following addendum written in
ink at the back page thereof which reads:
Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang mukha mo at ikaw pa ang
magpapablotter sa akin para pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo masasabi na
pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa inyo. Tanga.
The third letter, a photocopy of Dolores signed letter dated March 15, 1991, to the SubStation 5 Commander of BCP purportedly in reply to the statement given by Fe Alejandro to the
police station on March 3, 1991, reads, in part, as follows:
The Sub Station Commander
Sub-Station 5
Marcos Highway, B.C.
Dear sir:
cralawxxxxxxxxx
Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a maniac.Pumasok siya sa lote ko
sa garahe na naging shelter (temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagkatapos ng lindol (3 weeks
after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas ang zipper ng pantaloon nakayapak na
walang sapin sa paa.Tulog na kami.We were awakened by the constant barking of my dogs.I
have 3 native dogs but 1 was slaughtered by Mr. Cerelito Alejandro '.He is even a dog-napper.
My Manang Louie can relate the incident since we were out of the country x x x.I don't trust him
as my kapitbahay na bantay salakay.In simple tagalog magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon
dahil takaw na takaw at walang maibili.
It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged with libel under four
(4) separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804-R, 8805-R and 8806-R and raffled to Branch 6 of the court.
Upon arraignment, Dolores, as accused, entered a plea of Not Guilty to each of the offenses
charges in the four informations aforecited. Following a joint trial, the trial court rendered
judgment on September 23, 1993, finding her guilty of libel in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8804-R
and 8806-R and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment and ordering her to indemnify the
offended party a certain sum as moral damages. In Criminal Cases Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R,
however, she was acquitted.
On Appeal, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC.

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The appellate court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of Dolores Magno for lack of
merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Magno could be held liable for libel?
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that to be liable for libel under Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable
act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
There can be no quibbling about the defamatory nature of the written imputation or
allegations hurled against Cerelito. And the derogatory writings were obviously made out of illwill or revenge.The issue of defamation, malice or the identity of the person defamed is not even
raised in this recourse.
As earlier recited, the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R arose out of what
Dolores wrote about the spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro contained in an unsealed envelope
and delivered, through Evelyn Arcartado, on March 15, 1991. Dolores contends that, from the
time Evelyn was physically handed the unsealed envelope to the time the
latter turned it over to Cerelito, no one opened or read the offending letter contained therein.
Prescinding therefrom, Dolores argues against the existence of libel, citing, for the purpose,
American jurisprudence holding that "where libelous matter is communicated only to a person
defamed and he voluntarily discloses the contents of the libelous communication to others, the
originator of the libel is not responsible for the publication."Dolores argues that since the
obnoxious letter was addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro, Fe was, insofar as Cerelito
is concerned, not a third person for purposes of publication. She further declares that to call the
husband (Cerelito) a thief in connection with a charge that he and his wife had stolen goods, is
not to speak words of defamation of him alone so as to make the utterance in the presence of his
wife a publication.
Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter, after it has
been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. If the
statement is sent straight to a person for whom it is written there is no publication of it. The
reason for this is that 'a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot
injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good
opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him.
Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute publication,
for the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the
person defamed therein. Fe, the wife, is, in context, a third person to whom the publication was
made.
Finally, the Court cannot give credence to Dolores' allegation that she is not the author of
the unsigned libelous letter. It cannot be overstressed that she herself handed the unsigned letter
to Evelyn Arcartado with specific instructions to give the same to Fe Alejandro. Likewise, the
contents of the letters are basically reiteration/elaborations of Dolores' previous writing on the

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wall and her letter to the BCP Sub-Station commander. What the Court of Appeals said on this
point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance.
The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently established.
Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA and the trial court in
adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of libel cannot be sustained.

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Macasaet v. People
452 SCRA 225
FACTS: In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano,
Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the
newspaper Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the
crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS
QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE
LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing
editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD,
a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and
contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and maliciously
write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and
circulated in the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses
that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners' contention that he could only file his libel suit in the City
of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided
at the time the purported libelous article was printed is tenable.
HELD: Yes. The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the
institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:

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Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in
the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article
is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed
and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published.
The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and
that of the Court of Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this
point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties. [49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts
jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is
deemed perfected as to him.[50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all
the parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time
and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial
court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration
of the period to do so for all the parties.[51]
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private
and the public prosecutors before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing
of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect an appeal by all the parties,
the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two
incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is
supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the government.

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Vasquez v. CA
314 SCRA 480
FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in
April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority
(NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay
Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA
officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the
NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following exerpts
of the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were
supposed allegations by Vasquez that (1) nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo
upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan,
nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA;
(3) kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa
mga nakawan ng manok. x x x
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner
alleging that the latters statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel.
HELD: No. To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a
crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which
tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required
that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a
third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for a mans reputation is the estimate in
which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself.
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a
third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.
Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or security duty; and

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2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.
In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if the ill will is engendered by
one's sense of justice or other legitimate or plausible motive, such feeling negatives actual
malice. The anger observed by trial court to have been shown by the petitioner towards private
complainant at the time the former offered his testimony in defense of libel cannot be properly
considered as malice, either in fact or in law, that accompanied the dissemination of an alleged
libelous publication. For the anger discerned of petitioner on the witness stand could also mean
anger not only borne out of a sense of justice frustrated by the continued refusal of Judge Sidro
to return to him his cash bond, but also at being criminally sued in court for an act which he
stoutly believed was not imputable to him. This state of mind cannot be appropriately considered
malice and applied retroactively to the time of the distribution of the alleged libelous article
unless clear and convincing evidence shows otherwise; and, there is no such contrary evidence
in the case at bar. Since there is no indication about the cause of such display of "intense hatred"
by the petitioner for Judge Sidro, the Court will grant him the benefit of the doubt under the
"equipoise doctrine."
There was nothing defamatory in the news item. This much was found by the trial court
itself, noting that the published article was merely a factual report about the filing by the
Ombudsman of the charge of corruption against the judge with the Sandiganbayan. Of course, it
does not necessarily mean that if the news article complained of is not libelous because it is a
privileged matter, he who repeats the publication is likewise free from accountability for the reutterance. We recognize that a person's liability for libel does not necessarily proceed from the
fact that he was the original publisher of the discreditable act. The maker of a libelous
republication or repetition, although not liable for the results of the primary publication, is liable
for the consequences of a subsequent publication which he makes or participates in making so
long as the elements of libel are satisfied. But in every case malice must be present, something
which has not been shown in the case at bar.
The law presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation.

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Vicario v. CA
308 SCRA 25
FACTS: ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Catarman, Northern Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Mondragon-San Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining witness. According to the Information,
the crime was committed when Vicario allegedly distributed and circulated in the vicinity of the
Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page 7 of the 20 March 1992
issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer which contained the following article: SAMAR JUDGE
WHO POCKETED BOND CHARGED WITH GRAFT OMBUDSMAN -- Conrado Vasquez
yesterday filed with the Sandiganbayan graft charges against a Northern Samar judge who
pocketed the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by a respondent in one of several cases pending in his
sala. Charged was Judge Proceso Sidro of the Northern Samar municipal circuit trial court in
Mondragon.Investigation showed that Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk-ofcourt, and refused to return the money even after the accused who filed the bond was already
acquitted in the case. Private complainant Sidro alleged that petitioner's act greatly prejudiced
his reputation as a member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner Vicario on the
other hand disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, at the
same time asserting that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed a criminal
charge for graft and corruption against Judge Sidro before the Ombudsman and an
administrative complaint for dishonesty with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of petitioner in giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to
Amador Montes where the news item was published, constitutes the crime of libel.
HELD: No. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act
or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and, (d) existence of malice.
The evidence on record clearly shows that the elements above enumerated have not been
satisfactorily established as to conclude that libel was committed by petitioner. Thus, we rule in
his favor. For an incongruency exists between the evidence on one hand, and the findings of fact
and of law by the trial court and the appellate court on the other, which we must reconcile, if not
rectify.
As found by the trial court, there was no evidence at all to show that petitioner was the source of
the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Indeed, for
not only was the news item by itself bereft of this information, the records also confirmed its
absence. This is why it was incorrect for the appellate court to find that "the news item was

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patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint of the appellant imputing a criminal act on Judge
Sidro filed with the Ombudsman (emphasis ours)" when no basis, factual or legal, exists for so
ruling. To be sure, the Affidavit-Complaint was merely a narration of the facts constituting the
cause of action of petitioner. Its contents never appeared in the news article which spoke only of
the filing by the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Sidro after
its investigation of a complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an accused after
the latter's acquittal in a criminal case. There is no specific reference therein to petitioner nor to
his Affidavit-Complaint. Since it has not been established that he caused the publication of the
subject article nor was the source thereof, it would be inappropriate to conclude that through the
disputed news item he ascribed a criminal act to Judge Proceso Sidro. Parenthetically, it would
have been more accurate for the appellate court to state that the news article was culled from the
resolution of the Ombudsman directing the filing of a criminal charge based on the results of his
investigation of a complaint leveled against the named judge. But then, if it did, it would have
been left with no basis at all to hold, as in fact it did, that Vicario maliciously imputed a
discreditable act to respondent judge, and there would be no more justification for the finding
that the first element of libel was established.

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Villanueva v. People
487 SCRA 42
FACTS: Sometime in September 1994, petitioner was filing an application for monetized leave
for the approval of herein complainant. The application was not immediately attended to by
complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matters to her secretary. A heated
argument then ensued between the complainant and the enraged defendant Villanueva. In the
presence of several persons, defendant Villanueva, in a loud voice and within hearing distance of
everyone present, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and insulting
manner the following words: "Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man malinis, garapal ca" and "Balamu
mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat" (You are pretending to be
clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt; you are like a red apple, but
inside you are worm infested and extremely dirty).

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation.

HELD: Yes. Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term
oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or
means of livelihood. There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The
gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on
the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will
fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and
accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of
the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might
tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of
Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate
language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, it should be noted
that such scathing words were uttered by petitioner in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as
found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve
the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. The rule that all possible circumstances
favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor. The slander committed by petitioner can be
characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat
of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.

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Caal v. People
473 SCRA 403
FACTS: Petitioner is accused of bringing private complainant Daylinda Caal, into discredit,
disrepute and contempt when he unlawfully and publicly speak and utter against her the
following insulting words and expressions, to wit: AYAW MO KAHADLOK SA TESTIGOS
NI DAYLINDA KAY WALAY BANCA-AGAN, NAHADLOK KAW KANG DAYLINDA,
NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT which if translated in
English language will mean (You afraid to the witness of Daylinda who had no how, why you
afraid to Daylinda, she live from stealing, she is a long time thieves) and other words of similar
imports.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statements of the petitioner constitute oral defamation.
HELD: Yes. To say that Daylinda is a thief is irrefragably grave oral defamation. This imputes to
her a crime that is dishonorable or contemptuous. The Court affirms the trial courts award of
moral damages in favor of the private complainant. Article 2219(7) of the New Civil Code
allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
This provision establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover
from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. It must be remembered
that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the
style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at
bar. Indeed, calling Daylinda a thief is defamation against her character and reputation sufficient
to cause her embarrassment and social humiliation. Daylinda testified to the feelings of shame
and humiliation she suffered as a result of the incident complained of.

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PADER v. PEOPLE
325 SCRA 117
FACTS: On April 20, 1995, Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversing with his political
leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner appeared at the gate and
shouted Putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter was dumbfounded
and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong,
Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995. On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the MTC of
Bataan a complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pader is guiltly of slight oral defamation.
HELD: Yes. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon
the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and
the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual
backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its
decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolangos
reputation since the parties were political opponents.
We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were
also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the
fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father
died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
In Reyes vs. People, we ruled that the expression putang ina mo is a common enough
utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates ones expression of
profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father,
a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger.
Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the
latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval
or dislike of his person are not uncommon.

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VICTORIO v. CA
173 SCRA 645
FACTS: Atty. Vivencio Ruiz,has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil
cases from 1953 until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty.
L. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal
Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Exequiel Victorio and his wife afterwards filed an administrative
charge against Judge Guiang which was assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for investigation and disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio is the
son of Exequiel Victoria.
During the hearing of the administrative case, in the sala of Judge Avancea, Atty. Castillo,
counsel of the Victorios, presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancea to hear the
administrative case. After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down
the corridor, petitioners were overheard by Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City
and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the following defamatory words:
Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang
at estapador."
Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta
abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putanginang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.")
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio of
serious oral defamation and not slight oral defamation.
HELD: No. There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case.
Appellant-petitioner in this instant appeal, does not deny that the accused, on the occasion in
question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the sole issue that the
Court has to resolve is whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation
or simply slight oral defamation.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of
base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the
demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation
shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]).
To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court
adopted the following guidelines:
. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall
under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and grammatical

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meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession
are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where
statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their
ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are
libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states
cause of action." Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing
with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are slanderous per se.

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Ivler v. San Pedro


GR No. 172716
FACTS: Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the MeTC of Pasig City with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband. On 7 September 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused the petition, finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
RTC of Pasig City. Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with
the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on
the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A.
No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponces husband.
HELD: Yes. The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution
for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts,
were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it

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would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest. The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution
for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code. The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense
by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our ruling today secures for the accused
facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article
48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article
365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this
ruling.

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Loney v. People
482 SCRA 194
FACTS: Petitioners are officers of Marcopper, a corporation engaged in mining in the province
of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March
1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In August 1996, the
Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac,
Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), Section 108 of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), and Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the grounds that the Informations were
"duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
"absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942.
HELD: No. The Court had continuously ruled that a single act or incident might offend against
two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense. In
P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of
mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit
from the authorities concerned. In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be
proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In R.A. 7942
(Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and
gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate. On the other hand, the additional element that must be
established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent
damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws. The claim that the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as
those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal
intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.

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Abueva v. People
390 SCRA 82
FACTS: Abueva was charged before the RTC of Davao City in an information of Reckless
Imprudence resulting in homicide for the death of Lourdes Mangruban qualified by petitioners
failure to render or lend assistance on the spot to the victim such help as may be in the hands of
the accused to give. It was alleged that petitioner drove and moved a passenger bus out of the
terminal building even before Lourdes Mangruban, a passenger of said bus, could properly find
and safely take her seat, and that as a direct result of said negligence, recklessness and
carelessness, Mangruban fell down to the cemented pavement of the terminal road and sustained
the injuries which caused her death. The facts showed that the victim, Lourdes Mangruban, fell
rather than jumped off the bus. The claim of the defense that the deceased jumped off the bus is
incredible and contrary to human experience.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide?
HELD: Yes. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place. Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the bus company
for 18 years and has undergone training courses and seminars to improve his skills as a driver.
He is expected to be well aware of his responsibilities to his passengers. Not only must he make
sure that they reach their destinations on time, he must also ensure their safety while they are
boarding, during the entire trip, and upon disembarking from the vehicle. Having failed to
exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident, petitioners liability for the death of
passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by the lower courts, must be sustained.

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People v. Carmen
355 SCRA 287
FACTS: On or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 oclock p.m., in the City of
Cebu, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy Luntayao which injuries caused the death of the
said Randy Luntayao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants can be guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicice even the information filed charges them with murder.
HELD: Yes. The accused are all declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In
Samson v. Court of Appeals, the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa through
falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of
the accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended
that the appeals court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because
the information charged him with having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this
contention, the Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime
in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission
of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the
situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but
from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act
with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the
identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the
information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful
but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation
and proof. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted
by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that
the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was
committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of
negligence.
In People v. Fernando, the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the
trial court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.

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People v. Belbes
834 SCRA 161
FACTS: Appellant Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned by the Bacacay
Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay
High School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca,
appellant, Pat. Pabon and Elmo Bes were watching the dance, two students, Riselle Banares and
Juliana Basaysay, approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems that there is somebody
making trouble." Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with a rifle and a revolver, respectively,
responded forthwith. Moments after the two police officers left, bursts of gunfire filled the air.
Fernando Bataller, a student of Pili Barangay High School, was hit on different parts of his body
and died. Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in the
company of Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and holding on
to the bamboo wall of the schools temporary building, the bamboo splits broke. At this instance,
appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared. Without warning, appellant fired his gun. Fernando slumped
on the ground, bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat. Pabon fled from the crime scene.
Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the autopsy report,
Fernando suffered the following gunshot wounds: (1) head, located at the right lower face, skin,
muscles, blood vessels, nerves, bone torn away; (2) chest (front, located at left, antero lateral
approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, another gunshot wound on the same
location with tattooing located at left lateral waistline; (3) chest (back) located at the middle
back at the level of the lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away, another gunshot
wound located at the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, with tattooing.
ISSUE: Whether or not Belbes can be convicted of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
HELD: No. The appellant is guilty of tbe crime of homicide. The RTC also erred in convicting
him of murder. On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out
murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as
conclusively as the killing itself. For the same to be considered as a qualifying circumstance,
two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means, method or manner of execution
which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of
the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the
means, method or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
There is no showing that the shooting was premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim,
employed means, methods or forms to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended victim might make. Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack
does not necessarily imply treachery.
On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
because the shooting was intentional. Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

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are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who was killed by the accidental discharge
brought about by negligent handling; or (2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones
house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the balcony front; or (3) where
the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout
continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who
died soon thereafter. In this case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY
the victim.
We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being one mitigating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty should be reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying
the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken from prision
mayor.

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