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Teresa L. Ebert
The "Difference" of
Postmodern Feminism
In feminism, as elsewhere, "postmodern" has become a loaded and politically volatile word. Many feminists are opposed to it, worried that such a term
may trivialize the serious import of feminism, which is intervention and social
change. Underlying such mistrust is the common misunderstanding of postmodernism as a fad based on passing desires and trivial pursuits. This may be true of
some aspects of postmodernism, but it is not at all characteristic of postmodernism in general; it is a significant political, cultural, and historical development.
Teresa L. Ebert teaches postmodern critical theory and feminism at the State University of New York at
Albany. She has completed a book on postmodern materialist feminism called Patriarchal Narratives
and is at work on another on feminist theory and postmodern politics. In 1990 she organized and directed
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used to make sense of these groups-as in the conflicts over the terms,
"Negro," "Black," "African-American"-and their effects on the social situation of the racial other. Resistance postmodernism, thus, draws its linguistic theory not from Saussure but from Bakhtin and Voloshinov, who argued that the
"sign becomes an arena of the class struggle" (23) or, more generally, of social
struggle. Out of this politicized difference, resistance postmodernists can build a
new socially transformative politics of emancipation and freedom from gender,
race, and class exploitation.
There are thus two radically different notions of politics in postmodernism.
Ludic politics is a textual practice that seeks open access to the free play of signification in order to disassemble the dominant cultural policy (totality), which
tries to restrict and stabilize meaning. Whereas resistance postmodernism, I contend, insists on a materialist political practice that works for equal access for all
to social resources and for an end to the exploitative exercise of power.
The problem, to my mind, with most feminist discussions of postmodernism-whether they oppose or embrace it-is that they treat ludic discourses and
practices, particularly those of Lyotard and Derrida, as largely synonymous with
postmodernism. Feminists have, by and large, failed to see that postmodernism
is itself divided by a radical difference. This tendency is quite evident not only in
such poststructuralist works as Alice Jardine's Gynesis but also in more social
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of feminism, the contestations within feminism itself over social, political, theo-
retical, and strategic priorities. But I think we have to view these struggles
among various feminisms as necessary moves for dealing with the historical
limits and appropriations of specific feminist theories, strategies, and practices.
In fact, we can conceptualize feminism as a dynamic ensemble of contesting rewritings not only of patriarchy but of different feminisms in order to develop
more effective practices for transforming patriarchal social relations.
I would like to focus in this particular rewriting of feminism on activating a
"political difference" that can then be used for a more productive rewriting of
patriarchy. I will argue that for this project of rewriting to be politically effective, it must move beyond merely reversing the hierarchy that suppresses the
other or simply displacing the hierarchy altogether in the celebration of the local
and the regional. Instead it needs to inquire into the power relations requiring
such suppression. Differences, I will contend, are produced by social conflicts
which ultimately privilege one set of differences in order to serve the interests of
dominant social relations. Feminist rewriting thus not only needs to reveal the
concealed other but also to ask why it has been suppressed. It needs to examine
what is at stake in its exclusion and what the political consequences of its articulation are: what practices, ideologies, and relations its silence legitimates and
reinforces. Then it needs to articulate the social struggles in which difference is
inscribed in order to activate old and new sites of resistance, opposition, and
change.
Feminism inscribes gender in culture and society in various opposing ways.
In fact, feminism is engaged in contestation over the "difference" of difference--over the status of gender, or more specifically of "woman" as the sexual
"other," and thus how to write difference into culture as well as what to write as
a difference. The current debate in feminism is mainly over identity and difference, in which a postmodern notion of difference calls into question the very
men and women alike. In other words, the "self-hood" of women is the same
as, that is, "identical" with, their immanent human nature, specifically, their rational consciousness (which is the same as men's). Any differences between men
and women are thus thought to be the result of the violence of an unjust society
that prevents women from fully developing their innate (human) reason. By
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denying women access to education, to economic independence, and legal responsibility-as is still the case in many parts of the world--or by continuing to
restrict women's economic opportunities and individual rights (as in abortion),
patriarchal society cripples and distorts women's innate capabilities-which they
share with men-and denies women their "natural rights" to fully develop their
reason and achieve "self-fulfillment," to use a favorite term of liberal feminists.
For many feminists, the claim made by Enlightenment and liberal feminism
ences vary considerably among these feminists, ranging from biological causes, as
in Shulamith Firestone's claims that "biology itself-procreation-is at the origin
of the dualism" (8), to social and cultural factors. In environmental explanations,
women's different modes of thinking, characteristics, and values are seen as developing out of women's nearly universal participation in, and often their confinement
to, the domestic sphere and its duties and responsibilities, especially mothering and
the care of dependents, whether young or old. As one of the main documents of
contemporary radical feminism, Roxanne Dunbar's "Female Liberation as the
Basis for Social Revolution," puts it, "'maternal traits' " are "conditioned into
women." Dunbar adds that "most women have been programmed from early childhood for a role, maternity, which develops a certain consciousness of care for
others, self-reliance, flexibility, non-competitiveness, cooperation" (550). Carol
Gilligan, for example, contends that women and men generate opposing forms of
moral reasoning and ethics: women are concerned with an "ethics of care" and a
"morality of responsibility," whereas men, because of their different socialization
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and experiences in the "public" world, stress a "morality of rights" (5-23). Other
feminists, from Charlotte Perkins Gilman to Mary Daly, find that women as a group
are creative, peaceful, nondominating, and healing, whereas men and the patriarchal institutions and practices they have produced are destructive, violent,
exploitative, and dominating. In addition, many feminists also elaborate related
sets of differences: women are considered-whether by biological or social factors-to be situated primarily in the body and the contingencies of everyday reality
(as in housekeeping and child care); thus women tend to be focused on the concrete
and contingent and to be more sensuous, emotional, and associational in their
thinking while men emphasize the rational, abstract, scientific, and theoretical
modes of knowing.
However, for poststructuralist feminists these differences are themselves a
mode of identity, and the binary oppositions between those feminists advocating
equality-that is identity or sameness between men and women-and those feminists claiming a difference between men and women is a false opposition. For
equality and difference are "supplementary," the term Derrida devises from his
reading of Rousseau in Of Grammatology: the one is inscribed in the other. Thus
postmodernists read difference, as it is articulated by radical and cultural feminists, as an identity, and identity as difference. For instance, the "female difference" celebrated by cultural and radical feminists is seen by poststructuralists as
constituting an "identity" that is just as determining and congruent (that is just
as "identical") with the self-hood of a woman as is the "rational" identity of
Enlightenment and liberal feminists. The only distinction here is that this
"female identity" is differentiated from rather than seen as the same as men's
identity. Thus while both those feminists believing in equality and those committed to difference have critiqued the generic humanist self-man as the universal,
all encompassing figure-and revealed its exclusions and blind spots, they all
still subscribe to such basic humanist tenets as the autonomy, unity, and inviolability of the self, a self that is identical with itself or "self-same," whether that
self is defined in terms of a coherent rationality or maternalism. All still believe,
as Matilda Joslyn Gage stated in her 1893 text, Woman, Church and State, in
and men-in terms of which women are defined as sharing the same set of traits
and experience, thus constituting a unified group. For Enlightenment and liberal
feminists, this unity is the human race itself. For cultural and radical feminists,
the differences between men and women constitute an identity, unity, and cohesion within the groups defined by the two categories, thereby erasing the differences within each category, specifically the differences of class, race, and sexual
preference among women. Both modes of feminism-those advocating equality
and those claiming difference-are what I call "identitarian" feminism because
of their essentialist commitment to identity.
In opposition to identitarian feminism is what I call "differential" feminismthose feminisms developing largely out of poststructuralism, that is, out of ludic
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But what do we mean by identity and difference here, or rather what are the
contested meanings attached to these terms? Difference, in the humanist epistemology, is always understood as the difference between one particular, indi-
table. By positing separate, individuated, and bounded entities, the logic of identity creates a ground of certainty-if a chair is a chair and nothing but a chair,
then we can, at any given time, rely on it as a chair. To simplify a complicated
philosophical issue, we can say that difference between is a quest for certainty.
The contestation of postmodernity with "difference between," then, is the contestation with certainty-with the unshakable grounds and foundations which
give the traditional humanist epistemology a basis from which to know the real
ability.
Postmodern difference overturns identity and displaces the ground of decidability. And of course, the question for feminism is how can it build a transformative politics on a postmodern difference that throws out certainty and destabilizes identity. I will attempt an answer later by showing how resistance
postmodernism situates "difference within" back in the social and reads undecidability not as a result of textuality but of social struggle. But first I want to
specify this rewriting of difference as it is commonly articulated in ludic postmodernism, particularly poststructuralism. Ludic postmodern difference is the
"difference within" signification-it is the play, dispersion, and diffusion of distinctions circulating throughout textuality. In other words, in ludic postmodern
difference texts, (or any entities, including individuals), are not self-contained
uniqueness; rather they are traversed and divided by "differences within": they
are a "tissue of traces" of the endless dissemination of differences in the relations of signification.
To understand how this dissemination of differences destabilizes meaning, we
need to briefly recall some of the main presuppositions of Derridean deconstruction. Derrida radicalizes the idea of difference in Saussure, who argued that "in
language there are only differences without positive terms" (120), in other
words, without identity. The sign for Saussure consists of a relation between a
signifier and a signified, which anchors the signifier and thus meaning, but Derrida dispenses with any secured or stable signified-what he calls the "transcen-
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French feminist critic H6l1ne Cixous (63, 64). Moreover, these binaries are both
hierarchical and patriarchal ("phallogocentric"). The first term of any binary
pair is privileged and given priority over the second term, and this primary term,
as Derrida, Cixous and others have demonstrated, is always associated with the
privileged position of the male, of the phallus in Western society. The certainty
or truth of Western thought is thus determined by this hierarchy in which the
primary (male) term is not only privileged over its other (female) term but is designated the defining term or norm of cultural meaning. Poststructuralists-deconstructionists and feminists alike-attempt to dehierarchize and dismantle
these dichotomies by showing that the seeming priority and identity of the primary term is, in fact, a fraud. In any binary opposition, for Derrida, the difference of the primary term is not outside but "within" the term itself: any identity
is always divided within by its other, which is not opposed to it but rather
"supplementary." However, the logic of identity banishes this "difference with-
in" the privileged term by projecting its "otherness" onto a secondary term
seen as outside, thus representing the "difference within" as an external dichotomy. In doing so, the phallogocentric logic is able to assert its primary (male)
terms as seemingly coherent "identities without differences," as self-evident
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female dominating patriarchal social relations and gains presence and selfsameness while the female is constructed as other, as lacking, and as subjected
or secondary to the primary male term. In short, woman is constructed in what
Luce Irigaray, in Speculum of the Other Woman, calls the "specularizations" of
Western patriarchal discourse, in which woman is the mirror-image, the negative
reflection of man. Male is thus not a clearly bounded identity different from
female but is instead self-divided and traversed by its other, that is, by the
female, which is its supplement, the difference on which it depends for its coherent meaning and full existence. Deconstruction is thus a critical operation
that demonstrates how the binary other is always the suppressed supplement,
the difference inscribed within a term, and concludes that there can be no decidable term, no self-present identity that can assert meaning with any certainty in
culture. This undecidability-the inscription of difference into identity and the
removal of its self-sameness-is the mark of ludic postmodern difference. Thus
the position of Derrida and most poststructuralists, including many feminists,
"is not against sexual difference. It's against the transformation, the identification of sexual difference with sexual binary opposition" ("On College and Philosophy" 71).
"gynesis-the putting into discourse of 'woman' " as that space of the other, of
the excluded. But the woman inscribed by poststructuralism, according to Jar-
woman-in-effect that is never stable and has no identity" (25). She is the unrepresentable excess, the trope, for all that is excluded, unknowable, and other in
phallogocentric discourse. Or as Shoshana Felman puts it, she is "the realistic
invisible, that which realism as such is inherently unable to see" (6). Thus to dis-
rupt mimesis, to dismantle the representations that exclude her and to dehierarchize the binaries that subject her is seen as a subversive act. In this
sense, all poststructuralist writing, whether by men or women, engages in displacing phallogocentric discourse. L'ecriture feminine participates in this deconstructive inscription of difference, of woman into phallic discourse, and at
the same time rewrites the process. Irigaray, in fact, formulates a mode of deconstruction she calls mimeticism: the act of mimicking or miming women's assigned position in phallic discourse as the specular representative, the mirrorimage or mimic of the male. As Toril Moi describes Irigaray's practice, "Hers is
Irigaray's subtle specular move (her mimicry mirrors that of all woman) intends
to undo the effects of phallocentric discourse simply by overdoing them" (140).
Poststructuralists and ludic postmodern feminists deconstruct and dehierarchize
the dominant discourses through "textualizing" strategies that disturb representation. They demystify its naturalness, exposing its constructedness and showing
its clarity and decidability to be a fraud based on exclusion of the other-that is,
of woman.
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ing, in the existing state of society' " (418). I would like to emphasize that
"negative" as it is used here does not carry its commonsensical meaning. It is
sures and desires-that is, in her jouissance, which is the excess of her sexuality, of her being, of her desires that patriarchal discourses cannot represent
and thus cannot know. She identifies "herself with none of them in particular";
thus she is multiple, plural, "never being simply one" (This Sex 31). Woman is
thus self-divided, different from herself. This "difference within," dividing
woman, derives, of course, from the feminist rewriting of Lacan's rewriting of
Freud, who first exploded the unity of the humanist self, showing it to be split
by the divide between the conscious and the unconscious-a split which, Lacan
argues, traverses us as we enter language or the symbolic order and distances us
from the imaginary. In writing "herself," woman engages in a double move that
both "speaks" her excess-that which patriarchy cannot grasp, can represent
only as silence, as absence-and simultaneously disrupts the very binaries and
decidability of patriarchal discourse which has trapped her. As Cixous says in
"The Laugh of the Medusa":
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The "feminine text" woman writes is, above all, woman herself; for woman in
poststructuralism, whether l'ecriture feminine or "gynesis," is a trope, a rhetorical effect; she is the product of textuality as the regime of difference (within),
deferment, and differing.
How can this textuality, this writing of woman back into patriarchal dis-
But are they enough? Even Irigaray admits that "A woman's develop-
ment"-by which she means her inscription of the multiple, plural female imagi-
would thus not suffice to liberate woman's desire," because traditionally, as she
says, "woman is never anything but the locus of a more of less competitive exchange between two men" (This Sex 31-32). In other words, she is produced in
social and economic relations, in social struggle.
Thus while these ludic postmodern feminist deconstructions are necessary, I
argue that they are not sufficient to emancipate women (and men for that matter)
from the regime of patriarchy. These strategies do indeed destabilize and disrupt
the regime, but they do not transform it because they are essentially formalist
mediated by language and made intelligible only through the operation of differ-
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But what specifically does it mean to say the sign is the arena of social struggle? First, we need to retheorize the sign not as the correspondence between a
single signifier and signified (as in humanist linguistics) nor as a free-floating
chain of signifiers (as in poststructuralist semantics). Instead we can reconceive
the sign as an ideological process in which we consider a signifier in relation to a
matrix of historically possible signifieds. The signifier becomes temporarily connected to a specific signified-that is, it attains its "meaning"-through social
struggle in which the prevailing ideology and social contradictions insist on a
gle, the prevailing ideology can temporarily be the opposing ideology). Also
keep in mind that since the relation between signifier and signified is continually
struggled over, the assertion of an oppositional meaning or signified can be readily displaced and appropriated by the dominant ideology. Examples of the social
struggles over signifiers and their signifieds include those over the terms
To say that language is the arena of social struggle and that difference is a political difference is to say that difference-difference within, differance-is always "difference in relation"; in other words, difference within is always "difference within a system," specifically difference in relation within the system of
patriarchy. But to even raise the specter of system-that is of global relations, of
structure-at this moment is to bring the full barrage of anti-totality rhetoric
down on one: for many of those engaged in contemporary modes of knowing
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and Linda Nicholson take Lyotard as the norm for postmodernism in their
essay, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," and this leaves them in an un-
tenable position. While they have serious reservations about Lyotard's critique
of metanarratives, they use it largely uncritically to question the validity of a
number of feminist theories (including those of Firestone, Nancy Chodorow, Ca-
Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" (also included in FeminismlPostmodernism). Haraway attempts to rewrite a socialist, materialist feminism as an "argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries," as a local network of differences among women, and as a rejection of any notion of system and totality as
her essay is her attack on MacKinnon's radical feminism as "a caricature of the
appropriating, incorporating, totalizing tendencies of Western theories of identity grounding action" (200). In fact, MacKinnon has become the straw-woman
for attacks on feminist totalizing: one critic has even called her both "Lenin"
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and "Hitler" (Mullarkey 720). Such attacks on committed feminists like MacKinnon, who have long been on the frontlines of critique and intervention in the
contradictions and thus open to change. This is the key issue for feminism,
which must intervene in the power relations organizing difference in order to end
the oppression and exploitation grounded on them. If totalities are structures of
differences and thus multiple, unstable, changeable arenas of contradictions and
social struggle, then they are open to contestation and transformation. But such
transformations are themselves contingent on analyzing the ways in which the
operation of power and organization of differences in a specific system are overdetermined by other systems of difference, because systems of differences are
also situated in a social formation-which is itself a structure of differences
made up of other systems of differences, including the social, economic, political, cultural, and ideological. Systems of differences, then, are determinate, but
they act on each other, their relations, and differences in overdetermined ways.
What are some of the consequences of these concepts for rewriting patriarchy? First patriarchy is an economy of differences, not a unified homogenous "totalitarian totality." It organizes all differences according to a hierarchy
of gender divisions which it represents as natural and inevitable. But such an organization of differences according to gender is not fixed and stable but trav-
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they are "overdetermined" by the pressures from these and other systems,
which in turn act on patriarchy. For example, the traditional gender division of
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manding voice, and desexualized dress. Men, on the other hand, are increasingly
encouraged to take on some of the domestic responsibilities along with the traits
necessary to do the work, such as a more flexible sense of time and more nurturing and emotive behavior to accommodate these realignments in the gender division of the labor force. These overdetermined shifts in the gender division of la-
identitarian one; they are not the "same" as each other although they are all
subjects of the same structures of oppression. Nor are they the "same" in their
difference from men, although within the economy of power relations they are
all situated in the same asymmetrical position, yet they are subjugated in that
position differently.
I want to return now to the question of recent feminist inquiries into the dif-
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Moreover, contextualism reifies the local detail as a referent by which to anchor the specific difference of women as a new identity-an identitarian identity.
Thus "difference within," which disrupts and displaces identitarian identity, increasingly reinscribes it. For it isolates particular women in their local differences and reinstates individualism and uniqueness: for every woman, in and of
herself, becomes individual and unique in her particular race, class, national,
and age positionality-that is, in her difference from other women. Such local
contextualism occludes the ways in which all these specific, different, and
unique women are all similarly produced in the asymmetrical power relations
and organizations of differences that is patriarchy. It suppresses women's position in "difference-in-relation" to a system of oppression.
My contestations with contextual feminism are not scholarly and cognitive
but political. A great deal is at stake in how we rewrite "difference within,"
whether as a new contextualism or as "difference-in-relation" to structures of
oppression. For an emancipatory politics that seeks to intervene in and transform patriarchal structures of oppression which organize and "overdetermine"
every woman (and in a different way, every man) can only be formulated
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