Department of Oriental Studies, University of Vienna

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE GAZI-THESIS

Author(s): R. C. Jennings
Source: Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vol. 76, Festschrift Andreas
Tietze zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet von seinen Freunden und Schlern (1986), pp. 151-161
Published by: Department of Oriental Studies, University of Vienna
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23868782
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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE GAZI-THESIS

By R. C. Jennings, Urbana, Illinois

Prof. Andreas Tietze has been my patient teacher for more th

fifteen years, since I entered UCLA in 1967. Because he keeps learn

all the time, the gaps in our levels of learning keep increasing.

Since Paul Wittek announced his gazi-thesis in three lectures at

University of London in 1937, nearly every important Ottoman h

rian has endorsed the idea unreservedly. Wittek's excellence

Turcologist, his vivid, succinct prose, and his warm, charismatic pe

nality overcame the doubts of any who would have challenged this

Virtually all of Wittek's studies had immediate, but also endurin

impact on the field. The ideas he put forth on the rise of the Otto

empire have dominated all "modern scholarship" on the subject rig

down to the present day1.

The essence of Wittek's theory is that the real cause of the splen

rise of the Ottoman state was the presence of hordes of Turkish h

warriors for Islam (gazis) who were attracted to a territory locate

the Byzantine frontier, where they provided a nearly unlimited,

sistible military force for the small state of Osman (?1326), Or

(13261362), Murad (13621389), and Bayezid (13891403) (

which, according to another Wittek thesis, was transformed into a tru

empire only by the conquest of Constantinople in 1453). Meanwhile,

tenacious Byzantine resistance challenged the gazis to perfect the

skills. The gazi-state, according to Wittek, aims at military conq
and the acquisition of booty.

In this regard, however, it is useful to consider the nature of the h

war (cihad) as a central Islamic Institution. Although a few Islam

1 It did not seem necessary to provide precise documentation for ea

point. The purpose is to show that the commonly accepted accounts of
events of the period in question do not justify acceptance of the gazi-ihesis.

that purpose the books listed in the bibliography were consulted. R. P. L

neb's recent Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia does critize the Wit

TEK-thesis, though mostly on very different grounds than I have chosen.

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152 R.C.Jennings

legists have defined the cihad as a str

aggressors, most commonly the cihad

pand the territorial frontiers of Islam w

work of certain rules. Since carrying out

on the Muslim Community, there is no w

individual is obligated. The classic rules

a Muslim state to invite people of the
of war (dar ul-harb) to become Muslims

the Muslim ruler may ask his adversar

own Islamic state while still preservin
institutions, and personal property. If

refuses such requests, only then may

begin a cihad.

Only Muslims may undertake a cih

expected to consist exclusively of Mus

made for gazis to make peace or eve

sophisticated legal provisions involving

war and peace. At least in the central a
the rules of Islam were formulated, cih

non-Muslim states, or even vassalage. I

that some of the earliest Ottoman arm
Turkish horsemen but also some Greek

first conquered from the Byzantine emp

such Christians in an army of real gazis i

those engaged in a holy war are expec

relations with a non-Muslim state, for

legitimate. Still, there is much evidenc

state, rather than make an all out effo

state, became involved in dynastic str

times favoring one claimant, sometim
Byzantine ruling families sojourned in
went to Constantinople. Later the Ott
domestic affairs of the Serbian and Bu
ence which in some cases even helped
three states the Ottomans sometimes entered into machinations over
succession.

While marrying royal Christian women is not incompatible with the

principles of a cihad, anything that could be construed as alliance of

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Some Thoughts on the Gazi-Thesis 153

equals is. So many members of the Ottoman family, including rule

became involved in marriages with such women that they must hav
least at some times compromised the resolution of any who might h
considered themselves as gazis. Furthermore, as Ottoman power wa
in southeastern Europe at the expense of local Byzantine, Serbian,
Bulgarian frontiers, Ottoman rulers enjoined the rulers of those st

to turn over their armies for the Ottomans to use against their enemie

Sometimes the Balkan "rulers" were compelled to attend Ottom

campaigns in person with their Christian armies. Such armies cou
then be used not just against Christian states in the domain of war
also against neighboring Muslim Turkish states with which the O
mans vied for power in Anatolia. All such behavior was contrary to
theory and practice of the Muslim holy war. It is hard to imagine h
any Muslims who operated in those ways could be esteemed as gazis
Muslims who had any profound knowledge of their own faith.
Osman (?1326) was a kind and generous leader, and probably
very capable one. His early career as ruler involved establishing g
relationships with the local Byzantine "lords" (tekfur) of the area
Although he took the lands of some lords in battle, others were
chased, or obtained through marriage. Greek Orthodox Christi
served with Osman's army as he carved out a small territory on t
Byzantine frontier, although in what numbers or proportions is
known. How long Osman continued that practice is also unknown,
a number of Greek Orthodox warriors for the Byzantine empire
parently converted to Islam in frustration when the emperor did
provide them with adequate support. The resistance that Osman fa
was not too formidable. Despite a career devoted especially to conq
ing territories ruled and inhabited by Orthodox Christians, his rela
ship with them remained congenial.

If rapacious gazis such as described by Wittek were the basis for the

establishment and rise of the Ottoman state, Osman probably eit

would have been just another one of them or he would have been unabl

to control them, and they would have devastated both urban

village life in the territories conquered from Byzantium (not to mentio

the territories that he accumulated which previously had fallen into th

possession of other Muslim Turkish rulers). Towns and villages, mo

than the nomads, could have been the basis for the wealth of Osm

state. If such people did not flee from or dread Osman and his imm

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154 R.C.Jennings

ate successors, that may perhaps be b

gave security of person and property

If the first Ottoman gaza constitute
then the Ottoman-Byzantine relation
ing. In a gaza one might expect an int
subject the enemy and his territories

possible. In the reign of Orhan (1326

ship with Byzantium. Not only did he

intervened in Byzantine domestic mat

his father-in-law, John V Cantacuzenu

father-in-law in Constantinople, to se

tal, with some 5000 troops. Finally, w

provided 10,000 men who helped C

against Serbian and Bulgarian armies.

the upper hand over the Byzantines;
easily in Thrace as he had in northwe
have taken Constantinople easily, but

ings could have resisted him. Yet he d

when John Palaeologus replaced Or

family to power. In fact, Orhan simp

patronage, allowing the new emperor
Orhan's favorite son Halil.

If a ruler wishes to have inscribed over a mosque which he has

founded, "Sultan, son of the Sultan of the Ghazis, Ghazi, son of Ghazi,

marquis of the horizons, hero of the world", who could object? Never
theless, 1337, the date attributed to the inscription in the mosque in
Bursa which Orhan had constructed, seems impossibly early for an

Ottoman ruler to have called himself "sultan", never mind "gazi". In

any case, according to another inscription analyzed by . H. Ayverdi,
Mehmed I restored Orhan's mosque in 1417 after the Karaman bey had

burned it in 1413 while pillaging the suburbs of Bursa2. That inscrip

2 The history of Orhan's mosque in Bursa, including the inscriptions, is
discussed in Osmanli Mimarisinin Ilk Devri by . H. Ayverdi on pp. 5889,
especially pp. 58f and 80f. On a low arch in that mosque is the inseription
stating that the mosque whieh Orhan had built in 13391340 (740) was burned
by the Karaman bey; Mehmed ibn Bayezid had ordered its reconstruction by
a certain Bayezid paja. The inseription which identifies Orhan as gazi and sultan
in 1337 actually is found across the courtyard from Orhan's mosque above the

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Some Thoughts on the Gazi-Thesis 155

tion is just one more evidence of later Ottomans trying to Upgrade

image of their past. Orhan did not massacre and destroy, he built

empire, partly on the goodwill of local Christians.

The reign of Murad I (13621389), himself the son of a Gre

Orthodox mother, and married to both Bulgarian and Byzantine pr

cesses, also is marked by occurrences which seem inconsistent with

coneept of gaza. Murad quite successfully extended his Anatolian te

tories, obviously at the expense of other Muslim rulers. The Byzant

ruler John V, and later his son Andronicus IV, accepted Mura

suzerainty. As such they attended Ottoman campaigns in person w

their armies, not only into southeastern Europe but also into Anato

Later the Bulgarian ruler suffered the same indignity. Murad's vas
rulers, besides serving on campaign with their armies at his comma

also paid tribute, and often had to send their sons to the Ottoman cour

as hostages. Such actione show ignorance of the true nature of holy war

It seems unlikely that Murad considered himself too weak to deal m

firmly with his vassals. In any case, using Christian soldiers along w
Muslim ones on campaign violates almost everyone's Standard of a h

war, and leading Christian soldiers against Muslim ones is reprehensible

Like Orhan, Murad I apparently lacked the motivation to end t

vassalage which allowed the "allied" Byzantine, Serbian, and Bu

rian states admission, in practice if not in a legal sense, into the domai

of peace. In the course of his reign Murad's strength grew so rapidly th

the vassals feil to the lowest level of Subordination and had to entreat

with him for their very existence. Despite their obvious vulnerability,
the Ottoman ruler maintained the Status quo.
Bayezid I (13891402) was the first ruler who took steps to change
the nascent Ottoman State from a provincial, unsophisticated frontier
territory into a State more attuned to the governmental, religious, legal,

and military practices of contemporary Islamic empires. Nevertheless,

east door of the ehadet mosque, which was built in the time of Mehmed I.
(That building was destroyed by lightning in 1855 and rebuilt in 1892). AI
though it is not impossible that the inscription is the exact original from
Orhan's mosque, there was every opportunity, whether consciously or inad
vertently, to change the original.
My colleague J. H. Matthews first called to my attention the destruction
of Orhan's mosque. Her comments on an earlier draft of the paper also were
useful.

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156 R. C. Jennings

he inadvertantly continued some of the p

Bayezid I, too, grew up and lived in a rel

milieu, for his mother was a Greek Ortho

the daughter of the Serbian king. Bayez

Byzantine, Serbian, and Bulgarian rulers

falling out with all but the Serbian ruler, w

Bulgaria and an energetic, if brief, siege of

remained unchanged with the Serbian k

in every Ottoman campaign, whether in
Anatolia.

Since pillaging or taking booty was strictly forbidden on the cam

paigns in Muslim Turkish Anatolia, and since, as part of his plan to
concentrate power in his own hands, Bayezid I undermined the position
of his mounted Turkish warriors, they had little incentive to campaign

there. The Serbian king and his army, on the other hand, served
Bayezid loyally and effectively everywhere, so well, in fact, that their

use against Muslim Turkish peoples and armies became one pretext for
Timur's challenge to Bayezid and invasion of Anatolia. Timur's defeat

of Bayezid I at the battle of Ankara in 1402 interrupted progress

towards becoming an Islamic empire, including use of the holy war
(cihad),(cihad), and turned the Ottomans back in the direction of being a

provincial frontier State.

By the time of Bayezid II (14811512) a systematic cihad in the

Islamic sense was being undertaken by the Ottomans. The curious

practices that marked the "gaza" in earlier times had largely disap

peared. Bayezid II cared about his own reputation and that of the
Ottoman empire among sophisticated urban Muslims at home and
abroad. He wanted historians to create for him and his line an origin
that was grander and loftier than reality, not at all an unusual desire
for a ruler. With Bayezid's encouragement, and perhaps with the help
of historical sources that he may have provided or suggested, certain
chroniclers emerged who carried out their sultan's objectives, for which

they presumably were properly rewarded. (Their accounts also satisfied

the 16th c. Ottoman self-image.)

It seems that conquests of territories from Anatolian states ruled

by other Trks were about as desirable to the early Ottomans as

conquests from the Byzantines and other Christians. It seems that they
were not any less pleased to rule over territories taken from fellow

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Some Thoughts on the Gazi-Thesis 157

Muslim Turkish rulers than over those taken from Christian rulers.

(Wittek himself sometimes acknowledged the need for balanced

growth.)

The fighting prowess of the Turkish horseman was renowned. Not

just the Ottoman armies were blessed with them. The Mamluk empire
used them as slave soldiers. The Byzantine empire relied heavily on
them as mercenaries. They were the sole military force of the Anatolian

rivals of the Ottomans. Although their tribal ties were weak, presuma
bly even those on the frontiers still lived partly by grazing their ani
mals. Some of them were enemies of urban and village life, war-like and

eager for booty.

Nevertheless, during the 14th Century the Ottoman rulers must

have subjected the Turkish warriors to rigorous discipline, for those

rulers seem generally to have been favorably regarded by their seden
tary subjects, whether Orthodox Christians or Muslims. Consequently,
it is likely that uncontrolled quest for booty was the exception rather

than the rule. Possibly the early Ottoman rulers might have had a
strong desire to implement justice, such as distinguished particularly
Melik Shah (10721092) of the Great Seljuk line and several of the

Seljuk of Rum sultans.

Although Turkish soldiers did sometimes prey on the subjects of
other Muslim rulers in Anatolia, in general that practice was abhorrent
to Islam. Residente of those states undoubtedly would not have ac
cepted Ottoman rule so readily had it been normal Ottoman policy to
encourage, or even to permit, such behavior. That was good reason for
Ottoman armies to prefer to attack the Byzantine frontier, and later the

Serbian and Bulgarian ones. Occasionally Ottoman rulers accepted the

destruction and pillaging of major Christian urban centers, but more
often some sort of accommodation was reached where the conquered
people kept their lives, families, and property.
Such destruction was never vented on subjects of the Muslim Tur

kish states in Anatolia. (Of course, the Sharia idealistically discourages

warfare between Muslims.) Even in Christian states that feil to the
Ottomans some sort of accommodation seems usually to have been
reached where new subjects kept their lives, families, and property. For

the covetous Turkish warrior the best hope was to march against the

Byzantine frontier (or Serbian, or Bulgarian ones). For the town or

village dweller, the best hope probably was to submit to the authority

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158 R.C.Jennings

of the Ottoman state, although being a

vassal might have pretty much the sam

The policies of the 14th Century Ottom

policy of political and military aggr

Osman, Orhan, Murad, and Bayezid we

which included being good and effect
diers, most of whom were not far rem

connections. While satisfying the soldi

those early rulers kept them restrained i

who had previously submitted to the

states in Anatolia and also those wh

Ottomans. In general, Osman, Orhan,

fairness and justice towards their sub
security. Their reigns give little evid
waged against the neighboring Christi
Among the most important sources o
man state are contemporary and near

antine writers, particularly historians. T

and sophistication far above that of th

and their sources were as close to Ott
tions as were any Ottoman writers. S
John Cantacuzenus, and Gregory Palam
Century developments. Although othe

Phrantzes, and Kritobulus, are of the 15t

the first serious Ottoman historians lik

so even they have a claim to credibilit

If the Ottoman state from about 13

state, along the lines that Wittek has s

Byzantines ignore sophisticated legal p

covenant (Dar ul-Ahd), an intermediate

peace and the abode of war, with the p

jizya,jizya, and the sultan having the right

in exchange for providing troops and

Byzantine sources mention a house

recognized by some jurists whereby un

peace by paying tribute. Perhaps it is

rary Byzantine intellectuals should be

if they were applied. But certainly it is m

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Some Thoughts on the Gazi-Thesis 159

Byzantines indicate any awareness that a resolute holy war had bee
continually and resolutely waged against Byzantium for years, as i
held by proponents of the gazi-theory. Some of those writers had a
intimate knowledge of Ottoman affairs; while some despised the Ot
mans, others esteemed them. How can the Ottoman state have been

carrying on a holy war against the Byzantines for at least half

Century, and in other cases fully a Century and a half, and yet th
leading critical observers of Byzantium totally failed to notice?
Of course, there were many legal nuances by which a sophisticate
Islamic state could have rationalized much of its relationship wi
Byzantium, Serbia, or Bulgaria, but being most optimistic about th

Ottoman "frontier state" of the 14th Century, it is hard to imagine that

its leaders could have thought in such subtleties before the reign o

Bayezid I.
Moreover, the Turkish mounted warriors who are usually identified
as gazis probably were a force for instability, whose enthusiasms and

unruliness threatened the authority of the beys. While such elements

were essential to military conquest, they represent only a relatively
small proportion of the population. Orhan and his successors had not
just their wishes to consider but also large numbers of townspeople and

villagers on whom the early state was really built.

Each 14th Century ruler was probably closely associated with the
ahiahi fraternities which were so central to the social, economic, and
religious milieu of the time and which predominated in towns across
Anatolia, with no regard for state boundaries. It was, after all, villages
and towns, not Turkish warriors, who provided the bulk of the popula
tion. The entrepreneurs in the society were ahis. They linked together
merchants and artisans, who made up the most influential group not

just in towns but also within the whole Ottoman state. Ahis were
amenable to a religiously mixed society, for several of their groups had
Christian members. The ahis were a force for law and order in the

society, but also for love and congeniality. They had ideals of Service
and brotherhood which influenced all their behavior. Their social activi

ties were devoted to both those ends. Upstart rulers like the Ottomans
were extremely fortunate to have their fll support. Each 14th Century

Ottoman ruler in turn admired and respected the ahis, and more than
one actually was a member of an ahi Organization.
In conclusion, if we examine the evidence that Wittek presented to

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160 R.C.Jennings

prove his assertions abcrat the gazi origi

an epic, and (2) an inscription from

serted that Ahmedi, writing about 1
description of a chronicler whose work

is lost, Wittek obviously was making

rally the subject of epic poetry. From
know that Ahmedi was no historian

Iskender-name,Iskender-name, a familiar ge

related, Bayezid I's son Suleyman fele

wrote unter Ottoman patronage and
unbiased source. (2) As for the inscrip
with. Osman and Orhan both certain

sultans in their times; none would be fr

to have claimed the title sultan befor

would have been presumptious. Osman

I, were beys.
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