To Our Topic.) : 1 Case Digest in Civil Law Review 1 Atty. Elmer Rabuya

CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 1-44
1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING

COMPANY OF ASIA, INC
October 6, 2010
Topic: Article 13 of the Civil Code as Amended by the Administrative
Code
DOCTRINE: Article 13 of the Civil Code is deemed superseded by Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, which thus
means a year is equivalent to 12 calendar months.
FACTS:
On September 30, 2004, Respondent Aichi Forging Company filed a claim
for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002 in the total amount of P3,891,123.82 with the petitioner CIR. The refund
is based on zero-rated sales made by respondent, for which the NIRC allows
a VAT entity (such as Aichi) to claim a refund credit. In denying the
application, petitioner argued that the claim was filed beyond the 2-year
prescription period provided by law. It posited that pursuant to Article 13 of
the Civil Code, since the year 2004 was a leap year (364 days instead of 365),
the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was
beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim for refund was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive
period or not
HELD:
YES, because the claim prescribed in September 30, 2004 and not September
29, 2004. The Court explained that both Article 13 of the Civil Code and
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with
the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap

year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed
of 12 calendar months. In the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of
days is irrelevant. The Court further clarified that in this apparent
inconsistency, the Administrative Code must prevail, being the more recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods.
(The claim for refund was still denied. Respondent did not observe the NIRC
requirement of filing a judicial appeal after 120 days from CIR decision or
failure to render a decision. Hence, aside from the 2-year prescriptive period,
the 120-day administrative appeal period must also be observed. Not relevant
to our topic.)
2. WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner, vs. NEW PROSPERITY
PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY, Respondent. June
30, 2014
Topic: Article 13 of the Civil Code as Amended by the Administrative
Code
DOCTRINE: Article 13 of the Civil Code is deemed superseded by Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, which thus
means a year is equivalent to 12 calendar months.
FACTS:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy
filed a case against petitioner for the violation of B.P. 22. In the absence of Uy
and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9,
2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July 2,
2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.On July 2, 2004,
Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.The motion
was granted. After the case was reraffled (judge inhibited), Co then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases.
1 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
ARITCHETA, CELIS, ELUMBA, GAYADOS, IBANEZ, LAUS, PENAFLOR, SOLLER, VALDEZ, VALLEDOR
It was dismissed. MR and petition for reviewer on certiorari under rule 45

was likewise dismissed. However, before the cases were reraffled, a Motion
for Permanent Dismissal was filed by Co. Uy opposed the Motion. The new
judge granted the Motion. After Uys MR was denied, she filed a Petition for
Certiorari. The petition was filed. Thus, the RTC ordered that the proceeding
in the lower court proceed. Co filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The
CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for reviewer on certiorari
under Rule 45 with TPO/WPI.
DOCTRINE: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the

nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of
the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
Co claims that assuming that the dismissal on June 9, 2003 was provisional, it
became permanent after 1 year from its issuance (June 9) and not upon notice
to offended part and because 2004 (?) was a leap year, the total number of
days is not 365 days. Hence, the dismissal became permanent on June 8,
2004.
Atty. Luna, a lawyer in a big law firm, married Eugenia on September 10,
1947. They begot 7 children. After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY.
LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" whereby they agreed to
live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property. ATTY. LUNA likewise obtained a divorce decree in Dominican
Republic. On the same date, ATTY LUNA married Soledad. They bought a
condo unit in Makati which they paid through installments. Upon full
payment, the CCT was issued in their name as husband and wife. Atty Juan
died. His son Gregorio took over his law books, furniture and equipment
found inside the condo unit. This prompted Soledad to file a case against the
heirs of Atty Luna arguing that the properties in question was obtained
during the existence of their marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the total of number of days in a leap year should be used in
computing the 1-year period for the provisional dismissal to be considered
permanent
HELD:
NO. The fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine
the timeliness of Uys motion to revive the criminal cases. Granting for the
sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year
and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the
date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, the Court still
held that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed.
A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a
leap year.3 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a yearis
composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant.
3. SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA, Respondents.July 23, 2014
TOPIC: Nationality Principle
FACTS:
The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs thereby ordering the RD to change the
CCT in favor of Eugenia - from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna". The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should recognize should recognize the
divorce decree from Dominican Republic.
HELD:
No, because the Nationality Rule applies in the case at bar. Our Family Code
does not recognize divorce. The only two types of defective marital unions

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.The
non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can
ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
(The Court further ruled on the issue of the validity of the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement and the property relations during the
cohabitation of Soledad and Atty Luna. But as this case was assigned under
Articles 1 to 44 of the Civil Code, I did not include such ruling in this digest.)
4. MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT
November 7, 2008
TOPIC: Nationality Principle; Decree of divorce obtained abroad
DOCTRINE: An absolute divorce secured by an American married to a
Filipino can be recognized in the Philippines despite the formers eventual
recognition as a Filipino citizen.
FACTS:
Rebecca (an American citizen born in Guam) and Vicente were married on
April 20, 1979. After having their only child Alix, Rebecca initiated divorce
proceeding in Dominican Republic. The Dominican Court ordered the
dissolution of their marriage. After a year, the same Dominican Court issued
a decree settling their property relations pursuant to an Agreement they
executed. Within less than a month from the issuance of the divorce decree,
Rebecca filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The
petition was however later withdrawn with the approval of the court.
Rebecca then executed an Affidavit declaring that she is an American citizen,

that she and Vicente had been living separately, and that she is carrying a
child not of Vicente. She then filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicentes psychological incapacity.
Aside from such petition, Vicente and Rebecca filed various criminal cases
against each other (bigamy, perjury, concubinage). Vicentes Motion to
Dismiss and subsequent MR was denied by the RTC, which thus forced
Vicente to file a petition on certiorari to the CA. The CA ruled in favor of
Vicente, reversing the RTCs decision stating that Rebecca no longer had the
right to have her marriage declared void as she already obtained a divorce
decree as an American citizen. It must be noted that Rebecca was eventually
recognized as Filipino citizen as evidenced by her Philippine passport and ID
Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse can be
recognized in the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes, a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
When the divorce was granted, Rebecca was yet to be recognized as a
Filipino citizen. As an American citizen whose national law recognizes
divorce, she obtained the divorce decree. The Supreme Court emphasized
the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted
by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce
court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the
opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of
partition of their conjugal property. The two elements in Article 26 were
present in the case, and thus, there is no reason to not recognize the divorce
decree.
5. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO ONG,

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
November 24, 2010
TOPIC: Unjust enrichment; Accion in rem verso

DOCTRINE: The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates
payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the
payment has no right to receive it.
had paid with interest at 12% per annum computed from the filing of the
complaint. The CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the assumption of mortgage amounted
to unjust enrichment.
FACTS:
HELD:
Spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from LBP Legazpi City
in the amount of P16 million. They failed to pay the loan. They executed a
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Evangelines mother.
Evangelines father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to
inform it about the sale and assumption of mortgage. Alfredo was told that
there was nothing wrong with the agreement with the Spouses Sy but he was
provided with requirements for the assumption of mortgage. He was also
told that Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed at
P750,000 and to update due or accrued interests on the promissory notes so
that LBP could easily approve the assumption of mortgage. Alfredo then
issued a check for P750,000 and personally gave it to Atty. Hingco (Branch
Head). A receipt was issued for his payment. He also submitted the other
documents required by Land Bank, such as financial statements for 1994 and
1995. Atty. Hingco then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title of the
Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but this never materialized. No
notice of transfer was sent to him.Alfredo later found out that his application
for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank because of a
credit investigation about them. LBP then foreclosed the mortgage. Alfredo
only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the subject mortgage properties
included in a Notice of Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale. He was
promised that the P750,000 would be returned to them. As it was not
returned, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with
damages against LBP claiming that he was lured into believing that his
payment of P750,000 would cause Land Bank to approve his assumption of
the loan of the Spouses Sy and the transfer of the mortgaged properties in his
and his wifes name. In ruling in favor of the respondent, the RTC explained
that although the Assumption of Mortgage was not perfected, under the
principle of equity and justice, the bank should return the amount Alfredo
Yes, Land Bank is still liable for the return of the P750,000 based on the
principle of unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct in arguing that it has no
obligation as creditor to recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the
fulfillment of the obligation. But while Land Bank is not bound to accept the
substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is estopped by
its action of accepting Alfredos payment from arguing that it does not have
to recognize Alfredo as the new debtor.By accepting Alfredos payment and
keeping silent on the status of Alfredos application, Land Bank misled
Alfredo to believe that he had for all intents and purposes stepped into the
shoes of the Spouses Sy.Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience. Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions
called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper,
the following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant has been
enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of
the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict.
FAMILY CODE: ARTICLE 1-73
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen, contracted

marriage for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain American citizenship,
and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00. After some time, Albios filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer alleging that
they never had any intention of entering into a marriage to comply their
essential marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage
void ab initio, opining that when marriage was entered into for purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. Upon appeal of the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling, stating that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking and that their marriage was
similar to a marriage in jest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a marriage be declared void for lack of consent if it is
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
HELD:
No. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely
given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be REAL in the sense that
it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code. Consent Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly

demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into
such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with
no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention
of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
2. RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March

2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day
of the wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the
marriage because of lack of a marriage license.
1.
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and
2.
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
that they take each other as husband and wife.
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they
headed to an Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner
Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple took each
other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's
knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second
requirement is likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony
of its witnesses, proved that the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the
provision of the Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of
blessing and was not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was
found guilty. The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act
not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this
crime are:
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and
2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has
authority to solemnize a marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage.
However, Article 6 of the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined
P200 as penalty.
3. ALCANTARA vs. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage
against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he
and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went
through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26
March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and
maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She
alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and
that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage
with the Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and
respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who
arranged everything for them. He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite,
to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona,
Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that Marriage
License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and
Miss Rosita Almario but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033
for their marriage license number.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?
HELD: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license
to impugn the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the
parties are residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a
mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It
does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,
petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the
marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila
City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate
himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no
longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.
4. SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Atty. Luna married Eugenia in 1947. Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live
separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation
and Property Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve their conjugal property. Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he
married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers.
After Atty. Lunas death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law
books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first
marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty.
Dela Cruz.
Soledad, filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him,
the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage,
and because they had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2
being her share in the net estate, and the other half bequeathed to her in a
last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
was valid
2.
Who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100
pro indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law books
HELD:
1.
No. The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the
time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947
until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either
or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been
limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving
the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the
nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad,
did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms
to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The
non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can
ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
2. SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her
own independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and
the law books subject matter in contentionin this case proof that was
required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family
Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code,
the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if
the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment
to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between
the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the
Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie
presumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of
actual contribution was required.
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she
actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law
books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought
the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of
law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of
the law firm that he headed.
The petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her
burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being
evidence, did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the
first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty.
Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death.
Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty.
Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
5. IMBONG vs. OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible

Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1.
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products.
3.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude.
5.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7.
The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution.
8.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family
protected by the Constitution
Petitioners question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to
attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a
certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to
participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their
religious beliefs. As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and
facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious

freedom.
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the
respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity
for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those
who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them.
They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirement of attending a family planning seminar as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license violates the constitutional
guarantee to freedom of religion
HELD:
No. The requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable
exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the
assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at
all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does
not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG,
those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are
completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain
the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of
the State.
628 SCRA 266, August 11, 2010

RE: Whether an alien spouse has a right under Art. 26 par. 2 of FC
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R.
Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn
Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other
professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he
discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another
man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in
Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years
later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry
her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian
divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite
the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that
the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has
been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial
court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition
of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute
an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which
capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a
foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE:
WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
6. GERBERT CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
HELD:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par. of Art
26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a
naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of
the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to aliens national
law.
Remedy Available to Alien Spouse
The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the alien spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse,
pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgment.
7. MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ MARINAY
700 SCRA 69, June 26, 2013
RE: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; who may file the declaration of nullity; petition to
recognize foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
FACTS:
Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married Maria Paz GalelaMarinay in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with Fujikis
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC seeking, among others, the (1) recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage), and (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
RTC :
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
x xxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province
or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least
six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x xx
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that failure to comply

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate

dismissal of the petition." Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
2.
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3.
Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
1. NO. Petition granted.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing
foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and

issues. The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on
the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15
of the Civil Code provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of
lexnationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of
a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does
not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
2. YES. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
3. YES. The rulingBraza v. The City Civil Registrar of HimamaylanCity,
Negros Occidental, is not applicable where the RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It
is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already

have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines
to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial
by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not
a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
"the term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
8. REX TUPAL vs. JUDGE ROJO
717 SCRA 236, February 24, 2014
RE: MTC judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they will solemnize.
FACTS:
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint
against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct
and for gross ignorance of the law. Allegedly, Judge Remegio V. Rojo
solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead
notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting
parties. He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties marriage.
Herein petitioner contends that for notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated
Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1-90 allows

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize
documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex
argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judges official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize
ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
In his defense, herein respondent judge argued that petitioner was only
harassing him because he is the father of FrialynTupal, which has a pending
perjury case before his sala. Moreover, he argued that the filing of the
administrative case against him was only to delay Frialyns case. He further
argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his
official functions and duties as a judge. The Guidelines on the Solemnization
of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit judges from
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will
solemnize. Thus, there was no violation pursuant to Circular No. 1-90.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found
that respondent judge violated Circular No. 1-90. According to the OCA,
affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal trial
court judgesofficial functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, a judges duty is
to personally examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before
performing the marriage ceremony. Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes
judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and of gross ignorance of the law
HELD:
Judge Rojo was guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
Circular No. 190, and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo notarized
affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also
notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or

notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction. As a
solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of
cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for
at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does
not state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine
the parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized
the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the
affidavits statements before performing the marriage ceremony.
9. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE DAYOT
550 SCRA 435, March 28, 2008
RE: Civil Code is the governing law; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity,
Common-Law Cohabitation
FACTS:
Jose and FelisaDayot were married on November 24, 1986 at the Pasay City
Hall. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
On July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the RTC, Binan Laguna. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated,
that he did not execute the sworn affidavit and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.
Jose insists that he was introduced Felisa only in 1986 and she thereafter
became her landlady. One day, Felisa asked him to accompany her to the
Pasay City Hall to claim a package sent to Felisa by her brother from Saudi
Arabia. This is when Felisa fraudulently secured his signatures in the
purported marriage contract by making him believe that he needed to sign
three folded papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
reluctantly signed then immediately left. According to him, it was only in

February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa when he saw the alleged marriage certificate on top of the sala table.
Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties

have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
Felisa declared, for her part, that they had maintained their relationship as
man and wife without the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980 but
deferred to contract marriage on account of their age difference.
HELD:
The RTC ruled in favor of Felisa stating among others that Joses version is
implausible because any person in his right frame of mind would easily
suspect any attempt to make him sign a blank sheet of paper. Jose even
wrote Felisas name as his wife in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after his alleged discovery of
the purported marriage contract.
Additionally, Joses cause of action relating to fraud had already prescribed.
The CA initially affirmed the RTCs decision on the ground that the
circumstances do not fall squarely with the grounds constituting fraud
pursuant to the Civil Code. TheCA accepted the argument that Jose and
Felisas case is one of exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil
which allows the execution of affidavit in lieu of marriage license.
However, the CA reversed itself and declared the marriage between Jose and
Felisa void ab initio when it determined that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation was false with respect to the five-year period prescribed by law.
The CA gave credence toJoses opposition which cited the legal condition
that the man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Felisa sought reconsideration but to no avail. Hence this petition. The OSG
filed a separate petition praying for the reversal of the CAs decision which
declared the marriage between Felisa and Jose void ab initio.
ISSUE:
YES. Falsity of Affidavit not a mere irregularity; action for nullity of

marriage is imprescriptible
For the exception in Article 76 (old CC) to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto
that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and
that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers
the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years - and continuity that is unbroken.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other.
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be
had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law.
For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting

parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
Respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is
married to petitioner and that the latter has failed on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna
Tricia as his child.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their

marriage is voidab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merelyprevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also
averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has
never seen nor acknowledged the child. Trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural
father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals and was denied. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity
has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during
the subsistence and validity of the parties' marriage.
Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The
appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house. Therefore, the falsity of the
affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
10. REINEL DE CASTRO vs. ANNABELLE DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008
RE: The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked
ISSUE:
FACTS:
1. Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They

plannedto get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar,
the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through
with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to
2. Whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

HELD:
1. Yes. The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked.
Citing Nial v. Bayadog:

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
2. YES. the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to

support.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case,
it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not
have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of
the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the
affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites
of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. In the instant
case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
*Article 34 Marriage without a marriage license ; 5 years cohabitation

period
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws
11. LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
FACTS:
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to
Estela Galang, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-yearold widow then, married Santos. Four months after the solemnization of
their marriage, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit.
Petitioner asserted that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to
the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela
Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner
on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only or
after she had already married Santos.
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos
during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Petitioner moved for

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the CA gave more weight to

the prosecution witnesses' narration.
ISSUE:
Is the second marriage of Santiago valid, for there to be a conviction for
bigamy?
HELD:
YES. It is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was
celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have
actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of
cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the
two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they
had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract
marriage without a license. Petitioner now seeks to be acquitted of bigamy
based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license
despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement
under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner married Santos
while knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year
cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. It will be the
height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to
escape criminal conviction.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
12. LOLITA D. ENRICO v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI

GR NO. 173614, SEPTEMBER 28, 2007
*Article 34 ; Who file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
FACTS:
Respondents filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio Medinaceli (deceased) and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Respondents averred that the marriage between Eulogio and the petitioner
was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that
Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have
been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment
from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and
Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances
required by said provision. Respondents contend that the marriage of
Eulogio to Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli was dissolved only upon the latter's
death on May 1 2004, which was barely three months from the date of
marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could
not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Respondents likewise raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner said that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. They had 2 children
who carried the surname of Eulogio. She contended that the marriage
ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and
solemnized by the Municipal Mayor.
Petitioner sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
On October 11 2005, RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of
action. It cited section 2 par (a) of Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC
that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. Consequently, the heirs of the

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to
declare the marriage null and void.
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. RTC reversed its ruling on

October 11 2005 and reinstated the complaint saying that it ignored the
ruling in Nial vs. Bayadong which is the authority for holding that the heirs
of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after
the death of the latter. It said Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC only
applies where both parties to a void marriage are still living. Where one or
both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to
declare the marriage void.
13. CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922 Dec. 16, 2008
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, on 1 June 2006, the

RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised
therein. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Nial ruling or A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to the case.
HELD: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies in the case at bar.
The Nial ruling cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned
marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the
validity of the marriage during that time is the Civil Code, which was the
law in effect at the time of their celebration.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.
The marriage of petitioner and Eulogio took effect after the effectivity of the
Family Code. Thus, what should be resorted in this case in esolving such
issue is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.
However, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
*Who may file ; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC ; Rule on Declaration of Absolute

Nullity of Void Marriages
FACTS:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels
of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to
Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the
share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered
in the name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents:
Felicidad and their son Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and
co-respondent, Teofilo II.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in
Muntinlupa City. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition,
dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them. In August 1995,
petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of
property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence
of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment is
allowed in a proceeding for nullity of marriage.
2. Whether or not any person can question the validity of marriage.
HELD:
1. NO. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary
judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35
of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether
it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the
CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
2.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may

be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of
marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the
Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by
any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,

1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased
spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But
the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became
effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent
Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.
Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the
Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as

it affects their successional rights.
14. ISIDRO ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158298 ; August 11, 2010
* A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted
on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being
issued only on January 9, 1950. He insisted that his being the surviving
brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to onehalf of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included,
could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.
However, on October 18, 2000, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petitioner is not a party to marriage. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest.
HELD:
YES. Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-1110-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in

application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC; and
2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to
March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM 02-1110-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
However, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil
Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an
action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v.
Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate
a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be,
then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as
the late Cresencianos surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by
the nullification of her own marriage. She was truly an indispensable party
who must be joined herein. We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila
Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who
between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein.
As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have
knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and
daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another
indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will
definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
reconsideration is a precondition for an appeal; and, since the respondent

refused to comply with the precondition of filing a motion for
reconsideration, a relaxation on the rules of appeal is not proper.
15. CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS

G.R. No. 186400 ; October 20, 2010
HELD:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
*Am-02-11-10-SC - Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law on July 10, 2003. The RTC granted her
petition on August 2, 2006. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration after respondent received the decision of the lower court.
The decision as declared final after a motion to reconsider denial of appeal
was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and
hereby granted. The appellate court ruled that AM no 02-11-10-SC did not
apply to the case at bar as their marriage was solemnized Feb 14 1980 before
the Family Code took effect. The said court procedure required a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal cases on declaration of absolute
nullity on void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages. Petitioner
filed her manifestation and a motion for partial reconsideration but was
denied by the appellate court as the 15-day reglementary period to file is not
extendable.
Petitioner filed this said petition to the Supreme Court contending that the
appellate court erred in ruling that their case is not covered by the Family
Code; that AM no 02-11-10-SC covers/pertains to the word petitions
instead of marriages; if the Family Code covers the case then a motion of
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. no 02-11-10 SC Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of void marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is
applicable to the case.
Section 1. Scope This rule shall govern petitions for declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines. Applying the rule verba legis, the
categorical language of this section leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.
Also, the Court finds itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation
that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code.
Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability.
16. ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

Del Castillo, J.:
In a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the
source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato
City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano s civil status was indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has
been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents HajaPutriZorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf
and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda,
filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity
of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993.
Estrellitas argument is that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the
latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married
her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of
Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be
covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
under Muslim law.
Both the RTC and the CA declared such marriage bigamous and as such,
void ab initio.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ZORAYDA AND ADIB HAVE THE LEGAL

STANDING TO HAVE ESTRELLITAS MARRIAGE DECLARE VOID AB
INITIO?
COURTS RULING
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file
the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to
only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective
in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas
marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to
the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in
which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had
filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit.
17. SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs GLORIA GOO ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
A marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
same Code
FACTS:
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
(Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas
(Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No.

269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for
the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
presented to the solemnizing officer.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992
at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December
of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for
his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document.
He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until
Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that
area.
In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of
their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan.
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter
of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. Bagsic
testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that
the numbers are issued chronologically. He testified that the certification
dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by LeodivinaEncarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan
on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of
the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend
Mario Dauz, the solemnizing officer, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, the sponsor of
the wedding and the one who asked a certain Qualing to secure the marriage
license for the couple, Felicitas Goo, the mother of Gloria, and May Ann
Ceriola, one of the sponsors of the wedding.
RTC: held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage
License No. 9969967 had been issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had
certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. It also
took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. As the marriage was not one of
those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
CA: gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held
that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value. Ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. It gave
weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves
as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria
had filed a case against him for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid Marriage License had been issued for the couple?
HELD:
No, Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of
her witnesses to prove the existence of said license

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
In the instant case, Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license,
as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors,
whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the
license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of
applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have
testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply
been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a
valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that
there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect
the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed,
based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
The Marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
18. JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
It is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under

Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.
FACTS:
AngelitoSuazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years
old only. Without any means to support themselves, they lived with
Angelitos parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work
and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this
often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left
Angelito, Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged
physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of
Jocelyns testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to
comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an
effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to
infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive
dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or
the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks.
CA reversed said decision and held that the respondent may have failed to
provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse,
but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper
psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory
of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social
personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from
the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the
respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility
which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who
felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. Hence, this case.
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to

perform marital obligations.
ISSUE:
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically

incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or
was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the
spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito

under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible
error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare
Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition
only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course
be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality
profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological
condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. Both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a
general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder,
supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and
incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases
for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she
gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
NOTE:
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals(Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x xx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts x xx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensorvinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic
requirements of Santos.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no
longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity,juridical antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established.
Pesca v. Pesca clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then
already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or
construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the
date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lexprospicit,
non respicit.
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of

procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came
to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This
was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court
decided Te v. Yu-Te(Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the

resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by
which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina. Molina, toTe, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert
the sanctity of marriage.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by
so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon
Law. Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow
some resiliency in its application.
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is
consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,
that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was
not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according
to its own facts.Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked
at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. VelezTing follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far
from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of
the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report
of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive
for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is
also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available.
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or
parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina, merely stands
for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy
for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider
as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
x xxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of
cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the
intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage;
that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations
must be shown.Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations
of Santosjuridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is
proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.
19. ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR VS. ERLINDA AGRAVIADOR

G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010
Brion, J
Topic: Psychological incapacity(Art. 36 of the Family Code)
FACTS:
Enrique A. Agraviador (Enrique) met Erlinda A. Agraviador (Erlinda) in
1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. Enrique, at that time, was 24
yrs old while Erlinda was 17 years old. They contracted marriage in 1973 and
were blessed with four children. However, in 2001 Enrique filed with the
RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Art. 36 of
the Family Code citing psychological incapacity to exercise the essential

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
obligations of marriage on the part of Erlinda, as she was irresponsible,

carefree, refuses to do household chores, stay away from their house for long
period of time, had an affair with a lesbian, did not care for their sick child,
consulted a witch doctor to bring him bad faith and refuses to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities. He also claimed that she refuses to have
marital act with him because she became close with a male bolder and
discover their love notes to each other and caught them inside his room
several times.
Erlinda moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of
her psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the
petition. She also denied having extra marital affairs and maintain that it
was Enrique who refuse to do marital act with her and that He wanted to
have their marriage annulled inorder to marry their former household helper
Enrique presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his
claims through the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo Patac.
RTC nullified the marriage finding merit on in Enriques testimony and Dr.
Patacs psychiatric evaluation report.
Court of appeals reversed the RTCs decision and find that Dr. Patacs
psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondents
personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent and that no proof of
a natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated Erlinda from
accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects
that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely
lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents condition; neither
did he mention that the respondents malady was incurable, or if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake.
The petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault,
does not want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to
establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave or incurable
as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
The court also finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short
in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and
examine the respondent; he relied only on the information fed by the
petitioner, the parties second child, and household helper. Thus, while his
Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioners own
psychological condition, the same statement cannot be made with respect to
the respondents condition. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder.
NOTE:
The court in Ngo Te v. Yu-Tedeclared that it may have been inappropriate for
ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to

the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
COURTS RULING:
No, the totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity.Petitioners testimony failed to establish that the
respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted
on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes
her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations.
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not
cases of psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a

guideline, Molinaunintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases
only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
fours" with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of
a court and had had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena
time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.
stayed with her uncles house where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner.
Ting v. Velez-Ting and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazosquarely met the
Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will
issue and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In
be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was
these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from
hidden from Rowenas family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to
abandoning
the
live with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get
in
his inheritance instead so that they could live together separately or just stay
Molina,
it
relaxation of its stringent requirements.
simply
We
suggested
also
explained
Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
with her uncle.
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena
incapacity.
said that it is better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years later,
Kenneth filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Rowena.
20 EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YUTE

G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
Rowena did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation,
submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the two
parties. Eventually, the case was tried. The opinion of an expert was sought
wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are
Article 36: Psychological Incapacity Molina Case Merely a Guideline. Every case
psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Kenneth and
involving psychological incapacity must be resolved on a case-to-case basis
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The
FACTS:
break-up was caused by both parties unreadiness to commitment and their

young age. Kenneth was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu at a Filipino-
boredom, while Rowena was still egocentrically involved with herself. The
Chinese gathering at a school campus. They did not have interest with each
trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the findings of the expert
other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact
psychologist. The Solicitor General (OSG) appealed and the Court of Appeals
that they share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in
ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity
college, Rowena proposed to Kenneth that they should elope. Kenneth
of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
initially refused on the ground that he was still young and jobless. But due to
incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
Rowenas persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The
Rowena, and relied only on the information provided by Kenneth.
money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to
their respective home. Subsequently, Rowenas uncle brought the two before

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements
without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot
set forth in the Molina caseto be followed as guidelines.
perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and
ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be
impulsiveness.
21. TING v. VELEZ-TING
admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina.

COURTS RULING:
DOCTRINES:
Yes, such is possible. The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly, the it may
a. SC did not abandon the Molina Doctrine.
have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining

Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. So much so that the subsequent
cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein and that
there is not much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely
reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due
to both parties psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the
expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
b. Opinions of psychologists, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine

qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner
and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a
verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter.
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was
already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his
friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly
and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the
morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent,
physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also
instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.
Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors
and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped
calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be
unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking
problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not the Molina Doctrine was abandoned.

Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio by reason of
psychological incapacity
RULING:
1. No. Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina
doctrine.We have not.
In EdwardKenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, we declared that, in
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set
of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving
psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours
with another.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical
and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage.At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given
case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court,
as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision
not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.But where, as in this case,
the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a
partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be
presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to
grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
2. Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced
by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly,
that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts
and the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present
at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to
their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink
and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to
prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties
null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions
provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, while Dr. Obra
maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because,
aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what
Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological
evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview
with Benjamins brothers. Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr.
Obras findings.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.. In this case, the
presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
22. REPUBLIC v. CUISON-MELGAR
DOCTRINE: As the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, it
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person, it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
FACTS:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic
Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children, namely, Arneldo,
Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy, and Eulogio III. On August 19, 1996, Norma
filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.
According to Norma, the manifestations of Eulogios psychological
incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family since

December 27, 1985.
The RTC nullified the marriage by reason of psychological incapacity. The

RTC reasoned that:
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that defendant
has been incorrigible in his vices such as habitual alcoholism, subjecting his
family to physical maltreatment and many times caused them to be
scandalized, his being indolent by not at least trying to look for a job so that
he could also help his wife in supporting his family, and also his uncalled for
display of his jealousy. These are clear manifestation of his psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligation to his wife such as showing
respect, understanding and love to her. Defendant also became indifferent to
the needs of his own children who really longed for a father who is willing to
make the sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them. Without any
communication to his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation and
love would be improbable. The attendant circumstances in this case really
point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply with his
responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his wife and a loving
father to his children.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage is void ab initio by reason of psychological incapacity
RULING:
No. In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, Eulogio
was already suffering from a psychological defect, which in fact deprived
him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted in her testimony that
her marital woes and Eulogios disagreeable behavior started only after the
birth of their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not
cognizant of the basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72,220,
221, and 225 of the Family Code. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio
was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical.
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of
Eulogios immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family. These
circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.43
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. As the Court ruled in
Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo
filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their
marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and
void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the
psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr.
Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective testimonies. Teresita
did not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to
refute the allegations against her.
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita
was an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he
regularly sent money to his wife to cover the familys living expenses and
their childrens tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the
funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and
be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid
embarrassment.
FACTS:
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita
likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware
and cosmetics company. She left the familys utility bills and their childrens
tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for
the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had to live in
a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardos parents.
When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she
spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their
children.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon.

RemigioZari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children:
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was
pregnant with another mans child. During one of his visits to the country, he
23. RICARDO TORING v. TERESITA TORING

DOCTRINE:We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the
statements of Ricardo and Richardson (children), coupled with the results of the
psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already
constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
noticed that Teresitas stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her
to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months
into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the
child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by withdrawals; other than these, no other
sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his
relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too,
of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out
on dates with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic,
controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything;
had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife;
was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and
uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their
family; and was most painfully unmindful of him. He believed that their
marriage had broken down beyond repair and that they both have lost their
mutual trust and love for one another.
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the
demise of the marriage was Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that
rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations. She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from
her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and
Teresitas eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally
observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally delivered notice
for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained
unanswered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio by reason of psychological
incapacity
RULING:
No. Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita
suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her

psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To
support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to
her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation.
Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresitas
disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and
evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for the conclusion that no
marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of
the parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo
and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests
administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis
for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering
psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from onesided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the
marriage.
24. REPUBLIC v. GALANG
DOCTRINE: The psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys
psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time
of
the
celebration
of
the
marriage.
FACTS:
On March 9, 1994, Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar contracted
marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the respondents father
in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artistillustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00
monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They have
one child, Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the

Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and
his parents money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives
on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the
respondent, Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate immaturity,
distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him
and their] child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and
appears
to
be
incurable.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage is void ab initio by reason of psychological incapacity
RULING:
No. The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to
wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their
neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of
the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents
ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account;
(e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up
false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged
in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that the law requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must
be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations.
The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical
antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as
she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy
and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from
the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child
without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these
allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was
totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early life and
associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how
the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the
psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and
to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and
incurability. In these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents
efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this
premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvyappeared to be incurable or
incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions
cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family
Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing;
to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier
discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Previous doctrines laid down by the SC, which was discussed in this case:
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridicalantecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals and RoridelOlaviano Molina, whose salient points are
footnoted below.These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we
established in Santos.
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos we further clarified that it is not
absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological

incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages) which provided that the complete facts
should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez YuTeplaced some cloud in the continued applicability of the time-tested
Molinaguidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is
contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case
can be considered as completely on "all fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting and Jocelyn M. Suazo v.
AngelitoSuazo, however, laid to rest any question regarding the continued
applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that NgoTedid not
abandon Molina. Far from abandoning Molina, Ngo Tesimply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained that Suazothat Ngo
Temerely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
25. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA
JENNIFER QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
DOCTRINE:Validity of marriage can be collaterally attacked in a petition for
letters of administration
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No.
M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latters marriage with one FilipitoSandico (Filipito). To
prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by
Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real
properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00.
In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers
estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.The
petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for
settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Pias City.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Is the venue proper?

Can the validity of marriage be attacked in a petition for letters of
administration?
FACTS:
RULING:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria

Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional
Yes. Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot
be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, LasPias City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on
the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,Tarlac
where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of
his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
2. Yes. Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a
void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be
the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadogapplicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage.
26. BRAZA vs. CITY REGISTRAT OF HIMALAYAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009
Doctrine: Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be

questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and
not through collateral attack such as the filing of a petition to correct entries.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo SicadBraza, Jr.
(Pablo), also known as PablitoSicadBraza, were married. The union bore
Ma.Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo, Janelle Ann and Gian Carl.
Pablo diedin a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent
minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma.
Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained
Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar. The entries show that
Patricks father is Pablito S. Braza and annotated in the Birth Cert are:
"Acknowledged by the father PablitoBraza" Remarks: Legitimated by virtue
of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth,
the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Ma. Cristina
likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married.
The petitioners filed before the RTCa petition to correct the entries in the
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register under Rule 108. They
contend that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous. They
prayed, among others, for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his
acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza";2) the declaration of
nullity of the legitimation of Patrick and declaration of the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. Respondent Patrick filed a Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction.
RTC: dismissed the petition and held that in a special proceeding for
correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Family Code, has no jurisdiction. Controversy should be ventilated in an

ordinary adversarial action. MR also denied.
of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn
Patricks legitimacy.
They filed a petition for review to the SC.

Petitioners contention: court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage
and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil
registrar. Citing 3 cases, they contend that even substantial errors, such as
those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a
petition under Rule 108.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo can pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in
the civil registrar?
RULING: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108,
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy
and filiation.The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed.
The allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and
impugn Patricks filiation.The petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in the Family Code.
Petitioners position, that the main cause of action is for the correction of
Patricks birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental
thereto, does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration
27. REPUBLIC vs. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
Doctrine: A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-1110-SC and other related laws.
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate
of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage
with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that
she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on
June 24, 2002, at the MTCC. She denied having contracted said marriage and
claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She filed a Petition under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties
to
the
case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could
not have appeared before Judge Califlores of the MTCC, the supposed
solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in
HansaoPharma. She completely denied having known the supposed
husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in a
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. Respondent also
presented as witness a certain EufrocinaNatinga, an employee of MTCC,
Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared
was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate

adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries
of the civil register.
RTC: rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondent and directed the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all the entries in the WIFE
portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye
Son Sune. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage
contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the
latter's prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage
are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter,
however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who
contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims
that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one
who entered into such contract.
ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC correctly apply Rule 108 of the Rules of Court?
2. Is the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract in effect a declaration that the marriage is void ab initio?
RULING:
1. Yes. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986,
the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding."
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid
down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication
of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may
claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it
also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their
opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the
The procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The
Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in
turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents
were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondent's signature appearing in
some of her government issued identification cards. The court thus made a
categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage certificate
was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as
she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
2. No. The SC maintained that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, the SC ruled that it cannot nullify the proceedings
before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all
the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to
reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing
the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
In Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz GalelaMarinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil

Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
of the National Statistics Office, the SC ruled that a "petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention
of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry."
In this case, however, the SC found that aside from the certificate of
marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
"evidence" of marriage was a forgery.
28. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009
Doctrine: Without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In cases filed charging bigamy, the subsequent
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated.
FACTS:On May 24, 1974,VictoriaJarillo and Rafael Alocillo(1st Husband)

were married in a civil wedding ceremony.On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo
and Rafael Alocilloagain celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony.
On November 26, 1979, Petitioner Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a
subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City. On
April 16, 1995, Petitioner and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew
in a church wedding in Manila.
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the petitionera case for annulment of
marriage before the RTC of Manila.
Thereafter, PetitionerJarillo was charged with bigamy before the RTC of
Pasay City.
On October 5, 2000, Petitioner filed against Alocillobefore the RTC of Makati,
a case for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
RTC (trying the Criminal Case):found accused Jarillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY. Such court makes no
pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of
accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their
property. This aspect is being determined by the RTC of Manila.
Petitioners defense: (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null
and void because Alocillo (1st Husband) was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her
marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati Cityrendered a Decision dated March
28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and
void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said
decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003.
In her MFR, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
CA: affirmed RTCs (the court trying the criminal case) ruling in toto. CA
denied reconsideration and ruled that the subsequent declaration of nullity
of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without
legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred inaffirming the conviction of Petitioner despite
the supervening proof that the first two marriages of Petitioner to Alocillo
had been declared by final judgment null and void ab initio?
RULING: No. Without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage
is presumed to be subsisting.The subsequent judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.The outcome of the civil
case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners
marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in Tenebro v. CA, since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading
of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent

marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
29. MONTANEZ vs. CIPRIANIO
G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, respondent Lourdes Ciprianomarried Socrates Flores
(Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San
Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, a
Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
the latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family
Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa,rendered a decision declaring
the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision
became final andexecutory on October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner MerlindaCiprianoMontaez, Silverios daughter

from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a
Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Attached to the complaint was an
Affidavit (MalayangSinumpaangSalaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumbmarked and signed by Silverio, which alleged, among others, that
respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
On November 17, 2004, an Information for Bigamy was filed against
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
Before her arraignment, respondent, filed a Motion to Quash Information
(and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no
more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages,
is therefore wanting.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
RTC denied the motion. RTC invoked the Mercado Ruling.

Respondent filed a MFR claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before
the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became
final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40
of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will
impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity
of a completely void prior marriage.
RTC: dismissed the criminal case. In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time
the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e.,
before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting
a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was
ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of
respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, it
declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not
prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all
valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa
City in 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy
filed against respondent.
2. Since her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, can Article 40 of the Family Code be given retroactive effect?
RULING:1. Yes. In Mercado v. Tan, SC ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People, SC held that what is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted. Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration
that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
2. Yes. As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already
made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be
applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides
that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights."The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
30. ANTONE vs. BERONILLA
G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010
Doctrine: As reiterated in a long line of cases, Article 40 of the Family Code
has been established as a new provision expressly requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of a prior marriage for purposes of remarriage.
Therefore, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior
judicial declaration of nullity is guilty of bigamy.
FACTS:
Petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy
against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay
City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent Beronillain 1978 had not
yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with
one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. By virtue of such complaint, an Information has
been filed.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. He alleges thathis marriage with
petitioner was declared null and void by the RTC of Biliran on 26 April 2007;
that the decision became final and executory on 15 May 2007; and that such
decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12
June 2007. He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and
void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of.
Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute the crime of bigamy.
such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which
renders the elements of bigamy complete.
Prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained that the respondent

committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The
prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18
November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second
marriage on 16 February 1991.
While Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are
different. In Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized, although
later declared void ab initio. While in Morigo, no marriage ceremony was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred
was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a private act. Thus, there
is no need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can
contract a subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this
case.
The RTC quashed the information. Applying Morigo v. People,it ruled:

Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla
was actually never legally married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the
first element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the
definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage must at least be
annullable or voidable but definitely not void.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed the
petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after
contracting the subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy
RULING: Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous
ruling of People v. Mendoza (under the Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case
for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there
is no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is
invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that,

under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then the crime had
already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a
subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage is guilty of bigamy.
31. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR

GR. NO, 201061, JULY 3, 2013
FACTS:
On March 15, 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. filed a petition for declaration of
a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC of Manila. Benjamin alleged that on September 10, 1973, he married
Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City. They had three children namely, Rizalyn,
Emmamylin and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally HoBangayan who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business
owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United
States of America.
In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sallys father was against the relationship. On March 7, 1982 in order to

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig

City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally knowing
Benjamins marital status assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and
Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following
real properties:
1. Property under TCT 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses
2. Properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name
of Benjamin, married to Sally;
3. Properties under Condominium Certificate of title No. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally married to Benjamin;
4. Properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
Canada bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. Sally then filed criminal
actions for Bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin on the other hand filed a Petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was Bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for
the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with
Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator during
the pendency of the case and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. Aside from the 7 properties enumerated by Benjamin in
his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
was confirmed during trial, that the purported Marriage License No. N07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally. The trial court also ruled that
the marriage between Sally and Benjamin was not bigamous. It ruled that the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage
but because of other causes, particularly the lack of marriage license. The
trial court did not rule on the issue of legitimacy status of Bernice and
Bentley because they were not parties to the case. On the issue of partition,
the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in
her answer as her conjugal properties with Benjamin because such properties
were owned by Benjamins parents who gave those properties to his
children, including Benjamin as advance inheritance.
The trial court also ruled that properties no 1, 2, 3 (listed above) were part of
the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena. The trial court further
ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court
forfeited Sallys share in Property no. 4 in favor of Bernice and Bentley.
COURT OF APPEALS: The CA ruled that the trial court committed no error
in declaring the marriage of Sally and Benjamin null and void. The CA also
ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
Article 148 of the Family code and that only the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contribution.
As regards the 7 properties claimed by both parties only property no. 2
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was
able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The CA ruled that
property number 3 and 4 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of
proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. Property number 1
shall be owned by Benjamin and Sally in common.
ISSUE/S:
TRIAL COURT: the trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. It gave weight to
the certification dated July 21, 2004 from the Pasig Local civil registrar which

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
1. Whether or not the Trial Court and the CA erred in ruling that the
marriage of Sally and Benjamin is non-existent and at the same time void ab
initio
2. Whether the marriage between Sally and Benjamin was bigamous
3. Whether Article 148 of the FC should govern the property relations
between Sally and Benjamin
HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court did not see any inconsistency in finding the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and the same
time non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license shall be necessary, shall be void from the beginning. In this case,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
marriage license. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which
made their marriage void ab initio. Consequently, the marriage between
them is non-existent.
2. No. If the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the
first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the NSO. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
3. Yes. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue absolutely to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of Article 148. The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
32. LEONILA SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 200233, July 15, 2015
FACTS:
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on July 29, 1997,
Leonila Santiago and Nicanor Santos faced an Information for bigamy. It was
alleged that Nicanor who had been married to Estela Galang since June 2,
1974 asked Leonila to marry him.
Leonila who was a 43 year old widow then married Santos on July 29, 1997
despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was without
responsibility.
Leonila asserted affirmative defense that she could not be included as an
accusedin the crime of bigamy because she had been under the belief that
Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there
be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven
valid by the prosecutor; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was
void due to the lack of marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela
Galang testified that as early as March and April 1997 she met Leonila on
which occasions, the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
RTC: Based on the more credible account of Galang that she already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Nicanor, the trial court rejected the
affirmative of Santos that she had not known of the first marriage. The RTC

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
declared that as indicated in the certificate of marriage her marriage was

celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article
34 of the Family code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos
long before the celebration of their marriage. Thus the trial court convicted
petitioner with the crime of bigamy.
Leonila moved for reconsideration and contended that her marriage to
Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with
Article 34 of the Family code. Hence, she argued that the absence of a
marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying
the acquittal for bigamy. The RTC denied toreverse Leonilas conviction. It
ruled that in advancing that theory, Leonila wants the court to pass
judgment on the validity of her marriage to Nicanor, something that the trial
court cannot do. The best support for her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such
proof, the court cannot declare their marriage null and void.
CA: upheld the decision of the RTC
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Leonila Santiago should be liable for Bigamy
2. Whether or not the trial court and the CA erred in not ruling on the
validity of the marriage between Leonila and Nicanor
3. Can Leonila be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
HELD:
1. Yes. The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a.) the offender has been legally married;
(b.) the marriage has not been legally dissolved;
(c.) the he contracts a second and subsequent marriage; and
(d.) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage having all the essential requisites would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
For the second spouse to be indicted as co-accused in the crime, she/he
should have knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. The knowledge
of the second wife of the existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy which makes him/her responsible
as an accomplice.
Both courts consistently found that Leonila knew of the first marriage as
shown in the totality of circumstances.
2. Yes. if the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can
do it as a matter of defense during the trial proper of the criminal case.
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue.
After the perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between Leonila
and Nicanor took place without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of marriage which
reveals that their union was celebrated under article 34 of the Family code.
All told, the evidence on record shows that Leonila and Nicanor had only
known each other for less than four years before their marriage. Thus, it
follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years
prior to their marriage. Leonila and Nicanor however reflected the exact
opposite. Unfortunately, subsequent to his lie was the issuance of the
Certificate of Marriage in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath
that no marriage license was necessary because the marriage was solemnized
under Art. 34 of the FC
3. No. The court cannot countenance Leonilas illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and in the same breadth, adjudge her innocent of the crime. To do
so would only make mockery of the sanctity of marriage. Furthermore, it is a

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
basic concept of justice that no court will lend its aid to one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,
Leonila married Nicanor while knowing fully well that they had not
complied with the five year cohabitation requirement under art 34.
Consequently it will be the height of absurdity for this court to allow Leonila
to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
33. JAMES WALTER CAPILI vs. PEOPLE and SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI
GR No 183805, July 3, 2013
FACTS:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner Walter was charged with the crime of bigamy
before the RTC of Pasig City. It was alleged that on or about December 8,
1999, the accused being previously united with Karla Medina-Capili and
without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled contracted
a second marriage with Shirley Tismo. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to
suspend proceedings alleging that (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared
null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC Pasig in
view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Petitioner.
In the interim, RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted
by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his manifestation and Motion to dismiss
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on
the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent
had already been declared void by the RTC. The RTC granted the
manifestation and motion to dismiss. The CA on the other hand reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage
is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case of bigamy
HELD:
No. The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a.) the offender has been legally married;
(b.) the marriage has not been legally dissolved;
(c.) the he contracts a second and subsequent marriage; and
(d.) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy
were present when the information was filed on June 28, 2004. It is
undisputed that the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a
valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Medina-Capili contracted
on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent declaration of the second marriage being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime
og bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy even there is a subsequent declaration of
nullity of the second marriage so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. In Jarillo vs. People, the
court affirmed the accuseds conviction dor bigamy ruling that the crime of

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage

without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void.
petitioner did not hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was
alive or not.
Thus, under the law, marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on
June 20, 1985. Subsequently however, Virgilios application for naturalization
filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied
because petitioners marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, petitioner filed
a petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio. RTC rendered its decision dismissing the
Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita was not to able to
prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio was already dead.
This belief must be result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
What makes a person liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or

subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. The
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second
marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against
him.
34. ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
FACTS:
Angelita married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December
13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to their only child, Nancy. According to
petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was
unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left
their conjugal dwelling. In May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her
parents home in Bancay, Camiling Tarlac .Three years passed without any
word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed in Bancay. He and petitioner
talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a
document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that,
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that it is the Civil
Code that applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioners
marriage to Sofio was celebrated January 11, 1971, long before the Family
Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested
right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the
Family code should not be applied against her. It was claimed by the
petitioner that to apply the stricter provisions of the Family code will impair
her rights which she acquired under the Civil Code. The RTC denied the MR.
In its Manifestation and motion, the OSG recommended that the court set
aside the assailed RTC decision and grant the petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of well-founded
belief under Art. 41 of the FC is not applicable to the instant case because it
was not yet in existence during her marriage with Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The
OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the FC petitioner already
acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes
based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial court erred in applying the Family Code in the case at bar
HELD:

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
Yes. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the FC and holding
that petitioner needed to prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was
already dead. It is readily apparent however that the marriages of petitioner
to Sofio and Virgilio were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code.
Under the civil code, it can be gleaned that presumption of death id
established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to
arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place the seventh year of
absence. Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there
existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry and the marriage is
valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the civil code.
Further, considering that it is the civil code that applies, proof of wellfounded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to
comply with this requirement since the FC was not yet in effect at the time of
her marriage with Virgilio.
35. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA
CANTOR
husbands declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that she had

inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law as
well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hope sof finding
Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory
whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent
claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
RTC: issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring Jerry
presumptively dead.
CA: (OSG appealed the case) The court of appeals fully affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
dead
HELD:
GR No. 184621, December 10, 2013
No. In the case at bar, the respondents well-founded belief was anchored
on her alleged earnest efforts to locate Jerry. Those efforts however fell short
of the stringest standard and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence
for the following reasons:
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived
together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes,
Koronadal City, South Cotobato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a
violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondents inability to reach
sexual climax whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2)
Jerrys expression of animosity toward the respondents father.
1. The respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be
inferred from the records that her hospital visits and consequent checking of
the patients directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him. The Supreme court thus
considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is
dead.
FACTS:
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last
time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen,
communicated nor heard anything from jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than 4 ywars from the time of Jerrys
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her
2. She did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of
the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies
with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under
the present conditions, the court finds it proper and prudent for a present

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
spouse whose spouse had been missing to seek the aid of authorities or at the
very least report his/her absence to the police.
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked
the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
3. She did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and
friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons
whom she allegedly made inquiries were not even named. As held in
Nolasco, the present spouses bare assertion that he inquired from his friends
about his absent spouses whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony
nor presented as witnesses.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus
declared presumptively dead.
4. Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the

respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there
supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than
her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in laws about her
husbands whereabouts.
In sum the court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
passive search where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries. She failed to
conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.
36. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO
GRANADA,
G. R. No. 187512
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
FACTS:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada
(Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company where both
were then working. The two eventually got married on 3 March 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down,
Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that
time, she had not received any communication from her husband,
RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

PetitionerRepublic argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. However, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA.. Yolanda
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over
the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial
proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and,
thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by
the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground
that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
HELD:
No. In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the
Petition assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the appellate court noted that a petition

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a

summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC
Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is
therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it
through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.
The SC affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family
Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial
Proceedings in the Family Law. Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and
247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and
217, insofar as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CAs
affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was
an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated
the matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are immediately final and executory.
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the
bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7,
2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due
course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case,
and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result
reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined
that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been
superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,[7]
issued a few months later.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of

judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage.
Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
the Rules of Court,[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when

appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In
reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of
death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the
category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as
provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to enable
her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners action was a
summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a
special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this
action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a
record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc
superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the
CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a
summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in
Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an
ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a
summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code was intended to set the records straight and for the future
guidance of the bench and the bar.
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding
appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family
Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:[9]
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the
rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and
217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course,
it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in
the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she stopped
responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters Maria
wrote him. He claims to have forgotten her address since.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon,
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate
the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Upon inquiry from
the latters uncle, Antonio Ledesma, in Las Pias, Ferventino learned that even
Marias relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited the
assistance of a friend in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no
avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia in Los
Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma though,
their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by
without any news of Maria.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately
final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
37. REPUBLIC v. TANGO
G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
In 1987, Ferventino and Maria were married in civil rites before then Mayor
Ignacio Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of Marias relatives witnessed the
ceremony as they were opposed their relationship. The two had only spent a
night together and had been intimate once when Maria told Ferventino that
she and her family will soon be leaving for the United States of America
(USA). Maria assured Ferventino, however, that she will file a petition so he
can live with her in the USA. In the event that said petition is denied, she
promised to return to the Philippines to live with him. On March 13, 1987,
Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a verified petition
before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria
within the contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
RTC: granted the petition and declared Maria presumptively dead.
OSG filed a Notice of Appeal for the Republic.
CA: Treated the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, affirmed the RTCs Order.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Tango has established a basis to form a well-founded belief that
his absent spouse is already dead.
2. Whether the OSG erred in filing a Notice of Appeal, and thus, making a
serious procedural lapse, had made the decision of the RTC become final.
HELD:
1. Yes. But the Supreme Court did not dwell on the substantive portion of the
case because the decision of the trial court had long become final due to the
procedural lapse made by the OSG and the other courts.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
2. Yes. The cases filed under Art. 41, FC are summary proceedings. By
express provision of law (See Arts. 253 and 247, FC), the judgment of the
court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As
a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without
saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when
it filed a notice of appeal in the CA instead of a petition for certiorari. The
RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the
transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. By no means did
the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC
which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and executory.
Adding to the confusion, the CA entertained the appeal and treated the same
as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the
Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss
the erroneous appeal as the judgment was not appealable.
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at
this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of
the trial court had long become final.
38. CELERINA SANTOS vs. RICARDO SANTOS
A bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are
present: 1.) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; The spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; There
must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
FACTS:
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo
alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan,
Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980. After a year,
they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business.
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong
Kong. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he
allowed her to work abroad. She allegedly applied in an employment agency
in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was
never heard from again.
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to
Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional
Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed
away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in
October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.
RTC Tarlac City: Declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive

death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.
Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her
contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's
petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added that
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were
not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition
CA: Dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a
wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper
remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's
petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death
2.) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is bigamous on the ground
that the subject marriage was contracted in bad faith
HELD:
1st: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently
obtained judgment declaring presumptive death. Annulment of judgment is
the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or
other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the

petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. The court cited Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi which
described how Extrinsic Fraud can be committed and according to the Court
It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which
prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such
that there is no fair submission of the controversy. Celerina alleged in her petition
for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately
made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence. Ricardo also
falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no
publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of
general circulation. Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived
of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her
presumptively dead. Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's
petition for declaration of presumptive death were false. Celerina further
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies
of Ricardo's petition. These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals
sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
2nd: The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for determination
of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first
marriage, and the merits of the petition. The Court in this case merely stated
the Conditions to be complied with before Article 42 of the Family Code may
be applied. The Conditions are: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the
sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to
the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4)
the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of
the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family
Code are present.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
39. ALAIN M. DIO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO

DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY (ART 40); ARTS 50 AND 51; ART 147
FACTS:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent
citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him,
and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,

such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must
be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the
family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and
would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their
marriage void ab initio. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
HELD:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, Partition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x xx. It is not

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding

for declaration of nullity of marriage.
40. GO-TAN vs. SPOUSES TAN
G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008
Provisional Orders
Principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
FACTS:
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married in 1999 and out of
their union two female children were born. However, on January 2005
Petitioner Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses
Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with his parents were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Sec. 5, par.
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of R.A 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004)Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and
contend that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since as parentsin-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case on the ground that respondents
being the parents-in-law of the petitioner were not covered as respondents
under R.A. No. 9262.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents-spouses Tan as parents-in-law of petitioner may
be included in the Petition for the Issuance of a Protective Order in
accordance with R.A. No. 9262.
RULING:
Yes. The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. It held that while the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC. Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262, has expressly
provide for the suppletory of the RPC.Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law
is silent on a particular matter.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out
in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present
petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. It is thus premature for
petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered
only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a
petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be
best passed upon after a trial on the merits. Considering the Courts ruling
that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be
considered indispensable or necessary parties.
41. JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of

violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors

and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local
government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.
FACTS:
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and
the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely:
Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but
whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and
Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner,who is of
Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to
pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law,
and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He
was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of
some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her
killed.
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank
manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of
their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent
confronted him about it in 2004.
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent
physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner
grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that
caused bruises and hematoma. All the emotional and psychological turmoil
drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by
her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of
taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about
seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her.
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that
she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry
with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and
told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told
private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that
private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid
that he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial
support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal
battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. Action of the RTC of
Bacolod City:
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur,
the RTC issued a TPO on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO seeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the threeday notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent
and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation,
and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to
a more manageable level at P100,000.00.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW
DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE
FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
WON R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit.

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
HELD:
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about
by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing
or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women
does not discriminate against men. Petitioner's contention, therefore, that
R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing,"
and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice
Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character
of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the
development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution
and the judges."
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the
husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person"
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage,
or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. GoTan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the
latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected
from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
RALPH P. TUA vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge,

Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA
HONRADO-TUA
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On May 20, 2005, respondent RossanaHonrado-Tua (respondent) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition for herself
and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and
Jezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic
Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that
she and her children had suffered from petitioners abusive conduct; that
petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the
purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually
deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was
threatened to be deprived of her and her childrens financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City.
They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999,
Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on
December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit3 attached to the petition, respondent
claimed, among others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her
room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he
wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she
filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there was also an instance
when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her youngest
daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying,
petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she
felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop
coming to the house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a
protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat
on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with
companions went to her new home and forcibly took the children and
refused to give them back to her. RTC granted the prayer and issued the
Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
Petitioner denied the allegations of the respondent and alleged that it was
the petitioner who verbally abused and threatened him whenever their
childrens stay with him was extended. Petitioner challenged the TPO by
filing a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of the preliminary
injunction. The CA denied the petition and upheld the validity of the TPO by
the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the TPO issued by the RTC.
HELD:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of
the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked the
gun and pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent not to
proceed with the legal separation case; feeding his other children with the
food which another child spat out; and threatening the crying child with a
belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done; and holding
respondent by her nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to
come often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their agreed
separation and threatening her of withholding half of the financial support
for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a
TPO.
44. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) vs. DAISY R. YAHON
G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014
FACTS:
S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt.Yahon) is a retired enlisted personnel of the
Philippine Army. Respondent Daisy Yahon is his wife. Respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband.
The RTC initially issued a TPO ordering Sgt.Yahon to enjoin from
threatening to commit or committing further acts of physical abuse aginst the
petitioner. He was likewise ordered to stay away from Daisy, her residence
or place of work. Financial support was also ordered. Upon failing to appear
in subsequent hearings, he was ordered in default. The trial continued ex-

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA
parte. The RTC then rendered a decision against Sgt.Yahon. The court found
that respondent must be permanently protected after enduring physical,
emotional, verbal and psychological abuse from Sgt.Yahon. A Permanent
Protection Order was issued granting a P4,000 spousal support to the
respondent. 50% of whatever benefits or claims Sgt Yahon had from the
government were ordered to be automatically deducted in favour of
respondent.
or government. The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective
of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence and
provide them continued protection against threats to their personal safety
and security.
Petitioner AFPFC manifested (by way of special appearance) that while it has
initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the RTC had not acquired
jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence
the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Also, petitioner argued
that under the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA 8291) funds or properties (including
benefits) cannot be subject to any court processes such as a TPO/PPO. Such
exemption was likewise incorporated in the Rules of Court. Respondent
however argued that RA 9262 enumerates reliefs that may be included in
TPO, PPO or BPO issued by courts. Among these reliefs was withholding
salary or income from an employer which thus allows the court to enjoin the
petitioner from releasing the benefits to Sgt Yahon.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to
automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted
personnel, and to give the same directly to the latters lawful wife as spousal
support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to
R.A. No. 9262.
HELD: The SC ruled that R.A. No. 9262, a later enactment (compared to the
GSIS Act), should be construed as laying down an exception to the general
rule that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself
declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be
automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws
to the contrary. Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term
"employer," which includes in its coverage the military institution,
S/Sgt.Yahons employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private

ATTY. ELMER RABUYA

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CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 1-44

1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING

Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap

1 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

It was dismissed. MR and petition for reviewer on certiorari under rule 45

DOCTRINE: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the

2 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Rebecca then executed an Affidavit declaring that she is an American citizen,

3 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

November 24, 2010

TOPIC: Unjust enrichment; Accion in rem verso

4 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen, contracted

purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly

2. RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

5 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

6 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

7 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

8 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

9 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious

628 SCRA 266, August 11, 2010

6. GERBERT CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS

10 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

11 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate

foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and

12 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already

13 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or

14 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

reluctantly signed then immediately left. According to him, it was only in

Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties

YES. Falsity of Affidavit not a mere irregularity; action for nullity of

15 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They

2. Whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

16 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

2. YES. the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to

*Article 34 Marriage without a marriage license ; 5 years cohabitation

17 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the CA gave more weight to

12. LOLITA D. ENRICO v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI

18 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. RTC reversed its ruling on

13. CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, on 1 June 2006, the

*Who may file ; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC ; Rule on Declaration of Absolute

19 CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may

the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,