Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
COURT OF
APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and
executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from
the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without
her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in
1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have
taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special
proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament.
In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In
1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void.
The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued
declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of
Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective
estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws
on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government.i
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled
to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to
his death although she admitted that they were not married to
each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended
period granted.ii This dismissal became final and executory on
February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was
forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A
writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement
the final and executory Order. Consequently, private
respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel
petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles
(TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When
petitioner refused to surrender the TCTs, private respondents
filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of
new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B.
Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance
of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was
merely interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court
added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even
claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had
inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.xxviii
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by his heirs.xxix In their answer, the heirs denied
they were mere tenants of Justa xxx but the latters heirs entitled
to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was
originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, xxxi their great
granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan
Arnaldo, Ambrocios nephews, in a holographic will executed by
Ambrocio in 1908.xxxii Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the
land and Juan, one-third.xxxiii The heirs claimed that the land
had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime
Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only
received her share of the harvest from it. xxxiv They alleged that
private respondent did not have any right to the property
because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, xxxv the
original owner of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioners contention. In its decision
rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to
his two nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481
hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters
to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The
area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares
because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired
by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the
latters death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax
declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter
however died intestate and without issue. Her nearest surviving
relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to
whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation
of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code).xxxvi
Accordingly, the court ordered:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against
the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants and
the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late
Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land
described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising
tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. No cost.
SO ORDERED.xxxvii
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial
courts finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares
had been acquired by Justas parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula
Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her
half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be
entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion
of its decision the appellate court ordered:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and another is hereby entered -
(2)
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the
private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest
relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private
respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the halfsister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue only
now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up
during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a question
be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this
Court.xli
It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, xlii
petitioners admitted that private respondent is Justas nephew,
his mother, Agatonica, being Justas half-sister. Apparently they
are now questioning private respondents filiation because, as
explained by the Court of Appeals, private respondent is the
nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to
her estate.
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa
was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her
fathers (Juan Arnaldos) share in the conjugal property, while
petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition,
Justa inherited her mothers (Ursula Tubils) share consisting of
0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in
her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of
the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by
private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justas nearest
surviving relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance,
the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,
subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to
relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph
2, concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are
provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
ART. 963.
Proximity of relationship is determined by the
number of generations. Each generation forms a degree.
ART. 964.
A series of degrees forms a line, which may
be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but
who come from a common ancestor.
ART. 965.
ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who
descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there
are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor.
Thus the child is one degree removed from the parent, two
from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor
and then descent is made to the person with whom the
computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the
brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of
Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons
and daughters of Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree
relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest,
then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother
is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.xliii
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private
respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas
daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim
that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of
Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and
private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the
son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justas
nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may
inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent.xliv That private respondent is only a half-blood
relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from
being his aunts heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out, The determination of whether the relationship is of the full
or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the
share of the survivors.xlv
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and
fourth grounds of the petition for review must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of
Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate
estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its
Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in
this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988.
After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court,
in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the
request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en
banc, and the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988
to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992
of the New Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately
in such a way that access was not possible;
20
this Court
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse
and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated
April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. PascualBautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual,
Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed
the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July
14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the
latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973
without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted
or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full
blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the
deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of
the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia
Hermes S. Pascual
S.
Pascual
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given
due course.
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it
is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42).
And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same
as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654
[1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and
spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate
children are generally placed under one category, which
undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not
acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in
the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law
(DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO
MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL,
ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA
MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA
BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is
the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel
and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz,
and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively,
06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married
Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain",
firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in theIllegitimate Children and
relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4
and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said: Descendants (in the absence
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely aof ICDs and LPAs, the
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of saidIllegitimate Parents)
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this
is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.Surviving Spouse
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, inBrothers and Sisters/
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which itNephews and
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of aNieces
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Other Collateral Relatives
Alone
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the(within the fifth civil degree)
Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the
illegitimate
child
had
State
(g) Alone
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that
former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of
she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right.
the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a
A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial)
natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that
the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural
seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.
10
the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa
Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform
Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners,
general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative
11
not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither
by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other
12
the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
part as to produce a harmonious whole.
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the
order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in
Article
978
through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference
Descendants
Ascendants
Order of Concurrence
SO ORDERED.
SYLLABUS
xxx
xxx
WENCESLA
CACHO,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositorsappellants.
Gregorio
Dolojan
for
petitioner-appellee.
Benjamin A. G. Vega and Abad Santos and Pablo for
oppositors-appellants.
pp. 55-56). After one witness, the Notary Public who made and
notarize the will, had testified in court, oppositor Francisco G.
Udan died on June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales,
Philippines (RA. pp. 63-66).
After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and
Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix
Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on the
ground that the will was not attested and executed as required
by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and
that it was procured by fraud or undue influence (RA. pp. 6366; 67-71). On 20 January 1962 proponent-appellee, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss Oppositions filed by the
Oppositors (RA. pp. 73-80), and on 20 February 1962 the
Honorable Court of First Instance of Zambales issued an Order
disallowing these two oppositions for lack of interest in the
estate and directing the Fiscal to study the advisability of filing
escheat proceedings (RA. pp. 97-99). On 26 and 30 March
1962 both oppositors filed their Motions for Reconsideration,
through their respective counsels, and these motions were
both denied by the lower court on 25 April 1962 (RA. pp. 99122; pp. 131-132). On 7 May 1962 oppositors filed their joint
Notice of Appeal (RA. pp. 132-135).
The first issue tendered by appellants is whether the oppositor
brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs
intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. We find
that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the
time of her death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan,
was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is
clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of
the Philippines, in force at the time of the death of the testatrix:
That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina
is not denied by the oppositor; and he is so acknowledged to
be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by
the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single, the son must
be necessarily illegitimate (presumptively natural under Article
277).
MANUEL
SARITA,
ET
AL.,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-appellee.
Felix
Sevilla
y
Macam,
Vicente Urgello, for appellee.
for
appellants.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The spouses Apolinario Cedeo and Roberto Montesa
acquired during their marriage a piece of land, apparently of an
area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit
trees. Apolinario Cedeo died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in
1909. It is alleged that during the lifetime of these spouses,
from 1886 to April, 1909, on which latter date Roberta Montesa
died, Andres Candia was holding and cultivating the said land,
but that as stated in the complainant, he did so merely under a
lease and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos
semiannually; that, from May, 1909, he refused to pay the
emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land, appropriated the
land and claimed ownership thereof; and that he also took
possession of four mares, twelve carabaos, and several pieces
of furniture which were in the house erected on the said land
a house worth 50 pesos which he also seized and claimed
as his property. Apolinario Cedeo had three brothers and one
sister, Macario, Domingo, Leon, and Cristeta, of whom only the
last mentioned is living. Macario left of five children, among
them Tomas Cedeo; Domingo, the same number, among
them a daughter named Sofia, who died leaving a son, Manuel
Sarita; and Leon, four, among them, Gregorio Cedeo. All of
these except Gregorio Cedeo and his brothers sue for the
ownership of the land and the other personal property of
Andres Candia which, together with the fruits thereof, they
requested the Court of First Instance of Cebu to sentence the
latter to return to them and, further, that he indemnify them in
the amount of P800, and pay the costs.
Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta Montesa as the son of
her sister, testified that he had been brought up, from the time
he was very young, in the house of the spouses Cedeo and
Montesa; that he worked on the house which those spouses
left at their death when it was under construction, and, from his
boyhood, assisted in the cultivation of the land; that said
Apolonio Cedeo, otherwise known as Isidario Cedeo, was a
cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in order to
pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under his charge, on the
24th of June, 1881, sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarosa,
who held it in quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-four
years and at his death such possession was continued by his
sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarosa, from whom witness,
Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase; that at no
time did he hold the same as a lessee nor pay for it any
usufruct, this half of the other half remained liable for the
payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.)
Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is
proved that at the death of such alleged predecessor in interest
in the inheritance, the land in question was not owned by him,
it having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion
established by the trial judge. Therefore, the action for the
recovery of possession, derived from such alleged inheritance,
cannot exist.
This transfer of the and affected by Isidario or Apolinario
Cedeo was originally the title alleged by the defendant a
title which must not be presumed in the present case, but
proved. It is true that the possessor, in the capacity of owner
has in his favor the legal presumption that he holds under the
lawful title and cannot be compelled to exhibit it (Civil Code,
art. 446); but it is also true that when the defendant agrees with
the plaintiffs that the thing demanded belonged to a
determinate person during his lifetime from whom these latter
claim to derive their right, the existence is thereby admitted of a
right of ownership opposed to that of the present possessor,
and hence logically the necessity for the latter to prove his title
and exhibit it, in order to destroy the contrary presumption in
favor of that prior ownership.
The defendant, according to the finding of the trial judge, has
proved that he has such a title, by the exhibition of three
documents: one, of the sale by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to
Juan Basa Villarosa (Exhibit 2); another, of the sale with pacto
de retro by the latter's son, Sinforoso Villarosa, to the
defendant (Exhibit 3); and the other, of a final sale by the other
son, Vicente Villarosa, to the same party, Andres Candia
(Exhibit 4).
Against this finding of the lower court, the appellants allege: 1.
That Isidario Cedeo, the vendor, has nothing to do with
Apolinario Cedeo, his predecessor in interest; and, 2. That the
land in Talamban known as that of Juan Basa Villarosa is about
15 or 20 brazas distant from the land in Talamban which is
concerned in this litigation.
But the finding impugned is in no wise erroneous. Tomas
Cedeo, one of the plaintiffs, testified that his uncle Apolinario
had the baptismal or Christian name of Isidario, was better
known by the nickname of Adiot, and was the only cabeza de
barangay in Sibonga with the surname of Cedeo. Domingo
Cedeo, who was erroneously made to appear as a plaintiff,
said that the original owner of the land in question was "his
deceased uncle, Isidario Cedeo," and that Isidario was the
true name. The averment of the appellants that "the finding of
the court is precisely contrary to the agreement made by both
parties" (brief, 8)is in all respects incorrect. "In the said
agreement, they say, no other name than that of Apolinario was
recorded and admitted to be the name of the plaintiff's
predecessor in interest. By that same agreement the defendant
could not be heard to prove another so different name as that
of Isidario for the purpose of confusing it with that of
Apolinario . . . (brief, 8). The agreement only says: "By
agreement between the attorneys for both parties, the
complaint in this case is understood to be amended in the
Note: Picture
BICOMONG,
et
al.,
plaintiffs-appellees,
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals
1
in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue
raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on
the matter which is purely a legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and
adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8,
1859 (Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children
namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit
F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died
ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso
(Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two children,
Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon
Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the
plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also
died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs
Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her
are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also
on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of
her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo
Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5)
months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959,
Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the
defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her
father Geronimo Almanza.
(Rollo, pp. 2-3)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265
concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the
following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited
from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of
1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the
E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the
W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been
duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for
determination is a purely legal question involving the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence
the appellate court certified this case to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the
New Civil Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case
at bar. These Articles provide:
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former
shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
THE
CITY
OF
MANILA,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA and
THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF MARIA
CONCEPCION SARMIENTO, interveners-appellees.
City
Attorney
Escaler
for
appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for the appellee
Roman
Catholic
Archbishop
of
Manila.
No appearance for the other appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila on the 15th day of February, 1913. Its
purpose was to have declared escheated to the city of Manila
certain property situated in and around said city; that said
property consists of five parcels of land located ion the districts
of Malate and Paco of the city of Manila, as shown in a plan, in
the office of the Department of Engineering and Public Works
of said city of Manila, No. B-10-27. The theory of the plaintiff is
that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and
died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entitled to
the same."
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, in a
carefully prepared opinion, reached the conclusion that the
prayer of the plaintiff should be denied without any finding as to
costs. From that conclusion the plaintiff appealed to this court
and made a number of assignments of error.
After an examination of the evidence adduced during the trial
of the cause, we find that the following facts were proved by a
large preponderance of the evidence: That Ana Sarmiento
resided, with her husband, in the city of Manila sometime prior
to the 17th day of November, 1668; that on said date she made
a will; that on the 23d day of November, 1668, she added a
codicil to said will, that on the 19th day of May, 1669, she made
another will making a part thereof the said codicil of November
23d, 1668; that said will contained provisions for the
establishment of a "Capellania de Misas;" that the first chaplain
of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo;
that said will contained a provision for the administration of said
property in relation with the said "Capellania de Misas"
The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She
left a will. The will provides for the administration of said
property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent
administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor
without persons entitled to administer her estate. It further
shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law
entitled to inherit her property. In view of the facts, therefore,
the property in question cannot be declared escheated as of
the property of Ana Sarmiento. If by any chance the property
may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact
that persons subsequent to Ana Sarmiento died intestate
without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the same.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas
Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking
care of himself and had been placed under the care of his
cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or
only four days after the will above-mentioned was made,
Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died
on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made
Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as
guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at
the time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and
nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after
having been contested, has been admitted to probate by
judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez,
48 Phil., 772).
November 1, 1926
STREET, J.:
the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor
of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the
extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the
proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable
or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The
testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry
into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of
the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of
the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all,
the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required
by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is
the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for
the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such
proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In
them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that
a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v.
Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the
testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this
nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would
be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine
the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the
Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon
the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in
1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the
man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a
married man with already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of
respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would not
have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his
illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is unFilipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the
parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that she would
not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar
Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez,
considering that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo
(where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent
Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are
unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently improbable,
for they are against the experience in common life and the
ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a
woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to
marry whether or not he was already married to another,
knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that
would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not
know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of
the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to
respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with
the deceased during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is
against the making of a donation between persons who are
living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate
Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA
ACHAVAL
DE
PASTOR,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF
BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and
LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents.
PLANA, J.:
I. FACTS:
with all the formalities required by law; and (c) Did the late
presentation of the holographic will affect the validity of the
same?
Spain, and prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good order
after partition and when directed by the Court, but only after the
payment of estate and inheritance taxes;
(c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of
ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was
appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the
very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was
still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the
Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the
Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the
said Order.
(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of
execution dated August 20, 1980, the Probate Court in its
Order of November 11, 1980 explained that the basis for its
conclusion that the question of ownership had been formally
resolved by the Probate Order of 1972 are the findings in the
latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent, he was
receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2) he had resided in the
Philippines since pre-war days and was engaged in the mine
prospecting business since 1937 particularly in the City of
Toledo; and (3) PASTOR, JR. was only acting as dummy for
his father because the latter was a Spaniard.
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously farfetched.
(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders
to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the
question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties,
and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of
the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to
pay the legacy in dispute.
2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will (a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his
wife, aside from his two legitimate children and one illegitimate
son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal
partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in
the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and
liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include,
among others, the determination of the extent of the statutory
usufructuary right of his wife until her death. * When the
disputed Probate order was issued on December 5, 1972,
there had been no liquidation of the community properties of
PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior
definitive determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR,
SR. There was an inventory of his properties presumably
prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear
that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially
approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties
allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still
being litigated in another court.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less
payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate. Indeed, it
was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where the
Probate Court ordered that-
The Case
[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason wellestablished and entrenched jurisprudence when he determined
facts sans any evidence thereon.
V
P21,690.00
II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND
MARIA VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ
(1)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447,
Cad. Lot No. 2745, C-7 located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City
and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 2744, 2742, 2748;
South by Lot No. 2739; East by Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No.
2741, containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED (14,700) sq. ms. more or less.
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
P1,900.00
(2)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449,
Cad, Lot No. 3271 C-7 located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog
City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 3270; South by Lot
Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by Panyangan River & F. Lumanao;
and Part of Lot 3272; and West by Samay Creek, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
(104,600) sq. ms. more or less.
private
P11,580.00
(3)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449,
Cad. Lot No. 2319, Case 2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City
and bounded on the North by Lot No. 1061; South by
Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No. 1044; and West by Lot No.
1041, containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (3,225) sq. ms. more or less.
(4)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452,
Cad. Lot No. 3272, C-7 Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 3270 &
3273; East by Panyangan River; South by Panyangan River;
and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271, containing an area of
FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms.
more or less, being claimed by Damian Querubin.
(3)
P2.370.00
(5)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453,
Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog
City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267;
South by Lot Nos. 3271 & 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273;
and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
(483,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P61,680.00
(6)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457,
Cad. Lot No. 3273, C-7 Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 3269;
South by Lot No. 3272; East by Panyangan River; and West by
Lot No. 3270, contaning an area of THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (34,300) sq. ms. more or
less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.
P3,880.00
(7)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000,
Cad. Lot No. 2806, Case 7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City
and bounded on the North by Agayayan River; South by
Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo Ramoso; and West by
Restituto Baol, contaning an area of SIX THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (6,676) sq. ms. more or less.
P380.00
P1,050.00
(14)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789,
Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7, located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog
City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 5158, 5159, 5156;
South by SE-Steep Bank; East by NW, by Lot No. 5158,
Villafranca, containing an area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED (96,200) sq. ms. more or less.
(8)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924,
Cad. Lot No. 1206 C-1 located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and
bounded on the NW., by Lot No. 1209; SW., by Lot No. 1207;
East by National Highway; and West by Lot No. 1207;
containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTEEN (4,513) sq. ms. more or less.
P3,370.00
P740.00
1.
(9)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925,
Cad. Lot No. 5554, located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog
City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558;
South by Lot No. 3486; East by Lot No. 5555; and West by Lot
No. 5355, containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms. more or less.
P320.00
APPRAISAL
(10)
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926,
Cad. Lot No. 5555 C-7 located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Tinaytayan Creek &
Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South by Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488,
3491& 3496; East by Cr. & Lot No. 3496; and West by Lot No.
5554, containing an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (77,776) sq. ms. more or
less.
4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the aboveenumerated properties in the following manner, to wit:
P1,350.00
(11)
A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454,
Cad. Lot No. 61-C-1 located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog
City and bounded on the North by Lot 64; South by Road-Lot
613 Condeza St; East by Lot Nos. 63, and 62; West by RoadLot 614-Guno St., containing an area of ONE THOUSAND
FORTY TWO (1,042) sq. ms. more or less.
P9,320.00
(12)
A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484,
Lot No. 5, Block 2, located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot No. 4, block 2; South by Lot No.
8, block 2; East by Lot No. 6, block 2, West by Subdivision
Road, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. ms.
more or less.
P12,240.00
(13)
A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798,
Block No. 7-A-16-0 located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot No. 7-A-16-0; South by Lot No. 716-0; East by Lot No. 7-A-18-Road; West by Lot No. 8, PSU120704-Julito Arengo vs. Restituto Baol, containing an area of
TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more or less.
(a)
To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland
Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez
and Myrna T. Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso shares,
considering not only their respective areas but also the
improvements existing thereon, to wit:
(b)
To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the
properties, both real and personal, enumerated above with the
exception of the following:
(1)
Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel
Corporation, indicated in San Miguel Corporation Stock
Certificate No. 30217, which two shares she is ceding in favor
of Patricio Alburo;
(2)
The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block 2
together with the improvements thereon and identified as
parcel No. II-12, lot covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798 identified
as Parcel No. II-13 in the above enumerated, and Cad. Lot No.
5157-C-7 together with the improvements thereon, which is
identified as parcel No. II-14 of the above-enumeration of
properties, which said Rosalia S. Lugod is likewise ceding and
renouncing in favor of Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo
(Sgd.)
PATRICIO ALBURO
ROSALIA S. LUGOD
Intervenor-Oppositor
Oppositor
(Sgd.)
MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ
ASSISTED BY:
Intervenor-Oppositor
(Sgd.)
ASSISTED BY:
REYES
PABLO S.
R-101Navarro Bldg.
(Sgd.)
REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ
City
Cagayan de Oro
Gingoog City
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ
Petitioner
Petitioner
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
MYRNA T. SANCHEZ
Petitioner
Petitioner
(Sgd.)
LAURETA TAMPUS
For
herself and as Guardian
III
Cagayan
de Oro City
Greetings:
Please set the foregoing compromise
agreement for the approval of the Honorable Court today, Oct.
30, 1969.
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
IV
PABLO S. REYES
TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.
REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ
Quezon City. Bounded on the N., along line 1-2 by Lot 15,
Block D-3 of plan Bsd - 10642; along line 2-3 by Lot 4, Block D3 of plan Bsd-10642; along line 3-4 by Aurora Boulevard (Road
Lot-1, Bsd-10642); and along line 4-1 by Lot 3-D of the
subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being
S.29 deg. 26E., 1156.22 m. from B.L.L.M. 9, Quezon City,
Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B
which is registered under TCT No. 140946. This lot had been
occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since
1969. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31,
1982 to Maximino, Jr., cxxxiv for which reason the latter was
issued TCT No. 293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City.cxxxv
When Romeo found out about the sale to Maximino, Jr., he and
his wife Eliza locked Maximino, Jr. out of the house. On August
4, 1983, Maximino, Jr. brought an action for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for writs of preliminary
injunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. On December 12, 1986, the trial court
ruled in favor of Maximino, Jr. In CA-G.R. CV No. 12932, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.cxxxvi
On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate
of Maximino, Sr., the present case for annulment of sale with
damages against Natividad and Maximino, Jr. The case was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 88-58.cxxxvii Romeo sought the
declaration of nullity of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to
Natividad and that made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on
the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.
On March 1, 1990, Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a thirdparty complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza. cxxxviii
They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of
Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to Natividad, had been
surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a
new title (TCT No. 277968) in his name. cxxxix They alleged that
Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza to third
persons. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer
to Romeo and the cancellation of his title, the eviction of
Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from
Lot 3, and the payment of damages.
The issues having been joined, the case was set for trial.
Romeo presented evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea
Natividad insisted that she paid the amount stated in the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970. She alleged that their
parents had sold these properties to their children instead of
merely giving the same to them in order to impose on them the
value of hardwork.
Natividad accused Romeo of filing this case to harass her after
Romeo lost in the action for recovery of possession (Civil Case
No. Q-39018) which had been brought against him by
Maximino, Jr. It appears that before the case filed by Romeo
could be decided, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
CA-GR CV No. 12932 affirming the trial courts decision in favor
of Maximino, Jr.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970. Except as
to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third
persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest in trust for
Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated. The
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this
judgment on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 162735 and
162736 as a lien in the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.
All other claims by one party against the other are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.cxlvii
Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration.
As a result, on October 14, 1992 the trial court modified its
decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs Partial Motion for Reconsideration
is hereby granted. The judgment dated August 10, 1992 is
hereby amended, such that the first paragraph of its dispositive
portion is correspondingly modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
nullity of the Deeds of Sale dated January 29, 1970 and July
31, 1982.
Except as to Lots 3, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third
person, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest OF THE
PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE DEED OF SALE DATED
JANUARY 29, 1970 (LOTS 10 and 11) in trust for Jose
Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate
this judgment on Transfer Certificates of Title No. 162735 and
162736 as a lien on the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.
Indeed, it was found both by the trial court and by the Court of
Appeals that Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots
subject of the Deed of Sale.
All these convince the Court that Natividad had no means to
pay for all the lots she purportedly purchased from her parents.
What is more, Romeos admission that he did not pay for the
transfer to him of lots 3 and 25-L despite the considerations
stated in the deed of sale is a declaration against interest and
must ring with resounding truth. The question is, why should
Natividad be treated any differently, i.e., with consideration for
the sale to her, when she is admittedly the closest to her
parents and the one staying with them and managing their
affairs? It just seems without reason. Anyway, the Court is
convinced that the questioned Deed of Sale dated January 29,
1970 (Exh. A or 1) is simulated for lack of consideration, and
therefore ineffective and void.clv
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals said:
Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale
which make the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970
void and of no effect. In the case of Suntay vs. Court of
Appeals (251 SCRA 430 [1995]), the Supreme Court held that
badges of simulation make a deed of sale null and void since
parties thereto enter into a transaction to which they did not
intend to be legally bound.
It appears that it was the practice in the Nazareno family to
make simulated transfers of ownership of real properties to
their children in order to avoid the payment of inheritance
taxes. Per the testimony of Romeo, he acquired Lot 25-L from
his parents through a fictitious or simulated sale wherein no
consideration was paid by him. He even truthfully admitted that
the sale of Lot 3 to him on 04 July 1969 (Deed of Absolute
Sale, Records, Vol. II, p. 453) likewise had no consideration.
This document was signed by the spouses Max, Sr. and Aurea
as vendors while defendant-appellant Natividad signed as
witness.clvi
Fourth. Petitioners argue further:
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970 is an
indivisible contract founded on an indivisible obligation. As
such, it being indivisible, it can not be annulled by only one of
them. And since this suit was filed only by the estate of
Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. without including the estate of
Aurea Poblete, the present suit must fail. The estate of
Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. can not cause its annulment while
its validity is sustained by the estate of Aurea Poblete.clvii
An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed
in parts, whatever may be the nature of the thing which is the
object thereof. The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not
to the object thereof.clviii In the present case, the Deed of Sale
of January 29, 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to
Natividad. The obligation is clearly indivisible because the
performance of the contract cannot be done in parts, otherwise
the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are
therefore mistaken in basing the indivisibility of a contract on
the number of obligors.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
past due accounts including interests and penalties into a 5year term loan, payable semi-annually with one year grace
period on the principal; 2) payment of Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00) upon the approval of the proposal; 3)
reduction of penalty from 3% to 1%; 4) capitalization of the
interest component with interest rate at 16% per annum; 5)
establishment of a One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) LC/TR
line against the mortgaged properties; 6) assignment of all his
export proceeds to respondent bank to guarantee payment of
his loans.
According to petitioner, respondent PNB approved his
proposal. He further claimed that he and his wife were asked to
sign two (2) blank promissory note forms. According to
petitioner, they were made to believe that the blank promissory
notes were to be filled out by respondent PNB to conform with
the 5-year restructuring plan allegedly agreed upon. The first
Promissory Note,clxxiii No. 127/82, covered the principal while
the second Promissory Note,clxxiv No. 128/82, represented the
accrued interest.
Petitioner testified that respondent PNB allegedly contravened
their verbal agreement by 1) affixing dates on the two (2)
subject promissory notes to make them mature in two (2) years
instead of five (5) years as supposedly agreed upon; 2)
inserting in the first Promissory Note No. 127/82 an interest
rate of 21% instead of 18%; 3) inserting in the second
Promissory Note No. 128/82, the amount stated therein
representing the accrued interest as One Million Five Hundred
Thirty Six Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos and
Seventy Three Centavos (P1,536,498.73) when it should only
be Seven Hundred Sixty Thousand Three Hundred Ninety
Eight Pesos and Twenty Three Centavos (P760,398.23) and
pegging the interest rate thereon at 18% instead of 12%.
The subject Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 both
dated December 29, 1982 in the principal amounts of Two
Million Six Hundred Fifty One Thousand One Hundred
Eighteen Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P2,651,118.86) and
One Million Five Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Seven Hundred
Ninety Eight and Seventy Three Centavos (P1,536,798.73)
respectively and marked Exhibits BB and CC respectively,
were payable on equal semi-annual amortization and
contained the following escalation clause:
x x x which interest rate the BANK may increase within the
limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy
it may adopt in the future; Provided, that, the interest rate on
this note shall be correspondingly decreased in the event that
the applicable maximum interest rate is reduced by law or by
the Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment in the
interest rate agreed upon shall take effect on the effectivity
date of the increase or decrease in the maximum interest rate.
xxx
It appears from the record that the subject Promissory Notes
Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 superseded and novated the three (3)
1979 promissory notes and the eleven (11) 1979 Application
and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit which the
petitioner executed in favor of respondent PNB.
and the cancellation of the new titles issued to PNB; that PNB
vacate the subject premises in Pasig and turn the same over to
the petitioner; and also the nullification of the extrajudicial
foreclosure and sheriff's sale of the mortgaged chattels, and
that the chattels be returned to petitioner Mendoza if they were
removed from his Pasig premises or be paid for if they were
lost or rendered unserviceable.
xxx
2.
Projected cash flow (cash in - cash out) for five years
detailed yearly; and
3.
List of additional machinery and equipment and proof
of ownership thereof.
We would strongly suggest, however, that you reduce your
total obligations to at least P3 million (principal and interest and
other charges) to give us more justification in recommending a
plan of payment or restructuring of your accounts to higher
authorities of this bank.
The second document is a letter dated May 11, 1981
addressed to Mr. S. Pe Benito, Jr., Managing Director of the
Technological Resources Center and signed by said PNB
Branch Manager, Ceferino D. Cura. According to petitioner, this
letter showed that respondent PNB seriously considered the
restructuring of his loan obligations to a five-year term loan, to
wit:
xxx
At the request of our client, we would like to furnish you with
the following information pertinent to his accounts with us:
xxx
We are currently evaluating the proposal of the client to restructure his accounts with us into a five-year plan.
We hope that the above information will guide you in evaluating
the proposals of Mr. Danilo Mendoza.
xxx
The third document is a letter dated July 8, 1981 addressed to
petitioner and signed by PNB Assistant Vice-President
Apolonio B. Francisco.
xxx
Considering that your accounts/accommodations were granted
and carried in the books of our Mandaluyong Branch, we would
suggest that your requests and proposals be directed to
Ceferino Cura, Manager of our said Branch.
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SECOND DIVISION
the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had
been established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17
SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135,
December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1wph1.t
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February
28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the
fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included
his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would
not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where
some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the
invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing
injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern
half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although
she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and
proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs.
Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be
disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix
should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should
be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code
which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may
avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering
that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is
not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal
estate among her six children (her husband had renounced his
hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not
assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged
in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the
legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may
remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the
petitioner,
COURT
and
FEDERICO
AQUINO, J.:
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as
expressed in his will because any disposition therein is better
than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913,
February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
Less than a year later, on April 1, 1975, Federico for the third
time filed a separate action against Plan, Civil Case No. 2282,
to annul the sale. After trial, Judge Fule dismissed the case on
the same ground, namely, that his remedy is in the intestate
proceeding. He should not be allowed to seek relief outside the
intestate court (145-147, Record on Appeal).
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