G.R. No.

L-22554 August 29, 1975

DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO MADDELA, defendants-appellees.
Ricardo L. Manalilig for plaintiffs-appellants.
Iigo R. Pea for defendants-appellees.

MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on a question of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan in Civil Case No.
416, entitled "Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha vs. Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela", dismissing
the complaint of the plaintiffs and ordering them to pay each of the defendants jointly and severally the
sum of P500.00 by way of actual damages; P500.00 by way of attorney's fees; and P1,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point,
Palawan a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the
sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his
capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the
corresponding information for Robbery the Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2719.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in
Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment
commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. 1
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound
the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot
prevent the court from taking custody of the same. 2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial
Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized
the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch
but the latter refused. Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel made
representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.

All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-appellants Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, on
November 19, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a complaint for damages against
defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962
Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took
away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal
Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a
private property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of
Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil
Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did
not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay,
Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond repair. For the
alleged violation of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs-appellants prayed that defendants-appellees be
ordered to pay jointly and severally each of them the sum of P5,750.00 representing actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative
defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya
on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent
to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving
rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his
capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor
launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely
obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendantsappellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffsappellants, they were constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as
attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages
in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the
amount of P1,000.00.
On September 13, 1965, the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the validity of the seizure of the
motor launch on the ground that "the authority to impound evidences or exhibits or corpus delicti in a case
pending investigation is inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution and who introduces
those exhibits in the court." Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants
and ordered them to pay jointly and severally each of the defendants-appellees the amount of P500.00 by
way of actual damages another amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Hence, this appeal.
Two vital issues call for resolution by this Court. First, whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de
Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and
seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime. Second, whether or not
defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them
granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument is that the taking of the motor launch on July 6, 1962 by
Orlando Maddela upon the order of Fiscal Ponce de Loon was in violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures since it was done without a warrant.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution then in force reads:

3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 3
A cursory reading of the above provision easily brings into focus the unreasonableness of the seizure of
the aforementioned motor launch. A search and seizure to be reasonable, must be effected by means of a
valid search warrant. And for a search warrant to be valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2)
the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. 4 Thus in a long line of decisions, this
Court has declared invalid search warrants which were issued in utter disregard of the constitutional
injunction. 5
Defendants-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and
impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the
motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that
without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without
his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. 6 And since in the present case defendants-appellees
seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffsappellants against unreasonable search and seizure.
Defendants-appellees however would want to justify the seizure of the motor launch even without a
warrant because of Fiscal Ponce de Leon's alleged inherent power to order the seizure of a personal
property which is thecorpus delicti of a crime, he being a quasi judicial officer who has the control of the
prosecution and the presentation of the evidence in the criminal case. They argue that inasmuch as the
motor launch in question was allegedly stolen by Jikil Taha from Timbangcaya, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
could order its seizure even without a search warrant. We cannot agree. Under the old Constitution 7 the
power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and
seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was
no law or rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain
attempt to justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial fiscal; the
authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a personal property even if it
is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals
to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to
determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.8
Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court 9 which complement the
constitutional provision earlier cited, two principles are made clear, namely: (1) that in the seizure of a
stolen property search warrant is still necessary; and (2) that in issuing a search warrant the judge alone
determines whether or not there is a probable cause. The fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime

does not justify its seizure without a warrant. As held in U.S. v. de los
Reyes and Esguerra, 10 citing McClurg v. Brenton: 11
The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives him no
more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the
privacy of a home and subject its occupant to the indignity of a search for the
evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. No amount of
incriminating evidence whatever its source, will supply the place of such warrant.
At the closed door of the home be it palace or hovel even bloodhounds must wait
till the law, by authoritative process, bids it open. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would also invoke lack of time to procure a search warrant as an
excuse for the seizure of the motor launch without one. He claimed that the motor launch had to be seized
immediately in order to preserve it and to prevent its removal out of the locality, since Balabac, Palawan,
where the motor launch was at the time, could only be reached after three to four days' travel by
boat. 12 The claim cannot be sustained. The records show that on June 15, 1962 13 Fiscal Ponce de Leon
made the first request to the Provincial Commander for the impounding of the motor launch; and on June
26, 1962 14 another request was made. The seizure was not effected until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal
Ponce de Leon had all the time to procure a search warrant had he wanted to and which he could have
taken in less than a day, but he did not. Besides, there is no basis for the apprehension that the motor
launch might be moved out of Balabac because even prior to its seizure the motor launch was already
without its engine. 15 In sum, the fact that there was no time to secure a search warrant would not legally
justify a search without one.16
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on
Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the
New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public
official is abusing, and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it
concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is
liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who
openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the
abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one's duty.
And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the
object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to
abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of
officials abusing individual rights. 20

(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired
is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In
addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
claimed that he purchased the motor launch from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000.00, having given
P2,000.00 as advanced payment; that since or seizure on July 6, 1962 the motor launch had been moored
at Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the elements it has become worthless at the time of the filing
of the present action; that because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he suffered moral
damages in the sum of P1,000.00; and that because of the violation of their constitutional rights they were
constrained to engage the services of a lawyer whom they have paid P1,500.00 for attorney's fees. We find
these claims of Delfin Lim amply supported by the evidence and therefore should be awarded the sum of
P3,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000.00 as moral damages and P750.00 for attorney's fees. However, with
respect co plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered
from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had already transferred the ownership and
possession of the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he has no legal
standing to question the validity of the seizure. Well settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 17 Consequently, one who is
not the owner, lessee, or lawful occupant of the premise searched cannot raise the question of validity of
the search and seizure. 18 Jikil Taha is not without recourse though. He can still collect from his coplaintiff, Delfin Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands of the incident by claiming that "he
was in good faith, without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiffappellant, Jikil Taha" 19when he ordered the seizure of the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his
defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission, gave the following
reasons during the public hearings of the Joint Senate and House Committees, why good faith on the part
of the public officer or employee is immaterial. Thus:
DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights; Attorney Cirilo Paredes
proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public official liable for
violation of another person's constitutional rights only if the public official acted
maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these
reasons:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers
on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of
good faith. In the United States this remedy is in he nature of a tort.

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor
launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing
unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's
exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the
Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite
repeated orders from his superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal
Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of
the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could
not prevent the court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded the motor launch on July 6,
1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there
was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to
explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary action from
his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above
circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered
declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages,
and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees. With costs against defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon.
SO ORDERED.
Castro (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Muoz Palma, J, is on leave.

G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE
LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ,
EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIOMARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN,
BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA
TULALIANpetitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL.
GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON,
MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT.
ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon
City,respondents.

YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the
question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable
for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements
of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants;
that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for
some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights
were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements
from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of
at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito
Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of
action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo,
Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8,
1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos
Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex
Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was
filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge
Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock
and barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants
are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) that the
complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants
named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional
rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo
committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct
supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of defendants' arguments, the court
finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments
in their opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration
was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9,
1983, the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to
the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren
Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla,
Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further
proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge
Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion
with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned
has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve
an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on
April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for
reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the
motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:

It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca,
Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno,
Alan Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex
Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty.
Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento,
and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a
motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor
interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the
defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo

10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present
action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it
affects and refers to defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and

Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984,
alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to
file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the
reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the
amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of
the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its
order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983
had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants'
motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court
resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango

2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba

the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November
3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered
and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside
the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9,
1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward
to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State
witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those
sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the
temptation is strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee to the law
of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and
liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling
power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles
and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the
will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of
justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect
implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover
that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason
nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public
officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of
official duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary
duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that
the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial
law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The
proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall
continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive
strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners
claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task
force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful
searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to
property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task
force should be held liable for damages.

But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent

members of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional
duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts
performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to
shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties and
from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting the
performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or
constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran
v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their
duties is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631;
Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct.
2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de
Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and
his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such
immunity from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases
invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties
written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the GovernorGeneral had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and
circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to
him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power.
Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the
purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers
vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that
the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages
for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely
responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion
and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of
martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against
alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a
roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights
and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution
remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience
and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable
in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out
their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies,
whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic
institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this
task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our
faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as
the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith
is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the
suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial
inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is
indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the
same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as
grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry
barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts
cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere
expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly
recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its
text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasidelict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within
one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does
not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents'
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and
their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.

However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A
and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become
moot and academic.

3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of
respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person
whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward
to make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.

Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The
doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between
superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The
law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to
answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added
meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate
his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception
that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of
human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily
be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms
that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for
the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando
Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst
Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only
Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that
they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the
persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that
gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law
and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged
physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of
violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated
therein, among others
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of
cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive
and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of
'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture
and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements.
The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their
constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is
well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be
considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the
complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido
Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically,
would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil
Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to
plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said
plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the
respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs,
through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin
Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B.
Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara;

Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo
Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs.
And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his
comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to
all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado,
Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf
of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for
and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to
take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the
complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be
filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a
contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect
to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted
with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated
November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case
be remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and
Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or
members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat,
violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person,
stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by
petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle
of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty
to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence
and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a government of laws,
existence of the government be imperilled following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our
government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites
every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution." 1
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of the dreaded
secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If
we stoop to what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme
Court stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction
and cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The
spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom
that a person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante
delicto unless it was caned for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA which have
infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military
and police officers constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be
severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under President Corazon C.
Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and
access to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby
the government's commitment to observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively
ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been
created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial
measures against all such violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or
members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat,
violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person,
stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by
petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle
of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty
to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence
and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a government of laws,
existence of the government be imperilled following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our
government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites
every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution." 1
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of the dreaded
secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If
we stoop to what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme
Court stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction
and cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The
spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom
that a person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante
delicto unless it was caned for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA which have
infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military
and police officers constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be
severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under President Corazon C.
Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and
access to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby
the government's commitment to observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively
ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been
created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial
measures against all such violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994

Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages. 4 In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents, thus:

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN,
and GERTRUDES GONZALES, respondents.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against

defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally:

Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners.

1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at

12% per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the last receipt issued, until fully
paid;

Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents.

2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl
scout items not returned;
PUNO, J.:

3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and
P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a
pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed
by any public officer or private individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award for damages.

4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Costs against the defendants.

On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias.
In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to
be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting
supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes
Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia
without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to
undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and two
(2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went
to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and
girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and
embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned
over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. 2 During its
pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint. On
December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the
complaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the seized
items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. 3 Private respondents had to go
personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were
returned. The other items returned were of inferior quality.

SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division, 5 affirmed the
Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION;
and, as modified, the dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and against
defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and severally;
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman
and cancel her application for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the
unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from June
4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of
P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total of
P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and severally
against defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry de
Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE
OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE
MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO DID
NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.

We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods.
Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts
items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence
adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private
respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on
the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time
between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was
sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the
sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing
so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure
were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched." 8 These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the
petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of
the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that
conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private
respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for
violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:

We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. It
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty
but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at bench, the
seizure was made without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless search can only be
undertaken under the following circumstance:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) Illegal search;

(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer
or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers
on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the
good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis
supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly
responsible,viz:

against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the
Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting
supplies. 11 As correctly observed by respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees'
(respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair
competition against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of
appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to
infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance
that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These
circumstances should answer the trial court's query posed in its decision now
under consideration as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the
seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation
which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de
Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not only the
privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit:

[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the
actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be
made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the
persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should
be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its
provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations.
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to
private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents

TITLE: APPREHENSION OF
UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT
PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF
SAID PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to
apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout
paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or
Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to
impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate
administrative body. Orders the immediate and strict compliance with the
Instructions. 14
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.
Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not
have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant.

And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint
against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for
Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to
compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs.
Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that
petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid
caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure
of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. Respondent Cruz declared:
I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I am
doing business with borrowed money only, there was commotion created by the
raiding team and they even stepped on some of the pants and dresses on display for
sale. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me with accusing expressions. I
was trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18
Respondent Lugatiman testified:
I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because many
people have been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and many/I (sic)
heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am claiming P25,000.00 for
damages. 19
While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it looked like
that what I have been selling were stolen items that they should be confiscated by
uniformed soldiers. Many people were around and the more the confiscation was
made in a scandalous manner; every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even those
not wrapped dropped to the ground. I was terribly shamed in the presence of market
goers that morning. 20
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. 21 It
will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection
extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX
PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the
unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of
SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. 22 Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983

4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA,
and RENATO YAP,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.

5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he
could do so, the jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.

Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.

6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side
so as to avoid a frontal collision with he jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the
right shoulder of the road going to Bataan;

Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.

7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace
for which reason the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of
the road and crashed into the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.

RELOVA, J.:

8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the
collision which at the least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was
responsible.

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile petitioners against private respondents in the
concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless
imprudence.
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private
respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a
jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners,
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal
Case No. 2745).
On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner,
Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the
latter in driving the passenger bus.
While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action
proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo
Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted
in a decision promulgated on November 3, 1982, based on the findings, to wit:
1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino,
Zambales, at about 2:00 AM
2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the
appellant driver thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of
the road to Manila, without
3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km.
p. h. in order to pass said truck;

and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was
NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE
ACCIDENT."
As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals
acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section 3 (c), Rule I I
I of the New Rules of Court), which reads:
SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as
otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the persons
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing
and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein private
respondents) evidence. The following were presented as defendants' evidence in chief:
(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in which defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence
prosecuted criminally and convicted of homicide with serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence;

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the
accused; and
(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of
Appeals case.
On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the acquittal of
Paje in the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence "is not a
ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant civil action is entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
so that whatever may have been the result of the criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that
Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Section 3, paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that
the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the criminal action that defendant Paje as accused
therein was not guilty of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to make and is to be
completely disregarded as an extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any way the
instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje are inadmissible
evidence; that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by
uncontradicted, conclusive evidence that petitioners suffered damages as a proximate result of the
negligence of respondent Paje and that it has been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but
by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence, that the damages suffered by petitioners as a result of the
negligence of private respondents is in the amount of P250,817.96, and that the latter should be sentenced,
jointly and severally, to pay the same to petitioner.
In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision,
instituted a separate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages
based on the alleged reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the driver and the
Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint
of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was dismissed by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to
this Court (Laura Corpus et al vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28 SCRA 1062) which, however, affirmed the order
for the reason, among others, that "(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals
in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against
him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for
damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of
which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action."
Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Paje decision, respondent Court of Appeals held that
the private respondents Cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that
negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES

RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY

SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF THE NEW (CIVIL CODE
AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. AND IN
INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.
II.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO
PAJE, DRIVER OF RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE
CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE SAID PHYSICAL INJURIES AND
NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD
HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO THE INSTANT CIVIL
ACTION UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION 49 (c) OF
RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES,
CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION IN THE
TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACQUITTING
RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID
RESPONDENT AS ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE
INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
IV.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT
BAR, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY
UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT PETITIONERS
SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE
OF RESPONDENT PAJE.
V.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED,
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY
PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS IS IN
THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO
PETITIONERS.

It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof,
should apply in the case at bar.
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.
We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action
without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of
evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases.
However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the
filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case
of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal
charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the evidence throws
no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held
responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil
liability. " Likewise, in Albornoz vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a
criminal action contains an express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's
action for civil liability is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, in De Mesa vs.
Priela 24 SCRA 582, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the
damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of Court.)"
As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein
petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice.
Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further,
Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil
liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability
will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with homicide and
successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has
not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he

was not sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His
acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was
not, in the eyes of the court, sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.
In People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said that "the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The
law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only difference being
the party-plaintiffs or petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap suffered
physical injuries in the same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia filed Civil Case No. 6880 in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal against herein respondents. The case was dismissed and appealed directly
to this Court.1wph1.t The order appealed from was affirmed, as recorded in Laura Corpus vs. Felardo
Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.
The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the same
defendants in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. It is now before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said decision.
Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case against Paje, (b)
the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the respondent Paje
as accused-appellant, suffice it to say that since petitioners' cause of action is based on the alleged
recklessness and imprudence of respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his acquittal by the Court of
Appeals and its declaration that the mishap was "pure accident" are relevant and material evidence. In fact,
the lower court may even take judicial notice of the decision of the Court of Appeals in said criminal case.
Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule that the same
are final and cannot be disturbed by Us, particularly where they are based, as they are in the case at bar,
upon substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:

ABAD SANTOS, J.:+.wph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON
is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that:
"The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."
(Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No.
141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.
The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:t.hqw
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can
not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the
instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
(Rollo, p. 33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable
provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:t.hqw
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the

1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is
supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus:t.hqw
The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen
to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of
the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance
and initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the
vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to
in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered
that while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is
the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be
permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report,
p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:t.hqw
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it
separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception
to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these
cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there
has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article
makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether
the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been
terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil
action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.t.hqw

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.'
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses
defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used
not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in
their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the
terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime
defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and
another in its technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the
terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action
for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must hove been
accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If
the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the
complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code
Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that
of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death,"
(Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices
only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed
independently of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside;
no special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on
article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code.

These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro
Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an
independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not
included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by
only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on
article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code.
These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro
Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an
independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not
included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by
only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.

[G.R. No. 150256. March 25, 2004]

akong hinaltak ni Direktor Arafiles papasok sa loob ng kotse niya at may ipina-amoy
sa akin na nasa tissue na kulay yellow at bigla na lamang akong naghina at
nahilo. Sabay din ho sa pagpapa-amoy niya sa akin ang pagtutok niya sa akin ng isang
kutsilyo, at sabi sa akin ay huwag daw akong makulit tapos ay pinatakbo na niya ang
kotse niya. Pamaya-maya ay nararamdaman kong karga-karga niya ako pa-akyat sa
isang hagdanan. Tapos ibinaba ako sa isang kamang naroroon at akoy unti-unti niyang
hinuhubaran. Pamaya-maya ho ay pinaghahalikan po niya ako at nararamdaman ko
rin ang mga kamay niya sa mga maseselan na parte ng katawan ko, pero wala akong
sapat na lakas para pigilin siya o sumigaw man lamang. Nagawa niyang makuha ang
aking pagka-babae noong gabing iyon at nararamdaman kong masakit na masakit ang
buong katawan ko. Tinakot niya ako na huwag magsumbong sa mga kapatid ko at sa
mga maykapangyarihan at kung hindi ay papatayin daw ako at tatanggalin pa sa
trabaho at pati mga kapatid ko ay papatayin daw po. Binibigyan ako ng pera pero
ayaw kung tanggapin pero pilit niyang inilagay sa bag ko at ng tingnan ko ay P55.00
lang. Pagkatapos ay hinila na niya akong pababa at pilit ding pinasakay sa kotse niya
at doon ako pinababa sa isang lugar na maraming dumadaan ng biyaheng Quiapo at
sumakay na lamang ako ng jeep pauwi. Kagabi naman po, bandang alas-9:00 ng
gabi, sa may kanto ng United Nations Ave. at Taft Ave., Ermita, Mla., habang
hinihintay ko ang pinsan ko na umihi lang matapos akong bumili ng gamot ng tumigil
na naman sa tapat ko ang kotse ni Director. Bigla na lamang niya akong hinila
papasok sa kotse sabay tutok sa akin ng kutsilyo at sabi sa akin ay huwag na raw
akong papalag, total ay butas na raw ako. Sa takot ko ay hindi ako nakakibo at
itinuloy din ako sa Flamingo hotel. Ng hinuhubaran na niya ako ay bigla na lamang
nag-buzzer tapos naka-usap niya yong bellboy na nagsabi sa kanya na may
naghahanap daw sa akin o sa amin dalawa na nakakita sa paghaltak niya sa akin. Ng
umakyat sa itaas yong bellboy ay nag-usap sila sandali tapos nakita ko pinagbibigyan
niya ng pera yong bellboy at yong guwardiya. Tapos ay doon kami bumaba sa likod
na sa tingin ko ay fire escape at nakalabas kami ng hotel tapos doon ako ibinaba sa
isang lugar na hindi ko rin matandaan kong saan at doon na lang ako kumuha ng taxi
at nagpahatid ako sa Pasay City Police ngunit dito rin ako itinuro. [4](Underscoring
supplied)

CATALINO P. ARAFILES, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY MORALES,

MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Catalino P. Arafiles, seeks a review of the July 31, 2001 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals dismissing his complaint for damages against respondents Philippine Journalists, Inc., Romy
Morales, Max Buan, Jr., and Manuel C. Villareal, Jr.
About 2 a.m. on April 14, 1987, while respondent Morales, a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight,
was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters along United Nations Avenue, Manila, Emelita
Despuig (Emelita), an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a
complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with
attempted rape before the then on duty Patrolman Benito Chio at the General Assignments Section of the
headquarters.[2]
In the presence of Morales, Emelita executed a sworn statement [3] narrating the events surrounding
the reported offenses committed against her by petitioner. The pertinent portions of her sworn statement
are reproduced hereunder:
T: Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
A: Para po magsuplong, tungkol sa karumaldumal naginawa sa akin ni Director Catalino P.
Arafiles ng PAG-ASA.
T: Kailan at saan ito nangyari?

Following the execution by Emelita of her sworn statement, Patrolman Chio made the following
entry in the Police Blotter which was perused by Morales:

A: Noong hong March 14, 1987, diyan ho sa Plaza Miranda ako sapilitan isinakay sa kotse
niya at itinuloy sa Flamingo hotel bandang alas pagitan ng 5:30 at 6:00 ng hapon.

280

T: Kailan naman ang sumunod na pagtatangka sa puri mo si Direktor Arafiles?

S: Kagabi ho. Bandang alas 9:00 ng gabi.
T: Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito maari bang isalaysay mo sa akin sa isang maikling
talata kung paano nangyari ang ipinagsusumbong mong ito?
S Kagagaling ko lang po sa aking klase sa Feati University noong March 14, 1987, bandang
alas 5:45 ng hapon, humigit kumulang, habang ako ay naghihintay ng sasakyan pauwi
mula sa Plaza Miranda ng may tumigil sa sasakyan sa tabi ko, at bigla na lang po

11:00 PM
4/13/87 PAT. BENITO CHIO ON DUTY
2:00 AM 4/14/87 Subject Emelita Despuig y Puaso reported and personally came to this office that she
was abducted by a certain Catalino P. Arafiles and alledgely (sic) rape (sic) last March 14, 1987 in a motel
in Ermita. The undersigned made a referral to Medico-legal for Physical/Genital Exam. B. Chio. [5]
Morales thereupon personally interviewed Emelita for the purpose of reporting the same in the next
issue of Peoples Journal Tonight. [6] By his claim, he, after the interview, tried to contact Arafiles at the
NIAS office to verify Emelitas story but failed, the office having already closed.[7]

Morales then wrote an account about Emelitas complaint and submitted it to his editor.[8]
That same day, April 14, 1987, Morales report appeared as headline on Peoples Journal Tonight
reading:

She said the suspect abducted her at the corner of Taft Ave. and United Nations Ave. at about 9:15 last
night.
When Arafiles was told Capcom soldiers were waiting for them outside the Flamingo Motel, he allegedly
paid P100 each to four roomboys to help him go out through a side gate.

GOVT EXEC RAPES COED

The police will pick up Arafiles for questioning today.[9]
By ROMY MORALES
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A PRETTY coed, working as a grant-in-aid scholar at a Manila university and as an office worker at a
government office in Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a government agency director, last March 15,
but afraid to lose her job and of being harmed she chose to keep her ordeal to herself.
Last night, the government man, a director of the National Institute of Atmospheric Science, a branch of
PAGASA, again abducted the girl after following her around, forcing her into his car and locking her up in
a Malate motel.
This time, however, the girl was not to be raped as easily as the first time, when the man used chloroform
in forcing her into submission.
The girl fought like a tigress, alerting roomboys at the Flamingo Motel at corner Carolina and Quirino
Ave. Perhaps as a ploy, motel personnel called up the room and told the man some Capcom soldiers were
waiting for them outside.
The call saved the girl from being raped the second time around.
Her abductor immediately left the motel, with the girl in tow, and then dropped her off somewhere in
Ermita.

About a year following the publication of above-quoted report or on April 13, 1988, petitioner
instituted a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against respondents for
damages[10] arising therefrom.
In his Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-53399, petitioner alleged that on account of the
grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item prepared by respondent Morales,
edited by respondent Buan, Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal, Jr. as president of
Philippine Journalists, Inc., and published by respondent Philippine Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast
on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and
Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) was injured; he became the object of public contempt
and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his
promotion to the position of Deputy Administrator of PAGASA.
In their Answer,[11]respondents prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, they alleging that the
news item, having been sourced from the Police Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered
by a personal interview of the victim is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional
provision of freedom of the press . . . . , and by way of Compulsory Counterclaim, they prayed for the
award of moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.
Branch 97 of the Quezon City RTC, noting as follows:

When the man had gone, the girl took a taxi and went straight to the Western Police District and filed a
complaint.
The girl, 20-year-old Emilita Arcillano (not her real name), said she was first raped last March 15 by her
boss whom she identified as a certain Director Catalino Arafiles.
She recalled that while waiting for a ride at Plaza Miranda, Arafiles alighted from his Volkswagen Beetle,
dragged her inside and then pressed a cotton with chloroform on her mouth and nose.
When she regained consciousness she was already inside the Flamingo Motel, already raped, she said.
She said Arafiles told her not to report the matter or she would lose her job and she and her family would
be harmed.
When the act was to be repeated last night, Emilita decided to fight. Nanlaban ako at nagsisigaw at sinabi
kong mabuti pang patayin na lang niya ako, Emilita told Pat. Benito Chio of WPD General Assignments
Section.

[T]he publication stated that a pretty coed was raped by her boss, and not qualifying said statement that it
was merely a report, with such phrases as allegedly or reportedly. Furthermore, the article in question
continued reporting as if it were fact and truth the alleged abduction of the same girl by her boss,
identified as Director of the National Institute of Atmospheric Science. The questioned article did not even
hint that it was merely based on interview with the said girl or that it was reflected in the police blotter,
and then it would have been fair, for the mind of the reader would be offered the other side to speculate
on. As it turned out, the other side, the side of the defamed and libeled had an alibi to prove the story false,
aside from his testimony that proved the inherent unnaturalness and untruthfulness of the alleged victim of
the alleged rape and abduction,[12]
rendered a Decision[13] of August 13, 1992, in favor of petitioner, disposing as follows:
In view of the above evidence and the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of plaintiff and against the above-mentioned defendants, and orders the latter to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiff the following amounts: 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal damages; 2.) P50,000.00,
as exemplary damages; 3.) P1,000.000.00, as moral damages; 4.) P50,000.00, as attorneys fees; and 5.)
Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[14]
Respondents motion for reconsideration[15] of the trial courts decision having been denied by
Resolution[16] of March 2, 1993, they appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Citing Borjal et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.[17] which held that:
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might be reasonably inferred from
the facts.[18] (Underscoring supplied),
the CA found that herein petitioner was not able to prove by a preponderance of evidence that [herein
respondents] were motivated by a sinister intent to cause harm and injury to [herein petitioner] . . .
Accordingly, by Decision of July 31, 2001, the CA reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and
dismissed petitioners complaint.[19] Petitioners motion for reconsideration[20] of the appellate courts
decision was denied by Resolution of October 12, 2001,[21] hence, the petition at bar.
The petition revolves around the issue of whether the CA erred in holding that the publication of the
news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
It bears noting that the complaint petitioner instituted is one for damages under Article 33 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole.[24]
The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or
restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous,
depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. x x x
A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to
whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it.So, the whole item, including display lines, should be
read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined.
In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article must be considered, each
phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication x x x The headlines of a newspaper must
also be read in connection with the language which follows. [25]
Petitioner brands the news item as a malicious sensationalization of a patently embellished and
salacious narration of fabricated facts involving rape and attempted rape incidents. For, so petitioner
argues, the police blotter which was the sole basis for the news item plainly shows that there was only one
count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita.
The entry made by Patrolman Chio in the police blotter which respondent Morales scrutinized at
the WPD headquarters recorded indeed Emelitas complaint about only a case for abduction with rape
which occurred on March 14, 1987. In her above-quoted sworn statement, however, earlier given before
the same Patrolman Chio in the presence of Morales who subsequently interviewed her, Emelita reported
about an abduction with rape incident which occurred on March 14, 1987 and an abduction incident
which occurred on April 13, 1987.
Petitioners anchoring of his complaint for damages on a charge of malicious sensationalization of
fabricated facts thus fails.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal.[26]

Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the
purely criminal aspect of the case.[22]A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely
independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense
charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.[23]

Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline
and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS
actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner
and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, those found in the Chapter on Human Relations, namely
Articles 19 and 21, provide:

In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the
importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the
press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and
[editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care,
they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words.[27] (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, this Court finds that case against respondents has not been sufficiently established by
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135306

January 28, 2003
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G.
BINEGAS, JR.,petitioners,
vs.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG,
IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM
B.A. JUNIO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight to the death to make it possible for you to
continue writing it.
Voltaire
VOLTAIRE'S PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the basic liberties to free speech and free press
liberties that belong as well, if not more, to those who question, who do not conform, who differ. For the
ultimate good which we all strive to achieve for ourselves and our posterity can better be reached by a free
exchange of ideas, where the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the free market not just the ideas we desire, but including those thoughts we despise. 1
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy
(70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG,
IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM
B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and
as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC.,
MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit
na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong
Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these
words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but
with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this
country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these
libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world,
especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that the
article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages;
and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor
intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims. 2
On 30 June 1995 the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their
cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified
It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs, were not identified
with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without mentioning or
identifying the herein plaintiffs x x x. It is thus apparent that the alleged libelous article refers
to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the libel could not readily identify
the personalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim
member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence presented in this
case failed to convince this court that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really applied to the
herein plaintiffs.3
On 27 August 1998 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It opined that it was
"clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It
stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous
imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious
beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite
personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims. 4

Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate court (a) on the existence of
the elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and, (c) the liability of
petitioners for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements.5 It is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or
opinions about the plaintiff.6 It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or
reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.7 Defamation is an invasion of a relational
interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff.8
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and
mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken,
do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages.9 The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. 10
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or
identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a
class, no member of such class has a right of action11 without at all impairing the equally demanding right
of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.12 Thus, in Newsweek, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,13 we dismissed a complaint for libel against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground
that private respondents failed to state a cause of action since they made no allegation in the complaint
that anything contained in the article complained of specifically referred to any of them. Private
respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500
members and several individual members, filed a class action suit for damages in behalf of all sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental. The complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City alleged
that Newsweek, Inc., committed libel against them by the publication of the article "Island of Fear" in its
weekly newsmagazine allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by wealthy landowners
and sugar planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers but also
brutalized and killed them with impunity. Private respondents alleged that the article showed a deliberate
and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put the
sugarcane planters in a bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation in the
Philippines and abroad, and make them the objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural
workers and of the public in general. We ratiocinated
x x x where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that
group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove
that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be x x x x The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or
more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the representation of class interest affected by the
judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party. We have
here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community.
They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article.
Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual
causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a
cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each
Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people,
belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent political and
religious view some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable,
even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the nonbelievers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute
this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to
every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company,14 the United States Court of Appeals held that one
guiding principle of group libel is that defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action
on the part of an individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.

The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American case,15 a person had allegedly committed libel
against all persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there could be no libel against an extensive
community in common law. In an English case, where libel consisted of allegations of immorality in a
Catholic nunnery, the Court considered that if the libel were on the whole Roman Catholic Church
generally, then the defendant must be absolved.16 With regard to the largest sectors in society, including
religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the behest of the state, or civil
action on behalf of the individual, will lie.
In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, numbering more than 600 million, were defamed
by the airing of a national television broadcast of a film depicting the public execution of a Saudi Arabian
princess accused of adultery, and alleging that such film was "insulting and defamatory" to the Islamic
religion.17 The United States District Court of the Northern District of California concluded that the
plaintiffs' prayer for $20 Billion in damages arising from "an international conspiracy to insult, ridicule,
discredit and abuse followers of Islam throughout the world, Arabs and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia"
bordered on the "frivolous," ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate an actionable claim for
defamation. The California Court stressed that the aim of the law on defamation was to protect
individuals; a group may be sufficiently large that a statement concerning it could not defame individual
group members.18
Philip Wittenberg, in his book "Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of Libel,"19 discusses the
inappropriateness of any action for tortious libel involving large groups, and provides a succinct
illustration:
There are groupings which may be finite enough so that a description of the body is a
description of the members. Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the description of
the member implicit in the description of the body, or is there a possibility that a description of
the body may consist of a variety of persons, those included within the charge, and those
excluded from it?
A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shysters would obviously not be a charge that
all of the lawyers were shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point in a great city, such
as Times Square in New York City, were shysters would obviously not include all of the
lawyers who practiced in that district; but a statement that all of the lawyers who practiced in a
particular building in that district were shysters would be a specific charge, so that any lawyer
having an office within that building could sue.
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to
anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have
no action; the plaintiff does not establish any personal reference to himself.20 At present, modern societal
groups are both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as the size of these
groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become
elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first, where the group referred
to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying
to each individual member; and second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom
of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting
fundamental interests involved in libel cases.21
In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were
particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar
attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of
those who are believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites,
the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name
which describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body
whose construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any representative identification.
The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different sects: Catholic, Baptist,
Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the essence of which may lie in an inspired
charlatan, whose temple may be a corner house in the fringes of the countryside. As with the Christian
religion, so it is with other religions that represent the nation's culturally diverse people and minister to
each one's spiritual needs. The Muslim population may be divided into smaller groups with varying
agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the passionately radical. These divisions in the Muslim
population may still be too large and ambiguous to provide a reasonable inference to any personality who
can bring a case in an action for libel.

The foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly expressed by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in the
course of the deliberations in this case. We extensively reproduce hereunder his comprehensive and
penetrating discussion on group libel
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander the one being, in general,
written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the
interest in reputation and good name. This is a "relational interest" since it involves the opinion
others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.
The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation the interest in acquiring, retaining
and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's character and conduct warrant. The mere fact
that the plaintiff's feelings and sensibilities have been offended is not enough to create a cause
of action for defamation. Defamation requires that something be communicated to a third
person that may affect the opinion others may have of the plaintiff. The unprivileged
communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to hurt plaintiff's reputation, to
impair plaintiff's standing in the community.
Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a
defamation action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect
upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily considered defamatory if it "tend[s] to expose one
to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism,
degradation or disgracex x x." The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one
that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of
his prima faciecase that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of
and concerning the plaintiff.
The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory
charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for
damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even though the plaintiff suffers
some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is necessary that the publication be
"of and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a publication may be clearly defamatory as to
somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by
him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's reputation has been injured x
xxx
In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must
appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made. This
principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or class is defamed since, usually, the
larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to show that he was the
person at whom the defamation was directed.
If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied
to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for
defamation. When the defamatory language was used toward a small group or class, including
every member, it has been held that the defamatory language referred to each member so that
each could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in
certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a
society, a football team, a family, small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or
engineers of a particular company.
In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of
persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to
apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or
slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal application and was so general
that no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class referred to was so
numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no
private action could be maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory publications
concerning groups or classes of persons engaged in a particular business, profession or
employment, directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to those directed at
miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.
Distinguishing a small group which if defamed entitles all its members to sue from a large
group which if defamed entitles no one to sue is not always so simple. Some authorities
have noted that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has twenty five (25) or fewer

members. However, there is usually no articulated limit on size. Suits have been permitted by
members of fairly large groups when some distinguishing characteristic of the individual or
group increases the likelihood that the statement could be interpreted to apply individually. For
example, a single player on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University football team was
permitted to sue when a writer accused the entire team of taking amphetamines to "hop up" its
performance; the individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant position on the team and had
played in all but two of the team's games.
A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group and whether a
statement will be interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized and cohesive a
group, the easier it is to tar all its members with the same brush and the more likely a court will
permit a suit from an individual even if the group includes more than twenty five (25)
members. At some point, however, increasing size may be seen to dilute the harm to
individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit.
x x x x There are many other groupings of men than those that are contained within the
foregoing group classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are all the
political and ideological beliefs; there are the many colors of the human race. Group
defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of attack on various racial, religious and
political minorities. Some states, therefore, have passed statutes to prevent concerted efforts to
harass minority groups in the United States by making it a crime to circulate insidious rumors
against racial and religious groups. Thus far, any civil remedy for such broadside defamation
has been lacking.
There have been numerous attempts by individual members to seek redress in the courts for
libel on these groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the groups are too large
and poorly defined to support a finding that the plaintiff was singled out for personal attack x x
x x (citations omitted).
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not
specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged
libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure
pointedly resulting in damages.
A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an intentional tortious act
causing mental distress and not an action for libel. That opinion invokes Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire22 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that words heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to
incite hostility, hatred or violence, have no social value and do not enjoy constitutional protection;
and Beauharnais v. Illinois23 where it was also ruled that hate speech which denigrates a group of persons
identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law may validly prohibit such
speech on the same ground as defamation of an individual.
We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the immediately preceding paragraph. Primarily, an
"emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual24 to
assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no
application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article
of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the
principle of relational harm which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form
of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to
individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint,
respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to
their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the
country.25 It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational
harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept
of emotional distress properly belongs.
Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress
was extreme and severe.26
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to
humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.27 Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the

recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him or her to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or her reaction.28
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock,
fright, horror, and chagrin.29 "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe
and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by
professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic
depression, or phobia.30 The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered
emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the
distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.31
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,
embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff
is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and
to occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor
knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.32
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell33 illustrates the test case of a civil action for damages on intentional infliction
of emotional distress. A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring the American fundamentalist
preacher and evangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell depicting him in an inebriated state having an incestuous,
sexual liaison with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued Hustler and its publisher Larry Flynt for
damages. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled that the parody was
not libelous, because no reasonable reader would have understood it as a factual assertion that Falwell
engaged in the act described. The jury, however, awarded $200,000 in damages on a separate count of
"intentional infliction of emotional distress," a cause of action that did not require a false statement of fact
to be made. The United States Supreme Court in a unanimous decision overturned the jury verdict of the
Virginia Court and held that Reverend Falwell may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. It was argued that the material might be deemed outrageous and may have been intended to cause
severe emotional distress, but these circumstances were not sufficient to overcome the free speech rights
guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Simply stated, an intentional tort
causing emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free speech.
It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by the U.S. High Court as a "public figure," he
was anindividual particularly singled out or identified in the parody appearing on Hustler magazine. Also,
the emotional distress allegedly suffered by Reverend Falwell involved a reactive interest an emotional
response to the parody which supposedly injured his psychological well-being.
Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the
emotional distress allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it. There is no evidence on record that points to that result.
Professor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional infliction of emotional distress in this
manner34
There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants are not liable for mere
insult, indignity, annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in other circumstances
of aggravation. The reasons are not far to seek. Our manners, and with them our law, have not
yet progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy in the form of tort damages
for all intended mental disturbance. Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivial
indignity x x x x The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of rough language, and to acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind x x x
The plaintiff cannot recover merely because of hurt feelings.
Professor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this succinct observation, viz:35
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt.
There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be
left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
Thus, it is evident that even American courts are reluctant to adopt a rule of recovery for emotional harm
that would "open up a wide vista of litigation in the field of bad manners," an area in which a "toughening
of the mental hide" was thought to be a more appropriate remedy.36 Perhaps of greater concern were the
questions of causation, proof, and the ability to accurately assess damages for emotional harm, each of
which continues to concern courts today.37
In this connection, the doctrines in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been superseded by
subsequent First Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler times in the history of free expression the

Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory, known as the Two-Class Theory, that treated certain types of
expression as taboo forms of speech, beneath the dignity of the First Amendment. The most celebrated
statement of this view was expressed inChaplinsky:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Today, however, the theory is no longer viable; modern First Amendment principles have passed it by.
American courts no longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed merely because it is "lewd,"
"profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar or offensive. 38 Cohen v. California39 is illustrative: Paul Robert
Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse in April 1968, which
caused his eventual arrest. Cohen was convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting any person
from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive conduct." The U.S. Supreme Court conceded that Cohen's
expletive contained in his jacket was "vulgar," but it concluded that his speech was nonetheless protected
by the right to free speech. It was neither considered an "incitement" to illegal action nor "obscenity." It
did not constitute insulting or "fighting" words for it had not been directed at a person who was likely to
retaliate or at someone who could not avoid the message. In other words, no one was present in the Los
Angeles courthouse who would have regarded Cohen's speech as a direct personal insult, nor was there
any danger of reactive violence against him.
No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket. The
conviction could only be justified by California's desire to exercise the broad power in preserving the
cleanliness of discourse in the public sphere, which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant to the State,
holding that no objective distinctions can be made between vulgar and nonvulgar speech, and that the
emotive elements of speech are just as essential in the exercise of this right as the purely cognitive. As Mr.
Justice Harlan so eloquently wrote: "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another man's lyric x x x words are often
chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." 40 With Cohen, the U.S. Supreme Court finally
laid the Constitutional foundation for judicial protection of provocative and potentially offensive speech.
Similarly, libelous speech is no longer outside the First Amendment protection. Only one small piece of
the Two-Class Theory in Chaplinsky survives U.S. courts continue to treat "obscene" speech as not
within the protection of the First Amendment at all. With respect to the "fighting words" doctrine, while it
remains alive it was modified by the current rigorous clear and present danger test. 41 Thus, in Cohen the
U.S. Supreme Court in applying the test held that there was no showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened to provoke imminent violence; and that protecting the sensibilities
of onlookers was not sufficiently compelling interest to restrain Cohen's speech.
Beauharnais, which closely followed the Chaplinsky doctrine, suffered the same fate as Chaplinsky.
Indeed, whenBeauharnais was decided in 1952, the Two-Class Theory was still flourishing. While
concededly the U.S. High Tribunal did not formally abandon Beauharnais, the seminal shifts in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence substantially undercut Beauharnais and seriously undermined what is left of
its vitality as a precedent. Among the cases that dealt a crushing impact on Beauharnais and rendered it
almost certainly a dead letter case law are Brandenburg v. Ohio,42 and, again, Cohen v. California.43 These
decisions recognize a much narrower set of permissible grounds for restricting speech than
did Beauharnais.44
In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted under the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Statute for advocating the necessity, duty and propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reforms; and for
voluntarily assembling with a group formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.
Appellant challenged the statute and was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that the advocacy
of illegal action becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.45 Except in unusual
instances, Brandenburg protects the advocacy of lawlessness as long as such speech is not translated into
action.
The importance of the Brandenburg ruling cannot be overemphasized. Prof. Smolla affirmed that
"Brandenburgmust be understood as overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of treating
group libel under the same First Amendment standards as individual libel." 46 It may well be considered as

one of the lynchpins of the modern doctrine of free speech, which seeks to give special protection to
politically relevant speech.
In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit. As correctly
pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an element of a class suit is the
adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of
a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest
of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total
membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for
the rest of the class.47
The rules require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should be sufficiently numerous
to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In the present controversy, Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the
whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent
such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests with those
they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those absent will be
adequately represented by those present, a class suit, given its magnitude in this instance, would be
unavailing."48
Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that "moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is
able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection
with the acts complained of,49 and so it must be, as moral damages although incapable of pecuniary
estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual damages
suffered.50 Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his
right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.51 Unfortunately, neither of the
requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately
established by respondents."
In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about another individual's religion is as
commonplace as self-appointed critics of government, it would be more appropriate to respect the fair
criticism of religious principles, including those which may be outrageously appalling, immensely
erroneous, or those couched as fairly informative comments. The greater danger in our society is the
possibility that it may encourage the frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether
Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others. This would unnecessarily make the civil courts a
battleground to assert their spiritual ideas, and advance their respective religious agenda.
It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper religious conduct or
belief; neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of one religion over another, nor declare
which belief to uphold or cast asunder, for the validity of religious beliefs or values are outside the sphere
of the judiciary. Such matters are better left for the religious authorities to address what is rightfully within
their doctrine and realm of influence. Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious matters
if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech rights under modern jurisprudence where "[a]ll
ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the First Amendment even those ideas that are universally
condemned and run counter to constitutional principles."52 Under the right to free speech, "there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." 53 Denying certiorari and affirming
the appellate court decision would surely create a chilling effect on the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 August
1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the RTC-Br. 4, Manila, dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ ., concur.
Mendoza, J ., in the result.
Vitug, J ., see concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J ., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice A.T. Carpio.
Carpio, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J ., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice A.T. Carpio.
Azcuna, J ., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Austria-Martinez.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J ., concurring:
The innate right of a person to an unimpaired reputation and good name is no less a constitutional
imperative than that which protects his life, liberty or property. Thus, the law imposes upon him who
attacks another's reputation, by slanderous words or libelous publication, a liability to make compensation
for the injury done and the damages sustained.1
Private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a federation of more than 70 Muslim
religious organizations in the country, and the other named respondents all claim, with understandable
indignation, that they have been defamed by an item published by petitioners in Bulgar, a tabloid,
circulated in the Metro Manila area. The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
"Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
Muslim?
"Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na
sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na
tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
Private respondents, for themselves and in behalf of all Muslims, filed the complaint before the trial court
against petitioners, alleging that the published article was defamatory and an insult to respondents. The
trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower
court and ordered petitioners to pay damages to private respondents.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before the Court to assail the findings of the Court of Appeals on the
existence of the elements of libel, the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and the liability of
petitioners for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint. The
Civil Code recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Article 26, paragraph (4), to
the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense, "vexing or humiliating another on account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition,"
can give rise to a cause of action for damages, or consonantly with Article 33 which provides that in case
of defamation, a civil complaint for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case, may be
brought by the injured party. Both civil actions are based on tort liability under common law and require
the plaintiff to establish that he has suffered personal damage or injury as a direct consequence of the
defendant's wrongful conduct. In fine, it must be shown that the act complained of is vexatious or
defamatory of, and as it pertains to, the claimant, thereby humiliating or besmirching the latter's dignity
and honor.
Defined in simple terms, vexation is an act of annoyance or irritation that causes distress or
agitation.2 Early American cases have refused all remedy for mental injury, such as one caused by
vexation, because of the difficulty of proof or of measurement of damages. 3 In comparatively recent times,
however, the infliction of mental distress as a basis for an independent tort action has been recognized. It
is said that "one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress." 4 Nevertheless, it has also
been often held that petty insult or indignity lacks, from its very nature, any convincing assurance that the
asserted emotional or mental distress is genuine, or that if genuine it is serious. 5 Accordingly, it is
generally declared that there can be no recovery for insults, 6 indignities or threats7which are considered to
amount to nothing more than mere annoyances or hurt feelings.8 At all events, it would be essential to
prove that personal damage is directly suffered by the plaintiff on account of the wrongful act of the
defendant.
A kindred concept, albeit of greater degree of perversity, defamation, broadly defined, is an attack on the
reputation of another, the unprivileged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately
result in injury to another.9 It is that which tends to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in
which a person is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
him.10 Defamation is an invasion of a "relational interest" since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.11 The Revised Penal Code, although not the primary
governing law in this instance, provides an instructive definition of libel as being a form of defamation
expressed in writing, print, pictures, or signs,12 to wit: "A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending

to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead."13
While arguably, the article subject of the complaint could be characterized as vexatious or defamatory and
as imparting an erroneous interpretation of a Muslim practice that tends to ridicule the Islamic faith, it is,
however, impersonal on its face, its language not being directed at any particular person but to a large
segment of society. In order that defamatory words can be actionable in court, it is essential that they are
personal to the party maligned, an ascertained or ascertainable individual.14 It is only then that plaintiff's
emotions and/or reputation can be said to have been injured; thus, the plaintiff, to recover, must show that
he or she is the person to whom the statements are directed.15 Declarations made about a large class of
people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of
action16 without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of
the press, under the bill of rights.17
If an article, for instance, states that "judges in the Philippines are corrupt," such a general condemnation
cannot reasonably be interpreted to be pointing to each judge or to a certain judge in the Philippines. Thus,
no particular magistrate can claim to have been disgraced or to have sustained an impaired reputation
because of that article. If, on the other hand, the article proclaims that "judges in Metro Manila are
corrupt," such statement of derogatory conduct now refers to a relatively narrow group that might yet
warrant its looking into in an appropriate suit. And if the article accuses the "Justices of the Supreme
Court" of corruption, then there is a specific derogatory statement about a definite number of no more than
fifteen persons.
Jurisprudence would appear to suggest that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has 25 or
fewer members.18 When statements concern groups with larger composition, the individual members of
that group would be hardput to show that the statements are "of and concerning them." 19 Although no
precise limits can be set as to the size of a group or class that would be sufficiently small, increasing size,
at some point, would be seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury would fall beneath
the threshold for a viable lawsuit.20 This principle is said to embrace two important public policies: 1)
where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the
statements as so literally applying to each individual member; and 2) the limitation on liability would
satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of press, effecting a sound
compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases.21
Thus, no recovery was allowed where the remarks complained of had been made about correspondence
schools, one school suing;22 or where there was imputation of criminality to a union, one member
suing;23 or where an attack was made on Catholic clergymen, one clergyman suing. 24
In Newsweek, Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,25 this Court dismissed a class suit for scurrilous
remarks filed by four incorporated associations of sugar planters in Negros Occidental in behalf of all
sugar planters in that province, against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground, among other things, that the
plaintiffs were not sufficiently ascribed to in the article published by the defendant. And so also it was in
an older case,26 where the Court ratiocinated that an article directed at a class or group of persons in broad
language would not be actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements were
sweeping but, even then, it would be highly probable, said the Court, that no action could lie "where the
body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the
publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and
law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of
a part."
In the present case, the subject article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the Islamic
Da'wah Council of the Philippines or to any of the individual respondents. There is no direct reference or
allusion to the federation or any of its members, or to any of the individual complainants. Respondents
scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. Islamic
Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., itself, much like any other artificial being or juridical entity,
having existence only in legal contemplation, would be devoid of any such real feeling or emotion as
ordinarily these terms are understood,27 and it cannot have that kind of reputation that an individual has
that could allow it to sue for damages based on impinged personal reputation.28
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to SET ASIDE the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals, REINSTATING thereby the order of dismissal rendered by the Regional Trial Court.

Dissenting Opinion

CARPIO, J ., dissenting:
I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional
tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines; Inc. represents.
1. Nature of Action: Not a Libel but a Tort Case
Private respondents filed this class suit under Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. Accordingly,
private respondents stated their case as follows:
"Statement of Case
The Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
'Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.' [Art. 19]
'Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.' [Art. 20]
'Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.' [Art. 21]
'Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbor
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious belief, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.' [Art. 26]
It is on account of the foregoing provisions of our Civil Code that plaintiffs brought to the
court 'a quo' a civil case for damages on account of a published article at the editorial section of
the defendant newspaper x x x."1
Petitioners acknowledge that private respondents' principal cause of action is based on tortious conduct
when petitioners state in their Petition that "[p]laintiffs rely heavily on Article 26 of the Civil Code
particularly par. 4 thereof." Petitioners, however, assert that the newspaper article in question has not
caused mental anguish, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation or similar injury to private
respondents.2
Clearly, the instant case is not about libel which requires the identification of the plaintiff in the libelous
statement. If this were a libel case under Article 303 of the Civil Code, which authorizes a separate civil
action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense, I would agree that the instant case could
not prosper for want of identification of the private respondents as the libeled persons. But private
respondents do not anchor their action on Article 30 of the Civil Code.
Private respondents insist that this case is principally about tortious conduct under Article 26 of the Civil
Code. Unlike the action in Article 30 of the Civil Code which must arise from a "criminal offense," the
action under Article 26 "may not constitute a criminal offense." Article 26, adopted from American
jurisprudence, covers several kinds of intentional torts. Paragraph 4 of Article 26, which refers to acts
humiliating another for his religious beliefs, is embraced in the tort known as intentional infliction of
mental or emotional distress. This case must be decided on the issue of whether there was such tortious
conduct, and not whether there was defamation that satisfied the elements of the crime of libel.
II. The Tortious Act in Question
The newspaper article in question published by petitioners states as follows:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin
kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila kakain. Ginagawa nila itong
Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
Private respondents claim that the newspaper article, which asserts that Muslims worship the pig as their
god, was published with intent to humiliate and disparage Muslims and cast insult on Islam as a religion in
this country. The publication is not only grossly false, but is also the complete opposite of what Muslims
hold dear in their religion.
The trial court found that the newspaper article clearly imputes a disgraceful act on Muslims. However,
the trial court ruled that the article was not libelous because the article did not identify or name the
plaintiffs. Declared the trial court:

"There is no doubt that the subject article contains an imputation of a discreditable 4 act when it
portrayed the Muslims to be worshipping the pig as their god. Likewise, there is no doubt that
the subject article was published, the newspaper 'Bulgar' containing the same having been
circulated in Metro Manila and in other parts of the country.
The defendants did not dispute these facts x x x However, x x x identity of the person is not
present.
It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs were not identified
with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without mentioning or
identifying the herein plaintiffs. x x x x."
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents assailed the trial court for "deciding the case
as a libel case rather than a case for damages for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26 of the Civil
Code." The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court not on the basis of Articles 19, 20, 21
and 26, but on the ground that the newspaper article was libelous. Thus, the Court of Appeals held:
"It is clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed at all adherents of the
Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim
religion. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiffs-appellants who are
Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs."
Thus, both the trial and appellate courts found the newspaper article in question insulting and humiliating
to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. This is a finding of fact
that the Court is duty bound to respect.5 This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on
private respondents an intentional wrongful act humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs.
Like the trial and appellate courts, we find the newspaper article in question dripping with extreme
profanity, grossly offensive and manifestly outrageous, and devoid of any social value. The article
evidently incites religious hatred, discrimination and hostility against Muslims.
Private respondents have certainly suffered humiliation and mental distress because of their religious
beliefs. The only question is whether the wrongful act committed by petitioners, which does not constitute
the crime of libel, is a case of damnum absque injuria or an actionable tort under paragraph 4, Article 26
of the Civil Code.
III. Why Article 26 of the Civil Code was Enacted
The Code Commission explained the inclusion of Article 26 in the Civil Code in this wise:
"The present laws, criminal or civil, do not adequately cope with interferences and vexations
mentioned in Article 26.
The privacy of one's home is an inviolable right. Yet the laws in force do not squarely and
effectively protect this right.
The acts referred to in No. 2 are multifarious, and yet many of them are not within the purview
of the law in force. Alienation of the affection of another's wife or husband, unless it
constituted adultery or concubinage, is not condemned by the law, much as it may shock
society. There are numerous acts, short of criminal unfaithfulness, whereby the husband or the
wife breaks the marital vows, thus causing untold moral suffering to the other spouse. Why
should not these acts be the subject matter of a civil action for damages? In American law, they
are.
Again, there is meddling of so-called friends who poison the mind of one or more members of
the family against the other members. In this manner many a happy family is broken up or
estranged. Why should not the law try to stop this by creating a civil action for damages?
Of the same nature is that class of acts specified in No. 3: intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends.
No less serious are the acts mentioned in No. 4: vexing, or humiliating another on account of
his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect or other personal
condition. The penal laws against defamation and unjust vexation are glaringly inadequate.
Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by
reason of the latter's religion.
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter's lowly station in
life. To a certain extent this is inevitable, from the nature of the social make-up, but there ought
to be a limit somewhere, even when the penal laws against defamation and unjust vexation are
not transgressed. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. The courts will recognize it
in each case. Social equality is not sought by the legal provision under consideration, but due
regard for decency and propriety.

Place of birth, of physical defect and other personal conditions are too often the pretext of
humiliation cast upon other persons. Such tampering with human personality, even though the
penal laws are not violated, should be the cause of civil action.
The article under study denounces "similar acts" which could readily be named, for they occur
with unpleasant frequency."6 (Emphasis supplied)
The intent of the Code Commission is quite clear: Article 26 specifically applies to intentional acts which
fall short of being criminal offenses. Article 24 itself expressly refers to tortious conduct which "may not
constitute criminal offenses." The purpose is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in the law where a person
who suffers injury because of a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any redress. Under
Article 26, the person responsible for such act becomes liable for "damages, prevention and other relief."
In short, to preserve peace and harmony in the family and in the community, Article 26 seeks to eliminate
cases of damnum absque injuria in human relations.
Consequently, the elements that qualify the same acts as criminal offenses do not apply in determining
responsibility for tortious conduct under Article 26. Where the tortious act humiliating another because of
his religious beliefs is published in a newspaper, the elements of the crime of libel need not be satisfied
before the aggrieved person can recover damages under Article 26. In intentional tort under Article 26, the
offensive statements may not even be published or broadcasted but merely hurled privately at the offended
party.
In intentional infliction of mental distress, the gravamen of the tort is not the injury to plaintiff's
reputation, but the harm to plaintiff's mental and emotional state. In libel, the gist of the action is the injury
to plaintiff's reputation. Reputation is the community's opinion of what a person is.7 In intentional
infliction of mental distress, the opinion of the community is immaterial to the existence of the action
although the court can consider it in awarding damages. What is material is the disturbance on the-mental
or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to peace of mind. The offensive act or statement need not
identify specifically the plaintiff as the object of the humiliation. What is important is that the plaintiff
actually suffers mental or emotional distress because he saw the act or read the statement and it alludes to
an identifiable group to which he clearly belongs.
If one of the petitioners, without specifically naming private respondents, hurled the same statement in
private separately to each of the private respondents, the act would be actionable under Article 26 because
it would cause mental distress to each private respondent. The fact that the statement was made publicly in
fact makes matters worse because the mental or emotional distress caused on private respondents would
even be aggravated by the publicity. This merely illustrates that the requirements of libel have no
application in intentional torts under Article 26 where the impression of the public is immaterial while the
impact on the mind or emotion of the offended party is all-important. That is why in American
jurisprudence the tort of intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress is completely separate and
distinct8 from the twin torts of libel and slander.9
The majority opinion, however, cites the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell10 as
authority that a person "may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a
publication unless the publication contained a false statement of fact that was made with actual malice,
that is, with a knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." The majority opinion's reliance
on Hustler is misplaced. The doctrine in Hustlerapplies only to public figures, and the U.S. Supreme
Court found that "respondent Falwell is a 'public figure' for purposes of First Amendment law." The U.S.
Supreme Court held in Hustler that
"We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publication such as the one here at issue without 'a
showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
'actual malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Hustler allows recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the aggrieved party is
a private person and not a public figure even if there is no showing that the false statement was made with
actual malice. In the instant case, private respondents are not public figures or public officials but ordinary
private individuals represented by private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc.
IV. Constitutional Guarantee of 'Full Respect for Human Rights'
The 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights."11 The Constitution created a Commission on Human Rights with the
function, among others, to "[M]onitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights."12 The framers of the Constitution made it clear that the term "human rights"
as used in the Constitution referred to the civil and political rights embodied in the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights13 to which the Philippines is a signatory. This is clear from the following
exchange in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. GARCIA: But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article
therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in
this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, I am not clear as to the distinction between social and
civil rights.
MR. GARCIA: There are two international covenants: the International Covenant (on) Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The second covenant contains all the different rights the rights of labor to organize, the right
to education, housing, shelter, etcetera.
MR. GUINGONA: So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those
the Gentleman has specified.
MR. GARCIA: Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you."14 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that "[a]ny advocacy of
x x xreligious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited
by law." The Human Rights Committee created under the Covenant, in its 1983 Nineteenth Session,
reported to member states that:
"1. x x x In view of the nature of article 20, States parties are obliged to adopt the necessary
legislative measures prohibiting the actions referred to therein. However, the reports have
shown that in some States such actions are neither prohibited by law nor are appropriate efforts
intended or made to prohibit them. Further, many reports failed to give sufficient information
concerning the relevant national legislation and practice.
2. x x x For article 20 to become fully effective there ought to be a law making it clear that
propaganda and advocacy as described therein are contrary to public policy and providing for
an appropriate sanction in case of violation. x x x ." 15
The Covenant, being an international treaty to which the Philippines is a signatory, is part of the country's
municipal law.16 The Covenant carries great weight in the interpretation of the scope and meaning of the
term "human rights" as used in the Constitution. Unquestionably, the framers of the Constitution
intentionally referred to the civil and political rights embraced in the Covenant in describing the term
"human rights." The Constitution even mandates the independent Commission on Human Rights to
monitor the compliance of the Philippine Government, which includes the judiciary, with its treaty
obligations under the Covenant.
Paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code makes civilly liable any person who humiliates another because
of his religious beliefs. This is just a soft prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred that incites
discrimination, hostility or violence, the act the Covenant seeks to curb and which the Philippine
Government has undertaken to declare unlawful. Other countries that signed the Covenant
have criminalized the acts prohibited under the Covenant. Since our ratification of the Covenant in 1986,
the Philippines has not enacted any special legislation to enforce the provisions of the Covenant, on the
ground that existing laws are adequate to meet the requirements of the Covenant. There is no other law,
except paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code, that can provide a sanction against intentional conduct,
falling short of a criminal act, advocating religious hatred that incites hostility between Muslims and
Christians in this country.
If we are to comply in good faith with our treaty obligations under the Covenant, as the Constitution
expressly mandates the Philippine Government, we must give redress under Article 26 to the outrageous
profanity suffered by private respondents. Our Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. Pacta sunt servanda every treaty in force binds the
parties who must comply with the treaty in good faith17 is one such principle. Thus, if we refuse to
apply Article 26 to the instant case, then we admit that we have no law to enforce the Covenant. In effect,
we admit non-compliance with the Covenant.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in interpreting Canada's obligation under the Covenant, explained in R. v.
Keegstra:18
"C.E.R.D. (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) and
I.C.C.P.R. (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) demonstrate that the
prohibition of hate promoting expression is considered to be not only compatible with a
signatory nation's guarantee of human rights, but is as well an obligatory aspect of this
guarantee. Decisions under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms are also of aid in illustrating the tenor of the international community's
approach to hate propaganda and free expression. This is not to deny that finding the correct
balance between prohibiting hate propaganda and ensuring freedom of expression has been a
source of debate internationally (see, e.g., Nathan Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1980), at pp. 43-54). But despite debate
Canada, along with other members of the international community, has indicated a
commitment to prohibiting hate propaganda, and in my opinion this court must have regard to
that commitment in investigating the nature of the government objective behind s. 319(2) of
the Criminal Code. That the international community has collectively acted to condemn hate
propaganda, and to oblige State Parties to C.E.R.D. and I.C.C.P.R. to prohibit such expression,
thus emphasizes the importance of the objective behind s. 319(2) and the principles of equality
and the inherent dignity of all persons that infuse both international human rights and the
Charter."
As a signatory to the Covenant, the Philippines is, like, Canada, obligated under international law and the
1987 Constitution to protect the inherent dignity and human rights of all its citizens.
V. Freedom of Expression and Profane Utterances
The blatant profanity contained in the newspaper article in question is not the speech that is protected by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Words that heap extreme profanity, intended merely
to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have no social value and do not enjoy constitutional protection. As
explained by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:19
"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act
would raise no question under that instrument." (Emphasis supplied)
Chaplinsky expressly includes profane utterances as belonging to the narrowly limited classes of speech
that arenot constitutionally protected. Profane utterances, like asserting that Muslims worship the pig as
their God, have no social value meriting constitutional protection. Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.)
defines the words "profane" and "profanity" as follows:
"Profane. Irreverence toward God or holy things. Writing, speaking, or acting, in manifest or
implied contempt of sacred things. Town of Torrington v. Taylor, 59 Wyo. 109, 137 P.2d 621,
624; Duncan v. U.S., C.C.A. Or., 48 F.2d 128, 133. That which has not been consecrated."
"Profanity. Irreverence towards sacred things; particularly, an irreverent and blasphemous use
of the name of God. Vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language. It is a federal offense to utter an
obscene, indecent, or profane language on radio. 18 U.S.C.A. 1464. See also Obscenity."
The majority opinion states that the doctrine in Chaplinsky "had largely been superseded by subsequent
First Amendment doctrines." The majority opinion then cites the 1971 case of Cohen v. California 20 as an
"illustrative" case that "American courts no longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed merely
because it is 'lewd,' 'profane,' 'insulting' or otherwise vulgar or offensive." However, Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell,21 a 1988 case which the majority opinion also cites, clearly explains the state of American law on
this matter, thus:
"Admittedly, these oft-repeated First Amendment principles, like other principles, are subject
to limitations. We recognized in Pacifica Foundation that speech that is 'vulgar, offensive, and
shocking' is 'not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances.'
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, we held that that a State could lawfully punish an individual
for the use of insulting 'fighting words' those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' These limitations are but recognition of the
observation in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) that
this Court has 'long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.' x x
x ." [other citations omitted] x x x."

Indeed, while democratic societies maintain a deep commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, this free debate has never been meant to include
libelous, obscene or profane utterances against private individuals.22 Clearly, the newspaper article in
question, dripping with extreme profanity, does not enjoy the protection of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.
VI. Court's Duty and Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights
The 1987 Constitution has conferred on the Court the power to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights." This is an innovation in the 1987 Constitution to
insure, in the words of former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, one of the framers of the
Constitution, that "the protection and enforcement of these constitutional rights is something that the
courts have to consider in the exercise of their judicial power.23 This provision stresses that constitutional
rights, whether found in the Bill of Rights or in other provisions of the Constitution like in the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, are "not merely declaratory but are also enforceable." 24
One such right, the enforcement and protection of which is expressly guaranteed by the State under the
Constitution, is the right to "full respect for human rights." The trial and appellate courts have found that
private respondents' religious beliefs and practices have been twisted, ridiculed and vilified by petitioners.
This is a clear violation of the human rights of private respondents under the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It now becomes the duty of the Court, as the
guardian of the fundamental rights of the people, to exercise its power to protect and enforce the
constitutional rights of private respondents.
The Court, pursuant to its rule making power, can require that in actions like the instant case, the plaintiffs
must bring a class suit. This will avoid multiplicity of suits considering the numerous potential plaintiffs
all over the country. A judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is binding
under the res judicataprinciple on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.25 This rule will address the fear that cases will swamp the courts all over the country if profanities
against religious groups are made actionable under Article 26.
VII. The Special Circumstance of Muslim Secession in the South
Limitations on freedom of expression have always been rooted on special circumstances confronting a
society in its historical development. In the 1950s, faced with rising racial tension in American society, the
U.S Supreme Court ruled in Beauharnais v. Illinois26 that hate speech which denigrates a group of persons
defined by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law may validly prohibit such
speech on the same ground as defamation of an individual. This was the only time that the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld group libel, and since then, there has been a consistent retreat from this doctrine as blacks
and other ethnic groups became more assimilated into the mainstream of American society. Beauharnais
expressly acknowledged that race riots and massive immigration of unassimilated ethnic groups justified
the legislature in "punishing x x x libels directed at designated collectives and flagrantly disseminated."
The majority opinion states also that Beauharnais has been superseded by Brandenburg v. Ohio."27 The
majority opinion explains that Brandenburg, a 1969 decision, ruled that "advocacy of illegal action
becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action." While Beauharnais has been apparently weakened by
subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, it was not overturned in Brandenburg which did not
even cite or mention Beauharnais. What Brandenburgoverturned was Whitney v. California,28 thus
"Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied,
purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly
with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the
condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v.
California, supra, cannot be supported, and that decision is therefore overruled." (Emphasis
supplied)
In any event, Brandenburg involved the constitutionality of a criminal statute which sought to punish the
mere advocacy of violence as a means to accomplish industrial or political reform. This is distinctly
different from the instant case, which involves profane utterances that have long been recognized as
devoid of social value and outside the purview of constitutionally protected speech.29
In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court, in R. v. Keegstra,30 upheld a law criminalizing hate speech toward
any section of the public distinguished by color, race, religion or ethnic origin. The Canadian Supreme
Court rejected the clear and present danger test of the U.S. Supreme Court, stating that it did not address
the psychological trauma hate propaganda causes and the subtle and incremental way hate propaganda
works. The Canadian Supreme Court found the U.S. Supreme Court's Beauharnais decision more
reflective of Canadian values rather than later U.S. decisions that weakened Beauharnais. The Canadian

Supreme Court handed down Keegstra at a time when Canada was becoming a multi-racial society
following the influx of immigrants of different color, ethnic origin and religion. The following passages
in Keegstra are instructive:
"A myriad of sources both judicial and academic offer reviews of First Amendment
jurisprudence as it pertains to hate propaganda. Central to most discussions is the 1952 case
of Beauharnais v. Illinois, where the Supreme Court of the United States upheld as
constitutional a criminal statute forbidding certain types of group defamation. Though never
overruled, Beauharnais appears to have been weakened by later pronouncements of the
Supreme Court (see, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384
U.S. 195 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 1964); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). The trend reflected in
many of these pronouncements is to protect offensive, public invective as long as the speaker
has not knowingly lied and there exists no clear and present danger of violence or insurrection.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The question that concerns us in this appeal is not, of course, what the law is or should be in
the United States. But it is important to be explicit as to the reasons why or why not American
jurisprudence may be useful in the s. 1 analysis of s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code. In the
United States, a collection of fundamental rights has been constitutionally protected for over
200 years. The resulting practical and theoretical experience is immense, and should not be
overlooked by Canadian courts. On the other hand, we must examine American constitutional
law with a critical eye, and in this respect La Forest J. has noted in R. v. Rahey, (1987) 1 S.C.R.
588 at 639:
'While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American
constitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter
guarantees that have counterparts in the United States Constitution, they should be
wary of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different
countries in different ages and in very different circumstances. . .'
Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have the documents entrenching
human rights in our two countries arisen in the same context. It is only common sense to
recognize that, just as similarities will justify borrowing from the American experience,
differences may require that Canada's constitutional vision depart from that endorsed in the
United States." (Other citations omitted)
xxx
xxx
xxx
First, it is not entirely clear that Beauharnais must conflict with existing First Amendment
doctrine. Credible arguments have been made that later Supreme Court cases do not
necessarily erode its legitimacy (see, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, "Racial Defamation as Free
Speech: Abusing the First Amendment" (1985), 17 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 11). Indeed,
there exists a growing body of academic writing in the United States which evinces a stronger
focus upon the way in which hate propaganda can undermine the very values which free
speech is said to protect. This body of writing is receptive to the idea that, were the issue
addressed from this new perspective, First Amendment doctrine might be able to accommodate
statutes prohibiting hate propaganda (see, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling" (1982), 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Law Rev.
133; Irving Horowitz, "Skokie, the ACLU and the Endurance of Democratic Theory" (1979),
43 Law & Contemp. Prob. 328; Lasson, op. cit., at pp. 2030; Mari Matsuda, "Public Response
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," (1989), 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, at p. 2348;
"Doe v. University of Michigan: First Amendment Racist and Sexist Expression on Campus
Court Strikes Down University Limits on Hate Speech" (1990), 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1397)."
In deciding Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court also relied on Canada's treaty obligations under the
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which requires signatory states to
prohibit any "advocacy of x x x religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence." During the negotiations of the Covenant, the United States objected to this provision on free
speech grounds. When it finally ratified the Covenant, the United States made a reservation rejecting this
provision insofar as it conflicts with U.S. constitutional protections.31 The Covenant opened for ratification
on December 19, 1966 and entered into force on March 23, 1976. The Philippines ratified the Covenant in
1986 without any reservation, just like Canada. The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines even created a
Commission on Human Rights to "[M]onitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international

treaty obligations on human rights." Obviously, Canada and the Philippines are alike in their obligations
under the Covenant, but the United States is differently situated.32
In our country, there has been a long festering and bloody Muslim secessionist movement in the South,
fueled not only by poverty but also by the palpable feeling among Muslims that the Christian majority is
not treating Muslims fairly. Private respondents in the instant case, despite the outrageous profanity hurled
at them by petitioners, chose not to join their secessionist brethren in the armed struggle but instead
decided to petition our courts for legal redress of their grievance. They could have easily retaliated by
flinging their own blasphemous invectives against the Christian religion. They did not, realizing perhaps
that answering profanity with more profanity would mean answering hatred with more hatred, further
dividing rather than unifying the Filipino nation.
Just last November of 2002, a Christian newspaper in Nigeria where the Miss World contest was being
held opined that the Prophet Mohammed would have approved of the beauty contest. The newspaper
stated: "What would Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would have probably chosen a wife from one of
them." These words provoked bloody rioting in Nigeria among Muslims who felt insulted by the article.
Hundreds died in the religious riots. Yet the offensive article in the Nigerian newspaper pales in
comparison to the utterly profane newspaper article in the instant case.
Indeed, private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, a federation of more than 70
Muslim religious organizations in the Philippines, deserves commendation for bringing this case before
our courts for a peaceful and legal resolution of the issue. Private respondents have placed their trust and
faith in our courts, knowing and insisting that they are entitled to a just remedy under paragraph 4, Article
26 of the Civil Code. It is time to breathe life to this long dormant provision of the Civil Code, to give
even just a token redress to religious minorities who suffer mental and emotional distress from mindless
profanity committed by irresponsible persons belonging to the religious majority. In the process we will
contribute in avoiding a further cleavage in the fabric of our nation, and demonstrate to our Muslim
brothers that their grievances can be redressed under the rule of law.
The instant case does not even call for a re-examination of the clear and present danger test which we have
adopted in this jurisdiction in determining the constitutionality of legislation that impinges on civil
liberties.33 Even under the clear and present danger test, profane utterances are not constitutionally
protected at least with respect to profanities directed against private individuals. The special circumstance
involving the Muslim secessionist movement in the South should make us more sensitive to the
grievances of our Muslim brothers who continue to have faith in the rule of law in this country.
Since the peace of mind of private respondents has been violated by the publication of the profane article
in question, Article 26 of the Civil Code mandates that the tortious conduct "shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief." Article 2219 of the same Code provides that "[M]oral
damages may be recovered in x x x actions referred to in Articles 21, 26 x x x ." Private respondents are
entitled to moral damages because, as duly established by the testimonies of prominent Muslims, 34 private
respondents suffered emotional distress which was evidently the proximate result of the petitioners'
wrongful publication of the article in question.35
VII. Conclusion
Almost thirty years ago, I had occasion to write about Article 26 in this wise:
"At the time Article 26 was lifted by the Code Commission from American jurisprudence,
many of the rights embodied therein were not yet widely accepted by American courts, and in
fact even now at least one, the right to privacy, is still struggling to gain recognition in some
states. While we have been quick to leapfrog American state decisions in recognizing such
rights, we have, however, been painfully slow in galvanizing the same in actual cases. To date
Article 26 stands almost as a mere decorative provision in our statutes; but it may be harnessed
fruitfully anytime."36
Now is the time to apply this provision of law since the instant case falls clearly within paragraph 4 of
Article 26. Applying Article 26 will not undermine freedom of speech since the profane publication in
question belongs to the class of speech that clearly does not enjoy constitutional protection. Applying
Article 26 demonstrates good faith compliance with our treaty obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Applying Article 26 implements the constitutional policy that the
"State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Applying
Article 26 constitutes compliance by the Court of its constitutional duty to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. Applying Article 26 will help bind the wounds that mindless profanities inflict on
religious minorities in violation of their human rights.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the award by the Court of Appeals of P50,000.00
moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 attorney's fees to respondent Islamic
Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. based on paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code.

Dissenting Opinion
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals with certain modifications.
For a proper perspective of the issues involved in the present petition, it must be emphasized that the
portion of the subject article which alludes to the Muslims as not eating pork because it is dirty is not the
bone of contention of respondents, because admittedly, the Muslims may eat pork if driven by necessity,
as expressed in the Quran, to wit:
"Allah has forbidden you only what dies of itself and blood and the flesh of swine and that over
which any other (name) than (that of) Allah has been invoked. Then, whoever is driven by
necessity, not desiring, nor exceeding the limit, no sin is upon him." 1
The focal point of private respondents' claim for damages is the insult heaped upon them because of the
malicious publication that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their
basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God they call Allah, and, that the greatest sin in Islam is to
worship things or persons other than Allah.2
Petitioners are liable for damages both under Articles 33 and 26(4) of the Civil Code. The instances that
can be brought under Article 26 may also be subject to an action for defamation under Article 33. In such a
case, the action brought under Article 26 is an alternative remedy, and the plaintiff can proceed upon either
theory, or both, although he can have but one recovery for a single instance of publicity.3
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides:
"Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence." (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code comes into play. In the present civil case, it is
necessary that respondents are able to establish by preponderance of evidence the following elements of
defamation:
"1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance.
"2. That the imputation must be made publicly.
"3. That it must be malicious.
"4. That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead.
"5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed."4
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends
to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.5
As a general rule, words, written or printed, are libelous per se if they tend to expose a person to public
hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right
thinking persons, and deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society, regardless of whether they
actually produce such results.6Otherwise stated; words published are libelous if they discredit plaintiff in
the minds of any considerable and respectable class in the community, taking into consideration the
emotions, prejudices, and intolerance of mankind.7 It has been held that it is not necessary that the
published statements make all or even a majority of those who read them think any less of the person
defamed, but it is enough if a noticeable part of those who do read the statements are made to hate,
despise, scorn or be contemptuous of the person concerning whom the false statements are published. 8
Thus, in order to be libelous per se, the defamatory words must be of such a nature that the court can
presume as a matter of law that they will tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up to public
hatred, contempt, ridicule or cause him to be shunned and avoided; in other words, they must reflect on his
integrity, his character, and his good name and standing in the community, and tend to expose him to
public hatred, contempt, or disgrace.9 The imputation must be one which tends to affect plaintiff in a class
of society whose standard of opinion the court can recognize.10 It is not sufficient, standing alone, that the

language is unpleasant and annoys or irks plaintiff, and subjects him to jests or banter, so as to affect his
feelings.11
In the present case, it is evident that the subject article attributes a discreditable or dishonorable act or
condition to all Muslims in general, a derision of the religious beliefs of the Muslims and of the objectives
of respondent Council to herald the truth about Islam, in particular. The portion of the assailed article
which declares that the Muslims worship the pigs as God is obnoxiously contrary to the basic belief of the
Muslims.
Thus, the article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of
the religious beliefs of Muslims. It has been held that scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel;
it is enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be held of the plaintiff, or to make him contemptible
or ridiculous; 12 or that the imputation tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the offended
party.13
Petitioners' stance that the article "Alam Ba Ninyo?" is but an expression of belief or opinion does not
justify said publication. It cannot be considered as a mere information being disseminated. Petitioners'
defense that the article itself was merely a contribution of a reader, or that the writer was soliciting opinion
from the readers, does not hold water, since the article did not in any way refer to such circumstance.
Verily, the article, read as a whole with the other paragraphs, calls the attention of the readers to a
statement of fact, not fiction, and that the writer speaks with authority on the subject matter. Bulgar in fact
prides itself as being the "Pahayagan Ng Katotohanan".
Significantly, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of the
defamation.14In matters of libel, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what is
the meaning of the words he has used.15 The meaning of the writer is quite immaterial. The question is, not
what the writer meant, but what he conveyed to those who heard or read.16
In other words, it is not the intention of the speaker or writer, or the understanding of the plaintiff or of any
particular hearer or reader, by which the actionable quality of the words is to be determined. It is the
meaning that the words in fact conveyed, rather than the effect which the language complained of was
fairly calculated to produce and would naturally produce on the minds of persons of reasonable
understanding, discretion, and candor, taking into consideration accompanying explanations and
surrounding circumstances which were known to the hearer or reader. The alleged defamatory statement
should be construed not only as to the expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and
apparent object of the writer.17
Want of intention to vilify does not render an objectionable publication any the less a libel and a
publication is not excused by the publisher's ignorance that it contains libelous matter.18 The state of mind
of the person who publishes a libel is immaterial in determining liability. The law looks at the tendency
and consequences of the publication rather than the motive or intention of the writer or publisher.19 It does
not signify what the motive of the person publishing the libel was, or whether he intended it to have a
libelous meaning or not.20 The defendant may not have intended to injure the plaintiff's reputation at all
and he may have published the words by mistake or inadvertence,21 or in jest, or without intending to refer,
or knowing that he was referring, to the plaintiff, or any existing person, or again he may have been
actuated by the best motives in publishing the words, but such facts will usually afford the defendant no
defense, though they may be urged in mitigation of damages. 22
Tested with the foregoing principles of law, there is no doubt that the article in question is defamatory
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. If the imputation is defamatory,23 the Court has held that malice is
presumed and the burden of overcoming the presumption of malice by mere preponderance of evidence
rested on the petitioners.
A careful examination of the records of the case does not reveal any cogent reason that would set aside the
presumption of malice. In fact, there is convincing evidence that the publication of the assailed article was
malicious, as more extensively discussed in the latter portion of herein opinion.
Furthermore, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions provided for in
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
"Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
"1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and
"2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any

statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions."
Consequently, there is no compelling reason to disregard the findings of the Court of Appeals that no
evidence was presented to overcome said presumption of malice.
On the matter of publication, there is no dispute that the same is present, as the subject article was
admittedly published in the newspaper "Bulgar" which was circulated in Metro Manila and in other parts
of the country.
It must be emphasized that not only did both the trial court and the appellate court find that the subject
article was published, they also held that the subject article contains an imputation of a discreditable act
when it portrayed the Muslims to be worshipping the pig as their god.
But the trial court and the appellate court differed as to the presence of the element of the identity of the
persons defamed. While the trial court held that the libelous article does not identify the personalities of
the persons defamed and therefore respondents had no cause of action, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Muslims were the defamed persons and respondent IDCP has the requisite personality to sue for damages.
The appellate court is right.
Specific identity of the person defamed means that the third person who read or learned about the libelous
article must know that it referred to the plaintiff.24 In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim is identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named; it is likewise not sufficient that the
offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a
third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. 25
It cannot be refuted that the obvious victims in the article in question are specifically identified the
Muslims. The principle laid down in Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,26 that "where the
defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that class or group, or sufficiently specific so
that each individual in that class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to
him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be," obviously applies to the present case. Certainly,
the defamatory imputation contained in the subject article is a sweeping statement affecting a common or
general interest of all Muslims, that is, their religious belief in Allah as the one and only God. The
publication was directed against all Muslims without exceptions and it is not necessary to name each one
of them as they could only have one cause of action which is the damage suffered by them caused by the
insult inflicted on their basic religious tenets.
All premises considered, petitioners are indeed liable for damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Significantly, the respondents brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals the failure of the trial court
to appreciate Article 26(4) of the Civil Code, but the appellate court simply delved exclusively on the
applicability of libel and the existence of its elements.
Ordinarily, the Court may only pass upon errors assigned.27 However, this rule is not without exceptions.
The Court has ruled that an appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to consider errors not
assigned, involving, among others, (1) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which
is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of
justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (2) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal
but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the
parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; and (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.28 Evidently, all three
exceptions apply to the present case.
Necessarily, the Court has to dwell on the applicability of Article 26 (4) of the Civil Code in support of
respondents' claim for damages.
Before proceeding any further, a distinction must first be made between a cause of action based on libel or
defamation, whether in a criminal or civil case, and one based on Article 26. In libel, the gravamen of the
claim is reputational harm; whereas, under Article 26, it can be the embarrassment, emotional harm or
mental distress caused upon a person.29 In libel cases, its four (4) constitutive elements, to wit: (a)
defamatory imputation; (b) malice; (c) publication; and (d) identifiability of the victim,30 must be
established, by mere preponderance of evidence in a civil case which herein petitioners have done in the
present case. Said elements, however, are not essential in a cause of action based on tort under Article 26,
wherein one is liable for personal injury, whether administered intentionally, wantonly or by
negligence.31 Personal injury herein refers not only to reputation but also encompasses character, conduct,
manner, and habits of a person.32
American Tort Law, on the basis of which, Philippine Tort Law was patterned, has recognized that if the
plaintiff is shown to have suffered a wrong, the mere paucity of cases or absence of any precedent does

not constitute sufficient reason for refusing relief if a sound principle of law can be found which governs,
or which by analogy ought to govern.33 The fact that a case is novel does not operate to defeat recovery, if
it can be brought within the general rules of law applicable to torts. 34 Neither is the fact that a tort action
does not fit into a nicely defined or established "cubbyhole" of the law has been said not to warrant, in
itself, the denial of relief to one who is injured.35 Thus, to ignore the application of the proper provision of
law in the instant case would be an abdication of the judiciary's primordial objective, which is, the just
resolution of disputes.
Article 26 is an integral part of the Chapter in the Civil Code on human relations, "designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience. These guides for human conduct should
run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice."36 Article 26, which enhances and preserves human dignity and
personality, provides:
"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief.
"(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
"(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
"(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
"(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station
in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition." (Emphasis
supplied)
The raison d'tre for the foregoing statutory provision, as stated by the Code Commission in its Report, is
worth setting forth verbatim:
"The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant of every plan for human amelioration.
The touchstone of every system of laws, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how
far it dignifies man. If in legislation, inadequate regard is observed for human life and safety; if
the laws do not sufficiently forestall human suffering, or do not try effectively to curb those
factors or influences that wound the noblest sentiments; if the statutes insufficiently protect
persons from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not properly exalted
then the laws are indeed defective. Sad to say, such is to some "degree the present state of
legislation in the Philippines. To remedy this grave fault in the laws is one of the principal aims
of the Project of Civil Code. Instances will now be specified.
"The present laws, criminal and civil, do not adequately cope with the interferences and
vexations mentioned in Article 26."37 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Article 26 provides aggrieved individuals with a legal remedy against violations of human
personality, even though such do not amount to violations of penal laws. Social equality is not sought, but
simply due regard for decency and propriety.38
Among the rights covered by Article 26 are: (a) personal dignity, (b) personal security; (c) family
relations, (d) social intercourse, (e) privacy and (f) peace of mind. 39 However, it has been held that the
violations mentioned in the Article 26 are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other
similar acts.40 Thus, disturbing or offensive utterances, such as threats, false statements, or insulting,
humiliating, scandalous, or abusive language,41 may give rise to an action in tort where such language
causes mental or emotional disturbance, as in this case, or bodily injury or illness resulting therefrom. 42
Paragraph 4 of Article 26 which makes one liable for vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs finds proper application in the case at bar. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain
terms that religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by
reason of the latter's religion.43
In support of respondents' claim for damages, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, Dean of the Institute of
Islamic Affairs of the University of the Philippines, testified in this wise:
"WITNESS:
"A:
First, I understood that this tabloid is the voice of katotohanan but regarding this
article it is not 'katotohanan'. To the Muslim it is a blasphemy. It is an abuse and desecration
and belief of the Muslims and the Muslims are commanded by God to worship no other than
Him. So how could the publisher publish that the Muslims are worshipping pigs, that Muslims
in his mind do not eat animals while they are also eating slaughtered chicken, cow and carabao
and other non-prohibited animals. So to the Muslims this is an insult, not only to the Muslims
in Mindanao but to the whole Muslim community. This is a blasphemy to the Muslims.

"Q
As a Muslim, Professor Sayedy, how do you feel about this article?
"A
I feel insulted and I feel that the beliefs of the Muslims are over abused by the
publisher and it is a defamation and desecration on the religion of the Islam.
"Q
What is the concept of God insofar as the religion of Islam is concerned?
"A
The concept of God is that God is the only God, He was not begotten and He is to be
worshipped and no other to be worshipped aside from him, He has no beginning and has no
end, He is the creator of all creatures and He should be honored by all creatures." 44
Clearly therefrom, the assailed article is vexatious and humiliating to Muslims as they adore only one
God, they call Allah. Muslims are called Muslims because they sincerely believe in the Quran and the
Hadith (the Saying and the Conduct of the Prophet). It cannot be over-stressed that Muslims do not eat
pork because it is forbidden in the Quran for being unclean not because they hold pigs as sacred and
worship them; and that to the Muslims, the greatest sin in Islam is to worship persons or things other than
Allah.45
Petitioner Myla C. Aguja, who testified as Myla Tabora, admitted in open court that she: wrote the subject
article; was a graduate of "Mass Com"; based the said article on her interpretation of what she recalled she
had read in Reader's Digest while she was still in high school; and did not verify if what she recalled was
true46 . Such shocking irresponsible attitude on her part who at that time was an Assistant Editor of Bulgar
is utterly malicious, in the same degree as the failure of the rest of the petitioners (except Binegas, Jr.) 47 to
verify the truthfulness of the subject article, for which they should be held liable for damages.
The freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are, to be sure, among the most
zealously protected rights in the Constitution. But the constitutional right of freedom of expression may
not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths nor may it be used to insult others, for such would be
contrary to the plain mandate of the Civil Code for each person "to respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons." The freedom of speech does not require a
journalist to guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes but it does prohibit publishing or circulating
statements in reckless disregard without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.48
By causing the assailed article to be published in reckless disregard of the truth thereof, petitioners
publisher MVRS, Editor-in-Chief Mars C. Laconsay, Assistant Editor and writer Myla C. Aguja (Myla
Tabora) exhibited utter irresponsibility and acted contrary to the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism
profession in the Philippines, for which they deserve condemnation. The assailed article has falsely
portrayed all Muslims as worshippers of pig or swine and thus, perverted their religious beliefs and
demeaned the Muslims as a segment of human society. It belittled the Muslims by inverting the relative
importance of their religious beliefs and practice, thereby disgracing the ideals and aspirations of the
Muslim people. Such amounts to a violation of their personal dignity and peace of mind, which are the
very rights affirmed by Article 26.
Petitioner Binegas should be absolved from liability. It is not refuted that the principal function of
petitioner Binegas, Jr., as Circulation Manager of Bulgar, was to supervise the delivery and the
distribution of the paper, monitor the accounts of the agents and schedule the circulation personnel. It is
likewise unrebutted that petitioner Binegas, Jr. was never consulted on what articles are to be published;
that he had no authority to decide whether or not a certain publication of Bulgar shall be circulated; and
that his only duty was to distribute the issue after its printing. 49 As such, his duty being ministerial in
character, petitioner Binegas, Jr., should have been exonerated from liability.
Now, do plaintiffs-respondents IDCP and its officers have the requisite personality to institute the suit?
The answer is in the affirmative. Respondents IDCP and its officers have the requisite personality to
institute the suit inasmuch as the action is properly a class suit.
The concept of a "true" class suit has been elucidated upon in Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers
of Doa Paz,50 thus:
"What makes a situation a proper case for a class suit is the circumstance that there is only
one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many persons, not
separately or severally to distinct individuals.
'The 'true' class action, which is the invention of equity, is one which involves the
enforcement of a right which is joint, common, or secondary or derivative. x x (It)
is a suit wherein, but for the class action device, the joinder of all interested parties
would be essential.
'A 'true class action' as distinguished from the so-called hybrid and the spurious
class action in U.S. Federal Practice 'involves principles of compulsory joinder,
since x x (were it not) for the numerosity of the class members all should x x (be)
before the court. Included within the true class suit x x (are) the shareholders'

derivative suit and a class action by or against an unincorporated association x x. A

judgment in a true class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is
binding under res judicata principles upon all the members of the class, whether or
not they were before the court. It is the nondivisible nature of the right sued on
which determines both the membership of the class and the res judicata effect of the
final determination of the right.'
"The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or against numerous persons as a group or as an
integral entity, and not as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or liabilities are separate
from and independent of those affecting the others." (Emphasis supplied)
In order that a class suit may prosper, Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the concurrence of
three (3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons; (2) that the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court; and (3) that the action be maintained by parties who will fairly and adequately
represent the class.
Under the first requisite, the person who sues must have an interest in the controversy, common with those
for whom he sues, and there must be that unity of interest between him and all such other persons which
would entitle them to maintain the action if suit was brought by them jointly.51
As to what constitutes common interest in the subject matter of the controversy has been explained in Sulo
ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, Inc.,52 thus:
"The interest that will allow parties to join in a bill of complaint, or that will enable the court to
dispense with the presence of all the parties, when numerous, except a determinate number, is
not only an interest in the question, but one in common in the subject matter of the suit, x x x a
community of interest growing out of the nature and condition of the right in dispute; for,
although there may not be any privity between the numerous parties, there is a common title
out of which the question arises, and which lies at the foundation of the proceedings x x x
[here] the only matter in common among the plaintiffs, or between them and the defendants, is
an interest in the question involved, which alone cannot lay a foundation for the joinder of
parties. There is scarcely a suit at law, or in equity, which settles a principle or applies a
principle to a given state of facts or in which a general statute is interpreted, that does not
involve a question in which other parties are interested x x x."
It has further been held that in order to maintain a class action there must be an ascertainable class as well
as a community of interest among the members of that class in questions of law and fact involved. 53 The
class must be cognizable and manageable, and must be defined at the outset of the action. There must be a
cognizable class beyond the general strains which can be conceived to create a class of any superficially
resembling parties, but it is not necessary that the exact number comprising the class be specified or that
the members be identified.54
The first element is present in this case. The class spoken of in the assailed article that segregates them
from the other members of the general populace is the Muslim people, and their common interest,
undoubtedly, is their religious belief in adoring Allah as the one and only God and that the greatest sin is
to worship persons or things other than Allah. The article is an outrageous misrepresentation, inflicting
stark insult on the religious beliefs of the Muslims.
Concerning the second element, i.e., numerosity of parties one must bear in mind that the purpose. of
the rule permitting class actions is to furnish a mode of obtaining a complete determination of the rights of
the parties in such cases, when the number is so great as to preclude involvement by actual service. In this
class of cases, one is allowed to sue for all as a matter of convenience in the administration of justice. A
class action is particularly proper in an action wherein the persons are so multitudinous as vexatiously to
prolong and probably altogether prevent a full hearing.55
Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that Muslims in this country comprise a lot of the population, thus,
it is highly impractical to make them all parties or bring them all before the court. It is beyond
contradiction that the Muslims affected by the assailed article are multitudinous, and therefore, the second
element is present in the instant case.
With regards to the third element, that the action be maintained by one who fairly and adequately
represents the class, it is essential that the relief sought must be beneficial to the class members, the party
must represent the entire class asserted, and be a member of the class he claims to represent, in addition to
having an interest in the controversy common with those for whom he sues.56 For adequate representation,
it is sufficient that there are persons before the court who have the same interest as the absent persons and
are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the question and thus give such interest effective
protection.57 It has also been held that whether the class members are adequately represented by the named

plaintiffs depends on the quality of representation rather than on the number of representative parties as
compared with the total membership of the class.58 Thus, even one member of a large class can provide the
kind of representation for all that is contemplated by the class suit.59
Respondent IDCP, as a religious organization, being a federation or umbrella organization of more than
seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations in the Philippines, and its officers who are individual
respondents as well, carry the requisite personality to file a case for damages in behalf of all Muslims.
Unequivocally, they properly represent the Muslims who are similarly situated and affected by the assailed
article.
Respondent officers of IDCP namely, Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F. P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De
Guzman, and Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, not only
testified on how the assailed article emotionally, as well as psychologically, affected each of them, but also
as to how the said article received the condemnation and contempt of other Muslims, further evidenced by
the letter dated September 21, 1992 from thirty-one (31) students of the Islamic University Madinah AlMukarramah, K.S.A.,60 and the seething letter of one Abdil T. Arafat of South Cotabato province, dated
September 29, 1992.61
Moreover, an officer may sue in his own behalf if the defamation affects him as well as the corporation 62 ,
or where the defamation against the officer has a direct relation to the corporation's trade or business and it
causes injury63.
Thus, without a shred of doubt, respondents IDCP and the individual respondents, and all Muslims they
represent, have interest so identical that the motive and inducement to protect and preserve may be
assumed to be the same in each.64 By instituting the suit, the respondents necessarily represent all
Muslims.65
Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered for acts and actions based
on Article 26.66
Individual Muslim plaintiffs-respondents, Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F. P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid
De Guzman, and Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, as proper
representatives of the class action testified on the despair, mental anguish, social humiliation and inferior
feeling experienced by the Muslims as a result of the vexatious article.67 Thus, the award of moral
damages is justified.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees is likewise warranted and the amount is in
accordance with Articles 222968 and 220869 of the Civil Code.
However, damages awarded to individual respondents should be deleted inasmuch as the instant case is
considered as a class suit and they merely acted as officers and members of the principal plaintiffrespondent IDCP.
One last point. There should be no room for apprehension on future litigations relating to the assailed
article in view of the fact that the instant suit is a class suit. In a class suit, each member of the class for
whose benefit the action is brought is a party plaintiff; the persons represented are quasi parties or parties
by representation. A suit brought in behalf of others in a class gives the court jurisdiction of the whole
subject matter, and of all the parties, such that the judgment will be binding on all persons belonging to the
class represented.70
In other words, a judgment in a class action concludes upon all members of the class, whether formally
joined as parties or not. 71 The class action has preclusive effect against one who was not named
representative of the class, as long as he was a member of the class which was a party to the judgment.72
Thus, in the case at bar, the Muslims, who are parties represented by respondent IDCP and its officers, are
thereby precluded from instituting separate or individual suits for damages against MVRS Publications,
Inc., et al., as they are bound by the judgment in this class action, which amounts to res judicata.
In the light of all the foregoing, I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

G.R. No. L-37733 September 30, 1982

ALMARIO T. SALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI of Manila, Branch
XIV and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38035 September 30, 1982
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMANTE P. PURISIMA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII and
ALMARIO SALTA, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.
Nestor L. Kalaw, Edgardo M. Magtalas and Juan C. Gatmaitan for respondents,

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner
indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner
characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the
amount of the loans. This is how the respondent bank found petitioner to have discharged his duties as
branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case No. 79583,
Branch XIV) on April 22, 1970, and another case (Civil Case No. 88343, Branch VII) on September 23,
1972, to recover losses the bank suffered. At the same time the bank caused to be filed, based on the same
acts, a criminal case with the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District at San Fernando,
Pampanga, Criminal Case No. CCCV-668, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In the criminal case, the Court, on motion to dismiss filed by the defense, after the prosecution has rested,
granted the motion in a 64-page Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, therefore, the Motion to
Dismiss (Demurrer) to Evidence) should be as it is hereby granted and accused
ALMARIO T. SALTA ACQUITTED of the offense charged in the Information the
prosecution having failed to prove the essential ingredience and/or elements of the
crime charged,. with costs de oficio. 1
With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases,
based on Section 3(c), Rule I I I of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

DE CASTRO, J.:
In these two cases, the only issue to be resolved is whether a decision of acquittal in a criminal case
operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal
case, which is for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The petitioner, Almario T. Salta, in G.R. No. L-37733, takes the affirmative stand on the issue as above
indicated, as he made manifest in his motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 79583, of the CFI of Manila,
Branch XIV, which was, however, denied by Hon. Jesus de Veyra, presiding. In a similar motion,
aforementioned petitioner sought to dismiss another civil case (Civil Case No. 88343), pending before
Branch VII of the same CFI of Manila, presided over by Hon. Amante Purisima who granted the motion to
dismiss.
We have, therefore, the unedifying spectacle of two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two
judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively
settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. For
purposes of convenience, however, although the petitioner in G.R. No. L-37733, Almario T. Salta, is the
private respondent in the other case, G.R. No. L-38035, in which the petitioner is the Philippine National
Bank, We shall refer in this decision to Salta as "petitioner," and the PNB, as respondent bank."
Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. As such, his duty
was, among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the
amount of the loan applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care
and prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.

(c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. ... 2
It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila
took diametrically opposing views, the former denying the motion, the latter granting it.
We sustain the order denying the motion to dismiss as issued by Judge de Veyra, which, for its brevity, but
clear and convincing, We quote as follows:
Having been acquitted by the Circuit Court of the charges of violation of the AntiGraft Law, Defendant now seeks the dismissal of the civil case which arose from
the same set of facts. The motion to dismiss must be denied for the reason that
acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper
unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly the accused
would not be liable-there is no such a finding. Apart from this, Plaintiff in this
present civil case bases its case either on fraud or negligence-evidence that only
requires a preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the requisite in
criminal cases.
The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied for lack of merit. 3
To begin with, the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted
under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. 4 The criminal case is for the prosecution of an
offense the main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited

provision. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly
alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. It needs
hardly any showing to demonstrate this fact, which petitioner disputes, particularly as to the sufficiency of
the allegation of fraud in the civil complaints. Definitely, We hold that the following allegation in the
complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud:
13. That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans
which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily
Identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned. 5
That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the complaint states that "the
defendant as manager of Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the bank rules and regulations, and without
exercising necessary prudence, ... extended a number of credit accommodations . . ." 6 On this allegation
of negligence alone, the civil case may be maintained as an entirely independent action from the criminal
case. Consequently, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court has no application thereto.
The ruling in the case of PNB vs. Bagamaspad, 7 involving the same respondent herein, and also against
its branch manager, unherringly charts the course to be followed in the final resolution of these cases.
Thus The trial court based in the civil liability the appellants herein on the provisions of
Article 1718 and 1719 of the Civil Code, defining and enumerating the duties and
obligations of an agent and his liability for failure to comply with such duty.. . . A
careful study and consideration of the record, however, convinces us and we agree
with the trial court that the defendants-appellants have not only violated
instructions of the plaintiff Bank, including things which the bank wanted done or
not done, all of which were fully understood by them but they (appellants) also
violated standing regulations regarding the granting of loans; and what is more,
thru their carelessness, laxity and negligence, they allowed bans to be granted to
persons who were not entitled to secure loans. 8
If petitioner's civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart from the averment of
fraud, then on the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action can be maintained regardless of the
outcome of the criminal action.
9

The opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio vs. Alvendia is not only enlightening, but
authoritative. Thus
. . . in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the
criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirety irrelevant to the
civil action. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these
actions 'entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33, 34
and 2177). Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107 Sec. l(d) does not apply.10
It is significant to note that under Article 31 11 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action
permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that

the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the
criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to
proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the
court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so
because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that
they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their
respective juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of
an offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed
independently of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.
The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that when the
civil action is reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting officer
alone without intervention from a private counsel representing the interest of the offended party. It is but
just that when, as in the present instance, the prosecution of the criminal case is left to the government
prosecutor to undertake, any mistake or mishanding of the case committed by the latter should not work to
the prejudice of the offended party whose interest would thus be protected by the measure contemplated
by Article 33 and Article 2177 12 of the New Civil Code.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it should be stated with emphasis, for its decisive effect on how the issue
raised in this case should be disposed of, that in no manner may the resolution of the Circuit Criminal
Court be read as positively stating that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist, as
required in the provision relied upon by petitioner, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court. As
Judge de Veyra put it, "acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper
unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly, the accused would not be liablethere is no such finding." There, indeed, could not be such finding because the criminal court, aware that
the civil case is not before it, would be acting in excess of jurisdiction if it were to make any
pronouncement in effect disposing of a case pending before another court, over which it had not acquired
jurisdiction. Even if this were authorized by the Rules of Court, the validity of such rule would be open to
serious doubt as it would be affecting a matter of jurisdiction, which is substantive in character,
considering the constitutional limitation of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, that said rules
should not increase or diminish substantive rights.
WHEREFORE, the order denying the motion to dismiss issued in Civil Case No. 79583 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila (G. R. No. L-37733) is affirmed, while the order granting a similar motion in
Civil Case No. 88343 of the same court (G. R. No. L-38035) is reversed. Let the records of these two (2)
cases be remanded to their respective courts of origin for proper further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19331

April 30, 1965

VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G. CAPUNO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JON ELORDI, defendantsappellees.
Federico Andres for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This appeal (in forma pauperis), certified here by the Court of Appeals, is from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac dismissing appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. 3315 for recovery of damages
for the death of Cipriano Capuno.
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga.
Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The
collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina
Paras.
On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga (criminal case No. 1591). The information was subsequently amended to
include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.
It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against his petition on the issues abovediscussed. Absence of opposition, however, does not preclude the scanning of the whole record by the
appellate court, with a view to preventing the conferment of citizenship to persons not fully qualified
therefor (Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20151, March 31, 1965). The applicant's complaint of
unfairness could have some weight if the objections on appeal had been on points not previously passed
upon. But the deficiencies here in question are not new but well-known, having been ruled upon
repeatedly by this Court, and we see no excuse for failing to take them into account.1wph1.t
On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and
their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the PepsiCola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi (civil case No. 838). Included in the complaint
was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan the former being appellants herein
were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and
Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon
Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for
the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in
the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their
decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated
by the civil action.

The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court in an order
dated September 23, 1953, and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order dated
October 23, 1954. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders.
On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For
P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the
sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The
Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case on the following June 17.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein
the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958,
however, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was
dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has
been taken.
The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well
taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from
appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan
Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the
said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.
The ruling of the court below on both points is now assailed by appellants as erroneous. In our opinion the
question of prescription is decisive. There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of
damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil
Code). Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the
Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may
be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of
the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. But appellants' intervention was
subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. And when they
commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that
appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would
have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of
acquittal in the criminal case.
In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the
criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No.
L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957, 22 L.J. 175). In other words, the civil action for damages could have been
commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3,
1953 or thereabouts, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for
homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or
after the lapse of more than five years.
In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31,
1958, this Court held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code
as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day
(the action) may be brought," which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in
this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had
neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not
then necessary; without having made it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even
during the pendency of the criminal case (Pacheco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960; Azucena v.
Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based
on a quasi-delict."
As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of
the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription, we do not now decide. The said rule
does not apply in the present case.
Having found the action of appellants barred by the statute of limitations, we do not consider it necessary
to pass upon the other issues raised in their brief.
The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-26737

July 31, 1969

LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA and CORAZON, all surnamed
MARCIA and represented by their mother LAURA CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendantsappellees.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for defendants-appellees.
CAPISTRANO, J.:
This is a direct appeal on questions of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 6880 of that court.
On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo
Paje, collided within the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,
resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons.
An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed
against Felardo Paje in the Court First Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their
right to institute a separate civil action for damages. On November 7, 1960, the accused, Felardo Paje, was
found guilty and convicted of the crime charged in the information. Said defendant appealed the judgment
of conviction to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1961, while defendant's appeal was pending
decision in the Court of Appeals, Clemente Marcia's heirs, namely, his widow, Laura Corpus, and their
minor children, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case No.
6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Felardo Paje and the
Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., defendants, praying that said defendants be ordered to pay jointly
and severally the amounts of damages claimed by the plaintiffs. On November 9, 1962, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje reversing the appealed judgment and
acquitting the appellant after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and
that the collision was a case of pure accident.
On December 29, 1962, the defendants filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
action was barred by the acquittal by the Court of Appeals of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal
action. The motion was denied.
At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that
plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was
brought four years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil
Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The lower court, in its order
of May 31, 1966, dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasidelict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed direct to this Court on questions of law from the
order dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. The contention is
unmeritorious in view of the following considerations.
(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the
ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the
collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente
Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje
was acquitted in the criminal action. In the celebrated case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, which was an
appeal from the Philippine Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S. 476; 54 L. Ed.
1116; 40 Phil. 1056, Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said:
It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had
to bring a civil action. This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as there resulted a judgment
for the defendant, and the plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must
carry with it exemption from civil responsibility.
Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of
the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the
crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries. Although in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco,
et al., G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in article
33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, 1 it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. In the case
of People vs. Buan, G.R. No. L-25366, March 29, 1968, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the
Supreme Court, said that the "offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the
offense." It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless
imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double
physical injuries suffered by two other persons. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one
of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for
damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the
criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the
injured party reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action (Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra). In the
language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the
defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished
also the civil action for damages based upon the same act.
(2) Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia was based
upon a quasi-delict, 3 the trial court's finding that on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. An
action upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The fouryear prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict was committed, or from December 23,
1956, and the running of the said period was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for
reckless imprudence. (Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-10542, July 31, 1958.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is affirmed, with special pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro, Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.
1wph1.t Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez and Teehankee, JJ., concur in the result.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1

This and the following footnotes express my opinion on certain controversial articles of the
New Civil Code, which was drafted when I was a member of the Code Commission.
(a) The holding in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, etc., et al., supra, at the term "physical
injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide or murder, is contrary to the
letter and spirit of the law. I recall that when the draft of what is now Article 33 of the New
Civil Code was presented for deliberation by Code Commission Chairman Dean Jorge C.
Bocobo, a great civilian, before the Code Commission (then composed of besides Chairman
Bocobo, Professor Guillermo B. Guevarra, Dean Pedro Y. Ylagan, and Dean Francisco R.
Capistrano, members), said Chairman made, in substance, the following remarks: In America
the injured party in crime has the initiative, through his lawyer he immediately files a civil
action for damages against the offender. In the Philippines the offended party depends upon the
fiscal to demand in the criminal action the damages he has suffered. I think it is about time to
educate our people the American way by giving the injured party in crime the initiative to go to
court through his lawyer to demand damages, and for this purpose we should give him an
independent civil action for damages. Let us begin with just three crimes which are of common
occurrence, namely, defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. Depending upon the success of
the experiment, when the new Civil Code may come up for revision about fifty (50) or one
hundred (100) years from now, it will be up to our successors in the Code Commission to add
more crimes to the three already mentioned or make the provision comprise all crimes causing
damages to the injured party. This civil action, as in America, should proceed independently of
the criminal action and should be proved only by preponderance of evidence. Defamation may
be oral or written. Fraud comprises all forms of estafa. Physical Injuries is to be understood in
its ordinary meaning and does not include homicide or murder because where physical injuries
result in homicide or murder, the reason for the law (namely, to give the injured party
personally the initiative to demand damages by an independent civil action) ceases, for the
reason that a dead person can no longer personally, through his lawyer institute an independent
civil action for damages. (All the members of the Code Commission agreed with the Chairman
and the draft of the article was unanimously approved.)
In the Revised Penal Code, the crime of homicide is treated in Title Eight (Crimes Against
Persons), Chapter One (Destruction of life), while the crime of physical injuries is separately
treated in Chapter Two of the same title. This shows that the two crimes are distinct from each
other, that physical injuries is not included in homicide.
(b) Article 32 (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) of the Civil Code is also
intended, insofar as it provides for an independent civil action, to educate the Filipino the
American way by going immediately to the courts to file a civil action for damages in
vindication of his constitutional rights and liberties enumerated in the article in case of
violation of any of them.

(c) Article 34 of the Civil Code, insofar as it authorizes the institution of an independent civil
action, is also intended for the same purpose.
2

(a) The crime of reckless imprudence resulting in the death of Clemente Marcia and physical
injuries to two other persons not being one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages, the
heirs of the deceased correctly reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for
damages against the bus driver, Felardo Paje, who stood charged with the crime of homicide
and double physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The reservation was in accordance
with what is now Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Institution of criminal and civil action. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of a civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right
to institute it separately.
The civil action for damages against Felardo Paje was prematurely instituted in view of Rule
111, Section 3, which, in part, provides:
Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
At any rate, said civil action was correctly suspended in the Court of First Instance until final
judgment by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action was rendered pursuant to Section 3(b)
of said Rule 111 which provides that:
After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can
be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
The decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the appellant Felardo Paje of the crime of
reckless imprudence charged against him on the ground that it did not exist, extinguished the
civil action for damages filed against him, in accordance with Section 3(c) of Rule 111 which
states that:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. ....
This rule finds support in the celebrated case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra.
(b) Section 2 of Rule 111 which provides:
Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal

case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
is defective and imperfect in many ways:
First. Article 31 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action. An
independent civil action is an action that is based upon the same criminal act as in the case of
Articles 32, 33 and 34. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action being based upon an obligation not
arising from the criminal act but from a different source, is not an independent civil action
within the meaning of Articles 32, 33 and 34. Article 31 (drafted by Code Commissioner
Capistrano) which provides that:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
states a self-explanatory rule different and distinct from that laid down in Articles 32, 33 and
34. For example: A is prosecuted for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The heirs of the deceased institute a civil action for damages against him based upon quasidelict, under Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which is separate and distinct from criminal
negligence punished as a crime or delict under the Revised Penal Code. Quasi-delict is culpa
aquiliana and is separate and distinct from criminal negligence, which is a delict. The
distinction is made in Article 2177 itself which in part provides that:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Code Commission Chairman Bocobo, who drafted Article 2177 of the New Civil Code, took
the distinction from modern authorities in civil law. Accordingly, the report of the Code
Commission on the Project of Civil Code makes reference to the sources of the distinction,
thus:
The foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter, is a distinct and independent negligence, which is the 'culpa
aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence
and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'quasi-delict' has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound, and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist." .
Therefore, under the proposed article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a 'quasi-delict' or

'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery. (Capistrano, Civil Code of the
Philippines, With Comments and Annotations, Vol. 4, p. 470.)
Second. As above explained, Article 2177 of the Civil Code does not provide for an
independent civil action in crime. The article precisely distinguishes quasi-delict or civil
negligence from criminal negligence (reckless imprudence) and authorizes the institution of a
civil action for damages based upon quasi-delict and not upon criminal negligence, which is a
delict and not a quasi-delict. In accordance with Article 31, the civil action for damages based
upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, even if the defendant is acquitted in
the criminal action of the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, the civil action
for damages for the death of the deceased based upon quasi-delict may proceed to judgment.
Third. The proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111, with reference to the correctly cited Articles 32,
33 and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these
articles were drafted for the purpose explained in footnote one and are intended to constitute as
exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which
is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles
32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the
proviso.
In view of all the foregoing, Section 2 of Rule 111 should be amended so as to read as follows:
Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party before or after the criminal action is
instituted. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. Notice shall be given in the criminal action of the
institution of the civil action or of the intention to institute the same.
3

The prayer of the complaint in the civil action asked that the defendants, Felardo Paje and the
Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., be ordered to pay jointly and severally the damages
claimed by plaintiffs. This prayer, considering the action as one upon a quasi-delict, is not in
accordance with law. In quasi-delict, according to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
obligation to pay damages is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The article then, in part continues: "The owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise, are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed, or on the
occasion of their functions." Hence, the bus driver, Felardo Paje, was responsible for the quasidelict, he being, in the language of the American law, a tort-feasor. Likewise, the bus operator,
Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., was liable for the quasi-delict of its bus driver. This
liability is not solidary but primary, with right to full reimbursement pursuant to Article 2181,
which provides: .
Whoever pays for the damages caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the
latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
The prayer of the complaint, based upon a quasi-delict, against the bus driver, Felardo Paje,
and the bus operator, Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., should have been that the

plaintiffs recover the damages claimed from either of them. The bus operator defendant Victory
Liner Transportation Co., Inc., could have filed a third-party complaint against the defendant
bus driver, pleading its right for reimbursement under Article 2181.
When is the bus operator solidarily liable with the bus driver? Article 2184 of the Civil Code
provides:
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was
in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. .... "If the
owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable.
This article (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) is intended to cover only the
owners of private motor vehicles for private use. It is not generally applicable to motor
vehicles for public use and convenience because the operator thereof, usually a corporation,
cannot in the very nature of things, be in the motor vehicle at the time of the mishap. However,
if the manager of the bus company was in the bus at the time of the mishap, Article 2184 may
be applied by analogy.
In the case of De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-15247,
February 28, 1962, it was held that in quasi-delict, the bus operator is solidarily liable with the
bus driver in view of article 2194 of the Civil Code which provides:
"The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
This article (drafted by Code Commissioner Capistrano) merely restates the basic rule in
American law that joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort. In the case of a
quasi-delict committed by a bus driver, he alone is the tort-feasor; the bus operator is not a joint
tort-feasor. For this reason the liability of the bus operator is not governed by Article 2194 but
by Article 2180.
Joint tort-feasors in American law are the same as co-authors or co-principals of a quasi-delict
in the civil law, and it is only to them that Article 2194 is applicable. A bus operator is not a coauthor or co-principal of the tort committed by its bus driver; hence, it cannot be made
solidarily liable with the bus driver under Article 2194. Its liability is that of an employer under
Article 2180, with right to full reimbursement under Article 2181.
To make the bus operator solidarily liable with the driver would diminish its right to full
reimbursement from the driver because in passive solidarity, the solidary debtors share equally
in the obligation (Article 1208, Civil Code). Consequently, if the bus operator's liability were
solidary, in the event of full payment by it of the obligation, its right to reimbursement from the
bus driver would only be of one-half of the obligation because its share of the solidary
obligation would be one-half. This would result in reducing by one-half its right to full
reimbursement under Article 2181.
The prayer for solidary liability in the complaint against the defendants Felardo Paje and the
Victory Liner Transportation Co. Inc., considering the complaint as based upon criminal
negligence, is likewise not in the accordance with law. In crime committed by an employee

within the scope of his duties, the employer's liability is subsidiary, not solidary, in accordance
with Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br.
84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29,
1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the
"Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela
and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC.,
(Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
(Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance
with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza
Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the
former appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant
TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the acts of
defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .

3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was

on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38
caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD
(per Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its
having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said
Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided
by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary
liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based
on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint
is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that
Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its
sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to
dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the
complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention
any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the
performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of
the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere
conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13,
1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts
alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the
matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against
the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo,
p. 110)

civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may
therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended
party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the
civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private
respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause
of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article
2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being
purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security
guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.

The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied.

It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon
Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195
[1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability
is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)

It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do
in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is
founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in
dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause
of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief,
but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would
show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private
respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting
and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already
held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195
[1990]), wherein the Court held:

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should
be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above
doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33
has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in
the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where
the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the
case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was
charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that
they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having
been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela
and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
[1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it
was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it
failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general
rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present, namely:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or

omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable
breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is
enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's
death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to
establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and
wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties;
whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better
resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits

of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992]
citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v.
Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights
under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial
on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.