Abbas 1

AQ Khan Network, History and Impact

Mahar Abbas
Assistant Professor of English
ICB, G-6/3, Islamabad

Abbas 2

Table of Contents

1. Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Impetus

2. Arrival of AQ Khan in Kahuta: Import of Nuclear Material and Tools

3. Nuclear Trade: Sanctions, Money and Personal Interests

4. Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Other Countries:

Proliferation Par Excellence

11

5. Network Revealed: Cover Up

15

6. Impacts on Proliferation

16

7. Impacts on World Politics

18

8. Conclusion

20

9. Bibliography

22

Abbas 3

1.

Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Impetus

The context of Indo-Pak, Subcontinent, in weapons and military history is quite

unique that two states, India and Pakistan, created out of one, India, have proved arch rivals to
each other in that both follow a tit-for-tat policy vis-a-vis each other disregard of whether it is
cricket, a popular game in both countries, or nuclear weapons, the world's most feared
weapons. The journalists and politicians from both the sides of the partition line engage in
nuclear rhetoric for point scoring, knowing little how horrific their nuclear arsenals could
prove for both the countries and the entire world. However, what is not so much significant in
this context is stated by Feroz Hassan Khan, a Pakistani veteran soldier, in his well-known
book, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, as "all nuclear weapons development
programs constitute a response to insecurity and a form of balancing against foreign political
or military threats"1. This is not merely a generalization, for India has been a mammoth as
compared to minnow Pakistan in the context of which Pakistan has developed a mentality that
India is always a dominant power and will put its survival at stake in case it asserts too much
on Kashmir or water issues as both have become longstanding disputes between the two
countries. This mentality has a fair amount of evidences as is shown in the comments by
Colonel Anil A Athale, a retired Indian soldier and commentator, who narrates an encounter
with a Pakistan soldier, who asks him, " What kind of country is yours? If we were as
powerful as you, we would have bulldozed Pakistan"2. This shows how frightful Pakistan was
from India in the initial years. And to top it all, it was also to snatch Kashmir from India,
which according to Pakistani view, was to become part of Pakistan on the basis of popular two
nation theory, for it was a Muslim majority princedom. However, it did not happen. At the
same time, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian prime minister, adopted the strategy of going to
the United Nations to settle the issue of Kashmir dispute which did not favor him or India.
Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. (California: Standford
University Press, 2012), 04.
1

Athale, Anil A. "Pakistan Tends to Resemble a Suicide Bomber." Reddiff.com. September 8,

2016. http://www.rediff.com/news/column/pakistan-tends-to-resemble-a-suicidebomber/20160918.html
2

Abbas 4

Later, he adopted the strategy of prolonging it and making his grip firm on Kashmir with the
supposition that time would heal it and no more plebiscite would be arranged on the old
issue3. Adding fuel to the fire, India announced to go nuclear after it faced insulting defeat
from the Chinese military. Pakistani military and political establishment were stupefied after
this open declaration to go nuclear, and then subsequent Pokhran test. Haider K. Nizamani in
his book, The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan, says the
Indian security analysts as well as strategists were so much confident in the euphoria that
followed after that first test of 1974 that in his words, "Pakistan was portrayed as an unruly
child whose objective in international forums dealing with atomic issues is to embarrass
India" with "renewed interest in the so-called Islamic bomb of Pakistan"4. It was in this
backdrop that Pakistan's resolve become firm to make a nuclear weapons, though according to
Feroz Hassan Khan, the work on the nuclear reactor project has been in the offing since the
decade of 60's, but it was not for the nuclear weapons. It was sheer Indian phobia and its
nuclear dominance that made Pakistan to embark upon its quest of nuclear weapons.
2.

Arrival of AQ Khan in Kahuta: Import of Nuclear Material and Tools

Until 1974 when India launched its first nuclear test in Pokhran in Rajasthan, Pakistan
made a considerable progress but all of its efforts were not worth the bomb. It was Bhutto in
Pakistan who was very adamant in making Pakistan a nuclear state though he adopted the
tough stance of nuclear weapon acquisition after the Indian tests. Iram Khalid and Zakia Bano
in their research paper, "Pakistan's Nuclear Development," state that Bhutto arranged a
meeting of the nuclear scientists of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) headed
by a scientist Munir Ahmad Khan. However, Bhutto found out another face which later
became a notorious proliferator of the nuclear material in the world history, Dr. Abdul Qadeer
Khan. As he was a doctor in metallurgy, he could take on the task of uranium enrichment, a
vital process in the making of bomb, Bhutto thought. Iram Khalid and Zakia Bono says that,
Sahagala, Narendra. Jammu and Kashmir: A State in Turbulence. (New Delhi: Suruchi
Prakashan, 2011), 101.
3

Nizamani, Haider K. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and
Pakistan. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000. pp. 42.
4

Abbas 5

"Bhutto was determined to give him a free hand," and he gave full free hand to Dr. Khan5.
However, a renowned research George Perkovich does not agree with Feroz Hassan Khan
saying, "We do know that the first Indian nuclear test in 1974 did not start Pakistan on its
quest, as Pakistani propagandists used to insist"6. However, at the same time he asserts that
this quest was launched because Pakistan or Bhutto at that time thinks that "Nuclear weapons
would rebuild Pakistan's strength, heal its wounds, buttress its pride and ensure better results
in a future war" following the defeat of 19717. Daniel Painter has also listed the same reasons
in his paper, "Why the US Cannot Ignore Pakistan," stating that though Pakistan launched its
program in 1954 as the US initiative of Atoms for Peace, its pursuit for weapons was triggered
by three wars with India. Bhutto launched the weapons acquisition program in 1972, but it
was Dr. AQ Khan who laid the foundation of Kahuta research laboratories in 1976 which
proved a foundation not only in the building of the bomb but also for the delivery system, the
Pakistan's renowned missile program8. Whatever the reason is that, the point is that the stage
was set by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to bring Dr. AQ Khan, the right man for this job. Dr. AQ Khan
did his doctorate in Metallurgy, a field which is somehow relevant to the nuclear technology
and centrifuges, the basic components of uranium enrichment process. However, this did not
prove any easy ride. The western countries have gone alert and imposed certain sanctions on
Pakistan regarding import of the basic components. Even the first part of bringing Dr. Khan to
Pakistan with a clean record proved a Herculean task for the Pakistani Government, as Dutch
government launched a legal suit against Dr. Khan for allegedly stealing some blueprints of
basic nuclear components. Dr. Khan was working at Urenco, a nuclear technology company
located in Netherland. According to a report by Joop Boer, Henk van der Keur, Karel Kostyer
Khalid, Iram & Zakia Bano. "Pakistan's Nuclear Development (1974-1998): External
Pressures." A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no.1 (June 2015): 221-235.
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/15%20Iram%20Khalid_30_1.pdf
5

Perkovich, George. "Could Anything Be Done to Stop Them? Lesson's From Pakistan's
Proliferating Past." Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War edited by Henry D. Skolski.
Strategic Studies Institute. United States. pp. 59.
6

Ibid., 60.

Painter, Daniel. "Why the US Cannot Ignore Pakistan." American Security. September 06,
2012. https://www.americansecurityproject.org/why-the-u-s-can-not-ignore-pakistan/
8

Abbas 6

and Frank Slijper, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto crossed all limits of protocols and despite strong
objections from different agencies regarding his unsuitability for the task concerned, Bhutto
stayed adamant to his position. He was rather prone to inquiring about Dr. AQ Khan more.
They formally met with the PAEC (Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission) chief, Dr. Munir
Khan, and requested him to formulate a team and meet with Dr. AQ Khan to assess and
evaluate him for the task concerned. The team also included his later day rival, Dr.
Bashiruddin Mahmood, who arrived at his family home in Almelo in Netherland to meet him.
It was the final stroke. There is no word about whether they recommended Dr. Khan for the
job or not, it is clear that Bhutto was very much eager to bring Dr. Khan back to Pakistan.
They say that the "the team returned to Pakistan and Prime Minister Bhutto decided to meet
with Khan, and directed a confidential letter to him. Soon after, Khan took a leave from
Urenco, and departed for Pakistan in 1974"9
Finally Khan arrived in Pakistan to take the charge of the PAEC, which seemed
toothless without Dr. AQ Khan. As soon as he took the charge, he laid the foundation of
Kahuta Research Laboratories abbreviated as KRL to launch the task of the making of the
nuclear bomb. Despite changes in Governments, there was no change in the status, orders and
commands of Dr. AQ Khan. Whether it is a democratic dispensation in the center or Islamist
Martial Law of Zia or enlightened moderation of Musharraf, Dr. Khan as all-in-all. His words
were considered final in everything. The reason is that it was he would arranged all material,
contents and ingredients necessary for the making of the bomb. He knew everything about
and every detail of all necessary tools and where he could get it. The only thing was money,
which flowed not only from the United States but also from Saudi Arabia, which relied
heavily for security on Pakistani armed forces10. Khan soon realized that there was no space
for legitimate import of nuclear weapons related materials, contents and tools. In this
connection, Bruno Tertrais is highly expert hand, for he has not only talked about the export
but also highlighted the import of the nuclear related material and tools by this network. He
Boer, Joop et al. "AQ Khan, Urenco and The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Technology:The Symbiotic Relation Between Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons." GREENPEACE
INTERNATIONAL. May 2004. http://laka.org/info/publicaties/Khan/Khan.pdf
9

10

Khan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. 165.

Abbas 7

has highlighted this business in his paper "Not a 'Wal-Mart', but an 'Imports-Exports
Enterprise': Understanding the Nature of the AQ Khan Network." However, what is
significant about his argument is that he has not overlooked the imports, by which he means
that once this network came into being in the late 70's, it carried on working with its men and
expertise to evade and absorb the US sanctions. In other words, he accuses the US sanctions
and evading of the activities of this network as equally responsible for arming Pakistan to
teeth. The reason behind this evading of sanctions was that the West became more cautions
toward Pakistan following the Indian nuclear test in 1974. Earlier, Pakistan was perhaps not
interested in bomb, but only in energy generation. However, this test prompted Pakistan to see
an alternative for its survival or at least the phobia of its survival from the Indian threat took it
to this route. The western companies and other entities involved in producing items, tools and
nuclear materials were also equally guilty in this business. They were too eager to come to
assist Dr. Khan and his network and carry on with the import of whatever was required. Bruno
Tertrais argues echoing it, "The success of the imports network was not only due to the high
degree of Pakistani know-how, but also to the active cooperation of Westerns firms" about
which Dr. Khan was fully cognizant of11. Although several other analysts have pointed out this
import of the nuclear material and contents by the Pakistani network, the US complicity has
been a less debated point here. Perhaps, the reason as has been pointed out by Feroz Hassan
Khan, is that the United States was fully engaged in the Afghan Jihad game against the Soviet
Union with the help of Pakistan, a possible pretext of evasion. As far as the modus operandi is
concerned, Bruno Tertrais equates Pakistan with Iraq. Both created fake entities and pseudo
organizations to purchase contents and relevant tools from the international markets and both
succeeded in their efforts. Several factors were involved to allow those companies directly or
indirectly which include profit and financial benefits for others. However, the most important
factor that Bruno highlights is the liberal trade policies in Europe. He argues that "three words
can help understand the attitudes of the European firms and individuals in Pakistani nuclear
imports: denial, delusion, and defiance."12 In the midst of this, Dr. Khan has very important
Tertias, Bruno. "Not a 'Wal-Mart,' But an 'Imports-Exports Enterprise': Understanding the
Nature of the AQ Khan Network." Strategic Insights 5 (Aug. 2007): 1-15.
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/working_papers/Delory2.pdf
11

Tertias. "Not a 'Wal-Mart,' But an 'Imports-Exports Enterprise': Understanding the Nature of

the AQ Khan Network." 11.
12

Abbas 8

role to play that is that he brought with him every knowledge and information of such
companies and individuals that could directly or indirectly benefit his laboratory. Quoting a
source, Bruno Tertias states clearly that during the decade of 80's, there were more than 70
German entities which directly or indirectly helped Pakistan. This trade is not limited to
Germany only. Switzerland, Malaysia, Dubai, Australia and several other countries were the
places visited by the people of this network in these pursuit of the desired components (8-10).
This developed a full network comprises different expert individuals and different entities
with a firsthand knowledge of purchasing and selling that nuclear related material and content
in the open market, hoodwinking the immediate law enforcement agencies and international
bodies. This knowhow of the nuclear material, market and import gave full access to the AQ
Khan network to resort to export when time is suitable and the network is also looking for
generating funds for its other activities.
3.

Nuclear Trade: Sanctions, Money and Personal Interests

The significant aspect is that this happened under the US sanctions, when money was
coming hard by and the individuals involved in the network were also looking to generate
funds for their personal ventures. Garima Singh in her book, Pakistan's Nuclear Disorder:
Weapons, Proliferation and Safety, h argues that though Pakistan and North Korean relations
related to missile technology transfer and purchase of nuclear technology goes back to 1997,
it was during this period that "Pakistan was reeling under the US sanctions and it desperately
needed missiles to match India's capability."13 She further states that it was during this period
when there started the trade of nuclear material and knowhow between Pakistan and Libya,
Pakistan and Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and North Korea surfaced.
However, nothing tangible was recovered or retrieved from any source, for each country in
case denied having such purposes for the visits undertaken by different dignitaries of the
respective countries (65-68). This was purely a financial venture on which Pakistan has
embarked upon due to sanctions as Richard H. Nass has criticized the sanctions the United
States slapped on different states saying that "Military sanctions against Pakistan increases its
Singh, Garima. Pakistan's Nuclear Disorder: Weapons, Proliferation, and Safety. (New Delhi:
Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006), 64-65.
13

Abbas 9

reliance on nuclear option," but he stopped short of saying that those same sanctions made
Pakistan to sell its nuclear knowhow to generate money14. This can be judged from comments
of different analysts. Highlighting the worse impacts of these military and economic
sanctions, Nazia Malik states that economic sanctions against Pakistan spans over three
phases which start from 1979-1990, 1990-1998 and 1998 to 2001. She is of the view that
these sanction has worse impact sin the shape of per capita income having decreased $4.06
per annum and $1 billion of decrease in the total GNP. The worst came when the IMF put
hold on lending to Pakistan, she argues, and it was during this period of 1997 that the United
States further pressed Pakistan to keep hold on its nuclear arsenal, However, this led to further
alienation of Pakistan from the United States15. The sanctions hit Pakistan very hard. It did
not see any way out from its financial crunch in the face of rising India, which was also
posing a dominating impact on its very survival by supporting insurgencies within Pakistan
tit-a-tit for Pakistan's support to the Kashmiri separatists. Therefore, it was but natural for
Pakistan to use the network for importing nuclear material and nuclear contents to
manufacture Pakistani nuclear bomb. However, it is unknown whether the government
authorized this network to come into action for export. The network was in full swing during
the decade of 90's until 2001. Definitely, it reaped financial benefits from the market by
selling nuclear knowhow to the desiring countries. It means that even the individuals
harvested money in billions from this illicit trade, though Feroz Hassan Khan has admitted
that Khan did not get any benefit directly from this trade. In this connection, Christopher
Clary in his research thesis, The AQ Khan Network: Causes and Implications, says that it
could be that Khan has been involved in getting money from Iran for nuclear technology
transfer, but there are no exact evidences. However, he admits that his money man, Tahir,
accepted that he got two briefcases of money from Dubai for transfer of centrifuges and
delivered these two bags to Dr. AQ Khan in his Dubai guest house. He also states that this
trade involved money transfer of millions of dollars from Iran to Pakistan, while he accuses
Nass, Richard H. "Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing." Brookings. January 1,
1998. https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/
14

Malik, Nazia." Economic Sanctions Imposed on Pakistan and Their Impact (1979-2001)."
IPEDR. National University Singapore (2010): 140-149. http://www.ipedr.com/vol39/028ICITE2012-K00006.pdf
15

Abbas 10

Khan, saying his "regular foreign travel, and extensive charitable giving were well known
around Islamabad"16. Obviously, this means that some of the money went into the government
coffers and some into the pockets of the individuals involved in this trade, including the
middlemen like Tahir, as mentioned by Christopher Clary in his paper. Despite the argument
that this network started this export as it had already experience of nuclear trade, or that
European entities were too lenient, or that US economic sanctions triggered, the role of Dr.
AQ Khan was crucial, for he gathered not only the right individuals, but also the right entities.
Bruno Tertrais has also highlighted it in his paper, "Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was There as
State Strategy?" He has implicitly stated that that Pakistani state as a government was not
involved in this trade, for everywhere the dealing was done by the henchmen of Khan who
knew more than 50 people, and ran this network like his family business (1). Although most
of the money came through middlemen, sometimes Dr. AQ Khan himself visited several
countries around the world to see where the money easily comes from (3). However, Bruno
Tertrais has not accused the Pakistani government, for he is either too nave or has not really
found any evidence. The factors, he underlines, for triggering Dr. AQ Khan are his love for
Islam, money and desire to have larger than life persona17. This is not clear how much money
has gone into the public exchequer, but the situation of economic sanctions show that Pakistan
benefitted as much as the individual benefitted from this trade. The real threat, however, that
it poses to the world peace and impacts on the security balance have been unprecedented in
the human history. This illicit trade of bargain was not limited to any one country; rather, Dr.
AQ Khan proved a globetrotter with a briefcase of centrifuges virtually in his hand seeking
dollars.
4.

Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Other Countries: Proliferation Par

Excellence
Although there were many countries where Dr. AQ Khan went in his personal
capacity, it seemed that he visited most of the countries as a tourist. He did not seem to have
Clary, Christopher O. "The AQ Khan Network: Causes and Implications." (Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Montreal, California, 2005), 46.
16

Tertias, Bruno. "Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was There as State Strategy?" Non Proliferation
Education Center ( 2006). http://www.npolicy.org/files/20060720-TertraisPakistanNuclearExports.pdf. 15.
17

Abbas 11

any other interests except sightseeing, for he used to love nature, Musharraf tells this in his
memoir, In the Life of Fire, in which he relishes telling the details how he made Dr. Khan
confess and be pardoned 18. However, Musharraf has not given the detail of the activities
undertaking by Dr. AQ Khan and his network except with bragging that neither the army, nor
the government has any inkling about his activities. He was doing everything on his own and
that as a larger than life figure, the public love him, the reason that he is exonerated by the
Pakistani government. However, some other analysts and investigators have dug deeper than
this. They have found eye-opening details regarding his illicit trade and his global
proliferation activities. According to Bruno Tertrais, the network was involved in two types of
export. On the one hand, the network offered methods of enriching uranium including
centrifuges and their designs, and on the other hand, this network offered complete weapons
design. Tertrais has listed four definite clients and has expressed the doubt about others, while
in the same paper, he has also listed several other countries that Dr. Khan visited in the
capacity of the head of the KRL, his prime research laboratory located near Islamabad. Those
four countries include North Kora, Iran, Iraq and Libya 19.
Among the most immediate and important beneficiaries of this trade are Iran and
North Korean. According to Bruno Tertrais, Iran has benefitted the most by supplying cheap
oil to Pakistan in the bargain. Although there are several stories regarding former prime
minister Benazir Bhutto's involvement, the order of the then army chief, or some other
military officers, the prime suspect still emerges Dr. Khan, who visited Tehran on several
occasions. Tertrais argues that "An Iranian-Pakistani nuclear cooperation was coherent with
General Beg's strategic choices," the reason that he wanted to build an anti-US coalition to
withstand the pressure of the US sanctions20. Dilshod Achilov, a famous analyst tells IB Times'
correspondent, Palash Ghosh, that the Tehran-Islamabad Nuclear cooperation or relations are
shrouded in deep mystery, for there are little unknown factors regarding how a Shia country
could get concessional nuclear knowhow from a purely Sunni country and that too an ally of
its rival, Saudi Arabia. On questions of religious differences, Dilshod Achilov downplayed
18

Musharraf, Pervez. In the Line of Fire. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 171.

19

Tertias, Bruno. "Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was There as State Strategy?", 1.

20

Ibid., 3.

Abbas 12

those differences saying the relations are deeper than seen from the surface, adding that
governments do not seem to be involved in this racket, but "It is highly unlikely that Pakistani
scientists acted alone or without the governments direct or tacit consent."21 However, Tertias
is very much clear about the deal that he has given exact amount of $4 billion for which the
deal was struck and that most of the transfer took place during the governments of Ms. Bhutto
in Pakistan22. There could be other incentives and Islamic fraternity, but money was involved
even in this case. However, in the case of North Korea, Tertrais states that their strategic
partnership dates back to 1971 following the rise of Bhutto in Pakistan. Pakistan was looking
for, according to Tertrais, a certain delivery system apart from having US made fighting
Falcons obtained in 1984, and North Korea was looking for uranium enrichment knowhow23.
The relations continued surreptitiously until 1999 when Dr. AQ Khan himself visited
Pyongyang to launch the reactor. Gaurav Kampani, a senior research association at CNS, says
that it was a second tier proliferation in which both nations cooperated with each other to ink
a barter deal. He is of the opinion that details regarding "Evidence of the missile-for-uranium
enrichment technology trade probably emerged sometime in 1999," and it was the exact time
when Musharraf toppled Sharif government in Pakistan to impose a quasi-type of martial law
sans abrogation of the complete constitution24. In this connection, the most profitable venture,
according to Tertrais, for Pakistan was the technology knowhow transfer to Libya and Saudi
Arabia. Although the case of Saudi Arabia is a bit weak, there are rumors that Pakistan has
committed itself to the security of Saudi Arabia in case it comes under attack. However, the
Libyan case is very much clear that when Libya dismantled its program in 2003, Pakistan
emerged as the chief supplier of every type of knowhow for which Qaddafi is said to have
opened his banks to Pakistan25. In this connection, the article by William J. Broad, David E.
Sanger And Raymond Bonner, published in New York Times on February 12, 2004 is very
Ghosh, Palash. "Iran and Pakistan: Nuclear Partners?" IB Times. July 18,. 2012.
http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-pakistan-nuclear-partners-214092
21

22

Tertias, Bruno. "Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was There as State Strategy?", 2.

23

Ibid., 5.

Kampani, Gaurav. "Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea." The
Non-Proliferation Review, (2002): 110.
24

25

Tertias, Bruno. "Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was There as State Strategy?", 9.

Abbas 13

interesting. In this article, titled as, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His
Network,", they have highlighted every individual and company involved in this trade with
Dr. Khan. About Libya, they have given a special note saying, "When Libya embarked on a
two-step effort to become a nuclear-weapons nation, Dr. Khan's network was presented with
an opportunity to sell a particularly sophisticated system. The network was moving to a new
level of ambition."26 They are of the opinion that Pakistan won financial benefits mostly from
Libya. However, Tertrais is of the view that as Pakistan's relations with Libya were friendly
since the decade of 70's, it could be that Tripoli financed Pakistani nuclear program, the
reason that it easily got hold of what it wanted, though Dr. AQ Khan refused acquisition and
purchase of nuclear weapons to the Arab allies including the UAE and Saudi Arabia27. The
technology and component transfer, he states, took place during 1997 and 1999, but he has
alleged that there was no direct intervention or involvement of Pakistani authorities28.
The same is the case of Saudi Arabia which financed Pakistan's ambitious nuclear
program, but Pakistan just avoided transferring weapons on the pretext that it involves
political repercussions, though Saudi authorities visited Pakistan several times to see the
launch of missiles from specifically during 2002 to 200429. Tertrais has also stated that Dr.
Khan visited several other countries among which Egypt, Brazil and Turkey emerged as the
most important countries looking for assistance in nuclear knowhow. Reportedly, Dr. Khan
offered assistance to Egypt though Tertrais says that it was turned down. However, about
Turkey and Brazil, there are doubts that some technology transfer took place during the
decade of 80's and 90's, but it is still not found out how much assistance this network provided
to these countries and for what30.

Board, William J. David E. Sanger And Raymond Bonner. "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation:
How Pakistani Built His Network. "The New York Times." February 12, 2004.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/world/a-tale-of-nuclear-proliferation-how-pakistani-builthis-network.html?_r=0
26

27

Tertias, Bruno. "Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was There as State Strategy?", 25.

28

Ibid., 26.

29

Ibid., 27.

30

Ibid., 30.

Abbas 14

However, the tale of this surreptitious proliferation does not end here. Mark
Fitzpatrick has highlighted several other potential customers in his book, Nuclear Black
Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the Rise of Proliferation, saying that Sudan was used a
warehouse for the KRL products openly advertised through middlemen in Dubai and South
Africa. He claims that Khan visited more than 18 countries for this very purpose which
includes "Afghanistan, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger,
Nigeria, Syria, and Senegal" among others31. Although Syria emerged as another country to
have benefitted from this network, Fitzpatrick says that it is not clear how much Syria
benefitted, for CIA's classified reports suggest that there was no tangible evidence of this
transfer.
5.

Network Revealed: Cover Up

Although major news breaks about the activities of the AQ Khan Network came into
light after 2000, it was Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's former president, who revealed it in his
book after the network was caught and the American officials confronted Musharraf with
clear evidences regarding involvement of Khan in the network. Musharraf wrote that there
were two things which made him nervous and anxious. He argues that first information
regarding the network were quite sketchy and nothing was in detail. However, he termed
some known activities of Dr. Khan as "problematic and potentially dangerous." Musharraf has
pointed out in his memoir that he suspected this on two occasions regarding the cargo flights;
one from North Korea and other from Iran, but he did not mention any date when it did
happen. However, he is clear about it when he asked Dr. Khan to retire. He writes; "It was
becoming clearer by now that A.Q. was not "part of the problem" but "the problem" itself. In
his presence, we could never get a firm grip on KRL; the only way to do so was to remove
him from his position. Therefore, in 2001, I decided in principal to retire him when his
contract ended in March 2001."32However, this disclosure does not shed much light on how it
was discovered, how Dr. Khan was implicated, and then exonerated though he has just dilated
Fitzpatrick, Mark. Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the Rise of Proliferation.
London. IISS, 2007. pp. 82-83.
31

32

Musharraf, In the Life of Fire. 284-285.

Abbas 15

upon this issue that it was a dangerous business and that the army or the government did not
have any hand in it. Perhaps, his argument was made to save the army and other authorities
which could have been involved in the racket. The revelations of David Albright and Corey
Hinderstein in their paper, "Unravelling the A.Q. Khan and Future of Proliferation Networks,"
are eye-opening. They are of the view that the CIA had leads and some hints about the
activities of the entire network during the decade of 80's and 90's. However, it is quite
surprising that the neither the CIA nor the US State Department said anything about it. The
conclusive evidence, however, came in 2000 when the US intelligence, they argue, penetrated
the network and alerted its ally Pakistan, about which Musharraf has already stated that it was
closed in 2001. They say that more alarming revelations came in October 2003 when a
German cargo ship was seized with centrifuge components. It was at this stage when the
world came to know how proliferation this network was proving that it provided every type of
knowhow to Iran, North Korea and several other countries without the knowledge of the
Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and the IAEA. However, according to them, Khan was put in
custody in 2004 when Gen. (ret) Powell confronted Musharraf on this issue saying the United
States had so much information that the Pakistanis would have to go to public to be
accountable for what happened33.
Following this, Pakistan was in a tight corner. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) started its own investigations and come to startling revelations about the
activities of the network. Although it is not suggested how the United States made Pakistan
accountable, Musharraf hints in his book that it was due to his personal involvement in the
network that he put a lid on it. It could be that Pakistan was a non-NATO ally of the United
States at that time, and the United States could not afford to embarrass its close ally, seeing
the critical juncture at which the war on terror in Afghanistan was. However, the implications
of the proliferation of this network have proved highly dangerous and threatening to the world
peace and stability.
6.

Impacts on Proliferation

Albright, David & Corey Hinderstein. "Unravelling the A.Q. Khan and Future of Proliferation
Networks." The Washington Quarterly, 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 111-128. Project Muse.
33

Abbas 16

Further investigations and disclosure of the Khan's network demonstrated that it has
rather challenged the proliferation regime of the yesteryears in which not only the Khan but
also several other smaller networks were selling and reselling nuclear components and adding
to the already enhanced proliferation. This disclosure has impacted the proliferation regime on
three fronts. The first was the safeguards and measures taken up by the IAEA. The IAEA
contacted the Pakistani government in this connection to find out more following thorough
investigations. The second is that now the governments are more active to ensure safeguards
through UN sponsored laws. The third is that now the countries are perceiving the threat of
nuclear terrorism as more real. Hence, they are more proactive in detecting and dismantling
such networks.
As far as the IAEA safeguards and measures are concerned, following the detection of
this case and prosecution of few of its members, the United States and the United Nations
have ratchetted up efforts to over-utilize the IAEA Additional Protocol to the NPT and other
measures which were underutilized until then, argues David Albright, Paul Brannan and
Andrea Scheel Stricker, saying that "the US and other European companies are now liable to
be prosecuted in case they knowing supply any nuclear related material or components to any
trading partner"34. In other words, the IAEA and the UN have become proactive to investigate,
hold inquiry and find out if any country or entity is involved in the nuclear proliferation. This
is a good impact in a way that it could check the future proliferation.
As far second impact is concerned, immediately after the dismantling of this network,
the global community looked international ways to criminalize this nuclear trade. In this
connection, the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was passed which calls on the state to
prosecute all individuals and entities or even countries involved in WMD proliferation to nonstate actors or rogue states, says Molly MacCalman. Quoting Albright, he differs a bit with his
own opinion saying that even the United States is ready to put political pressure on such states
in case of deliberate proliferation, though he has some misgivings regarding US relations to
Islamabad (Pakistan)35. MacCalman means here that there are always political expediencies in

Albright, David & Paul Brannan, & Andrea Scheel Stricker. "Detecting and Disrupting Illicit
Nuclear Trade After A.Q. Khan." The Washington Quarterly 33, no.2 (2010): 102-105.
34

Abbas 17

that even the United States had had to overlook Islamabad though several intelligence
communities knew all these activities for decades.
Following some disclosures in the Pakistani press regarding the PAEC's individuals
having leanings towards terrorists, it became more than necessary to find it out. However, no
other information than these reports surfaced ever since. It is not known whether Al-Qaeda or
any other such organization has been able to lay their hands upon the nuclear components.
Neither is there any information regarding their capabilities despite having very good
technical human resources. In this connection, Esther Pan points out the same Bush initiative,
a Proliferation Security Initiative, which binds 11 countries to stop and "search vessels in their
territories suspected of carrying banned weapons or technology" to control and curb such
trade36. The NSG also came into action, he argues, adding the EU became more proactive. The
significant point emerges here is that the threat of nuclear terrorism is a reality and that it must
be stopped. Therefore, several political and practical measures have been taken, an impact the
AQ Khan Network has brought in the world. Despite stating several obstacles, Matthew
Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth and William H. Tobey argue that the IAEA, Additional
Protocols, US laws, the UNSC Resolutions and several other initiatives have minimized the
risks of nuclear terrorism37. In other words, it has been the dismantling of the AQ Khan
network that the world has moved fast towards stopping the threat of nuclear terrorism.
7.

Impacts on World Politics

Whereas the question of global politics is concerned, Khan network, when it was
active, posed a serious threat to the global stability as well as politics. It was a threat to the
MacCalman, Molly. "A. Q. Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network." Journal of Strategic Security
9, no. 1 (2016): 115.
35

Pan, Esther. "NON PROLIFERATION: The Pakistani Network." Council on Foreign

Relations. February 12, 2004. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/nonproliferation-pakistannetwork/p7751.
36

Bunn, Matthew et al. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism. Harvard Kennedy School. 2016. 140-145.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web.pdf
37

Abbas 18

global stability because the network provided nuclear knowhow and full technology to the
states declared terrorists, supporters of terrorists or rogues by the United States such as Iran,
Iraq, Syria, North Korean and Iran. North Korean and Iran are still posing serious threats to
the global peace and are destroying the stability of their respective regions as well as the
world due to having nuclear knowhow. Although the threat has been minimized from Iran
after the signing of the accord, as Kenneth N. Waltz has argued that Iran should have a nuclear
bomb to bring stability in the region, because he thinks that "Punishing a state through
economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program," which ultimately
happened in the case of Iran where only negotiations ended the program with some give-andtake38. He means that as there was a stability after both superpowers, Russia and the United
States were nuclear powers, this stability would also prevail in the Middle East. After all the
same has happened in case of Pakistan and India in the South Asia.
As far as Libya, Iraq and Syria are concerned, they have been bowed down after their
nuclear programs were devastated either through aerial bombardment or through diplomacy as
in the case Libya. However, North Korea has gone much ahead. It is still posing a serious
challenge in the Far East Asia by going nuclear and threatening its immediate neighbors as
well as the world. Tracie Egan in his book, Weapons of Mass Destruction and North Korea,
traces the history of North Korean going nukes stating that the nuclear blackmail as a strategy
to disrupt the world stability has been used by the regime very successfully. Since 1990, he
argues, "North Korea has hinted or even stated outright that it has nuclear weapons,", for
which it has conducted nuclear tests and then announced it too39. Although it could be argued
that it has also brought stability, for other countries cannot attack North Korean, but at the
same time it could be argued that North Korea is threatening other countries including the
United States. This is only because of its nuclear weapons, a courtesy of the Khan network.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean
Stability." Foreign Affairs 91. no. 4 (2012). 1-2.
38

Egan, Tracie. Weapons of Mass Destruction and North Korean. (The Rosen Publishing Group,
2005), 39.
39

Abbas 19

In the same way, there is always a risk of nuclear terrorism. The impact of even a
single incident would be catastrophic, for 9/11 was not a nuclear terror incident, yet it brought
a havoc in several countries. And the threat of nuclear terrorism in the wake of the activities
of Khan network are very much real, for any rogue element from this network could have
joined Al-Qaeda or can do this in the future. In his article published on June 16, 2008, Rolf
Mowatt-Larseen says that Osama Bin Laden expressed his desire as the Islamic duty to
acquire nuclear weapons. In the light of this desire, he says, a Saudi cleric has also voiced his
desire that the nuclear weapons are justified to be used. He argues that in the light of the
revelations, it is but natural that several customers are willing to pay including "rogue
networks and other customers" who can resort to nuclear terrorism, and this is a real threat.
He further says that "the world will be confronted by the nuclear genie in his malevolent
forms for the foreseeable future," in the wake of which the world powers are joining heads
and making arrangement to stop nonproliferation as well as make it impossible to be done40.
In other words, the Khan network has put the world and the world powers on tenterhooks
regarding the likely happening of a nuclear terror incident though in the present circumstances
of the tight security, the IAEA safeguards and ban of nuclear technology transfer except strict
protocols, it seems highly unlikely. However, its impacts on the nuclear security and nuclear
shipment security are unprecedented. The United States and the global community also did
not stay satisfied with half measures. The Pakistan government has assured not only the world
community but also the IAEA and the United States regarding security of its nuclear weapons
and nuclear sites but regarding proliferation.
8.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be stated that the AQ Khan network came into be being shortly
after Dr. AQ Khan took charge of the KRL and became its godfather. He contacted several
persons, entities and companies who could benefit him in importing contents and nuclear
material for the KRL to prepare nuclear weapons for Pakistan. When the network came into
being, and the nuclear reactor of Pakistan started working, and the network confirmed that it
Mowatt-Larseen. "The Strategic Threat of Nuclear Terrorism." The Washington Institute.
November 16, 2008. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-strategicthreat-of-nuclear-terrorism
40

Abbas 20

is on the verge of making a test, it started looking for ways to spread the network and earn
money forced by the US economic sanctions during the decade of 90's. With personal greed in
the heads of the people involved in this racket, the Islamic ideology, the nationalism and
personal interests played additional roles in turning this import business into an export
business to sell components on wholesale basis to other countries. Although earlier the United
States turned a blind eye due to Pakistan being its close ally, it turned a deaf years to the
complains of its other allies regarding Pakistan's nuclear proliferation. When the things started
getting worse during 2000 and 2001, the United States confronted Pakistan and got removed
Khan from the charge of the KRL. Not only did he confess his crime publicly but also won
exoneration from the Pakistani government due to being the hero of the nation. However, his
network has been responsible for providing nuclear components to several countries and make
deals with several others to provide either designs or models for a hefty sum that Pakistan and
the individuals involved needed the most at that time. The impacts of the Khan network have
been wide ranging on the issue of proliferation ranging from strict measures to stringent
security and UN's legal provision. The IAEA also became active. Perhaps the best impact
could be the dismantling of the Libyan nuclear program, destruction of Syrian reactor and
Iranian deal. It has also its impacts on the global politics in that the world has been successful
in dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat and eliminating others along with confronting
Korean nuclear blackmail. This has even severe repercussions on the world politics as now
the world is facing the risk of nuclear terror prompted by the fears of this proliferation. It is
hoped that strict measures, IAEA safeguards and UN resolution may be able to stop this
impending disaster.

Abbas 21

Abbas 22

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Abbas 23

Fitzpatrick, Mark. Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the Rise of Proliferation.
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