Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
UK ABWR
Document ID
Document Number
Revision Number
:
:
:
GA91-9901-0032-00001
XE-GD-0126
2
Form01/01
UK ABWR
Page i/ii
DISCLAIMERS
Proprietary Information
This document contains proprietary information of Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd. (Hitachi-GE), its
suppliers and subcontractors. This document and the information it contains shall not, in whole or in part,
be used for any purpose other than for the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) of Hitachi-GEs UK ABWR.
This notice shall be included on any complete or partial reproduction of this document or the information it
contains.
Copyright
No part of this document may be reproduced in any form, without the prior written permission of
Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd.
Copyright (C) 2014 Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd. All Rights Reserved
Form01/01
UK ABWR
Page ii/ii
Foreword
1. Objective
This document provides a general systems level description of Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd.s
(Hitachi-GE) Advanced Boiling Water Reactor design in Japan (hereafter referred to as ABWR General
Description). The document provides descriptions on the purpose, function (and/or safety roles), and
systematic configuration (structure and constitutive components) of corresponding systems and facilities.
2. Scope
The descriptions in this document are based on Hitachi-GEs general ABWR design concept, for its
Japanese customers, and do not necessarily reflect the design concept of the UK ABWR to be described
during the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process. In addition, systems or system details that depend
on site conditions are excluded from the descriptions.
The systems and/or the details of the corresponding systems described in the document are selected,
based on the following criteria.
(1) Details that would help capture the entire system configuration of the ABWR general design.
(2) Main systems and facilities in the nuclear and the turbine island that form the boundary to contain
the reactor coolant during normal operation.
(3) Systems and facilities that contain radioactive materials within the nuclear island in the event of an
accident.
(4) Systems and facilities that play important roles and functions in safe operation, and shut down of the
reactor.
(5) Systems and facilities used to monitor the condition of the plant, notify the operators, or actuate
corresponding systems to prevent or mitigate any abnormalities.
(6) Systems and facilities used to monitor radiation and radioactive materials during normal operation
and in the event of an accident.
(7) Systems and facilities used to treat radioactive waste within the nuclear power plant.
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Table of Contents
Chapter
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Chapter
Safety Systems
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Chapter
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Chapter
4 Auxiliary Systems
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Chapter
Section
Section
Section
3 DC Power Supply
Section
ii
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Chapter
Section
1 Control Panels
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
15 Process Computer
Chapter
Section
Section
iii
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
ABWR
AC
ADS
AO
Air-Operated
APR
APRM
ARI
ARM
ARM/PrRM
AS
ATLM
ATWS
DBE
BG
Background
BOP
Balance of Plant
BWR
C/B
Control Building
CAMS
CFDW
CI/O
CPS
CPU
CR
Control Rod
CRD
CRDA
CR Drop Accidents
CRGT
CRT
CSP
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
CUW
CW
CWP
(E)D/G
D/W
Drywell
DC
DISK
D-PRNM
DTM
DWC
ECCS
ED/G
EHC
ES
F/A
Flow Auto
F/D
Filter Demineraliser
F/M
Flow Manual
FA
Fuel assembly
FCS
FCV
FD
Flat Displays
FDW
Feedwater System
FDWC
FMCRD
FPC
FWH
Feedwater Heater
G/A
Gang Auto
GEN
Generator System
ii
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
GSC
HCU
HCW
HD
HEPA
High-Efficiency PArticle
HPCF
HPCP
HPDP
HPDT
HPIN
HP-T
HS
House Steam
HTr
House Transformer
HVAC
HVH
I-131
Iodine-131
IA
IC
ILW
IPB
L/A
Local Auto
L/M
Local Manual
LCD
LCW
LD
Laundry Drain
LDS
LLW
LN2tank
iii
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
LOCA
LOOP
LOPA
LPAP
LPCF
LPCP
LPCRD
LPDP
LPDT
LPFL
LPRM
LPSP
LP-T
LSTr
LWTS
M/C
Metal-Clad Switchgear
M/D-RFP
M/T
MCC
MCR
MG
Motor-Generator
MRBM
MS
MSIV
MSLBA
MSR
MTr
Main Transformer
MUWP
iv
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
MVP
NB
NMS
NPP
NSSS
OG
Off-Gas System
OLU
P/C
Power Centre
PASS
PCIS
PCS
PCV
PI/O
PRNM
PrRM
PWR
R/B
Reactor Building
RC&IS
RCCV
RCIC
RCW
RFC
RFP
RFP-T
RHR
RHR Hx
RIP
RMC
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
RMISS
RMP
RPS
RPT
RPV
RRPS
RRS
RSS
RSW
Rw/B
Radwaste Building
RWM
S/C
Suppression Chamber
S/P
Suppression Pool
SAM
Sampling System
SAM/PASS
SCIN
Scintillation Detector
SCRRI
SFP
SGTS
SJAE
SLC
SPCU
SRNM
SRV
SSCs
SSD
Semiconductor Detector
SW
Switch
SWTS
vi
Form05/00
UK ABWR
Revision 2
List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
T/B
Turbine Building
T/D-RFP
TAF
TBS
TGS
TIP
TLU
UHS
UO2
Uranium Dioxide
UPS
VAC
VAS
vii
UK ABWR
Revision 2
CHAPTER 1
Plant Overview, Nuclear Island and
Nuclear Boiler Systems
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-1-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1. Introduction
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is a generation III+ light water reactor that was developed
based on operational experience, utilising tested and proven technology of previous Boiling Water Reactor
(BWR) generations and designs, as well as further simplification in the design of reactor systems and
containment.
The two fundamental differences between BWRs and the other common light water reactors, the
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs), are (i) bulk boiling of water occurs in the reactor core; and (ii) steam
produced from boiling in the reactor core is sent directly to the turbine used to turn the generator to produce
electricity. This highly contributes to simplification in design, and the systems required for both operation and
safety of the plant.
Chapter 1 Section 2
Chapter 1 Section 3
Chapter 1 Section 4
Chapter 1 Section 5
Chapter 1 Section 6
Chapter 1 Section 7
Chapter 2 Section 3
Chapter 2 Section 4
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Figure 1-1-1 Schematic Diagram showing the Configuration and Main Systems of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Improvement of operability
Additionally, the ABWR was developed based on demonstrated technology from both domestic and
overseas construction and operational experience. The main improvements in systems and equipment applied to
ABWR are as follows.
(1)
ABWR RIPs are directly attached to the bottom of the RPV to directly circulate the flow of water(coolant) inside
the reactor. In the earlier BWR designs the recirculation loop is located outside of the RPV, and the recirculation
pump, in combination with the jet pump inside the reactor, provides circulation flow of the coolant. The RIP is
characterised as follows:
(a) There are no external pumps for recirculation, therefore, the installation position of the Primary
Containment Vessel (PCV) is lower. Hence, the centre of gravity of the reactor is lowered, thus improving
resistance to earthquakes.
(b) The RIP uses a wet motor which is immersed in water in the casing, and has no shaft seal. Therefore,
possibility of core water leakage is reduced, and reliability in leak tightness is further enhanced.
(c) As the external pipes used in the conventional method are eliminated, the amount of radiation exposure to
workers during maintenance inspection work is reduced.
(2)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
(4)
(a) The large diameter pipes are not connected below the TAF due to the adoption of the RIPs. The ECCS is
designed with a focus on LOCAs from medium and small-diameter pipes. Each individual division of
ECCS is installed with its own HPCF.
(b) Each of the LPCF systems installed in the 3 independent divisions of ECCS have a heat exchanger,
therefore, offering sufficient core cooling functions for both the short to long term after a LOCA.
(5)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Based on performance of and experience with previous control panels, the third-generation control panel
with higher levels of safety and reliability was chosen. This control panel is composed of the main control
panel and a large display panel(screen). Utilizing a flat touch-screen display, the main panel integrates
monitoring and operational functions, and makes it possible for everyone in the MCR to share information
on its large display panel (screen).
The control panel is characterised as follows:
(a) Along with the streamlining and enhancing of operations, accident operations are handled easily and
accurately, and start up times can also be shortened.
(b) The large display panel encompasses information to be monitored during times of normal operation and
accidents. Also, it improves the ability of all operators in the MCR to share information.
(c) New human-machine interface such as general digitalization, large-display equipment and touch operation,
has been adopted for the new control panel in the MCR. It also has sufficient operation support functions
such as automation of sequential operation. Since the system allows more leeway for monitoring and
operation by operators than the conventional system, it contributes to safety in terms of prevention of
human errors.
(6)
(a) 52-inch long blade turbine, Moisture Separator Re-heater (MSR) and heater drain pump-up systems are
used to improve plant thermal efficiency.
(b) The forged mono block rotor is used in the steam turbine. The rotors transmit the power of the turbine to
withstand not only the torque during normal operation, but also the greater torque resulting from unusual
events such as generator short circuits.
Item
Specification
3,926 MWt
Output
(Continued)
ABWR General Description
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Item
(Continued)
Specification
Reactor
Fuel Assemblies
872
Core
Control Rods
205
Reactor
Recirculation System
Equipment
3 divisions / 2 divisions
3 divisions
52 inches
Reheat type
Turbine System
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-6
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-7
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-1-8
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
To Maintain appropriate water coolant flow so that power operation can be achieved.
To fix and support Fuel Assemblies (FAs), CRs, neutron monitor and reactor internals, and enable
the removal of these components for maintenance.
2.
Function / Configuration
The reactor is composed of the pressure vessel, the core which is placed at the centre of the vessel,
the core support internals and other reactor internals, as shown in Figure 1-2-1 below. Brief descriptions of
the reactor structures follow.
Core
Reactor internal
pump
In-core housing
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-2-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(1)
RPV
RPV
Feed water
Top head
inlet nozzles
RPV Shells
RPV
Bottom
head
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-2-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
Core
The core is in the shape of an upright cylinder, with a height of approximately 3.7m and a diameter
of approximately 5.2m. It contains 872 FAs and 205 CRs (see Figure 1-2-1).
(3)
Core Shroud
The core shroud supported by the shroud support is a stainless steel cylinder that encircles the core.
The core shroud separates the downward flow outside the core from the upward flow inside the core.
The shroud head is installed above the core shroud and the top guide. The shroud head forms one
part of the plenum above the outlet of the core and serves as the mixing chamber for steam and water
before they enter the steam separator.
High pressure
(HPCF) sparger
Core shroud
core
flooder
Lower plenum
Photo of the core shroud
(RPV)
Diffuser
Reactor internal pump
(temporary structures
(RIP)
included)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-2-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(4)
Steam Separator
The pipes and the turbine could be damaged by water drops if the mixture of steam and saturated
water generated in the core is directly sent to the turbine, therefore, water is separated from the steam
by the steam separator and the steam dryer (see Figure 1-2-4).
The steam separator guides the mixture of steam and saturated water into the upper plenum of the
core through the stand pipe, introducing a spiralling motion with the propeller-like inlet nozzle, and
whirls the steam and water mixture up the tube. At this time, water is separated from the steam by
centrifugal force and discharged into the downcomer.
(5)
Steam Dryer
Steam emitted from the steam separator enters the steam dryer. In the steam dryer, steam changes its
direction as it passes between the corrugated plates shown in figure 1-2-5 below. Every time the
direction changes, moisture within the steam hits the surface of the corrugated plates, thereby
removing moisture. Afterwards, steam goes through the dome at the upper part of the RPV and is
discharged to the outside of the RPV through the MS nozzles where it is guided to the turbine.
Steam
Separated
Water
Water Level
Separated
Water
Mixed
flow
Drain
Vane
Steam flow
Water
discharged to
the down comer
Stand pipe
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-2-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(6)
(7)
Feedwater Sparger
The purpose of the feedwater sparger is to uniformly mix feedwater entering through the feedwater
nozzle, with the high-temperature coolant that was separated by the steam separator. There are six
feedwater spargers in total. Each feedwater sparger is T-shaped and installed circumferentially along
the inner surface of the RPV (see Figure 1-2-1 Internal structure of the RPV).
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-2-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(9)
Channel fastener
Expansion spring
Plenum spring
Fuel cladding
Partial length fuel rod
Pellet
Spacer
Standard fuel rod
Water rod
Channel box
(not a part of fuel bundle)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-2-6
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-2-7
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The Nuclear Boiler System (NB) transfers steam and feedwater between the reactor and turbine
facilities during normal operation. The NB prevents overpressure of the reactor at abnormal transients in
operation or during an accident. The NB also provides isolation of the reactor.
2.
Function
(1)
(a)
During normal operation, steam generated at the reactor is transferred to the turbine facility via 4 MS
pipes.
(b)
In order to prevent overpressure of the reactor following a transient in operation or an accident, steam
inside the reactor is discharged into the S/P by the relief valve function or the safety valve function of
the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs).
(c)
In the case that the reactor cannot be cooled down with the condenser due to condenser failure or
reactor isolation, the SRVs are manually operated to depressurise the reactor to the pressure at which
the RHR can operate in the reactor shutdown cooling mode.
(d)
In the case of a LOCA, the reactor is automatically depressurised with the Automatic
Depressurization System (ADS) of the SRV to enable core injection by the Low Pressure Flooder
System ( LPFL).
(e)
In order to minimise the release of radioactivity outside of the PCV in case of fuel failure, Main
Steam Line Break Accident (MSLBA) or LOCAs, the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) are
automatically closed to isolate the reactor.
(f)
In order to minimise the outflow of reactor coolant and radioactive materials in the case of MSLBA,
a steam flow restrictor is mounted in each MS line at the RPV MS outlet nozzle.
(g)
Vapour condensation, generated inside the MS pipe during reactor start-up, is discharged to the
condenser by use of the MS drain line.
Figure 1-3-1 shows an outline of the MS System.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
To Drain
To Turbine
RPV
To Turbine
To Turbine
To Turbine
S/C
To Main
To Main
Condenser
PCV
1-3-2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
(a)
During normal operation, feedwater from the turbine facility is transferred to the reactor through 2
feedwater pipes. Each feedwater pipe is divided into 3 pipes inside the PCV. The 6 total feedwater
pipes are all connected to the feedwater inlet nozzles.
(b)
Returned water from the CUW, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC), and Division A
of the LPFL/RHR is directed to the reactor via the feedwater pipes.
Figure 1-3-2 shows an outline of the FDW.
(3)
(4)
3.
Configuration
(1)
(a)
Steam generated in the reactor is transferred to the turbine facility through 4 MS pipes. These 4 MS
pipes merge at the turbines main stop valve upstream header. A drain pipe is installed at the lowest
point of each MS pipe inside and outside the PCV, all of which combine into 1 pipe connecting to the
condenser hot well. A depressurisation orifice, installed on the downstream side of the last valve of
the condenser hot well, enables continuous drainage of the MS pipes.
(b)
The SRVs for preventing overpressure of the RPV are installed on the MS pipes inside the PCV.
When the SRV is operated, steam is discharged to the S/P through the discharge pipes for
condensation.
(c)
A steam pipe for driving the turbine of the RCIC is branched from 1 MS pipe inside the PCV.
Figure 1-3-3 shows the arrangement of SRVs and MSIVs on the MS lines.
(2)
(a)
The FDW consists of 2 feedwater pipes, each of which is divided into 3 pipes inside the containment
vessel. The 6 total feedwater pipes are connected to the feedwater sparger inside the RPV to
uniformly supply water to the inside of the reactor.
ABWR General Description
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
(4)
RPV
From FDW
From RHR
From CRD
From CUW
From
From RCIC
From FDW
PCV
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Figure 1-3-3 Arrangement of Major Equipment around the Nuclear Boiler System MS pipe (Example)
4.
(1)
(ii) The reactor feed pump is tripped so that excess cooling water does not enter the RPV.
(iii) When the RCIC or the HPCF is in operation, the turbine of the RCIC is tripped and the discharge
valve of the HPCF is also closed.
(b) Water level 7 (L-7)
The high water level alarm indicates the water level when moisture carryover to steam becomes
higher than the prescribed value during rated operation.
(c) Water level 5 (L-5)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
In order to minimise moisture carryover and steam carry-under in the entire steam flow area when
transitional water level change occurs, feedwater control is initiated to maintain this level 5 water
level. The water level can be maintained at any of the levels higher than level 4, including level 4,
and lower than level 7.
(d) Water level 4 (L-4)
The low water level alarm indicates the water level when steam carry-under of reactor water is
higher than the prescribed value during rated operation.
(e) Water level 4 (L-4)
This water level is the water level at which decrease of coolant inside the pressure vessel due to loss
of 1 feedwater pump causes reactor scram. The recirculation system automatically runs back due to
the loss of 1 feedwater pump.
(f) Water level 3 (L-3)
High moisture carryover bypassing the steam dryer is prevented by shutting down the reactor scram.
This level is higher than the bottom of the steam dryer seal and skirt. The amount of coolant at this
water level is enough to keep the water level higher than level 1.5, which is when the HPCF is
activated, even considering the loss of coolant due to steam from the NB system after loss of reactor
feedwater flow. This amount of coolant takes into account the amount that evaporates due to decay
heat. In addition to scram, 4 RIPs that are not connected to the Motor-Generator (MG) set are tripped
and the RHR system shutdown cooling pipe isolation valve is closed at level 3. The containment
vessel isolation valve (excluding the RCW isolation valve and the HNCW isolation valve for the
DWC cooling water supply, the CUW isolation valve, and the MSIV) is closed at level 3.
(g) Water level 2 (L-2)
This water level is set as follows:
(i)
A volume between water level 2 and water level 3 is sufficient to make up for lowered water level
due to the elimination of voids contained within the reactor water after a scram caused by low
reactor water level (water level 3) has occured.
(ii) If the reactor FDW, after a scram, is in normal state, the water level becomes one that does not
cause unnecessary activation of the RCIC.
(iii) A value will not reach water level 1.5, taking into account the supply after a scram at water level 3
and the automatic activation of the supply water function of the reactor core isolation cooling
system at this water level, when feedwater from the reactor feedwater system is lost.
(iv) Remaining RIPs that did not trip at level 3 will be tripped at level 2.
(h) Water level 1.5 (L-1.5)
At level 1.5, the MSIV is closed and the core cooling function of the HPCF and the RCIC is
activated. If the reactor coolant is supplied by the supply water function of the RCIC during loss of
feedwater, level 1.5 must be designed low enough to prevent activation of the aforementioned
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-6
UK ABWR
Revision 2
equipment. Under the conditions of feedwater loss and inactivation of the RCIC, level 1.5 must be
set high enough for the HPCF to prevent the level 1 activation signal.
(i) Water level 1 (L-1)
The ADS is activated at level 1 (when the signal for high drywell pressure is simultaneously issued),
and water can be supplied to the RPV by the operation of the LPFL mode of the RHR system. The
LPFL mode of the RHR system is also activated at level 1.
Level 1 must be able to hypothesize the most severe pipe rupture (HPCF pipe rupture or MS pipe
rupture) and must be set high enough to prevent core overheating as a condition of the licensing
basis analysis.
(2)
(3)
(4)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-7
UK ABWR
Revision 2
5.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-8
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-3-9
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
In the event of LOCA, the purpose of the RCCV is to suppress the release of fission products around
the site, and to keep the public exposure dose around the site sufficiently under the reference value defined
by the applicable regulatory limits.
2.
Function
The RCCV is a type of reinforced concrete pressure suppression vessel lined with a steel liner. The
containment vessel is composed of the upper drywell that contains the reactor primary system, a lower
drywell (D/W) enclosed by the RPV Pedestal structure, a Suppression Chamber (S/C) that stores water
(S/P), a Diaphragm Floor that separates the D/W and S/C, and a number of D/W Connecting Vents that
connect S/C and D/W, Vent Pipes and a Vacuum Breaker (see Figure 1-4-1 for the main components of the
RCCV). The RCCV contains access hatches for personnel and equipment access to the SSCs within the
RCCV. The RCCV, with the metal structure called the D/W head and associated isolation valves comprise
the PCV of ABWR. The PCV has an inert atmosphere of Nitrogen gas during operation.
(1)
The RCCV controls increase of pressure after a LOCA. The following items show the major
functions of the RCCV:
(a) In the event of a reactor primary system pipe break, reactor water and steam are released inside the
D/W, which causes an increase in internal pressure which forces the mixture of Nitrogen, steam and
water into the pool inside the S/C through the D/W Connecting Vent and Vent Pipes.
(b) The PCV and RCCV structures and R/B structure are designed to maintain integrity in the event of
the internal pressure resulting from a pipe rupture.
The steel liner of the containment vessel is not structural or a pressure vessel but acts as a boundary
material for maintaining leak tightness.
(c) Steam released in a LOCA is condensed in S/C to control increase of internal pressure of the PCV.
(d) Non-condensable gas that is transferred to S/C from the D/W during an accident is stored in the free
space of S/C to limit the increase of internal pressure of the PCV.
(e) The D/W Connecting Vent and Vent Pipes, which guide the mixture of coolant and non-condensable
gas that are released to the D/W, into the S/P ensuring maximum condensation of steam to relieve
pressure.
(f) Decay heat generated from the core and from any metal (Zirconium) water reaction will gradually
raise pressure and temperature within the PCV, but pressure can be decreased by spraying S/C pool
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-4-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
3.
Configuration
(1)
Upper D/W
(a) The Upper D/W is composed of the RCCV wall (reinforced concrete cylinder lined with the steel
liner), the Top Slab (reinforced concrete slab with steel liner), the steel D/W Head, and the lower
flange cylinder, which acts as the interface between the Top Slab and the D/W Head.
(b) The steel liner is not a structural element or a pressure vessel but acts purely as a leak-resistant
boundary.
(c) The D/W Head is bolted to the lower flange cylinder. The contact part of the flange has a double
gasket seal, and is designed to allow for leakage test.
(d) In order for workers and equipment to enter, a single Personnel Air-lock and single Equipment
Hatch are installed. The contact parts of the Equipment Hatch and the Personal Air-lock both have a
double gasket seal and are designed to allow for leakage test.
(2)
Lower D/W
(a) The Lower D/W is enclosed by the RPV Pedestal. The Lower D/W and the Upper D/W spaces are
connected by the D/W Connecting Vent within the RPV Pedestal structure.
(b) Since the D/W Connecting Vent acts as a pipe passage, the D/W cooling system ducts and
instrument pipes are installed in the D/W Connecting Vent.
(c) During a LOCA, most steam flows from the Upper D/W in the S/C and some steam flows to the
Lower D/W, which suppresses the increase of internal pressure of the containment vessel until steam
condensation starts in the S/C.
(d) In order for workers and equipment to enter, the S/C has access tunnels installed through it that
connect the R/B outside the PCV and the Lower D/W.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-4-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
(a) The S/C is composed of a bottom slab and cylinder which are made of reinforced concrete, lined
with a steel liner.
(b) The liner is not a structural element or a pressure vessel but acts as a leak resistant boundary.
(c) Water fills the bottom of the S/C (S/P), which condenses steam released during a LOCA.
(d) There is space at the upper part of the S/C, which accommodates the increase of internal pressure
caused by non-condensable gas flowing into the S/P during a LOCA.
(e) To provide access for maintenance and inspection, the S/C Hatch and the Platform are installed. The
contact part of the S/C hatch has a double gasket seal.
(4)
Vent Pipes
(a) The Vent Pipe system is composed of vertical pipes that extend downward from the lower end of the
D/W Connecting Vent in the RPV Pedestal and terminate at multiple levels of horizontal pipes for
discharging steam and gas into the S/C below water level.
(b) The D/W Connecting Vent and vertical pipes are not connected to each other. This is to allow some
of the steam released during a LOCA to flow into the Lower D/W through the gap between the end
of the D/W Connecting Vent and the start of the vertical pipes.
(c) Some of the vertical pipes are installed with a return line or spillover line back into the S/P. Water
injected from the emergency cooling system flows into the Lower D/W from the space between the
D/W Connecting Vent and vertical pipes, but is then allowed to flow back through the return lines to
the S/P to avoid a loss of water source for the ECCS and to prevent increase of water level inside the
Lower D/W above the permissible level.
(5)
Vacuum Breaker
(a) 8 vacuum breakers are installed. Penetrations that connect the S/C and Lower D/W are made through
the RPV Pedestal walls, and the vacuum breaker is installed on the S/C side.
(b) The equipment has a check valve type structure and is activated by the pressure difference of the
disks on both sides.
(c) An opening and closing test using IA (valve fully opened with the lowest normal IA pressure) is
possible in this equipment. The test can be carried out remotely from the MCR.
(6)
Diaphragm Floor
(a) The Diaphragm Floor separates the Upper D/W and S/C. It is a reinforced concrete slab with a seal
plate on the lower surface.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-4-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(b) The inside of the Diaphragm Floor is supported by the top of the RPV Pedestal, and the outside is
connected to the RCCV cylinder.
(c) The diaphragm floor withstands differential pressure between the D/W and S/C at abnormal
conditions, and is designed to withstand other abnormal and earthquake loads.
(7)
Isolation valve
(a)
Isolation valves are installed to prevent release of radioactive materials from the PCV in the event
of an accident.
(b) Isolation valves are installed inside and outside the PCV on all pipes which connect with the RPV
and penetrate the PCV.
(c) Piping that penetrates the PCV and are open ended within the PCV (e.g. ventilation pipes or suction
pipes for S/P water) are fitted with two isolation valves (installed in series) on the outer side of the
PCV (for pipes that are normally filled with water, a single valve is installed).
(d) For piping that penetrate the PCV, but are neither open-ended inside the PCV nor connected to the
RPV, an isolation valve is installed outside the containment vessel.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-4-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-4-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
RCCV
GL
RPV Pedestal
4.
Interlock
See Interlock in the explanation of each individual system, for details of interlocks concerning the
5.
(1)
(2)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-4-6
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
(4)
(5)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-4-7
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
(1)
To remove the heat from nuclear fuel by forcing recirculation of the coolant in the core.
(2)
To control reactor power output by changing coolant flow which leads to change in density of water
(which also acts as a neutron moderator).
2.
Function
(1)
(2)
The RRS adjusts core flow by changing the rotational speed of the RIPs, thereby controlling reactor
power output. The RIPs rotational speed is controlled by the Recirculation Flow Control (RFC)
system.
(3)
10 RIPs are continuously operated during normal plant operation (including the startup and shutdown
processes).
(4)
Even if one RIP stops during normal plant operation, continuous operation of the remaining nine
units allows operation at a rated core flow.
(5)
(a) Fuel rods have sufficient thermal margin in case 3 RIPs lose power.
(b) Reactor output is controlled with the reactor Recirculation Pump Trip system (RPT) immediately
after a turbine trip or generator load rejection event.
3.
Configuration
(1)
Reactor coolant discharged by the RIPs reaches the core via the lower plenum of the reactor and core
plate. Some amount of the boiled coolant passes through the steam separator, then becomes main
steam, and is transferred to the turbine facility via the MS pipes.
On the other hand, liquid reactor coolant that was separated with the steam separator joins with
feedwater and returns through the downcomer. the coolant is re-pressurised by the RIPs to and
recirculated inside the core.
(2)
The RRS is composed of the RIPs and the following auxiliary systems
(a) RIP
The RIP increases or decreases the amount of void near the fuel rods to control reactor power output,
by supplying reactor coolant to the core with an impeller and changing the core flow rate.
(b) Recirculation Motor Cooling system (RMC)
Cooling water is forced to circulate between the RIP motor and RIP motor cooling heat exchanger to
cool the RIP motor (See Figure 1-5-1).
(c) Recirculation Motor Purge system (RMP)
ABWR General Description
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-5-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
The entry of reactor water into RIP casings is prevented by supplying purge water into the RIPs and
creating a flow from the casing toward the reactor pressure vessel. Purge water is supplied from the
CRD system and water flows into the reactor after passing through the space between the shaft and
stretch tube.
(d) Recirculation Motor Inflatable Shaft Seal system (RMISS)
When the RIP motor is removed during reactor outage, the inflatable shaft seal (secondary seal),
stored in the casing, is inflated by pressurised water so that reactor water does not flow into the RIP
casing side. Pressurised water is supplied from a portable tank and pump.
See Figures 1-5-1 and 1-5-2 below for an overview of the systems and components.
Primary
Containment
Vessel
Shroud
Impeller
From CRD
Recirculation Motor Purge System
Portable Pump
& Tank
From MUWP
Motor Cover
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-5-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-5-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
(1)
The CRD system controls reactivity of the core by changing the position of the CR inside the core in
fine increments with the use of the electric motor drive of the FMCRD.
During abnormal transient conditions of the plant, the FMCRDs are hydraulically driven with high
pressure water from the Hydraulic Control Units (HCUs) and provide rapid insertion of all control
rods into the core (scram) to shutdown the reactor in an emergency.
(2)
During normal operation, the CRD system supplies purge water to the FMCRD, the RIPs and the
CUW pumps, whilst continuously filling the HCU accumulator with high pressure water by means of
the CRD pumps to prepare for scram.
2.
(1)
Function
In normal CR insertion and withdrawal, the position of the CR in the reactor core is controlled by the
motor according to the control signal from the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS).
(2)
The FMCRD engages in scram after receiving the scram signal from the RPS. At the same time, the
FMCRD electric motor is initiated after receiving the scram signal from the RPS, to back up insertion
of all CRs.
(3)
All CRs are rapidly inserted and the reactor is shutdown by opening each scram valve installed at the
outlet of each of the HCU accumulators which supply high pressure water, stored in the HCU
accumulator, to the piston area of the FMCRD to hydraulically drive the FMCRD, when the scram
signal is issued.
(4)
The CR is inserted after receiving an Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) signal if an Anticipated Transient
Without Scram (ATWS) event occurs. At the same time, the motor of the FMCRD is activated after
receiving FMCRD run-in signals from the ATWS to back up all CR insertion.
(5)
In order to prevent clad sedimentation inside the FMCRD on the reactor side, purge water is supplied
from the CRD pumps.
(6)
In order to prevent reactor water from mixing in, purge water is supplied to the RIPs and the CUW
pumps from the CRD pumps.
3.
the HCU, which supplies purge water and high pressure water during scram to the FMCRD. The main
components are as follows:
1-6-1
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(1)
(a) Insertion and withdrawal of the CRs during normal operation is driven by the electrical motors of the
FMCRDs depending on the control signal from RC&IS.
(b) Hydraulic insertion is accomplished by high pressure water supplied from the HCU accumulator
according to the scram signal from the RPS or the ARI signal from the ATWS.
(c) The RC&IS transmits the control signal to the FMCRDs after receiving the control signal from the
RPS. In consequence the FMCRDs actuate the electric motors in order to initiate the scram follow.
(d) CR insertion is driven by the motor according to the control from the signal of the RC&IS which
was received by ARI signal initiated by the ATWS.
(e) The CRs and the FMCRDs are connected via a bayonet coupling structure which cannot be removed
unless either the CR or the FMCRD is rotated 45 around its axis (see Figures 1-6-4 (a) and 1-6-4 (b)
below for a diagram overview of the CR-CRD coupling structure). In the case of a CR drop, of CR
Drop Accidents (CRDA), CRs are coupled with the hollow piston of FMCRD, and the maximum CR
drop speed is limited to 0.7 m/s or lower by dashpot effect to produce a large resistance.
(2)
(a) The HCU is composed of a scram solenoid pilot valve, a scram valve, an accumulator and a nitrogen
gas bottle. It stores enough high pressure water to scram 2 FMCRDs with 1 HCU (only 1 FMCRD is
scrammed with 1 HCU) (see Figure 1-6-5 below for an overview of HCU).
(b) The air-operated scram valve is installed to ensure scram when scram operation is required.
(c) The three-way double solenoid single diaphragm electromagnetically-operated valve (scram pilot
valve) is installed above the scram valve to open or close.
(d) The scram valve and scram solenoid pilot valve are designed to become fail-safe against the loss of
air and electric power when they are used in combination.
(e) In normal operation, the scram valve actuator is subjected to air pressure and the scram valve is
closed while the scram solenoid pilot valve is excited. In an emergency, the scram valve is opened
by discharging air from the scram valve actuator due to non-exciting the scram solenoid pilot valve.
(f) Compressed air is discharged from the scram valve actuator and the scram valve is opened with one
of the following operations:
(i)
(ii) Depressurisation of the scram pilot valve air line is achieved with the backup scram pilot valves
or the ARI solenoid valves (electromagnetic valves).
(3)
1-6-2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Two pumps are positioned in parallel; one unit is used during normal operation and the other one
works as a backup.
(4)
(5)
1-6-3
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1-6-5
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1-6-6
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1-6-7
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1-6-8
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4.
(1)
(2)
The rear emergency shutdown valve of the scram pilot valve air line is activated (air discharge), after
receiving the scram signal from the RPS, to open the scram valve and go into scram.
(3)
The Filling water line pressure low-low signal is issued to the RPS to go into reactor scram before
loss of scram functions.
5.
(1)
Purpose of CRs
Reactor start up, shut down and power distribution shaping are controlled during operation of the
reactor by manipulation of the CRs. The CRs can also make the reactor go into a sub-critical state
and maintain that state in the case of an emergency.
1-6-9
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
Function of CRs
(a)
(b)
Reactivity control
Reactivity control is performed by insertion and withdrawal of the CRs. In case of an emergency,
CRs are inserted into the core rapidly to shut down the reactor and maintain a sub-critical steady
state.
(3)
CR Design requirements
(a) To provide, mechanically, the required strength to maintain the materials used for reactivity
control.
(b)
To prevent interference during operations when inserting and withdrawing the CRs.
(4)
CR Structure
Typically, the CRs have a cruciform shape containing stainless steel tubes in each blade of the
cruciform. The following constitute the different parts that make the CR:
(a)
Handle
(b)
(c)
Sheath
(d)
(e)
Connector
(f)
Roller
(g)
Cooling hole
(h)
Coupling Socket
(5)
(a)
Conventional type:
(b)
Hafnium type:
For (1) and (2), see Figures 1-6-7 and 1-6-8 below for an overview of the CR cross section and CR type.
(6)
CR Coupling structure
The coupling connections between the CRs and CRD mechanism have a rotary connection (bayonet
coupling) structure in which these cannot be removed unless it is rotated 45. Thus, the CR and drive
1-6-10
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
mechanism (hollow piston) can stay connected in withdrawal and insertion operations during plant
operation.
See Figures 1-6-4 (a) and 1-6-4 (b) for an overview.
(7)
(a)
Number of CRs
205
(b)
Form
Cruciform.
Handle
Roller
Tie Rod
Cooling Hole
(Centre Post)
Absorber Tube
Sheath
Connector
Coupling Socket
Figure 1-6-6 Overview of the CR
1-6-11
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
End Plug
Absorber Tube
Sheath
Iron Wool
Roller
Dimple
Active
Absorber Zone
Ball
Tube
Tie Rod
Fuel Channel
Iron Wool
(Centre Post)
End Plug
Absorber Tube
Figure 1-6-7 Diagram of the CR Cross Section
1-6-12
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
For Shutdown
(Hafnium Type)
Absorber Tube
1-6-13
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The CUW is installed for the following purposes:
(1)
To remove impurities contained in the reactor water and maintain the core water quality within the
specified range in order to control:
(a) Corrosion of equipment and pipes composing the reactor primary system.
(b) Heat-transfer efficiency due to the accumulation of impurities on the fuel surface.
(c) Radioactive contamination of the reactor primary system and relevant equipment due to
accumulation of irradiated impurities floating in the coolant.
(2)
To discharge excessive reactor water (blow down) in order to maintain normal water level of the
reactor at start-up and shutdown.
(3)
2.
(1)
To cool the upper area inside the RPV if it is necessary to open the RPV early during an outage
Function
Reactor water is purified to maintain the core water quality during normal plant operation, at plant
start-up, at plant shutdown and during refuelling.
(2)
Removal of corrosive products and fission products inside the reactor primary system.
(3)
Removal of dissolved inorganic materials that flow into the reactor from the FDW.
(4)
After purifying reactor water at reactor start-up, shutdown and during hot standby, the excess water is
discharged.
(5)
Reactor water is drained from the bottom of the RPV and re-circulated through the feedwater system.
(6)
If it is necessary to start refuelling early during outage, the CUW cools the RPV by spraying reactor
water from the inside of the RPV head.
3.
Configuration
(1)
CUW pump
2 units
(2)
1 unit
Heat loss is reduced through the heat exchange between reactor water drained out and water
returning to the reactor.
(3)
2 units
Cooling is achieved, through the heat exchange of reactor water and RCW, to a temperature that does
not damage the resin of the Filter Demineralisers (F/Ds).
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-7-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(4)
2 units
PCV
From FDW
R
P
V
To RHR
Regenerative Hx
Non-Regenerative Hx
Non-Regenerative Hx
RCW
RCW
CUW Pump
Filter
Demineralizer
To S/P
To LCW
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-7-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The FPC keeps the spent fuel pool water temperature below the prescribed value and maintains the
2.
Function
The FPC has the following functions:
(1)
Decay heat from spent fuel is removed and spent fuel pool water temperature is kept below
approximately 50C.
(2)
The following impurities are removed and spent fuel pool water quality (purity, transparency) is
maintained:
Configuration
3.
(1)
The FPC is structured with the following equipment (See Figure 1-8-1):
1 unit
2 units
2 units
2 units
2 units
(2)
The FPC is operated as follows in order to achieve the functions of the system. (during normal
operation mode)
(a) Pool water that flows to the skimmer surge tank is pressurised with the FPC pump.
(b) Various impurities within the pool water are continuously filtered and demineralised using an
ion-exchange resin of the FPC F/D system.
(c) Pool water temperature is kept below the prescribed temperature with the use of the FPC heat
exchanger.
(d) Pool water discharged from FPC heat exchanger is returned to the pool through the water spray pipe
of the SFP.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-8-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
From MUWC
(5)
(1)
MO
From RHR
Skimmer
Surge
Tank
MO
From SPCU
D/S Pit
Reactor Well
MO
Make-up
Water
SFP
Alternaive
make-up water
To RHR
(4) (2)
(1)
(2)
RCW
MO
RCW
FPC Pump
MO
AO
FPC F/D
AO
MO
MO
MO
AO
AO
(3) (2)
AO
AO
SPCU
AO
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-8-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
(1)
To maintain Oxygen concentration inside the PCV below the specified value by inerting the inside of
the PCV (D/W, S/C) with nitrogen gas during normal reactor operation, and dilute hydrogen and
oxygen accumulation levels (in the PCV) below flammability level, in the event of a LOCA.
(2)
2.
To keep the pressure inside the PCV within the specified range during normal reactor operation.
Function
(1)
(a) During normal reactor operation, nitrogen supplied from the Nitrogen supply facility is heated by the
Nitrogen gas heater and supplied into the PCV (see Figure 1-9-1 below).
(b) To maintain pressure inside the PCV at the specified level (a relatively high positive pressure) by
compensating leakage from the PCV.
(c) To prevent the rise of Oxygen concentration in the containment due to the inflow of air from outside
by maintaining the inside of the PCV at a relatively higher positive pressure.
(2)
3.
Configuration
Nitrogen gas supply machine
It is composed of the liquid Nitrogen tank (LN 2 tank), evaporator and heater, as the N 2 gas supply
source of the AC.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-9-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
PCV
Nitrogen
Gas Supply
Facility
HVAC
SGTS
HVAC
HVAC
1-9-2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
To maintain the required thermal environment and humidity so that the components in the D/W
operate in a proper manner during plant normal operation.
(2)
To cool the atmosphere in the D/W to retain a good working environment (temperature) during plant
inspection and maintenance.
2.
(1)
Function
DWC Coolers and DWC Cooling Dehumidifiers supply the bulk head, inner D/W and pressure
vessel skirt areas with cooled air (N 2 during normal plant operation) through ducts (See Figure
1-10-1).
(2)
The circulating air is returned to the DWC Coolers once collected at the upper D/W area. Each DWC
cooler mixes, circulates and cools the air for each part of the D/W (See Figure 1-10-1).
(3)
3.
Configuration
2 units
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-10-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Upper Drywell
Cooling
Water
EL.25300
Cooler (C)
Cooler (A)
Cooler (B)
Fan (C)
C
C
Fan (A)
Fan (B)
EL.19600
Cooling
Water
C
Cooling
Cooling
Dehumidifier (B)
Cooling
Dehumidifier (A)
EL.16500
Water
EL.16300
Lower Drywell
EL.-2600
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-10-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The SPCU is installed for the following purpose:
(1)
To purify the S/P water and use it as the water source for the reactor well during refuelling, for filling
up the temporary equipment storage pool, and as the water source for tests of the ECCS during
normal plant operation.
2.
Function
(1)
Impurities are removed with the F/D, and the S/P water is purified so that it satisfies the water quality
standard.
Water is sucked in from the S/P, passed through the F/D of the FPC using the SPCU pump, and
returned to the S/P.
(2)
The steam dryer/steam separator pool and reactor well are filled with water before refuelling, using
the S/P as the water source.
3.
Configuration
The configuration and operation mode of the SPCU are shown below:
(1)
SPCU mode
(a) 1 F/D of the FPC is separated from the SFP clean-up mode and is used with the SPCU mode.
(b) Water sucked in from the S/P with the SPCU pump is returned to the S/P after being treated with the
F/D.
(c) Since this operation mode is not normally operated, it is designed to use 1 of the 2 F/Ds of the FPC
and operate it at the same time as the SFP water purification.
(d) This operation mode is to be continued until it satisfies the prescribed water quality.
.
(2)
(3)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-11-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
1-11-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
CHAPTER 2
Safety Systems
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
In case of a LOCA, the ECCS injects cooling water into the RPV, and removes the decay heat
generated in the core over a long period of time, retaining integrity of fuel cladding.
2.
(1)
Function
Low Pressure Flooder System (LPFL)
The LPFL can operate in coordination with the HPCF, the RCIC and the ADS to cool the core in
case of a LOCA. The LPFL is one of the operating modes of the RHR which is generally used for
removing the decay heat during reactor shutdown.
The LPFL has a separated loop for each of the 3 low pressure coolant injection pumps. The pumps
are activated by the signal for low reactor water level (L-1) or high D/W pressure, and injects water
from the S/P to the outer side of the core shroud cooling the core.
(2)
(3)
(4)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-1-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
The ADS is activated after receiving signals for both low reactor water level (L-1) and high D/W
pressure, and helps achieve core cooling by compressing the reactor steam using S/P water and
promptly reducing the reactor pressure to a sufficient level to allow water injection with the LPFL.
The ADS cannot cool the core on its own, and it is designed to be activated with a specified delay as
it decreases the coolant quantity once it is activated.
3.
Configuration
The ECCS is designed with sufficient margin in redundancy and independency of active and static
components, and has the objective of maintaining the required safety functions upon assumption of
various pipe ruptures in the primary system and single failure of active components in some of the systems
of the core standby cooling system, or in case of Loss Of Off-site Power (LOOP).
(1)
RCIC
- Composed of 1 system and 1 turbine driven pump activated with high D/W pressure or water level
L-1.5
- Feedwater function to be activated automatically with low reactor water level (L-2) signal
(2)
HPCF
- Composed of 2 independent systems and 1 pump for each system
- Activated by high D/W pressure or low reactor water level (L-1.5)
(3)
LPFL
- Composed of 3 systems and 1 pump for each system
- Activated by high D/W pressure or low reactor water level (L-1)
(4)
ADS
- Composed of 8 SRVs
- Activated with high D/W pressure and L-1, in AND conditions
The definitions of reactor water levels L-xx are indicated in Chapter 1 Section 3.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-1-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Core
To A
CSP
Suppression Pool
RCIC: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
HPCF: High Pressure Core Flooder System
RHR:
Heat Removal
LPFL:Residual
Low Pressure
Flooder System
ADS:
ADS:Automatic
AutomaticDepressurisation
DepressurizationSystem
System
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-1-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4.
Interlock
An overview of the start-up signals of the core standby cooling system (ECCS) is shown in Figure
2-1-2 below. (See Chapter 2 Section 7 for the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)).
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-1-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
5.
Division
ECCS Arrangement
Electric Supply
High Pressure
Low Pressure
System
Division A
RCIC
LPFL (A)
ED/G (A)
Division B
HPCF (B)
LPFL (B)
ED/G (B)
Division C
HPCF (C)
LPFL (C)
ED/G (C)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-1-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
In the case of a LOCA, the SRVs open when the reactor water level cannot be maintained due to high
pressure. A prompt depressurisation of the RPV and injection of water with the LPFL is carried out to cool
the core and retain integrity of fuel cladding.
2.
Function
The SRVs are installed in the MS pipes inside the PCV and between the RPV and the inboard MSIVs.
The objective of the SRVs is to prevent excessive pressure inside the RPV and promptly depressurise the
reactor when necessary. The discharged steam is guided to the S/P through the discharge pipe for
condensation.
3.
Configuration
(1)
SRVs
The SRVs are safety related components and perform various functions: as a spring-loaded safety
valve self-actuated by inlet steam pressure, or as an actuated valve supplying nitrogen to a
piston-type pneumatic actuator following an automatic or manual external signal.
There are 18 SRVs, with the following functions:
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-2-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
The SRV can be manually and remotely operated from the MCR to control reactor pressure in order
to remove steam generated by residual heat. This function is used if for some reason the condenser is
unavailable as heat sinks after an automatic reactor shutdown. All 18 SRVs have this function.
(2)
Discharge pipe
Activation frequency is high for the functions of the SRVs, therefore, radioactive contamination of
the PCV and surrounding equipment and a pressure rise in the PCV are assumed. In order to prevent
these situations, steam is discharged through the discharge pipe into the S/P water where it is
condensed.
(3)
Accumulator
Accumulators contain nitrogen (N2) gas for the following purposes:
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-2-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
To inject water into the core so that the temperature of the fuel cladding does not exceed the
specified criteria (1200C) in the case of a LOCA (accident mode).
(2)
To substitute for the RCIC to maintain the reactor water level during the reactor isolation process
(reactor isolation mode).
2.
Function
The HPCF is activated by a low reactor water level signal (L-1.5) in the case of a LOCA with the
purpose to keep the core submerged. In the case of a transient event of loss of feedwater accident, it
recovers the reactor water level as a backup of the RCIC.
(1)
Accident mode
In the case of a LOCA, the HPCF pump starts the injection of the coolant within 35 seconds after
receiving the start-up signal of low reactor water level (L-1.5) or high D/W pressure.
This mode is also used for long-term cooling after LOCA.
(2)
3.
Configuration
This system forms the ECCS together with the RCIC, RHR (LPFL mode) and ADS. It is composed
of 2 independent subsystems and it cools the core by injecting into the RPV the cooling water from the CSP
or the S/P through the core injection spargers installed inside the plenum in the upper part of the core.
The pump has two design flow rates:
Low flow rate
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-3-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-3-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
In order to remove residual heat during reactor shutdown and reactor isolation and to cool the core
during LOCA, the RHR uses valves to switch between the following modes:
(1)
LPFL mode
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
2.
Function
The RHR has the following 5 basic functions:
(1)
The LPFL cools the reactor core by removing the decay heat in the case of a LOCA. The LPFL cools
the core (together with the HPCF, RCIC and ADS) to keep the fuel cladding temperature below the
specified criteria in the case of all the design-basis LOCA.
(2)
The containment vessel spray cooling mode removes decay heat released into the gas phase inside
the D/W, W/W, and condenses steam, after a LOCA, in order to prevent overpressure of the PCV.
(3)
The S/P cooling mode cools the S/P water below a specified temperature during normal operation.
(4)
The shutdown cooling mode removes the decay heat of the fuel to make refuelling activities and
maintenance operations possible after reactor shutdown.
(5)
The fuel pool cooling mode supports cooling of the FPC when the heat load of the spent fuel pool
exceeds the maximum cooling capacity of the FPC.
3.
(1)
Configuration
RHR pump
Number of units
(2)
3 units (954m3/h/unit)
3 units
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-4-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4.
(1)
Operation modes
LPFL mode
This mode has the objective, like the other ECCS during LOCA, to recover and maintain reactor
water level and retain integrity of fuel cladding.
This mode is automatically activated by low reactor water level (L-1) or high D/W pressure and S/P
water is injected from the LPFL sparger to the outer side of the core shroud and feedwater sparger, in
case of a LOCA. This mode is prioritised over other operation modes of the RHR.
The LPFL can keep the core submerged by the activation of both the RCIC and the ADS even in the
case that a single failure of the ED/G, which powers the HPCF and a complete rupture of the other
HPCF pipe occurs.
After recovery of the reactor water level, 1 unit of the LPFL pump is sufficient to maintain the
reactor water level even if the HPCF pipe is completely ruptured, since it only needs to make up the
amount of water decreased due to steam produced from decay heat. In the event of a small rupture
accident, the LPFL injects cooling water after the pressure is reduced using the ADS.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-4-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
PCV
Drywell
To FPC
From FDW
NB
RHR
To CUW
RPV
To FPC
Wetwell
S/P
RHR Hx (B)
From FPC
From FPC
RHR Pump(B)
RHR Pump(C)
RHR Hx (C)
RHR Pump(A)
RHR Hx (A)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-4-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The RCIC operates in the following modes to cool the core and maintain the reactor water level, to
(1)
When the reactor is isolated from the turbine system and cooling water cannot be supplied from the
feedwater system (Reactor isolation process)
(2)
In case of a complete pipe break in one of the two HPCF pipings, or in case of any other accidents,
including LOCA, together with the HPCF, the LPFL mode of the RHR and the ADS, since the RCIC
is part of the ECCS.
2.
(1)
Function
The RCIC automatically starts up at low reactor water level (L-2) or high D/W pressure signed and
injects rated flow into the reactor within the specified time. None of the equipment in this system
requires AC power, IA or auxiliary cooling water.
(2)
The RCIC starts up at low reactor water level (L-2) at a loss of feed water, but when low reactor
water level (L-1.5) or high D/W pressure is achieved, start-up signal corresponding to ECCS function
is issued.
(3)
3.
(1)
Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the S/P (See the diagram of Figure 2-5-1).
Configuration
RCIC turbine
Saturated steam generated from the decay heat of the reactor core is supplied from the MS line to
drive the RCIC pump directly connected to the shaft. Exhaust steam is discharged to the S/P.
(2)
RCIC pump
CSP or S/P water is injected into the reactor.
The injected flow is 182m3/h
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-5-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
To
Main Steam
PCV
RCIC
MO
MO
MO
RCIC
MO
RPV
From FDW
AO
RCIC
MO
RCIC Turbine
RO
MO
RO
MO
MO
HO
RCIC
Pump
RCIC
CSP
RCIC CST
RCIC S/P
MO
MO
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-5-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) is an emergency system designed to safely bring
the reactor from a full power operation status to sub criticality by a continuous injection of a sodium
borate solution in a situation where CRs cannot be inserted.
2.
Function
The SLC has the following functions:
(1)
When it is judged that the reactor cannot achieve cold shutdown status using CRs, an aqueous
solution of boric acid is injected into the reactor by activating the SLC pump remotely from
the MCR.
(2)
Functional tests can be undertaken without injecting aqueous solution of boric acid into the
reactor.
(3)
As a backup of the CRD, the SLC is designed with high redundancy and reliability, and in a
way that erroneous operations leading to the injection of aqueous solution of boric acid are
prevented.
(4)
3.
(1)
Configuration
SLC pump (100% capacity2, 1 spare unit)
Aqueous solution of Sodium Borate can be injected into the reactor for the entire pressure
range (from high reactor pressure to low reactor pressure).
(2)
(3)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-6-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Reactor Primary
PCV
Containment
Vessel
AO
MO
Demineralised Water
Supply Line
From HPCF
RPV
SLC Test
Tank
MO
MO
SLC
Pump
MO
MO
SLC
Storage
Tank
SLC Heaters
SLC Pump
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-6-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
(1)
The Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) is designed and installed to reduce the release of
radioactive materials in the case of a LOCA or a fuel drop accident. The system keeps the inside of
the reactor secondary containment (reactor area of the R/B) at a negative pressure and filters
radioactive materials to prevent direct release to the environment.
(2)
The SGTS is installed to treat the air discharged from the PCV and from the reactor area to reduce
public exposure at site periphery in cases other than LOCA when it is necessary.
(3)
The following actions are taken to control the release of radioactive materials to the site periphery
when the signal for reactor area isolation is issued:
(a) Air is filtered inside the reactor area and discharged using the stack.
(b) The pressure inside the reactor area is kept negative to prevent direct leakage outside the building.
2.
(1)
Function
SGTS fan
Because the SGTS fan is an active component, the system is composed of two 100% capacity units
for redundancy. When the signal for reactor area isolation is issued, the SGTS fan keeps the pressure
inside the reactor area negative to prevent direct leakage of air outside the building. The treatment
capacity of the single SGTS fan is 50% of spatial volume of the R/B area per day.
(2)
Filter equipment
Filtration is carried out combining several types of filters so that radioactive materials are not
directly released into the environment. The following filters are used:
High-efficiency particle filter (HEPA)
This is installed to sandwich the iodine charcoal filter to keep the release of radioactive particles
to the site periphery at a minimum and prevent clogging of the iodine charcoal filter.
Charcoal filter
A charcoal filter is installed to remove radioactive Iodine (which is a fission product).
(3)
Heater Unit
Since the heater unit is an active component, the SGTS is composed of two 100% capacity units for
redundancy.
The heater unit is composed of a moisture separator and a heating coil and is used to maintain the
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-7-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Configuration
This system is composed of the following major equipment:
(1)
1 unit
This contains the HEPA filter and the Iodine charcoal filter. The rated treatment capacity is
2000m3/h.
(2)
2 units
This is installed on the upstream side of the SGTS fan and contains the moisture separator. The rated
treatment capacity is 2000m3/h.
(3)
SGTS fan
2 units
This is installed on the upstream side of the SGTS filter. The rated treatment capacity is 2000m3/h.
(4)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-7-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
From PCV
To Main Stack
SGTS Fan
SGTS Heater Unit
SGTS Filter Train
SGTS Fan
Figure 2-7-1 Schematic Diagram of the SGTS
2-7-3
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The Flammability Control System (FCS) is installed to keep the concentration level of the
combustible mixture of Hydrogen and Oxygen below the flammability limit in the event of a LOCA, and
therefore preventing drastic pressure and temperature increases inside the PCV.
2.
Function
The FCS has the following functions:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Power source
Power is supplied by the emergency power source (ED/G) to allow the system to fulfil its functions
in the case of a LOOP.
(4)
Redundancy
The FCS is one of the indirect engineered safety features. Two redundant Hydrogen and Oxygen
recombiners are installed to allow the system to fulfil its functions with the assumption of a single
failure of an active component.
3.
Configuration
The FCS configuration is shown in Figure 2-8-1. The entire system is composed of 2 recombination units,
pipes, valves and measurement and control instrumentation. The components of the FCS are listed below.
(1)
Entire system
System capacity
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-8-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Recombination
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
FCS Recombiner
Type
Number of units
2 units
FCS Blower
Type
Number of units
2 units
FCS Heater
Type
Electric type
Number of units
2 units
FCS Cooler
Type
Spray type
Number of units
2 units
When the FCS starts up, the gas inside the D/W is sent with the blower to the S/C via the FCS
heater, FCS recombiner, FCS cooler and FCS steam separator. The gas is heated up to approximately
720C and the Hydrogen and Oxygen present in the gas reacts in the recombiner forming steam. Part of
the gas discharged from the recombiner is returned to the blower inlet via the recirculation line and the
rest is returned to the S/C after being cooled. When the S/C pressure becomes high, the vacuum breaker
valve is opened and the gas is set to the D/W. Concentration of flammable gas inside the PCV is
controlled by repeating this process.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-8-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
From MUWP
From RHR
FCS Heater
FCS Blower
Drywell
FCS
Recombiner
FCS
Water
Separator
FCS Cooler
Suppression
Chamber
2-8-3
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
In the event that the MCR becomes inaccessible, the RSS can be used as an emergency system which
aims for safe, cold shutdown of the reactor by remote operation from an appropriate location other than the
MCR.
2.
Function
The RSS is a system that shifts the reactor in scram from hot shutdown to cold shutdown by remote
operation outside the MCR when an accident that requires evacuation from the MCR occurs.
3.
Configuration
The RSS comprises the following systems including operation switch, monitoring equipment and
(a) HPCF
(b) RHR
(c) NB, 3 safety relief valves
(d) AC
(e) RCW
(f) RSW
(g) D/G
(h) On-site Power System
(i) MUWC
(j) FCS
4.
(1)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-9-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
5.
Supplementary information
Shift to reactor cold shutdown
After reactor scram, the SRV and HPCF systems are activated to put the reactor in hot shutdown
status. At this point, the RHR system is operated in S/P cooling mode and cools the S/C.
The SRV releases steam generated from reactor decay heat and other heat sources to the S/C to
control the increase of reactor pressure. The HPCF system injects water from the Condensate Storage Pool
CSP or the S/C into the reactor to maintain the reactor water level.
These functions help to cool the reactor and also depressurise the reactor while the reactor pressure is
under control. The reactor is depressurised to the adequate level for the RHR system shutdown cooling
mode. Ultimately, the RHR system is operated in the shutdown cooling mode to bring the reactor into cold
shutdown status.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-9-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
2-9-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
CHAPTER 3
Turbine Island and Turbine
Auxiliary Systems
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The MS supplies steam generated in the reactor to the steam turbine. The Turbine Bypass
System (TBS) is designed to send the reactor steam directly to the condenser during reactor start-up,
shutdown, normal operation, and transient stages.
2.
(1)
(2)
The steam system branches from the MS header and connects to the condenser via the turbine
bypass valve (TBV).
(3)
The MS header is installed upstream of the main stop valve for pressure equalisation of the
MS pipes, and to decrease pressure fluctuation during main stop valve operation tests, making
it easy to supply turbine auxiliary steam. The turbine bypass line lets excess steam bypass the
main turbine at turbine start-up, and as the generator load changes rapidly, the steam is sent
directly to the condenser in order to prevent increase in reactor pressure. The TBV capacity is
approximately 33% of the total steam flow rate at the rated generator output.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-1-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3-1-2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
(1)
Purpose
The ES heats the condensate water and the feedwater in the Feedwater Heater (FWH) using
the steam extracted from the turbine and the cross-around pipe in order to improve plant
thermal efficiency.
(2)
This system supplies the heating steam to the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) and the
Gland Steam Evaporator (GSE).
(3)
2.
(1)
This system supplies the driving steam to the Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine (RFP-T).
Function
Forms the cross-around pipe connecting the High Pressure Turbine (HP-T) outlet to the
Combined Intermediate Valve (CIV) through the MSR, and the extraction lines that are
connected to the 2 stages of high pressure FWH (HP FWH) and the 4 stages of low pressure
FWH (LP FWH).
(2)
Forms heating steam line that is routed from the HP-T outlet to the MSR 1st stage reheater.
(3)
Forms the low pressure steam line from the cross-around pipe to the RFP-T and the exhaust
system that is routed to the condenser.
(4)
Forms the heating steam line that is routed from the 2nd extraction pipe to the GSE.
(5)
Forms the steam line that is routed from the GSE heating steam pressure control valve for
start-up/shutdown and for low-load operation to the extraction steam pipe.
(6)
Check valves are installed on No. 1, 2, 3, 4 extraction lines to prevent heater drain flushing,
steam reverse flowing and turbine overspeed.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-2-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The AS supplies heating steam to the MSR 2nd stage reheater and the GSE, and supplies the
drive steam to the RFP-T and the Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) from the MS header. The house
steam system supplies the drive steam for the start-up SJAE.
2.
(1)
Function
The SJAE inlet pressure is reduced from the MS pressure to the required pressure by the
pressure control valve, and used as the SJAE driving steam.
(2)
The start-up SJAE driving steam is supplied in order to get the required condenser vacuum
when the MS pressure is not high enough, such as during plant start-up/shutdown operation.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-3-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
(1)
Purpose
The condensate water in the condenser is pressurised by the Low Pressure Condensate Pump
(LPCP), the High Pressure Condensate Pump (HPCP), and the Turbine Driven Reactor
Feedwater Pump (T/D-RFP) or the Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (M/D-RFP) before
it is supplied into the reactor.
(2)
The condensate water is supplied from the LPCP to the SJAE condenser and the Gland Steam
Condenser (GSC), and the processed gas is then cooled and the heat is recovered as
condensate water.
2.
Function
In the condensate system, the condensate water extracted from the condenser is pressurised
by the LPCP, purified by the Condensate Purification System (CPS), and transferred to the
HPCP. The condensate re-pressurised by the HPCP is heated in the 4 stages of the LP FWH
and is transferred to the Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP).
In the feedwater system, T/D-RFP or M/D-RFP pressurise the feedwater sent from the HPCP,
and it is then supplied to the reactor through 2 stages of the HP FWH.
The LP FWH drain is recovered in the condensate system by the Low Pressure Drain Pump
(LPDP), and the HP FWH drain is recovered in the RFP suction side by the High Pressure
Drain Pump (HPDP).
The control signal from the Feedwater Control System (FDWC) controls the feedwater flow
rate. The flow rate is controlled by adjusting the RFP-T rotation speed for T/D-RFP; or by
adjusting the discharge Flow Control Valve (FCV) opening for M/D-RFP.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-4-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
(1)
Major equipment
Low Pressure Condensate Pump (LPCP)
Three 50% capacity LPCPs are installed. Normally two of the three LPCPs are operated while
the third LPCP is on standby.
(2)
(3)
(4)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-4-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The turbine extraction steam heats the FWH, thus raising the feedwater temperature. The
drain pump up system improves the plant thermal efficiency by directly injecting the high
temperature drain into the condensate system.
2.
Function
(4)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-5-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-5-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The TGS uses steam to prevent leakage of steam from the HP-T shaft packing and the main
valves gland, and to prevent air in-leaks from the LP-T and the shaft packing of the RFP-T.
2.
Function
When reactor pressure is less than 0.7MPa: The seal steam from the house boiler is supplied
as the gland seal steam.
(b)
When reactor pressure is higher than 0.7MPa: the AS from the MS header or the ES from the
HP-T is supplied to the GSE as the heating steam, and the seal steam generated by heating
makeup condensate water is supplied to the gland.
(2)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-6-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The OG recombines flammable gases (Hydrogen (H2) and Oxygen (O2)), which are
generated from the radiolysis of reactor cooling water, into steam. The OG sufficiently reduces the
emission rate of radioactive particles before discharging them to the environment. The OG transfers
the off-gas from the Gland Steam Exhauster and the Mechanical Vacuum Pump (MVP) to the stack.
The OG is designed to perform the required functions during all operating modes based upon the
established environmental design conditions.
2.
Function
The OG Recombiner recombines the Hydrogen and the Oxygen in the off-gas diluted with
the steam of the SJAE. The OG Preheater is installed to improve the recombination efficiency. The
recombined moisture vapour is cooled below 50oC by the OG Condenser in order to condense and its
volume is reduced, and the off-gas temperature is decreased below 10oC by the OG Cooler
Condenser to reduce moisture. This off-gas is cooled and dried, and sent to the OG Charcoal
Adsorbers to reduce radioactivity where Xe and Kr decay.
The off-gas passing through the OG Charcoal Adsorber is removed from the radioactive
particles and solid substances by the OG Filter before being discharged into the environment through
the stack.
The off-gas monitor and the stack monitor observe the level of radioactivity in the off-gas.
3.
Configuration
Figure 3-7-1 shows the system schematic diagram. The outline of the main equipment is as
follows:
(1)
OG Preheater (1 unit)
This preheater heats the off-gas by House Steam (HS) to prevent water drops that would
adversely affect the performance of the catalyst.
(2)
OG Recombiner (1unit)
This recombiner recombines explosive gases H2 and O2 in the off-gas from the SJAE, and H2
concentration at the OG Recombiner outlet is reduced to below the flammability level.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-7-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
OG Condenser (1unit)
This condenser cools off-gas from the OG Recombiner, and condenses moisture vapour in the
off-gas. The drain generated in the OG Condenser is returned to the condenser.
(4)
(5)
(6)
OG Filter (1 unit)
This filter removes radioactive particles and solid materials in the off-gas and prevents
radioactive particles and solid materials from being released into the environment.
(7)
OG Ejector (1 unit)
This ejector maintains the operating pressure behind the OG Charcoal Adsorber in the
condition of negative pressure, and discharges the off-gas to the environment.
(8)
OG Blower (1 unit)
This blower is utilised to treat a large amount of the off-gas, and is operated only during the
vacuum-up of the condenser. During normal operation, this blower is available as a backup to
the OG Ejector.
(9)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-7-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4.
(1)
(2)
To prevent off-gas leakage outside the facility, the OG Charcoal Absorber room is operated at
a negative pressure.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-7-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
This system supplies service water (sea water) into the condenser tube as cooling water. The
system is also designed to remove scales in each cooling tube of the condenser by ball cleaning and
backwashing during the plant operation.
2.
Function
The CW runs continuously during the generation of power, including start-up and shutdown,
supplies the cooling water (service water) to the condenser water box by the Circulating Water Pump
(CWP), and condenses steam (the main turbine exhaust and the RFP-T exhaust) flowing into the
condenser. The steam is indirectly cooled through surface contact with the cooling water flowing in
the condenser tubes. During abnormal operations, the system shall be designed so that the CWPs
continue supplying cooling water to the condenser, even in transient operating states such as load
rejection and turbine trip. The power cycle heat sink is designed to maintain the temperature of the
water entering the CW. The service water is discharged into the sea through the discharge canal.
The CW has a condenser tube cleaning system which continuously cleans condenser tubes
to remove bio-fouling and water stain from the tubes, thereby preventing degradation of the
condenser cooling efficiency, and corrosion in the condenser cooling tubes.
The CW consists of the following components:
-
Condenser water box drainage system which consists of a pump and a sump
GA91-9901-0032-00001
3-8-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
CHAPTER 4
Auxiliary Systems
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The RCW removes the heat generated within equipment or rooms with cooling water. The removed
heat is transferred into the sea or the ultimate heat sink through the Reactor Building Service Water System
(RSW).
2.
Function
(1)
(2)
(3)
To cool and remove the heat generated in the RHR Heat Exchangers.
(4)
To cool and remove the heat generated in the reactor normal auxiliary system equipment, waste
treatment system equipment and auxiliary system equipment inside the T/B that handle radioactive
fluid.
3.
Configuration
The RCW is composed of three systems: a closed loop corresponding to Division A, Division B and
(1)
RCW pump:
Number
(2)
4.
Operation modes
(1)
During normal plant operation, cooling water is provided to each auxiliary equipment of normal
operation systems, upon operating one RCW and Reactor Building Service Water system (RSW)
pump, as well as one RCW heat exchanger for Division A, B and C, respectively.
During this operation mode, one RCW and RSW pump, and one heat exchanger are in standby mode,
and a backup unit is available in each system at all times.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-1-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-1-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4-1-3
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
In order to cool and remove the heat from the RCW, the RSW supplies service water via the RCW
heat exchanger.
2.
Function
The RSW takes in service water from the water intake pit, removes heat within the RCW heat
exchanger, and discharges the water to the water discharge pit. The RSW consists of three independent
divisions (i.e. Divisions A, B and C) corresponding to those of the RCW.
3.
Configuration
The RSW is composed of the following equipment, per division.
RSW pump:
Number
Rated capacity
1800m3/h/unit
4.
Operation Modes
(1)
(2)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-2-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
From RCW
From FEI
RCW Heat Exchanger
MO
To RCW
MO
RSW Strainer
MO
From RCW
MO
To RCW
From FEI
RSW Strainer
MO
RSW Pump
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-2-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
(1)
(2)
To adjust indoor temperature and humidity in order to provide a workable environment for operators
and workers.
(3)
To limit the leakage or spread of radioactive materials from devices or equipment to the room, during
operation or maintenance/inspection, and confine such radioactive materials locally. At the same time,
to carry out the necessary ventilation to maintain the cleanliness of indoor air. Additionally, to process
contaminated air with the exhaust system filter as necessary.
2.
(1)
Function
To prevent spread of contamination
HVAC in areas which may be subject to contamination by radioactivity shall maintain the area to a
negative pressure to prevent spread of radioactive materials to other areas in the event of
contamination. At the same time, the HVAC must possess functions to dilute the indoor contaminated
air by securing appropriate frequency of ventilation. Additionally, the HVACs shall be fitted with
appropriate filtering.
(2)
Heat removal
Functions to remove heat release from electrical/equipment facilities and heat emission equipment
such as high-temperature pipe shall be available.
(3)
Ventilation
Functions to supply fresh air to operators and workers shall be available.
(4)
Air conditioning
Functions to maintain appropriate indoor environment (temperature, humidity) for operators, workers
and equipment shall be available.
3.
(1)
Configuration
Each HVAC facility is composed of the following:
Fans, air conditioners, louvers, filters, cooling/heating coils, ducts, humidifiers, control
instrumentation devices, etc.
(2)
Air is supplied from clean areas. Clean areas are maintained at a positive pressure relative to areas
that may be subject to contamination, and exhaust is conducted from areas that may be subject to
contamination. Exhaust from areas that may be subject to contamination shall be emitted from the
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-3-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Regarding rooms with high heat generation amounts, the cooling of the atmosphere is performed
locally by installing air conditioners. When room temperature is low, the heater shall be used as
necessary to maintain the prescribed temperature.
(4)
The R/B areas (R/A) and T/B area (T/A) fan/exhaust fan, as well as the supply/exhaust process
devices, which are major systems, shall be shared facilities. Four units, each with a capacity of 33%,
R/A and T/A fan/exhaust fans shall be installed, and one for each shall be a backup unit (see Figures
4-3-1 and 4-3-2 for an overview of the R/A and T/A HVAC system).
(5)
Cooling of rooms that require heat removal during loss of normal power is conducted by
fans/exhaust fans that receive supply from an emergency power supply, or air conditioners.
(6)
As for the MCR area, two units, each with a 100% capacity, MCR supply/exhaust and recirculation
supply fans shall be installed, and one of each of the two units shall be a backup unit (see Figures
4-3-3 for an overview of the MCR HVAC system).
(7)
As for the Rw/B area, two units, each with 100% capacity, Rw/B supply/exhaust fans shall be
installed, and one of each of the two units shall be a backup unit (see Figures 4-3-4 for an overview
of the Rw/B HVAC system).
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-3-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(8)
4-3-3
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-3-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-3-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The purpose of the IA is to supply compressed air to the Air-Operated (AO) Valve for plant
2.
Function
Two IA compressors with 100% capacity are installed in parallel (1 backup). To prevent drain
blockage of the instrumentation pipings, and in order for the AO valve and AO instrumentation and control
equipment to operate smoothly, oil-less, dehumidified and dust-less compressed air is supplied. The IA
schematic flow chart is shown in Figure 4-4-1.
3.
(1)
Configuration
IA Compressor (100% capacity2 units, 1 backup)
The air compressor compresses atmospheric air and supplies compressed air to the equipment.
(2)
(3)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-4-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
T/B
To T/A
To S/B
To R/B
SA
To RW/B
Others
IA
Compressor
(A)
IA
Compressor
(B)
IA Air
Reserver
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-4-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
(1)
The Sampling System (SAM) is used to confirm the performance of the plant, systems, and
equipment to ensure precise operation and maintenance of the plant. This is carried out by either of
the following two approaches: measurement of conductivity, hydrogen ion concentration, or
dissolved oxygen in process fluids with pre-installed instruments, or chemical analysis of extracted
samples from each system.
(2)
The Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) provides a sample of reactor coolant and containment
atmosphere in order to confirm the soundness of radioactive barriers and FAs following an accident.
Function
2.
(1)
SAM
This system monitors the process fluid of the plant by chemical analyses and process instruments,
and is composed of a sample cooler rack, a sample analysis rack, a sampling rack, a transmitter panel,
and a sampling sink or sampling tap.
(2)
PASS
This system consists of a device which collects samples outside the secondary containment and a
local (on-site) control panel.
Configuration
3.
(1)
SAM
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-5-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
PASS
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-5-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4.
Sampling point
Purpose
RPV bottom
F/D inlet
F/D outlet
Main steam
S/P water
RHR water
OG recombiner inlet
Monitoring of performance
Hotwell outlet
Reactor coolant
Off-gas
Main condenser
Discharge water
demineraliser
Discharge canal
GA91-9901-0032-00001
4-5-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
CHAPTER 5
Electrical Power Supply
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The Station Electrical Power Supply system transmits electrical power to the external grid,
supplies the electrical power to the equipment needed for the power plant operation, and ensures the
power plant safety without any loss of power during the normal operation and the design basis
accident.
2.
(1)
Function
The electrical power generated by the generator is transmitted to 500kV external grids (4
lines) through the Main Transformer (MTr). This system also supplies the auxiliary power
through the House Transformer (HTr). The 500kV transmission lines can transmit the
electrical power corresponding to the sum of four power stations even if one line is not
available.
(2)
The auxiliary power supply can be supplied through a Low Voltage Start-up Transformer
(LSTr) from the 66kV bus, other than that of via the HTr.
(3)
An emergency power supply is provided through LSTr from 66kV to ECCS and to the
equipment to shut down the reactor, the turbine, and the generator safely at the time of a Loss
Of Off-site Power (LOOP) or a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in combination with
LOOP.
3.
Configuration
4 buses in 2-line
(b)
4 buses in 2-line
(c)
3 buses in 3-line
(d)
(e)
(f)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-1-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
5-1-2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4 buses in 2-line
This bus receives the power through the LSTr from the 66kV switchyards bus, and No. 6 and
No. 7 units use the power in common.
(b)
4 buses in 2-line
The loads required for the normal operation are distributed to 4 buses, and the generator
supplies the power directly through the HTr to the 6.9kV normal bus while the plant is under
operation. At the time of the plant start-up (until the generator can feed power through the
HTr) or at plant shutdown, the 66kV switching station supplies power through the LSTr to the
6.9kV normal bus. The load exceeding 300kW is directly connected to the 6.9kV medium
voltage bus, and a lower load than 300 kW is supplied from the low voltage bus.
(c)
3 buses in 3-line
The bus supplies power to engineered safety systems and its auxiliary equipment that are
connected with three independent buses respectively. During normal operation, the bus
receives power from the LSTr through the common bus. In the event of a design basis accident
(loss of power), the ED/G supplies power to the emergency bus.
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
1 unit
The MTr steps up the 3-phase and 3-line voltage 27 kV generated by the generator to 525kV
via the Isolated Phase Bus from the three bushings installed in the generator bottom, and
supplies it to the ultra-high voltage switching station.
(h)
2 units
This transformer is directly connected to the generator. This transformer steps down the
voltage from the generator voltage to the voltage corresponding to the station medium voltage
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-1-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
system in order to supply power to the normal load in the power plant while the generator is in
operation.
(i)
This transformer steps down voltage of the 66kV bus to the voltage corresponding to the
station medium voltage system in order to supply power to the auxiliary common bus,
emergency bus, and the normal bus during the plant outage period.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-1-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The ED/G is an emergency AC power supply equipment which provides power to engineered
safety systems and to the necessary loads required to shut down the reactor in the event of a LOOP
accident or in the event of a combination of a LOOP and a LOCA.
Function
2.
(1)
The Diesel Generator (ED/G) supplies Alternative Current (AC) power to the necessary load
in the event of a LOOP or in the event of a combination of a LOOP and a LOCA. Therefore,
the ED/G should have features that allow a rapid automatic start-up and a rapid load
connection.
(2)
The ED/G should be able to perform start-up automatically and to maintain the voltage and the
frequency within the specified value in the rated output until the generator stops manually.
(3)
(4)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-2-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Configuration
ED/G (C):
RCIC(DC)
RHR(LPFL ) (A)
ED/G
Div-
ADS
HPCF (B)
RHR(LPFL ) (B)
ED/G
Div-
HPCF (C)
RHR(LPFL ) (C)
ED/G
Div-
Diesel engine
(i) The ED/G should be able to start-up automatically using compressed air.
(ii) The ED/G should be able to start-up and shut down by the local control panel or by a remote
control operation from the MCR.
(iii) The ED/G should start-up automatically by an automatic start-up signal except when the
lockout relay for ED/G is operating.
(b)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-2-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Day Tank
A
FQ
A
A
Ou tside
R/B
Inside
R/B
B
B
ED/G Engine
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-2-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
engine start-up.
The cooling water cools the engine while the engine is in operation.
(c)
Generator
The generator is a synchronous generator of an air-cooling, protection, drip-proof, forced
lubrication, and rotary-field type.
The generator stops automatically for protection when a generator internal failure, engine
overspeed, or generator reverse power is detected. However, the generator does not stop in the
event of a generator reverse power in case of LOCA.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-2-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4.
The generator should be able to automatically start-up and remain in standby operation during
LOCA (reactor water level low or RCCV pressure high) signal.
(b)
The generator should be able to automatically start up and continuously operate in the event of
LOOP.
5.
(1)
(2)
The make-up water to the cooling water expansion tank of the diesel cooling water system is
supplied from the Make Up Water System (MUWP).
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-2-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
(1)
Purpose
The DC power supply system provides the power for equipment and the control /
instrumentation during normal plant operation.
(2)
The DC power supply is used to power the auxiliaries which perform plant shutdown, and
control in the event of loss of onsite AC power or a LOCA.
2.
(1)
Function
Battery capacity
The battery should have an adequate capacity to operate the following equipment:
(a) Circuit breaker control
(b) Emergency load necessary for safe plant shutdown
(c) Instrumentation control load
(d) DC lighting
(e) Initial excitation of the ED/G
(2)
(a)
(b)
DC250V system
-Emergency oil pumps, etc.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-3-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Configuration
There are four individual 125V emergency DC power supplies of A, B, C, and D types, and a
250V normal DC power supply (See Figure. 5-3-1 and Figure 5-3-2).
(b)
Each system consists of a battery and a battery charger configured with a Silicon dropper and
a rectifier (See Fig. 5-3-1 and 5-3-2).
(c)
The 250V DC power supply system supplies power to the DC load that is not categorised to a
safety system of a relatively large capacity such as DC motor.
1 set
1 set
1 set
1 set
1 set
1 panel
1 panel
1 panel
1 panel
1 panel
1 panel
1 panel
1 panel
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-3-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
MCC
MCC
MCC
MCC
Interlock
DC125V
Battery (B)
DC 125V
Battery (A)
DC 125V
Backup
Charger
(A)(B)
DC 125V
Charger
(A)
Interlock
Interlock
DC 125V
Charger
(B)
Interlock
Silicon
Dropper
Silicon
Dropper
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-3-3
UPS
Emergency D/G
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
P/C
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
M/C
UPS
Emergency D/G
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
P/C
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
M/C
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
UK ABWR
Revision 2
DC250V
P/C
P/C
P/C
Battery
MCC
Interlock
80
Spare
Motor
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-3-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The AC Power Supply system supplies AC power to the instrumentation, controller, and
plant process computer.
2.
(1)
Function
Uninterruptible AC Power Supply System (UPS)
This system supplies AC power to the safety protection system (4 divisions), and to the
control and instrumentation requiring continuous monitoring.
(2)
(3)
3.
Configuration
(1)
(a)
This system receives electrical power from the emergency 480V power supply system and the
DC power supply system, and supplies stable AC power to the safety protection system.
Normally, the UPS converts the emergency AC power supply to DC in the UPS, and reverses
it to AC again. Furthermore, this system receives power from a DC power supply when the
emergency AC power supply is not available due to a LOOP, and supplies power to each load
after converting DC power into AC power with an inverter. The power is supplied from the
emergency AC power again after the emergency AC power supply is re-established by the
ED/G. This changeover is performed automatically without any loss of power.
(b)
Each division of the UPS has a standby transformer, so that power can be supplied to the load
in the event of UPS failure or during maintenance period.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-4-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
This system steps down normal or emergency AC 480V motor control centre voltage to AC
120V through the transformer, and supplies power to each load from a distribution panel. It
consists of the three subsystems.
(b)
Normally, the system receives power from the emergency AC 480V MCC, but this can be
manually switched to the normal AC MCC when the emergency AC power supply is not
available.
(c)
1 power supply for normal use instrumentation equipment in the turbine building and reactor
building) is the tapped from emergency AC power line.
This system receives electrical power from the emergency 480V power supply system and the
DC power supply system. Normally, the UPS converts emergency AC power supply to DC by
rectifying it in the UPS, and reverses it to AC again. At the time of a LOOP, this system
receives power from the DC power supply of the battery by switching a thyristor, and supplies
the power to each load after converting it into AC with an inverter. Power is supplied from the
emergency AC power supply when the emergency AC power is reinstated. This changeover is
performed automatically without momentary loss of power.
(b)
The two UPSs shall be installed to supply power to the plant process computer.
(c)
Each UPS has a standby transformer, so that power can be supplied to the load, even in the
event of UPS failure or during maintenance period.
(4) UPS
(a)
The UPS receives power from the AC power, converts it into DC with the rectifier, and
supplies stable AC power supply to the load through the inverter.
(b)
The UPS closes the thyristor switch on the DC power supply connection circuit immediately
after the AC power supply blackout, and supplies AC power to the load from the
uninterruptible power supply.
(c)
When the AC power supply is reinstated and its condition is confirmed, the thyristor switch of
the DC power connection circuit is automatically opened and the equipment returns to normal
operation.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-4-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
MCC
MCC
DC125V
52CI
52R
72B
Thyristor switch
Rectifier
Inverter
52CL
Thyristor switch
52C2
Thyristor switch
52CS
Mechanical
Interlock
52I
52L1
AC 120V
UPS
Distribution
Panel
52L2
AC 120V
UPS
Distribution
Panel
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-4-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(DIV-)
125V DC
480V MCC
(DIV-)
480V MCC
480V MCC
125V DC
480V MCC
DC-AC
(DIV-)
480V MCC
480V MCC
125V DC
480V MCC
DC-AC
120V UPS A
120V
(DIV-)
(DIV-)
480V MCC
480V MCC
125V DC
480V MCC
DC-AC
120V UPS B
120V
Instrumentation
Bus A
480V MCC
DC-AC
120V UPS C
120V
Instrumentation
Bus B
120V UPS D
Instrumentation
Bus C
Instrumentation
Bus
Process Instrumentation
Figure 5-4-2 Single Line Diagram of Power Supply System for Instrumentation
ABWR General Description
GA91-9901-0032-00001
5-4-4
Neutron Monitoring
120V/240V
ECCS Circuit
480V MCC
480V MCC
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
(DIV-)
Process Instrumentation
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
ECCS Circuit
Neutron Monitoring
Process Instrumentation
Neutron Monitoring
ECCS Circuit
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
Process Instrumentation
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
ECCS Circuit
Neutron Monitoring
(DIV-)
UK ABWR
Revision 2
DC
UPS
forComputer
Plant Process Computer
UPS for
Inverter
Thyristor
switch
Thyristor
switch
Thyristor
switch
Mechanical
Interlock
Rectif ier
Standby
Transformer
Inverter
Thyristor
switch
Thyristor
switch
Mechanical
Interlock
Spare
Spare
AC 210V
Distribution
Panel
AC 210V
Distribution
Panel
AC 210V
Distribution
Panel
AC 105V
Distribution
Panel
Distribution
Panel
Distribution
Panel
Figure 5-4-3 Single Line Diagram of UPS for Plant Process Computer
ABWR General Description
5-4-5
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UPS
Process Computer
UPSfor
for Plant
Computer
Thyristor
switch
Rectif ier
Standby
Transformer
UK ABWR
Revision 2
CHAPTER 6
Instrumentation and Control Systems
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The operators' accurate and rapid understanding of the plant operating conditions is essential for
operating the plant. As a general rule for nuclear power plants, a centralised monitoring and control system
for all operation controls in the Main Control Room (MCR) is adopted, and the cornerstone of this system
is the main control panel.
The design concept is as follows:
(1)
As long as there are no abnormalities during normal start-up and shutdown and normal operation, as
a general rule, the control panel is configured so that all monitoring operations can be conducted by
the operator.
(2)
As a rule, the control panel design is configured so that monitoring and operations in the event of an
abnormal condition can be conducted by the operator until the plant reaches a stable state.
Function
2.
(1)
(2)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-1-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Alarms
In order to prevent information overload to operators due to simultaneous outbreak of multiple
alarms at times of plant abnormalities, alarms have been prioritised into Important Alarm and
Individual System Alarm. Further, alarms have been separated into the following ranks: major
failure, minor failure, and status display.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-1-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Configuration
The human-machine interface functional structure chart is shown in Figure 6-1-1, and the appearance
Fixed Mimic
Process Status
Major Equipment Operating Status
Large Screen
FD
CRT x 7
Main Panel
Safety
System
FD
Non-Safety
System
FD
Safety System
Controller Group
Non-Safety System
Controller Group
Process
Computer
System
Chartchart
6-1-3
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Fixed-position
Important
Alarms
Mimic Display
System-level
Alarms
Large
Variable Display
Hard
Switches
CRT
CRT
FD
Monitoring / operations are conducted through the use of the main panel and CRT (or equivalent), the FD,
the hard switch panel (hard-wired switches) and display devices in the large display panel
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-1-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
For safe operation, the monitoring and display, in the MCR, of plant parameters such as reactor
pressure and reactor water level is necessary. If abnormal conditions which could impair the safety of the
reactor are detected, the RPV instrumentation provides signals to activate Reactor Protection Systems
(RPS).
2.
Function
In normal operation including plant start-up and shutdown, pressure vessel instrumentation
constantly measure reactor pressure, reactor water level, core flow, and core temperature, and send signals
to the MCR monitoring instruments and related operation systems. During accidents such as the LOCA,
RPV Instrumentation detects abnormal conditions and releases a signal to activate the RPS and ECCS.
3.
Configuration
(1)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-2-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-2-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-2-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(4)
(a) Coolant temperature change rate during reactor start-up and shutdown
Reactor coolant change rate must be below a predetermined value during reactor start-up and
shutdown.
(b) Pressure vessel upper and lower temperature difference before RIP start-up
In order for the RIP to start-up, the temperature difference between the pressure vessels upper and
lower areas must be less than a predetermined value.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-2-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-2-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The purpose of the RFC is to control reactor power level by controlling the recirculation flow. In
order to change the recirculation flow, this system changes the rotational speed of the Reactor
Internal Pump (RIP) by changing the frequency and voltage of the AC power supplied to the RIP
driving motor.
For this purpose, the Reactor Internal Pump-Adjustable Speed Drive (RIP-ASD) is connected to each
RIP to change the rotational speed, and to supply the above-mentioned AC power.
2.
Function
2.1
(1)
Master controller
When the RFC is in automatic mode, the master controller receives the load demand error signal
from the Automatic Power Regulation System (APR) and sends the core flow demand signal to the
flow controller. Through the operation of this controller, reactor power is controlled automatically
based on the power set point of the APR.
(2)
Flow controller
The flow controller receives the core flow demand signal and the actual core flow signal to
adjust the demand signal of the RIP speed. Through the operation of this controller, core flow is
controlled automatically.
(3)
2)
Manual mode
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-3-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(4)
2)
Manual mode
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-3-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
2.2
(1)
The RPT with the reactor scram can mitigate the transient reactor power increase by use of the
turbine trip or the generator load rejection. The turbine trip, generator load rejection-RPT
function is shown in Figure 6-3-2.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-3-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
ATWS-RPT function
The ATWS-RPT function acts as one of the functions that are used to mitigate ATWS events.
By tripping the RIPs, the core flow is reduced and negative reactivity is rapidly inserted. This
effectively mitigates the increase of reactor power in the case of the occurrence of an ATWS event.
The ATWS-RPT function is shown in Figure 6-3-3.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-3-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Power supply
The power supplies for the RIP consist of 10 RIP-ASDs, and while the power supply for 4 of the
RIP-ASDs are directly connected to the bus, the other 6 RIP-ASDs are connected to two
Motor-Generator sets (MG sets) in order to ensure electrical inertia.
The configuration of RIP power supply is shown in Figure 6-3-4.
0
RIP
Disconnector
270
Unit transformer
breaker
90
G
F
E
180
Unit transformer
Arrangement of RIP
Auxiliary transformer
Auxiliary transformer
6.9kV M/C
A1
6.9kV M/C
6.9kV M/C
A2
B1
6.9kV M/C
B2
Gen
From start-up
transformer
From start-up
transformer
From start-up
transformer
From start-up
transformer
Input
transformer
DS
RIP-ASD
RIP
A
RIP
F
RIP
B
RIP
E
RIP
H
RIP
D
RIP
J
RIP
C
RIP
G
RIP
K
DS : Disconnection Switch
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-3-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The purpose of the FDWC is to maintain the water level in the reactor pressure vessel by adjusting feed
water flow and/or the Reactor Water Cleanup System (CUW) blow down flow while the plant is
operating.
(2)
The FDWC adjusts reactor feed water flow in order to maintain the pre-set water level determined from
the steam separator performance demands for the pressure vessel water level over the entire power
range of the reactor during normal operation.
2.
Function
The FDWC has the following 4 functions:
(1)
(2)
Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (T/D-RFP) flow control function (T/D-RFP Control Unit)
The T/D-RFP flow control function sends a T/D-RFP speed request signal to the reactor feedwater
pump turbine (RFP-T) control instrumentation.
(3)
Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (M/D-RFP) flow control function (M/D-RFP Control Unit )
The M/D-RFP flow control function sends signals to the flow control valve (FCV) or the low flow
control valve (LFCV) installed in each M/D-RFP unit.
(4)
CUW blow down flow control function (CUW blow down Control Unit )
The CUW blow down flow control function sends valve open commands to the CUW valve.
Although this function takes place in the CUW blow down control unit, controls are limited to plant
start-up and shutdown (until reactor pressurisation is completed).
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-4-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Configuration
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-4-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
In order to retain fuel integrity even in the event of an incorrect continuous CR withdrawal of CR
when the reactor power exceeds 30% of rated power, the Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) signals
surrounding the selected CR are monitored, and CR withdrawal block signal is released.
2.
LPRM has 4 layers, (levels A,B,C,D). The signals are processed into 2 sub-channels, i.e., LPRM A, C level
(as one sub-channel) and LPRM B, D level (as the other sub-channel)..
(1)
MRBM level
In order to monitor local power rise in the event of incorrect CR withdrawal, the output of the LPRM
surrounding the selected control rod are averaged as Multichannel Rod Block Monitor (MRBM)
values.
(2)
Initialisation
complete
Comparison of LPRM
average value and APRM
Control rod
withdrawal permit
CR position signals are received from the two RC&IS systems. Normally only one signals (from
either of the two RC&IC system) are used. However if a bypass or failure signal (of the
corresponding RC&IS) is detected, signals from the other system are used.
When a CR is not selected, MRBM is bypassed.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-5-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
LPRM monitoring
Regarding the selected LPRM, input values are compared and processed in the following manner.
Average value
calculation
LPRM value 5
Automatic bypass
(4)
CR withdrawal condition
(a)
(b)
(5)
(a)
(b)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-5-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(6)
CR block logic
After the reactor achieves power of approximately 30%, CR withdrawal monitoring is conducted
using the MRBM. When local power rises above setting values due to CR withdrawal, a CR block
signal is sent to the RC & IS to block CR withdrawal.
The MRBM A channel and B channel both have the same input signals and processing contents, and
CR withdrawal will be blocked by either of their operations. Either channel can be bypassed in case
of failure.
3.
(1)
Configuration
Design Standard
(a) Under the worst MRBM input bypass conditions allowed, the MRBM prevents incidence of loss of
fuel integrity from an accidental CR withdrawal.
(b) The MRBM outputs a signal so that operators can evaluate changes in the local power level during
withdrawal or insertion of a CR.
(c) Taking into consideration gang mode CR withdrawal, CR withdrawal of up to 8 rods shall be
simultaneously monitored.
(2)
System Structure
The MRBM is configured with 2 identical function units A and B. Each unit has CR placements by
the RC & IS, APRM units, core flows, and LPRM value inputs. When the output level reaches the
set value, the control rod block signal is released to the RC & IS. Monitoring parameters necessary
for operation are output to other systems.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-5-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
During low power state (reactor startup and shutdown), CR patterns are monitored so that
the value determined for the reactivity worth of each CR or CR group is not exceeded. When the
CR withdrawal or insertion pattern differs from the preset RWM logic, CR withdrawal or
insertion is blocked.
2.
Function
(1)
reactivity
Maximum reactivity worth of one CR does not exceed a predetermined value of reactivity
(2)
During low power states of reactor (start-up and shutdown), the insertion or withdrawal of
(3)
sequence.
(4)
(5)
Bypass Functionality
As rod worth is low during high reactor power, the RWM is automatically bypassed at a
reactor power output of 20% or more power (LPSP: Low Power Set Point), and at a predetermined
power (LPAP: Low Power Alarm Point) alarm output is also blocked.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-6-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
(1)
Configuration
System structure
The RWM is configured with 2 channels. Each channel is independent of the other so that
even if 1 system fails, the other channel can block CR operation. Either of the channels can be
bypassed.
4.
(1)
Interlock
Monitors all CRs, and when even 1 rod violates the criteria, output of the CR operation block
sends a signal to the RC&IS.
(2)
(3)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-6-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Section 7
1.
Purpose
The purpose of this system is to drive the FMCRD motors to set the position of the Control Rods
(CR) to control the reactor power. This is performed either manually (by the operator) or by the Automatic
Power Regulator (APR). The system also monitors CR position and provides necessary information for rod
control.
2.
Function
This system executes the following functions through control of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) / Fine
Moves the CR according to the manual operation signal or the APR automatic control function, and
thereby controls reactor power.
(2)
(3)
(4)
Conducts automatic insertion of all the operable FMCRD when a scram signal is issued (Scram
follow function).
(5)
Following the Alternative Rod Insertion (ARI) signal from the backup reactor shutdown system in the
case of Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS), conducts automatic insertion for all operable
FMCRD (ARI function).
(6)
Following the Selected Control Rod Run In (SCRRI) signal, inserts selected CR for the purpose
of core thermal hydraulic safety.
(7)
In the case of undesirable core reactivity formation due to CR movement, or when monitoring of the
reactor by the CR drive becomes no longer possible due to instrumentation system failure, the CR
movement shall be blocked.
(8)
The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) is used to verify that CR patterns match their prescribed patterns.
(9)
Conducts gang CR selection based on the Reference Rod Pull Sequence (RRPS).
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-7-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Configuration
The RC & IS is configured as a duplex system, with the 2 channels of the RC & IS having the same
function. The 2 channel control output is set to prevent activation unless normal drive and emergency
drive signals match. Regarding CR extraction block functions, extraction block is determined by the
block signal output from 1 channel.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-7-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The purpose of the RPS is to perform safe emergency reactor shutdown (CR emergency insertion:
referred to as scram) at preset conditions, when the reactor is in an unstable state, or in order to prevent
operation under conditions in which there is a possibility of reaching an unsafe state.
In other words, the RPS detects abnormal neutron flux or reactor pressure changes during operation
so as to automatically start the RPS, to maintain the integrity of fuel.
2.
Function
The RPS system is configured with 4 divisions of detectors, trip channels, and main scram circuits
(1)
Safety
While satisfying the continuity of operation, the RPS system is configured in the following manner
to ensure high plant reliability.
(a) Configured with 4 independent trip systems, with each trip system provided with at least 4
independent detectors or related equipment for each measured variable.
(b) Use of the 2 out of 4 logical composition. Each trip system will be activated when trip relevant
signals are received from 2 or more trip detectors, and when 2 or more trip systems are in a tripped
state, scram signals are released.
(c) Trip system reset is performed manually by the reset switch.
(2)
Reliability
In order to make the possibility of an accidental scram failure (failure to trip or spurious trip) under
predetermined scram conditions extremely small, the RPS systems shall be designed as follows.
(a) To perform fail-safe type operations, and in the occurrence of power loss or abnormalities such as
failure of equipment relating to safety protection systems, it shall be configured to trip.In order to
minimise interactions increasing the possibility of an accidental scram failure or malfunctional scram,
the 4 trip systems are physically and electrically separated from other functions as well as from each
other.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-8-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(c) In the case of partial sharing between the RPS system and Instrumentation and Control systems, the
two systems are physically and electrically separated so that failure in Instrumentation and Control
Systems does not affect the RPS system.
(3)
Function test
(a) As a principle, together with function being periodically testable during reactor operation, in order to
verify the preservation of soundness or redundancy, the RPS is designed so that each channel can be
independently tested.
(b) The RPS is designed so that the following tests can be conducted without reactor scram during
normal operation.
(i)
Manual scram pilot valve operation test : Verification of scram pilot valve solenoid non-excitation
by means of the manual scram switch (SW).
(ii) Automatic scram pilot valve activation test: Verification of trip channel (ch) and scram pilot valve
solenoid non-excitation by means of the test SW for each trip ch.
(iii) Detector activation test: Verification of trip ch activation by means of inputting calibration
simulation signals from the trip ch test terminal and each detectors calibration tap.
(iv) CR scram test: Verification of 1 group affiliated with the same HCU by means of manual SW or
scram time of 1 CR.
2.
(1)
Configuration
Configuration
The RPS system structure is shown in the Figure 6-8-1. System structure elements hold the following
functions.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-8-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(a)
Scram action
As shown in the Figure 6-8-2, each pair of the CRs is connected to an HCU. In each HCU, one
double solenoid activated scram pilot valve and one scram valve are installed. The scram valve is
operated by the IA, whose supply is controlled with the scram pilot valve.
The scram pilot valve double solenoid is connected by the main scram circuits A and B. Normally,
the scram solenoid is in an alternating current energised state and the scram valve is closed using the
IA. When a scram condition (signal) at the main scram circuit A or B is detected, the two scram
solenoids become de-energised, and the IA is discharged from the scram pilot valve thus opening
the scram valve. As a result, high pressure water flows into the CRD, the hollow piston separates
from the ball nut, and the control rod is quickly inserted into the core. When only one of the scram
solenoids becomes de-excited, it assumes the so-called half scram state. In this situation, scram
valves shall not open, and a scram is not performed.
(b)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-8-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
B. Normally, the solenoid is in a de-energised state. When a scram condition (signal) is detected, the
solenoid undergoes energisation by direct currents, discharges the IA supply to each HCU, and
opens the scram valve irrespective of the state of the scram pilot valve. At this time, even if one of
the two backup scram valves becomes excited, the IA is discharged, leading to a successful scram.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-8-4
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-8-5
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The Containment Vessel and PCIS prevent release of radioactive materials to the environment by
closing pipes, ducts and access paths which penetrate the Containment Vessel.
2.
Function
For primary systems which have the possibility of releasing radioactive materials directly outside of
the Containment Vessel, the PCIS can perform automatic closure (isolation) of pipes. To enable this
automatic isolation, parameters are monitored for this equipment and when the parameters exceed
predetermined values, automatic isolation operation is initiated. The functions of the PCIS are summarised
as:
(1)
(2)
Closing the radioactive material release routes and trapping radioactive materials within the
containment vessel for a LOCA within the containment vessel.
(3)
Preventing the release of radioactive materials for primary system pipe rupture accidents outside
the containment vessel.
3.
Configuration
The PCIS is configured with a sensor, trip channel, switch, valve and its drive mechanisms, and
(1)
A Type
A type consists of two isolation valves installed in series on either side of the Containment Vessel (as
close as possible to the vessel) for all pipes which directly connect with the reactor pressure vessel
and penetrate the containment vessel. Examples include MSIV, CUW valves, RCIC steam supply
valves and reactor coolant sampling valves.
(2)
B Type
B type consists of two isolation valves in series installed on the outer side of the Containment Vessel
for pipes that do not directly connect to the reactor pressure vessel, but penetrate and are open within
the containment vessel. For example, valves installed on open pipes such as the SGTS (Standby Gas
Treatment System) valves, PCV vent / purge valves, and D/W sump valves.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-9-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(3)
C Type
C type consists of one isolation valve installed on the outer side of the Containment Vessel for pipes
that penetrate the Containment Vessel, but are neither directly connected to the reactor pressure
vessel, nor do they open within the Containment Vessel. Examples include the RCW valves and the
IA valves.
Selected valves within A and B Types are automatically isolated (valve closed) in an incident,
based on the importance of the system and the potential consequences of non-isolation.
(4)
circuit configuration.
(a)
(i) Main steam system isolation valve group (MSIV, MS drain line isolation valve, reactor water sample
isolation valve)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Isolation valves closed by signals other than PCIS automatic isolation signals (RCIC, HPCF, RHR
system isolation valves and other test valves, injection valves)
(5)
activation signals, isolation actions by reactor water level fluctuation share a common activation signal.
In the event of an accident the plant status changes as time elapses. In particular, for accidents such as
LOCA and Feedwater loss, the reactor water level drops as time passes, and isolation valves that have
reached their configuration values will sequentially close in accordance with this.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-9-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The purpose of the NMS is to monitor reactor power levels from start-up to beyond rated
power.
2.
Function
The NMS monitors reactor power in two ranges: the start-up range and the power range. If
concerns of loss of fuel cladding integrity due to excess reactor power are present, this shall be
detected beforehand, sending a signal to the RC & IS or the Reactor Protection System (RPS), from
there CR block or reactor scram shall be conducted, to retain integrity of fuel cladding. The NMS
measures core flow using core plate delta pressure, which is used for calculations of core flow rapid
coast down scram and flow rate dependent setting values.
Also, this system presents the information necessary to conduct power operations to the operator,
process computer system, and so on.
3.
Configuration
This system is configured by subsystems of a SRNM, power range monitor, multichannel rod
block monitor, and traversing in core probe.
(1)
Fission Chamber
Preamplifier
Signal processing unit (count rate, root mean square conversion, and reactor period)
Power Unit
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-10-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(2)
Fission chamber
Power unit
(3)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-10-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(4)
4.
Fission Chamber
Indexer
Drive mechanism
Interlock
The trip function of this system is used for protecting fuel cladding and allowing conducting
of reactor scram.
The plant operation state of each reactor scram function (determined by reactor mode switch
position) is set for the following operations:
(a)
(b)
Regardless of reactor mode switch, when the following conditions are met:
(i)
APRM Inop
(ii)
TPM Hi
(iii)
When the reactor mode switch is in run and the following conditions are met:
APRM Hi-Hi
(c) When the reactor mode switch is in a position other than run and the following conditions are
met:
(i)
(ii)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-10-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The ATLM monitors the thermal parameters (CPR, LHGR*1) in real time by using a model which
instantly calculates the index values of thermal parameters. When thermal parameters deviate from
the acceptable range, the ATLM releases the automatic stop request signal to the Automatic Power
Regulation System.
2.
Function
(1) The ATLM continuously monitors the index (FLCPR, FLPD*2) of the operational limits of
thermal parameters (CPR, LHGR).
(2) ATLM monitoring sets a maximum of 16 fuel bundles surrounded by four LPRM string (in
some cases 2 or 3 strings) as one region, and monitors core thermal limit values within each
ATLM monitoring region.
(3) Provides information to the process computer to calculate core performance (at a cycle of from
several minutes to tens of minutes). The process computer calculates thermal limit values in
real time using a high-speed algorithm based on LPRM signal.
(4) When calculated thermal limit values (FLCPR or FLPD) deviate from the acceptable range, the
ATLM outputs the signal which serves as a trigger for an automated stop of the Automatic
Power Regulation System.
*1
CPR : Critical Power Ratio,
*2
FLCPR : Fraction of Limiting Critical Power Ratio,
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-11-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
Configuration
The ATLM is configured by 2 channels. Each channel links with the RC & IS and RFC, and when
reactor thermal limit value calculation results by ATLM exceed limit values, it outputs those
automatic control exclusion signals to them.
When failure occurs in the ATLM-A system or ATLM-B system (detected through a self-test),
monitoring shall be continuously conducted through ATLM by bypassing the defect channel.
4.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Process Computer
Inputs P1 data, setting constants, and failure information from the process computer. Outputs
display information to the process computer.
(4)
RFC
Outputs the automatic mode exclusion signal to the recirculation flow control system.
(5)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-11-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
(1)
The CAMS monitors oxygen concentrations in the D/W and S/C atmosphere during normal
plant operation.
(2)
The CAMS monitors hydrogen and oxygen concentration and radiation levels in the D/W and
S/C atmosphere during LOCA.
2.
Function
(1)
(a)
The concentration can be monitored during normal plant operation and accident conditions (i.e.
LOCA).
(b)
(c)
(d)
The system is operable for half a year with an additional 100 days following LOCA.
(2)
Radiation monitor
(a)
Detectors can directly measure Gamma () dose equivalent rates from fission products in the
D/W and S/C.
(b)
The detectors are placed in areas where the radiation from the D/W and S/C can be monitored,
and the direct radiation from the fuel and other sources is at a minimum.
(c)
(d)
The detectors are installed in the penetrations of the PCV. Two units on the D/W and two units
on the S/C.
3.
Configuration
(1)
(2)
The oxygen concentration monitoring system can be performed during both normal plant
operation and in the event of an accident.
(3)
The monitoring system continuously measures hydrogen and oxygen concentrations, which
are generated by metal-water reaction and radiolysis of the water. The FCS starts up to ensure
that hydrogen and oxygen concentrations remain below flammable limits.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-12-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(4)
The radiation monitoring system continuously measures gross gamma radiation levels in the
PCV in the event of an accident in order to verify the scale of the accident and provide
information for recovery.
4.
Operation
The Oxygen monitoring system is always operated to measure oxygen concentration during
both normal plant operation and in the event of an accident.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-12-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Section 13
1.
Purpose
The APR automatically conducts plant power controls by means of the control rod (CR) and core
2.
Function
The APR has the following functionalities, from the beginning of control rod withdrawal during
reactor start-up, criticality, reactor pressurization, reactor power rise for turbine start-up, power rise until
generator rated power and power decrease associated with plant shutdowns, and control rod full insertion
operations during reactor shutdown. All power controls from plant start-up to shutdown are conducted
automatically.
(1)
Criticality Mode
Operates the control rods until criticality is achieved. Withdraws control rods while monitoring the
reactor period until the criticality is achieved.
(2)
(3)
Heat-up mode
After reaching criticality, the APR raises neutron flux through CR extraction operations, and boosts
reactor heating within the predetermined reactor water temperature change rate range.
(4)
(5)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-13-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
control rod positions (if control rod pattern limitation is activated) while keeping the rate of change
in generator output at a target rate.
(6)
(7)
3.
Configuration
This system is configured by a triple system digital controller, and executes automatic power control
corresponding to the plant operation modes. It is configured by the error monitoring unit monitoring the
plant status during operation at each control mode, the input and output signal processing unit, and the
control mode managing unit which conducts target load pattern development and so on.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-13-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The ABWR has radiation monitoring systems, namely ARM and PrRM, which are provided for the
following purposes:
(1)
(2)
information for alarm, control and recording purposes. Gross Gamma () radiation levels are measured so
that activity levels of radioactive liquid and gas released to the environment do not exceed the permitted
release levels. Also, the radiation levels are monitored for the purpose of managing the plant operation.
2.
Function
The function of each radiation monitoring system is shown below.
(1)
equivalent rate in each area and transmit the information for display and record in the main control room
and at surrounding monitored locations. If the Gamma () dose equivalent rate exceeds a predetermined
value, the system activates an alarm in the relevant location with the measurement indication.
(2)
and gas streams in the NPP by radiation monitoring equipment and grabs sampling analyses for the purpose
of plant operation control.
Radiation detectors are placed next to the process pipes, ducts or sample chambers. They
continuously measure gross Gamma () radiations, and the measurements are displayed and recorded in the
main control room. When radiation level exceeds a predetermined value, it activates an alarm.
Radioactive particulates, Iodine and Tritium, are continuously sampled by filters and Tritium
collection equipment. These samples are periodically collected and analysed.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-14-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
3.
(1)
Configuration
Area Radiation Monitoring System (ARM)
This system consists of a detector, indicator, auxiliary unit and recorder.
There are four local equipment units: a Semiconductor Detector which includes a pre-amplifier, a
digital transmitter, a local auxiliary unit, and a local alarm unit. The local auxiliary unit and local alarm unit
are provided as necessary.
The MCR equipment consists of a graphic panel and a radiation monitor attached to a radiation
monitor panel, and a recorder attached to a radiation monitor recorder panel.
The Semiconductor Detector is installed with the purpose of integration of pulses proportional to a
surrounding Gamma () dose rate, and continuous measurement of the Gamma () dose rate of a
strategically selected area. The output is transmitted to the radiation monitoring panel in the MCR via the
digital transmitter. The dose rates are indicated on the radiation monitor, and the upper and lower alarm
limits are provided to detect anomalies. When an abnormal state is detected, the system activates an alarm.
The output of the radiation monitor is connected to the recorder, and is constantly recorded.
If a local alarm is required, the local auxiliary unit with a local alarm unit is provided. The local
alarm unit is a buzzer for informing abnormalities to operators, and the local auxiliary unit plays the role of
displaying the dose rate as well as transmitting an alarm signal to the local alarm unit.
An AC vital power source is supplied to the radiation monitors, which are configured with multiple
channels. The other equipment is powered by the AC power source.
(2)
(a)
Electronic Device
Both analogue-type and digital-type electronic devices are used within the PrRM. Radiation monitors
for safety protection systems and for non-safety systems are configured with analogue-type and
digital-type devices, respectively.
(b)
Detector
There are three types of detectors: the Scintillation Detector (SCIN), the Semiconductor Detector
(SSD), and the Ion Chamber Detector (IC). The most appropriate detector is provided for each
system.
(c)
Recorder
Signals from each detector are recorded. Monitors are categorised in the following manner:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-14-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
4.
(1)
(iv)
(v)
Gland steam condenser and condenser vacuum pump exhaust gas radiation monitor
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
Interlock
Fail-safe Design
An alarm circuit is activated following a power source or equipment failure.
(2)
Trip
The logarithmic dose equivalent rate module is equipped with adjustable upper and lower limit trip
circuits, as well as an operation inability trip circuit.
(3)
5.
(1)
(2)
RCW
Coolant of the gland steam condenser and condenser vacuum pump exhaust gas radiation monitor is
supplied from the RCW.
(3)
IA
Purged gas (clean air) is supplied from the IA to the gland steam condenser and condenser vacuum
pump exhaust gas radiation monitor. Diluent gas for vial sampling is also supplied from the IA.
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-14-3
UK ABWR
Revision 2
Purpose
The purpose of the process computer is to rationally and safely operate nuclear power plants.
2.
Function
This system is composed of the central processing unit, input / output device, CRT display device,
(1)
a. Input processing
b. Operator request processing
c. Transmission of data for work computerisation
d. Transmission of headquarter data for display
e. Transmission of LPRM auto correction data
(2)
Logging Function
a. Record/listing
b. Progress value transient phenomenon
c. Trip sequence
(4)
a. CRT display
b. Monitoring alarm
c. Summary status monitor
d. Standby system monitor
e. Emergency response head office data display
(5)
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-15-1
UK ABWR
Revision 2
(7)
(8)
3. Structure
This system is composed of equipment shown in Table 6-15-1.
Table 6-15-1 Process computer system
Components
1 unit
1 unit
1 unit
12
1 unit
1 unit
Number
13
Notes
Including
one
large
screen
controller
9
10
Typewriter
11
Line Printer
1 unit
12
Operator Console
13
Engineers Console
14
SPDS Console
15
1 unit
16
1 unit
17
1 unit
18
Transmission Device
1 unit
19
1 unit
GA91-9901-0032-00001
6-15-2
UK ABWR
Revision 2
CHAPTER 7
Radioactive Waste Treatment
Systems
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The LWTS is designed to control, collect, process, handle, and store liquid radioactive
waste generated as the result of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences.
2.
Function
All potentially radioactive liquid wastes are collected in sumps or drain tanks at various
locations in the plant and transferred to collection tanks in the Rw/B. The liquid wastes from various
sources can be segregated and processed separately.
The LWTS components are designed and arranged in shielded enclosures to minimise
exposure to plant personnel during operation, inspection, and maintenance. Tanks, processing
equipment, pumps, valves, and instruments that may contain radioactivity are located in
access-controlled areas, again to minimise exposure to plant personnel.
The LWTS normally operates on a batch basis. Provisions for sampling at important process
points are included. Protection against accidental discharge is provided by detection and alarm of
abnormal conditions and by administrative controls.
3.
Configuration
The LWTS is composed of several sub-systems, so that the liquid wastes from various
sources can be segregated and processed separately, based on the most efficient and economical
process for the type of impurity and chemical content in each waste stream.
Figure 7-1-1 shows an overview of a typical process for treatment of both liquid and solid waste in
ABWR nuclear power plants.
7-1-1
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
This system consists of components such as filters, demineralisers and sampling tanks. Treated
liquid waste which has been filtered and demineralised by this system is transferred to the
condensate storage pool. The treated liquid waste is mainly re-used, or discharged after
confirming radioactivity level.
Figure 7-1-1 Typical Radioactive Waste and Process Flow for ABWR Power Plant
7-1-2
GA91-9901-0032-00001
UK ABWR
Revision 2
1.
Purpose
The SWTS is designed to control, collect, handle, process, package and temporarily store
wet and dry solid radioactive wastes prior to shipment or onsite interim storage. These wastes are
generated as a result of normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences.
2.
Function
These wastes are categorised as wet solid wastes (such as spent ion exchange bead resin
and filter backwash arising from the operation of the LWTS, or other treatment, clean-up, or filtering
system) or dry solid wastes (such as HEPA filters, protective clothing, contaminated tools, tissue
paper, or other items arising from operations). Both Low Level Waste (LLW) and Intermediate
Level Waste (ILW) are processed by the SWTS.
3.
Configuration
The SWTS functionally consists of the following four sub-systems. A typical process flow
GA91-9901-0032-00001
7-2-1