Marcela Rodelas v. Amparo Aranza G.R. No.

L-58509; December 7, 1982 Facts: Petit

ioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holo
will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor
. The petition was opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla
Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. The grounds of their opposi
tion are as follows: 1. Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased l
eft a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the
testator. 2. The alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of prop
erty after death and was not intended to take effect. 3. The original must be pr
esented and not the copy thereof. 4. The deceased did not leave any will. The ap
pellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will
. The appellees' motions were denied. They filed a Motion for recon. Motion for
Recon was approved. Appellant's motion for recon was denied. Appellant appealed
the case to the CA which certified the case to the SC on hte ground that the app
eal does not involve questions of fact. Issue: Whether or not a holo will which
was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Ruling
: Yes. a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed b
ecause comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the
case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must
be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the docume
nt itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decisio
n, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost
or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of t
he handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court. Spouses R
oberto and Thelma Ajero v. Court of Appeals and Clemente Sand
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)
G.R. No. 106720; Septem er 15, 1994 Facts: The decedent names as devisees Ro ert
o and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, L
ilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero and their children
. The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decendent's holo will. P
rivate Respondnet opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testamen
t's ody nor the signature therein was in decendent's handwriting; it contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly signed y the decedent; and the
will was procured y pets through improper pressure and undue influence. Dr. Jos
e Ajero also opposed the petition. He contested the disposition in the will of a
house and lot located in Ca ad aran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said pro
perty could not e conveyed y decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole
owner. The trial court admitted the holo will to pro ate. On appeal, the said d
ecision was reversed and the pet for pro ate was dismissed. The CA found that th
e holo will failed to meet the requirements for its validity. I held that the de
cedent did not comply with Arts 813 and 814.It alluded to certain dispositions i
n the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed ut not dated. It a
lso found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not
een authenticated y decedent. Ruling: 1. Refer to Art. 839. These lists are ex
clusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to
admit a holographic will to pro ate, the only issues to e resolved are: (1) wh
ether the instrument su mitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testamen
t; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescri
ed y law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at
the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and i
ts signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. A reading of Article 813 of
the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispos
itions contained in the holographic will, ut not its pro ate. If the testator f
ails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these disposi

tions cannot e effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole te
stament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still e admitted to pro ate, notw
ithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814.

Kalaw vs. Relova: Ordinarily, when a num er of erasures, corrections, and interl
ineations made y the testator in a holographic Will have not een noted under h
is signature, . . . the Will is not there y invalidated as a whole, ut at most
only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Thus, unl
ess the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on th
e date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does n
ot invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in di
sallowance of such changes. It is also proper to note that the requirements of a
uthentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provis
ions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary
conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).
2. The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly
dispose of the house and lot located in Ca ad aran, Agusan del Norte, in its ent
irety. This is correct and must e affirmed.As a general rule, courts in pro ate
proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will so
ught to e pro ated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless
to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provision
s of the will. In the case at ench, decedent herself indu ita ly stated in her
holographic will that the Ca ad aran property is in the name of her late father,
John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of
the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held y respondent court, she cann
ot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's oth
er heirs. -Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Sofia Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, Rufina Gomez, Oscar Jugo Ang, Carmelita Ju
go G.R. No. L-62952; Octo er 9, 1985 Facts: Martin Jugo named and appointed here
in petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. The
will clearly stated that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Go
mez y whom he had legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita. He stated that sinc
e 1952 he had een estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had een living w
ith petitioner as hus and and wife. The testator and the petitioner herein were
married in Victoria, Tarlac efore the Justice of the Peace. The testator devise
d to his forced heirs, namely his legal wife and his children (Oscar & Carmelita
) his entire estate. He devised the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. T
he pet filed a petition for the pro ate of the last will and testament of the de
ceased. The legal wife and her children filed an opposition. The lower court den
ied the pro ate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to coha iti
ng with the pet. The Will's admission to pro ate will e an Idle exercise ecaus
e on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident
. The respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI. It declared the will t
o e valid except the devise in favor of the pet pursuant to Art, 739 in relatio
n with Art. 1028. Pet filed a motion for recon - denied. Issues: 1. Whether or n
ot the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went
on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner. 2. Validity of hte disposition in favor of the pet. Ruling:
1. No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring t
he Will to e validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of t
he Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The ge
neral rule is that in pro ate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limite
d to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The ru
le, however, is not inflexi le and a solute. Given exceptional circumstances, th
e pro ate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do an
d pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of du ious legality
, and ecause of the motion to withdraw the petition for pro ate (which the lowe
r court assumed to have een filed with the petitioner's authorization) the tria
l court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even efor
e its formal validity had een esta lished. The pro ate of a will might ecome a
n Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to e intrinsically void. Where practi
cal considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will e passed upon
, even efore it is pro ated, the court should meet the issue.
2. Invalid. Refer to Art. 739. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may e rought y the spouse of the donor or donee; and t
he guilt of the donor and donee may e proved y preponderance of evidence in th
e same action. Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: The prohi itions mention
ed in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions. The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As
argued y the private respondents: First. The last will and testament itself exp
ressly admits indu ita ly on its face the meretricious relationship etween the
testator and petitioner, the devisee. Second. Petitioner herself initiated the p
resentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the
testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. In short,
the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in
the will to petitioner y the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived
with as man and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue r
ought y the parties efore the trial court, and passed upon y the Court of App
eals. Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will,
it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in ma
rrying the testator.

Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Polly Cayetano v. Hon. Tomas Leonidas and Nenita Campos Paguia G.R. No. L-54919;
May 30, 1984 Facts: Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermo
genes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez,
and Marieta Medina as surviving heirs. Hermogenes Campos adjudicated unto himsel
f the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased. Eleven months after, Nenit
a filed a pet for the repro ate of a will of the deceased which was allegedly ex
ecuted un the US. Nenita alleged that after the testatrix death, her last will a
nd test was presented, pro ated, allowed, and registered in Philly. The pet for
the repro ate of the will was opposed. Pet filed a motion to dismiss opposition
stating that he has een a le to verify the veracity of the will and now confirm
s the same to e truly the pro ated will of his daughter. The lower court admitt
ed the will to pro ate. Hermogenes filed a pet for relief, praying that the orde
r allowing the will to e set aside was secured through fraudulent means. Motion
for recon denied. Meanwhile, pet died and left a will, which incidentally has
een questioned y the respondent. Issues: Validity of the provisions of the will
. Ruling: Petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the repro
ate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime whic
h was reserved y the law for him. - Without merit. Although on its face, the wi
ll appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge sho
uld have denied its repro ate outright, the private respondents have sufficientl
y esta lished that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. -Art. 16, 1039. T
he law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the P
ennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may e gi
ven away y the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that suc
h law should not apply ecause it would e contrary to the sound and esta lished
pu lic policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine La
w.
Vda. De Molo v. Molo 90 Phil 37
Facts: The proponent of the will is the widow of the testator, while the opponen
ts are nephews and nieces of the testator. Petitioner filed a pet for the pro at
e of a will executed y the deceased on June 20, 1939. The will was denied pro a
te on the ground that it did not comply with the formalities prescri ed y law.
In view of the disallowance, the widow filed another petition for the pro ate of
a copy of another will executed on August 17, 1918. The will was admitted to pr
o ate in spite of the opposition of the appellants. The will of 1939 contains a
revocatory clause expressly revoking the will of 1918.
Ruling: The will can still e admitted to pro ate under the principle of dependen
t relative revocation. Under this doctrine, the rule is established that where th
e act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly t
o raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depen
d upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the revoc
ation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition
; and if for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is ino
perative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in force.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Teodora Caneda v. Court of Appeals and William Ca rera G.R. No. 103554; May 28,
1993 Facts: Mateo Ca allero executed a last will and testament in Talisay, Ce u
efore three attesting witnesses. The said testator was duly assisted y his law
yer and a notary pu lic. It was declared that the testator was leaving y way of
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola,
Angel A atayo, Rogelio A atayo, Isa elito A atayo, Benoni G. Ca rera and Marcosa
Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to e related to the testator. Four months
after the execution of the will, Mateo himself filed a petition seeking the pro
ate of his will. The testator passed away efore his petition could e heard. O
ne of the legatees named in his will sought appointment as special administrator
of the estate. The estimated value of the estate was 24K. Petitioners, claiming
to e nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a 2nd petition for the int
estate proceeding of the estate and opposed thereat the pro ate of the testator'
s will. Benoni Ca rera died, hence, the pro ate court appointed William Ca rera
as special administrator. Petitioners opposed the pro ate on the ground that the
testator was already in poor health when the will was executed. Petitioners lik
ewise question the genuineness of the testator's signature. One of the attesting
witness and the notary pu lic testified that the testator was of sound mind. Th
e pro ate court rendered a decision declaring the will as the last will and test
ament of the deceased. The pets elevated the case to the CA on the ground that t
he will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause
is fatally defective. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial cou
rt. MR denied. Issue: Validity of the attestation clause. Ruling: Invalid. It is
contended y petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in contravent
ion of the express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civ
il Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the a
ttesting witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presenc
e and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
While the will recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its page
s in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the num er
of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumst
ance that said witnesses su scri ed their respective signatures to the will in t
he presence of the testator and of each other. The phrase "and he has signed the
same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on th
e left hand margin," o viously refers to the testator and not the instrumental w
itnesses as it is immediately preceded y the words "as his Last Will and Testam
ent." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and
in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first lush, appear to likewise
signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however, e interpreted as referrin
g only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phras
e immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof,
on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is t
hen clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the statement that the w
itnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another. It is our considered view that the a sence of that statement
required y law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result
in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to e admitted to pro ate.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attes
tation clause o viously cannot e characterized as merely involving the form of
the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the
su stantial compliance rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon
in the Civil Code(Refer to Art, 809) While it may e true that the attestation
clause is indeed su scri ed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each pa
ge y the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot e conclusively inferre
d therefrom that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in the pre
sence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly o served
, the presence of said signatures only esta lishes the fact that it was indeed s
igned, ut it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did su scri e to the w

ill in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will i
s supposed to e one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on va
rious days or occasions and in various com inations, the will cannot e stamped
with the imprimatur of effectivity.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina Palang and Herminia Dela Cruz G.R. No. 116668; July 28
, 1997 Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his first marraige(1949) with Carlina Val
lesterol. They had one child, Hermina Palang(1950). Miguel left to work in Hawai
i a few months after the wedding. He returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit
was in 1964. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel attem
pted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he came ack for good in 1972, he refuse
d to live with the PRs. Miguel contracted a 2nd marriage with Erlinda Aglipay (1
973). Two months earlier, M and E jointly purchased an agricultural land. They a
lso ought a res. lot. In 1975, M and C executed a Deed of of all their conjugal
prop to Herminia Palang. M and E produced a son(Kristofer). In 1979, they were
convicted of concu inage. Miguel died 2 yrs later. RPs instituted an action for
the recovery of ownership and poss with damages against pet in the RTC of Urdane
ta. PRs sought to get ack the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchase
d y Miguel during his coha itation with the pet. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.
Issues: 1. Ownership of the two pieces of property su ject of this action; 2. Kr
istofer's heirship and filiation. Ruling: 1. In the case at ar, Erlinda tried t
o esta lish y her testimony that she is engaged in the usiness of uy and sell
and had a sari-sari store ut failed to persuade us that she actually contri ut
ed money to uy the su ject Riceland. On the date of conveyance, petitioner was
only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a p
ensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic
to conclude that she contri uted P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was ought two months efore Miguel and
Erlinda actually coha ited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added asserti
on was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the F
amily Code. 2. "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, p
roof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate o
f the latter and claims thereto should e ventilated in the proper pro ate court
or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot e adjudicated
in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and pos
session."
Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio Vivares G.R. No. 12099; Octo er 30, 1
997 Facts: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testame
nt. He equeathed all his prop to his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his rother Jose
. The will consisted of two pages and was signed y Torcuato Reyes in the presen
ce of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Pri
vate respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default
or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a petition for pro ate of
the will. The recognized natural children of Torcuato with Este ana Galolo and C
elsa Agape filed an opposition. The court declared that the will was exec accord
ing w/ the forma prescri ed y law. However, it ruled that Asuncion was never ma
rried to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is invalid). Julio Vivares file
d an appeals efore the CA with the allegation that the oppositos failed to pres
ent ay comp. evidence taht Asuncion was legally married to another person. The C
A affirmed the trial court's decision ut with the modification that dispo in fa
vor of Oning was valid. Ruling: As a general rule, courts in pro ate proceedings
are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to e p
ro ated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it
complies with the formalities prescri ed y law, and the testamentary capacity
of the testator. It does not determine nor even y implication prejudge the vali
dity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not conside
red since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has een p
roved and allowed. There are, however, nota le circumstances wherein the intrins
ic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on i
ts face and the pro ate of the will may ecome a useless ceremony if it is intri
nsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may e passed upon ecause "p
ractical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or th
e testamentary provisions are of dou tful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on

pro ate is not inflexi le and a solute. Under exceptional circumstances, the pr
o ate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pa
ss upon certain provisions of the will. The lower court was not asked to rule up
on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result
, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did n
ot have to e scrutinized during the pro ate proceedings. The propriety of the i
nstitution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inqui
ry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not e inquired upon y the p
ro ate court.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Ursulina Ganuelas v. Ro ert Cawed G.R. No. 123968; April 24, 2003 Facts: Celesti
na Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of real prop covering seven parcels of l
and in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas .Celestina executed a docu purportin
g to set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later, Celestina died(196
7) without issue and any surviving ascendants and si lings. After Celestina's de
ath, Ursulina had een sharing the produce of the donated properties with privat
e respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina. In 1982, Ursulina
secured tax decs in her name over the donated props and since then, she refused
to give private respondents any share in the produce. PRs filed a complaint aga
inst Ursulina. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed y Celes
tina in favor of Ursulina was void. The trial court rendering judgment declaring
null and void the Deed of Donation and ordered the partition of the estate of C
elestina. Issue: Donation inter vivos or mortis causa?? Ruling: TC decision affi
rmed! Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the for
mer, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may e deferr
ed until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or
acquired y the donee until the death of the donor-testator. If the donation is
inter vivos, it must e executed and accepted with the formalities prescri ed y
Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case
the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must e
in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, other
wise it is void and cannot transfer ownership. The distinguishing characteristic
s of a donation mortis causa are the following: 1. It conveys no title or owners
hip to the transferee efore the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to th
e same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) an
d control of the property while alive; 2. That efore his death, the transfer sh
ould e revoca le y the transferor at will, ad nutum; ut revoca ility may e p
rovided for indirectly y means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of t
he properties conveyed; 3. That the transfer should e void if the transferor sh
ould survive the transferee.
In the donation su ject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indi
cates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to e tran
sferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase "to ecome effec
tive upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation ut that Cel
estina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her d
eath, not during her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in the deed stati
ng that if the donee should die efore the donor, the donation shall e deemed r
escinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmor
tem disposition. As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characte
ristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should e considered voi
d if the donor should survive the donee. More. The deed contains an attestation
clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa. As the su ject deed th
en is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will und
er Article 728 of the Civil Code should have een complied with, failing which t
he donation is void and produces no effect.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125888; August 13,
1998 Facts: A deed of donation was executed y Aurora Montinola. It named as do
nees her grandchildren. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in
acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation. Aurora drew up a deed of rev
ocation and caused it to e annotated as an adverse claim on hte title. She file
d a petition in court for the cancellation of the transfer on the ground that th
e transfer was mortis causa - thus, void ecause it did not comply with the form
alities of a will. The donees opposed the pet. The trial court judgment holding
that the donation was one inter vivos. She elevated the case to the CA. Meanwhil
e, Aurora died. Shortly after A's demise, a manifestation and motion was filed
y Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Sicad alleged taht they had ecome the owners of the
prop y virtue of a deed of definite sale. The CA affirmed the TC's decision. Is
sue: Character of the deed of donation. Ruling: The evidence esta lishes that Mo
ntinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) yea
rs from her death, and that the deed include a prohi ition on the sale of the pr
operty for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed read
ing: "however, the donees shall not sell or encum er the properties herein donat
ed within 10 years after the death of the donor." The actuality of the su sequen
t insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the i
ntercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a differ
ent machine, and is crammed into the space etween the penultimate paragraph of
the deed and that immediately preceding it. Not only did Aurora Montinola order
the insertion in the deed of that restrictive proviso, ut also, after recordati
on of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating the property as her own.
She continued, as explicity authorized in the deed itself, to possess the proper
ty, enjoy its fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the p
roperty taxes as they fell due all these she did until she transferred the Prope
rty to the Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990. As already intimated, the real nature
of a deed is to e ascertained y oth its language and the intention of the pa
rties as demonstrated y the circumstances attendant upon its execution. In this
respect, case law has laid down significant parameters.
The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora Estrada G.R
. No. 110427; Fe ruary 24, 1997 Facts: Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired
pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of th
e University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent y judgment of the QC
RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted y her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.
She was so adjudged ecause of her advanced age and physical infirmities which
included cataracts in oth eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was a
ppointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Amparo commenced a suit to eje
ct the spouses Estrada from the said premises. In their Answer, the defendants d
eclared that they had een living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in cons
ideration of their faithful service they had een considered y Caiza as her own
family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will y which she " eq
ueathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.The MTC rendered judgment
in favor of Caniza. The RTC reversed said decision. The appellate court affirme
d the RTC's judgment. Issue: Evangelista's authority. Ruling: The Estradas insis
t that the devise of the house to them y Caiza clearly denotes her intention tha
t they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guar
dian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would
e inconsistent with the ward's will. A will is essentially am ulatory; at any
time prior to the testator's death, it may e changed or revoked; and until admi
tted to pro ate, it has no effect whatever and no right can e claimed thereunde
r, the law eing quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal pro
perty unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (AR
T. 838, id.). An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons poss
essing property y his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking
ack possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in thi
s case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is ap
parent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical

infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age. Amparo Evangelista was
appointed y a competent court the general guardian of oth the person and the
estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed h
er as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAN
IZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent i
n any
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

province or provinces in which it may e situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the management of her properties . . " By that appointment, it ec
ame Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical
and spiritual needs, to assure her well- eing, with right to custody of her pers
on in preference to relatives and friends. It also ecame her right and duty to
get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, oth real and per
sonal, it eing recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or
control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward'
s estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it fro
m anyone who retains it, and ring and defend such actions as may e needful for
this purpose. -Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Heirs of Jesus Fran v. Hon. Bernardo LL. Salas G.R. No. L-53546; June 25, 1992 F
acts: Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants; she left re
al and personal properties located in Ce u City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Me
rida, Leyte. She left a last will and testament wherein she equeathed to her co
llateral relatives( ,s,n,n) all her properties. She designated Rosario Tan or, u
pon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor. Jesus Fran filed a pet for the
pro ate of Remedios' will. The pet alleged that Rosario was not physically well.
Tan signed a waiver in favor of Fran on hte third page of the pet. The PRs (sis
ters of the deceased) filed a manifestation, alleging that they needed time to s
tudy the petition ec. some heirs have een intentionally omitted. PRs did not f
ile any opposition. The pet thus ecame uncontested. The pro ate court rendered
a decision admitting the will to pro ate. Pet filed an Inventory of the Estate,
copies thereof were furnished to the PRs. A Project of Partition was su mitted
y hte exec to the court. The PRs still did not make any o jections. TC issued it
s Order approving the partition. Thereafter, the aforesaid ranch(which issued t
he order) was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. PRs filed wi
th the new ranch a MR of the pro ate judgment and the order of partition. Pets
challenged the juris of the court. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring th
e testamentary dispos as void.
respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in the
ir Omni us Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indu i
ta le proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would h
ave een an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes
the project of partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and i
s among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings. If private respond
ents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they should have desisted fr
om performing the a ove acts and instead demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfi
llment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same conclusion refutes
and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing the C
lerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify
them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail ec
ause private respondents were present when the court dictated the said order.
Issue: 1. GAD of respondent Judge.
Ruling: 1. Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave a use of discretion amounting t
o lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omni us Motion for Reconsideration an
d thereafter set aside the pro ate judgment of 13 Novem er 1972 in Sp. Proc. No.
3309-R, declared the su ject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the tes
tamentary dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the testate proceed
ings into one of intestacy. After the pro ate court rendered its decision on 13
Novem er 1972, and there having een no claim presented despite pu lication of n
otice to creditors, petitioner Fran su mitted a Project of Partition which priva
te respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which privat
e respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed with
the pro ate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Joseph Cua v. Gloria Vargas G.R. No. 156536; Octo er 31, 2006 Facts: A parcel of
land(99 sqm) was left ehind y the late Paulina Vargas. The heirs executed a n
otarized extrajudicial settlement among themselves, partitioning and adjudicatin
g unto themselves the lot in question, each of them getting a share of 11 sq met
ers. Among the heirs, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed i
t. Florentino, Andres, Antonina, and Gloria did not sign the document. The docum
ent was pu lished for three consecutive weeks. An extra-j settlement with sale w
as again executed. Once more, only E,V,J,Z, and R signed and their shares were s
old to Joseph Cua. According to Gloria, she came to know of hte settlement only
when the original house was eing demolished. She also claimed that she was unaw
are of the first document. She sent a letter to petitioner in order to redeem th
e property. When Gloria and Jose failed to reach an amica le settlement, the for
mer filed a case for annulment of the EJS and legal redemption of the lot. After
trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The MT
C upheld the sale to petitioner ecause the transaction purportedly occurred aft
er the partition of the property among the coowner heirs. The RTC affirmed the M
TC decision. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of oth lower courts. MR deni
ed.
the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial sett
lements do not ind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge
and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. *This is not to say, thoug
h, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to thi
rd persons even efore the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually parti
cipated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sa
le to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the su ject property, are ound
y the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shar
es pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never los
t ecause respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale y their
co-heirs.
2. Written notice is indispensa le and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale a
cquired in some other manner y the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot e c
ounted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sal
e. The law gives the coheir thirty days from the time written notice of the actu
al sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effe
ct the redemption. It should e kept in mind that the o ligation to serve writte
n notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs ecause the latter are in the est po
sition to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must e notified of the s
ale. This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and
its perfection and validity, and quiet any dou t that the
Issues: 1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and ound, regardles
s of their failure to participate therein, y an extrajudicial settlement and pa
rtition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has een duly
pu lished; 2. Whether the written notice required to e served y an heir to his
co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger efore
partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code can e dispensed with when such c
o-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale.
alienation is not definitive. As a result, the party notified need not entertain
dou t that the seller may still contest the alienation. Considering, therefore,
that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no
legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner
given the former's o vious willingness and capacity to do so.
Ruling: 1. The pu lication of the settlement does not constitute constructive no
tice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it ecause the sa
me was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of pu lication is gea
red for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of t

heir lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the reco
rds of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the sett
lement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly efore
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Cresencia Tu o Rodriguez v. Evangeline Rodriguez G.R. No. 175720; Septem er 11,

2007 Facts: Juanito Rodriguez owned a 5-door apartment. In 1983, he executed a "
Huling ha ilin at testamento' giving petitioner Cresencia Tu o Rodriguez, his li
ve-in partner, apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin(deceased hus and of
respondent), apartment A; respondent Buenaventura, aprtment B; and Belen, apart
ment C. However, in 1984, the deceased executed a deed of a solute sale over the
property in favor of the petitioner. In 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the respondents, alleging that she is the lawful and r
egistered owner of the property, and that in 1984, she allowed respondents to oc
cupy hte units. However, without her knowlege and consent, the respondents separ
ately leased the units to Magpantay, Navarro, and Escota. Respondents claimed ow
nership of hte property y succession. They alleged that the deed of sale was si
mulated and void. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents. The RTC
reversed the decision of the MTC. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. MR d
enied.
--> Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means of prote
cting actual possession or right to possession of property, the question of titl
e is not involved and should e raised y the affected party in an appropriate a
ction in the proper court.
2. However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its
jurisdiction. Section 16 of Rule 70.(ROC)
All that the trial court can do is to
make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it ca
n resolve who is entitled to its possession a sent other evidence to resolve own
ership. But this adjudication is only provisional and does not ar or prejudice
an action etween the same parties involving title to the property.
*Wills - The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriv
ing at their respective decisions: 1) Huling Ha ilin at Testamento 2) Deed of Sa
le 3) TCT No. in the name of the petitioner; and 4) Partition Agreement executed
y oth the respondents and the petitioner. Based on the foregoing documentary
evidence, we find that there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the petiti
oners claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling
Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal
Issue: 1. 2. Possession of the property. Ownership
effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or v
alidity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of pu
blic policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass eit
her real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. As the will was not
Ruling: 1. *Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject prope
rty, she enjoys the right of possession thereof and that question of ownership c
annot be raised in an ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of
possession. While the court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and
possession de jure to determine the nature of possession, it cannot resolve the
issue of ownership because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudic
ation on ownership which is not proper in the summary action for unlawful detain
er. Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Huling
Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments disregar
ding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that the testator changed or
revoked his will by selling the property to petitioner prior to his death. -ya!
duh!
probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto cannot be
given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becom
es immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession. Moreover, at the

time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez
remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the
time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Teresita Bordal a v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112443; January 25, 2002 Facts: A
lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned y the late Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita de Jayme. In 1947, an EJP was executed. Distri uted as follows: 1. 1/3
in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of privat
e respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina
, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and ( ) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme
-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Ca
rmen Jayme-Daclan; 2. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of
petitioner Teresita P. Bordal a; and 3. 1/3 to an unidentified party. Nicanor's
house stands on the land adjudicated to the heirs. Sometime in 1964, pets mothe
r, filed with the RTC an amended application for the registration of the lot. Ni
canor and Asuncion filed their opposition contending that said application inclu
ded the 1/3 portion inherited y them in the extra-judicial partition. The case
was dismissed. Su sequently, pet filed with the Bureau of Lands an application f
or a free patent. Pet was successfullly granted a free patent. Thereafter, pet c
aused the su division of the lot into 6 lots. The private respondents filed with
the RTC, the instant complaint against the petitioner and the director of the B
OL. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed y pet, declared said paten
t and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses
Genaro U. Ca ahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purc
hasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as val
id the sale of the lot. Both petitioner and private respondents appealed to the
CA which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118464; Deceme r 21, 1998 Fa
cts: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-o
wners of a lot in Lucena City. Lourdes died without issue. PRs, claiming to e t
he collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes, filed an action for partition.
Conti refused the partition on the ground that PRs failed to produce any documen
t to prove that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes. When Ignacio died, he w
as su stituted as party-defendant y his kids. PR Lydia Sampayo presented an ori
ginal copy of her cert. of live irth to prove that she was one of the nieces of
Lourdes. Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel tried to prove that they were the
si lings of Lourdes y presenting their aptismal certs together with the irth
cert of Manuel. Rosario claimed that Lourdes agreed to leave her share of the pr
operty to them. However, no will, either testamentary of holo, was presented y
pets to su stantiate this claim. The TC declared PRs as the rightful heirs of Lo
urdes. It further ordered PRs and pets to su mit a project of partition. Pets el
evated the case to the CA, which affirmed the assailed decision. MR denied.
Issues: 1. WON the settlement of the estate is a condition precedent efore the
commencement of any action pertaining to hte deceased. 2. WON PRs are the rightf
ul heirs of the deceased.
Ruling: 1. No. The title to the property owned y a person who dies intestate pa
sses at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, su ject
to the claims of administration
Wills Issue:(ito lang ata) WON the PRs are the legal heirs of the deceased.
and the property may e taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying de ts and
expenses, ut this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the
death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.
Ruling: Other than their are allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evi
dence was presented y them to su stantiate their allegations. Besides, in order
that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous ju
dicial declaration of heirship is necessary.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of pu lication would have een correct

had the action een for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if w
e were dealing with extrajudicial settlement y agreement etween heirs and the
summary settlement of estates of small value. But what private respondents are p
ursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited
from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partiti
on etween co-owners. Rule 69, Sec. 1)
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

2. Yes. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence su mitted are compe
tent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourde
s Sampayo. Succession is a mode of acquisition y virtue of which the property,
rights and o ligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others either y his will or y
operation of law. Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies wi
thout a will, or with a void will, or one which has su sequently lost its validi
ty. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a survivi
ng spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the de
cedent. It was esta lished during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and with
out issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to e the
collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

[G.R. No. 156819. Decem er 11, 2003] ALICIA E. GALA, GUIA G. DOMINGO and RITA G.
BENSON, petitioners, vs. ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, MARGO MANAGEMENT A
ND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RAUL E. GALA, VITALIANO N. AGUIRRE II, ADNAN V. ALON
TO, ELIAS N. CRESENCIO, MOISES S. MANIEGO, RODOLFO B. REYNO, RENATO S. GONZALES,
VICENTE C. NOLAN, NESTOR N. BATICULON, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
.: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking th
e reversal of the decision dated Novem er 8, 2002 [1] and the resolution dated D
ecem er 27, 2002 [2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71979. On March 2
8, 1979, the spouses Manuel and Alicia Gala, their children Guia Domingo, Ofelia
Gala, Raul Gala, and Rita Benson, and their encargados Virgilio Galeon and Juli
an Jader formed and organized the Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation. [3] The to
tal su scri ed capital stock of the corporation was apportioned as follows: Name
Num er of Shares Amount 11, 700 1,170,000.00 23,200 16 40 40 2 1 1 35,000 P3,50
0,000.00 [4] 200.00 100.00 100.00 2,320,000.00 1,600.00 4,000.00 4,000.00
Raul E. Gala Ofelia E. Gala Guia G. Domingo Virgilio Galeon Julian Jader TOTAL 2
0,000
6,640 6,640 6,640 40 40
66,400.00 66,400.00 66,400.00 40.00 40.00
P200,000.00 [9]
On Novem er 10, 1982, Manuel Gala sold 13,314 of his shares in Ellice to Margo.
[10] Alicia Gala transferred 1,000 of her shares in Ellice to a certain Victor d
e Villa on March 2, 1983. That same day, de Villa transferred said shares to Mar
go. [11] A few months later, on August 28, 1983, Alicia Gala transferred 854.3 o
f her shares to Ofelia Gala, 500 to Guia Domingo and 500 to Raul Gala. [12] Year
s later, on Fe ruary 8, 1988, Manuel Gala transferred all of his remaining holdi
ngs in Ellice, amounting to 2,164 shares, to Raul Gala. [13] On July 20, 1988, A
licia Gala transferred 10,000 of her shares to Margo. [14] Thus, as of the date
on which this case was commenced, the stockholdings in Ellice were allocated as
follows: Name Margo Num er of Shares Amount 24,312.5 2,431,250.00 21,480.2 2,148
,020.00 2,704.5 980.8 516 2 1 1 1 1 P5,000,000.00 270,450.00 98,080.00 51,600.00
200.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Manuel R. Gala Alicia E. Gala Guia G. Domingo Ofelia E. Gala Raul E. Gala Rita G
. Benson Virgilio Galeon Julian Jader TOTAL
Alicia Gala Raul Gala Ofelia Gala Gina Domingo Rita Benson Virgilio Galeon Julia
n Jader Adnan Alonto Elias Cresencio TOTAL 50,000
As payment for their su scriptions, the Gala spouses transferred several parcels
of land located in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna to Ellice. [5] In 1982, M
anuel Gala, Alicia Gala and Ofelia Gala su scri ed to an additional 3,299 shares
, 10,652.5 shares and 286.5 shares, respectively. [6] On June 28, 1982, Manuel G
ala and Alicia Gala acquired an additional 550 shares and 281 shares, respective
ly. [7] Su sequently, on Septem er 16, 1982, Guia Domingo, Ofelia Gala, Raul Gal
a, Virgilio Galeon and Julian Jader incorporated the Margo Management and Develo
pment Corporation (Margo). [8] The total su scri ed capital stock of Margo was a
pportioned as follows: Name Num er of Shares Amount
On June 23, 1990, a special stockholders meeting of Margo was held, where a new b
oard of directors was elected. [15] That same day, the newly-elected board elect
ed a new set of officers. Raul Gala was elected as chairman, president and gener
al manager. During the meeting, the board approved several actions, including th
e commencement of proceedings to annul certain dispositions of Margos property ma
de by Alicia Gala. The board also resolved to change the name of the corporation
to MRG Management and Development Corporation. [16]

Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

Similarly, a special stockholders meeting of Ellice was held on August 24, 1990 t
o elect a new board of directors. In the ensuing organizational meeting later th
at day, a new set of corporate officers was elected. Likewise, Raul Gala was ele
cted as chairman, president and general manager. On March 27, 1990, respondents
filed against petitioners with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a pe
tition for the appointment of a management committee or receiver, accounting and
restitution by the directors and officers, and the dissolution of Ellice AgroIn
dustrial Corporation for alleged mismanagement, diversion of funds, financial lo
sses and the dissipation of assets, docketed as SEC Case No. 3747. [17] The peti
tion was amended to delete the prayer for the appointment of a management commit
tee or receiver and for the dissolution of Ellice. Additionally, respondents pra
yed that they be allowed to inspect the corporate books and documents of Ellice.
[18] In turn, petitioners initiated a complaint against the respondents on June
26, 1991, docketed as SEC Case No. 4027, praying for, among others, the nullifi
cation of the elections of directors and officers of both Margo Management and D
evelopment Corporation and Ellice Industrial Corporation; the nullification of a
ll board resolutions issued by Margo from June 23, 1990 up to the present and al
l board resolutions issued by Ellice from August 24, 1990 up to the present; and
the return of all titles to real property in the name of Margo and Ellice, as w
ell as all corporate papers and records of both Margo and Ellice which are in th
e possession and control of the respondents. [19] The two cases were consolidate
d in an Order dated November 23, 1993. [20] Meanwhile, during the pendency of th
e SEC cases, the shares of stock of Alicia and Ofelia Gala in Ellice were levied
and sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against them by the R
egional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66, in Civil Case No. 42560, entitled Regin
es Condominium v. Ofelia (Gala) Panes and Alicia Gala. [21] On November 3, 1998,
the SEC rendered a Joint Decision in SEC Cases Nos. 3747 and 4027, the dispositi
ve portion of which states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby r
endered, as follows: 1. 2. (a) Dismissing the petition in SEC Case No. 3747, Iss
uing the following orders in SEC Case No. 4027; Enjoining herein respondents to
perform corporate acts of both Ellice and Margo,
(c)
Ordering the respondent Raul Gala to return all the titles of real properties in
the
names of Ellice and Margo which were unlawfully taken and held by him. (d) Direc
ting the respondents to return to herein petitioners all corporate papers,
records of both Ellice and Margo which are in their possession and control. SO O
RDERED. [22] Respondents appealed to the SEC En Banc, which, on July 4, 2002, re
ndered its Decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Decisio
n of the Hearing Officer dated November 3, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one hereby rendered granting the appeal, upholding the Amended Petiti
on in SEC Case No. 3747, and dismissing the Petition with Prayer for Issuance of
Preliminary Restraining Order and granting the Compulsory Counterclaim in SEC C
ase No. 4027. Accordingly, appellees Alicia Gala and Guia G. Domingo are ordered
as follows: (1) jointly and solidarily pay ELLICE and/or MARGO the amount of P7
00,000.00
representing the consideration for the unauthorized sale of a parcel of land to
Lucky Homes and Development Corporation (Exhs. N and CCC); (2) jointly and severally
pay ELLICE and MARGO the proceeds of sales of agricultural
products averaging P120,000.00 per month from February 17, 1988; (3) (4) (5) joi
ntly and severally indemnify the appellants P90,000.00 as attorneys fees; jointly
and solidarily pay the costs of suit; turn over to the individual appellants th
e corporate records of ELLICE and

MARGO in their possession; and (6) desist and refrain from interfering with the
management of ELLICE and MARGO.
SO ORDERED. [23] Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appea
ls which dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the decision of the SEC
En Banc. [24] Hence, this petition, raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR N
OT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS ILLEGAL AND CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLI
CY THE PURPOSES AND MANNER IN WHICH RESPONDENT CORPORATIONS WERE ORGANIZED WHICH
WERE, E.G. TO (1) PREVENT THE GALA ESTATE FROM BEING BROUGHT UNDER THE COVERAGE
(SIC) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP) AND (2) PURPORTEDLY FOR
ESTATE PLANNING. II
as directors and officers thereof. (b) Nullifying the election of the new sets o
f Board of Directors and Officers of Ellice
and Margo from June 23, 1990 to the present, and that of Ellice from August 24,
1990 to the present.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED (1) IN SUSPICIOUSLY RESOLVING THE CASE WITH
IN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF RESPONDENTS COMMENT; AND (2) IN NOT MAKING A DETE
RMINATION OF THE ISSUES OF FACTS AND INSTEAD RITUALLY CITING THE FACTUAL FINDING
S OF THE COMMISSION A QUO WITHOUT DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS; III WHETHER OR NOT TH
E LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF RESPONDENT CORPORATIONS W
AS NOT ILLEGAL FOR DEPRIVING PETITIONER RITA G. BENSON OF HER LEGITIME. IV WHETH
ER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT PIERCING THE VEILS OF CORPORATE FICTION O
F RESPONDENTS CORPORATIONS ELLICE AND MARGO. [25] In essence, petitioners want t
his Court to disregard the separate juridical personalities of Ellice and Margo
for the purpose of treating all property purportedly owned by said corporations
as property solely owned by the Gala spouses. The petitioners first contention in
support of this theory is that the purposes for which Ellice and Margo were org
anized should be declared as illegal and contrary to public policy. They claim t
hat the respondents never pursued exemption from land reform coverage in good fa
ith and instead merely used the corporations as tools to circumvent land reform
laws and to avoid estate taxes. Specifically, they point out that respondents ha
ve not shown that the transfers of the land in favor of Ellice were executed in
compliance with the requirements of Section 13 of R.A. 3844. [26] Furthermore, t
hey alleged that respondent corporations were run without any of the conventiona
l corporate formalities. [27] At the outset, the Court holds that petitioners con
tentions impugning the legality of the purposes for which Ellice and Margo were
organized, amount to collateral attacks which are prohibited in this jurisdictio
n. [28] The best proof of the purpose of a corporation is its articles of incorp
oration and by-laws. The articles of incorporation must state the primary and se
condary purposes of the corporation, while the by-laws outline the administrativ
e organization of the corporation, which, in turn, is supposed to insure or faci
litate the accomplishment of said purpose. [29] In the case at bar, a perusal of
the Articles of Incorporation of Ellice and Margo shows no sign of the allegedl
y illegal purposes that petitioners are complaining of. It is well to note that,
if a corporations purpose, as stated in the Articles of Incorporation, is lawful
, then the
SEC has no authority to inquire whether the corporation has purposes other than
those stated, and mandamus will lie to compel it to issue the certificate of inc
orporation. [30] Assuming there was even a grain of truth to the petitioners clai
ms regarding the legality of what are alleged to be the corporations true purpose
s, we are still precluded from granting them relief. We cannot address here thei
r concerns regarding circumvention of land reform laws, for the doctrine of prim
ary jurisdiction precludes a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an ad
ministrative body of special competence. [31] Since primary jurisdiction over an
y violation of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 that may have been committed
is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), [32]
then it is with said administrative agency that the petitioners must first plead
their case. With regard to their claim that Ellice and Margo were meant to be u
sed as mere tools for the avoidance of estate taxes, suffice it say that the leg
al right of a taxpayer to reduce the amount of what otherwise could be his taxes
or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. [3
3] The petitioners allegation that Ellice and Margo were run without any of the t
ypical corporate formalities, even if true, would not merit the grant of any of
the relief set forth in their prayer. We cannot disregard the corporate entities
of Ellice and Margo on this ground. At most, such allegations, if proven to be
true, should be addressed in an
administrative case before the SEC. [34] Thus, even if Ellice and Margo were org
anized for the purpose of exempting the properties of the Gala spouses from the
coverage of land reform legislation and avoiding estate taxes, we cannot disrega
rd their separate juridical personalities. Next, petitioners make much of the fa
ct that the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision a mere two days f
rom the time the respondents filed their Comment. They alleged that the appellat

e court could not have made a deliberate study of the factual questions in the c
ase, considering the sheer volume of evidence available. [35] In support of this
allegation, they point out that the Court of Appeals merely adopted the factual
findings of the SEC En Banc verbatim, without deliberation and analysis. [36] I
n People v. Mercado, [37] we ruled that the speed with which a lower court dispo
ses of a case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its fu
nction. Indeed, magistrates are not supposed to study a case only after all the
pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to d
uty that jurists study a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation
of their decision has arrived. The two-day period between the filing of petition
ers Comment and the promulgation of the decision
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)

was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the
decision. As long as the lower court does not sacrifice the orderly administrati
on of justice in favor of a speedy ut reckless disposition of a case, it cannot
e taken to task for rendering its decision with due dispatch. The Court of App
eals in this intra-corporate controversy committed no reversi le error and, cons
equently, its decision should e affirmed. [38] Verily, if such swift dispositio
n of a case is considered a non-issue in cases where the life or li erty of a pe
rson is at stake, then we see no reason why the same principle cannot apply when
only private rights are involved. Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that th
e factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are
not reviewa le y the Supreme Court. They carry even more weight when the Court
of Appeals affirms the factual findings of a lower fact-finding ody. [39] Like
wise, the findings of fact of administrative odies, such as the SEC, will not
e interfered with y the courts in the a sence of grave a use of discretion on t
he part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supporte
d y su stantial evidence. [40] However, in the interest of equity, this Court h
as reviewed the factual findings of the SEC En Banc, which were affirmed in toto
y the Court of Appeals, and has found no cogent reason to distur the same. In
deed, we are convinced that the arguments raised y the petitioners are nothing
ut unwarranted conclusions of law. Specifically, they insist that the Gala spou
ses never meant to part with the ownership of the shares which are in the names
of their children and encargados, and that all transfers of property to these in
dividuals are supposedly void for eing a solutely simulated for lack of conside
ration. [41] However, as correctly held y the SEC En Banc, the transfers were o
nly relatively simulated, inasmuch as the evident intention of the Gala spouses
was to donate portions of their property to their children and encargados. [42]
In an attempt to olster their theory that the organization of the respondent co
rporations was illegal, the petitioners aver that the legitime pertaining to pet
itioners Rita G. Benson and Guia G. Domingo from the estate of their father had
een su ject to unwarranted reductions as a result thereof. In sum, they claim t
hat stockholdings in Ellice which the late Manuel Gala had assigned to them were
insufficient to cover their legitimes, since Benson was only given two shares w
hile Domingo received only sixteen shares out of a total num er of 35,000 issued
shares. [43] Moreover, the reliefs sought y petitioners should have een raise
d in a proceeding for settlement of estate, rather than in the present intra-cor
porate controversy. If they are genuinely interested in securing that part of th
eir late fathers property which has been
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)
reserved for them in their capacity as compulsory heirs, then they should simply
exercise their actio ad supplendam legitimam, or their right of completion of l
egitime. [44] Such relief must e sought during the distri ution and partition s
tage of a case for the settlement of the estate of Manuel Gala, filed efore a c
ourt which has taken jurisdiction over the settlement of said estate. [45] Final
ly, the petitioners pray that the veil of corporate fiction that shroud oth Ell
ice and Margo e pierced, consistent with their earlier allegation that oth cor
porations were formed for purposes contrary to law and pu lic policy. In sum, th
ey su mit that the respondent corporations are mere usiness conduits of the dec
eased Manuel Gala and thus may e disregarded to prevent injustice, the distorti
on or hiding of the truth or the letting in of a just defense. [46] However, to wa
rrant resort to the extraordinary remedy of piercing the veil of corporate ficti
on, there must e proof that the corporation is eing used as a cloak or cover f
or fraud or illegality, or to work injustice, [47] and the petitioners have fail
ed to prove that Ellice and Margo were eing used thus. They have not presented
any evidence to show how the separate juridical entities of Ellice and Margo wer
e used y the respondents to commit fraudulent, illegal or unjust acts. Hence, t
his contention, too, must fail. On June 5, 2003, the petitioners filed a Reply,
where, aside from reiterating the contentions raised in their Petition, they ave
rred that there is no proof that either capital gains taxes or documentary stamp
taxes were paid in the series of transfers of Ellice and Margo shares. Thus, th

ey invoke Sections 176 and 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, which woul
d ar the presentation or admission into evidence of any document that purports
to transfer any enefit derived from certificates of stock if the requisite docu
mentary stamps have not een affixed thereto and cancelled. Curiously, the petit
ioners never raised this issue efore the SEC Hearing Officer, the SEC En Banc o
r the Court of Appeals. Thus, we are precluded from passing upon the same for, a
s a rule, no question will e entertained on appeal unless it has een raised in
the court elow, for points of law, theories, issues and arguments not rought
to the attention of the lower court need not e, and ordinarily will not e, con
sidered y a reviewing court, as they cannot e raised for the first time at tha
t late stage. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule. [48] Furtherm
ore, even if these allegations were proven to e true, such facts would not rend
er the underlying transactions void, for these instruments would not e the sole
means, much less the est means, y which the existence of these transactions c
ould e proved. For this purpose, the ooks and records of a corporation, which
include the stock and transfer ook, are generally admissi le in evidence in fav
or of or against the

corporation and its mem ers. They can e used to prove corporate acts, a corpora
tions financial status and other matters, including ones status as a stockholder.
Most
importantly, these books and records are, ordinarily, the best evidence of corpo
rate acts and proceedings. [49] Thus, reference to these should have been made b
efore the SEC Hearing Officer, for this Court will not entertain this belated qu
estioning of the evidence now. It is always sad to see families torn apart by mo
ney matters and property disputes. The concept of a close corporation organized
for the purpose of running a family business or managing family property has for
med the backbone of Philippine commerce and industry. Through this device, Filip
ino families have been able to turn their humble, hard-earned life savings into
going concerns capable of providing them and their families with a modicum of ma
terial comfort and financial security as a reward for years of hard work. A fami
ly corporation should serve as a rallying point for family unity and prosperity,
not as a flashpoint for familial strife. It is hoped that people reacquaint the
mselves with the concepts of mutual aid and security that are the original drivi
ng forces behind the formation of family corporations and use these tenets in or
der to facilitate more civil, if not more amicable, settlements of family corpor
ate disputes. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The D
ecision dated
November 8, 2002 and the Resolution dated December 27, 2002, both of the Court o
f Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J
., Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Octaviano, Clarence (1932)