EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008

PADUA v. PEOPLE
(convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, no probation)
FACTS: Padua, 17, and Ubalde were charged for violating RA 9165 for selling 4.86 grams of
dried marijuana fruitings placed in a folded newsprint to a police poseur-buyer. Padua
withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to firsttime offenders under Section 70 of RA 9165. The RTC found him guilty of the crime charged.
Padua's petition for probation was denied on the ground that under Section 24 of Rep. Act No.
9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law. ***SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of
the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
ISSUE: Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344 violated?
HELD: NO.
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
The intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and
harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending
a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty
of violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of
illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on
probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend
their ways. The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the
legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who
are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once
a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended

sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18
years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus,
the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is
concerned.
G.R. No. 136845 October 8, 2003
PEOPLE v. FLORENDO
(jealousy is not insanity)
As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages
of a disease prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming
that he had some form of mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms of
schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning
faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain
matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts any
intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While appellant on many
occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would indicate that he was not of
sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental state and not
necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality
of mental faculties will not exclude imputability... Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or
deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not prove insanity.

G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000

PEOPLE v. ESTRADA
(insanity based on circumstantial evidence)
To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that
time. Direct testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for
the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and
emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to the
practice of people of sound mind.
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at
the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount
the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of
Crisanto Santillan attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that should
have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his
mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to
the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament
of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary
behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter
at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness.

Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly
approached the microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful
which the rational person would have been made. He then returned to the Bishop's chair and
sat there as if nothing happened.

G.R. No. 126283 May 28, 1999

PEOPLE v. ESTEPANO
(absence of proof that minor acted with discernment)
The records show that he was only thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense. . . The minor referred to here is presumed to have acted without discernment.
Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor acted otherwise. . . A
scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant Rene
Estepano acted with discernment. . . Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish
Rene's mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its
cross-examination of Rene did not in any way attempt to show his discernment. . . Accordingly,
even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the
prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his
age. . . Rene Estepano is acquitted in the absence of proof that he acted with discernment.

G.R. No. 129899 April 27, 2000

PEOPLE v. VILLA
(anger does not constitute insanity)
There is a vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one who has worked himself
up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. A
man sometimes does crazy things when enraged but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is insane. . . It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was
examined at the center. But, in all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period
of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of the
time. He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses and the
thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired
to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental
state of accused-appellant should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise
moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that

crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal
liability.

G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009

PEOPLE v. SARCIA
(automatic suspension)
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged.
Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense
and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should
apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty
of a heinous crime.
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated,
even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939

PEOPLE v. DOQUEA
(determination of discernment)
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial

G.R. No. 140794. October 16, 2001

PEOPLE v. AGLIDAY
(firing a shotgun is not exempting)
Before the accused may be exempted from criminal liability by reason of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the
following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. For an
accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful. The act of firing a shotgun at
another is not a lawful act.
An accident is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. It connotes
the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a persons overt
acts. In the case at bar, appellant got his shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had
intervened in the quarrel between the former and Conchita. It must also be pointed out that the firearm
was a shotgun that would not have fired off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant cocked the
shotgun before discharging it, showing a clear intent to fire it at someone. xxx Intent is not lacking in the
instant case. Appellants external acts prove malice or criminal intent. A deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence.

G.R. No. 158057 September 24, 2004

TOLEDO v. PEOPLE
(no accidental self-defense in criminal law)
The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in the
trial court and foisted in the CA by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete selfdefense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and
appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories (1) that he killed the victim to defend
himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses
are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal
law.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
G.R. No. 177218 October 3, 2011

PEOPLE v. SALES
(praeter intentionem cannot be used in disciplining a child)
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic
beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain
reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a
spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble and expense that
may be incurred for his search and capture" which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied
their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as
much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his
death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually
perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to
produce and did actually produce the death of the victim."

G.R. No. 102772 October 30, 1996

PEOPLE v. DEOPANTE
(no resistance is not voluntary surrender)
In order to appreciate voluntary surrender by an accused, the same must be shown to have been
"spontaneous and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In the absence of any of these
reasons, and in the event that the only reason for an accused's supposed surrender is to ensure his
safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and, hence, not voluntary. It will be
observed in this case that there was no conscious effort on the part of the accused who was fetched
from his house by police officers to go to police headquarters for investigation to voluntarily surrender
and/or acknowledge his guilt. He went with them for the purpose of clearing his name as he in fact tried
to do during the investigation where he professed his innocence. The fact alone that he did not resist but
went peacefully with the lawmen does not mean that he voluntarily surrendered.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. L-30116 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE v. DAMASO
(uninhabited place - reasonable possibility of receiving help)
Anent the circumstances of uninhabited place, counsel disclaims its existence by pointing to the
proximity of the sugarcane field where the victims were killed to the national highway as well as to certain
houses in the barrio. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable
possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and
the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no
reasonable possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That the accused deliberately sought the
solitude of the place is clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane field
although they could have disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were found.
Thus, in People v. Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having been committed in an uninhabited
place because the killing was done in a secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and uninhabited.

A.M. Nos. 3250-J-11 April 27, 1981

PEOPEL v, CODEREZ
(uninhabited place)
It has been established through the testimony of prosecution witness Dumlao that Tourist Spot is not an
uninhabited place. His house is only 50 meters away from it. The Tourist Spot was established and so
named by the Rotarians for people to stand and view the scenery of Grande Island. It is V shaped
surrounded by a fence, and there is a gap or a passage way on one side where people, particularly the
witness, go up and down everyday. Moreover, the Tourist Spot is only four -meters away from the national
highway coming from Olongapo City, and going to Subic, and where vehicles were continuously passing
by, even as the crime was being committed. The house of Dumlao was inhabited by four people at the
time, including himself, and it was sufficiently near the Tourist Spot for him to hear the screams of the
complaining witness which enabled him to go to her rescue. ...
Uninhabited place is aggravating when the crime is committed in a solitary place, where help to the victim
is difficult and escape of the accused is easy, provided that solitude was purposely sought or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the felony.
xxx In the light of the foregoing decisions and in the presence of uncontradicted evidence that the alleged
scene of the offense is not uninhabited, there rises the inevitable conclusion that the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place cannot be considered against the three accused-appellants in the case
at bar.

G. R. No. 143817 October 27, 2003

PEOPLE v. BAJAR
(disregard of age - old enough to be the father of the offender)
Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended party on account
of age, it is considered present when the offended person, by reason of his age, could be the father of the
offender. This is obvious in this case. Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age, considered old enough to
be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally declared in open court that he was 58 years old), he was also
the latters father-in-law. The presence of this aggravating circumstance by reason of their age difference
is, therefore, reinforced by their actual relationship by affinity. Further, it is ingrained in Philippine
culture that those advanced in age are respected especially in the provinces.

G.R. No. 68898 March 31, 1989

PEOPLE v. LAPAZ
(disregard of age; alternative circumstance literacy)
While it may be true that nighttime is absorbed in the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex and age cannot be similarly absorbed. Treachery refers to the
manner of the commission of the crime. Disregard of sex and age pertains to the relationship the victim,
who is a 70-year old woman, and the appellant who is young man, 27 years old, at the time of the
commission of the offense.
The mere lack of instruction or illiteracy of the appellant cannot be considered as a mitigating
circumstance. One does not have to be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to
take the life of another person even if it is to redress a wrong committed against him

G.R. No. 98431 January 15, 2002

PEOPLE v. DELA TORRE
(dwelling definition)
It appears from the records that the kitchen at the La Fiesta Farm where Marita was dragged by appellant
is her "dwelling," albeit the same does not belong to her. In People v. Parazo, this Court stressed that the
"dwelling" contemplated in Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code does not necessarily mean that the

victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, the place is his
home, the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect. The fact that the crime was consummated in the
nearby house is also immaterial. Marita was forcibly taken by appellant from her dwelling house (kitchen)
and then raped her. Dwelling is aggravating if the victim was taken from his house although the offense
was not completed therein.

G.R. No. 148877. August 19, 2003

PEOPLE v. BAGSIT
(dwelling)
Dwelling, also alleged in the amended Information, is likewise aggravating. The triggerman showed greater
perversity when, although outside the house, he attacked his victim inside the latters own house when he
could have very well committed the crime without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the victims
home. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends
him elsewhere. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused
should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense - it is enough that the victim
was attacked inside his own abode, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the
assault from the outside.

G.R. No. 140404 February 27, 2003

PEOPLE v. ALIBEN
(abuse of superior strength)
We agree with the trial court that the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength which was alleged in the Information. Superiority in number does not
necessarily amount to the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength. It is
necessary to show that the aggressors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their
superiority in strength. There must be proof of the relative physical strength of the aggressors and the
assaulted party or proof that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. The circumstance of
taking advantage of superior strength depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is
considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the offense.

G.R. No. 83903 August 30, 1990

PEOPLE v. OCTAVIO
(alevosia)
(facts) While Espiridion and Mamerto were drinking beer, appellant Octavio Juanga went inside the place
where the two were. Mamerto invited Octavio to have a drink with them. Octavio refused the invitation.
Mamerto then placed his arm around the shoulder of Octavio but the latter brushed aside the former's
arm. Afterwards, Mamerto attempted to shake hand with Octavio at the same time telling him to forget
what happened in the past between them. Octavio evaded the hand of Mamerto and left the place without
saying anything. xxx Moments later, Mamerto asked permission from Esperidion to urinate. Esperidion

followed Mamerto toward the footwalk near a banana plant at the back of the kitchen of said house. When
Esperidion was about four and half arms length from Mamerto who was urinating, he saw Octavio
pointing something at Mamerto. Almost at the same time, Octavio whispered to Mamerto and a gunshot
rang out. Mamerto turned around and collapsed with blood oozing from his right clavicle and with his
private part still visible.
Finally, we hold that the crime committed was murder qualified by alevosia, the accused having shot the
victim from behind without warning (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 70133, July 2, 1990). This is shown by the
suddenness of the attack. (People v. Maranan, 146 SCRA 243 [1986])

G.R. No. L-50276 January 27, 1983

PEOPLE v. BUTLER
(treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the deceased)
While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain the finding of the lower court
that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against
the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by
having an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did
not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the
medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B1 ", clearly
established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman
after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.

COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

G.R. No. 139615 May 28, 2004
PEOPLE v. TIRA
(two separate crimes of illegal possession; constructive possession)

The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a) the accused is
found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. xxx (constructive
possession - refer to People v Torres)
In this case, the prohibited and regulated drugs were found under the bed in the inner room of the house
of the appellants where they also resided. The appellants had actual and exclusive possession and control
and dominion over the house, including the room where the drugs were found by the policemen. The
appellant Connie Tira cannot escape criminal liability for the crime charged simply and merely on her
barefaced testimony that she was a plain housewife, had no involvement in the criminal actuations of her

husband, and had no knowledge of the existence of the drugs in the inner room of the house. She had full
access to the room, including the space under the bed. She failed to adduce any credible evidence that
she was prohibited by her husband, the appellant Amadeo Tira, from entering the room, cleaning it, or
even sleeping on the bed.
We find and so hold that the appellants are guilty of two separate crimes: (a) possession of regulated
drugs under Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their possession
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to Section
20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug.

G.R. No. 148547 September 27, 2006

PEOPLE v. EMPLEO
(two separate crimes of illegal possession)
The prosecution was correct in filing two separate Informations for the crimes of illegal possession of
shabu and illegal possession of marijuana. Clearly, the Legislature did not intend to lump these two
separate crimes into just one crime of "possession of dangerous drugs." Otherwise, there would be no
need to specify the different kinds of drugs and the corresponding quantity in the application of the
appropriate penalty. Multiple offenses can be committed under RA 6425 even if the crimes are committed
in the same place, at the same time, and by the same person. Thus, this Court has upheld rulings of the
lower courts convicting an accused charged with two separate crimes of illegal possession of shabu and
illegal possession of marijuana, even if the crimes were committed at the same time and in the same
place.
Just like Tira, this case involves illegal possession of both shabu and marijuana. Hence, it was only
proper for the prosecution to file two separate Informations since there were two distinct and separate
crimes involved. This is in accordance with the rule that a complaint or information must charge only one
offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

G.R. No. 170837 September 12, 2006

PEOPLE v. TORRES
(constructive possession)
This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the
prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the

accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.
Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive
possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and
character of the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same
may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drugs is in the house or place over which the accused
has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.