LILIA B. ADA, et al., vs.

FLORANTE BAYLON

FACTS:
This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon) who died on November 7, 1961 and
May 5, 1974, respectively. 3 At the time of their death, Spouses Baylon were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita Baylon (Rita),
Victoria Baylon (Victoria), Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila), Ramon Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada
(Lilia).
Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and was survived by her daughter, herein
petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by herein respondent Florante Baylon (Florante), his child from
his first marriage, as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children, namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners
Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all surnamed Baylon.

Florentino +
Maxima

Rita

Victoria

Luz

Dolores

Lilia

Ramon

Panfila

Florante
+ Flora

Ramon Jr
Remo, Jose,
Eric,
Florentino,
Ma. Ruby
Petitioners filed with the RTC complaint for partition, accounting, and damages against respondent Florante, Rita, and Panfila. They
alleged that Spouses Baylon owned 43 parcels of land. They claimed that Rita took possession of the land and appropriated the income
derived therefrom. Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted, in their answer, that the co-owned the properties in question. On July 1997, Rita
donated a parcel of land to Florante. In July 2000, Rita died. Petitioners learned of the donation made by Rita in favor of Florante. They
filed for a Supplemental Pleading, asking the court to rescind the Deed of Donation.
The RTC rendered a decision, finding the existence of co-ownership but ordered the partition of the estate of the Spouses Baylon. RTC
also rescinded the donation made.
The case was appealed to the CA. The appellate court set aside the decision and remanded the case to determine ownership of Lot Nos.
4706 and 4709.
The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate, distinct and independent actions partition and
rescission. First, the petitioners raised the refusal of their co-heirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties which they
inherited from Spouses Baylon. Second, in their supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709
and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite.

ISSUE/S: W/N

RULING:
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one
action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could
be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several
distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 29
While parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an
opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules. 31
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the
rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure . The
variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one
complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as
well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action. 32

Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to
the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. 33 However, if there is no
objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of
all the erroneously joined causes of action.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein
notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined
cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the
same would be a nullity.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the petitioners' action for rescission from their action for
partition. While this may be a patent omission on the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its
decision. The RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the petitioners.
Asserting a New Cause of Action in a Supplemental Pleading
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 6.Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms
as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10)
days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.
In Young v. Spouses Sy, 36 this Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus:
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A
supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental
pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an
issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which
justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to
in the original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the
kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original
right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though they
themselves constitute a right of action. 37 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought
to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante is a new
cause of action that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners' prayer for the rescission of the said donation inter
vivos in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partition case. Lot No. 4709 and half
of Lot No. 4706 are included among the properties that were sought to be partitioned.
The petitioners' supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of the gratuitous conveyance of Lot No. 4709
and half of Lot No. 4706 after the filing of the original complaint and prayed for additional reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim
that the said lots form part of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same is rescinded.
Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their original complaint remained the same.
Petition is partly granted. The case is remanded to the RTC.
Reyes vs Enriquez
Facts: Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land located in
Talisay, Cebu, with Anacleto Cabrera. On the other hand respondents, claim to be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as
husband and daughter of Anacleto's daughter.
On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez, sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for
P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in this
case. When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that certain
documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his
share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July
13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest
of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico.
Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or
nullification of the aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the "repartition and
resubdivision" of the subject property.
The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and
Dionisia Reyes.
Ruling: Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance. The respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court. A
real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled
to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.

Comment: This ruling of the court is only proper because if people are allowed to file claims without verifying first
their respective interest, then the whole system will be in shambles. Because then, courts would try to decide on
claims but only to find out later that the claimants do not really have interest to the claim, wasting the courts
time,money, and resources.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of
Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and
the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the abovequestioned documents.
We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.[10] A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.[11]
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court.
[12] A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one
entitled to the avails thereof.[13] Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and
substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.[14] A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, while
a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.
[15] The purpose of the rule is to protect persons against undue and unnecessary litigation.[16] It likewise ensures
that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case.[17]
Thus, a plaintiffs right to institute an ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said
property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,[18]
or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,[19] this Court has
consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is within the
exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding. [20] In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,
[21] the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir
has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment
of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
[22]
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the Declaration of Non-Existency[sic],
Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc., a review of the allegations therein reveals that the
right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned onehalf of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del
Rosario[23] is applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of
the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of
Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners
predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court
ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any
proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who
are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance.[24]
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the
legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the
records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of
action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was
not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to
protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the
new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs
in the proper forum.
Furthermore, in Portugal,[25] the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject the estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed
because it appeared from the records of the case that the only property left by the decedent was the subject matter
of the case and that the parties have already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In
the present case, however, nothing in the records of this case shows that the only property left by the deceased
Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to

establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
who are not parties in this case that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances
in this case, this Court finds that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDER

Arturo Flores vs Spouses Enrico and Edna Lindo

In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan amounting to P400k from Arturo Flores. To secure the loan, Edna executed a deed of real estate
mortgage on a property which is however part of the conjugal property (it was both in her name and her husbands name Enrico Lindo). Only
Edna signed the deed. But in November 1995, Enrico executed a special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the property.
Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated demands from Flores. Flores then filed an action to foreclose the mortgage.
The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the action for foreclosure cannot prosper because it appears that there was no valid mortgage
between Edna and Flores. Edna mortgaged the property without the consent of her husband and the special power of attorney executed by Enrico
a month after the execution of the deed did not cure the defect. The trial court however ruled that Flores can instead file a personal action
(collection suit) against Edna.
Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of money against Edna and Enrico (raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 42). The Lindo spouses
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The spouses then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when Flores filed an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, he had abandoned the remedy
of filing a personal action to collect the indebtedness. These remedies are mutually exclusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a mortgagee-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt; and
that he has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. These remedies are indeed mutually exclusive. However, in this case, the Supreme Court made a pro hac vice decision (applicable only
to this case and as an exception to the rule) which allows Flores to recover via a personal action despite his prior filing of a real action to recover
the indebtedness. This procedural rule cannot be outweighed by the rule on unjust enrichment. Here, Edna admitted her liability of indebtedness.
Further, the ruling of the Manila RTC Branch 33 is erroneous when it ruled that the mortgage between Edna and Flores is invalid. It is true that a
disposition (or in this case a mortgage, which is an act of strict dominion) of a conjugal property by one spouse without the consent of the other
spouse is VOID. However, under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus it is clear, the mortgage was void at the outset but it was ratified when a month later, Enrico executed a special power of attorney
authorizing Edna to mortgage the subject property. (So I guess this is an exception to the rule that no void act can be ratified.)
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang,
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an
action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that
Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners
filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employers
subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is
not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.

Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting
the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
(2) No. The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of
criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33
lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation
Facts:
The petitioner Multi-Realty constructed condominium known as theMakati Tuscany Condominium Building. In pursuant to RA
4726,respondent Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation (Matusco)was organized and established to manage the condominium
units.In 1975, Multi-Realty executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Makati Tuscany, which did not specify
theownership of the 98 parking slots. In 1989, Multi-Realty requested that two of its executives be allowed to park their cars in two of
Makati Tuscanys remaining 72 unallocated parking slots but Matusco denied the request. Then, Matusco sent a letter offeringMultiRealty for the use of the two unallocated parking slots which the latter rejected.On April 1990, petitioner filed a complaint against
Matusco for Damages and or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary restraining order and or preliminary injunction
with theMakati RTC. Petitioner alleged that it had retained ownership of the 98 unassigned parking slots but it was not specified in
theMaster Deed and that the mistake was discovered for the first time when Matusco Rejected its request. In its answer
withcounterclaim, Matusco alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of action against it for reformation of their contract. The
RTCdismissed the case and ruled that Multi-Realty failed to prove anyground for the reformation of its agreement with
Matusco.Multi-Realty appealed the decision to the CA contending thatReformation is proper because the deed failed to express the
true agreement or intention of the parties. It alleged that Matusco knew that petitioner owned the 98 parking slots and Matusco
never objected the sale of the slots to third parties. Matusco was also stopped from assailing the ownership over the parking
slots.Petitioner also averred that Matuscos counterclaim had already prescribed because it was filed only in 1990 when the period
therefor had elapsed in 1981. Whereas, Matusco contended that if there was a mistake in the drafting of the master Deed in 1975,
itshould have been corrected in 1977 upon the execution of the Deed of Transfer. Matusco alleged that it was not stopped from
claiming ownership over the slots because Multi-Realty acted fraudulently and illegally. The CA rendered its decision dismissing
Multi-Realtys appeal on the ground that its action had already prescribed. The CA denied the MR filed by petitioner. Hence this
petition.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal on theground of prescriptionWhether petitioners action had already
prescribed when it wasfiled in 1990
Ruling:
1) The CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal. Settled is therule that no questions will be entertained on appeal unless they have
been raised below. Points of law, theories, issues andarguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not
be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In the case at bar,neither petitioner nor
respondent raised the issue of prescription throughout the proceedings in the RTC, hence the appellate court should have
proceeded to resolve petitioners appeal on its merits instead of dismissing the same on a ground not raised by the parties in the
RTC and even in their pleadings in the CA.
2) Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at
great distances of time and surprising the parties or their
representatives when the facts have become obscure from thelapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of
witnesses. The essence of the statute of limitations is to preventfraudulent claims arising from unwarranted length of time and notto
defeat actions asserted on the honest belief that they weresufficiently submitted for judicial determination.Article 1144 of the New
Civil Code provides that an actionupon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years fromthe time the right of action
accrues. In relation thereto, Article 1150of the New Civil Code provides that the time for prescription of allactions, when there is no
special provision which ordainsotherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. It isthe legal possibility of bringing the
action that determines thestarting point for the computation of the period of prescription.
The term "right of action" is the right to commence andmaintain an action. In the law of pleadings, right of action isdistinguished from
a cause of action in that the former is aremedial right belonging to some persons while the latter is aformal statement of the
operational facts that give rise to suchremedial right. The former is a matter of right and depends onthe substantive law while the
latter is a matter of statute andis governed by the law of procedure. The right of actionsprings from the cause of action, but does not
accrue until allthe facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred.
A cause of action must always consist of two elements:
(1)the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate
person, character, property or contract; and

(2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primaryright and duty have been violated.To determine
when all the facts which constitute a cause of actionfor reformation of an instrument may be brought and when the rightof the
petitioner to file such action accrues, the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, must be considered because an action for the
reformation of an instrument may be brought under said Rule:SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights areaffected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violationthereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
todetermine any question of construction or validity arising, and for adeclaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.An action for the
reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to realproperty or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownershipunder Article 1607
of the Civil Code, may be brought under thisRule.The concept and meaning of the term cause of action inproceedings for
declaratory relief, vis--vis an ordinary civil action,is broadened. It is not, as in ordinary civil action, the wrong or delict by which the
plaintiffs rights are violated, but it is extendedto a mere denial, refusal or challenge raising at least anuncertainty or insecurity which
is injurious to plaintiffs rights.For a petition for declaratory relief to prosper, the followingconditions sine qua non must concur: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be betweenpersons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seekingdeclaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.To controvert is to dispute; to deny, to oppose or contest;to take issue on. The controversy must be definite and
concrete,touching on the legal relations of the parties having adverse legalinterests. It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character asdistinguished from an opinion advising what the law would
be upona hypothetical state of facts.In sum, one has a right of action to file a complaint/petitionfor reformation of an instrument when
his legal right is denied,challenged or refused by another; or when there is an antagonisticassertion of his legal right and the denial
thereof by another concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitiveand substantive controversy between the
parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests. This may occur shortly after the execution of the instrument
or much later.A party to an instrument is under no obligation to seek areformation of an instrument while he is unaware that
anyopposition will be made to carry out the actual agreement. Thestatute of limitations does not begin to run against an
equitablecause of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until the mistake has been discovered or ought to
havebeen discovered. The mere recording of a deed does not chargethe grantor with constructive notice of a mistake therein, but is
tobe considered with other facts and circumstances in determining whether the grantor be charged with notice actual or
constructive.In the case at bar, Petitioner only discovered the error in1989, hence he is not prescribed or still has a right of
actionagainst respondent in the reformation of the instrument. When hefiled the complaint in 1990, the prescriptive period had not
yetelapsedacts:
The petitioner Multi-Realty constructed condominium known as the Makati Tuscany Condominium Building. In pursuant to RA 4726,
respondent Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation (Matusco) was organized and established to manage the condominium units.
In 1975, Multi-Realty executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Makati Tuscany, which did not specify the
ownership of the 98 parking slots. In 1989, Multi-Realty requested that two of its executives be allowed to park their cars in two of
Makati Tuscanys remaining 72 unallocated parking slots but Matusco denied the request. Then, Matusco sent a letter offering MultiRealty for the use of the two unallocated parking slots which the latter rejected. On April 1990, petitioner filed a complaint against
Matusco for Damages and or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary restraining order and or preliminary injunction
with the Makati RTC. Petitioner alleged that it had retained ownership of the 98 unassigned parking slots but it was not specified in
the Master Deed and that the mistake was discovered for the first time when Matusco Rejected its request. In its answer with
counterclaim, Matusco alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of action against it for reformation of their contract. The RTC
dismissed the case and ruled that Multi-Realty failed to prove any ground for the reformation of its agreement with Matusco. MultiRealty appealed the decision to the CA contending that Reformation is proper because the deed failed to express the true
agreement or intention of the parties. It alleged that Matusco knew that petitioner owned the 98 parking slots and Matusco never
objected the sale of the slots to third parties. Matusco was also stopped from assailing the ownership over the parking slots.
Petitioner also averred that Matuscos counterclaim had already prescribed because it was filed only in 1990 when the period
therefor had elapsed in 1981. Whereas, Matusco contended that if there was a mistake in the drafting of the master Deed in 1975, it
should have been corrected in 1977 upon the execution of the Deed of Transfer. Matusco alleged that it was not stopped from
claiming ownership over the slots because Multi-Realty acted fraudulently and illegally. The CA rendered its decision dismissing
Multi-Realtys appeal on the ground that its action had already prescribed. The CA denied the MR filed by petitioner. Hence this
petition.
Issues: Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground of prescription Whether petitioners action had already
prescribed when it was filed in 1990
Ruling:
1) The CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal. Settled is the rule that no questions will be entertained on appeal unless they have
been raised below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not
be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In the case at bar, neither petitioner nor
respondent raised the issue of prescription throughout the proceedings in the RTC, hence the appellate court should have
proceeded to resolve petitioners appeal on its merits instead of dismissing the same on a ground not raised by the parties in the
RTC and even in their pleadings in the CA.
2) Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at
great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of
time or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses. The essence of the statute of limitations is to prevent fraudulent
claims arising from unwarranted length of time and not to defeat actions asserted on the honest belief that they were sufficiently
submitted for judicial determination. Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that an action upon a written contract must be
brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. In relation thereto, Article 1150 of the New Civil Code
provides that the time for prescription of all actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted
from the day they may be brought. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action that determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription. The term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the law of
pleadings, right of action is distinguished from a cause of action in that the former is a remedial right belonging to some persons
while the latter is a formal statement of the operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and
depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by the law of procedure. The right of action
springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. A cause
of action must always consist of two elements:
(1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate
person, character, property or contract; and

(2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. To determine
when all the facts which constitute a cause of action for reformation of an instrument may be brought and when the right of the
petitioner to file such action accrues, the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, must be considered because an action for the
reformation of an instrument may be brought under said Rule: SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the
reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article
1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The concept and meaning of the term cause of action in proceedings for declaratory relief, vis--vis an ordinary civil action, is
broadened. It is not, as in ordinary civil action, the wrong or delict by which the plaintiffs rights are violated, but it is extended to a
mere denial, refusal or challenge raising at least an uncertainty or insecurity which is injurious to plaintiffs rights. For a petition for
declaratory relief to prosper, the following conditions sine qua non must concur:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
To controvert is to dispute; to deny, to oppose or contest; to take issue on. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching
on the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree of a conclusive character as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. In sum, one has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an instrument when his legal
right is denied, challenged or refused by another; or when there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial thereof
by another concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and substantive controversy between the parties
touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests. This may occur shortly after the execution of the instrument or much
later. A party to an instrument is under no obligation to seek a reformation of an instrument while he is unaware that any opposition
will be made to carry out the actual agreement. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an equitable cause of action
for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until the mistake has been discovered or ought to have been discovered.
The mere recording of a deed does not charge the grantor with constructive notice of a mistake therein, but is to be considered with
other facts and circumstances in determining 15 whether the grantor be charged with notice actual or constructive. In the case at
bar, Petitioner only discovered the error in 1989, hence he is not prescribed or still has a right of action against respondent in the
reformation of the instrument. When he filed the complaint in 1990, the prescriptive period had not yet elapsed.