CITIZENSHIP

Thus the present petition.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest

ISSUE:

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold

public elective office in the philippines.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were
both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered
the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is
both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was
reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his
US citizenship when he attained the age of majority
and registered himself as a voter in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor
of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in
R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a
result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to

terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship

considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at

the same time forswear allegiance to the other country
of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the
point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such
an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by
naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies
with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within
the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted
by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation
and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of

candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or

immigrant of another country; that he will defend and

support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as
far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of

allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country,
leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he
will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine
citizenship,
renounces
his
foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of

merit

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of
the
Philippines
under
the
Koalisyon
ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a
petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou,
a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter

being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier

based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on
two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004,
the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on
6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with GR
161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634,
both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.

Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be
allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the
Philippines.

Held:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth
of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made
by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate
of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them
on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
(4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5)

At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,

Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the
totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in RomualdezMarcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.

CO vs. HRET
199 SCRA 692
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the
setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the
private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of
the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989,
found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the

petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22,
1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.

Held:
Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose
Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from
China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan
was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te
to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his
childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside

community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural
born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic
faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the
Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He
decided to put up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable.
As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In
the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he
cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial,
declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15,
1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an
order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already
take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath
of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose
Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him

from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took
and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since
employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his
family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.
The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in
Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1.
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2.

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3.
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4.

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as

applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those
who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in question
was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If
one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article
IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for
the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a
citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen

but his father had been naturalized

respondent was only nine (9) years old.

when

the

He could not have divined when he came of age that in

1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already having been
a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would
have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for
one who had been a citizen since he was nine years
old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise
his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly
a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking
of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure
of stripping respondents father of his citizenship after
his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity,
therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null
and void would run against the principle of due
process because he has already been laid to rest.

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that no
person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization
as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship

through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson
who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto
Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the HOR
since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for
quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE:
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
Petition dismissed
YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may

however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. Desertion of the armed forces;
2. Services in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II;
3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any other time,
4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. Political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality this means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

Cordora vs Comelec
FACTS:
Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law
department against Tambunting asserting that
Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his

certificate of candidacy by claiming that Natural Born

Filipino and resident before the election in 2001and
2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not
eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and
residency
requirements.
Cordora
presented
a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that
he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16
December 2000 and upon departure from the
Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora,
these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired
American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on
the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To
refute Cordoras claim that
Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting
presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed
that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was
naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of
citizenship conferred by the US government after
Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form I
-130(Petition
for
Relative)
merely
confirmed
Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambuntings possession of an American passport did
not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen.
Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on
18November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225
(R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition
Act
of
2003.The
Comelec
law

department recommended the dismissal of complaint

because it failed to substantiate the charges. The
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the
resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The
COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed
to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence. Commissioner
Sarmiento wrote a separate opinion which concurred
with the findings of the En Banc Resolution.
Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting
could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover,
Tambunting effectively renounced his American
citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy
in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner
filed a MR but was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.
HELD:
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino
mother and an American father. Neither does he deny
that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers
citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his
parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and
American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists
that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation
that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because
of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary
for
Tambunting
to
undergo
the

naturalization process to acquire American citizenship.

The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to
confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting
acquire dat birth. The certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which Cordora presented contained two
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an
American. However, the same certification showed
nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship
prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before
the 2001elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from running for
public office.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any
other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person
with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his
certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by
the
individuals
active
participation
in
the
naturalization process. States that, under R.A. No.
9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of
another countryis allowed to retain his Filipino
citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an
oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a
naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.

ROSELLER DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009
DOCTRINE:
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of
a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance AND for those seeking elective public offices
in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.|
FACTS:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina
DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the 2007 elections. On April 3,
2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a
petition for disqualification alleging that petitioner is
not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and
resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a
naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006,
he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No.

9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the

Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.
Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
September 6, 2006. He argued that, having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to
exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is
qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent
Dela Cruz won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an
election protest on grounds of irregularities and
massive cheating.
COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007
Resolution disqualifying petitioner on the ground that
herein petitioner should have renounced his American
citizenship before he can run for any public elective
position. This respondent did not do. The Oath of
Allegiance taken by respondent was for the purpose of
re-acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not, at the
same time, mean that respondent has renounced his
American citizenship. Thus, at the time respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija he was, and still is,
a dual citizen, possessing both Philippine and
American
citizenship.
For
this
reason
alone,
respondent
is
disqualified
to
run
for
the
abovementioned elective position.|
Hence, De Guzman filed a MFR but it was dismissed by
the COMELEC En Banc for having been rendered moot
in view of private respondent's victory. Petitioner filed
the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in

disqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor because

of his failure to renounce his American citizenship, and
in dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being
moot.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is disqualified from running for vicemayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the 2007 elections for
having failed to renounce his American citizenship in
accordance with R.A. No. 9225.
HELD:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for public office
in view of his failure to renounce his American
citizenship.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement
for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An
elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines".
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of
a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a
natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship

upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the

instant case, there is no question that petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath
of allegiance on 2006. However, it must be
emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public
office.
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the filing of a
certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to
a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No.
9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado
are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No.
9225 provides for more requirements. To wit, Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for
those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,
to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.|
In the instant case, petitioner failed to renounce his
American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from
running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the
May 14, 2007 elections.
Additional info: as to won the issue is moot::: An issue
becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be
without practical use and value. In this case, the

pendency of petitioner's election protest assailing the

results of the election did not render moot the motion
for reconsideration which he filed assailing his
disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of
petitioner's citizenship did not become moot; the
resolution of the issue remained relevant because it
could significantly affect the outcome of the election
protest. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion for
reconsideration solely on the ground that the same
was rendered moot because he lost to private
respondent.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AZUCENA

SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS
GR No. 183110 October 7, 2013
DUMALANTA
DOCTRINE:
The State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to
an alien wife of one of its citizens, could have had no
other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance
among the members of the family. Under existing laws,
an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship either thru
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under RA 9139. A third option, called
derivative naturalization, is available to alien women
married to Filipino husbands. This third option is found
under Section 15 of CA 473.
FACTS:

On December 2, 2002, respondent Azucena filed a

Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. She alleged the following in her
petition:
That she believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution;
That she has conducted herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in
the Philippines;
That she has mingled socially with Filipinos and has
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
culture;
That she has all the qualifications required under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473;
That she is not opposed to organized government nor
affiliated with any group of persons or associations
that uphold teachings and doctrines against organized
governments;
That she is not defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence;
That she is neither a polygamist nor believes in
polygamy;
That the nation which she is a subject of is not at war
with the Philippines;
That she intends in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,

potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to

China;
That she will reside continuously in the Philippines
from the time of the filing of her petition up to the time
of her naturalization.
The OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
respondent failed to allege that she is engaged in a
lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
The RTC denied the motion and granted respondents
petition. The OSG or its representative failed to appear
in subsequent hearings, particularly during the exparte hearing where respondent presented her
evidence.
The OSG then appealed to the CA, now alleging that
Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement
under CA 473, because as an alien, she cannot engage
in retail trade. Her business is also not a lucrative
trade. The OSG also alleged that the ex-parte
proceedings that took place in the lower court were
not in the nature of public hearings.
ISSUE:
WON the lower courts erred in granting Azucenas
naturalization?
HELD:
NO. Azucena has sufficiently proven that she complied
with the requirements of the law on lucrative trade and
income. It was established that she worked as a
teacher in several schools, had five children with her
husband, and that she and her husband managed to

send all of their children to college. Their children have

all finished their studies and are now all professionals,
three of whom were working abroad. Azucena and her
husband also sufficiently proved that they established
and operated a retail business of milling and
distributing rice, corn and copra. She even filed a joint
annual tax return over their business, and that she and
her husband even brought parcels of land in Barrio
Lombog, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur.
While it was on record that Azucena filed before the
then Commission on Immigration and Deportation an
application for the cancellation of her alien certificate
of registration and that it was denied, the reason for
the denial was that it was not sufficiently established
that her husband was a Filipino citizen, because only
their marriage certificate was submitted as evidence.
Her application was not denied because of noncompliance with the lucrative trade and income
requirements. Therefore Azucena filed for judicial
naturalization. In her second attempt to be naturalized
as a Filipino citizen, it was sufficiently established that
her husband was indeed a Filipino citizen. Since the
same issue raised before the CA were brought to the
Supreme Court, the high tribunal decided it had no
reason disturb the findings of the lower courts.

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8,
2016)

Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections,
Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day
before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines
after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to
and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally
adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18,
2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she
had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.
She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post
as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA
9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped using
her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or

cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove
that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos.
The COMELEC en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6

votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote
on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on
the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for
the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a
candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the
SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the
election contests, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members, whereas over the President and
Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole
jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for
such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is
simply no authorized proceeding in determining the
ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack
of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for
the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of
procedures would be contrary to the intent of the
Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of
Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation
of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born

Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a naturalborn Filipino.
For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes
parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical
of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than 99% chance that a child born in
such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents nationality. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that
foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the
intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with

natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and
the general principles of international law. Although
the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these
treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus
manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a
new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of
May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI.
COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an
aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless
she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires
her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which
Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US.
Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
familys actual continuous stay in the Philippines over

the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on

May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be
denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the

ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to
grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior
authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution
that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace
Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency.
Hence, there cannot be any false
representations in her COC regarding her citizenship
and residency.