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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CASE DIGESTS

Privileges and Salary Art. VII, Section 6


REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 152154, JULY 15, 2003
FACTS:
Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission of Good Government (PCGG), represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to RA 1379. Declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in the PNB,
as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign
foundations in certain Swiss banks.
In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which
exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately
acquired property. The treasury notes arefrozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of
and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained
therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that
petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three
Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the
Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x xx."
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
Agreements. In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for
summary judgment.
"The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss
Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership
by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the
government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must
also have been without basis."
The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of
Sections 2and 3 of RA 1379.
HELD:
RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to
forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful
income of the public officer who owns it.
The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be
effected:
1. Ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be
in his name or otherwise; and
2. The extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate
to, the legitimate income of the public officer.
3. That the said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds pursuant to
RA 1379.
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officers.
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos had acquired and owned properties during their term of office, as
evidenced by their admittance regarding the ownership of the Swiss accounts.
The Swiss accounts of the Marcoses had balances amounting to US$356 million, a figure beyond the
aggregate legitimate income of $304,372.43.
THE PETITION WAS GRANTED.

The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National
Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest,
are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST)
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any
other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession,
participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly
or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or
any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or
controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x xx. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled
corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
thegovernment for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of
Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body,
or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other
disqualification as may be provided by law.
Succession In case of temporary disability Article VII Sections 11-12
ESTRADA VS.DESIERTO, G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001
ESTRADA VS.ARROYO, G.R. NO. 146738, MARCH 2, 2001
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice -President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was
plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from Jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage.
On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16,
2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under
the name Jose Velarde.
The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis.
Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some
Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was
leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation.
It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration
that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
HELD:
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Resignation is
a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as
the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner
did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether
or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after

Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state
of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily
Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already
about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the
second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The
only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement:
(1) He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the
reservation about its legality;
(2) He emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he
will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and
(5) He called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is
contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the
assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the
nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada
is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot
pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political
issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Secretary of Justice as member of Judicial and Bar Council, Article VIII, Section 8 (1)
CLU VS.EXEC. SECRETARY, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
FACTS:
The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department
to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional
compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII
prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless
otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII,
section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution.
RULING:
The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to
prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment
which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable
to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be
the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13,
Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the
legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only
to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
CRUZ vs. COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001
NAC V. COA, G. R. NO. 156982, September 08, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by
then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive process and
review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members
appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned
over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid with honoraria beginning December 12,
1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of
honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June
27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE:
Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
RULING:
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by
mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such. There is
a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by
the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a
designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in
the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not
entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.
Executive Power Article VII, Section 1 & 17
LAUREL VS. GARCIA
G.R. NO. 92013, July 25, 1990
FACTS:
The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said
property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists
of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of
the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling nonFilipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease
or disposition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell
the Roppongi property.
RULING:
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so
much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its
symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related
properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must
concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of
property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO. 88211, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)
FACTS:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people
power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. Failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders


2. Channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. Plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This
is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasans failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. Secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. Devastated economy because of: (a) accumulated foreign debt; (b) plunder of nation by Marcos &
cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also
questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security,
public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
DECISION: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (Art. VII secs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not
stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is
obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances.
The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to
the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must
be granted or denied.
For ISSUE NUMBER 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis
for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the selfpreservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional
Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato
to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR
Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the
President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
Control of Executive Departments Article VII, Section 1 & 17
DE LEON VS. CARPIO
178 SCRA 457 (1989)
FACTS:
Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales.
Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for
reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new
Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission.
The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional,
having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the
Board ordered their reinstatement.
However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to
CSC without action, claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the
Secretary of Justice
HELD:
It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored
not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under
the control of the President of the Philippines.
The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in
turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and
does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as
he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the
disposition of the President as their immediate superior. Without minimizing the importance of the
heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
(Villena v. Secretary of the Interior)
In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the
petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the
President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is
in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this
department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretarys directives, which are
presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.
BLAQUERA VS. ALCALA
G.R. NO. 109406, September 11, 1998

FACTS:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the
government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employees one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided
that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of
agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies,
were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29
authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity
incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments,
offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in
excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads
of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners
salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive departments.
HELD:
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and
implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of
his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government
agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the
excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising
his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby
resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive
departments.
HUTCHISON PORTS V. SBMA
G.R. NO. 131367, AUGUST 31, 2000
FACTS:
The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA) advertised in leading national daily newspapers and in
one international publication, an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and
operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of seven bidders
who responded to the published invitation, three were declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after
passing the pre-qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMAs Technical Evaluation Committee (or
SBMA-TEC). Among these is the petitioner.
Thereafter, the services of three (3) international consultants recommended by the World Bank for their
expertise were hired by SBMA to evaluate the business plans submitted by each of the bidders, and to
ensure that there would be a transparent and comprehensive review of the submitted bids. The SBMA
also hired the firm of Davis, Langdon and Seah Philippines, Inc. to assist in the evaluation of the bids
and in the negotiation process after the winning bidder is chosen. All the consultants, after such review
and evaluation unanimously concluded that HPPLs Business Plan was far superior to that of the two
other bidders.

However, even before the sealed envelopes containing the bidders proposed royalty fees could be
opened at the appointed time and place, RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally barred from
operating a second port in the Philippines based on Executive Order No. 212 and Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Order 95-863.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner HPPL has the legal capacity to seek redress from the Court.
RULING:
Yes. Admittedly, petitioner HPPL is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands. While the actual bidder was a consortium composed of petitioner, and two other
corporations, namely, Guoco Holdings (Phils.) Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc., it is only
petitioner HPPL that has brought the controversy before the Court, arguing that it is suing only on an
isolated transaction to evade the legal requirement that foreign corporations must be licensed to do
business in the Philippines to be able to file and prosecute an action before Philippines courts.
There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to what constitutes doing or engaging in
or transacting business in the Philippines. Each case must be judged in the light of its peculiar
circumstances. Thus, it has often been held that a single act or transaction may be considered as doing
business when a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some of the functions
for which it was organized. The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular
act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign corporations intention to do
business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes doing business because it shows the foreign
corporations intention to engage in business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an
exercise of the corporations reason for creation or existence. Thus, it has been held that a foreign
company invited to bid for IBRD and ADB international projects in the Philippines will be considered as
doing business in the Philippines for which a license is required.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
377 SCRA 223 (2002)
Topic: Control of the Executive Department
FACTS:
The National Electrification Administration is a GOCC with the responsibility of organizing, financing and
regulating electric cooperatives throughout the country. RA 6758 took effect. It provided, among others,
a salary schedule for all government positions, appointive or elective, including positions in GOCCs. In
response to pressing economic difficulties, and the need to levitate the plight of government personnel,
the Senate and the HR urged the President, through a joint resolution to increase the salary of
government employees. President Ramos acted on the joint resolution and issued EO 389 which
directed payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under Joint Resolution No. 1 in TWO
TRENCHES. NEA implemented the salary increase but it did not do so in two trenches. COA resident
auditor issued a notice of suspension requiring the submission of the legal basis for the full
implementation of the new salary schedule. And thus, COA resident auditor issued a notice of
disallowance. COA sustained the decision made by the resident auditor. NEA argues that it may
accelerate the implementation of the salary increases due to the availability of funds.
ISSSUE:
Did the COA commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disallowing the increased salaries? In other words, is NEA allowed to accelerate the implementation of
the salaries due to availability of funds?
HELD:
Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do not constitute unbridled authority to government agencies
to spend the appropriated amounts as they may wish. Section 60, Chapter 7, Book VI of the
Administrative Code provides that no portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment
of any salary increase or adjustment unless specifically authorized by law or appropriate budget circular
Section 33 of the 1997 GAA itself expressly provides that the salary increase authorized by the SenateHR Joint Resolution or the salary standardization law are subject to the approval by the President
Section 10 of EO 289 does not authorize, expressly or impliedly, the advance implementation of the
salary increases just because the GOCC has the available funds.
RUFINO VS. ENDRIGA
G.R. NO. 139554, July 21, 2006

CASE MAIN POINT: Appointing authority may be given to other officials than the President provided the
appointment is in a rank lower than the appointing official.(ARTICLE 7, SECTION 16: APPOINTING POWER
CAN BE VESTED IN OTHEROFFICIALS)
FACTS:
Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting each others
appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current members, was appointed by then-President Ramos
and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by
then-President Estrada. Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group
transgressed PD 15 creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6,
appointment into the Board shall only be made by a majority vote of the trustees; presidential
appointments can only be made when the Board is entirely vacant to uphold the CCPs charter of
independence from pressure or politics. Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their appointment since the
provision on appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the
Constitution. The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its
members.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow members is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President, Such
power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the appointing authority. In the case, an
appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since both
positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption
from the limitation of delegative appointing power because such invocation puts CCP outside the control
of the President.
General Supervision over local governments/autonomous regions
PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
G.R. NO. 132988 (JULY 19, 2000)
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures
by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents
from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments.
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement
measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:
Xxx
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue
allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
ISSUE:
WON the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost
reduction program in violation of the LGUS fiscal autonomy and the withholding of 10% of the LGUS
IRA
HELD:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has
been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A
directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only
to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will
help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that
certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)

consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release
of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the
Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Power of Appointment
BERMUDEZ V. TORRES
G.R. NO. 131429, AUGUST 4, 1999
FACTS:
The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the main contestants in this
case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the
proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a
recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor.
Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President
Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his
appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and
immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service
Commission, of that assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition
and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary
restraining order, against herein respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for
resolution and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move
by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be
held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
HELD:
NO. An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having
the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or
trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has
been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the
exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof. When the Constitution or the
law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be
understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here
pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in
Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a
mere advise, exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding
or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President, being the head of the Executive
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices
even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted
beyond the scope of his authority.
Regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council Article VIII, Sections 8
SARMIENTO vs. MISON
G.R. No. 79974; December 17, 1987
FACTS:
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo

Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of


Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE:
W/N the position of Commissioner of Bureau of Customs requires the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
o

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs. Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree
No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads
as follows:
"Sec. 601.Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one
assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner)
and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance
with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines."
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, RA No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony
with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make,
such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
CONCEPTION-BAUTSITA vs. SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439; 172 SCRA 160, April 13, 1989
FACTS:
On Aug. 27, 1987, the President DESIGNATED petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). But she was extended by the President a permanent
appointment as Chairman of the CHR. Immediately after taking her oath of office as Chairman on Dec.
23, 1988, petitioner discharged the functions and duties of the office. However, on January 9, 1989,
petitioner received a letter from the Secretary of the CA requesting her to submit to the Commission
certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her
appointment. Petitioner refused to comply with the aforesaid letter alleging that the CA has no
jurisdiction under the Constitution to review appointments by the President of Commissioners of the
CHR. In a letter of the CA's Secretary addressed to the Executive Secretary Macaraig, Jr., the CA
informed the latter that the CA disapproved petitioner's "ad interim appointment" in view of her refusal
to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA. After petitioner had elevated her case to the SC and pending
resolution thereof, the President designated Mallillin as "Acting Chairman" of the CHR. The President's
action followed after CA Chairman Salonga declared that petitioner's appointment was not confirmed for

the second time. On Jan. 20, 1989, petitioner filed with this Court this petition for certiorari to review
the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR, an "independent office" created
by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the confirmation of the CA.
HELD:
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the CHR and the lawful
incumbent thereof.
1. Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments which are to be made with the confirmation
of the CA, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made
without the review or participation of the CA.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and members of the CHR is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission, COMELEC and Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of CA.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence, that is,
without the confirmation of the CA because they are among the officers of the government "whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint." And Sec. 2(c), EO No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR.
2. When the President converted petitioner's designation as Acting Chairman on Dec. 7, 1988,
significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment,
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. All that remained for
Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by
taking her oath of office. Bautista's appointment therefore on Dec. 17, 1988 as Chairman of the CHR
was completed on the part of the President.
3. Appointments that are for the President solely to make, without the participation of the CA cannot be
"ad interim" appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the CA is needed.
CALDERON vs. CARALE
G.R. No. 91636; April 23, 1992
FACTS:
Pursuant RA 6715, Pres. Aquino appointed the chairman and commissioners of the NLRC representing
the public, worker and employer sector. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the permanent appointments extended by the president
to the respondents without submitting the same to the CA for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715. According to petitioner, RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the
appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, as congress may, by
law, require confirmation by the CA, other officers appointed by the President in addition to those
mentioned in the 1st sentence of said provision. Petitioner further claimed that the Mison and Bautista
rulings are not decisive in this case for in the case at bar, the Pres. issued permanent appointments
without submitting them to CA for confirmation, despite passage of law (RA 6715) which requires the
confirmation by the CA of such appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments extended by the
Pres. to government officers in addition to those expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec..16,
Art. VII, whose appointments require confirmation by the CA.
HELD:
Article 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation by the CA
of appointments of the chairman and members of the NLRC is unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect. The petition is dismissed.
1) The NLRC chairman and commissioners fall within the 2nd sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, more
specifically under the 3rd group" of appointees referred to in Mison case, i.e., "those whom the Pres.
may be authorized by law to appoint." Undeniably, the chairman and members of NLRC are not among
the officers mentioned in the first sentence whose appointments require confirmation by the CA.

2) To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents
chairman and members of NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:
a. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII by adding thereto appointments
requiring confirmation by the CA;
b. it amends, by legislation, the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII by imposing the confirmation by the
CA on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only to the President.
MANALO vs. SISTOZA
G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999
FACTS:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating
the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief
Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S.
Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank
of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their
respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of
the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is
akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3)
Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite
the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation
2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional
HELD:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government
to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers, who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in
the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Philippine National Police are separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which
shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
necessary for the security of the State.
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are
not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the
PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm
the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be
confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when
provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the
unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the
statute remains valid without its voided sections. (Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, August 11,
1999)
SORIANO VS LISTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003
FACTS:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear
Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning
the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE:
W/N assumption of office requires confirmation?
HELD:
Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or
statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as
a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise
by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of
National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC).

Interim or recess appointments Article VI, Section 19


PIMENTEL v ERMITA
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular
session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that while Congress is in
session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is
in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter
5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as
provided for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily designate an
officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an

office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer
regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any
other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]
Issue:
WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while
Congress is in session.
Held:
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of
a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress
is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to
the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments
to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.
The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the
duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
Article VII, Section 16, par. 2
IN RE: VALENZUELA
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998
FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were
deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections.
Senior Associate Justice FlorenzRegalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was in the position that election ban had no application to the CA based on
the Commissions records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration
together with the Councils nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day

immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments), which implies that the Presidents
Office did not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the list of final
nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date
present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been
scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view
(hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments.
However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of the Council took action
without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ
received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where the President expressed his view
that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the whole article being entitled
EXECUTIVE DEPT. He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific provisions,
as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Article 8 Sec 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacaang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned.
Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining
the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming
he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the originals of the
appointments for both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the
latters office and had not been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of
the May 7 Malacaang copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential elections, Art. 8 shall apply where
vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be considered where
the President shall not make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in
order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
Issue:
Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the,
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the
ban in the interest of public service.
Held:
The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission
of the list.

During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution (t)wo months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided
therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on
appointments comes into effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes
and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the
two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261.Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises money or anything of
value gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or
offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote
for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant
for thenomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political
party.
xxxxxxxxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases.
During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election
and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government
office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or
creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall
not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the
proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called midnight
appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even
after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are few and so spaced
as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointees qualifications, can be made by the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight
appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of
their making but also appointments of the Presidential election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making oftemporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the
ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the
restriction on the Presidents power of appointments, it is the Supreme Courts view that, as a general
proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of votebuying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the
disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and
as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the
lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and
permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is considered an election
offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of
the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the
membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a
particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case,
however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
DE RAMA VS. CA
G.R. NO. 131136, FEBRUARY 28, 2001

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO


G.R. NO. 149036 , APRIL 2, 2002
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. OnMarch 2001, respondent Benipayo
was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment.
While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner
appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the
Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)of the
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s.
001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations. During the
pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning
the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
apointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
LARIN VS.EXEC. SECRETARY
G.R. 112745, 280 SCRA 713, OCTOBER 16, 1997
Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The President issued E.O. No. 132 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of
InternalRevenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed,
decentralized ortransferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service,
of which thepetitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished.
Petitioner assailedthe legality of EO No. 132 claiming that he was removed as a result of the
reorganization made in the BIRpursuant to E.O. No. 132. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by
Congress which authorizes thereorganization by the Executive Department of executive agencies,
particularly the BIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned EO
No.132.
HELD: YES. Section 48 of R.A. 7645 clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and
abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions.
Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section
62 which shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational charges including the creation
of offices in the department or agency concerned. Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1416 expressly grants the President of the Philippines the continuing authority
to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials.
Effects of Pardon
ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
301 SCRA 96) (1999)

FACTS:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions. In the meantime,
Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to
lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION
AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director. In
his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground. Furthermore, public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which
reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered, that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an Executive function.
HELD:
NO. The constitutional provision which is the source of the pardoning power of the President cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality An accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no higher right than the right to life.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in
various states in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power
to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over-arguments that they
infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to
contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.The
text and tone of this provision (Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution) will not yield to the
interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction
by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can
be claimed in the appropriate courts.
PEOPLE VS. CASIDO
G.R. 116512, MARCH 7, 1997
FACTS:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and
Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon, as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission.
They were granted conditional pardon during the pendency of their appeal. Their applications for
amnesty were also favorably acted upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pardon and amnesty was valid
HELD:

Yes. The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and
not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes
or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or
before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under
Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.
PEOPLE VS. NACIONAL
G.R. NO. 11294, SEPTEMBER 7, 1995
MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
FACTS:
On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Mosanto (then assistant treasurer) and 3
other accused, of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents and sentenced
them to imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prisioncorreccional as minimum, to 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. On appeal, her conviction was affirmed by this court. She then
filed a motion for reconsideration but pending said motion, she was extended by the President absolute
pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the city treasurer requesting
that she be restored to her former post since the same was still vacant. In a resolution, the Ministry of
Finance ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her former position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city
treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbavan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government be satisfied. In her motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
ruling, petitioner stressed that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; and that she is entitled to
back pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the sum of
P4,892.50.
The Office of the President, to which the petitioner's letter was referred for further review, adopted the
resolution of Sandiganbavan and held that petitioner is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on
the basis of her absolute pardon but must secure an appointment to her former position and that she is
liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. In this present petition, petitioner
contended that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case because she was extended
executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal. Without that final judgment of
conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment
remained suspended. According to her, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it
was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the Pres. declared her not guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
HELD:
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as asst. treasurer, she must
reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
1. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in
the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not

operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon
implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It
does not wash out the moral stain It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a
criminal indictment if or dy to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon
blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were
innocent.
2. The rationale is plainly evident. Public officers are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private
interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
3. The 1981 amendments to the 1973 constitution had deleted the earlier rule that clemency
could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the
High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 constitution, the former limitation of final
conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material
when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the
same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
4. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
SABELLO VS. DECS
100 SCRA 623 (1989)
Ponente: J. Gangayco

LLAMAS VS. ORBOS


202 SCRA 844 (1991)
FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was
found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office.
In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence
he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner
argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying
phrase after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the
grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case,
allegedly because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.
ISSUE:
WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative
cases.
HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative
cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases,
it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch
as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial
or Legislative branches of the government. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to
convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the
quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision
CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR
71 PHIL. 34 (1941)
FACTS:
On March 15, 1930, the CH found respondent Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to
6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law, to return to the offended parties the
amounts of P375 and P125 respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. On appeal, the judgment Of conviction was affirmed and the respondent was accordingly
confined in the provincial jail from March 14, 1932 to Aug. 18, 1932. Notwithstanding his conviction,
respondent continued to be a registered elector and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and
1937, seated as the municipal president of Malabon, Rizal.
On Aug. 22, 1938, CA 357 (Election Code) was approved by the National Assembly, Sec. 94 of which
disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime
against property." The respondent forthwith applied to the president for an absolute pardon. On Dec. 24,
1939, the Chief Executive granted the petition restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political
rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility."
On Nov. 16, 1940, petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of respondent Santos from the list
of voters, citing Sec. 94 of CA 357. The CFI denied the petition. Hence, this petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the decision of the lower court sustaining the right of respondent to remain in the
list of registered voters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pardon granted by the President restores the respondent to the full enjoyment of his
political rights.
HELD:
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from
the conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent is conditioned in the sense that "he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political
rights."
1.
Under Section 11(6), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this Constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, to wit: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction; and, (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject
to the limitations imposed by the Court, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by
the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
2.
The disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon
those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes an that is left of the consequences of conviction.
PELOBELLO VS. GONZALES
152 SCRA 27 (1987)
FACTS:
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for 2
years, four mos and one day, disqualified from voting and being voted upon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor General and on Dec 25, 1940,
an absolute pardon by the President.
Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI against respondent Palatino, the
mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. He alleged that the respondent, having been criminally convicted
by final judgment in 1912 and sentenced to imprisonment, was disqualified from voting and being voted

upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary
pardon granted by the President on Dec. 25,1940. From the records, it is admitted that the respondent
committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already been merited conditional pardon
from the Gov. General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected
councilor for the period 1918 1921; was elected municipal president of Torrijos three times in succession
(1922 1931) and finally elected mayor in the 1940 local elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from the disqualification incident to criminal
conviction under paragraph a of sec 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the
election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office.
RATIO:
Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning power is only subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative action.
HELD:
We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by
the constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by the legislative action; that
an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from
the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
Under the existing circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to
enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended
on the date mentioned above and before the date fixed in the Election Code for assuming office. We see
no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and
disregard what at bottom is a teclu'lical objection
Thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the
period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession
(1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December,
1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to
enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended
on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for
assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial
interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive
action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection. JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT
AFFIRMED.
IN RE LONTOK
43 PHIL 293 (1923)
FACTS:
Marcelino Lontok, a lawyer, was convicted of bigamy and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment on
February 27 1918. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court on September 18, 1919.
On February 9, 1921, he was pardoned by the Governor General on the condition that he shall not
again be guilty of any misconduct. A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred
because he has convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Lontok however argued that pardon reaches the offense and blots it out so that he may not be looked
upon as guilty of it.
HELD:
Petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and the proceedings must be dismissed.
RATIO:
When proceedings to strike an attorneys name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a
statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a
pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted.
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a
transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the
pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the
disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the
attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license
to practice law. Ex parte Garland was cited, in which a lawyer pardoned by the president being a

member of the confederate congress during the secession of the South was allowed to practice law,
although lawyers were supposed to take an oath saying they have never aided any government hostile
to the US. It was held that the exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense would be to
enforce a punishment for the offense, when he has already been pardoned for it. With this, the court
had no right to do.
GARCIA VS. CHAIRMAN
COA G.R. 75025, SEPTEMBER 14, 1993
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the Bureau of
Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some materials in their company. Thus, public
respondents filed a criminal case against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground
respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was found guilty and was later
dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court
due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now claiming before
the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on the other hand
reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute
pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated
pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
HELD:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and further
articulates that the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the
adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating
petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered
automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated
to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
TORRES vs. GONZALES
152 SCRA 273, (1987)
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that
he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,
Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and
executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD:
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
Under the article 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer
the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is
not subject to judicial scrutiny.

When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive or the
President of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried
with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the
pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been
entrusted.
Residual Power
MARCOS vs. MAGALAPUS
177 SCRA 668
FACTS:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impairs their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and
the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the
right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others.
However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate
to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining
to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Prosecution of crimes
WEBB V DE LEON
247 SCRA 652
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of
Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne
Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June
30, 1991. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable
cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her

inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge
AmelitaTolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination. Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge
accused with crime of rape and homicide?
2. Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
3. Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary
investigation?
4. Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in
the information as an accused?
HELD:
1. NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt
2. NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon
filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly then, our laws
repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted searching examination
of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to
be heard. The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf
and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.
Power to impound
PHILCONSA vs. ENRIQUEZ
AUGUST 19, 1994
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved
by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also
authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President
for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and
declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On
the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill
he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done
through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of
1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs).
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law
(R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of
the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for
the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on
the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment
of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights,
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.
HELD:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those
questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose,
it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National
Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department
of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply
with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate
provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of
medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the
said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that
the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion
to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative
of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III,
Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is
therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the
AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, is violative of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not
find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress
intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate
11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is
not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another
law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on
the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain
provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are
proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take

necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied
in the guidelines.
Powers as Commander in Chief
IBP vs. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall
have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
is subject to judicial review
2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of
the PNP
HELD:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the
PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of
the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
SANLAKAS v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
421 SCRA 656, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
FACTS:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the
Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their
withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of

Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of
the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is
no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the
same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo,
petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
2. Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
HELD:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition
to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed
that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without
factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of
Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any
person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge
the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
AQUINO et.al v. ENRILE et.al
G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974
FACTS:
The instant case is a consolidation of 9 cases for habeas corpus following the arrests of petitioners in
effect of General Order No. 2 which was pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country
under martial law issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos. The said petitioners were held for being
participants or conspirators in the forceful siege of political and state power in the country.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial
law subject to judicial inquiry
2. Whether the detention of the petitioners is legal and in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law
RULING:

5 justices ruled that the issue at hand is a political question, thus, not subject to judicial inquiry. On the
other hand, 4 justices also ruled that the same issue is justiciable and that the Court may inquire on the
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law. However the Court is unanimous that the
Presidents decision to declare martial law is within the powers vested unto him under the 1935
Constitution and that a state of rebellion had existed, as it was of common knowledge, when
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued.
The Court ruled on the positive. The Court states that the basic objective of the proclamation of martial
law is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent
danger thereof and that the suspension of habeas corpus is of necessary consequence in order to
implement arrests or detention of persons of interest. Thus, it finds that the detention of the petitioners
is legal and in accordance to the declaration of martial law as such declaration automatically suspends
the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to and preservation of society and national survival
take precedence over individuals.
OLAQUER VS.MC NO. 4
150 SCRA 144 (1987)
FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp
Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of
explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3)
conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4)
conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine
buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo
Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On
August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case
reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When
the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is
effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the
herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant
Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and
academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still
continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians
while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals
during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or
tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for
offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the military tribunal concerned.
NAVALES V. ABAYA
G.R. NO. 162318, OCTOBER 25, 2004
LANSANG vs. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971
FACTS:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding
a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889
was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a
conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of
habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons
caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word
actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-

provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and
cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18
provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that
Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners
further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is
no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged JulyAugust Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces
in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the
Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongsto the President and his decision is final and conclusive
upon the courts and upon all other persons.
2. Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
HELD:
The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the
valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces;
(b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two
other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio
captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the
Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor
organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass
organizations actively advancing the CPP.
IN RE DE VILLA
G.R. NO. 158802, NOVEMBER 17, 2004

DAVID V. ARROYO
G.R. NO. 171390, MAY 3, 2006

Contracting and guaranteering foreign loans


CONSTANTINO VS. CUISIA
G.R. NO. 106064, OCTOBER 13, 2005
Treaty Making
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT VS. MANGLAPUS
SEPTEMBER 13, 1988

COMM. OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTER SEA,


3 SCRA 351 (1961)
Deportation of undesirable aliens
GO TEK VS. DEPORTATION BOARD
79 SCRA 17 (1977)
FACTS:

Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation after a search of an office in Sta Cruz,
Manila. He was alleged to have with him at the time of the arrest fake dollar checks in violation of
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Court which rendered him an undesirable alien.- The Chief Prosecutor of
the Deportation filed a complaint against Go Tek with a prayer that after the trial the Deportation Board
recommend to the President of the Philippines Go Teks immediate deportation as his presence in this
country having been, and will always be a menace to the peace. welfare, and security of the
community.- Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature because
there was a pending case against him and that the Board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of
the ruling in Qua CheeGanvs. Deportation Board118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deported only on the
grounds specified in the law.- The Board denied the motion. They reasoned that it was not necessary for
an alien to be convicted before the State can exercise its right to deport said alien. Besides the Board is
only a fact finding body whose function is to report and recommend to the President in whom is lodged
the exclusive power to deport an alien.- The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writ of prohibition
against the Board.- Hence this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not specified in
Section 37of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense
imputed to him.
HELD:
Yes.- A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of
the instant prohibition action of Go Tek. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of
aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code:- SEC. 69.Deportation of subject of foreign power.
A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled, or
excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior
investigator, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action
is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against
him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also
have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses.- On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that
certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien."- So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1)
by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
under section 37 of the immigration Law
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (ChuocoTiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549,
57 L. Ed.960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems
such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.
Disposition
CFI decision is reversed and set aside
Executive Privilege
SENATE VS. ERMITA
G.R. NO. 169777, APRIL 20, 2006
FACTS:
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005, "Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers
in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was

sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated September
22, 2005 to the officials of the AFP. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28
2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464,which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy
of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to
appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the
consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required
consent from the President."
On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga
sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the
Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval
has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only
Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and
were made to face court martial proceedings.
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari
and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the
resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as
it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great
public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777
and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the
Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the
Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials
were invited to the hearings but most of them failed to attend having invoked E.O. 464.
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution
HELD:
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two
provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through
the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage
of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of
any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3
vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent
under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as
the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President,
or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and
the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of
Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis Section 21
which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." An
excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows that the framers were aware that
these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It
is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers
accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in
Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973
Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the
parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the
legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in
the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before
their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet may be changed.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the
question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of
powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from
the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear
in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
G.R. NO. 170165. AUGUST 15, 2006
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing
them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to
do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the

Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege
must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court
is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
Immunity from suit
BELTRAN VS. MACASIAR
G.R. 82585, NOVEMBER 14, 1998
GLORIA VS. CA
G.R. NO. 119903, AUGUST 15, 2000
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner
was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor,
Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16,
2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under
the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of
the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada
government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs
resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was
leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation.
It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration
that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner resigned as President.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
HELD:

Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.


Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied.

As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that
petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacaang Palace.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative
window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized
in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the
topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was
implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by him leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with
the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say
he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is
contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the
assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the
nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada
is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot
pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political
issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
NIXON VS. FITZGERALD
457 U.S. 731 (1982)
Brief Fact Summary: A cost-management expert for the Air Force was fired after he testified in front of
Congress about cost overruns in certain military projects. The Defendant, the President of the United
States Richard Nixon (Defendant), claimed that he made the firing decision.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity
from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President.
Facts:
The Plaintiff, Ernest Fitzgerald (Plaintiff), was fired from his job with the Air Force as cost-management
analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying about certain cost-overruns. The Air Force
said he was fired because of reorganization and a reduction in force. An internal memo was passed
through White House staff saying the Plaintiff was a top notch cost expert but with very low marks of
loyalty and recommended that they let him bleed. At a press conference, the Defendant said he
personally made the decision to fire the Plaintiff. The White House later retracted the statement saying
that the Defendant had confused the Plaintiff with another employee. The Plaintiff brought suit and the
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of absolute immunity from suit.
Issue. Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his official capacity?
Held:
Yes, the President is immune from suit from his official acts as a matter of public policy rooted in the
structure of government mandated by the separation of power principle. This immunity stems from the
Presidents unique position in the constitution scheme and the immense importance of his duties. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is worried about diverting the Presidents energies
to the concerns related to private lawsuits.
Dissent: Justice Byron White (J. White) felt that this decision places the President above the law.
Discussion: The President must be empowered with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and
impartially with the duties of his office. If not, his visibility would subject him to numerous suits for civil
damages. To keep the public safe, there is the constitutional remedy of impeachment, vigilant oversight
by Congress and the press.
HARLOW VS. FITZGERALD

457 U.S. 800 (1982)


Facts:
Two former Senior Presidential aides and advisors, Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, were
previously denied the use of immunity as a defense in a civil case. The case involved suit brought by
the current respondent, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, in which he stated that the petitioners had entered into a
conspiracy while employed as Senior Presidential Aides. The court denied the use of immunity as a
defense by citing that anyone who should have "reasonably" known that any action violating another
persons civil rights, or denying them any Constitutional rights, would be considered an action with
malicious intentions, and that the actions of the petitioners clearly violated those rights.
Issue:
The issue in the case is where the scope of immunity falls, and how it is applied to Senior Presidential
Aides and Advisors.
Ruling:
The case is remanded for further opinion.
Rationale for the Decision:
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the court. After noting the decision passed down by the Court of
Appeals, in which they did not offer an opinion as to the denial of immunity for the petitioners, the Court
sought to grant certiorari. It was stated that public officials require the protection of immunity in order
for them to complete their jobs in a timely fashion without having to worry about lawsuit after lawsuit
hindering their performance. In the case of the President and his Cabinet, prosecutors, legislators, and
related entities, "absolute immunity" is granted, allowing them to be shielded from all legal action.
However, in the case of executive officials, those who are Aides, Advisors, and the support staff for the
Presidential body, an issue of qualified immunity is applicable. As cited through Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974), " we acknowledged that high officials require greater protection than those with less
complex discretionary responsibilities." In that case, the public policy being drawn by the official is also
representative of the moral and judgment of the official himself; unconstitutional conduct must not be
met with absolute immunity if only to justify the means. A claim of absolute immunity by an executive
member must be in relation to a matter of national security or foreign policy. In the civil case involving
the petitioners, the matter at hand was of public policy, in which it is duly noted by the Court that
previous courts overlooked their desire for qualified immunity. At the same time, an official must
petition the proposal for qualified immunity, and it could easily be recognized as "good faith" immunity
and a "good faith" defense. The petitioners sought to serve the Presidential cabinet, thus making their
efforts ones that were thought to be for the good of the country. At no point in time did they realize they
were breaking any rules or regulations. In that case, being that the District Court knew the facts of the
case, it was remanded for further opinion.
Concurring Opinions:
Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist join in
concurring opinion. Justice Brennan notes that the issue of qualified immunity allows for the Court to
investigate and question as to what the defendant did have knowledge of, in relation to the issue of
"reasonably have been expected" in term of the knowledge of civil or Constitutional violations. Justice
White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join him. Justice Rehnquist notes that the Court is willing
to review the decision in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Dissenting Opinion:
Chief Justice Burger delivered the dissenting opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice notes that the
President and his Cabinet are offered absolute immunity, and that the staff, consisting of Aides and
Advisors, is only offered qualified immunity. The support staff acts as alter egos to the President, which
in turn, should give them the same immunity as the President, being that they make the decisions and
write the policy for him. If the Aides and Advisors to the President are required to balance and weigh
every move they make, it will interfere with their ability to do their job.
Holding of the Court:
While the President and his Cabinet are offered absolute immunity, which shields them from suits, the
executive staff is only offered qualified immunity. This qualified immunity grants them immunity under
certain conditions, mostly relating to national security, foreign, and domestic policy, opposed to
immunity from all suits
CLINTON v. JONES
117 S. Ct. 1636, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
FACTS:
On 1994, Paula Jones sued for the recovery of damages against the then Arkansas Governor William
Bill Clinton on the grounds that the former suffered several abhorrent sexual advances and that her
rejections had led to punishments in the state job she held at that time. Clinton, by then the President
of the United States of America, filed for a motion to dismiss invoking Presidential Immunity and for all

other related motions and pleadings to be deferred until the immunity issues are resolved. The Federal
District Court denied Clintons petition for dismissal but ordered that trial be held in abeyance until
petitioners Presidency ended. The Eight Circuit (the federal equivalent of a Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction over Arkansas) affirmed the denial of petition for dismissal but reversed the suspension of
trial as it would be equivalent to a grant of temporary to which Clinton is not constitutionally entitled.
The Eight Circuit expounded that the President, like any other official, is subject to the same laws that
apply to all citizens. Further, it stated that there are no existing jurisprudence that allowed for an
immunity from suit for unofficial acts insofar as the personal and private conduct by a President is at
issue.
ISSUES:
Whether Clinton could rightfully invoke Presidential Immunity in the case at bar.
RULING:
The Court ruled on the negative.
The Court does not find merit in Clintons contention that, as sitting President, the Constitution extends
temporary immunity from civil suits from events that occurred before he took office. The Court stated
that the principal rationale for affording the President immunity from suit is to enable them to perform
their designated functions effectively without fear for any personal liability, in effect setting its limitation
to official acts and conducts and not unofficial ones. Further, the Court expounds that the immunities
afforded to the President are for acts within official capacity and thus grounded on the nature of the
function performed and not on the identity of the person who performed it.
Declaration of state of rebellion
LACSON v PEREZ
G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
TOPIC: DECLARATION OF STATE OF REBELLION
FACTS:
On May 2001, faced with an angry, armed, and violent mob assaulting and breaking into the
Malacanang Palace, then President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1 which
declared a State of Rebellion in the National Capital Region (NCR) and ordered the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the NCR, respectively. On
account of the impending warrantless arrests and aggrieved by the declaration of the state of rebellion,
4 consolidated petitions were filed before the Supreme Court. However, the Proclamation No. 38 and
General Order No. 1 were already lifted 5 days after its issuance thus rendering the petitions moot and
academic.
ISSUES:
Whether the declaration of the State of Rebellion is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Court ruled on the negative.
On account of the instant case, G.R. No. 147799, petitioners contention states that the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the
domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took
place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the
general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers. However, the Court finds the acts of the
President in congruent with Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution and cited jurisprudence in the case of
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora.
Excerpts from Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
x xx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several
factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly
unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. x xx

Calling out of the Armed Forces


IBP v. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
TOPIC: CALLINGOUT OF THE ARMED FORCES
FACTS:
On 2000, in view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings
and carnappings, the then President Joseph Estrada issued a Memorandum, dated January 24, 2000,
directed to the AFP and PNP Chiefs to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a
more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols and for the AFP, through the
Marines, to augment and assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUES:
Whether the President committed a grave abuse in discretion in calling the armed forces to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminality.
RULING:
The Court ruled on the negative.
The Court states that the President is not only vested with extraordinary powers in times of emergency,
but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order. And when
the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom in effect giving him full
discretionary power. Thus, any act to assail the constitutionality of the Presidents directive in calling out
the armed forces to assist the PNP should dwell on lack of factual or justifiable basis in doing so.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the Presidents actions are within the limits set according to Art.
VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution and that the factual basis are supported by the occurrence of violent
crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings that continue to transpire in
Metro Manila and to which the Court takes judicial notice of. Thus, considering all pertinent facts and
with the IBP failing to prove otherwise, the Court held that the President has sufficient factual basis to
call for military aid in law enforcement and said act is within the exercise of his constitutional power.
Declaration of People Power
AQUINO et.al v. ENRILE et.al
G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974
TOPIC: DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
FACTS:
The instant case is a consolidation of 9 cases for habeas corpus following the arrests of petitioners in
effect of General Order No. 2 which was pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country
under martial law issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos. The said petitioners were held for being
participants or conspirators in the forceful siege of political and state power in the country.
ISSUE:

Whether the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare
martial law subject to judicial inquiry
Whether the detention of the petitioners is legal and in accordance to the declaration of
Martial Law

RULING:

5 justices ruled that the issue at hand is a political question, thus, not subject to judicial inquiry.
On the other hand, 4 justices also ruled that the same issue is justiciable and that the Court may
inquire on the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law. However the Court is
unanimous that the Presidents decision to declare martial law is within the powers vested unto
him under the 1935 Constitution and that a state of rebellion had existed, as it was of common
knowledge, when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued.

The Court ruled on the positive. The Court states that the basic objective of the proclamation of
martial law is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof and that the suspension of habeas corpus is of necessary
consequence in order to implement arrests or detention of persons of interest. Thus, it finds that
the detention of the petitioners is legal and in accordance to the declaration of martial law as
such declaration automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to
and preservation of society and national survival take precedence over individuals.

Suspension of the writ of habeas officer


BARCELON v. BAKER et.al.
G.R. No. 2808, September 30, 1905
TOPIC: SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
FACTS:
Felix Barcelon filed a writ of habeas corpus against David Baker, Jr. and John Thompson on the grounds
that Thompson acting under orders from Baker, both men being officers of the Philippine Constabulary,
detained and restrained Barcelon of his liberty at Batangas. Further, Barcelon alleged that his detention
and restraint is wholly without legal authority and said detention and restraint is neither by virtue of any
process issued by any court or magistrate whatsoever nor does any rebellion, insurrection, or invasion,
nor any of them, in any form or degree exist in Batangas. In response, the respondents argue that the
writ of habeas corpus has been lifted in Cavite and Batangas by virtue of a Resolution of the Philippine
Commission and Executive Order No. 6 issued by the Governor General both dated January 31, 1905. In
effect, respondents admitted to the detention of Barcelon but deny the right of the court to inquire into
the reasons therefor by virtue of both the aforementioned resolution and executive order.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate the facts upon which the
legislative and executive branches of the Government acted in providing for the suspension and in
actually suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in said provinces
RULING:
The Court ruled on the negative.
The Court held that it is the duty of the legislative branch to make laws and regulations as will
effectually conserve peace and order and protect the lives and property of the citizens and that it is the
duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of
enforcing such laws. Under the form of Government established in the Philippines, one department of
the Government has no power to inquire the acts of another, which acts are performed within the
discretion of the other department. It was held that the Governor-General and the Philippine
Commission has the right to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the conditions
therein named on the paragraph of section 5 of the act of the Congress on July 1, 1902. Furthermore, by
the virtue of the said act of the Congress, together with the said resolution of the Philippine
Commission, the Governor-General had authority to issue the said EO of January 31, 1905, suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Also, one branch of the United States Government in the
Philippines Islands has no right to interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the
discretionary acts of another independent department of the Government. The authority to suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus is vested upon the legislative and executive department and their
decision is final and conclusive upon the Judicial Department of the Government and upon all persons.
Thus, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
MONTENEGRO v. GENERAL CASTANEDA, et.al.
G.R. No. L-4221, 91 Phil 882, August 30, 1952
TOPIC: SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
FACTS:
On October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro was arrested, among others, by the armed forces of the
Philippines for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion,
insurrection or sedition and that he is under custody of the respondents. Shortly thereafter on October
21, 1950, then President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the writ of habeas
corpus. Within the period between petitioners arrest and issuance of proclamation, petitioners father
filed for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his son. Respondents assailed that such petition
is not justiciable invoking above-mentioned proclamation whereas petitioner countered that such
proclamation was void and is not applicable to the case at bar because arrest was already established
and petition had been filed even before promulgation of proclamation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is valid
2. Whether Montenegros petition should be granted.
RULING:
1. The Court ruled on the positive.
The Court finds that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 210 is in
accordance with the powers expressly vested in the legislation and execution by the Constitution and

that the authority to decide whenever the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.
2. The Court ruled on the negative.
The Court finds it untenable for the petitioners contention that suspension should not apply to his son
because the latter had been arrested and had filed the petition before the Executive proclamation. The
Court states that the order of suspension affects the power of the courts and operates immediately on
all petitions therein pending at the time of its promulgation as cited in the jurisprudence in the cases of
Matter of Dunn, D.C. N.Y. 1863, 25 How. Prac. 467, 8 Fed. Cas. 4,171.
LANSANG vs. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971]
FACTS:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding
a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889
was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a
conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of
habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons
caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word
actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 subprovinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and
cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18
provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that
Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners
further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is
no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged JulyAugust Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces
in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the
Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive
upon the courts and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
HELD:
The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the
valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces;
(b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two
other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio
captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the
Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor
organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass
organizations actively advancing the CPP.
GARCIA-PADILLA vs. ENRILE
121 SCRA 472

FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees.
Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at
Dr.Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were then
identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They
were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PCs know, hence, the present petition of
Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid
HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and
that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested,
assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension
of the privilege of the writ. In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been replaced by
Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA
constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned
crimes, for a period of one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the
President or the by the Review Committee created for the purpose.
Control versus Supervision
DRILON vs. LIM
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, Cruz, J.
FACTS:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code
1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance
No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment
of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC
revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section
187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by
the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
ISSUE:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
HELD:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section5(2), of the Constitution vests
in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the
exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in
mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on
the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is
charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory
that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To
doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showingthat there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
Alter-ego principle or Doctrine of Qualified Political Agancy
CARPIO vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 96409; February 14, 1992
FACTS:
RA 6975 was passed in 1990. The act entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the
constitutionality of the said law for he figured that it only interferes with the control powerof the
president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its

power to administrative control over the PNP thus, control remained with the Department Secretary
under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA6975
HELD:
The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidentialpower of
control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers fromCabinet
Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers
ofthePresid
ent, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them
tohis Cabinet members.Under this doctrine, which recognize
s the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
variousexecutive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where theChief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the
situationdemand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
ChiefExecutive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries ofsuch departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, and
in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
LACSON-MAGALLANESvs PAN0
G.R. No. L-27811, 27 November 1967
FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated
in Davao. On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above public land to
the plaintiff. On 1954, the same was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and
declared agricultural land. On 1955, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of
90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire
released area. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on
1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation. When the case was elevated to the
President of the Philippines, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the president, declared that it
would be for public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers, be allocated that portion
on which the petitioner have made improvements.
ISSUES:
May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of
Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?
HELD:
YES. The Presidents duty to execute the law and control of all executive departments are of
constitutional origin. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go
over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. It may also be stated
that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of control over the
executive departments. He may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does
not command that he perform in person. As the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President,
his decision is that of the Presidents. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.
Control vs. Supervision
Control is defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act
or to assume a power directly vested in him by law. Control is a stronger power than mere supervision,
which means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, then the former may take such action or steps
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.